## **PREFERENCE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD PROGRAMMATIC LINKAGES IN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA**

By

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### Abstract

In this thesis I map two dimensions of programmatic linkages: strength and consistency of ideological preferences, in Hungary and Romania. The extent to which the two countries are characterized by strong and consistent ideological preferences is examined in comparison to other Western -, Central and Eastern European countries, while the role of these preferences is analyzed in detail with regards to the party competition and political representation patterns of Hungary and Romania.

As a methodological innovation, in the thesis I employ survey data of the electorate and of parliamentary candidates in order to examine programmatic linkages in a comparative manner in the two national contexts. In the conclusion, I suggest a typology at the level of different countries, based on the multi-dimensional nature of programmaticism and examine the role of individual parties in constructing specific patterns of programmatic linkages. Strong and consistent ideological preferences are scrutinized, to ascertain whether they contribute to parliamentary candidates getting elected and to the ideological representation of the Hungarian and Romanian electorate.

The present study contributes to research on Central and Eastern European transition, voting behavior and party politics of the region.

Keywords: programmatic linkages, Hungary, Romania, ideological preferences, parliamentary candidates

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## I. Introduction

Students of the Central and Eastern European transition process were often concerned with the burden of historical legacies. As the Hungarian philosopher Janos Kis wrote in an essay on the state of Hungarian democracy, "In the last 20 years after the regime change, two anachronisms fought with each other, and kept each other alive: on the right, ideas loaded with nostalgia towards the Horthy-era and, on the left, ideas incapable to separate themselves from the Kadar-era." (2013). The emergence of stable and prosperous liberal democracies was often thought to be hindered by the institutional and societal legacies of the preceding totalitarian regimes.

In this sense, one of the puzzles research on Central and Eastern European transition was concerned with referred to the role of programs and ideas in party competition. As opposed to electoral support driven by feelings towards party leaders or clientelistic resource distribution, initiating, debating and voting on different conceptions of the public good both in the electorate and in politically elected assemblies were thought of as conducive to stable and successful democracies. In this sense, linkages based on programmatic grounds between the political elite and society were inherently related to the accountability mechanisms of the publical process (Kitschelt et al. 2009) and they were expected to foster, for instance, the institutionalization of the volatile CEE party systems (Kitschelt 1995).

Due to the burden of the previous socialist totalitarian regimes, researchers not only expected lower relevance for programmatic linkages in the post-1989 Central and Eastern European polities than the observed pattern of Western Europe, but they also theorized about the effects of the heterogeneity within the CEE region, defined by a typology of the previous socialist regimes. From this perspective, Hungary and Romania belonged to two different categories: the "goulash communism" of the former was sometimes described as the happiest barrack within the socialist camp; while Romania under the leadership of its socialist despot Ceauşescu, sustained by one of the most cruel secret services of the socialist block, was often referred to as sultanism or patrimonial communist country.

The research question of the present study refers to the state of programmatic linkages 20 years after the regime change in Central and Eastern Europe, and specifically in Hungary and in Romania: in light of the vanishing historical legacies, to what extent are the two CEE countries characterized by programmatic structures and what influence do these have on political representation? Through the comparative study of the two cases, I tackle two aspects of programmatic linkages inquiring: (1) whether they are specific to individual parties or party systems and (2) what their role is in the political representation and party competition of the two countries.

The research uses survey data of European elections and two national elections from Hungary and Romania to map programmatic beliefs across the electorate of the European countries, and in Hungary/Romania in the level of parliamentary candidates as well. Breaking down the abstract concept of programmatic linkages to empirical indicators of mass surveys is one of the methodological contributions of the present study to a field which primarily relies on expert surveys. For this reason, ideological survey items are used to map the strength and consistency of the ideological preferences of respondents (the electorate and parliamentary candidates) at the individual level. Both of these dimensions are operationalized in a way that they allow for comparisons across different cases, respondents and datasets.

In the next chapter, I review the literature and discuss the theoretical background of the present research. I also present my hypotheses, the particularities of the two selected countries

and the operationalization of the strength and consistency of ideological preferences. The aim of the third chapter is to place Romania and Hungary relative to each other and to other European countries in terms of the relevance of programmatic linkage mechanisms, and it also examines whether programmatic linkages primarily refer to individual parties or to the national party systems as a whole. The fourth chapter discusses in detail the two countries in terms of the influence of the strength and consistency of ideological preferences for parliamentary candidates being elected and for the representation of the ideological preference of the electorate as a whole and of socially marginalized groups in particular. The chapter relies on the analysis of the data of the 2010 Hungarian and the 2012 Romanian legislative elections. The last chapter summarizes and discusses the contributions as well as the limits of the overall findings of the present research.

## **II.** Theoretical Considerations

#### 1. Literature Review

Political representation in Central and Eastern Europe was long thought to develop around patterns formed under the burden of historical legacies. Accordingly, the postcommunist transition literature formulates the two hypotheses of tabula rasa and postcommunist continuity, with an ever-widening agreement over the latter. Based on the first tabula rasa – hypothesis (Offe 1991; Elster et al. 1998), the legacies of totalitarianism were not in a position to determine the post-1989 politics, since due to the enormous difficulties of the transition process, these societies had to build democratic politics from scratch. According to the post-communist continuity hypothesis (Kitschelt 1992), the societal and economic inequalities of the socialist era were to define the lines of societal cleavages, providing the underlying structure of the party systems of the region (with cross-country variation defined by a typology of the previous socialist regimes). The comparative empirical evidence, which became available once large-scale mass surveys were implemented, by and large supported the post-communist continuity hypothesis (e.g. Kitschelt et al. 1999; Tworzecki 2003; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009; Bakke 2010; Schmitt 2011). Although, compared to other new-wave democracies CEE party systems as a whole remained under-institutionalized (Lane and Ersson 2007; Powell and Tucker 2013), with political parties which mostly proved to be stable (e.g. Tworzecki 2003), representative to a reasonable extent of ideological preferences (latest comparative evidence on this: Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012) and providers of a large degree of policy responsiveness and accountability (Roberts 2009).

One of the ways scholars, particularly Herbert Kitschelt and his colleagues, conceptualized the mechanism how historical legacies were transmitted in the democratic party competition was through the linkage mechanisms between citizens and their elected representatives (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Kitschelt 1995). Linkages concerned the specificities of the party competition, the form of equilibrium which emerged between the political elite and the population. Kitschelt distinguishes between three basic types of linkage mechanisms: charismatic, clientelistic and programmatic. By charismatic linkage he means cases when the partisan elite built its appeal around the charisma of a particular leader and when the voters use the elections to express their identification with that leader. In such a case the respective candidate receives a blank check to pursue whatever policies he/she thinks appropriate. By clientelistic linkage mechanism he refers to cases when the partisan elite makes a credible promise for compensation in exchange for electoral support and when their electorate decides to cast their ballot in order to gain those resources. In such a case, there is a contingency of resource allocation based on electoral support in the respective polity, which in most cases remains hidden from the public eye. By the third type of linkage mechanism, which is called programmatic, Kitschelt identifies those cases when the parties are competing based on their different conceptions of the public good and the voters decide by weighting these proposals according to ideas of their own. Therefore, political competition under programmatic linkages in many respects resembles the spatial models of party competition (Stokes 1963).

From a normative standpoint, programmatic linkages are the most preferred, since they allow for popular accountability, the standpoint from which the specific types of linkage mechanisms are evaluated (Kitschelt et al. 2009). In addition, the preference for programmatic linkages is deeply embedded in the normative model of responsible party governance (Pierce 1999), where parties are conceptualized as the agents who gear public policy and state institutions according to the will of the sovereign, the popular demand formulated by public opinion, expressed by free and fair elections (APSA 1951). Programmatic linkages enable voters to have a meaningful choice among different conceptions of the public good and thus to

govern their polity in the direction towards which the preferences of the majority of their fellow citizens point.

After 1989, due to the difficulties of the democratic transition, the general novelty of democratic politics and popular accountability (both for the elite and the electorate), and the variation of political culture fostered by the different types of socialist regimes, low levels of programmaticism<sup>1</sup> were expected in CEE, with a variation following the specificities of the previous regime (Kitschelt 1995). As far as the empirical findings were concerned, the CEE region turned out to be among the most successful ones from the third wave democracies (Kitschelt and Kselman 2011, p.30), with levels of programmaticism just below the ones observed in Western Europe.

