

INFECTED FROM OUTSIDE OR ROTTING FROM WITHIN?  
METAPHORS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF CORRUPTED  
BODY POLITIC IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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## Abstract

Over the past two decades corruption has become a new star of public concern. Politicians, policy makers, bureaucrats, governments, international organizations, CEOs, all have emphasized the need to be more transparent and open in the fight against the 'cancer' of corruption. While these anti-corruption crusaders flatter themselves with the concise operational concept and precision of technocratic measures, they nevertheless use highly problematic language to talk about corruption that reveals yet another face of this multifarious phenomenon. Metaphors, and more precisely — performativity of medicinal metaphors in the discourse of corruption, will present departing point of this paper in which I will analyze interplay of body natural and body politic in today's discourse of corruption. The first part will introduce theory of metaphor and review its applications in the field of international relations. After identifying lacunae in existing analysis, I will then propose theoretical upgrade with the concept of performativity. The second chapter will focus on short genealogy of the notion of body politic and its materialization through the performativity of metaphors of the diseased body politic. Final chapter will attempt to analyze the contemporary discourse of corruption through the reading of today's medical paradigms and the work of metaphors in the contemporary political order.

*Keywords: corruption, body politic, metaphor, performativity, cancer, postmodern sovereignty*

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To professor Astrov, in a messianic gesture: “Someone, it's not clear who, has assigned them to us, and it isn't always easy to get them off our back. In sum, ‘we don't know who they are’—perhaps they are ‘emissaries’ from the enemy. But they look like angels, messengers who do not know the content of the letters they must deliver, but whose smile, whose look, whose very posture ‘seems like a message’.” (Giorgio Agamben, *The Assistants*)

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## INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that corruption has occupied a prominent place in today's political vocabulary. However, despite the number of analysis that are trying to get to the roots of the discourse that has developed to incredible extent in the aftermath of the Cold War, the emergence of anti-corruption crusaders still remains largely unexplained. Indeed, why has suddenly corruption, after being regarded as a topic of specialist academic tracts, been promoted to “the largest single inhibitor of equitable economic development.”<sup>1</sup> As Polzer observes, “from being a subject to be avoided as 'taboo', it is now a subject to be funded with a U.S.\$ 7.5 million budget for financial year 1999 at the World Bank Institute.”<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, given the evolution of the concept since the end of the eighteenth century and its grounding in the modern distinction between private and public sphere that has, as it has been argued<sup>3</sup>, followed the concept of corruption all the way to the twentieth century, one would expect, as Bratis<sup>4</sup> observes, that this question would be primarily treated as a domestic issue, and not present such a challenge for so many international organizations.

Certainly, part of the explanation lies in the developments in the aftermath of the World War II, when corruption was seen as a “neutral symptom of changing societies”<sup>5</sup>, and when it was brought to the fore by scholars who praised its positive effects on the political transition of ex-colonies<sup>6</sup>. Then, in 1990s, attitude changed dramatically: from being seen as a mere impediment to economic development, corruption was then presented as a serious treat to the

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<sup>1</sup> James Wolfensohn, quoted in Tamara Polzer, "Corruption: deconstructing the World Bank discourse", London School of Economics, London, *DESTIN Working Paper* 01-18, (2001): 2.

<sup>2</sup> Tamara Polzer, "Corruption: deconstructing the World Bank discourse", London School of Economics, London, *DESTIN Working Paper* 01-18, (2001): 2.

<sup>3</sup> Bruce Buchan and Lisa Hill, *An Intellectual History of Political Corruption*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014),155.

<sup>4</sup> Peter Bratis, "Corrupt compared to what? Greece, capitalist interests, and the specular purity of the state", *Hellenic Observatory*, London School of Economics, no.8 (2003):41.

<sup>5</sup> Lucy Koechlin, *Corruption as an Empty Signifier. Politics and Political Order in Africa*, (Brill, 2013),1.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (Yale University Press, 1968).

pillars of democracy<sup>7</sup>. Trying to isolate possible causes of this shift, Wedel, for example, enumerates the facts such as the post-Cold War intolerance for Third-World dictators (previously supported by the West), the challenge of transition of Eastern Block to free-market economy, and finally — the passage of US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, which prohibited to US officials and corporations to bribe foreign officials<sup>8</sup>. Still, while certainly covering some of the causes of the rise, this does not fully explain yet another face of this concept: corruption has never presented such a security threat to world order as it is the case nowadays<sup>9</sup>.

The multitude of initiatives, declarations and conventions have arisen around this 'recent' phenomenon which culminated in the 1996 declaration of then President of the World Bank: "Let's not mince words: We need to deal with the cancer of corruption."<sup>10</sup> The 'South' and the 'East' started to figure preeminently on the map of these transparency crusaders, led by the Transparency International, the NGO founded in 1993 by Peter Eigen who left his managerial position at the Bank precisely because, at that point, the issue was seen to be outside of the Bank's agenda<sup>11</sup>. But it did not take long for others to join the quest: politicians, policy makers, bureaucrats, governments, international organizations, CEOs, all emphasized the need to be more transparent and open.

The process by which corruption has been integrated in the international agenda could not be carried out without appropriate, clearly defined 'operational' concept. The concise formula of corruption, with 'fixed' parameters and characteristics was thus elaborated to become the tool for study and policy intervention in the fight against corruption. "C=M+D-A", which stands for "corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability"<sup>12</sup>, is now widely quoted

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<sup>7</sup> Lucy Koechlin, op.cit., 5.

<sup>8</sup> Janine R. Wedel, "Rethinking Corruption in an Age of Ambiguity", *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, vol. 8 (2012)

<sup>9</sup> Robert Rotberg, *Corruption, Global Security, and World Order*, (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

<sup>10</sup> James Wolfensohn, quoted in Monique Nuijten and Gerhard Anders, *Corruption and the Secret of Law. A Legal Anthropological Perspective*, (Ashgate, 2009), 3.

<sup>11</sup> Tamara Polzer, op.cit., 9.

<sup>12</sup> Robert Klitgaard, "International cooperation against corruption", *Finance and Development*, March, pp. 3–6, available at [www.worldbank.org/fandd/english/pdfs/0398/080398.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/fandd/english/pdfs/0398/080398.pdf) (retrieved April 2014):4.

definition in this global campaign. Corruption has thus become something upon which the international organisms can pronounce its judgments.

In spite of predominance of 'rationalistic' accounts of corruption nowadays, there exists a well-developed literature, coming mainly from social anthropology, which, apart from eliciting the 'true' nuances of corruption, i.e. differences between bribery, nepotism, gift and so on, contributes the discussion with studies that criticize global conversation, or rather — monologue about corruption, by arguing that these efforts did not lead to any substantive change in the transparency in the exercise of power<sup>13</sup>. Quite on the contrary, as Das and Poole claim, actions of the very crusaders have become anything but transparent and altered to the point where they became utterly 'illegible'<sup>14</sup>.

Furthermore, numerous are those scholars who have started to point to the anti-corruption neo-liberal agenda<sup>15</sup> as a series of reforms leading to the 'normalization'<sup>16</sup> of the evil and primitive Other with the light of transparency and 'good' governance. As Bristis humorously notes:

“It may very well be that Rudyard Kipling would have been sympathetic to TI<sup>17</sup>'s arguments. He may have even sent off for TI's Corruption Fighters' Tool Kit. It comes complete with lesson plans for teachers who wish to teach anti-corruption values to their dark skinned students, plans for how to begin an anti-corruption day in your overly corrupt corner of the world, ideas for making and distributing your own anti-corruption cartoons, and so on.”<sup>18</sup>

Indeed, while scholars who have joined anti-corruption discourse admit that corruption presents no less problem for Western democracies, there exist a significant tendency to analyze corruption in developed countries as an incidental 'scandal', far removed from the endemic and deep structural corruption that remains reserved for those less developed bits of the world<sup>19</sup>. There is

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<sup>13</sup> Harry G. West and Todd Sanders, *Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World Order*, (Duke University Press, 2003).

<sup>14</sup> Das and Poole 2004:9, quoted in Monique Nuijten and Gerhard Anders, op.cit.

<sup>15</sup> Ed Brown and Jonathan Cloke, "Neoliberal reform, governance and corruption in the South: assessing the international anti-corruption crusade", *Antipode* 36(2).

<sup>16</sup> Hindess: 2004, quoted in Elizabeth Harrison, "Corruption", *Development in Practice*, 17:4-5 (2010), 675.

<sup>17</sup> TI: Transparency International.

<sup>18</sup> Bristis, op.cit., 41.

<sup>19</sup> Ruth A. Miller, *The Erotics of Corruption*, (State University of New York Press, 2008), xiii.

no doubt that the association of poverty and lack of development with corruption evokes a well-known distinction of global periphery/semi-periphery and Western 'core', as well as there is no doubt that those behind the anti-corruption rhetoric really believe that corruption, seen as the lack of 'political will'<sup>20</sup> to implement necessary measures, is the main cause of underdevelopment and poverty. The civilizational discourse is, as it was extensively stressed, still quite alive in the global standards of market civilization<sup>21</sup>.

While not denying the neocolonial glare of these practices, it would be wrong to reduce it to the classical 'peripheral' story. After all, the century was long and troublesome, and many important changes, influencing directly or indirectly the evolution of political order, were taking place. *Inter alia*, the story we find ourselves in today is the one of imperialism being deemed as illegitimate since the new forms of political organization and participation, such as state sovereignty and the right to self-determination, are for quite some time taking the place of 'empire'. But as one of history's truisms remind us – empires rise and fall.

Taking into consideration the evolution of political order, but also the implications of the contemporary discourse of corruption, the main question that will lead us through this analysis is the following: “to what extent can we talk about corruption discourse as of civilizing discourse?”

Contrary to the analyzes whose premises resemble straightforward conspiracy theories, I would like to suggest that, in order to grasp the logic behind today's anti-corruption discourse and its 'neocolonial repercussions, it is necessary to go one step further and to look at the long and complex history of the notion of corruption. By doing that, my aim is to demonstrate, following Foucault, “its precariousness, [and] make visible, not its arbitrariness but its complex interconnection with a multiplicity of historical processes.”<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Tamara Polzer, op.cit., 17.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Brett Bowden, Leonard Seabrooke, *Global Standards of Market Civilization*, (Routledge, 2006).

<sup>22</sup> Michel Foucault, "Questions of method: an interview with Michel Foucault", in *Ideology and Consciousness*, No.8. (1981): 5.



One thing that jumps out in the history of this concept is its elaboration in close connection with another key political concept — that of the body politic. The metaphor of the 'body' is one of the most extensively applied metaphors in the Western political thought. Nowadays however, its use, that is — the characterization of political entity as a collective body, immediately awakes certain distrust. Attached to the notion of individual freedoms, we spontaneously resist any presentation of society that would tend to confine human relationships into too rigid and narrow frame of organic unity.

