

# **Local Ownership Dilemma: The Role of Political Locus of Control in State-Building**

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## ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to explain the conditions under which local ownership transition in the post-conflict state-building fails. The paper identifies the concept of political locus of control as the potential breaker of political ownership transition from international to locals. Political locus of control influences decision-maker's performance. It is suggested that external political locus of control negatively influences development of political accountability. Additionally, this paper argues that intrusive approaches adopted by the international state-builders create the perception of external political locus of control among domestic actors. In addition, it suggests that external political locus of control undermines political ownership transition from internationals to locals. The second half of the paper analyzes these notions on two case studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Mostar and defense reform. The paper concludes that there is a strong correlation between intrusive approach performed by state-builder and external political locus of control held by local actor. Additionally, positive correlation is found between external control and failed local ownership transition.

*Keywords:* political locus of control, local ownership, intrusive state-building,  
Mostar, defense reform

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## INTRODUCTION

The third wave of democratization created many fragile countries. The collapse of communism was characterized by increased political instabilities and escalations of violence in different parts of the world. The last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century faced numerous humanitarian crises. It was the decade of political violent conflicts and violations of basic human rights. The international community responded to these crises by intervening in conflicts and reaching for the termination of hostilities. However, the work of the international community expanded beyond simple establishment of ceasefire, and attempted to create functioning post-conflict countries through state-building processes.

Therefore, state-building aims at the creation of stable and functioning political institutions of a post-conflict state. One of the main objectives of state-building is transition of political ownership from internationals to locals. This paper is going to tackle this component of state-building. Leading scholars in the state-building discipline argue over the best approach to ensure this transition. More specifically, they discuss the best ratio between international and domestic influence over the process of state-building. Fukuyama argues that community driven development benefits post –conflict societies the most.<sup>1</sup> Narten acknowledges that locals should be provided with opportunities to design their own models of governance, however, she also recognizes that post-conflict societies can benefit greatly from joint institutions.<sup>2</sup> While traditional paternalistic mode of state-building is not desirable in the new discourse, Chandler suggests that modern

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<sup>1</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “‘Stateness’ First,” *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 1 (January 2005):86.

<sup>2</sup> Jens Narten, “Dilemmas of Promoting ‘Local Ownership’: The Case of Postwar Kosovo.” In *The Dilemmas of State-Building: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (NY: Routledge, 2009), 253.

discourse on state-building, which is based on informal trusteeship, produces equally devastating results for post-conflict societies as abounded paternalistic models.<sup>3</sup>

This ongoing debate over the most efficient model of state-building for promotion of local empowerment has identified many different factors that act either as facilitators or breakers of local ownership. Scott identifies factors on the domestic side that have potential to undermine state-building, such as political corruption, inefficiency or lack of education.<sup>4</sup> On contrary, other scholars, such as Huges or Chandler suggest that the fault is not always on the domestic side, but on the state-builder's side.<sup>5</sup> Chandler specifically suggests that complicated models of shared sovereignty imposed in post-conflict countries prevent creation of local empowerment.

This paper attempts to contribute to this discussion about the factors that influence local ownership transition. However, the paper is not concerned with identifying a side responsible for undermining state-building, rather it is interested in understanding the process that takes place which leads to transition failure. Therefore, the paper will answer a broad research question: under what conditions local ownership transition fails in the post-conflict state-building? The paper attempts to contribute to this discussion by filling out a gap with analysis of a new concept that potentially influences transition of political ownership in post-conflict state-building. The new concept that will be analyzed is political locus of control.

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<sup>3</sup> Chandler, David. *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building*. London: Pluto Press, 2006, 59.

<sup>4</sup> Zoe Scott, "Literature Review on State-Building" Governance and Social Development Resource Center (University of Birmingham, International Development Department, 2007), 6.

<sup>5</sup> Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac, "Framing Post-Conflict Societies: International Pathologisation of Cambodia and the Post-Yugoslav States," *Third World Quarterly* 26 no. 6 (2005): 873.

Political locus of control is identified as a degree to which political actors perceive that they are able to influence their political environments. People with internal political locus of control believe that they are in control of political environment, while people with external control perceive that they do not have control over their political environments. Externals are prone to demonstrate behaviors which can be characterized as politically unaccountable or irresponsible. The paper will demonstrate strong correlation between intrusive international state-building and external political locus of control. Additionally, it will suggest that external locus of control leads to failed empowerment of local ownership.

In order to analyze the above identified connection among these three concepts, the paper will be divided into four chapters. The first chapter will offer a literature review of state-building and local ownership. The second chapter will tackle the concept of political locus of control by analyzing its influence on decision-makers behaviors in state-building. The last two chapters will offer analyses of two case studies. The first case study is the case of Mostar. Hence the third chapter will explain the negative influence of external political locus of control on local ownership transition. On contrary, the forth chapter will demonstrate the case study of Defense reform in BiH, thus analyzing positive effects of internal locus of control on local ownership.

## CHAPTER I: LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN STATE-BUILDING

The process of state-building is defined as the creation of a stable and functioning post-conflict state. Many established scholars in this field, define this process differently. Chandler defines state-building as “the political process of creating organizational and institutional capacity, legitimacy and political processes for managing expectations and the resource base of the state at the domestic level.”<sup>6</sup> Fukuyama adds the concept of local ownership to the definition, thus identifying state-building as “the creation of government that has a monopoly of legitimate power and that is capable of enforcing rules throughout the state’s territory.”<sup>7</sup> In addition to these, there are many other definitions of state-building. However, this chapter won’t analyze different discourses on state-building, it will rather analyze some of the components of the process and their impacts on success of it. In simple words, state-building attempts to create an efficient post-conflict state by empowering its institutional and political capacities. This chapter will analyze three components that directly influence state-building: core actors, international presence, and local ownership. The chapter will try to identify interactions among them. Additionally, this chapter will analyze the model of state-building used in the Balkan region.

### 1.1. Endogenous vs exogenous state-building

One important aspect of state-building is the mode of political actors involvement. There are two different models of state-building: endogenous and exogenous. The former indicates that the process is controlled by the domestic political actors, while the later implies that the international state-building is designed and led by the external actors. The

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<sup>6</sup> David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building*, (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 10.

<sup>7</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “‘Stateness’ First,” *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 1 (January 2005): 87.



endogenous model of state-building calls for a political environment lacking in external interventions in which domestic political actors are the core actors. The objective is institutional strengthening through domestic political, economic and cultural interactions and reforms.<sup>8</sup> This model of state-building is positively correlated to empowerment of the local ownership (a concept that will be discussed in section 1.3). National state-building is supported by neoliberals and constructivists, with an empirically supported acknowledgment that the process is prone to various political maneuvers often resulting in inefficient, corrupted, and failed reforms and political structures in post-conflict societies. Unlike the endogenous model, the exogenous state-building is based on external interventions. Troncota suggests that this model is supported by realist theory which emphasizes that the process is based on interactions between the aid donor country and aid recipient country.<sup>9</sup> However, a danger of this type of state-building is the establishment of an asymmetrical dependency between donor and recipient. Additionally, this model negatively correlates to the strengthening of the local ownership in the post-conflict societies, thus contributing to the lack of political accountability on the local side.

Political accountability is one of the core constructs in state-building and thus in this paper. It refers to who is politically responsible for the state-building implementation? The answer to this question is important in a case of state-building failure. The endogenous and exogenous models identify responsible actors in a case of failure. The endogenous model is characterized by identifying external actors as

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<sup>8</sup> Miruna Troncota, "‘Balkanization of the Europeanization Process’: How State-Building was Affected by Axiological Matters in the Western Balkans," *Western Balkans Security Observer- English Edition* 21 (2011): 69.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 68.

politically accountable for the disintegration. The local politicians refuse to take responsibility for their political inefficiencies that cause eventual disintegration under the excuse that the external actors “allowed” the disintegration, and are thus to blame.<sup>10</sup> In the exogenous model, the circle of blame goes in opposite direction, where the international community always blames the locals for the state-building failures. The locals are blamed for failing to follow and exercise the directions designed by the exogenous actors. Troncota suggests, that since, in the eyes of the exogenous actors, these directions (which often follow liberal discourse) are just, they are predisposed to produce only positive results.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, any deviation from these directions leads to disintegration, and thus the locals are responsible for not following the rules. These circles of blame identify difficulties in establishing stable local ownership in the post-conflict countries.

While these models are straightforward in identifying the politically accountable actors, the situation on the ground is often not that clear and even implies that both sides are responsible. In order to identify politically responsible actors, it is necessary to understand the division of authorities among the actors participating in state-building. This paper is interested in exogenous model of state-building. Therefore, the following section will analyze the presence of the international community in a post-conflict state. The section will identify the most common legal framework under which the foreigners act in the post-conflict state. It will also identify the division of authorities under this framework, thus implying who should be accountable for the state-building.

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<sup>10</sup> Troncota, “Balkanization of the Europeanization Process’,” 70.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 70.

## 1.2 International territorial administrations

As previously stated, this paper is interested in analyzing exogenous model of state-building. The legitimization of the international presence in sovereign countries has been one of the most debated aspects of state-building. One factor that centers the legitimization issue in the middle of the state-building debate is the collapse of colonialism. Colonialism had defined the interactions among the states in the international system for a very long time, creating a legal justification for controlling internal politics of a foreign country. Once colonialism collapsed, a colonial or donor country faced a challenge preserving its presence in a foreign country. Therefore, traditional modes of international intervention were seen as illegitimate and paternalistic. Additionally, the demand for a new legal framework was especially demonstrated in the post-Cold War era. Chandler suggests that this era has set up a new political environment with an accent on just actions.<sup>12</sup> The political instabilities of the third wave of democratization have called for an increase in the international interventions, thus the international community needed to adopt an intervening mechanism in order to insure that their actions were just.

As indicated above, the discourse on international state-building has transformed over the last couple of decades. State building in the past had aimed at re-establishing a state's independence with full sovereignty. The post –Cold War era has shifted state-building's focus on a notion of responsibility to protect, incorporating intervention and evasion. Therefore, the goal has changed in a way that nowadays state-building aims at

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<sup>12</sup> Chandler, *Empire in Denial*, 13.

re-establishing of a state's independence with partial /controlled/ guided sovereignty.<sup>13</sup>

This produces the informal trusteeship that accounts less political accountability for the international state builders. The EU political involvement in the Balkan region is one example of this trend. Additionally, the Dayton Peace Accord is another example. The legitimization problem of international assistance was solved by developing a mode of intervention identified as international territorial administration.