In relation to the internal variation within the CEE region, the level of programmaticism was expected to vary according to the specific socialist historical legacies of each country. In this sense, Herbert Kitschelt (2001) distinguishes between three types of socialisms: bureaucratic-authoritarian (Czechoslovakia), national-accommodative (Hungary, Poland) and patrimonial communist (Romania, Bulgaria), with a level of programmaticism following this pattern. Programmatic linkages are also influenced by the institutional structure of the respective country, as well as their pre- and post-communist party politics, but the main causal link in Kitschelt's theory is linked with the typology of the socialist regimes, the effect of which is transmitted by political culture.

There are two gaps in this literature the current study proposes to extend on; one of conceptual and one of methodological nature. Conceptually, one of the most important questions this line of research is yet to answer refers to the appropriate level of analysis

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> I borrow the term from Kitschelt to denote the extent to which programmatic linkages are widespread (Kitschelt 2011)

(Kitschelt 2011; Kitschelt and Kselman 2011). It is not yet clear whether linkage mechanisms characterize the individual parties, the party systems as a whole, or maybe both, depending on the historical-cultural context. The conceptual ambiguity is linked with methodological limitation: almost all of this research is based on expert surveys, particularly on a relatively new cross-sectional dataset (Kitschelt et al. 2009) and as Kitschelt himself admits, due to problems of small the sample size/missing values, the dataset is inherently flawed when it comes to mapping the linkage mechanisms of individual parties (Kitschelt and Kselman 2011, p. 1). An additional methodological concern I have with the dataset relates to its validity: while country experts might be able to successfully identify what the supply side of politics decides to build its appeal on, based on what factors the electorate casts their ballot remains an empirical question possibly revealed by mass surveys rather than experts' judgments.

#### 2. Main Concepts

Due to their normative desirability and in order to have an empirical grip on the linkage mechanisms of different parties and party systems I narrow the primary focus of my analysis to programmatic linkages and the level of programmaticism. To be able to operationalize the concept in a way to rely on it across different levels of analysis, I decided to use individual level characteristics. In this sense, from the concepts what the field of voting behavior offer political science, I argue that political sophistication comes closest to the individual level prerequisites of programmatic linkages. At the elite level, ideological stances and consistency of those stances is a relatively straightforward translation of political sophistication, while the link between voters and candidates is provided by research on political representation and ideological congruence.

Political sophistication is a multi-dimensional concept of voting behavior. Partially it refers to factual knowledge on politics, defined by Delli Carpini and Keeper (1989 p. 294) as

"the range of factual information about politics stored in the long-term memory". The measurement of this dimension is relatively straightforward, citizens are required to answer a range of factual political questions, and then the number of correct answers is calculated for every respondent. There is a wide range of research showing that political knowledge understood in this sense corresponds to what Carpini and Keeper called the "currency of citizenship": it enables voters to reach more informed decisions, and vote for candidates which best represent their interest (e.g. Arnold 2012).

However, from the perspective of linkage mechanisms factual political knowledge is not a distinguishing element, since there are no good reasons to believe that clientelistic or charismatic linkages do not require factual political knowledge. On the contrary, being able to trade with political support or to listen to candidates, recognize them and link them with political parties requires a considerable level of factual political awareness. What is specific to programmatic linkages is another dimension of political sophistication, namely the strength and existence of a what Converse calls belief systems (1964) defined as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint of functional interdependence".

Ideological belief system refers to the individuals' capacity to filter and evaluate political events through ideological lenses. Traditionally it is measured by the strength of correlation between ideological attitude questions, although as Luskin (1987) points out, there are strong methodological concerns with the validity of these measures. Conceptually – as it refers to individuals' ideological preferences – it provides the basis of taking political decisions according to a comparison of the different conceptions of the public good; therefore it is inherently linked with programmatic linkages. Citizens who decide on charismatic or

clientelistic basis do not develop ideological or programmatic filters, belief systems of political attitudes.

According to my conceptualization, belief systems have two distinct dimensions. On the one hand, they refer to the strength of ideological preferences, on the other hand they refer to the consistency of (or the constraint implied by) these preferences. The ideologically most committed voters have highly consistent strong preferences, while most of the electorate has somewhat consistent, moderately strong preferences. The largest share of the electorate does not feel strongly about ideologies, they are consistent in the moderate nature of their political beliefs. A separate category consists of issue publics (Converse 1964), voters who feel strongly about one or a few of the issues and they only consider those when they decide who to vote for. Issue voters do not organize their views on public affairs in consistent ideological conceptions of the public good. Among the politically most interested few, consistency and strength of ideological preferences reinforce each other, but in case of the general electorate these are crosscutting dimensions with consistency linked to preferences of moderate strength.

Due to their ambiguous relationship (dependent on which segment of the electorate is analyzed) I decided not to construct from the two dimensions of the strength and consistency of ideological preferences one index of programmaticism. Both of these refer to conceptually different dimensions of programmaticism, and none of them has primacy over the other. Programmatic linkages might be in place if the electorate is inconsistent but feels strongly about an ideologically driven concept of the public good, they might be in place if the electorate has a very consistent preference for an ideologically moderate vision of the public good, or they might be in place if the electorate is both highly consistent and feels strongly about the different conceptions of the public good. Both, strong and consistent ideological preferences are characteristics of programmatic linkages with no order of priority among them.

#### 3. Case Selection

I apply the above conceptualization to the two cases of Hungary and Romania. Both of these were two countries of paradigmatic importance for Kitschelt's typology of the previous socialist regimes; with Hungary illustrating national-accommodative and Romania patrimonial communist structures. Yet, both came from a socialist background with a transition process started in 1989, therefore by and large they correspond to the requirements of the most similar system design of comparative politics. In addition, these are the two CEE countries, in which a representative sample of parliamentary candidate surveys is available, making the study of linkage mechanisms doable.

Previous literature shows, that in both countries left-right ideology is the most common system of reference how the programmatic elements of party politics are interpreted, and in both cases the understanding of these labels has varying ideological grounding (Fábián 2005; Comşa 2007). Nonetheless, there is an important difference in the use of the left-right semantics: in the Romanian electorate those who self-identify are around 60% (depending on contextual and over-time variation), while in Hungary their share typically reaches over 80%. The self-identifying Romanians statistically are more likely to be highly educated, politically more interested, to be men, to belong to higher social classes, consume more media and live in urban communities, compared to the part of the Romanian society which does not identify with these labels. In other words, left-right self-identification in Romania is heavily self-selected on political interest understood in a broad way.

In terms of the use of these ideological labels, in Hungary they almost deterministically distinguish between parties on the two sides of the spectrum (e.g. MSZP-Fidesz), both in terms of party identification and vote choice of the electorate (Tóka 2005), in Romania I did not find a study linking left-right ideological predispositions with political behavior, but I believe the

two are even more interwoven, since those who are able to identify will hardly make a difference between the parties they vote for and their left-right identity. In Hungary these ideological beliefs also led to mass polarization at the level of personal political discussion/media exposure networks (Angelusz and Tardos 2005; 2011) In Romania, parties themselves are characterized by a relatively high symbolic polarization on the communist – anti-communist cleavage (Frye 2002).

Although in Romania the area remains largely unexplored, in Hungary leaders' likability has a large influence on voting behavior (Toka 2006), to the extent that researchers identify the long-standing leaders of Hungarian politics as one of the reasons of the remarkable level of party system institutionalization (Enyedi 2006, p. 224). Sympathy or antagonism of the Hungarian electorate towards one or many of their leaders is also identified as an element of stability of (mostly symbolic) electoral cleavages (Karácsony 2006), some of which were built in a top-down fashion (Enyedi 2005). In Romania the specific role of the leaders is yet to be researched, but one might suspect similar mechanisms in place, although party leaders did not stay as long in front of their political formation as in the case of Hungary.

As a contextual information, my analysis does not specifically address the issue, in terms of electoral participation, the electorates of both countries remain under the European average (Toka 2006; Sum and Bădescu 2004), but both are close to other CEE countries. The low levels are especially specific to forms of participation other than voting. In terms of the individual level statistical profile of the non-voters, the two countries (Bobirsc and Comşa 2005; Kmetty and Tóth 2011) replicate the same pattern: politically uninterested, young, non-ideological; people who tuned away from politics. Almost all scholars researching turnout of the region agree that the low levels of participation are linked with the legacies of the previous

regime (for the most comprehensive theoretically grounded hypotheses: Kostadinova and Power 2007; Kern and Szabó 2011).

The empirical analysis of the current study covers the 2009 European parliamentary (EP) elections of the two countries and the 2010 (Hungary) and 2012 (Romania) national elections. In Hungary these two elections can be labeled as critical elections (Nardulli 1995 cited by Enyedi and Benoit 2011), which less to the dismemberment and realignment of the previous parties/cleavages to a considerable extent. Two new parties emerged with the 2009 EP elections and then a few months later with the national parliamentary elections: the radical right Jobbik and the green LMP. Both of them had anti-establishment rhetoric, although they came from a different ideological background. At the same time, the incumbent socialist party (MSZP) achieved a historically low score, while the main opposition center-right Fidesz party won 2/3 of the mandates.