Furthermore, many claim that this metaphor lost its appeal by the mid-seventeenth century, which consequently led to its death thereafter<sup>23</sup>. Indeed, when we encounter the idea of body politic, we consider it to be either anachronistic or radically contrary to democratic spirit. We tend, in fact, reduce the idea of body politic to the organic conception of society which presupposes reification of social ties. What is more disturbing, twentieth century fascist regimes exhibited all the pernicious influence of this metaphor<sup>24</sup>. With this double reduction, the figure of the body politic seems to illustrate the political philosophy of constraint, subordinating individual freedom to the superiority of the group — a philosophy that we hope forever bygone.

While acknowledging that the body is not anymore, in Foucault's words: “the fulcrum on which all resemblances turn”<sup>25</sup>, I will argue that it is nevertheless still largely present in today's political discourse and more importantly, that it has kept its righteous place in the discursive field of corruption. As I hope to show, while remaining occulted, body politic is present and 'performed' through metaphors of social pathology that largely imbue both political and academic discourses of corruption.

Metaphors, and more precisely — medicinal metaphors, will thus present main 'methodological' framework for examining complex interplay of the 'body natural' and body politic in today's discourse of corruption. But what is more important, and what I hope to show

<sup>23</sup> Jonathan Gill Harris, *Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic*, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 141.

<sup>24</sup> Mark Neocleous, *Imagining the State*, (Open University Press, 2003), 29.

<sup>25</sup> Foucault:1970, quoted in Harris, op.cit.,3.

with this analysis, is that, contrary to the general perception, metaphors are not innocent rhetorical devices, but the very tool in 'political hands'.

In the first chapter, I will define metaphors and trace its existing applications in the field of international relations. After identifying debate between cognitive linguistics and poststructuralist approach to metaphors, I will then try to offer reconciliation between the two through the concept of performativity. In the second chapter, I will proceed with a short historical elaboration of the metaphor of body politic in order to show how the latter was always developed in the close connection with the notion of corruption. With this short genealogy, I will also attempt to demonstrate how the approach to political body was constantly evolving in the connection with multiplicity of historical paradigms, of which the most influential one was the medical paradigm. In the third and the final chapter, by identifying recurrent medicinal metaphor in the contemporary discourse of corruption and through the reading of today's medical paradigms, I will analyze the work of metaphors in the contemporary political order.

# 1. TROPIC RELATIONS

In the following chapter I will not attempt to provide the exhaustive account of the theory of metaphor since this is well beyond the scope of this paper. The brief overview of its evolution will just help us to identify the crucial moments that have shaped the popular understanding of this trope. I will further move on the review of international relations scholarship that analyzes political metaphors and identify the existing lacunae in these approaches. However, given a limited space of this paper, a complete literature review is, again, quite impossible. While acknowledging this drawback, I will briefly present some of the analyses in which I detect what appears to be recurrent pattern in the analysis of metaphors in international relations theory. Since these analyses are mostly based on the legacy of cognitive linguistics of Lakoff and Johnson, I will challenge the most contentious parts of their argument by bring them in dialogue with the theory of discourse analysis and the concept of performativity.

## 1.1 WHAT ARE METAPHORS?

“The metaphor is probably the most fertile power possessed by man.”

—Jose Ortega y Gasset

Classical definition and earliest analyses of metaphor are provided by the Ancients, more precisely by Aristotle and rhetorical schools that included famous orators like Cicero, Quintilian and Plutarch. They defined the metaphor as a description of something in terms of something else. Deriving from the Greek verb *metapherein* that means to carry over, to transfer, the term referred primarily to a specific version of poetic language. Following Aristotle: “Metaphor is the application of a strange term either transferred from the genus and applied to the species or from

the species and applied to the genus, or from one species to another or else by analogy.”<sup>26</sup> In *Rhetoric*, he further developed his understanding of metaphor, claiming that “it is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air”, “for men admire what is remote, and that which excites admiration is pleasant.”<sup>27</sup> However, it is important to point out that what Aristotle refers to as metaphor was much wider than its modern understanding since it encompassed tropes in general under the same category<sup>28</sup>. Metaphor was for him a special type of analogy, but unlike analogy that uses direct comparison to draw attention on similarity, metaphor triggers this association in indirect way. This indirect move was of utmost importance since, according to the Ancients, the impression trope leaves on the reader or the listener is much stronger when a familiar objects are presented in unusual fashion, a technique modern authors refer to as 'defamiliarization' or *ostranenie*<sup>29</sup>.

One theoretical development was particularly important in moving from Aristotelian understanding of metaphor as having a merely substitutive function to modern understanding according to which metaphors are perceived as a way in which human thought operates. It is in his influential book *Models and Metaphors*<sup>30</sup> that Max Black proposes approach to metaphor that involves the cognitive dimension. According to him, metaphor is not mere language embellishment and substitute for literal expression, not carrying new information and therefore without any cognitive function. Quite the contrary to the 'substitution view', he introduces a view on metaphor that has become known as the 'interaction view'. With the cognitive dimension being attached to them, metaphors are then understood as conceptual 'lenses' through which the principal subject is being seen. In other words, metaphors become heuristic devices creating models with which to approach the unknown 'reality'.

<sup>26</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics*, quoted in Véronique Mottier, "Metaphors, Mini-Narratives and Foucauldian Discourse Theory", 183, in T. Carver & J. Pikalo (Eds), *Political Language and Metaphor*, (Routledge, 2008).

<sup>27</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics*, quoted in Véronique Mottier, op.cit., 183.

<sup>28</sup> Silk 2003:117 in Mottier, op.cit., 183.

<sup>29</sup> Viktor Shklovsky, *Art as Technique*, (1917), available at <http://www.vahidnab.com/defam.htm>, (accessed April, 2014)

<sup>30</sup> Max Black, *Models and metaphors: Studies in language and philosophy*, (Cornell University Press, 1962).

Unlike Black who denies the specification of the truth conditions for the metaphor, seeing it as a mere way to assist understanding, in the hands of cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson metaphor becomes much more powerful tool. According to them, regardless of the existence of 'physical reality', all human thought is essentially metaphorical. What has become known as 'embodied thought' or 'embodied metaphor' has brought the cognitive linguistics in the center of contemporary debates over the role of metaphor. Following their thesis, metaphor is one of mechanisms in the process of human interaction with their physical environment. In other words, they understand metaphor as a principle of the meaning-formation whose linguistic expression is the product of the reconceptualization of bodily experiences and their further transmission in the abstract sphere of language. Simply put, our thoughts and perceptions are shaped by our bodily experiences and, accordingly — “important differences in the *natural* environment”<sup>31</sup>. 'Embodied metaphor' thus refers to the foundation of knowledge that is located within bodily experiences<sup>32</sup>, and since it is through relatively standardized fashion that human beings engage with their physical and cultural environment, process of understanding and embodied metaphors are shared across different human languages and cultures.

With the advent of cognitive linguistic scholarship in social sciences, the approach to metaphors has shifted from metaphors being seen as pure rhetorical devices to metaphors being perceived as reflective of how knowledge about the world is devised. Among these social scientists, international relation scholars have also started to pay attention on the role metaphors have in political discourses as well as their role in elaborating models and theories. Next section will focus on the review of literature that has so far addressed these questions.

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<sup>31</sup> George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought*, (New York, Basic Books, 1999), 27, emphasis added.

<sup>32</sup> The thesis advanced by Lakoff and Johnson is of the recognized groundbreaking importance, but that does not mean that the exploration of the relationship between language and thought was not done before. As the most evident origins of cognitive research, we should surely mention the tradition of English empiricism — John Locke, David Hume — who were the fathers of the idea of experiential origins of knowledge, and philosophy of Immanuel Kant in which he posits that cognition must be connected in some way with sensed experience.

## 1.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ITS METAPHORS

Linguistic turn in international relation has shed a new light on the way world politics is constructed and reflected through language<sup>33</sup>. As philosophy of language and linguistics has always nourished an important relation with metaphors, international relations made no exception. And there is a good reason for that: although the language of international relations is seemingly technical, abstract and impenetrable, both IR 'practitioners' and scholars use highly metaphorical language. What is more interesting, as Marks notes, is that certain metaphorical representation of world politics generates new metaphors that challenge the implications of the latter<sup>34</sup>.

Following the lead of social scientists in thinking about how metaphors can help to flesh out theories and models in the course of academic inquiry, international relation scholars have turned their own tools to examine the knowledge they develop. The idea that major international relations paradigms are built on the basis of metaphorical images has informed Michael P. Marks' timely contribution to the assessment of the use of metaphors in international relations theory<sup>35</sup>. While drawing on certain theoretical implications of cognitive aspects of metaphorical communication, Marks analyses range of metaphors present in the modern international relations theory in order to show that behind seemingly neutral theoretical instruments there are metaphors that are, indeed, their constitutive elements. The author argues that they not only direct the interpretative framework in one way or another, but also simultaneously frame and delimit which questions are to be studied under the banner of 'International Relations'.

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<sup>33</sup> K.M. Fierke, "Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations", *International Studies Quarterly* Volume 46, Issue 3(2002).

<sup>34</sup> Michael P. Marks, *Metaphors in International Relations Theory*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

<sup>35</sup> Marks, op.cit.

Before Marks, Richard Little<sup>36</sup> has already pointed out that there is ongoing debate between positivists and post-positivists in the discipline about the role that metaphors should assume in the formulation of theory. Following Little, for positivists, metaphors are clearly linked to models that theorists devise and as such, they should be subjected to close empirical investigation<sup>37</sup>. Little sees the post-positivist approach as more promising, which he also applies in the analysis of metaphorical dimension of the concept of 'balance of power'. According to this strategy, metaphors are not mere tools used to help form the model, but also “integral elements of the world under investigation.”<sup>38</sup> In other words, metaphors can become integral part of the object under investigation and adopt the properties of myth, which consequently has serious implications for the understanding of the concept. As for the 'balance of power' metaphor, once it assumed the role of the myth, it provoked the army of counter-myths, i.e. rival theories that are immersed in the metaphorical imagery proposing distinctive understanding of world relations. Little thus claims that both myths and counter-myths, equally based on metaphors, are what helps to draw the contours of different theoretical paradigms and outline the borders between various academic communities.

When it comes to research subjects of international relation, since the advent of linguistics in international relation theory, wide array of tools have been introduced in order to show and understand how the language shapes world politics. Thus, IR scholars have tried to show the effectiveness of narrativist explanation of the causes of war<sup>39</sup>, the analytical utility of language games *à la* Wittgenstein<sup>40</sup>, Habermasian argumentative rationality<sup>41</sup>, and among many others — analysis of metaphors.

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<sup>36</sup> Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations. Metaphors, Myths and Models*, (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>37</sup> Landau: 1961, quoted in Little, op.cit., 57.

<sup>38</sup> Little, op.cit., 67.

<sup>39</sup> Hidemi Suganami, "Agents, Structures, Narratives", *European Journal of International Relations*, 5, 3 (1999).

<sup>40</sup> Karin M. Fierke, *Changing Games, Changing Strategies*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).

<sup>41</sup> Thomas Risse, "Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics", *International Organization*, 54 (2000).