Territorial administration refers to a “formally constituted, locally based management structure operating with a respect to a particular territorial unit”<sup>14</sup>. This framework legally justifies international presence in fragile states. Locally based territorial administration lowers chances for external actors participating in state-building to be accused of paternalistic behaviors. Therefore, this framework is often used in contemporary international interventions. There can be identified more than 20 different international territorial administration missions in the last 100 years.<sup>15</sup> There are two types of the international territorial administrations: limited and plenary. The limited or partial international territorial administration implies that the external actors are in charge of and provide assistance to some specific stages or programs of state-building. Unlike the limited type, plenary administration allows the external actors broader responsibilities. It also allows international actors to exercise certain executive powers under specific conditions. Two recent examples of the countries where plenary

<sup>13</sup> David Chandler, “State-Building in Bosnia: the Limits of ‘Informal Trusteeship’,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 1 (2006): 24.

<sup>14</sup> Ralph Wilde, “From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration,” *The American Journal of International Law* 95, no. 3 (July 2001): 585.

<sup>15</sup> Ralph Wilde, “Colonialism Redux? Territorial Administration by International Organizations, Colonial Echoes and the Legitimacy of the ‘International’,” in *State-Building: Theory and Practice*, ed. Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson (New York: Routledge, 2007), 31.

administration has taken place are Kosovo and East Timor.<sup>16</sup> In simple words, these two approaches give legal room for the international actors in a post-conflict country to either act as supervisors of state-building or direct implementers of the process.

International territorial administrations are required to act on a domestic ground. However, their identities differ very much from local identities. The administrations and their officials are perceived by the local populations as foreign and different, even if the officials are nationals of a state themselves. Therefore, these administrations are often characterized as parallel administrations. This means that a local population of a post-conflict state perceives the executive power of a country to be divided onto two agents: local and international. Additionally, both agents are perceived as legal representatives of the executive power. Wilde suggests that the international territorial administration is thus seen as a substitute for the ‘normal’ governance.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, its role is to replace the local actors within the internal political sphere when needed. The intervention is justified when the normal governance experiences the following problem(s)<sup>18</sup>:

1. A post-conflict country is perceived to have a sovereignty problem despite the efforts of the local actors to maintain control over the territory;
2. There is a perceived governance problem with the conduct of governance by local actors.

If the international territorial administration decides to intervene in internal politics, it can adopt two approaches. It can opt for direct involvement in a specific question, or it can choose to deal with a situation/crisis through a package of (macro) reforms that include

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<sup>16</sup> Wilde, “From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond,” 585.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 587.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 587.

resolution of a specific micro crisis.<sup>19</sup> Mostar and the Saar are example for direct involvement. In these cases the international administration has been involved into drafting and later imposing the statuses of the units directly. These examples present the sovereignty problem as external problem.<sup>20</sup> In Eastern Slavonia, West Iran, and Leticia the international actors decided to include necessary reforms for these specific crises into broader political packages.

The international state-building process is based on interactions between locals and foreigners. Success of state-building depends on the quality of these interactions. This sub-section has analyzed the legal framework under which interactions are formed. The proposed relationship between locals and foreigners can be characterized as asymmetrical. The next section will discuss a degree of this asymmetry through identification of the role of local ownership in state-building. Specifically, the following sub- section will identify the influence of asymmetry on empowerment of local ownership.

### **1.3 Local ownership in state-building**

Previous subsections have described the roles of the actors and legal framework in the state-building process. This subsection will analyze local ownership as another component that determines the success of the process of institutional restoration. Local ownership is defined as the political process of state and institutional capacity building that is created and controlled by local political actors.<sup>21</sup> The concept originated within the

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<sup>19</sup> Wilde, "From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond," 589.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 590.

<sup>21</sup> Timothy Donais, "Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes," *Peace & Change* 34, no.1 (January 2009): 3.

discipline of participatory development which holds that the prerequisite for successful development is that domestic people are in control of their developmental programs.<sup>22</sup> Local ownership in post-conflict societies is rooted in two approaches to peace-building. Liberal approach supports adoption of liberal democratic models as the most appropriate institutional transformation of the post-conflict systems. This approach calls for the process designed upon liberal standards. The liberal perspective is based on the interactions among the countries in the international realm and positively correlates the adoption of the liberal framework to stability and security of the realm.<sup>23</sup> Unlike liberal perspective, a communitarian approach puts accent on tradition, culture and local systems, and therefore identifies the local actors as the core responsible actors. This process should be led by locals who have freedom to independently choose principles regardless of foreigners' preferences.<sup>24</sup>

The previous paragraph suggests that locals are the only ones who are able to consider all relevant factors (ranging from systemic to cultural) that could influence conflict transformation in their decision –making. Therefore, locals should be given power to (co-)design the state-building process. Fukuyama supports this assumption by suggesting that “community-driven development” which favors endogenous state-building can serve a post-conflict country better in its democratization, due to its orientation towards holding the local political actors accountable for their own institutional/government building.<sup>25</sup> The emphasis on local ownership empowerment

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<sup>22</sup> Jens Narten, “Dilemmas of Promoting ‘Local Ownership’: The Case of Postwar Kosovo.” In *The Dilemmas of State-Building: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (NY: Routledge, 2009), 253.

<sup>23</sup> Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition,” 6.

<sup>24</sup> Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition,” 7.

<sup>25</sup> Fukuyama, “‘Stateness’ First,” 86.

creates patterns of mature, stable and responsible political behaviors early on in the state-building process, and thus positively influences the democratization process in the long run. Furthermore, outsiders' lack of the cultural and political intelligence and sensitivity of the post-conflict societies can undermine effectiveness of the exogenous approach.

However, even though locals are more knowledgeable about their societies, foreigners have institutional expertise needed for state-building. Therefore, endogenous and exogenous models of state-building are not exclusive. However, it is important to find appropriate degree of political involvements of these two sides in the state-building process. The following paragraphs will analyze the development and challenges of local ownership in post-conflict states.

In the case of post-conflict states, very often the roles played by foreigners and locals in state-building are generated at the stage of drafting and signing a peace accord. It is at this stage when the state-building mechanisms are fabricated. Unfortunately, most of the time, local actors are incapacitated to participate due to their militarization and disorganizations.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, a peace accord is drafted by external actors who adopt the dominant liberal discourse of the peace-building. If the adopted principles do not match specificities of post-conflict countries, local actors will experience difficulties positioning themselves in designed political spheres, thus failing to take control over state-building and consequently diminishing local ownership.<sup>27</sup> Nonetheless, even if locals are incapacitated to participate at the indicated stage, they should be given political control once they recapacitate themselves.

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<sup>26</sup> Donais, "Empowerment or Imposition," 9.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 9.



As demonstrated above, when locals are not able to hold leadership positions, foreigners appropriate some executive powers in order to facilitate state-building. While this is appropriate for certain stages, foreigners need to transfer the authorities back to locals. Accordingly, they should adopt the participatory intervention styles. Lemay-Hebert suggests that the main aim of participatory intervention should be the creation of mechanisms that reinforce participatory governance.<sup>28</sup> He identifies participatory governance as the most effective tool for creating sustainable domestic stability. Additionally, this model prevents foreigners' monopoly over politics of a post-conflict state. It proposes limited authorities of international territorial administrations and restricts intrusiveness of foreigners. Therefore, local ownership is not about either/or political authority, it is rather about the relationship between locals and foreigners.

This relationship is based on a leadership style adopted by foreigners. Narten proposes that state-building benefits more from less intrusive international leadership styles.<sup>29</sup> Foreigners' intrusive modes of political behavior can be characterized as, what Hughes and Pupovac call, "pathologization of post-conflict society"<sup>30</sup>. This means that a derogative perception of a post-conflict society enables exogenous actors to adopt paternalistic attitudes toward the implementation of state-building. The paternalistic attitudes undermine development of local ownership. Therefore, the foreigners should avoid using impositions and promote decisions reached in consent with relevant local representatives. While Narten recognizes that plenary administration is often needed at

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<sup>28</sup> Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, "The Potential and Limits of the Local Ownership Paradigm for Future Peace Missions" (paper submitted for the conference "Perspectives on Conflict and Security", University of Birmingham, UK, July 11-12, 2011), 5.

<sup>29</sup> Narten, "Dilemmas of Promoting 'Local Ownership'," 255.

<sup>30</sup> Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupovac, "Framing Post-Conflict Societies: International Pathologisation of Cambodia and the Post-Yugoslav States," *Third World Quarterly* 26 no. 6 (2005): 873.

the beginning of the process of reconstruction, she also suggests that it should be replaced by joint co-administration, whose powers can later be transferred to local administration.<sup>31</sup> In other words, the international community should act as a trainer or consultant to local authorities most of the time, except in limited situations when the plenary authorities are needed.

In addition to the modes of donors' behaviors, the timing of the transfer of political control from foreigners to locals directly influences state-building. Premature transfer of control might find locals unprepared to take political authority. They might lack capacity, expertise and/or experience to run politics independently. All of this negatively influences state-building. Similarly, late transfers of control can also undermine success of state-building. In this case, local politicians became too dependent on the external presence and thus unwilling to act independently.<sup>32</sup> Additionally, too long interventions inhibit political capacities of locals thus reinforcing this dependency. Both types of the negative impacts are intensified with intrusive modes of foreigners' behaviors.

The failure of establishing local ownership leads to devastating consequences for a post-conflict recipient country. If sustainable local ownership is not created, the recipient country is not able to perform political activities in democratic and efficient modes after a donor withdraws from it. Narten suggests that in such case, international intervention "would either be a never-ending and thus, a quasi-colonial external rule, with the inherit risk of increasing resistance from the local population, or the country would be

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<sup>31</sup> Narten, "Dilemmas of Promoting 'Local Ownership'," 256.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 258.

at risk of falling back into violence and chaos”<sup>33</sup>. Therefore, in order for international donors to exit post-conflict country, the transition of political authority and capacity from international actors to locals is highly needed.

While the previous paragraphs analyze foreigners’ attitudes toward local ownership, this paragraph will briefly suggest that profiles of domestic political actors also matter in establishing successful domestic political control. Foreigners often cooperate with domestic political elites who deliberately diminish progress of local ownership in order to increase their self-interests. This is especially evident in post-conflict societies that adopt political systems vulnerable to nationalism. Fukuyama identifies three reasons for such behaviors. One reason is that locals support the establishments of institutions and policies that serve only their own interests. They oppose everything else that is out of their scope of personal advantages. Another reason is that these domestic politicians often engage in corruption and/or ‘rent-seeking mentality’ trying to abuse and manipulate the presence of internationals by charging local inputs.<sup>34</sup> Additionally, Fukuyama suggests that sometime locals fail to gain expertise of the liberal governmental approach, thus they fail to recognize all political opportunities available to them. Consequently, they are not able to engage in effective cost-benefit policy decision- making, hence undermining state-building.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to Fukuyama’s reasons, there are many other factors that increase negative domestic political attitudes towards local-ownership development. While many arguments identify cultural and historical characteristics of a nation as the possible

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<sup>33</sup> Narten, “Dilemmas of Promoting ‘Local Ownership,’” 252.