In Romania, the 2009 EP elections were the first time the Romanian electorate could elect their European representatives for an entire term. It did not had a surprising result in terms of the score of the main parties in place. The electoral alliance of the socialist PSD and the conservative PC won the elections, with a small margin before the center-right Democrat-Liberal PDL. Both of these parties were part of the governing coalition of the time. From the opposition side, the liberal PNL achieved the greatest score of 15% followed by the 9% of the Hungarian ethnic party of UDMR. This was the last election when the radical-right PRM could also pass the 5% threshold; they scored slightly below the Hungarian ethnic party. By the 2012 parliamentary elections PRM disappeared, the socialist PSD and the liberal PNL formed the electoral alliance of the Social-Liberal Union (which won 2/3 of the mandates), the center-right PDL also formed an electoral alliance with smaller parties called the Right Romania Alliance. Next to them, a new populist party centered on the appeal of their party leader, the People's

Party of Dan Diaconescu also entered parliament. The Hungarian ethnic party, UDMR managed to pass the 5% threshold in the 2012 parliamentary elections.

Since, the current research does not hypothesize/benefit from the differences among these parties; I will not provide a detailed description to all of them. The above is important to get a glimpse of the national party systems of the two countries in time of the empirical analysis, since these party labels will appear in the empirical analysis. It is also important to point out that the two time points chosen are more than 20 years after the 1989 regime change, therefore the effect of the socialist historical legacies might be minimal.

#### 4. Hypotheses

Regarding the effect of the socialist historical legacies, my first two hypotheses refer to the CEE transition and to the effects of the varying types of socialism of the CEE countries. Although the two time points covered by the empirical data are 20 years after the 1989 collapse of the socialist regimes, I expect a significant difference between Western and CEE countries, as well as between countries belonging to the three types of the socialist typology of Kitschelt in terms of programmaticism. I will test these patterns at the level of the European electorate.

 $H_1$ : The electorate of Western European countries has ideological preferences of greater consistency and strength than the electorate of Central and Eastern European countries.

 $H_2$ : The strength and consistency of the ideological preferences of the electorate of Central and Eastern Europe vary in accordance with the typology of the previous socialist regimes: bureaucratic-authoritarianism > national-accommodative countries > patrimonial communism.

My third hypothesis refers to the ambiguity of the primary reference group of linkage mechanisms. Namely, the aim is to map the extent to which programmaticism varies in concordance with countries or specific parties within countries. Based on the above theoretical considerations the extent to which programmatic linkages characterize national contexts depend on the political culture and the history of the specific country. Nonetheless, I believe when one examines the details of specific cases (Hungary and Romania) the variation within individual national contexts might be substantial enough to explore the varying levels of programmaticism in the electorate of the different parties. This scenario is plausible in otherwise programmatic or non-programmatic contexts as well, since in a very programmatic context one of the electoral strategies a party might choose is to form its appeal around non-programmatic linkages like a charismatic party leader or clientelistic resource allocation; or in a context which is characterized by these, a party might choose to concentrate its appeal on programmatic grounds, rather than on a charismatic party leader or clientelism. In both cases, the electorate might reward parties which are perceived to go against the general status quo and thus concentrating on an appeal around any of these forms of linkages - depending on the national context - might be a profitable party strategy aimed at increasing electoral support.

In none of these cases the conceptual model assumes a causal link between the parties' programmatic appeal and the existence of ideological preferences of varying strength or consistency among the supporters of a particular party. It only implies an association between the strength and consistency of ideological preferences and the strength and direction of the partisanship of the electorate. Moreover, since there might be a substantial context-dependency of the extent to which individual parties are willing to/able to distinguish themselves by varying level of programmaticism, I intend to broadly examine this pattern with a multi-country European sample as well as in details in the case of Hungary and Romania. The third hypothesis of the current study is:

 $H_3$ : Depending on the strength of their attachment to their political party, the electorate of different political parties is associated with ideological preferences of significantly different strength and consistency.

In case the above logic is in place, and parties distinguish themselves by building/mobilizing the ideological preferences of the electorate, then the phenomenon will have an influence on the ideological preferences of the candidates as well. Although candidates have different motives than their electorate, they also assume ideological preferences of varying intensity and consistency. Contrary to the presence of these beliefs in the electorate, for whom these provide guidance and heuristics to the complexity of political choices (for a comprehensive review of the social construction of ideologies see: Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009), research on linkage mechanism typically conceptualizes ideological stances taken by the elite (parliamentary representatives) as being influenced by strategic considerations of getting elected. Being the ones who decide whether to form/how to form the programmatic appeal of their party, parliamentary candidates are expected to be more consistent in their ideological stances and have more powerful preferences than their electorate, which has limited motivation/ability/opportunity to develop the same level of ideological sophistication (Converse 2000; Zaller 1993). Although there is a theoretical possibility of equally strong and consistent ideological preferences among the candidates and the general electorate, previous research on voting behavior refutes the idea based on the above mentioned variation in terms of motivation/ability/opportunity of candidates and voters to deal with politics (e.g. Converse 2000). Therefore, the case, when candidates are not different in terms of the strength/consistency of their ideological preferences than the general electorate, corresponds to low levels on both of these dimensions of ideological preferences and indicates the lack of programmatic linkages. As a result, the fourth hypothesis of the current study is:

*H*<sub>4</sub>: *The strength and consistency of ideological preferences of parliamentary candidates is significantly higher than those of the mass electorate.* 

Moreover in case the political competition is structured on programmatic basis, parliamentary candidates are likely to benefit from high levels of strong and consistent ideological preferences. In addition, if there is a substantial between parties variation, these preferences might benefit to varying extent the candidates of different parties. The mechanism for these effects is ambiguous, since Hungarian or Romanian voters typically have no influence on which candidate of a party runs in their district. Nonetheless, the ideological views of the candidates they can vote for might play a role in voters' support, plus strong and consistent ideological views might help candidates in their internal power-struggle to achieve candidacy in one of the safer districts of the party. As a result, strong and consistent ideological views have the potential to contribute to candidates getting elected in case of all or some of the parties. Therefore:

*H*<sub>5</sub>: *The strength and consistency of ideological preferences increases the likelihood of a parliamentary candidates getting elected.* 

*H*<sub>6</sub>: Strong and consistent ideological preferences unequally benefit the candidates of different parties to get elected as members of parliament.

Research on programmatic linkage mechanisms is inherently linked with research on ideological representation, since the latter yields relevance to the former, by providing the link between what the preferences of the electorate are and what eventually will be instituted as public policy. In this sense, specific parties or the government can chose to follow the preferences of their own partisan voters (median partisan voter) or of the electorate as a whole (median voter). The choice depends on the differences in the ideological preferences of the

different parties' electorate since these constrain the parties in following the preferences of the median voter. In any of the two cases, programmatic linkages (whether they only vary by party systems/individual parties) provide the pre-requisite of public policies congruent with the ideological preferences of the voters.

Therefore, the conceptualization of programmatic linkages begs the question of who are the most likely to benefit from these structures among the different groups of society? From research on factual political knowledge we know that it is disproportionately distributed across the different societal strata to the expense of the most marginalized (Bartels 1996). Research shows that the same applies to ideological heuristics; these do not moderate the unequal distribution of factual political knowledge, but rather reinforce it: those who are the most knowledgeable also benefit from the most heuristics (Elf 2014). Therefore, programmatic structures at the level of the electorate (conceptualized as belief systems) might follow the same distribution, and thus they might hinder political equality by pushing parties away from their voters coming from a more socially marginalized background, towards representing the preferences of their core party base. At the same time, as long as strong or consistent ideological preferences emerge among the most marginalized groups of society these might help them to make their preferences represented by their political parties. For this reasons, the seventh and eight hypotheses of the current study are:

*H*<sub>7</sub>: *The level at which parties represent their voters' preferences is dependent on the strength/consistency of ideological preferences of these voters.* 

*H*<sub>8</sub>: Ideological preferences of socially marginalized groups of voters are more accurately represented by political parties if they share strong and consistent preferences.

#### 5. Operationalization

The two key independent variables of the current study are the strength and consistency of individual level belief systems. In order to have an empirical grip of both of these items I created indices, using survey batteries on ideological preferences. These batteries are typically part of every election study, they formulate an ideologically loaded statement (e.g. Same sex couples should be allowed to marry) and then the respondents indicate their position on a five point Likert scale, ranging from "strongly disagree", "disagree", "neutral", "agree" "strongly agree", with the possibility of "don't know" and "refuse to answer" options. Therefore all of the conceptualization/operationalization of the current model is available for researchers and easily replicable across different contexts and time points.