The use of metaphors by politicians and policymakers in framing and formulating the issues in the arena of international relations has been in the center of attention of many IR scholars<sup>42</sup>. Despite some obvious developments in moving from the analyses that discuss purely rhetorical function of the metaphors, there are also incoherencies and problems in thinking about metaphors as analytical tools. The authors often ambitiously engage with some premises of the embodied metaphor of cognitive linguistics, but very often they end up with a commentary about semantic properties of metaphor, ignoring the potential these can have for deeper political analysis<sup>43</sup>. This certainly enables scholars to identify the metaphors present in public discourse and analyze their use by practitioners to legitimize particular actions and policies, but very few, if any of these scholars, have taken on board the full consequences of integrating metaphor theory in the field of international relations.

On the other hand, scholars involved in political discourse analysis have largely criticized predominant cognitive theory for ignoring cultural and historical factors in their analysis. For instance, Michael Leezenberg dismisses cognitive approaches for building its account of metaphor on the assumption that metaphor is not so much the matter of language as of thought. He rejects their analyses because “many of the particular conceptual metaphors or image schemas that Lakoff and Johnson propose are ad hoc generalizations, rather than theoretically motivated, and descriptively and explanatorily adequate structures”<sup>44</sup>. That way, as Leezenberg claims, they not only omit sociocultural factors in concept formation, but they eschew prospect for any theoretical or methodological development that would go beyond claims to metaphor's universality and open up a space in the theory for the socio-cultural and historical dimensions that lead to metaphoric variation.

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<sup>42</sup> Cf. Francis A. Beer, *Metaphorical World Politics*, (Michigan State University Press, 2004).

<sup>43</sup> In the book *Political Language and Metaphor*, (Routledge, 2008), many authors depart precisely from this assumption.

<sup>44</sup>Michiel Leezenberg, *Contexts of Metaphor*, (Elsevier, 2001), 141.



Although Lakoff and Johnson have played a prominent role in bringing metaphor research back in the center of attention of many different disciplines, among which international relations, the conclusions they propose follow the trace of some earlier observations. One of the authors on whom they build their theory is Friedrich Nietzsche. Departing from a different philosophical tradition, in *On Truth and Lie in an Extra Moral Sense*, Nietzsche describes cognitive judgment as a metaphorical process which includes series of transformations going from nerve stimulus to sound as signifier. Furthermore, Nietzsche argues that metaphors are transformative as they define human beings while constantly influencing their conceptions of themselves and of their environment. However, although Nietzsche sees as the source of metaphoricity the cognitive functions of the body and the mind, his metaphoricity is, as argued by Cazeaux<sup>45</sup>, not solely perceptual. Following Cazeaux's extrapolation from Nietzschean epistemology to his will-to-power, Nietzsche presents being in general not as being confronting the world, but as “a set of competing perspectives or wills to power, out of which emerges human experience of an external world.”<sup>46</sup> The metaphorical nature of this experience is present in “transpositional nature of the contest between perspectives”<sup>47</sup> since no one's will to power emerges in isolation, but is always rival to another. Consequently, as Cazeaux argues, metaphor is a “network of transpositions, where any individual item, any individual identity, be it a person, an experience or a meaning, occurs as a tensional interaction between competing forces.”<sup>48</sup>

These power struggles are at the center of history and at the center of human knowledge about the world. Therefore, it is essential to locate the concept of metaphor within its rightful surrounding, that is — within “an analytical framework that centers on the relations between meaning, identity and power.”<sup>49</sup> In the next section, I will elaborate on the most problematic

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<sup>45</sup> Clive Cazeaux, *Metaphor and Continental Philosophy: From Kant to Derrida*, (Routledge: 2007).

<sup>46</sup> Cazeaux, op.cit., 8.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Mottier, op.cit.

points encountered in current, predominantly cognitivist research on metaphors in international relations, and propose a theoretical and methodological framework that links the analysis of metaphor with that of institutions and power. I hope to show that the promising way to understand the political effects of metaphors requires the analysis of power dynamics that ultimately determines knowledge-making.

### 1.3 BEYOND CONCEPT, TOWARDS POWER

“What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations which, poetically and rhetorically intensified, become transposed and embellished, and which after long usage by people seem fixed, canonical, and binding on them. Truths are illusions which one has forgotten are illusions.”

— Friedrich Nietzsche

Simply put, the observations about theory of metaphor made by cognitive linguistics can be read as a type of constructivism. There is a great deal of assumptions that these two have in common. The first and the most evident is the understanding of reality, in this case international reality, as socially constructed through cognitive structures that imbue the material world with meaning. Secondly, this embodied nature of metaphor carves the 'middle ground' between on the one hand — objectivity, and on the other — pure intersubjectivity. To put it differently, while rejecting the thesis according to which objects exist independent of human understanding, 'embodied realism' maintains that discourses are constructed, at least to a certain point, by the body. This is clearly one of the main points of contention between constructivist and poststructuralist approaches, since the latter posits that the body is itself discursively constructed. However, these two 'constructions' should not be confused since the poststructuralist account rejects the materialist/idealist dichotomy on which constructivism is built. On the other hand, when Lakoff and Johnson dismiss poststructuralism for being a doctrine of arbitrariness of sign and relativity which leads to a pure historical contingency of meaning<sup>50</sup>, then they are reasoning

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<sup>50</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, op.cit., 463-7.

on the basis of dichotomies of realism/idealism and idealism/materialism, ignoring that in fact, discursive concern certainly does not imply a denial of the world as such. Quite the contrary, “the fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. What is denied is not that objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion - that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive condition of emergence.”<sup>51</sup>

To take cue from Campbell et al.<sup>52</sup> in their assessment of performativity vs. construction, there are two predominant ways in which constructivist arguments, or in this case — cognitive metaphor analysis, are operating. In the first case, cognitive metaphor assumes the role of omnipotent force that disables and excludes all the analytical accounts of human agency, or in other words, it underlines 'linguistic features' and pays “insufficient attention to the materiality of discourse.”<sup>53</sup> Second case follows the logic of the first, but with a shift in the lead role which is now assumed by human agent laying claim on “construction without constraint.”<sup>54</sup> To continue with authors' example from international relations, this would mean that practitioners and policy makers or other agents are involved in the deliberate construction of reality. That finally implies that the practitioners are for cognitive linguistics perceived as ones having a privileged position and overarching view on the constitutive domain, and while being exempted from this dimension, they have simultaneously control over variables like history, culture and identity. This is clearly in contradiction with Foucault who rejects the search for motivation or intentionality, or

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<sup>51</sup> Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, (Verso: 1985), 108.

<sup>52</sup> David Campbell et al., "Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy", *Political Geography* 26 (2007).

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

a quest for a deeper meaning in order to develop his method of inquiry into discursive conditions which make the contingent events possible<sup>55</sup>.

Carrying the words between the 'inside' and the 'outside' of the literal meaning and away from the 'things as they really are', the Aristotelian *epiphora*, moving 'from...to', eschews any adherence to models of causality. If one has not intended to engage in the quest for the truth in its conventional understanding, or in other words — for perfect correspondence of the words and things, then it might well see in metaphor “potential for creativity in politics.”<sup>56</sup> This creativity is most tightly connected to Aristotelian account since, in this case, it implies the transference from one domain to the other, but unlike with Aristotle, it does not only 'excite admiration' since 'foreign', but it also transforms its own meaning and the meaning of the discourse which is imbued with it. However, this meaning is not every meaning, but the one that goes beyond the meaning as such, surpassing mere semantic dimension and entering the interplay with identity and power. Differently put, by moving from analysis which assesses what type of metaphor is being used and what is its meaning, one expands the potential of metaphor as analytic tool beyond the blunt emphasis on the speaker's intentions. By bridging the gap between semantics and pragmatics, i.e. meaning with actions, the concept of discourse is not being substituted with metaphor as it is sometimes the case, while the latter retains its rightful place in the analysis.

The hunch of this possibility can be found in Aristotle's shift in the view of metaphor from *Poetics* where metaphor is primarily approached in its semantic capacity to *Rhetoric* where he expands the analysis, delving into questions of conditions of efficiency of metaphors<sup>57</sup>. That implies that metaphorical understanding, couched in pre-conceptual structures coming from our daily experiences, as argued by conceptual linguistics, has to first of all admit its cultural

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<sup>55</sup> Mottier, op.cit.

<sup>56</sup> Carver & Hyvärinen 1997:6, quoted in Mottier, op.cit., 192.

<sup>57</sup> Mottier, op.cit.

situatedness. For political analysis of metaphors that entails not just understanding of context proposed by both relevance theory<sup>58</sup> or hermeneutics, but also, as Mottier posits, the acknowledgment of the roles of institutions and power relations. As she further continues, that is also problematic from the point of view of the unit of analysis in linguistics, which is the utterance. The isolated statements are particularly tricky in social and political analysis since the analysis of one specific element of the discourse should take into account the wider discourse of which this element, in this case — metaphor, is part of.

Furthermore, as we have already shown, when it comes to the 'embodiment' thesis, the stakes become higher. Again, *pace* Lakoff and Johnson, this is not to say that materiality of the body does not matter. Body operates in time and space, but the way it operates is not naturally given: cultural learning process is at the source of the 'embodied experience'<sup>59</sup>. The legacy of Merleau-Ponty's *corps propre* on which Lakoff and Johnson build their theory<sup>60</sup> is precisely about this. As Cazeaux argues, whereas for Lakoff and Johnson the 'metaphor is *embodied*', for Merleau-Ponty embodiment itself is a metaphor<sup>61</sup>, which means that he describes the body “as the ontological schema which structures human being in the world through transposition.”<sup>62</sup> What's more, the notion of *corps propre* must be seen in a dual mode: on the one hand, as a physical body

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<sup>58</sup> Relevance theory started as a project by Sweetser (1990) and Sperber and Willson (1986), cognitive linguists whose aim was to develop a theory of interpretation that would be based on the effects of language. Together with hermeneutic theories, it provides a useful tool for analysis of context understood as a background knowledge or particular communicative interaction. These both theories situate the production of the meaning in the broader *horizon of meaning* (Gadamer). However, following Mottier (2008), their drawback is the neglect of the role of institutions and power within that context that nevertheless shape the communicative situation.

<sup>59</sup> Mottier (2008: 187-188) gives an illustrative example of the metaphor 'sopeka' which emerged in the post-genocide Rwanda, referring to female survivors of the genocide. Whereas the word 'sopeka' was originally the name of the local gas station, in the post-genocide context it was used to mark the women who managed to survive the genocide because they were providing sexual services to the members of Hutu Squads. Building its semantic burden on the image of filling up different car tanks, metaphor hides the broader historical implicature, that is - the fact that these women were taken by members of squad to be raped and subsequently murdered. As Mottier observes, when approaching the analysis of this particular metaphor, cognitive linguist would take it out of the wider political context to concentrate primarily on the construction of meaning of the statements, noticing primarily the context of specific interaction and the participants attitude towards these women. On the other hand, political and social analysis should include the ways the metaphor 'sopeka' was used to produce, reproduce or transform the power relations in the formation of gender, ethnicity or sexuality in this particular situation.

<sup>60</sup> In *Philosophy of the flesh* (1999:xi), they refer to Merleau-Ponty as the predecessor of their 'embodied' metaphor.

<sup>61</sup> Cazeaux, op.cit., 7.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

and on the other, as what I feel about the body, in other words — human experience of the body. The spatial body is thus palimpsest of these different experiences and spatial information.