<sup>34</sup> Fukuyama, “‘Stateness’ First,” 86.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 86.

components that negatively influence state-building, this paper won't analyze those discourses. However, the paper is interested in interpreting the process of local ownership transition from exogenous actors to endogenous actors. But, the paper will analyze the role of political locus of control on this transition. Political locus of control will be defined and analyzed in details in the second chapter. However, before the second chapter, the following section will briefly explain state-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This section is relevant for the paper because the last two chapters will analyze case studies from BiH.

#### **1.4 Transition of political ownership in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The open-ended state-building that takes place in Bosnia and Herzegovina has started in 1995 after signing the Dayton Peace Accord.<sup>36</sup> The state-building aimed at three transformations:

1. to stop the war and restore peace and political stability,
2. to create a post-conflict agenda aimed at creating sustainable development, and
3. political and economic regime change toward democracy and open market economy.<sup>37</sup>

The Dayton was drafted by the international actors without consent of the local political actors. The agreement and its regulations were vulnerable to the nationalistic political agendas perpetuated by the actors who started or were directly involved in the war.

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<sup>36</sup> "The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," OHR, last modified December 14, 1995, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content\\_id=380](http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380)

<sup>37</sup> Troncota, "Balkanization of the Europeanization Process," 65.

Therefore, in general terms Dayton created the post-war politics that can be characterized as “frozen conflict”.<sup>38</sup> This means that ethnic divisions and tensions stayed, but the means of the conflict changed. It is important to recognize that the agreement adopted liberal peace-building approach for Bosnia. The Agreement envisioned development of local ownership under a supervision of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The OHR was given were flexible and intrusive powers which will be discussed in detail in the section 2.6.

The state-building in BiH was first designed as an intervention in a post-conflict country. At this point, as Chandler suggests, the presence of the OHR was justified “by the principle of consent”.<sup>39</sup> Interestingly, the OHR was subordinate to Peace Implementation Council (PIC) which was not hold responsible under the international law, thus making the OHR not legally accountable under the international law either. This implies that the Dayton agreement pioneered very intrusive and flexible state-building model. Unlike any other peace agreement the Dayton Agreement had a strong emphasis on political and civilian reconstruction of the country. Originally envisioned exit date for the OHR was 1996 upon the state-level elections. The international community envisioned transferring political powers back to locals after the elections. However, the transition failed to take place and the OHR prolonged its mandate indefinitely in 1997.

The imposition of the Bonn powers in 1997 transferred the relationship between internationals and locals into a protectorate democracy model. This model kept strong

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<sup>38</sup> Chandler, “From Dayton to Europe,” 336.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 337

emphasis on the local empowerment, but it allowed the exogenous actors to hold authority over most decision-making. The Bonn powers vested the High Representative with authority to “set political agenda, impose it, and punish with sanctions those who refuse it to implement it”<sup>40</sup>.

From 2000, the OHR started losing its legitimacy in BiH. However, this did not increase the transition of political ownership from the OHR to locals. On contrary, the transition of powers took place, but it was directed towards the EU. At this point the international community designed a new state-building model for BiH. This time EU membership was carrot for the local politicians. The international community wanted to replace “the ‘push’ of the Bonn powers with the ‘pull’ of European powers”<sup>41</sup>. The EU pre-accession instrument seemed a perfect match for the country. This approach combined technical and normative modeling according to the EU standards.<sup>42</sup> This approach was further supported by a view that the EU enlargement, due to its pre-accession package, served as a great incentive for the domestic politicians to successfully transfer political ownership from the international level to domestic/local levels.<sup>43</sup> In the light of this new approach, the OHR marked 2007 as its exit date.<sup>44</sup> However, this exit failed leaving BiH with two international institutions the OHR and the EUSR.

The available literature explains constant failures of BiH to transfer political powers to locals on different ways. Chandler suggests that models imposed by the

<sup>40</sup> Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition,” 4.

<sup>41</sup> Chandler, “From Dayton to Bosnia,” 343.

<sup>42</sup> Troncota, “Balkanization of the Europeanization Process,” 76.

<sup>43</sup> Fukuyama, “‘Stateness’ First,” 86.

<sup>44</sup> “Christian Schwarz-Schilling: Delaying OHR’s Departure not in BiH’s Interest,” OHR, last modified August 25, 2006, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content\\_id=37934](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=37934).

international community do not design such transition. He uses the example of the exit of the UN International Police Task Force, which was replaced with the European CFSP shortly after.<sup>45</sup> On the other side, Troncota identifies inefficiencies on local side as the main spoilers of the transition. He claims that locals do not have sense of political accountability and thus are unable to carry out all the necessary reforms. Similarly, Fukuyama suggests that domestic politicians are often trapped into corrupted and “rent-seeking mentalities”<sup>46</sup> thus failing and even avoiding adopting the transfer of power. He also suggests that one of the possible factors that negatively influences transition to local ownership envisioned in the EU accession process, is a failure of the local political actors to gain appropriate intelligence about the state-building process and liberal components of it, that had been originally implemented and consequently had shaped the political environment of the country.<sup>47</sup> As these examples demonstrate, there is an ongoing debate over the process of power transition in BiH. This paper will contribute to this discussion by identify another possible factor that negatively influences this transition. The next chapter will explain the concept of political locus of control as indentified in the previous section. This concept can be understood as the unintentional creation of the international community in BiH which ended up prolonging their stay.

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<sup>45</sup> Chandler, “From Dayton to Bosnia,” 345.

<sup>46</sup> Troncota, “Balkanization of the Europeanization Process’, ”82.

<sup>47</sup> Fukuyama, “‘Stateness’” First,” 86.

## CHAPTER II: POLITICAL LOCUS OF CONTROL

The previous chapter identified the most important components of state-building with local ownership being one of them. Some of the potential factors that can undermine development of local ownership in post-conflict societies have been identified in the previous sections. This chapter is going to analyze the influence of political locus of control on this concept. The chapter will suggest that political locus of control is correlated with political actors' behaviors. In particular, the chapter will suggest that external political locus of control negatively influences political actors' perceptions of local ownership. Thus, external locus of control diminishes opportunities for transfer of ownership from internationals to locals. On the other side, internal political locus of control increases opportunities for local ownership transition. The chapter will identify the different types of influence of political locus of control on actors' behaviors. However, the first section will define the concept of political locus of control.

### 2.1 Defining political locus of control

Theory about locus of control belongs to social-learning theory. The concept was developed by Julian Rotter in 1954. Locus of control is defined as a degree to which individuals perceive that they are in control of events in their lives.<sup>48</sup> There are two types of locus of control: internal and external. The internally controlled individuals are ones who perceive events in their lives to be under their control and thus they can influence them. The externally controlled individuals perceive the events in their lives not to be

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<sup>48</sup> Donald C. Pennington, "Basics of Social Psychology," Jastrebarsko: Naklada Slap (2004): 24.



under their control, and thus the individuals cannot influence them.<sup>49</sup> External locus of control has a causal relationship with passivity and learned helplessness. The identified definitions define general locus of control in one's life. Since this paper is interested in analyzing the relationship between political environment and locus of control, I will use a new concept of the control. I will name the concept political locus of control.

Political locus of control will be interpreted as a narrow concept that reflects interaction between political systems--structures and political actors--agents. I define political locus of control as a degree to which political actors perceive that they are able to influence their political environments. Internal political locus of control characterizes those political actors who believe that they have capacity to influence their political environments. The actors who believe that they are unable to influence the political surroundings are defined as externally politically controlled actors. These two types of the actors will be referred to as internals and externals in the following sections.

This concept is independent of the general locus of control, meaning that an individual's perceptions of general and political locus of control can differ. I modeled the concept after Wolman's model of political efficacy.<sup>50</sup> Political locus of control explains behaviors in the political arena better than the general locus of control. Political locus of control and activity level of political behavior are in a correlation relationship. However, Wolman suggests that the strength of this correlation and sufficient data available support

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<sup>49</sup> Stanley M. Gully, and Jean M. Phillips, "Role of Orientation, Ability, Need for Achievement, and Locus of Control in the Self-Efficacy and Goal-Setting Process," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 82, no.5 (1997): 795.

<sup>50</sup> Neil Wollman and Robin Stouder, "Believed Efficacy and Political Activity: A Test of the Specificity Hypothesis," *The Journal of Social Psychology* 131, no. 4 (2001): 558.

assumptions that a causal relationship can be expected.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, it can be assumed that political locus of control directly affects political behaviors. Furthermore, it can be assumed that this concept influences perceptions of local ownership among domestic political actors in post-conflict societies.

Paulhus has demonstrated that internals and externals differ in their political behaviors and activity when responding to stimuli of the same level of motivation.<sup>52</sup> Internals are associated with increased political activism, including political behaviors such as active participation in policy-making, voting, boycotting, and increased interactions with other political actors.<sup>53</sup> These behaviors are expected for these actors due to their perceptions of internal control in political matters. Unlike them, externals perceive politics as out of their influence; thus they are characterized by passivity. These views of powerless eventually lead to learned helplessness among these actors. In other words, these actors fail to act even when they have a capacity to influence political matters.

External political locus of control is influenced by different environmental factors. This perception is not fixed, which means that it is influenced by political environment.<sup>54</sup> Harvey suggests that government administrators are prone to adopt external perception of control under certain circumstances.<sup>55</sup> Absence of opportunities to exercise decision-making skills is one of the factors that influences onset of the perception. Inability to exercise decision-making authority directly causes “lack of

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<sup>51</sup> Neil Wollman and Robin Stouder, “Believed Efficacy and Political Activity,” 557.

<sup>52</sup> Delroy Paulhus, “Sphere-Specific Measures,” of Perceived Control,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 44, no. 6 (1983): 1261.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 1262.

<sup>54</sup> Donald C. Pennington, “Basics of Social Psychology,” 58.