One of the ways belief systems can be operationalized is by constructing the co-variance matrix among these survey items and then factor analysis, Cronbach's alpha or another similar measure is used as an indicator of constraint. Besides their above mentioned conceptual problems (Luskin 1987), one of the specific issues of operationalization by co-variances is linked with comparisons across cases. Namely, since they gain their meaning from the distribution of individual observations and the relationship between these observations, the ideology score they provide is a relative measure, valid for the specific dataset. Measures of ideological preferences based on co-variances will have different meaning in different countries or in case of candidates and their electorate; even if the same survey items are used. As a result, comparisons between different datasets or between different groups of cases are ruled out by the method. Since the aim of the current study is to map and explain programmatic linkages across cases and in Hungary and Romania between candidates and their electorate, I opted for an alternative operationalization.

In order to measure consistency I rely on the operationalization of Zoltan Fazekas (2012 p.96), who uses within individual respondents variance. In the first step, I recoded each item on a scale from 0 to 4 keeping the five point scale but reversing the direction in a way that the values range according to the left-right dimension. Thus, people who had a strong stance on the right of the ideological spectrum received a score of 4, people who were neutral received a score of 2, and people who were on the left received a score of 0. Moderates received a score of 1 or 3, depending on their left-right preference. Afterwards I calculated the within individual variance from all the answers people gave, based on how many of the nine questions they answered. Accordingly, the measure only distinguishes based on how constrained individuals were when they answered these questions, not based on how many questions they answered. Since the theoretical and observed maximum of the variance measure was 4 (four point scales) I transformed it into a consistency index which had a theoretical range of 0 to 100. The final measure was calculated with the following formula, where  $\mu$  is the mean of the valid answers given to the included questions,  $x_i$  is any of the answers for these questions, and n is the number of valid answers:

$$\pi = \frac{1}{n} + \sum_{n=1}^{i} (x_i - \mu)^2$$

To measure the strength of ideological preferences (the second conceptual dimension, not included in the measure of consistency) I relied on the same survey items, but in this case, I did not distinguish between the left-right answers. I recoded the answers to each of these questions on a four point scale, according to the strength of the ideological preferences of the respondents. People who did not answer the item received a score of 0; those who answered by picking the ideologically neutral center position received a score of 1; those who picked the more moderate slightly agree/disagree positions received a score of 2; and those who felt they

could strongly agree/disagree with the statement received a score of 3. After coding each of these items, in order to counterbalance issue publics – people who felt strongly about one or a few of these items, but not about the others (and therefore they did not share a comprehensive view of the public good) – I added up the scores received across each item included in the analysis. As a final step, I transformed the index into a scale of the strength of preferences which had a theoretical range of 0 to 100.

The measure of the strength of ideological preferences makes several distinctions to benefit from the nuances in the respondents' ideological beliefs. It scores those who did not have any opinion, those who always picked the middle position on the scales, the ones who shared moderate and the ones who shared extreme views. Therefore the extremity of ideological positions was only part of the measure of the strength of ideological preferences and it is not its only or core dimension. In the end, both the consistency and the strength of ideological preferences are measured on a linear scale with the potential to compare different countries, candidates and the electorate, independent of the co-variance matrix in the specific dataset.

The disadvantage of the current operationalization is its reliance on a pre-conceived and essentialized view of the left-right positions. Each ideological survey item had to be coded in advance, in accordance with what a position on the left and on the right implies on the specific dimension of the survey item. Such an operationalization implies the existence of a comprehensive sample of ideological positions, constructed from politically relevant items, which are able to provide a reasonably good depiction of the overall ideological beliefs of the respondents. As a result the sample of ideological survey items used to represent the overall ideological beliefs of the respondents will be discussed at the beginning of each empirical chapter. The reason for relying on a pre-conceived idea of the ideological positions is to be able to construct an individual level linear variable of the consistency and the strength of ideological preferences and to avoid scales which rely in their meaning on the relative placement of individuals to each other in one specific dataset, since then comparisons across cases are not possible.

## **III.** Programmaticism in Europe – A Comparative Analysis of the Hungarian and Romanian Cases

#### 1. Introduction

The aim of the present chapter is to place Romania and Hungary relative to each other and to other European countries. I will present a comparative analysis of programmatic structures in the level of the electorate on a European sample and in the level of candidates by comparing Hungary and Romania. In the current chapter I test my first three hypotheses, and I explore the contextual variation of the presence/importance of programmatic linkages across the European continent.

#### 2. Data and Survey Items

The mass-survey data for the present analysis is coming from the European Election Voter Study 2009 (EES), a comparative large-scale mass-survey, collected in the 27 member states of the European Union (of the time), with the use of almost identical questionnaires. The data was collected immediately after the European Parliamentary (EP) elections, held between the 4<sup>th</sup> and the 7<sup>th</sup> of June 2009. In most cases computer-assisted telephone interviewing was used, but in seven countries<sup>2</sup> only 30% of the data was collected via phone and the rest through face-to-face interviewing. The survey was coordinated by the European University Institute and its Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; it involved a wide range of country-experts. The data for all the analysis of this section was weighted by the sample weights/country, calibrated according to the demographic composition of each society of every country represented by the sample.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia

To create the indicators of the strength and consistency of individuals' ideological preferences I rely on the battery of 12 questions of the EES sample, enquiring about the respondents' political attitudes. The battery was designed to tap into the political attitudes of the European electorate in the context of the EP elections, independent of the national political contexts. I decided to include only the nine items, which referred to a common understanding of the left-right dimension. Therefore, following Fazekas (2012) I excluded two items pointing towards a more latent liberal-conservative attitude and one which dealt with attitudes towards the European Union, since these are in many cases cross-cutting with the national left-right ideological distinction<sup>3</sup>. None of the remaining nine survey items had a factually correct answer; respondents indicated on a 5 point Likert scale the level of their agreement.

The nine items from which the indicators of consistency and strength of ideological preferences were constructed can be grouped into two categories: the ones which dealt with the state's role in the field of communal values and the ones which dealt with the state's involvement with the economy. These two categories correspond to the two dimensions of left-right politics, typically distinguished by the spatial models of party competition(e.g. Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). Based on a cultural/value led understanding of left-right politics, strong or moderate agreements with the following statements were coded by the consistency measure as identification with the right side of the spectrum: (1)"Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of [country]" (2) "Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law" (3) "Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion" (reversed scale) (4) "People who break the law should be given much harsher sentences than they are these days". Based on an economic understanding of left-right politics, strong or moderate agreements were coded by the consistency measure as a greements were coded by the consistency measure as marriages should be given much harsher sentences than they are these days". Based on an economic understanding of left-right politics, strong or moderate agreements were coded by the consistency measure as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> These were: (1) Schools must teach children to obey authority (2) A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family (3) EU treaty changes should be decided by referendum.

identification with the right side of the spectrum: (1) "Private enterprise is the best way to solve [country's] economic problems" (2) "Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership" (reversed scale) (3) "Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy" (4) "Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people" (reversed scale) (5) "Immigration to [country] should be decreased significantly". The last item can be interpreted through either economic or cultural lenses; the consistency measure did not make a distinction in this sense.

I believe the nine items used provide a comprehensive sample of the most politicized and discussed ideological issues of the countries of the European Union of the time. They map most of the contentious left-right positional issues, from same-sex marriage to redistribution<sup>4</sup>. Although not all of these had equal importance in the national politics of the 27 member states, they are all widely discussed topics of European politics, and I believe by relying on nine items, the variance of the relevance in the national semantics of specific ideological questions is balanced out. Overall, respondents' positions on these nine ideological question gives a reasonably valid representation of their political attitudes; therefore the consistency by which they take their ideologically motivated stances represents the constraint implied by the ideological belief system of each individual respondent.

To construct a comparative measure for the supply side of politics, I rely on parliamentary candidate surveys, representative in terms of the parties which competed at the respective elections and in terms of the candidates who got elected and who did not during legislative elections of Hungary and Romania. In the case of Romania, the candidate survey

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The appendix presents the extent to which these stances correlate with the left-right self-placement of the respondents in each country. These correlations should not be interpreted as an analysis of the consistency measure's validity, since in some way programmaticism exactly refers to the extent to which left-right labels are backed up with ideologically motivated conceptions of the public good, therefore to examine this variation is the aim of the current study.

was implemented before the 2012 parliamentary elections (three years after the EES data collection<sup>5</sup>), in the case of Hungary the candidate survey was implemented before the 2010 parliamentary elections (two years after the EES data collection). Both were part of the Comparative Candidates Survey project, the Hungarian data collection was coordinated by TÁRKI and Zsolt Enyedi, the Romanian by Open Politics and Mihail Chiru.