Thus, we need a more refined account of the context and a change of unit of analysis from utterance to discourse. The Foucauldian discourse analysis can fill in the gap and contribute to the metaphor analysis by linking semantics with pragmatics, that is — meaning to power — in order to develop a substantive thought about the work metaphors perform. Discourse here stands for broad historical system constructed through the productions of meaning, or better said in “relations of meaning” which enters the interplay with “relations of power.”<sup>63</sup> But how does it happen that certain discourses win over others and remain relatively stable over time? In other words, how come some metaphors are more politically influential than others in transforming relation of power and meaning?

The answer to that question takes us to the theory of the performativity of language, or in other words, the capacity of language to bring worlds into being. As an idea, performativity was inspired by the speech act theory first elaborated by Austin (1962) and Searle's comment on Austin's writing, as well as later Wittgenstein<sup>64</sup>. Understood from that point on as a function of the pragmatics of the language, the notion of performativity was further developed by Judith Butler who proposed a new, Foucauldian reading according to which performativity is “that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains.”<sup>65</sup> Through repetition and consistent use, statements exhibit certain level of power. Subject *is* socially constructed, but in order to avoid unwanted consequences of such determinisms, Butler

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<sup>63</sup> Mottier, op.cit.

<sup>64</sup> The basic design behind the speech act theory is that the words are not mere labels for the world out there, but that language is constitutive of social reality. Performative utterances, from which later developed performativity, refer to sentences where saying something is actually doing something. The case in point is wedding situation where two people join or *perform* the marriage by saying “I do”. In his *How to Do Things with Words* (1962), Austin showed how the distinction between constative and performative utterances cannot be clearly made, which finally led him to introduce illocutionary - denoting what speaker is actually doing while uttering the locution, and perlocutionary effect, designating the actual effect the speaker actually has on the interlocutor.

<sup>65</sup> Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex*, (Routledge, 1993), 2.

holds that this same subject is still in the possession of the agency. It is the latter that is expressed with the notion of performativity, understood as an activity that brings into being that which it names.

To continue on the 'embodiment' thesis, from this follows that while the body is the matter of pure *physis*, the materiality of the body is something altogether different. It is the matter of how we relate to the world and it is constructed in the context of power relations that help formulate its contours. But unlike simple construction, the one Butler refers to is a temporal process, or in other words, it is “neither a single act nor a causal process initiated by a subject and culminating in a set of fixed effects. Construction takes place not only in time, but is itself a temporal process which operates through the reiteration of norms.”<sup>66</sup> While claiming that the materiality does indeed emerge inside the power relations matrix, Butler nevertheless posits that this materiality is performed by the agency of the subject through the process of embodiment<sup>67</sup>.

While Butler mostly targets performativity of gender and sex, when expanded, materiality of the body can help us to further deepen the embodied metaphor. In conformity with cognitive linguistics, bodily experiences indeed inform and structure the way we think of and perceive our physical environment through the mechanism of metaphors, but since the materiality of the body is socially constructed and accordingly performed by the subject in his iteration of regulatory norms, the metaphors themselves eventually change. In other words, as materiality of the body, or in Butlerian terms the effect of the doer behind the deed, is never finalized, but rather an ongoing process, which through reiteration and sedimentation of the norms gives the ontological weight to the notion of the history and shapes the body as such, so are the processes and mechanisms that direct the way we think about the body and its environment.

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<sup>66</sup> Butler, op.cit., xix.

<sup>67</sup> In the case of materiality of gender and sex, that means that 'naturalized' states like masculinity or femininity have emerged through the continual reiteration of the regulatory norms which have defined these states. To compare concept of performativity to its roots in theatrical performance: unlike in theatrical performance where actors exist prior to the role, in the case of performativity it is the actor who becomes the role.

As the case in point, in the next section, I will take one of the oldest existing metaphors — the one of the body politic, and briefly take it through its process of 'sedimentation' that has given to it, following Butler, 'real' materiality of the body. The metaphor of body politic is not only interesting in so far as it necessarily implies body natural, in other words — because of the 'apparent' similarities between the body politic and body natural upon which the metaphor was constructed, but precisely because its evolution from the ancient times all the way to our own century provides the account of 'perfect' performed materiality. Not only that this materiality was formed in the interconnection with different paradigms, i.e. in relation to power-knowledge nexus, but more importantly — it was materialized through the performance of its constitutive subjects. To insist on the bodily metaphor — it was materialized by the 'members' who assumed the 'roles' of their 'organs' and behaved accordingly. 'Members'/members themselves became the metaphor.



## 2 THE BODY IS DEAD, LONG LIVE THE BODY

Even today, we still talk about 'organs', as well as about 'body politic'; one evokes the 'members', and at the same time it is the problem of the 'head' of the state. Being in the center of Western political thought ever since pre-Socratics, the metaphor of body, carefully guarded behind major political theories, virtually disappears in the early Middle Ages to become the omnipotent metaphor of the medieval political system. Furthermore, as this chapter will show, metaphor of the body politic and the political order it performs have been since the earliest moments of political theory developed in close connection with the notion of corruption. What is more important, it was precisely through the discourse of corruption, i.e. 'elaboration' of various political treats that were menacing the body politic, that the order itself was maintained.

Thus, it may be reasonable at the outset not to fall under influence of disdain one could have for this metaphor, in order to proceed with the exploration of its evolution. Since this metaphor is the subject of multiple interpretations, that is — perpetually recovered, retained and reworked by successive generations of thinkers, the full reconstruction will not be possible. However, to make a sufficiently accurate picture, its continuity and its variations, I will isolate and succinctly present on the following pages some moments in the history of this notion which are crucial to grasp the logic of the overall argument. I will lead and conclude the analysis in the eighteenth century when, according to Buchan and Hill, important changes occur.

### 2.1 ENTER THE BODY

Unlike with Plato who rejects the metaphor of body to substitute it with soul<sup>68</sup>, one might expect that in Aristotle, himself attached to the science of life and experience, this metaphor will

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<sup>68</sup> By claiming that the man is nothing more but his soul, this rejection of the body is, as noted by Lacore, fundamental to Plato's disdain towards the order of realities it belongs to.

occupy an important place in the discussion of politics<sup>69</sup>. Aristotle, for his part, talks about *polis*, but most often about political community — *koinôniapolitike*. And yet, in some critical parts of the text, the life of community is apprehended through the model of the body. Thus, despite the lack of term, the idea of body politic is well rooted in Aristotelian *Politics*. For him, the comparison of political community and body is specifically intended to demonstrate the priority of the former and its adequacy for the political nature of man. However, despite some interpretations according to which Aristotle completely assimilates *polis* to human body<sup>70</sup>, closer reading of his idea of body politic demonstrates how his account is not synonymous with organicism. Contrary to the letter, Aristotle does not assume materialism of the social link, which means that the idea of *polis* as body politic is not based on biological assumptions about human body.

Yet, Aristotelian body sometimes also provides monstrous images. This is the case when he sets to explain the alterations suffered by political regimes by abnormality of growth similar to that which can be observed in the body. It is in this vein that Aristotle speaks of his preference for mixed regimes, where neither democracy, nor monarchy, nor aristocracy would prevail, and that would not depend on personal will of a single ruler or of any particular group<sup>71</sup>. Furthermore, following his physics, all earthy bodies are exposed to the constant process of 'change' which can be measured in the reduction or growth of the body and which can, as he writes in *Of Generation and Corruption*, induce changes on the substance of the body and thereby, the changes of the body of *polis*.

As Lacore remarks, the use of body in this monstrous sense suggests the inadequacy of comparison to express the plurality of individuals, to which Aristotle is particularly attached. Indeed, the refusal of the metaphor of body cannot be explained by Aristotle rejection of the body: unlike in Plato, the body in Aristotelian thought is not denied, but quite on the contrary —

<sup>69</sup> When it comes to 'body politic', one important caveat is to be made: the term that we use today does not have equivalent in Greek language, but is of Latin provenance (Lacore 2003).

<sup>70</sup> Michelle Lacore here cites Ernest Barker according to which Aristotle performs "an absolute assimilation of the State to the human body and of its citizens to the bodily organs." (Barker 1959: 277, quoted in Lacore 2003)

<sup>71</sup> Buchan and Hill, op.cit, 13-14.

it plays a very important role in his definition of the individual. However, Aristotle's caution to deepen the comparison of organic unity of the body to that of polis can be explained by the rejection of totalitarianism which is implied in his critiques of Platonic polis, where the excessive unity of the polis endangers the very nature of political community<sup>72</sup>.

In contrast to the use of the 'image' of body of polis, the notion of the body politic that followed the classic era seems to have fundamentally anti-egalitarian connotations attached to the metaphor. As I have stated at the beginning of this chapter, the term body politic is not present as such in the Aristotelian corpus, and it does not have, it seems, the literal equivalent in the Greek language. This expression has, in fact, Latin origin and it appears as a declination of the formulas *corpus mysticum* and *corpus morale* that were forged in the dual context of Roman law and Christian theology. Moreover, it is in the Middle Ages that the metaphor of the body politic goes through unprecedented development.

In the writings of medieval philosophers, there is an extraordinary abundance of the metaphors of body. It is certainly in the Christian cultural environment that we can find key elements to explain the centrality of the body in medieval thought. Religion of the incarnation, in which God took the earthly body in order to unify the Church through it, Christianity became the foundation of medieval order, contributing thus to paradigmatic move that has made the body a model of medieval thought and social organization. That an institution as important as Church in the Middle Ages saw itself as a collective body of Christ did certainly exert a decisive influence on the way society performed itself at that time. Both Ernst Kantorowicz<sup>73</sup> and Henri de Lubac<sup>74</sup> traced the evolution of the idea of the Church as *corpus mysticum*<sup>75</sup> to *corpus juridicum* which became applicable to any 'body'. As Neocleous observes: "once the idea of a political

<sup>72</sup> Michelle Lacore, "Corps des citoyens, corps de la cité", *Kentron*, no 19, 1-2 (2003): 147.

<sup>73</sup> Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, (Princeton University Press, 1957).

<sup>74</sup> Henri de Lubac, *Corpus mysticum. L'Eucharistie et l'Église au Moyen Âge, étude historique*, (Aubier-Montaigne, 1944).

<sup>75</sup> The idea of Catholic Church as inheritor of eternal body of Christ is not directly deriving from Biblical writings. Apart from writings of Saint Paul, the concept of Church being a host who mystically embodies Christ's actual physical body has its roots in seventh-century Carolingian Eucharist (Kantorowicz, op.cit., 1195-6).

community endowed with a 'mystical' character had been articulated by the Church, the secular state was almost forced to follow the lead and ape the language of corporeal unity upon which theological universalism appeared to rely."<sup>76</sup> But it was not just about mere endowment: what Church performed at that point was the 'work' of the metaphor itself. To paraphrase Charbonnel, unlike representation which stands for 'in the name of', embodiment (embodiment of the Christ) is interesting because it denotes community in person, that is 'instead of'<sup>77</sup>.