<sup>55</sup> Michael J. Harvey, “Locus of Control Shift in Administrators,” *Perceptual and Motor Skills* 33 (1971): 980.

internal reinforcement through disconfirmation of internal control expectancies”<sup>56</sup>. The lack of decision-making opportunities is caused by political constraints on the individual’s independent decision-making. Political lobbying and bargaining influence politicians to behave in certain manners, that might be opposite of their personal preferences. This disbalance between behavior and personal belief enhances the perception of an external political locus of control. In addition to these influences, politicians are prevented from independent decision-making due to budget cuts, inefficient or incompetent staff, and other organizational barriers.<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, in order to be re-elected, promoted or rise in their careers, political actors often find themselves trapped into making decisions that reflect preferences of their constituents, political ideologies and political parties’ platforms. By meeting these targeted preferences in their behaviors, political actors fail to exercise decision-making authority. The above identified factors which prevent politicians from using their knowledge, expertise, and competencies in decision-making, increase their sense of frustrations and powerlessness. Therefore, Harvey suggests that external locus of control rises as a psychological defense among political actors.<sup>58</sup> However, as previously stated, this perception is not fixed. A external locus can be transformed into an internal one and vice versa. The factor that influences this transformation is years of experience practicing certain modes of behaviors.<sup>59</sup> All this information is valuable for this paper, since it outlines potential influences of political locus of control on political leadership styles. The next section will analyze two different leadership styles that can be adopted by state-builders and domestic politicians in post-

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<sup>56</sup> Michael J. Harvey, “Locus of Control Shift in Administrators,” 980.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 981.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 982.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 981.

conflict states. Additionally, the section will analyze interaction between political locus of control and these leadership styles.

## 2.2 Political locus of control and leadership style

Leadership style is a very important concept which can directly influence the process of the state-building. leadership theories analyze various factors that influence leadership styles. These factors are divided into two major groups: personal characteristics and environmental contexts.<sup>60</sup> Political locus of control belongs to the former group, while the latter group of factors can influence it. Empirics suggest that internals are prone to demonstrate more personality traits effective for the leadership, while externals are found to be ineffective bureaucrats, as well as leaders.<sup>61</sup> There are multiple models of leadership, however this section will analyze only two major models: transactional and transformational. The transactional model is a leadership style based on “a series of exchanges between leaders and followers”<sup>62</sup>. This model uses systems of rewards and punishments in order to influence others. Under transactional model these systems are called “contingent reward leadership” and “management by exception” retrospectively.<sup>63</sup> Due to the nature of the model, this style is also characterized as responsive and thus passive. Transactional leaders work within the existing structures, without high incentives to changes them. Furthermore, the leaders also engage more in ideologies of “societal determination of behavior”<sup>64</sup>. These characteristics of the model

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<sup>60</sup> Elina Ibrayeva et al., “The Potential for the ‘Dark Side’ of Leadership on Post-Communist Countries,” *Journal of World Business* 33, no. 2 (1998): 186.

<sup>61</sup> Michael J. Harvey, “Locus of Control Shift in Administrators,” 981.

<sup>62</sup> Bruce J. Avolio and Jane M. Howell, “Transformational Leadership, Transactional Leadership, Locus of Control, and Support for Innovation: Key Predictors of Consolidates-Business-Unit Performance,” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 78, no. 6 (1993): 891.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 891.

<sup>64</sup> Delroy Paulhus, “Sphere-Specific Measures,” 1262.

suggest that externals are prone to adopt it. Additionally, since people in post-communist countries tend to have low levels of internal control, this model is also characteristic for these countries.<sup>65</sup>

Unlike externals, internals are characterized as actors with high self-confidence, inner control and self-determination, and thus are more likely to adopt transformational leadership. Howell defines transformational model as a “leadership that goes beyond exchanging inducements for desired performance by developing, intellectually stimulating, and inspiring followers to transcend their own self-interests for a higher collective purpose, mission, or vision.”<sup>66</sup> In other words this leadership model emphasizes long-term goals for improving the political environments by placing an accent on political initiatives to positively and actively impact the process of the improvement. This suggests that these leaders oppose the status-quo and opt for more participative leadership models. Therefore, transformational leadership is a more proactive model which emphasized self-determination. These qualities make the model more appropriate for vulnerable systems that are undergoing political reformations due to its long-term quality orientation. However, it must be noted that the transactional and transformational models are not exclusive.<sup>67</sup> A leader can simultaneously exercise both models (in different amounts depending on context) while complementing them.

The above concepts can be applied on a case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would be correct to identify the relationship between the foreigners and local political actors as transactional leadership with foreigners in a role of leaders. The presence of the OHR and

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<sup>65</sup> Elina Ibrayeva et al., “The Potential for the ‘Dark Side,’” 194.

<sup>66</sup> Bruce J. Avolio and Jane M. Howell, “Transformational Leadership,” 891.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 892.

existence of the Bonn powers clearly illustrates that the relation between these two groups is based on a reward and punishment model. Frequent use of the Bonn powers over the recent years strongly enforces the view that the international community regulates the locals with this leadership style. However, the state-building process implemented in BiH strives to create a local transformational leadership which could maintain peace and stability of Bosnian highly nationalistically composed political system. The transformational local leadership is better fit for BiH's long-term stability and prosperity.

However, two factors reinforce the transactional leadership in BiH. First, the local political behaviors are modeled after the political practice of foreigners in BiH. Bosnian politicians do not have internalized participative and democratic modes of governing. When a post-conflict political system is dysfunctional, the local leaders tend to advocate radical changes and increase charismatic images of themselves, thus transforming themselves into what Phillips calls "dark leaders".<sup>68</sup> Post-communist societies are especially prone to this sequence, due to a psychological tendency of the once oppressed actor (when given a political control) to continue manifesting passive behaviors even in a new system. This means that the cognitive understanding of political order of this actor is based on concepts of authority and clear hierarchy. The transactional leadership exercised in BiH reinforces the notions of hierarchy and political dependency. Therefore, the locals do not have a model of transformational leadership which they could internalize.

Second argument implies that this reinforcement of the transactional leadership is furthermore possible due to the previously described interaction of locus of control with a

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<sup>68</sup> Elina Ibrayeva et al., "The Potential for the 'Dark Side,'" 193.

leadership style. Transactional leadership assists a creation of external political locus of control. Since it is based on the models of rewards and punishments, Bosnian politicians depend on the OHR's judgment of their performances. This presence of external judgment makes local politicians susceptible to develop notions of external control. This development of the external notions is greater in BiH due to communist political modeling in ex-Yugoslavia. A degree of external political locus of control presents a direct barrier to creation of transformational leadership, which, regarding BiH, can be characterized as highly needed. Political locus of control has very strong impacts on political behaviors.

This section has explained one aspect of the relation between the control and leadership style. The next section will analyze this relationship by using concepts of goal orientation and self-efficacy. This will explain cognitive consequences of internalization of political locus of control among political actors. This section will add to our understanding of political actors' preferences.

### **2.3 Political goal-setting**

Political locus of control directly influences an actor's perception, categorization and interpretation. Internals and externals will to very differently interpret same political stimuli.<sup>69</sup> The actors' persuasion of a certain behavior depends on an objective assessment of their own skills and subjective perception of their ability -self-efficacy. Phillips identifies various factors that influence a view of self-efficacy. These include:

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<sup>69</sup> Shephard Liverant and Alvin Scodel, "Internal and External Control as Determinants of Decision Making under Conditions of Risk," *Psychological Reports* 7 (1960): 66.

“past performance, psychological states, vicarious experiences, and verbal persuasion”.<sup>70</sup>

Bandura’s social-cognitive theory of self-regulation explains a role of self-efficacy in determining human behaviors.<sup>71</sup> The concept of self-efficacy is positively correlated with a goal level setting in a decision-making. Goal level setting is defined as a degree of complexity of a goal an actor wishes to meet/perform. Therefore, a higher perception of self-efficacy produces higher goal levels. Additionally, a goal level is positively correlated with performance, implying that higher goal levels increase performance quality. The locus of control influences the identified cognitive and behavioral processes. One explanation of this influence is that internals, due to their beliefs in their own abilities to influence an environment, are more likely to have stronger perceptions of their self-efficacies than externals.<sup>72</sup>

However, there is another approach to explaining the interaction between these variables which is more important for a analysis of political behavior. There are two types of actor’s goal orientation: learning and performance goal orientation.<sup>73</sup> Phillips identifies a learning goal orientation as a “desire to increase one’s task competence, whereas a performance orientation reflects a desire to do well and to be positively evaluated by others”.<sup>74</sup> In other words, the former orientation is internally driven process, while the later is externally driven and modeled process. The performance orientation holds that subjects’ capacities are fixed, thus these subjects modify their behaviors only in regard to external enforcement. This means that performance orientation is “negatively

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<sup>70</sup> Stanley M. Gully and Jean M. Phillips, “Role of Orientation,” 793.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. 795.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 794.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.



related to self-efficacy”<sup>75</sup>, while learning orientation is positively related. These two goal orientations also interact with locus of control. The theory of locus of control suggests that internals view capacities as pliable, therefore they have higher need for achievement and are more likely to cognitively opt for learning goal performance. On the other side, externals believe that their abilities are fixed which negatively influences their need for achievement, therefore they are prone to choose performance goal orientation.<sup>76</sup>

This interaction among the motivational variable, cognitive process and behavior is important in explaining the barriers to the local ownership transition. State-building which support onset of a strong asymmetrical dependency and territorial administration model the local political actors to cognitively prefer performance goal orientation. Thus, the behaviors of the locals are shaped after the instructions given by the foreigners. Since the externals with performance orientation tend to avoid failure, they will engage only in the operations designed by the foreigners. An example of this modeling is the Bonn powers. These executive powers are used by the OHR for controlling the state-building in BiH. The powers include punishment of the locals for failing to perform desirable and effective tasks for the country. This superior evaluative role of the OHR reinforces the performance goal orientation. Paulhus argues that level of motivation influences a subject’s performance, especially punishment which actually serves as a better motivational factor that reinforcement.<sup>77</sup> This implies that out of a fear of being punished, the local politicians will use only the foreign intelligence and capacities in problem-solving processes. A danger of this dependency is that it decreases the local actors’

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<sup>75</sup> Stanley M. Gully and Jean M. Phillips, “Role of Orientation,” 797.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 797.

<sup>77</sup> Delroy Paulhus, “Sphere-Specific Measures,” 1261.

perceptions of their self-efficacy. Over time the locals lose their judgment about their own problem-solving skills, and thus even if they have real capacities to perform problem-solving operations independently of the foreigners, they fail to engage in such operations due to low self-efficacy and reluctance of setting high performance goals.<sup>78</sup> The tendency to operate only under clear international and/or imposed instructions diminishes opportunities for the transition of political ownership from the foreigners to the locals. In addition to performance orientation, at some stages externals are also drawn to perform risky behaviors, thus challenging the external force. This characteristic will be explained in the following section.

## 2.4 Political risk taking

The locus of control is correlated with a risk decision-making process. An individual's preference for risk taking is based on his/her perception of luck. In other words, a degree of belief in luck will determine whether an individual will behave in a rational or irrational manner. Actors with internal locus of control tend to be low risk takers, meaning that they play safe. As such, these actors can be labeled as rational, and thus predictive and responsible.<sup>79</sup> On the other hand, a person with an external locus of control tends to believe that an external force can indeed influence his/her performance. Therefore, this person has very strong belief in luck, and is liable to perform risky behaviors.<sup>80</sup> This preference for risk characterizes the person as irrational. An individual with external locus of control makes his/her decisions in two ways: random choice or

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<sup>78</sup> Stanley M. Gully and Jean M. Phillips, "Role of Orientation," 795.