Although both surveys were part of the same international research project, since they were implemented independent from each other, in different time points, with items which made the most sense given the respective national context, there were only a few overlapping ideological items I could rely on to construct my indicators of the strength and consistency of the candidates' ideological beliefs. In the end, I selected three of them, which provided me with a measure based on which the two countries can be compared: In Hungary candidates who prioritized public safety as "more important than anything else", since "the efficiency of law enforcement has priority over the human right of crime offenders" as opposed to "those who commit crimes also have rights; the police should respect the rights and dignity of people taken in custody" were coded on the right of the spectrum. I matched this item with one which in Romanian candidate survey was slightly differently formulated but also referred to candidates' attitudes towards criminals and law enforcement (moderate or strong agreement was coded as position on the right): "those who break the law should receive stricter punishments" (Likert scale). The second item asked about attitudes towards protection of the environment (moderate or strong agreement was coded as position on the left); in Hungary: "Protection of the environment should be taken more seriously, even if it hinders economic development"; and in Romania: "Stronger measures should be implemented to protect the environment". The last item mapped candidates' attitudes towards women and preferential treatment with the same

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For this reason, there were some changes on the supply side of the Romanian politics. PSD and PNL formed USL, PDL formed with other parties ARD, PRM disappeared, and the new party of PPDD appeared – see the theoretical chapter for a more detailed discussion.

item in the two countries (moderate or strong agreement was coded as position on the left): "Women should benefit from preferential treatment when they apply for jobs and promotions."

Given the low number of items the comparison of the candidates' ideological preferences relies on (which might be too few to balance out the difference in the importance of the specific items in the political semantics of the two countries at the time), these measures remain only indicative in nature. In addition, all three of these are based on a cultural understanding of politics and the items were slightly differently formulated in the two countries, therefore they do not yield a very reliable/valid scale to compare the strength and consistency of the candidates' ideological preferences. Nonetheless, in both countries these items were politicized at the time, in the case of criminals by the radical right Hungarian Jobbik and by the populist PPDD of Romania; in the case of the attitudes towards environmental protection by the green LMP in Hungary and by the Rosia Montana/shale gas extraction protests in Romania; and in the case of women and preferential treatment the socialist parties of the two countries (MSZP in Hungary and PSD in Romania) made the topic somewhat salient during their campaign. In spite of these items relevance for national politics, given the fact that only three items are used to construct the scale of the strength and consistency of ideological preferences of the candidates, these scales remain tentative in nature, only used for a descriptive comparison of the two countries.

#### 3. Descriptive Analysis

Based on this battery of nine questions, I calculated the two indicators of the strength and consistency of the ideological preferences of the European electorate. Figure III.1 presents a scatter plot of the country means:

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Figure III.1 Strength and Consistency of Ideological Preferences of the European Electorate - EES 2009

As Figure III.1 depicts, the two dimensions are highly negatively correlated almost listing the countries on one dimension. According to the figure, as expected, there is a tradeoff between the strength of ideological preferences and their consistency. Most people are consistently moderate, strong ideological preferences tend to correspond to inconsistency. If one is to draw a diagonal line from Portugal to Greece, in countries which are above the line the electorate is more consistent and feels more strongly about ideological questions than the European average. Defined as such, by and large we see a distinction between Western and Eastern Europe: in the more institutionalized and entrenched party systems of Western Europe the electorate is more consistent and feels more strongly of ideological items, than the electorate of the more volatile party systems of CEE polities. Based on the graph, both Hungary and Romania are outliers and they illustrate the tradeoff between strong ideological preferences and consistent stances. Hungary does not resemble almost any of the CEE countries; in terms of consistency of ideological preferences, the Hungarian electorate lags behind the European and the CEE average. However, in terms of the strength of ideological preferences it is among the top European countries, the Hungarian electorate feels the most strongly of ideological questions in CEE. In terms of consistency, Romania is slightly more consistent than Hungary but it is still well below the European average; in terms of the strength of ideological preferences, the Romanian electorate is much more moderate than the Hungarian electorate is. Overall, the graph depicts an ideologically inconsistent Hungarian electorate can be characterized as consistently moderate. The greatest difference between the two countries lies in the strength of ideological preferences.

The next level of the descriptive analysis refers to the individual parties. Although this will mostly be developed in the next chapter, given the advantage of identical EES indicators and the candidate surveys, I will compare the strength and consistency of the individual parties' electorate and candidates in Romania and Hungary. Figure III.2 and Figure III.3 presents the plots of the means of the strength and consistency of the ideological beliefs of the candidates and of the electorate in the Hungarian and Romanian cases.

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Figure III.2 Strength and Consistency of Ideological Preferences of the Supporters of the Hungarian and Romanian Parties - EES 2009



Figure III.3 Strength and Consistency of Ideological Preferences of the Candidates of Hungarian and Romanian Parties - HU 2010, RO 2012

Figure III.2 reiterates the findings of the earlier analysis; the Hungarian electorate had generally stronger but less consistent ideological preferences than the Romanian one. The only Romanian party which approaches the pattern observed in Hungary in terms of the strength of the preferences of its supporters' ideological preferences is the democrat-liberal PDL. The case of PDL indicates that parties have the possibility to build a distinctively ideological appeal even if the context in general is not characterized by similar patterns, and it also illustrates the trade-off between strength and consistency, since its supporters had the most inconsistent preferences in the Romanian electorate of the time. Figure III.3 depicts a similar pattern in the case of the parliamentary candidates of Jobbik (there was no separate PDL in the 2012 elections). Namely, they are as inconsistent as the Romanian parties, although with much stronger preferences. Overall, based on the remarkable extent to which the parties of the two countries cluster together (in terms of the two dimensions of the ideological preferences of the parties' electorate and candidates) both figures underpin the relevance of the aggregate, national party-system in defining the profile of linkage mechanisms.

#### 4. Hypothesis Tests

The hypothesis tests of the current chapter refers to  $H_1$ ,  $H_2$  and  $H_3$ , the three hypotheses which given the availability of the empirical data and their conceptual nature are fit to be tested in a comparative manner. Similarly to the previous analysis, I rely on the weighted EES dataset.

My first two hypotheses refers to the dynamic captured by Figure III.1. In order to provide a formal test whether respondents from Western Europe have ideological preferences of greater strength and consistency than respondents from CEE countries, I conducted ANOVA analysis for both of these dimensions. For this reason, I grouped the 10 countries of the dataset
which before 1989 were on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain in the CEE category<sup>6</sup>, and I included the rest of the 17 EU member states in the Western European category<sup>7</sup>. Table III.1 depicts the result of the two ANOVA tests:

 Table III.1 Strength and Consistency of Ideological Preferences in CEE and Western

 European Countries – ANOVA, EES 2009

|                            | Consistency |             | Strength of<br>Preferences |             |
|----------------------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|-------------|
|                            | Mean        | F statistic | Mean                       | F statistic |
| Western Europe             | 58.83       | <0.00       | 53.50                      | <0.00       |
| Central and Eastern Europe | 55.72       | <0.00       | 52.00                      | <0.00       |

Table III.1 formally confirms the pattern observed on Figure III.1; CEE polities on average have an electorate with ideological preferences of lower level of strength and consistency. Although, substantively, the magnitude of the difference is not too large, Central and Eastern European EU member states 20 years after the regime change are still characterized by significantly lower level of programmaticism than the Western European countries on both of these dimensions. Therefore I accept my first hypothesis.