Other important feature of medieval culture also illuminates the centrality of body in the political thought of Middle Ages. Specialists in this period have emphasized the mode of understanding inherent to medieval reality— a mode of interpretation based on analogy. For medieval man, the universe formed a coherent whole, organized according to a rational principle that is at work in every part, as well as in the whole universe. That meant that, since the universal order is inscribed in every being, a type of correspondence could be established between various components of the world<sup>78</sup>. In this context the human body becomes a privileged model for understanding reality. Therefore, the privilege enjoyed by the organic metaphor among medieval thinkers may also be explained by the type of 'representation' of the world that is inherent to Middle Ages: it seems that the use of body is informed by certain requirements of medieval world. The utterance seeks to upholster each abstract thought in covering of the words that makes it sensible; in other words — the utterance in the Middle Ages wants to be incarnated, and language is the instrument of the incarnation of idea<sup>79</sup>.

Finally, what is important to point out when it comes to practical implications of these paradigms, it that medieval version of metaphor of body politic had two levels of meaning. On the one hand, human body was held to reflect a real “truth inscribed by the God in the nature of

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<sup>76</sup> Neocleous, op.cit.,13.

<sup>77</sup> Nanine Charbonnel, *Comme un seul homme. Corps politique et corps mystique*, (Editions Aréopage, 2010).

<sup>78</sup> Jacques Le Goff and Nicolas Truong, *Il corpo nel Medioevo*, (Leterza Editori, 2005).

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Brémond et al., "L'Exemplum", in *Typologie des sources du Moyen Âge occidental*, (Turnhout, Brepols, 1982).

things”<sup>80</sup>, while on the other, human body was seen as prone to corruption, disease and decay, which were held to be the indicators of spiritual degradation and sinful soul. Even in medieval medicine diseases were understood to be a spiritual matter, since in the Middle Ages there was no disease that was not symbolic and that did not involve being in its totality<sup>81</sup>. Thus, the leper is, as Le Goff and Truong suggest, a sinner who seeks to liberate his soul and his body from the filth, primarily caused by lust.

These two levels of meaning are best illustrated in *Policraticus*, one of the most important medieval political books, in which the author John of Salisbury describes medieval body politic. In this version, Church takes the place of the 'soul of the body', ruler, who needs to control social harmony, is positioned on the 'head', the senate or senior council makes the 'heart', and all other parts stand for different social groups; all the way to the 'feet' which referred to laboring peasantry. Interesting in this body politic's hierarchy is the place of stomach and intestines which was occupied by treasurers: “Treasurers and record-keepers...resemble the shape of the stomach and intestines; these, if they accumulate with great avidity and tenaciously preserve their accumulation, engender innumerable and incurable diseases so that their infection threatens to ruin the whole body.”<sup>82</sup> The presumption that the stomach and the intestines are the source of both physical and spiritual impurity is not new to medieval thought. It goes back to Aesop's fable of the *Belly and the Members* in which discord arises between the various 'members' and 'belly' which just voraciously devours the delights brought to it by the rest of the body<sup>83</sup>. In Salisbury's body politic, greedy and lazy stomach, the seat of finance which should take care of the proper 'nourishment' of the body, stands as a cause of disease and infection of body which threatens to disorder and disfigure the body politic.

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<sup>80</sup> Nicolson 1960:126, quoted in Buchan and Hill, op.cit, 48.

<sup>81</sup> Le Goff and Truong op.cit.

<sup>82</sup> Salisbury, quoted in Buchan and Hill, op.cit.,62.

<sup>83</sup> Buchan and Hill, op.cit.,12.

In such a 'totalitarian' scheme, where the metaphor of body politic is intended to illustrate reciprocal moral dependence between all 'members', who all obey the same Christian and natural law, it is impossible to live in righteousness alone. For medieval thinkers, justice is an action that involves respect for others and which has to lead the members to the same common good. Thus, the disease that appears in one of the members stands as a sign of disintegration and degeneration, loss of unity of body politic arising from sinful human nature. Differently put, the injustice of one necessarily contaminates all the other members of society, whether 'feet' or 'head', and especially if such injustice was committed by the prince. However, in medieval times, this requirement for organic cooperation between citizens was not supported by the elaboration of policies and institutional mechanisms intended to contribute to such accomplishment: it was rather through specific dynamics of medieval society, i.e. ceremonial and other rituals to which citizens conformed, that they rehabilitated distanced or damaged moral and socialities<sup>84</sup>.

It was already in Machiavelli's time that contours of the Medieval body politic began to significantly change. Although he did employ organic terms to characterize political communities as prone to infirmities and diseases, these notions were quite distinct from spiritual connotations of human nature present in Medieval thought. However, while going back to Aristotelian political thought, Machiavelli now inherits strong medieval concept of the body politic.

Machiavelli makes use of medical and cosmological discourse informed by Galenic understanding of body. Even though, as Le Goff and Truong note, this medical paradigm was dominant throughout the Middle Ages, with Machiavelli it obtains distinctly political, rather than spiritual understanding<sup>85</sup>. From this follows that the disease of the body politic were not caused by the sinful nature of members of polity, but by the disbalance between four 'humors'<sup>86</sup>, and that the way to avoid disease was to keep these humors in check. For Machiavelli, societal version of

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Jean Douvignaud, *Spectacle et société*, (Denoël, 1970).

<sup>85</sup> I build this account of Machiavellian body politics on Buchan and Hill, op.cit.

<sup>86</sup> In Galen's medical theory, the four humors were black and yellow bile, blood and phlegm (cf. R. French, *Medicine before Science: The Business of Medicine from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.42-63).

the humors was reflected in the 'humoric struggle' between common people (*popolo*) and nobility (*grandi*). Whereas in Rome, humoral consistence was exhibited as a sort of dynamic tension that was resolved by the law, in Florence, with a predominance of narrow interest among the people who wanted to control the government all by themselves, it took a form of struggle that resulted in exile. If the causes of imbalance are to be found in the weakness, indolence and effeminization of the society, as he believes is the case, then the prevention of the corruption of the body politic should consist in exercise of hardly, manly and war-like virtues of which the best example was provided by Romans or Spartans. What has become known as Machiavellian *virtù*, was indeed representing the Prince's 'manly' characteristics which are to be emulated by individual citizens in order to achieve healthy political body.

Furthermore, when discussing less or more 'balanced' states, Machiavelli in his *Discourses* mentions Germany as exemplary of completely balanced country, not least because they were dedicated to the idea of self-sufficiency, nurturing thus simple agrarian economy which enabled them not to mix with 'other', more corrupt nations, but also because German republics inhibited their citizens from becoming 'gentlemen', which he identified as the cause of Italian disease<sup>87</sup>.

With gentlemen who are not moved by the love of their country, but concerned with their own particularistic interest, not contributing with any productive labor, but rather dedicated to idleness and indulgence, Machiavelli sees the only way out of the humoricdisbalance in the warlike spirit which has to be directed outwards in the contest through which republics can acquire empire and greatness. While Europe enabled this exercise of *virtù* through frequent military quests, Asia was, in Machiavelli's view, seat of disease and corruption, as it allowed to be dominated by one power — China, which did not lead them to favor the collective martialvirtues.

Whereas Machiavellian political thought exhibits signs of paranoia provoked by manifold possible reasons that can bring about disbalance of the polity, it is important to maintain that,

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<sup>87</sup> Hans Baron interprets Machiavellian notion of 'gentleman' as standing for someone who does not have a free mode of life, but lies as a parasite on the inequality which exalts him over all other citizens (Baron 1961, cited in Buchan and Hill 2014:209).

although largely drawing on Medieval thought by representing the problem of disease of republics in terms of decay, for him the disease is not just understood as the matter of sinful human nature, belonging to spiritual domain, but rather as complex political problem that asks for equally complex political treatment. The move from the universalistic view on human sinful nature enables Machiavelli to classify polities as more or less corrupt, and to isolate thus the possible remedies that could prevent further decay. Acknowledging degenerative property of time as one of causes of the drift from the virtuous path, he suggests that strength of republic is reflected in their capacity to anticipate these events and circumvent them by implementing in the design of body politic restorative events that would prompt the renewal of polity. While he dismisses medieval assumption about the embodied community, he nevertheless argues that a powerful ruler is capable of diagnosing malicious condition and intervening on body politic, rather than simply partake in its embodiment.

As we have seen so far, the conceptualization of corruption of the body politic as 'degeneration', conceived as either the “*process* of moral or physical decay of animate beings” or “the *terminus* of this process of decay”, was possible in the existing episteme of hierarchical correspondence between divine structure of cosmos, nature, rightly ordered society and the well proportioned human body. But what happens once this correspondence is dismantled?

It was with the birth of modern politics that the concept of body politic underwent significant changes. In the context of Early Modernity, the idea of body politic was invested with a quite original meaning, while an important paradigmatic shift occurred which further informed evolution of the metaphor itself.



## 2.2 INFECTED FROM OUTSIDE?

In the mid-seventeenth century, the model of body took radically different turn: from being viewed as the template of cosmic and political order, it came to be discredited as an increasingly dysfunctional rhetorical device. Following the demise of neoplatonic cosmology of macro- and microcosm and enfeeblement of monarchy, the new form of rule consolidated secular political formulas of omnipotence of the state and implemented them through the modern concept of impersonal power, i.e. abstract body of the state. To put it in more illustrative terms, “where the prince once stepped into the shoes of the Pope, the state now stepped into the shoes of the prince.”<sup>88</sup> What was once immortal sovereign power incorporated in the body of the king and carried on in the funeral effigy which stood to represent accumulated power, has now become perpetual corporation of the immortal state. Since the state was then perceived to be the artificial, man-made, but nevertheless real body that never dies, thus guaranteeing the permanent center for the accumulation of the power<sup>89</sup>, the focus switched from its internal affairs to its borders which were supposed to secure the center.

This shift in the metaphor of the body politic was paralleled by the new accounts of body natural and the change of body politic status was decisively informed, as Harris shows<sup>90</sup>, by the transformations and reconfigurations induced by new medical paradigms.

As a case in point for this resolutely new medical twang in politics, it is enough to look into one of the fundamental texts of modern political theory — Hobbes' *Leviathan*. The metaphor of the body politic, in fact, plays a critical role in the composition of *Leviathan*, but it also advances a radically new account of its origins. More specifically, Hobbes breaks with previous formulations of polity which was based on the ontological similarity between body natural and body politic, to introduce the understanding of metaphor according to which legitimization of

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<sup>88</sup> Neocleous, op.cit., 18.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Harris, op.cit.

the polity is rather based on the similarity of creation, that is — the creation of the state by men as an emulation of the divine creation.

Hobbes elucidates the artificial nature of his creature even with the choice of register, i.e. with the mythical language of the biblical *Book of Job* to which he resorts in order to depict the omnipotence of the state he advances in his political thought. Leviathan is indeed artificial being 'brought to' life by man, not nature, but this artificiality is at the same time the source of its power. Thus, the image Hobbes uses to evoke the power in question is there rather to evoke the omnipotent power of this construction, than its monstrous, animal properties. What is more important, unlike state of nature from which it emerges, mechanical and artificial body of Leviathan assures his infallible character and guarantees to all the individual bodies over which it exerts authority, the body politic which protects them from the state of nature in which humans would otherwise find themselves.