<sup>79</sup> Shephard Liverant and Alvin Scodel, "Internal and External Control," 65.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

decision-making based on previous modeling.<sup>81</sup> Neither of these two types of decision-making is beneficial for the state-building process. While the danger with the former type is the unpredictability factor, the danger with the latter type is inability to break the locals' dependency on the foreigners. The strong asymmetrical relation between these actors and late onset of local ownership strongly model locals to become depended on decisions or instructions from foreigners. Therefore, locals are modeled not to take decisions on their own, and thus local ownership transition is prone to fail. Additional negative component of risk taking among externals is that their senses of responsibility are lower than among internals, due to the externals' believes in an external factor. Therefore, it is expected that externals are less likely to take full responsibility for their actions. In addition to being politically irresponsible, externals are also prone to exercise intrusive political behaviors. This characteristic will be analyzed in the following section.

## **2. 5 Political control and use of coercive powers**

In addition to the influences of locus of control on the previously described areas of personal and political behaviors, this section will analyze the influence of this concept on the degree of use of power. Social learning theory strongly supports notions that actors with internal locus of control are more confident in their abilities to influence others, while, externals lack this confidence and thus reinforce views that they are ineffective or powerless in influencing others. The political actors with these two different confidence levels, therefore, act differently in environments when interacting with other subjects. Goodstadt suggests that the internals or actors with high levels of confidence in their abilities to impact others tend to engage in behaviors that include personal persuasion

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<sup>81</sup> Shephard Liverant and Alvin Scodel, "Internal and External Control," 66.

acts (e.g. give encouragement or praise) more frequently than those with low confidence.<sup>82</sup> The actors with low confidence, who are also characterized as externals, tend to engage more frequently in behaviors that demonstrate more coercive power. There are several explanations of the tendency to engage in such coercive manners when interacting with others. One explanation suggests that with the use of the coercive governing models, the externals advance their perceptions of self-esteem, thus upgrading their notions of dignity and worth.<sup>83</sup> Another explanation acknowledges the roles of past experiences, former political systems, and the overall aggressiveness of a culture or an environment. In order to understand this tendency, it is important to acknowledge that externals believe that they will fail to successfully impact others. They, therefore, engage in these aggressive modes of ruling even when there is an objective judgment that they hold capacities to influence.

Acknowledgement of this tendency of externals to use intrusive approaches is very important when analyzing the influence of political locus of control on local ownership. As analyzed in previous paragraphs, the strong asymmetrical system of the state-building produces depended local political actors. This dependency increases the perception of external political locus of control among locals, and thus increases the use of aggressive modes of governing once the local ownership is transformed. The use of coercive governing directly undermines the liberal components of the state-building, thus creating political inefficiencies and consequently calling for increased international interventions. Therefore, the external political locus of control indirectly diminishes

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<sup>82</sup> Barry E. Goodstadt and Larry A. Hjelle, "Power to the Powerless: Locus of Control and the use of Power," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 27, no. 2 (1973): 190.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

process of democratization of a post-conflict society. There are many examples from BiH that prove this negative influence. The most recent example is the use of the coercive powers by local power-holders in Mostar in response to the citizens' demonstrations that took place in February 2014. The power-holders in Mostar issued an order to arrest a certain number of protesters in a secret mission that took place during a night after the demonstrations.<sup>84</sup> Another example from Mostar is a recent denial of authorization to hold public demonstrations by authority figures of the city.<sup>85</sup> These processes demonstrate abuse of power and low transparency of governing, thus undermining democratic principles. The next section will further analyze the presence of external political locus of control among Bosnian politicians.

## 2.6 External political locus of control in BiH

The previous sections analyzed the influence of political locus of control on political actors' behaviors. This section will apply the identified concepts on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The section 2.1 recognizes lack of independent decision-making as the main factor that creates the perception of external political locus of control. As recognized in this chapter, there are many administrative and systematic constraints that decrease opportunities for politicians to engage in independent decision-making. Since this paper is interested in international state-building, it will account the international presence as the main constrain on domestic political autonomy. This paper aims at explaining the failure of the political ownership transition from internationals to

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<sup>84</sup> Mondo.rs, "Masovna Hapsenja u Mostaru," last modified February 8, 2014, accessed June 1, 2014, <http://mondo.rs/a660227/Info/Ex-Yu/Masovna-hapsenja-u-Mostaru.html>.

<sup>85</sup> Tina Jelin-Dizdar. "Otkazan Protest Ispred Vile Lidera HDZ BiH: Ko se Boji Covica Jos," *Radio of Free Europe*, December 24, 2013, accessed June 1, 2014, <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/otkazan-protest-ispred-vile-lidera-hdzbih-ko-se-boji-covica-jos/25211149.html>.

locals in Bosnia by using the concept of political control. Therefore, the next paragraph will explain the main constrain to independent domestic decision making in Bosnia.

The OHR (as identified in the section 1.4) is the official representative of the international community in BiH. The Dayton Peace Agreement regulated the mandate of the OHR in Annex 10. Article V of this Annex recognizes the High Representative as “the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the said Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement”<sup>86</sup> Additionally, Article II.1. (d) states that the High Representative should “[f]acilitate, as the High Representative judges necessary, the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation”<sup>87</sup>. These two provisions of Annex 10 imply that the High Representative was given power to interpret his own authorities and powers.<sup>88</sup> Additionally, he had authority to independently interpret any domestic political activity and act upon his judgment. These flexible authorities guaranteed by the Dayton, directly limited the domestic political autonomy and independent decision making. The implementation of the Bonn Powers in 1997 further decreased the domestic political autonomy. The PIC decided to vest executive and legislative powers to the High Representative (HR), thus enabling the HR to rule by decree and remove domestic political actors from Bosnian institutions.<sup>89</sup> These legal provisions created asymmetrical dependency between internationals and locals, hence promoting transactional leadership style with foreigners in a role of leaders.

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<sup>86</sup> “The General Framework Agreement: Annex 10,” OHR, last modified December 14, 1995, accessed June 1, 2014. [http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content\\_id=366](http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=366)

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> David Chandler, “From Dayton to Europe,” *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 3 (2005): 340.

<sup>89</sup> Bart M.J Szewczyk, “The EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Powers, Decisions and Legitimacy,” *Occasional Paper*, no. 83, (2010): 32.

These state-building regulations imposed in BiH placed locals in subordinate positions. Hence, this internationally envisioned state-building process facilitated creation of the perception of external political locus of control among domestic actors from the start. The High Representative's frequent implementation of the given powers over the post-Dayton years further reinforced this perception, thus strengthening the internalization of external control among locals. Such high degree of the internalization of external control in locals negatively influenced the transition of political ownership from foreigners to Bosnians. This failure of the political ownership transfer had devastating consequences for the democratization of the country. The reason is that this intrusive political approach used by the international community in BiH produced a generation of politically unaccountable actors.

The disempowered Bosnian politicians over the years internalized external political locus of control, thus demonstrating behaviors typical for this group of actors. The sections 2.2 – 2.5 of this chapter identified some of these behaviors performed by domestic actors. These sections have suggested that domestic actors demonstrate passive and responsive performance oriented modes of behaviors. Additionally, Bosnian politicians display tendencies to adopt the transactional intrusive styles of governing in their domestic sectors thus negatively influencing democratization of the country. All these behaviors suggest that locals are politically unaccountable actors, thus failing to take over the local ownership.

This section identified the negative influences of external locus of control on local ownership in BiH. The following chapters will demonstrate the influence of political

control on local ownership on two case studies. The methodology will be explained in the following section.

## **2.7 Research design**

This paper attempts to explain the conditions under which local ownership transition in the post-conflict state-building fails. Therefore, the research question of the paper is: under what conditions does local ownership transition fail in the post-conflict state-building? In order to answer this question, the paper will analyze the following concepts: political locus of control (including external and internal locus), local ownership, state-building process, and political behaviors.

The paper suggests that these concepts are in a relationship. The paper suggests the following relationship: intrusive state-building approaches in post-conflict countries performed by exogenous actors create external political locus of control which diminish political accountability among endogenous actors that consequently negatively influences transition of political ownership from exogenous to endogenous actors.

This paper is going to use post-positivist approach, there the observed relationships will be correlational and not causal. The paper will observe two correlations. Hypothesis number 1 is that there is a positive correlation between intrusive state building approach and external locus of control. Hypothesis number 2 is that there is a negative correlation between external political locus of control and local ownership.

These expectations will be tested on two case studies. Both case studies are from Bosnia and Herzegovina. One case study is the case of Mostar. This case study will be analyzed in Chapter III. This case will demonstrate strong positive correlation between



intrusive state-building approach and external locus of control. Additionally, this case will also demonstrate negative impact of external control on local ownership. The second case study will be defense reform. This case study will analyze the positive impact of internal locus of control on local ownership. Additionally, this case will suggest positive correlation between less intrusive approaches and internal locus of control.

In order to analyze the above concepts on these case studies, this paper will operationalize political locus of control. Two variables will be used for testing for a political locus. One variable will be a degree of intrusiveness of the state-building approach used by the internationals, and the other variable will be a degree of agreement over a proposed legislation between locals and internationals. The coding for these two variables is the following: high degree of intrusiveness and low degree of political agreement represent external locus of control. On contrary, low degree of intrusiveness and high degree of political agreement indicate internal political locus of control.

In order to analyze its hypotheses the paper will use primary and secondary data, published in English and the local languages spoken in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among other academic data, the paper will use official documents in order to analyze two case studies. Additionally, the paper will use some news sources when necessary.

## CHAPTER III: EXTERNAL POLITICAL LOCUS OF CONTROL:

### THE CASE STUDY OF MOSTAR

The Washington Agreement signed in 1994, and Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995 created, among other things, the territorial arrangements of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>90</sup> Additionally, the agreements granted the special status to the city of Mostar as the city of Bosnian Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. The Agreement established a ceasefire between the two groups, nevertheless, leaving the city politically divided onto two parts. The side of the city that was dominated by Bosnian Croats was labeled as the West side, while the East side was controlled by Bosniaks.<sup>91</sup> Given the special status, Mostar has been under international control since then. This chapter will analyze the international presence in Mostar. The chapter will suggest that intrusive political approaches used by internationals created external political locus of control among locals. The following sections will identify two variables that represent external control. These variables are: the act of international imposition of legal documents and the low degree of local political agreement with imposed legislation. Furthermore, the chapter will imply that external political locus of control negatively influenced state-building attempts of empowerment of local institutions in Mostar. These concepts will be analyzed on the two examples of creation of Mostar Statutes.