My second hypothesis aims to map the role of historical legacies within the 10 CEE countries included in the dataset. In order to formally test the differences in the strength and consistency of ideological preferences of these countries' electorate, similarly to my first hypothesis test, I also conducted separate ANOVA analysis for both dimensions. In order to do so, I grouped the CEE countries according to the socialists regimes they experienced based on the typology of Herbert Kitschelt (Kitschelt 2001; Kitschelt 1999 cited by Møller 2009, p.96):

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom

(1) bureaucratic-authoritarian countries: Czech Republic, Slovakia;(2) nationalaccommodative countries: Estonia, Hungary, Latvia; Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia; (3) patrimonial communist countries: Bulgaria, Romania. Table III.2 illustrates the results:

Table III.2 Strength and Consistency of Ideological Preferences in CEE Countries – ANOVA, EES 2009

|  | Consistency |             | Stren | gth of Preferences |  |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------|--------------------|--|
|  | Mean        | F statistic | Mean  | F statistic        |  |
| bureaucratic-<br>authoritarian countries | 56.18       |             | 52.36 |                    |  |
| national-<br>accommodative<br>countries  | 56.18       | <0.000      | 51.72 | 0.004              |  |
| patrimonial communist<br>countries       | 52.07       |             | 51.14 |                    |  |

Based on the results of table III.2, the differences in the means of the strength and consistency of the ideological preferences of the respondents of the three types of CEE countries are also minor, but they follow the pattern theoretically expected based on the effect of the socialist historical legacies. Bureaucratic-authoritarian countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are characterized by preferences of greater strength than the other two groups; in terms of consistency of ideological preferences they resemble national-accommodative countries and they surpass patrimonial communist countries. National-accommodative countries are characterized by ideological preferences of similar strength with patrimonial communist countries, but they are more consistent than the latter, which represents the least consistent group of countries in the CEE region. Somewhat surprisingly, even 20 years after the regime change, CEE countries resemble the same pattern of the strength and consistency of ideological preferences what  $H_2$  expected based on the typology of the socialist regimes; therefore – in light of the highly significant F statistics – I accept the second hypothesis.

My third hypothesis test refers to the variation of the ideological preferences by the party supported by the individual respondents. The dynamic on this level is depicted by Figure III.2 in the case of Hungary and Romania. I will test this hypothesis in two steps, on the general European sample and in the case of Hungary and Romania.

In order to test the hypothesis on the European sample, I constructed two ANOVA models for each of the two dimensions of the strength and consistency of ideological beliefs. In the first ANOVA test, I explain these two dimensions on the country level, in the second ANOVA test I explain these two dimensions on the party level<sup>8</sup>. To test the hypothesis, I compare the model fit measure of eta<sup>2</sup> which indicates the variance explained by each ANOVA model. Table III.3 depicts the results:

*Table III.3 Model fit of the Strength and Consistency of Ideological Preferences explained by the country of origin or the party supported by the respondents – ANOVA, EES 2009* 

|           | Consistency | Strength of Preferences |
|-----------|-------------|-------------------------|
| Countries | 0.65        | 0.62                    |
| Parties   | 0.11        | 0.09                    |

According to table III.3 parties explain 4.5% more of the consistency of ideological preferences than the respondents' country of origin. Since they almost double the explanatory power of countries (6.5%) I believe it is fair to conclude that consistency of ideological beliefs varies by party rather than by country. However, the same remark does not stand in terms of the strength of ideological preferences, the variance of which is hardly dependent on the political party of the respondents (it seems to be purely a characteristic of the national context). In this sense the Romanian Democrat-Liberal (PDL) party, for which Figure III.2 depicted

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> All the parties which more than 5 percent of the national samples indicated as their vote choice during the 2009 EP elections were included as separate independent variables. Parties with a smaller share of supporters were pooled under the "other parties" category for each national subsample of EES 2009 and included as such in the models.

ideological preferences of unusual strength given the respective national context, seem to be an outlier from the European pattern. Therefore, to examine the details, I further analyze the expectations of my third hypothesis in the case of Hungary and Romania.

To test whether the electorate's ideological preferences (strength and consistency) in the two countries varies by party identification, in other words, if parties are associated with electorates of varying ideological preferences, I included several control variables. These control variables are of three types; they tap into the respondents' resources, motivation and opportunities to deal with these issues. For the purposes of the hypothesis test, I am not specifically interested in these indicators, rather in the effect of party identification once the alternative explanations of varying individual level resources/motivation/opportunities were controlled for.

The main independent variables of the model are the interactions with the party dummies. These were constructed as dichotomous measures from the classic party identification question ("which party do you feel close to?") and then they were interacted with the strength of the respondents' partisanship. With the four point scale they generate<sup>9</sup>, they tap into not just the direction but also the strength of respondents' attachment to their party, and they are able to map linear effect sizes of how ideological preferences vary by the strength and direction of partisanship. I also included a dichotomous measure for respondents who did not identify with any of these parties.

As control variables, for the level of resources what respondents possess to deal with ideological questions I included three variables: factual political knowledge (6 point scale), education (4 point scale), being employed in the private/public sector (dummy). For their level

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> 0 "Not an identifier", 1 "Mere sympathizer", 2 "Fairly close", 3 "Very close"

of motivation, I included their general level of interest in politics (four point scale). For the opportunities respondents are exposed to with regards to these ideological issues I included politically relevant media exposure (four point scale), frequency of political discussions (four point scale), and an urban-rural dichotomous measure. In addition, I included socio-demographic controls for gender, ethnicity (only for Romania), age and age<sup>2</sup> (for curvilinear effects). All the measures and survey batteries from which they were constructed (e.g. the political knowledge measure) are included in the appendix.

Since both consistency and the strength of ideological beliefs were normally distributed continuous measures and since all the other assumptions were met, I constructed ordinary least square regression models (the distribution of the dependent measures are also available in the appendix). Missing cases were dealt with list wise deletion. Just like previously, the current regression analysis was also weighted by the per country weights of the EES dataset.

| Table III.4: Individual Level Ideological Beliefs                |               |                |                   |                |  |  |
|--|---------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------|--|--|
|  | M1 M2 M1 M2   |                |                   |                |  |  |
|  | Hungary       | Hungary        | Romania           | Romania        |  |  |
|  | Strength of   | Consistency    | Strength of       | Consistency    |  |  |
|  | Ideological   | of Ideological | Ideological       | of Ideological |  |  |
|  | Preferences   | preferences    | Preferences       | preferences    |  |  |
| HU: Fidesz – Hungarian Civic                                     | -0.37         | 0.16           |                   |                |  |  |
| Alliance * strength of partisanship                              | (0.36)        | (0.78)         |                   |                |  |  |
| HU: MSZP – Hungarian Socialist                                   | -0.38         | 0.35           |                   |                |  |  |
| Party * strength of partisanship                                 | (0.57)        | (1.24)         |                   |                |  |  |
| HU: Jobbik – Movement for a                                      | 0.01          | -1.76          |                   |                |  |  |
| Better Hungary * strength of                                     |               | (1.20)         |                   |                |  |  |
| partisanship   | (0.64)        | (1.39)         |                   |                |  |  |
| HU: Lack of Party Identification                                 | -0.63         | 0.39           |                   |                |  |  |
|  | (1.01)        | (2.19)         | 1 70**            | 0.00           |  |  |
| RO: PSD – Social Democratic                                      |               |                | $1./8^{**}$       | -0.23          |  |  |
| Party * strength of partisanship                                 |               |                | (0.58)            | (1.14)         |  |  |
| KO: PNL – National Liberal Party                                 |               |                | (0.01)            | $5.55^{***}$   |  |  |
| * strength of partisanship                                       |               |                | (0.82)            | (1.04)         |  |  |
| RO. FDL – Democratic Liberal<br>Porty * strength of partisanship |               |                | 2.46              | $-2.10^{11}$   |  |  |
| RO: PRM Greater Romania  |               |                | (0.39)            | (1.10)         |  |  |
| RO. FRIM – Ofeater Romania<br>Party * strength of particanship   |               |                | (0.74)            | (1.47)         |  |  |
| RO: Lack of Party Identification                                 |               |                | 3 75**            | (1.47)         |  |  |
| KO. Lack of Farty Rentification                                  |               |                | (1 24)            | (2.47)         |  |  |
| Interest in Politics   | 1 13**        | -2 01**        | 1 28**            | -0.12          |  |  |
| interest in Fonties  | (0.42)        | (0.90)         | (0.54)            | (1.08)         |  |  |
| Political Knowledge  | 0.79**        | 0.95*          | 1.37***           | 0.06           |  |  |
| 6  | (0.25)        | (0.54)         | (0.29)            | (0.57)         |  |  |
| Education  | -2.73***      | 4.40***        | 1.23**            | 1.16           |  |  |
|  | (0.56)        | (1.22)         | (0.57)            | (1.12)         |  |  |
| Employment   | -0.68         | 2.30           | 0.73              | -0.94          |  |  |
|  | (0.75)        | (1.63)         | (0.96)            | (1.91)         |  |  |
| Media Exposure   | 0.58*         | -1.25*         | 0.91**            | -2.03**        |  |  |
|  | (0.30)        | (0.65)         | (0.33)            | (0.66)         |  |  |
| Political Discussions  | 0.95*         | -0.40          | 1.00              | -1.15          |  |  |
|  | (0.48)        | (1.05)         | (0.62)            | (1.22)         |  |  |
| Urban-Rural  | -2.15**       | 3.93**         | 0.59              | -2.31          |  |  |
|  | (0.78)        | (1.70)         | (0.84)            | (1.66)         |  |  |
| Women  | 0.37          | -2.35*         | 0.44              | -3.52**        |  |  |
| Non Domonion Ethnicited  | (0.66)        | (1.42)         | (0.83)            | (1.65)         |  |  |
| Non-Romanian Ethnicity   |               |                | $-0.12^{***}$     | 13.30***       |  |  |
| A  | 0.22**        | 0.29           | (1.01)            | (3.20)         |  |  |
| Age  | $(0.23^{++})$ | -0.28          | (0.13)            | $-0.00^{44}$   |  |  |
| A === <sup>2</sup>   | (0.10)        | (0.22)         | (0.13)<br>0.01*** | (0.27)         |  |  |
| Age-   | 0.00          | 0.00           | -0.01             | 0.01           |  |  |
|  | (0.00)        | (0.00)         | (0.00)            | (0.00)         |  |  |
| (Constant)   | 49.16***      | 52.70***       | $27.38^{***}$     | /9.00***       |  |  |
| <b>D</b> <sup>2</sup>  | (2.95)        | (0.40)         | (3.48)            | (0.91)         |  |  |
| K <sup>2</sup>   | 0.09          | 0.06           | 0.20              | 0.0/           |  |  |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>  | 0.07          | 0.05           | 0.19              | 0.06           |  |  |
| Ν  | 985           | 983            | 877               | 874            |  |  |
| ***************************************                          |               |                |                   |                |  |  |