Given the infallible nature of a strong sovereign's law, political problems that Hobbes sees as treats to sovereign authority are articulated in and through the vocabulary which presupposes exogenous figures of social pathology. According to Hobbes, apart from those individuals whose short-term passions may overrule their judgments<sup>91</sup>, the corruption of body politic is equally likely to be induced by those few who were still to his day in the state of nature. “The savage people in many places of America” who live “to this day in that brutish manner” lead Hobbes to conceptualize the problems and to detect their causes in exogenous figures of social illnesses<sup>92</sup>. Thus, what can be detected already in Machiavelli when he praises German diligence which allows them to live on their own produce and keeps them from entering in contact with more corrupt nations, had with the emergence of nation-state and international trade grown into a paradigm that explains political disease as the “consequence of incursion by foreign commodities”, or in Hobbes words — into external threat that sovereign must keeps in

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<sup>91</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, quoted in Harris, op.cit.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

check in order to secure body politic's "nutriment", which consist of commodities, so that he restrains the "forraign Traffique" which is not just "noxious", but "at least unprofitable".

The use of medical vocabulary in the articulation of problems of body politic is, as we have so far seen, nothing new. However, Harris notes an essential shift in the medical lexicon used by many political thinkers in the period of early modernity that was informed, as I have already suggested, by new medical paradigms and new accounts of body natural. Thus, Hobbes' exogenous causes of social illness benefited greatly from new medical theory according to which disease was not perceived anymore as a result of bodily humoral disbalance, as it was the case with Machiavelli, but as a condition induced by the foreign body that infiltrates host's body from the outside<sup>93</sup>.

Harris here draws attention on the important omission in the analysis of the early modern body politic. While he fills the hole in the accounts of the medical paradigms in early modernity to show their importance for the *corpus politicum*, he also notes that the omission of such analysis has greatly endowed emerging body politics with the perfect instrument of social control. Thus, Harris' argument is not only valuable insofar as it exhibits new portrayal of corporeal matters in post-Restoration England, and their symbolic significance in supplying metaphorical comment upon the body politic and larger world of affairs, but it is significant as it shows how the discourse on political body crystallizes from certain point in time all kinds of anxieties related to the figure of foreigner, and advocates a series of 'remedies' to fight against this menacing figure presented as the disease of the body politic. This social pathologizing, which has, as Harris notes, grown with the growth of global capitalism, *was* and still *is* less the application of developments in

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<sup>93</sup> In his *Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic*, Harris parts from two models of the diseased body politic, the one informed by the medical theory of Galen and the other by that of Paracelsus. Whereas Galen's theory of humoral body was paradigmatic for Ancient and Medieval world, which thought of diseases and the process of corruption of body politic as generated by the humoral disbalance, Paracelsus's idea of the disease as implanted in the body from the outside, in the Early Modernity becomes a reference point for many political tracts which start to see body politic as threatened by the foreign invaders, of which most dangerous in English context were Jews, Catholics and witches. The shift from body's internal balance to body's impermeable surface was also influenced by the first-hand experience of big epidemics of plague and syphilis.

knowledge about the human body on social matter, than an attempt to scientifically shape laws and political imperatives of social life.

While the general argument is being made about the unavoidable demise of the metaphor of body politic in the context of rationalization and modernization that took place in the eighteenth century, Harris's inquiry and the developments of the metaphor in the early modernity can help us to understand further reformulation of this old political device and its resonance nowadays.

Indeed, the ideological transition which has led from iconic system centered on the body politic to the eighteenth century logocentric universe based on the idea of the 'sacred' word of law<sup>94</sup>, was often described by scholars as the death of old imaginary of body natural and body politic in the midst of the emerging impersonal bureaucratic machine. Furthermore, following Neocleous, there are good reasons to believe so: firstly, the emergence of the liberalism gave significant boost to the idea of social contract. Although some of its proponents as John Locke still used bodily vocabulary to elaborate new political ideas, the body was never presented as something as either natural or artificial and having a life of its own. Secondly, resisting to advance any idea of collective body to the individual bodies of citizens, political philosophers of that period praised the ongoing modernization of society, which brought about determining rationalization of Enlightenment politics. Thirdly and lastly, the idea of 'society as mechanism' was thought to bring a final deathblow to the mystery of personalized sovereignty<sup>95</sup>.

Contrary to these predominant accounts, Neocleous, arguing against those who hold that the twentieth century big comeback of the body politic in the form of fascism and Nazism was merely the reappropriation of the premodern idea,<sup>96</sup> has traced its possible reformulation in the Age of Reason. What followed from his analysis is that, contrary to the popular belief about the

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<sup>94</sup> Neocleous, op.cit., 22.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>96</sup> Neocleous here mentions Claude Lefort, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy who argued that the demise of the metaphor of the body politic was due to the rise of bourgeois democracy from the late eighteenth century.

death of the metaphor, the body politic was still well alive and kicking. With the advent of nation-state, global trade and later—liberal democracy, the body has acquired significantly different guise. Thus, what happened at the end of the late eighteenth century was not the “disincorporation of individuals”, but rather the “incorporation in a new form, a form appropriate to the bourgeois states that were to emerge from the democratic and intellectual revolutions set in motions in the late eighteenth century.”<sup>97</sup> Moreover, what Kantorowicz's analysis of Dante identify as secular religion of humanity<sup>98</sup>, or Nanine Charbonnel sees as the transposition of *corpus mysticum* of medieval theologians to the idea of humanity<sup>99</sup>, collides with these accounts of the eighteen and nineteenth century's new form of the body — the *corpus* centered on people.

Indeed, as it can be traced in many major political thinkers of that period, notably Rousseau and Smith, as Neocleus claims, but also through two major events of that period — French and American Revolution — the body endured yet another transition: that from the body of the state to the body of the people, accordingly reshaping the contours of the sovereignty to fit that larger social body.

However, new political imagination according to which the idea of 'people' for the first time comprised 'lower orders', essential to support industry, promoted the concept of society which largely attenuated virtue-based approach<sup>100</sup>. Social body, unlike political one which was built on the idea of civic virtues, was particularly appropriate to fetch both the assumptions of body politic and the new dimension of economy which was guided by particularist and private interests. In the fear of the consequences of such 'popular' sovereignty which was merging these separate spheres, but also because of constant population growth, urbanization and international trade, ruling class devised a management of living environments as a necessary next step for the

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>98</sup> Kantorowicz, op.cit.

<sup>99</sup> Charbonnel, op.cit.

<sup>100</sup> Buchan and Hill, op.cit., 155.

exigencies of security of new social order. In other words, what this social order has prompted was the development of new Enlightenment politics where human being and their collectivity were treated as “objects of planning and administration”.<sup>101</sup>

In this newly elaborated social body with the new constellation of social realities encompassing the emergence of bureaucratized and centralized state, material progress and expanding trade, a new repertoire of body politic's threats could not be skipped. As we have seen so far by tracing the metaphor to its very beginning in ancient Greece, the idea of political threat and disease of the body politic was always closely connected to the notion of 'degenerative' corruption, denominating those moral and spiritual behaviors which threatened to weaken political virtues of both ruler and subjects. However, with the advent of modern paradigm that saw the range of previously corruptive social phenomena as something good, the range of activities that were incorporated in the concept of political corruption significantly decreased<sup>102</sup>. In the eighteenth century thus, as Buchan and Hill suggest in their *Intellectual History of Political Corruption*, harmful behavior termed as political corruption adopted its narrowed definition and began to refer exclusively to the intrusion of the private interest into the public sphere<sup>103</sup>. In other words, whereas political corruption once stood for degrading quality of time, moral or spiritual decay of the corpus politicum, or the intrusion of the foreign corrupted seeds in that same body, and was seen as either caused or symptomized by gluttonous tendencies of its 'members', was by the end of the eighteenth century, completely replaced by the narrow idea of public and private interests. Certainly, the new conceptualization could not go without accompanying elaboration of public and the private: with the integrity of the modern state independent from “civic virtues of its people“, private interests were clinging on the thin line between good and desirable, and

<sup>101</sup> Colleen Bell, "Hybrid Warfare and Its Metaphors", *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, Volume 3, Number 2 (2012), 235.

<sup>102</sup> Buchan and Hill, op.cit., 171.

<sup>103</sup> Important is to understand that what is thought here by public and private does not correspond to typical use of these categories in politics. Probably the most known is the Arendtian understanding of public and private, i.e. public sphere, state (including police and legal functions) and finally private one. Private and public that make for political corruption are shaped by the modern understanding of *interests* which, as Albert Hirschman (1977) argues, presupposes a crucial reformulation of premodern concept of *good*. Cf. Bratsis (2003a) and Bratsis (2003b).

something that is radically bad. But, as both public and private interests are not seen as anything bad in themselves, how come that they now define something that is conceived as inherently bad? Indeed, while being entirely fine as long as they are kept separate, as soon as one crosses the domain of the other we talk about the “contamination of the public by the private”, that is itself “dirty, tainted, infected, and thus corrupt.”<sup>104</sup>

Furthermore, what is problematic about the definition of private/public split when regarding contemporary anti-corruption practices is that some cases of this intrusion are acceptable, while others are not. The main function of this idea of corruption is to maintain the purity of categories with legal fiction about public servants that do not act as “concrete individuals but as articulations of the abstract body of the polity and, accordingly, are neutral, objective, and free from the passions and interests that may plague their private existence.”<sup>105</sup> This fiction is further supported with the series of bureaucratic rituals introduced to systematically, professionally, rationally tackle political corruption, and to enhance performance of rules of transparency of the body politic whose activities, while supported and ordered, are 'clearly' separated from those of the market.

However, while presenting it as the most sacred goal of their political action which can be fought against with the precision of the cold scalpel and number of technocratic measures of transparency which are surely pointing to the root of the problem, anti-corruption crusaders use highly problematic metaphorical language to talk about corruption. First of all, in biologizing their fight, they presuppose that some correspondence exists between body politic and body natural when it comes to pathologies. Clearly, in order to understand this, we have to understand today's construction of this diseased body politic.

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<sup>104</sup> Peter Bratsis, "The construction of corruption, or rules of separation and illusions of purity in bourgeois societies", *Social Text* 21 (2003b),15.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 27.

### 3 FLEXIBLE BODIES IN FLEXIBLE EMPIRES

#### 3.1 ROTTING FROM WITHIN?

Many scholarly analysis did not miss to notice that the alleged 'rational' definitions and prescription for combating corruption are not so innocent from moral overtones<sup>106</sup>. In words of Nuijten and Anders:

“On the surface the new science of corruption promoted by Transparency International and the Bretton Woods institutions relies on quantifiable data and scientific strategies to stamp out the 'cancer' of corruption, but underneath it is driven by a zealous belief in the necessity and possibility of cleansing and strengthening the body politic.”<sup>107</sup>

However, what these accounts fail to reckon is that, rather than just leaving the notion of corruption bare of 'shared' moral basis presupposed by the idea of uncorrupted body politic, the very disease these anti-corruption physicians identify corruption with, already opens the number of important concerns that are far from being politically innocent. Political speeches, declaration, conventions, newspapers, have all assumed the role of diagnostic medicine which identifies so many different cancers of corruption that are threatening to “metastasize across the society”<sup>108</sup>. Moreover, as some posit, the insidious character of this disease allows it to rapidly infiltrate and grow imperceptibly in the body politic. The most recent of diagnosis was given by US Vice President Joe Biden to the leaders of Ukraine: “To be very blunt about it, and this is a delicate thing to say to a group of leaders in their house of parliament, but you have to fight the cancer of corruption that is endemic in your system right

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<sup>106</sup> Cf. I. Krastev, "When 'Should' Does Not Imply 'Can': The Making of the Washington Consensus on Corruption.", in: W. Lepeńies, *Entangled Histories and Negotiated Universals: Centers and Peripheries in a Changing World*. (Frankfurt, Campus, 2003) and S. Sampson, "Integrity Warriors: Global Morality and the Anti-Corruption Movement in the Balkans", in: D. Haller and C. Shore, *Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives* (London: Pluto Press, 2005).