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<sup>90</sup> United States Institute of Peace. "Washington Agreement." Accessed June 1, 2014. Available at: <http://www.bihdaytonproject.com/?p=434>.

<sup>91</sup> Mladen Klemencic and Clive Schofield, "Mostar: make or break for the federation," *Boundary and Security Bulletin* 4, no. 2 (1996), 75.

### 3.1. The EU Administration

The application of international territorial administration has been first introduced through out the presence of the EU administration. The mandate of the administration lasted from 23 July 1994 to 23 July 1996.<sup>92</sup> The administration was deployed as temporary response to sovereignty and governance problems faced at the local levels. In particular, the EU administration (EUAM) was deployed due to the inability of domestic political actors to reach consensus about governing Mostar jointly.<sup>93</sup>

In order to deal with conflicted domestic parties and political post-war instability in Mostar, the administration was given plenary authorities. The position of the head of the EUAM (the Administrator) was performed by Hans Koschnick who was given supreme authority to govern by decree. Under his supervision, the EAUM divided the city into six different municipalities and a central zone. In attempt to create political communication with locals, the EUAM appointed the Advisory Council, composed of local politicians. Even though the head of the EUAM reported back to and consulted the Advisory Council about the political undertakings of the EUAM, the Council itself had no authority over decision-making of the EU administration.<sup>94</sup> This constrained political interaction between foreigners and locals can be understood as the first phase in which the political control had been taken away from the locals. In this phase, the locals were mere observers of the political decision-making that was taking place in Mostar. Therefore, already in this phase, the locals experienced external political authority. This

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<sup>92</sup> John Yarwood, *Rebuilding Mostar: Urban Reconstruction in a War Zone* (UK: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 8.

<sup>93</sup> Ralph Wilde, *International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and Civilizing Mission Never Went Away* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2008), 208.

<sup>94</sup> Yarwood, *Rebuilding Mostar*, 8.

experience was intensified with the political events that followed, one of which will be analyzed in the next section.

### ***3.1.1 Interim Statute 1996***

The mandate of the EU administration was determined by the Memorandum of Agreement (MOU), which indicated six political areas that needed reforms.<sup>95</sup> One of them was the creation of the multi-ethnic administration in the city. This reform was accomplished through the imposition of the Interim Statute in 1996.<sup>96</sup> This paper identifies the imposition of this statute as one of the examples of external political locus of control. The international community without the expertise of the local political parties designed the document. Given the plenary powers of the EUAM and the absence of local governance the statute was imposed by this administration. This intrusive approach created perception among locals that they are subordinate actors to internationals.

This externally designed document aimed at the creation of the local multi-ethnic administration and transfer of plenary powers from the EUAM to the locals. In order to create it, the EUAM drafted and imposed an electoral statute which regulated the elections that took place in 1996. Driven by its objective to create multi-ethnic administration, the EUAM divided the City Council seats on the following manner: “16 City Council seats to the Bosniaks, 16 to the Croats and 5 to ‘Others’”<sup>97</sup>. Additionally, 24 councilors were to be elected from the basic six municipalities, while the remaining 13

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<sup>95</sup> The MOU targeted six reforms: “the creation of a unified police force (led by the West European Union), freedom of movement across the front line and public security for all, the establishment of conditions suitable for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their original homes, the establishment of a democratically elected council for a single unified city, and the reconstruction of the buildings and infrastructure as well as the reactivation of public services,” in Yarwood, *Rebuilding Mostar*, 7.

<sup>96</sup> Florian Bieber, “Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brcko,” *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 3 (2005): 422.

<sup>97</sup> David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 79.

were supposed to be elected from through out the city based regardless of their municipality affiliations.<sup>98</sup> The complicated division of the seats was allocated in order to ensure equal representation of two dominant ethnic groups and prevent the political dominance of one group over the other.

However, unlike the efforts of the EUAM to create political mechanism that would unify the city, local political parties opposed unification and thus abused the mechanism provided by the Interim statute. Political parties on both sides of the city resisted giving up political authority over their parts to individuals of other ethnic groups. This opposition was demonstrated early on in the process of the unification. The Croat Democratic Union (HDZ BIH) strongly opposed the establishment of the central zone by organizing demonstrations against and later even attacking the head of the EU administration.<sup>99</sup> The Bosnian Croats were the main opposition against the Interim Statute. Since the six local councils were designed to represent the ethnic groups according to the 1991 census, the Bosnian Croats feared that the Bosniaks would challenge the Croats' political dominance over the three municipalities on the West side of the city.<sup>100</sup> Therefore, they obstructed the formation of the local municipal councils on the pretenses that they did not serve their political interests, and on such way stalled the local elections in 1996. The imposition of these electoral regulations despite the resistance of local political actors, reinforced the local actors' perceptions about external political locus of control. The described political developments imply that locals had no

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<sup>98</sup> David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, 79.

<sup>99</sup> Bieber, "Local Institutional Engineering," 423.

<sup>100</sup> Florian Bieber, "Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brcko," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 3 (2005): 423.

control over the regulations of their elections. The lack of political control experienced by locals, negatively influenced their political tolerance of the elections' results.

The discontent of the local political elites intensified after the election's results. During the elections both, Bosniaks and Croats, tried to manipulate the electoral lists by placing their candidates to fulfill the seats reserved for 'others'. On this way they wished to gain political dominance over the unified administration. The elections' results demonstrated that the Bosniak's Social Democratic Action (SDA) was indeed successful in manipulating the electoral lists and thus Bosniaks won 21 out of 35 seats in the City Council, while HDZ BiH won only 16 seats.<sup>101</sup> Following the elections' results, the HDZ BiH refused to accept political defeat; instead it denied the legitimacy of the Council and thus continued obstructing the work of the unified administration. The behavior demonstrated by the HDZ can be characterized as performance oriented. After failing to receive desired outcomes of the elections, the HDZ refused to accept its defeat as part of the learning process and wait until the next elections to win. Additionally, the HDZ's refusal to accept the elections' results implies that this party internalized external political locus of control, and thus it increased its risky behavior due to disappointment. This refusal evolved into political crisis.

In order to deal with the raised crisis, the international community decided to take away political control once more from the locals and design its own governmental arrangement for Mostar. Specifically, the EUAM and the OHR, independently of local leaders, decided in Brussels that the City Council should elect a Mayor (who ought to be Bosnian Croat) and Deputy Mayor (who was to be Bosniak). It was also decided that the

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<sup>101</sup> David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, 80.

mayor and his deputy would work with the EU Special Envoy to Mostar.<sup>102</sup> There were two problems with the imposition of this political mechanism. One problem was that the international community reinforced the subordinate position of locals, and consequently external political locus of control, thus preventing the local politicians to respond to the crisis by producing their own political agenda. This obstruction prevented the establishment of effective democratic local leadership. Another problem was that the local elites, as well as Mostarians, did not agree nor were willing to establish these two positions. This disagreement reinforced external locus. Therefore, the candidates for the mayor position failed to get needed cross-community support, and thus did not have authority to govern the ‘other’ side.<sup>103</sup> This inability to legitimize the mayor’s authority on the half of the territory of the city, resulted in setting up parallel institutions in Mostar. In practice, the mayor and deputy mayor acted as the heads of their local administrations on their respected sides, with minimum cooperation between themselves. Consequently, the central zone designed by the EUAM, never functioned due to the lack of the unified effective government.<sup>104</sup> The absence of local leadership also negatively influenced the work of the City Council, which became rather a symbolic institution. Therefore, in practice, instead of unifying Mostar, the decisions passed by the EUAM and the OHR further divided the city.

The examples from above suggest that in order to reserve its influence, the international community opted for more intrusive leadership styles by imposing policies. Such external interference decreased the political autonomies of the local actors, and

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<sup>102</sup> David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, 82.

<sup>103</sup> Florian Bieber, “Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brcko,” *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 3 (2005): 423.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 424.

reinforced internalization of external political locus of control. Hence, this negatively reflected on locals who became less willing to adopt responsible political approaches, consequently decreasing a degree of cooperation between them, and locals and the international community. Internationals in Mostar failed to understand this relationship between intrusive behaviors and external locus of control. Unfortunately, this harmful interference of the international community in Mostar continued. The most controversial imposition was the imposition of a new statute in 2004.

### **3.2. Mostar Statute 2004**

In order to promote the unification of the city's administration, the international community in Mostar has been governing by decree for years. In the interest to create a political mechanism that assured the political representation of the constituent peoples, as well as the political blockage for the domination of one ethnic group, the international community designed a new governmental arrangement for Mostar in 2004. The new model called for the dissolution of the six municipalities and the formation of a single municipal unit. The following sections will analyze the process of the creation and implementation of the governmental arrangement. The paper will interpret how the international community, led by the OHR, politically excluded local politicians from final decision-making regarding the model, thus making the entire process to be perceived by locals as external. The following sections will also explain how this perception undermined the implementation of the new governmental arrangements in Mostar.



### 3.2.1 *The Commission for Mostar*

Unlike the approach adopted by the EUAM while creating the Interim Statute in 1996, which was based intrusive model of leadership, the OHR opted for more transformational type of leadership in 2003. The OHR involved locals in decision-making process, thus transforming the political to them. The OHR allowed the City authorities to form the Commission for Mostar comprised of local political actors in Spring 2003.<sup>105</sup> Additionally, relevant civil society representatives and NGOs were welcomed to contribute to the work of the Commission with their initiatives and expertise. The Commission was responsible to design the new statute that would benefit Mostarians. The OHR did not directly monitor the work of the Commission, even though it provided objectives that needed to be taken into account while designing the new statute. However, the effort to transfer political control failed shortly after. The Commission produced limited results in a given time framework due to conflicted political positions of the actors involved.<sup>106</sup> This political deadlock resulted in the dissolution of the first Commission and the establishment of the second Commission under the OHR control.

The OHR issued decision establishing new commission in September 2003. Under this decision, the OHR preserved the right to appoint an international chairman to the commission, as well as to set up regulations for appointing other eleven members, who were to be local political representatives and experts.<sup>107</sup> The OHR's decision to

<sup>105</sup> "High Representative Welcomes Establishment Of The Mostar Commission And Provides Eight Principles For Its Work," OHR, last modified April 23, 2003, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/ohrdept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content\\_id=29772](http://www.ohr.int/ohrdept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=29772).

<sup>106</sup> "Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, January - June 2003," OHR, last modified March 22, 2004, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content\\_id=32065](http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=32065).