p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 0.05

Based on the results of Table III.4 party identification, regardless of its strength, is not associated with stronger or more consistent ideological preferences in the Hungarian electorate. Contrary to the Hungarian pattern, in Romania parties are associated with an electorate of varying levels of strength and ideological commitment. The two large parties of the right and left of the spectrum (PDL, PSD) are associated with an electorate which shares more powerful ideological preferences than the electorate of other parties. At the same time, the electorate of PDL illustrates the tradeoff between the strength and the consistency of ideological preferences. Their electorate had the most powerful ideological preferences, but they were also the least consistent about those. There is only one, the liberal PNL party which is associated with an electorate who shares more consistent ideological preferences. All these effects are reinforced by the strength of partisanship, they increasingly manifest in case of strong party identifiers. Respondents from Romania who did not identify with any of these parties felt more strongly about ideological questions than those who did<sup>10</sup>, which suggests that the reason they are not linked with any of the parties has to do with what they believe in, rather than the lack of any beliefs.

In terms of the control variables, respondents' interest in politics is usually associated with more powerful and in Hungary less consistent ideological preferences. In terms of resources, higher factual political knowledge mostly results in stronger and more consistent (not in Romania) ideological preferences. Education is context dependent, in Hungary it leads to less extreme but more consistent ideological preferences, while in Romania it only leads to more extreme ideological positions. Having a workplace does not alter the strength/consistency of ideological commitments. In terms of the opportunities, exposure to politically relevant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The lack of party identification is a dichotomous measure, therefore the estimate of its effect is not comparable with the effect of the rest of the party identification measures

media in both countries results in ideological preferences of greater strength and less consistency. Political discussions somewhat strengthen ideological preferences of the Hungarian electorate, and it does not have any effect in Romania. Hungarian urban communities have ideological preferences of less strength, but they are much more consistent about the ones they share. In terms of consistency of these beliefs there is a gender gap in both countries, favoring men. Age is associated with more powerful preferences and in the case of Romania with less consistency. Finally in Romania, non-Romanians from Romania (mostly ethnic Hungarians) consistently share ideological preferences of far less strength, than the preferences of Romanians.

Based on these results I cannot clearly accept or reject  $H_3$ , since the mechanism appears to be in place in Romania while it does not emerges in Hungary. On a European level, parties are associated with varying levels of consistency of ideological preferences, but they are not associated with the variation in the strength of these preferences. Therefore the influence of parties on the ideological preferences of their electorate appears to be limited by the general ideological context in which they are embedded in.

One of the over-arching conclusions of the present chapter suggests that the two dimensions of programmaticism, strength and consistency of ideological preferences ought to be treated separately, since they have slightly different determinants and different variance. I believe the current chapter provides a comparative analysis of ideological structures in Hungary and Romania and also places these two countries in the European spectrum from the perspective of both of these dimensions. In the next chapter I will consider the details of these two cases.

# IV. The Role of Programmatic Linkages – The Hungarian and Romanian Cases

#### 1. Introduction

In the current chapter I examine the extent to which the electorate and the political parties of Hungary and Romania connect with each other in an ideological manner. The chapter is introduced by a descriptive analysis of representation by the two countries political parties, followed by an analysis of (1) the extent to which candidates and the electorate of individual political parties differ in their ideological preferences (2) the extent to which strong and consistent ideological preferences help candidates to gain parliamentary mandates (3) help voters to make their voices heard. Accordingly, the current chapter tests my fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eight hypotheses. Overall, the chapter examines the role of programmaticism for party politics and representation in Hungary and in Romania.

#### 2. Data and Survey Items

Due to limitations caused by data availability, I face a tradeoff between comparability and control for the political context. Since the available candidate surveys (the ones I relied on in the previous chapter) were collected in different time points, before the 2010, respectively 2012 parliamentary elections of the two countries, I decided to rely on the national election studies collected in the same year in order to analyze the preferences of the electorate of these two countries. The use of these datasets comes with the cost of different ideological preference items and therefore they hinder the validity of the comparisons I draw between these two countries. The reason why I still opted for the use of this data to test my remaining five hypotheses (instead of EES) is to account for the potential temporal contextual differences in the two political structures which were in place at the moment of the two national elections. Otherwise, in research of political representation the error caused by the over-time variation of the political context can be substantial once there is a greater than two years gap between the elections and the mass surveys linked with them (Powell 2000).

The Hungarian election-study data was collected by the Szonda Ipsos and the Medián survey institutes, between March 30, 2010 and April 9, 2010 (the first round of these elections were held on April 11, the second on April 25, 2010). The Romanian election-study data was collected by the Babeş-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca. It is a panel study, with the first wave collected between October 30- November 10, 2012; the second wave between November 29-December 8, 2012; the third wave between January 10-20, 2013 (the elections were on December 9, 2012). For the purposes of the current analysis I will only use the first wave of the Romanian election panel study. In both cases the data was collected through computer assisted telephone interviewing, during the same campaign as the candidate surveys were<sup>11</sup>.

In the Hungarian case, the candidates and the electorate were interviewed with the same ideological survey items. I constructed the scales for the consistency and the strength of their ideological preferences based on 11 ideological items, from which 7 were positional items (7 point scale, with different meanings associated with the two extremes of the scale) and 4 were Likert scale items. Regarding the positional items, based on a conventional understanding of positions on the right and on the main parties' positions at the time, people on the right were coded as those who prioritized the following statements:(1) "the flow of foreign capital/investments needs to be controlled, since it renders under foreign interest the Hungarian economy" over "it does not matter if capital/investments are foreign, as long as it help production and creates jobs"; (2) "higher education should be freely provided" over "tuition fees need to be introduced to cover the costs of higher education"; (3) "Roma people are responsible for their own problems, which they have to solve themselves" over "Roma people

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> For a description of the candidate survey data see the previous chapter

should be supported by the government more than others in order to compensate the discrimination they are facing"; (4) "for societal morals, it is required that the state should supports the Church" over "religion is a private affair, the state should stay away from the affairs of the Church"; (5) "public safety is more important than anything else, the efficiency of law enforcement has priority over the human right of crime offenders" over "those who commit crimes also have rights; the police should respect the rights and dignity of people taken in custody"; (6) "lists of members of the former communist secret service should be published" over "these lists should not be published, we should move on and leave the past behind"; (7) " Taxes should be decreased even if this implies cutting social expenditures" over "The state should spend more on social expenditures even if this implies raising the taxes". Regarding the Likert scale items, moderate or strong agreement with the following items were coded as position on the left: (8) protection of the environment should be taken more seriously, even if it hinders economic development (9) women should be the government's duty to ensure a workplace for everyone (11) women should be free to decide on abortion.

Each of these issues was (and still is) deeply embedded in Hungarian politics, and some of them were present in almost each parliamentary election campaign since the regime change (e.g. cutting taxes vs. welfare benefits). Each of them has its own story of entering politics and dividing parties in their assumed ideological positions. For example antagonistic attitudes towards ethnic Roma people were wildly regarded as the main driving force behind the popularity of the radical right Jobbik party in the 2010 elections. As a result, based on the large number of items all of which tap into greatly politicized debates of Hungarian politics, I believe this sample of ideological attitudes yields an accurate representation of the strength and consistency of ideological attitudes of the Hungarian electorate and parliamentary candidates.