<sup>107</sup> Nuijten and Anders, op.cit., 21.

<sup>108</sup> Nigel Baker, "The Cancer of Corruption", (Foreign and Commonwealth office web-site, 2013), available at <http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/nigelbaker/2013/12/10/the-cancer-of-corruption/> (accessed May, 2014).



now.”<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, the disease that “takes root in secrecy and whose consequences can be dire”<sup>110</sup> is not anymore unique to less developed or transitioning economies, but is getting worse in some of the major economic powers of today's world. In China, New Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping warns that, if the disease does not stop to develop, it will destroy the Party and with it, the country itself. Therefore, he prescribes: “We should fight it with an iron fist.”<sup>111</sup> From China to India, all the way to the Arab countries where it ate the last bit of citizens' faith in the governing body and led to the Arab upsurge<sup>112</sup>, the cancer of corruption is recognized as being fueled and fought at the same time by the very political forces of these different countries. Far from being an individual transgression as mainstream definitions like to posit, corruption is understood by both politicians and society as a vital treat to the larger social tissue of which it is a part. Differently put, the metaphor of cancer which is allocated to the social illness of corruption nowadays, is not merely providing the incidental evocative repertoire of images of the disease, but hints to the very logic behind the idea of corruption in the today's body politic.

Cancer is nowadays, as Susan Sontag famously put in her landmark essay *Illness as Metaphor*, “a disease that doesn't knock before it enters”, and that “fills the role of an illness experienced as a ruthless, secret invasion”<sup>113</sup>. Indeed, as Sontag shows, this is the role that this illness will keep as long as its etiology and its treatment do not become as clear as it was previously the case with plague, syphilis or tuberculosis. Until then, cancer will keep its status of “demonic pregnancy”, a “disease of growth”, which consumes host's whole body, but whose symptoms remain nevertheless invisible and discovered by pure chance. This portrait of illness that Sontag presents irresistibly evokes the struggles over the definition of corruption: although anti-corruption physicians would like to elaborate scientific, cold,

<sup>109</sup> Ben Wolfgang, "Joe Biden to Ukrainian Lawmakers", (*Washington Times*, 2013), available at <http://p.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/22/biden-ukrainian-lawmakers-tackle-cancer-corruption/#ixzz33wQqpUEA>, (accessed May, 2014).

<sup>110</sup> Tim Smith, "Effective Remedy for cancer of corruption", (*The Sydney Morning Herald*, 2010), available at <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/effective-remedy-for-cancer-of-corruption-20100604-xknh.html#ixzz33wSITDgT>, (accessed May, 2014).

<sup>111</sup> Shirley Jam, "A cure for cancer of corruption will take more than an iron fist", (*South China Morning Post*, 2012), available at <http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1105682/cure-cancer-corruption-will-take-more-iron-fist>, (accessed May, 2014)

<sup>112</sup> Tariq A. Al Maena, "Cancer of corruption led to Arab Spring" (*Gulf News*, 2013), available at <http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/cancer-of-corruption-led-to-arab-spring-1.1228396>, (accessed May, 2014).

<sup>113</sup> Susan Sontag, *Illness as Metaphor*, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978), 5.

objective, operational concept, corruption, like a cancer in its sponger and anarchist manner, resist any clear definition by colonizing many *others*, and not just 'public office cells' of body politic.

Furthermore, unlike tuberculosis or syphilis, which were seen as a diseases of passion<sup>114</sup>, cancer is understood as frigide, dispassionate state which is hard to cure if there is lack of political will, i.e. the will of power, at least according to theories that argue that the cancers are caused by mental states<sup>115</sup>. And yet, as Sontag posits, these theories are just an index of how much a real, physical terrain of the disease remains obscure: just as any disease whole causality is murky and treatment ineffective, corruption tends to be imbued with significance.

Far from being easily identifiable as it was the case with foreign bodies - seeds of infection coming from outside, cancer cells are seen as mysterious, a disease with multiple causes, internal as well as external. Moreover, cancer cell is a frenzied individualist, with a will of its own, creating a tissue of alien cells in its own image that differs radically from those of host. As Sontag shows, immunologists class the body's cancer cells as 'nonself': "In cancer, non-intelligent ('primitive', 'embryonic', 'atavistic') cells are multiplying, and you are being replaced by the non-you."<sup>116</sup>In other words, "hoary forms of corruption persist alongside and facilitate the spread of the newer, more potentially destructive modes of corruption."<sup>117</sup> Therefore the need of cancer patients to distance themselves from it, or in the words of Ronald Regan when asked about his disease: "I didn't have cancer. I had something inside of me that had cancer in it and it was removed"<sup>118</sup>. By doing so, as Weiss hypothesizes, body insists on localizing a disease to a particular region that could be either physically or symbolically cut out. In contrast, those who do not suffer from it, tend to foster the idea that the 'whole person' has cancer; 'cancerophobia', in her words, "always operates by distancing the Other: either the tumor (in the case of patients) or the person affected by the disease (in the case of non-patients)."<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>117</sup> Rotberg, op.cit., 2-3.

<sup>118</sup> Ronal Regan, quoted in Meira Weiss, "Signifying the Pandemics: Metaphors of AIDS, Cancer, and Heart Disease", in *Medical Anthropology Quarterly*, New Series, Vol 11, no.4 (1997): 461.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

In the article *Signifying the Pandemics: Metaphors of AIDS, Cancer, and Heart Disease*, Weiss on the contrary argues that, unlike the heart attack, which is of localizable nature, echoing mechanistic connotations, cancer, in stark contrast, is the disease in which the body has “turned against itself”, mutating and transforming the self into the universal estrangement, to the extent that is beyond part/whole, inside/outside, or in her words –“beyond culture”. The most suitable image to that alienation is, as she suggest, that of amoeba, precisely because

“Amoeba captures the whole symbolic array related to cancer: it is amorphous, omnivorous, alien, *transparent*, and disgusting. Additionally, it emphasizes the theme of boundary disruption. The best known and much studied specimen of this group is Amoeba Proteus. Proteus is the Greek name for a god who could assume different shapes at will, and it is hence a protean animal/entity that has the power to disrupt and transform the very contours of the body.”<sup>120</sup>

Similar picture is evoked by Sontag, who argues that the cancer transforms the medical paradigm to make it suitable for “our own era of destructive overproduction”, and “increased bureaucratic restraints on the individual”, which induce “both the fear of having too much energy and an anxiety about energy not being allowed to be expressed.”<sup>121</sup> Cancer, as Weiss remarkably demonstrates, is carving a shape of a different body that she refers to as “the body in late capitalism” — the post-modern one. This body has to be understood in its context — that of increased globalization which makes of body the 'whole', “interconnected system rather than a standardized machine with replaceable parts, an 'engineered communication system, ordered by a fluid and dispersed command-control-intelligence network'.”<sup>122</sup>

The analysis of the prevention and immunology discourse is part where Weiss and Sontag diverge. Writing in 1978, Sontag still witnesses the use of xenophobic-militant metaphors that are pervading immunology discourse. These metaphors, whose origin she locates in the 1880s, with the identification of bacteria as agents of disease, were, as I have previously shown, at the forefront of the elaboration of external treat and obsession with boundary 'hygiene' ever since the early modern discourse of containment.

However, as Emily Martin argues, they are no longer applicable. Current scientific discourse on immunology is breaking with the notion of the body's invading enemies. As the boundaries between

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 462.

<sup>121</sup> Sontag, op.cit., 62.

<sup>122</sup> Haraway 1989:12, quoted in Weiss, op.cit., 470.

'poison' and 'cure' are becoming blurred<sup>123</sup>, so is the border between 'self' and 'non-self' more difficult to elucidate. Martin further detects the transition in the immunity metaphors that, as she hypothesizes, suggest a shift in the social order. Cancer here enters picture perfectly, as the disease that challenges any attempt at classification or understanding of etiology, but most importantly, as the disease that conveys the idea of the *body that has turned against itself*. As the body becomes yet another system in the interconnected network of others larger systems, the notion of the enemy becomes rather obscure and unnecessary, marking the demise of militant metaphors used all the way to the end of the Cold War. Moreover, this shift advances new medical paradigm in which is impossible to clearly distinguish between health, illness and immunity.

As Martin posits, during the Fordist years, private body entered a public sphere as a well-functioning unit, maintained and surveilled through the system of checks, balances and rewards for the maintenance of the body's productivity. However, the change of global economic conditions has led to shift in the social order from that of the 'assembly line' of the mass production to the order that is dedicated to “fleeting, fluid network of alliances, a highly decoupled and dynamic form with great organizational flexibility.”<sup>124</sup> 'Flexible specialization', a term that Martin borrows from political economy, thus suggests a change in the flow of the capital that defies the borders and advocates the interconnectedness of all parts at any moment in the continuously changing market. What this requires are equally flexible bodies, the bodies that are, as Martin argues, implied in the metaphorical shift from xenophobic metaphors to those that favor *homeostatic* order.

While the idea of homeostatic design might sound familiar and point to the great comeback of the humoral balance that was present in the political thought ever since Plato, new 'disorder' greatly diverges from any idea of corruption seen as the result of humoral disbalance. Thus, to elucidate the logic behind the new immunitary design, I will now turn to the idea of 'disorder' played out by the metaphor of the cancer.

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<sup>123</sup> Martin here analysis the developments in the field of the biotechnology, where the manipulation of viruses has led to discovery of viruses' innate qualities and capabilities to contribute to human disease prevention.

<sup>124</sup> Emily Martin, *Flexible Bodies*, (BeaconPress, 1994), 209.

### 3.2 FLEXIBLE EMPIRE: WHEN ORDER BECOMES DISORDER

“Yet the victims themselves are beyond all this. Curses, feelings of rebellion, comparisons, reflections on the future and the past, are obliterated from the mind of the captive; and memory itself barely lingers on. Fidelity to his city and his dead is not the slave's privilege.”

- Simone Weil

Although the existing interpretations of the Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's *Empire* are quite exhaustive, interestingly enough, significant number of commentators have omitted rather important segment of the idea authors develop. The reason for that might be more than apparent: when someone writes a book about everything, some things can be easily overlooked. But another reason can lie in the fact that, despite the corruption's key role in their work, it might seem, as some commentators observe<sup>125</sup>, that Hardt and Negri define the concept quite laxly. Still, I would rather suggest that although corruption in *Empire* does indeed cover many meanings, there actually exists finely tuned logic behind it which may complicate its understanding. But in order to understand the nature of imperial corruption, we need to first explicate the body politic as being materialized through the performative character of the metaphor of today's main social disease – 'cancer of corruption'.