<sup>107</sup> "Decision Establishing the Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar," OHR, last modified September 17, 2003, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content\\_id=30823](http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content_id=30823).

create the second Commission was the sign of reducing local political control. Even though the local politicians were still able to participate in decision-making, their authorities were limited in comparison to the first commission, thus making them more suburbanite actors.<sup>108</sup> At this stage the interaction between the locals and the OHR can be described as transactional type of leadership. Additionally, the OHR opened the commission for multiple political parties. However, this commission was successful in producing the concrete draft of the Mostar Statute. The draft recommended the formation of a single municipality with six electoral units.<sup>109</sup> Additionally, the draft proposed quota system for electing representatives in the City Council.<sup>110</sup> The proposed system blocked the possibilities of political dominance of one ethnic groups over others.

The recommended draft was welcomed by the international community. It was adopted by the Peace Implementation Council at the end of 2003.<sup>111</sup> The international community wanted to create a unified administration, however, the dominant local political parties refused to implement the recommendations. Unlike the Commission, two dominant local political parties (SDA and HDZ BIH) were against proposed statute. The SDA was afraid that protective mechanisms proposed by the Commission were insufficient to protect ethnic minorities from the domination of a majority ethnic group. Bosniaks were concerned that Bosnian Croats, having formed a dominant ethnic group in

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<sup>108</sup> "Internationally-Chaired Commission for Reforming Mostar Established," OHR, last modified September 9, 2003, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content\\_id=30958](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=30958).

<sup>109</sup> Florian Bieber, "Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brcko," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 3 (2005): 424.

<sup>110</sup> The representatives for the City Councils were elected "on the basis of fix parameters of a minimum number-four for the three constituent people and one for "Others"- and a maximum number (15) of the 35 council members". See in Bieber, "Local Institutional Engineering," 425.

<sup>111</sup> "The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council Says Mostar Should be a Single City Administration," OHR, last modified December 13, 2003, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content\\_id=31371](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=31371).

Mostar, were given political tools to control minorities.<sup>112</sup> Therefore, they refused to adopt the recommendations. On the other side, Bosnian Croats, being aware that they formed the majority group, opposed the creation of six electoral units and demanded city-wide elections. On this way, Bosnian Croats wanted to gain dominance over the City Council. Additionally, Bosnian Serbs objected the recommendations and six units on the basis that such system would decrease already limited political representation of this group.<sup>113</sup> As indicated above, the major political parties in Mostar criticized the Commission's recommendation and thus refused to implement them. However, the OHR intervened and imposed the statute.

In January 2004, the High Representative Paddy Ashdown issued decision to impose the new Statute.<sup>114</sup> The OHR justified imposition by stressing the need to hold local elections. Additionally, it got approval from the Peace Implementation Council which also supported creation of a single unified city's administration. The OHR acted regardless of the political resistance provided by locals. The act of imposition was the OHR's final step of taking political control away from the Mostarians. Consequently, the OHR found itself lacking in domestic political partners to reorganize the city's governance. Therefore, the international community once again used its powers to issue another decision in April 2004. This time, the OHR regulated the process of the implementation of the Statute.<sup>115</sup> Among other things, the decision introduced the Special Envoy for Mostar, whose task was to cooperate with locals, but also to monitor and

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<sup>112</sup> Florian Bieber, "Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brcko," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 3 (2005): 425.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 425.

<sup>114</sup> "Decision Enacting the Statute of the City of Mostar," OHR, last modified January 28, 2004, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content\\_id=31707](http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content_id=31707).

<sup>115</sup> "Decision On The Implementation Of The Reorganization Of The City Of Mostar," OHR, last modified April 1, 2004, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content\\_id=31725](http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content_id=31725).

ensure the implementation of certain articles of the Statute. The creation of international supervision of the reorganization process was just another act of placing locals in subordinate positions, thus increasing the perception of external control. As it was the case in 1996, when the HDZ rejected to accept the elections' results, locals in 2004 also demonstrated irresponsible political behaviors by boycotting work of the City Council. The next section will analyze the crisis.

### ***3.2.2 Political crisis in Mostar***

The politics in Mostar has deteriorated since the imposition of the Statute. The domestic political actors refused to govern under the imposed rules and therefore obstructed the work of the City Council. As previously stated, the disputed concept was the local electoral system. The SDA refused to effectively participate in the politics on the ground that it wanted re-formation of municipalities. On the other side, the HDZ BiH disputed the Statute on the basis that it wanted the creation of a single electoral unit.<sup>116</sup> The HDZ BiH argued that the electoral system imposed in Mostar is unconstitutional. It argued that the system is not based on 'one man one voice' principle, as it is the case in rest of the country. Bosnian Croats therefore claimed that they cannot gain political majority in the City Council which corresponds to them due to demographics. They referred the case to the Constitutional Court of BiH, which ruled in favor of Bosnian Croats in 2011.<sup>117</sup>

After the Court's ruling, the political crisis in Mostar escalated. The domestic political parties were ordered to change the electoral system imposed in the Statute. The

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<sup>116</sup> "Mostarska Kriza Otisla Predaleko," Starmo.ba, last modified June 6, 2013, accessed June 1, 2014, <http://starmo.ba/regijas/item/17309.html>.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

SDA and HDZ BiH preserved their political positions regarding the electoral system, therefore no compromise was reached. Consequently, the domestic reforms of the electoral system failed, thus creating political deadlock. After the failure of locals to implement the Court's ruling, the case was referred to the Parliament of BiH. However, until this day no consensus on this issue has been made in the Parliament either.<sup>118</sup> The identified political deadlock has had devastating consequences for Mostar. Local elections in 2012 failed to take place. As of now, there are no signs that the elections in 2014 will take place either. Additionally, the mandate of the City Council expired at the end of 2012, thus leaving the city lacking in governance.<sup>119</sup> Currently, the mayor acts as the only political authority in the city. After the budget crisis that was caused by the expiration of the mandate of the City Council, the Constitutional Court of BiH ruled in 2013 that the mayor had right to impose budget by decree.<sup>120</sup>

During the above-identified political crisis, the OHR acted as the advisory political actor that aimed to bring the SDA and HDZ BiH closer to reaching consensus. The OHR agreed to initiate the process of negotiations among local political parties and provide technical assistance and legal expertise through out the process. However, it refused to take responsibility for the crisis. Additionally, it refused to impose solution for the crisis, as it had done in 1996 after local politicians failed to accept the election results (the crisis has been explained in section 3.1.1). The OHR wanted to transfer political power back to the locals. Nevertheless, local politicians did not share this attitude, instead

<sup>118</sup> Mostarska Kriza Otisla Predaleko," Starmo.ba, last modified June 6, 2013, accessed June 1, 2014, <http://starimo.ba/regijas/item/17309.html>.

<sup>119</sup> "Gradsko Vijeće Neće Raditi Sve dok se ne Rijesi Pitanje Mandata," Vecernji List, last modified November 22, 2013, accessed, June 1, 2014, <http://www.vecernji.ba/gradsko-vijece-nece-raditi-sve-dok-se-ne-rijesi-pitanje-mandata-478216>.

<sup>120</sup> "Ustavni Sud FBiH: Gradonačelnik Mostara Imao Puno Ovlašćenje Donijeti Proracun," Abrasmedia.info, last modified October 11, 2012, accessed June 1, 2014, <http://www.abrasmedia.info/content/ustavni-sud-fbih-gradona%C4%8Delnik-mostara-imao-puno-ovla%C5%A1tenje-donijeti-prora%C4%8Dun>.

blaming the OHR for imposing the unconstitutional Statute.<sup>121</sup> Therefore, from the local politicians' perspectives they were not to be blamed for the crisis. Since they did not feel politically responsible, they refused the pressure created by the OHR to compromise and provide solution for the crisis. The SDA and HDZ BiH's officials have expressed these beliefs on multiple occasions, by stating that it was the responsibility of the OHR to solve the problem which it created itself.<sup>122</sup> These political attitudes demonstrate that locals adopted irresponsible modes of behaviors connected with external locus. These modes have been discussed in chapter II.

This chapter analyzed two crucial occasions when the political control over internal affairs was taken away from the Mostarians and given to the international community. These two examples demonstrate the same pattern of political development. The chapter first analyzed the imposition of the Interim Statute in 1996. The EUAM acted independently and excluded locals from the process of drafting the statute. Once imposed, the statute faced opposition from locals, who disagreed with the imposed decentralization of local power. The disagreement developed into political crisis which trapped internationals into making more intrusive decisions. Forced into intrusive approaches, the OHR imposed the new Statute in 2004. While creating the statute, the OHR failed to reach consensus with dominant local political actors over the electoral structure, thus the statute was boycotted by the SDA and HDZ BiH. The disagreement once again led to the political crisis. These two examples indicated that intrusive approaches in Mostar failed on both occasions. This chapter suggested that one of the

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<sup>121</sup> "Visoki predstavnik međunarodne zajednice u BiH donio odluku o gradu Mostaru - uslijedile brojne reakcije," D.K. *Voice of America*, January 28, 2004, accessed June 1, 2014, <http://ba.voanews.com/content/a-29-a-2004-01-28-10-1-86102082/678346.html>.

<sup>122</sup> "U OHR-u Zapoceli razgovori o Mostari," Bljesak.info, last modified January 23, 2013, accessed June 1, 2014, <http://bljesak.info/rubrika/vijesti/clanak/u-ohru-zapoceli-razgovori-o-mostaru/23061>.

reasons for these failures was development of external political locus of control among locals. The chapter suggested that the state-builders created external locus by intrusive political approaches. This locus was further increased by high degrees of political disagreements with the imposed legislations demonstrated by locals. Therefore, external political locus of control negatively influenced the empowerment of local ownership by creating politically irresponsible domestic actors. While this chapter suggested the negative influence of external political locus of control on local ownership, the next chapter will demonstrate opposite. Therefore, the next chapter will analyze defense reform in BiH and the positive influence of internal political locus of control on the reform.

## CHAPTER IV: DEFENSE REFORM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The Dayton General Framework Agreement on Peace designed the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina which regulated the country's defense and military affairs. The post-conflict state-building process in BiH attempted to reform externally outlined security sector. This chapter will analyze defense reform in BiH. Unlike Mostar reform which has been identified (in chapter III) as the clear example of failed local ownership transition, defense reform is characterized as success. Analyzing the process of defense reform, this chapter will suggest that internal political locus of control held by the local political actors contributed to the success of it. The chapter will identify two variables that represent internal political locus of control held by locals throughout the reform. The variables that will be discussed are: the act of adoption of drafted document and the high degree of political agreement reached among locals. Furthermore the positive influence of these two variables on the reform will be analyzed. Hence, the chapter will suggest that defense reform is an example of successful transition of political control from the international community to locals. The next section will briefly acknowledge the complexity of the Constitutional regulation of defense sector in the immediate postwar years.

### 4.1 Defense Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Dayton Agreement created very complex and decentralized security sector which proved to be inefficient. Three factors contributed to this inefficiency. First, the Constitution of BiH decentralized power in the country onto two entities (FBiH and RS), thus making them in the control of security sector, including the military



establishments.<sup>123</sup> In practice, this resulted in creation of two military forces<sup>124</sup> that were governed by two independent Defense Ministries. The two military establishments had competing political and ethnic platforms, hence reinforcing political instability of BiH. The Constitution also created a Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) as “a coordinating mechanism for Bosnia’s armed forces”<sup>125</sup>. However, its weakness undermined its mandate, thus leaving the two military armies under entity-level control. Second, the post-Dayton international state-builders perceived defense reform as a highly politically sensitive issue. Thus, the initiation of the reform was delayed until stable political environment was created. Third, in addition to the OHR, other international organizations, including OSCE and NATO, participated in defense reform. This created the very complex network of international state-builders who often differed in their mandates and approaches.<sup>126</sup> Often lacking in the coordination of their approaches, these institutions were unproductive in promoting the reform in the immediate postwar years.

The above indicated factors slowed down the process of reform. The co-existence of two military forces further straightened ethnical political divisions in the country, thus preventing the creation of stable and effective united government. Prior to 2002, the international community’s efforts were characterized by attempts “to reduce the consequences of the military division without openly criticizing it”<sup>127</sup>. Thus limited negotiations had taken place in order to meet this goal. Additionally, the international community created the legal framework to coordinate activities of various international

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<sup>123</sup> Matthieu Damian and Heinz Vetschera, “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community,” *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 1 (March 2006): 29.

<sup>124</sup> Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the FBiH and Army of the Republika Srpska in RS.

<sup>125</sup> Lara Nettelfield, *Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (New York: Cambridge University Press: 2010), 214.

<sup>126</sup> Damian and Vetschera, “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 28.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

organizations involved in the process. The organizations were coordinated under an Institution Building Task Force (IBTF). While this section provided general background information about reform, the following sections will identify two phases that led to the success of defense reform. Internal locus of political control will be analyzed in these phases.

#### ***4.1.1 Phase I - Limited Success***

After initial limited success of the international community to promote defense reform, the political environment in BiH matured for changes in 2001. A major shift in the Bosnian politics was the increased interests of the domestic politicians for NATO Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). This domestic drive boosted the reform process. In order to join the Program, the Bosnians needed to establish a state-led control and civil command of unified military establishments.<sup>128</sup> This meant that the country needed to factor unified Defense Ministry controlled by the central government and a single BiH's army. The representatives of two ethnic groups (Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats) highly supported the efforts of creating centralized defense sector. The Bosnian Serbs initially demonstrated flexible political attitudes that were withdrawn once they were asked to accept the SCMM Secretariat as the Defense Ministry for BiH.<sup>129</sup> The Serbian rejection of the proposal delayed the reform process. However, unobtrusive political endeavors performed by the international community and other domestic politicians positively influenced the government in the RS, which eventually accepted the proposal in 2002.

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<sup>128</sup> Armin Krzalic, "Pregled Reforme Sigurnosnog Sektora u Bosni i Hercegovini," policy brief prepared for Center za sigurnosne studije, Sarajevo, October 2011, 8.

<sup>129</sup> Damian and Vetschera, "Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 32.

This phase of reform resulted in the establishment of a Military Commission that coordinated the two entity armies and a joint General Staff.<sup>130</sup>

This phase identifies two important notions for this paper. First, locals voluntarily agreed to start the process of reform. The international community offered a carrot, which locals found desirable and internally decided to act. Therefore, they were highly motivated to make reform successful. Second, most importantly, the international community did not use any intrusive methods in this phase. This was of essence during the political deadlock due to the Serbian exit. Unlike Mostar case, where the international community constantly opted for intrusive methods in the face of a political deadlock, here it chose other low-key political approaches. These low-key approaches gave opportunities to locals to communicate back to the state-builders and reach consensus on the issue. These two notions created the perception of internal political control among locals, thus making them believe that they were not subordinate to the international community.

#### ***4.1.2 Phase II - the Defense Reform Commission***

The Serbian opposition to defense reform was further diminished after the ORAO affair. In 2002, the RS was accused of illegal arms sales to Iraq.<sup>131</sup> This affair decreased the position of the RS police authorities, thus weakening their objections to reform. Following the affair, the OHR initiated series of the legal seminars about drafting constitutional changes required for defense reform. Additionally, it established the

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<sup>130</sup> Krzalic, "Pregled Reforme," 9.

<sup>131</sup> BiH Media Report, "OHR BiH Media Round-up, 28/10/2002," *OHR*, October 28, 2002, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/press/bh-media-rep/round-ups/print/?content\\_id=28295](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/press/bh-media-rep/round-ups/print/?content_id=28295).

Defense Reform Commission in May 2003.<sup>132</sup> The Commission was consisted of 12 members, including an international chairman, one representative from each organization OSCE, NATO, OHR, SFOR and seven domestic actors. The Commission gathered all relevant domestic actors, therefore it was consisted of: the Secretary-General of the SCMM and his two Deputies, two civilian representatives (one from the FBiH and one from the RS), and two Entity Defense Ministers.<sup>133</sup> Its task was to draft legislation necessary for reform. After five months, the Commission finalized its work with unanimous agreement, proposing creation of a state Ministry of Defense. Most of the Commission's proposals were adopted by the Bosnian Parliament. Among other legal changes, the Parliament established "civilian control over the military and created a new state-level Defense Ministry, Joint Staff and Operational Command"<sup>134</sup>. Additionally, the adopted legislation regulated defense budget. Similarly, on the recommendation of the Commission, the entities decided to reduce their active forces.

While these adopted changes were welcomed, more needed to be done to bring BiH closer to the PfP. Therefore, in 2004 the High Representative prolonged the mandate of the Commission in order to ensure the implementation of legislated reforms.<sup>135</sup> The relation between the international actors and locals, within the Commission, remain the same. However, the mandate was refocused on the transfer of powers from the entities' ministries to the state level ministry and on establishing closer cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). This Second Commission was

<sup>132</sup> "Decision Establishing the Defense Reform Commission," OHR, last modified April 9, 2003, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content\\_id=29840](http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=29840).

<sup>133</sup> Damian and Vetschera, "Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 34.

<sup>134</sup> "Military Matters: Reforming Bosnia and Herzegovina's defence institutions," NATO Review, last modified, winter 2004, accessed June 1, 2014, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue4/english/military.html>.

<sup>135</sup> "Decision Extending The Mandate Of The Defense Reform Commission," OHR, last modified February 4, 2004, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content\\_id=38567](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=38567).

successful in producing a single defense budget, abolition of conscription, and creation of a single command structure.<sup>136</sup> A single unified army force, named the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was created in January 2006. After having completed all necessary steps, BiH received the invitation to join NATO's PfP program in November the same year, thus meeting the main objectives of the reform.<sup>137</sup>

## 4.2 The Role of Internal Political Locus of Control

The OHR recognizes defense reform as the clear example of a successful reform. In 2009, this institution issued a press release stating that defense reform had demonstrated that locals developed local ownership in defense sector.<sup>138</sup> Additionally, this reform is often regarded to as a model for efficient local empowerment. Therefore, this section will identify the most important lessons that can be learned from the process.

First, the domestic political actors actively participated in the process of reform. The OHR treated the locals as equal political partners, hence reinforcing their internal political locus of control. Even though the international community initiated reform and formed the Commission, locals were able to establish effective communication and exchange of ideas with the OHR. Second, the international community established cooperation with relevant local actors. This increased legitimacy and efficiency of the Commission. Additionally, it provided the OHR with relevant information and realistic expectations about the reform. However, at the same time, the OHR was ready to acknowledge local perspectives. This qualitative intelligence led to the creation of the

<sup>136</sup> Nettelfield, *Courting Democracy*, 215.

<sup>137</sup> "Schwarz-Schilling: PfP Invitation Reward for Successful Defence Reform," OHR, last modified November 29, 2006, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content\\_id=38567](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=38567).

<sup>138</sup> "Learning from Positive Experience," OHR, last modified November 3, 2009, accessed June 1, 2014, [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content\\_id=44085](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=44085).

appropriate draft. Third, in time of crisis, the OHR opted for the use of less intrusive political approaches. The approach adopted by the OHR was more soft power approach. It was also timely approach, meaning that the OHR waited until the political environment was mature for such undertaking. This positively influenced the process of reform, creating opportunities for locals to engage in decision-making and fabrication of their own strategies. Fourth, all these identified characteristics led to the creation of the draft which was unanimously adopted by locals. The process of this reform demonstrated that locals positively responded at internal political locus of control.

This reform produced politically accountable local actors who continued improving defense sector. Over the past eight years, BiH have participated in various international defense programs. Unlike the Mostar case this reform transferred political power to great extends back to locals. While internal political locus of control is not the factor that contributed to the success of defense reform, it certainly positively influenced it. The continuation of stable defense establishments in BiH reinforces this assumption.

## CONCLUSION

This paper attempted to analyze the factors that led to failed local ownership transitions in the post-conflict state-building processes. The existing literature presented in the first chapter suggested that the international state-building interventions are the leading type of third party interventions in post-conflict states. These post-conflict state-building operations tend to focus their interests on empowering of local ownership. The goal of the paper was to make a contribution to the existing debate over the factors that can influence state-building. The paper identified a gap in the literature and thus recognized political locus of control as a potential breaker of the empowerment of locals in this type of state-building operations. The paper identified a strong correlation between politically intrusive approaches adopted by the international state-builders and external political locus of control among domestic actors. The literature presented in the second chapter, as well as observations from the case studies suggested that this correlation was very strong indeed. Additionally, the paper wanted to analyze the influence of external control on the political ownership transition from internationals to locals. Observations from the chapters III and IV suggest that external control is positively correlated with failed local ownership transitions, further suggesting that external political locus of control may cause the transition failure. However, due to the nature of the research design a causal relationship is just an assumption.

While the paper's findings are very interesting, it is important to recognize certain limitations to the research design used in this paper. As it has been stated in section 2.1, the concept of political locus of control was developed particularly for this paper.

Therefore, it is possible that the operationalization of the variables used in the chapters III

and IV need additional research and indicators. Furthermore, this paper observed the case studies only from BiH. Taking into consideration the political specificities of BiH, it is possible to expect that case studies from some other countries would suggest different observational findings. Similarly, this paper observed only two very specific case studies, therefore it is possible to expect that multiple case studies would produce different findings.

However, the indicted limitations leave open space for future research. This paragraph will indicate some of the ideas for future research. This paper could benefit in the future from designing a questioner that would measure political locus of control among political actors. This is the only real way to measure a degree of external locus among actors. Additionally, the tests could be run and the results could be interpreted. This can serve for establishing a causal relationship between political locus of control and political actor's behaviors. Furthermore, the existing literature suggests that external control influences political behaviors on various ways. It would be interesting to perform studies comparing different cultures and/or countries on this variable.



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