Hardt and Negri's important theoretical contribution consist in elaboration of today's new model of sovereignty that took place with a shift from imperialism to what they call Empire. Concept of modernity, which they see as different from contemporary postmodernity, was defined by the crises, “a crisis that is born of the uninterrupted conflict between the immanent, constructive, creative forces and the transcendent power aimed at restoring order”<sup>126</sup>. This crises was, according to Hardt and Negri, resolved by the development of modern sovereign state, emergence of the concepts such as people and nation, and the development of colonial sovereignty in which the representation was organized in the following way: “the people representing the multitude, the nation representing the people, and the state representing the nation.”<sup>127</sup>

<sup>125</sup> Jon Beasley-Murray, *Posthegemony. Political Theory and Latin America*, (University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 264.

<sup>126</sup> Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, (Harvard University Press, 2000), 76.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 134.

In the context of the passage from modern to what they term - imperial sovereignty - they posit that the expansive tendency of 'their' Empire should be clearly divorced from the expansive tendencies of modern nation-state<sup>128</sup>. Unlike in liberal modernity of the nineteenth and statist modernity of the twentieth century where the executive power was aiming to stay compatible with the various forms of market economy that were developing over the past two centuries, the political constitution of the Empire is “expressed as juridical formation”<sup>129</sup>. As it is obvious that such juridical structure cannot alone account for the stability of the world order and ensure the way economic globalization is being reproduced, it is necessary to imagine some center of power that takes the initiative to implement these norms. While Hardt and Negri rule out any possibility of 'center', they argue that what Empire performs is the model of network power that is, unlike previous notions of sovereignty, open, decentered and deterritorialized space that progressively absorbs within its apparatus of rule the whole global realm. Important to note is that the contemporary idea of Empire is, according to Hardt and Negri, “born through the global expansion of the internal U.S. constitutional project. But, unlike the latter which, as they argue - strikingly resembles “political theory inspired by imperial Rome”<sup>130</sup>, and that, despite its idea of constitutional network power, still sometime diverted into the old-style European imperialism, the Empire today does not have any *outside* to 'colonize'. In other words, the essential difference between modern and postmodern sovereignty is precisely in the fact that in the latter there is no outside.

This fundamental distinction and its deconstruction is in itself nothing new, but rather a characteristic post-modernist backbone. However, when straightforwardly translated into the language of political philosophy, the deconstruction of inside/outside opposition suggests the deontologization of power - rejection of idea that power that restores the order resides elsewhere, somewhere beyond. Still, as the old Machiavelli and Polybus' account advises –“without expansion the republic constantly

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid.,166.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.,166.

risks being absorbed into the cycle of corruption”<sup>131</sup>. How this imperial, limitless, open space sovereignty does then today control the “pressure of the multitude to surpass every limit and every control”<sup>132</sup>?

Following the case of racism to illustrate their idea, Hardt and Negri argue that in postmodern imperial sovereignty, with the disappearance of outside other, racism itself did not disappear, but it has adopted new, more sophisticated and barely distinguishable forms. The latter has several other important implications: firstly, the nature of conflicts has changed. With a conflict between an inner and outside space not being possible anymore, this newly united surface starts to uncover an infinite number of 'micro-conflicts' that are everywhere and nowhere. For Hardt and Negri, this phenomenon marks the shift from one major crises to ‘omni-crises’, as the movement from crises to corruption - a corruption that they understand not as accidental phenomenon, but rather necessary design<sup>133</sup>.

Unlike some ancient empires, postmodern imperial sovereignty is itself not in crises, but it rather maintains itself through it, and it is in this sense corrupt. Important is, however, not to understand this corruption in ethical or moral terms, but to recall ancient definition that they recreate in order to elaborate the double logic of the Empire itself. According to that definition, corruption stands for “general process of generation and composition, with none of the moral overtones”<sup>134</sup>, and as such it is reverse process of generation and composition, which they also see as a moment that carries with it potential for change. As they further argue: “To say that imperial sovereignty is defined by corruption means, on the one hand, that Empire is impure and hybrid and, on the other, that imperial rule functions by breaking down. (...) Imperial society is always and everywhere breaking down, but this does not indicate any teleology or any end in sight.”<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 202.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., 201.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., 202.

In other words, in much the same way as the 'norm' of the crisis in modern sovereignty, “as one would refer to the stock market crash of 1929 as a crisis”<sup>136</sup>, the corruption of the Empire is not an aberration, but its very essence and *modus operandi*. Thus, even the imperial economy cannot function any other way, but through corruption that makes all the relation accidental.

The claim that the corruption lies in the basis of the Empire implies that “imperial power is founded on the rupture of any determinate ontological relationship”<sup>137</sup>, and that it maintains itself by *performing* contradictions corruption gives rise to. Like cancer, “corruption in the Empire is everywhere”<sup>138</sup>. In Sontag's words: “its principal metaphor refers to topography (cancer 'spreads' or 'proliferates' or is 'diffused’)”<sup>139</sup>. “Through corruption”, as Hardt and Negri claim, “imperial power extends a smoke screen across the world.” Thus, quite the opposite to the purported transparency, to paraphrase Das and Poole once again — actions of the very crusaders have become anything but transparent and they have altered to the point where they have become utterly 'illegible'. Moreover, “the forms in which corruption appears are so numerous that trying to list them is like “pouring the sea into a teacup.” Indeed, it is like amoeba, “Amoeba Proteus” which “assumes different shapes at will” and “that has a power to disrupt and transform the very contours of the body.”<sup>140</sup> It is individual choice, 'mafia-style', it is 'venal' and 'petty', it afflicts human rights, development, it helps proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, it is more than ever in the past a threat to the world order<sup>141</sup>.

By losing its relationship to value, capitalism itself “appears immediately as corruption”. “The increasingly abstract sequence of its functioning (from the accumulation of surplus value to monetary and financial speculation) is shown to be a powerful march toward generalized corruption.” It shows itself as a “perversion of the senses of linguistic communication”, touching thus on biopolitical realm and distracting the productive nodes. Tänzler shows how in Romania the pervasiveness of the

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., 389.

<sup>139</sup> Sontag, op.cit., 15.

<sup>140</sup> Weiss, op.cit., 462.

<sup>141</sup> Rotberg, op.cit.



discourse on corruption, maintains the image of mythological political system that in a certain way serves as a platform for the excommunication of ‘people’ from political and social changes<sup>142</sup>. That way, he observes, the new tyrants, i.e. new elites, secure their place in the political order legitimizing themselves through a well-taught neoliberal rhetoric. Smith discusses the case of Nigeria and concludes that

“Nigerians' sense that their state and society have become increasingly amoral — with elites pursuing wealth and power without regard for the consequences, and ordinary people seeking money by all means available simply to survive — contributes to a popular perception that law and order have given way to corruption at every level.”<sup>143</sup>

But, metaphors of pervasive corruption do not only affect people's trust in state and their politicians: under the threat of decay, of the failure of the state, it also becomes an apparatus for imperial development. Thus, the novelty of phenomenon of corruption which justifies intervention is portrayed by the World Bank as “a rise in external demand to which the Bank is responding.”<sup>144</sup> In the words of the World Bank: “corruption is of growing concern to donors, non-governmental organizations, and governments and citizens in developing and industrial countries alike... a small but growing number of countries has approached the Bank for assistance.”<sup>145</sup>

On imperial level, corruption is “the pure exercise of command”. Going back to the etymology of corruption from Latin word *corrumpere*, which is the juncture of Latin preposition *cum* meaning with, and *rumpere* which means to break, we see that corruption, as Koenig observes<sup>146</sup>, has this oxymoronic tendencies: on the one hand, it tends to destroy, to *rumpere* forms of legality and of ‘good life’, and on the other – *cum* tries to establish the relation. This latter is implied in Hardt and Negri's proposition when they discuss corruption as a “moment of metamorphosis that potentially frees spaces for change.”<sup>147</sup> Thus, while the biopolitical generation transforms the subjectivity to enrich them with intellectual and cooperative power, to make of them bodies “beyond measure”, or in Martin's words –

<sup>142</sup> Dirk Tänzler, "Corruption as a Metaphor", *Crime and Culture* 8, European Commission (2007).

<sup>143</sup> Daniel Jordan Smith, "The Paradoxes of Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria", in Rotberg, op.cit., 284.

<sup>144</sup> Polzer, op.cit., 13.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> Gaspard Koenig, *Les discrètes vertus de la corruption*, (Grasset, 2009), 137.

<sup>147</sup> Hardt and Negri, op.cit., 201.

“flexible bodies”, corruption acts like a cancer, like an alien, “unregulated, abnormal, incoherent growth” that breaks the healthy tissue. And just like cancer, which is hard to localize, because it is everywhere, it is impossible to eradicate it completely.

Thus, corruption operates by segmenting society into different units. It ruptures the “community of singular bodies” and inhibits its productive biopolitical action. It opposes generation through the promise of individual choice as opposed to collective action, privatization against common, police action against ideology. As Hardt and Negri conclude, as such, corruption is this paradoxical logic behind the imperial sovereignty which, on the one hand “recognizes and profits from the fact that in cooperation bodies produce more and in community bodies enjoy more”, on the other “it has to obstruct this cooperative autonomy so as not to be destroyed by it.”<sup>148</sup>

In the Empire that assert itself as the Empire of autonomous individuals with the possibility of absolute democracy, in the Empire where there is no more absolute outside and no more ‘real’ wars which can lead to the erasure of ‘domestic’ conflict, where the “great open American spaces eventually ran out”<sup>149</sup>, the Empire, just like the cancerous body, turns against itself in order to keep the *order*.

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<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 172.

## CONCLUSION

That the words create worlds is by now a well-known mantra. However, it sometimes seems that the awareness of such possibility is rather far away from the 'real' world. The aim of this paper was to draw attention to one such possibility. Metaphors do not have to be reserved only for the abstract interplays of a 'free-floating signifiers' somewhere 'there' — they are very real and present. And they do not only bring with them a breeze of a 'foreign air', but on the contrary, and as I have tried to show, they can become a political tool at different moments in history. Thus, we have to thrive to understand not only their historical origins, pitfalls, and various appropriations that have gone through to become strong, autonomous and omnipresent, or even the other way round — powerful while dead, but also to 'unravel' their insidious influence when such things are not clarified.

My purpose was not to impose a value judgment on these 'corrupted' and 'anti-corrupted' phenomena, but rather to draw attention to dominant discourses that make them so pervasive, and that use them either as a tool for 'Othering', or, as Sampson would argue (2005) — to retain their agenda of the 'projectization' of society. To conclude with Harris “we may choose (...) to read against the grain of our culture's dominant discourses of social pathology, and thereby transform organic political analogy into a vehicle for dissent and critique.”<sup>150</sup> To end on a positive note, we may choose to 'perform' some other metaphors.

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<sup>150</sup> Harris, op.cit., 146.

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