In the Romanian case, most of the ideological items on which parliamentary candidates and the electorate were interviewed were not overlapping. In case of the parliamentary candidates, nine items were used to construct the scale of the strength and consistency of their ideological preferences, and moderate/strong agreement with the following statements were coded as positions on the right: (1) those who break the law should be punished by more severe sentences; (2) politicians should abstain from intervening in the economy; (3) protection of the environment should be taken more seriously (reversed scale); (4) women should benefit from preferential treatment when they apply for jobs and promotions (reversed scale); (5) immigrant workers are good for Romania's economy (reversed scale) (6) the income tax should be reduced for people earning less than the medium wage (reversed scale) (7) the Labor Code should be modified to increase workers' protection (reversed scale) (8) introducing the copayment of medical services is necessary (9) the gold extraction project at Rosia Montană should start. From the nine items used in case of the general electorate 5 were measured on a Likert scale, moderate/strong agreement were coded as positions on the left: (1) the austerity measures should be replaced by measures stimulating the economy; (2) the current level of contribution to the social security system needs to be decreased (reversed scale); (3) the state should redistribute the income of those who are the most well off towards those who are the worst off; (4) we should allow people of different races or ethnicities to come and live in Romania or to settle here permanently; (5) Romania should help poorer states to develop. There were 4 positional items, on which respondents who prioritized the following statements were coded on the left: (6) "the differences in income should be decreased" over "the differences in income should be increased to encourage individual effort"; (7) "the state's property should extend and develop" over "private property should extend and develop"; (8) "state should take more responsibility for the welfare of everyone" over "every individual should take more responsibility for their own welfare"; (9) "competition is a bad thing, it gets the worst out of people" over "competition is a good incentive for people to work harder and to develop new ideas".

Since in Romania parties' ideological and policy positions fluctuate from one election to the other on key ideological questions and policy domains (Gherghina and Chiru forthcoming; Frye 2002), the items are slightly less linked with everyday party politics and they rather aim to tap into the underlying (more abstract) left-right attitudes. As such, I believe the two samples of nine items are able to map the consistency and the strength of ideological stances, as long as such stances exist in the Romanian electorate (see for instance the theoretical chapter on the self-selective nature of the left-right labels) and parliamentary candidates. Overall, the Hungarian and the Romanian samples of ideological items I believe compose samples based on which the strength and consistency of the ideological preferences of the candidates and of the electorate can be meaningfully mapped.

#### 3. Descriptive Analysis

For the purposes of the current chapter I will mostly rely on the left-right scale to characterize the scope of the ideological preferences of the electorate and the parliamentary candidates. However, as outlined in the theoretical chapter, the scale does not solely refer to ideological preferences, but it is rather an encompassing measure of political preferences. In the case of voters it acts as super-issue, a cue which helps them to organize the different parties on one dimension and select according to what they, themselves believe in. In the case of candidates it is a strategic decision where do they place themselves in the left-right issue space depending on their general strategy of maximizing their political support. As a result, before using as a measure of party-voter distance I will uncover what the scale stands for in the two contexts.

Based on the logic of charismatic linkages, the left-right ideology as a super-issue and as a major decision making factor of voters is correlated with leaders' likability. Leader likability can work in both casual directions: people might identify on the left-right scale based on their sympathy towards one of the parties' leader, or based on their rejection towards the other parties' leader. They might also identify ideologically based on how much they like/dislike a particular leader. Both of these mechanisms are in line with charismatic linkages and to see the extent any of them are in place, Figure IV.1 and IV.2 plots the Pearson correlation coefficients of the respondents' attitudes towards the main politicians and their left-right self-placement, broken down to the electorate of different parties (in terms of vote choice). I expect positive correlations from leaders of parties on the right and negative correlations from leaders of parties on the left. Throughout the current chapter left-right self-placement is measured on an eleven point scale where 5 is neutral, 0-4 are people on the left and 6-11 are people on the right of the ideological spectrum<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Unfortunately the Hungarian mass survey used a ten point scale which I transformed for the sake of comparability, but since there was no option for the ideologically neutral position, additional errors were introduced.



Figure IV.1 Leaders' likability and left-right ideology (Hungarian electorate – 2010)



Figure IV.2 Leaders' likability and left-right ideology (Romanian electorate – 2012)

In both cases the expected pattern is reproduced: leftist politicians' likability negatively correlates with the scale, while the likability of party leaders on the right of the spectrum positively correlates with the scale. In Hungary, politicians likability seems much more closely attached with left-right ideology (with r=0.6 correlation coefficients in the case of Fidesz and MSZP leaders), than in Romania (r=0.3 correlation coefficients in case of president Băsescu, and the main party leaders of the leftist alliance).

Based on the logic of programmatic linkages, left-right labels should also be associated with ideological stances. In fact, if they are the basis of programmatic representation, their primary meaning needs to be centered on a well-identifiable ideological belief system. In order to trace their substantive, ideological content, I produced similar figures, where I correlated the left-right scale with the scale my consistency measure is based on (before calculating the within individual variance). I transformed the initial four point scale to 11 points and I included the table with what means the candidates/electorate of different parties had in the appendix. Figure IV.3 and Figure IV.4 depict the Pearson correlation for both candidates and voters in both countries (with the same items in case of Hungary).



Figure IV.3 Ideological beliefs and left-right scale (Hungarian candidates/electorate – 2010)



*Figure IV.4 Ideological beliefs and left-right scale (Romanian candidates/electorate – 2012)* 

The two figures depict a rather gloomy picture of the extent to which these left-right labels are backed up with ideological content. Apart from the Hungarian LMP, in the case of the rest of the parties the left-right labels used by their electorate and candidates are only weakly correlated with ideological stances (a similar graph of the European countries – with a different sample of ideological items yet a similar conclusion - is available in the appendix of the previous chapter). A somewhat interesting phenomenon emerges with the main leftist Social-Liberal Romanian alliance, the candidates of which – if they rely on the scale at all – seem to use the left-right position to counter balance their actual ideological beliefs. In the rest of the cases no similar pattern emerges, or if it does it is not strong enough to achieve statistical significance (PPDD – Romania, MSZP – Hungary). Based on these figures, in both countries, the left-right labels primarily refer to feelings towards party leaders and candidates rather than to ideologically grounded stances.

Keeping this in mind, I calculated the parties distance from their own partisan median voter and the median voter of the electorate<sup>13</sup> based on the left-right scale, since – in spite of its blurred meaning – it is still the dimension on which voters compare the parties with each other and with their own preferences. To identify the parties' position I used the mean of their parliamentary candidates' left-right position, and in accordance with Golder and Stramski (2010) I use the absolute value on the 11 point scale as a measure of the ideological distance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> I only excluded non-voters, undecided and supporters of other parties were included.



*Figure IV.5 Ideological distance of political parties and the median voter (HU 2010; RO 2012)* 

As Figure IV.5 shows in general political parties are remarkably close to their own median voter. As for the median voter of the electorate, both in Hungary and in Romania, the winner of the elections (Fidesz and USL) were the closest (discounting the populist PPDD). The winner of the Romanian elections, USL is an exception from the pattern in the sense that it is the only political alliance which was closer to the median voter than to their own partisan base. As a general pattern it seems parties as a whole are to a great extent congruent with their electorate's left-right preferences.

#### 4. Hypothesis Tests

My fourth hypothesis places the minimum threshold to see if ideological preferences play a significant role in linkage mechanisms, therefore it links with the previous analysis of correlation patterns. According to this hypothesis candidates should be more consistent and have stronger ideological preferences than the party's electorate. To conduct the hypothesis test, given the low number of cases I did not conduct any statistical analysis; I only depict the conditional means of candidates and their electorate with the very liberal confidence interval of one standard deviation around them:



Figure IV.6 Ideological Preferences of the Hungarian Candidates/Electorate - 2010



Figure IV.7 Ideological Preferences of the Romanian Candidates/Electorate – 2012

As Figures IV.6 and IV.7 illustrate, candidates hardly have stronger and more consistent ideological preferences than their electorate. In the Romanian case they tend to cluster together, but that is also associated with the lack of powerful stances. Once the confidence intervals are taken into account  $H_4$  is clearly rejected, reiterating the earlier finding of the blurred ideological preferences beyond the left-right placement.

To test my fifth and sixth hypotheses, I built a statistical model for explaining which candidates got elected. The key independent variables are the strength and consistency of their ideological beliefs, operationalized in accordance with the theoretical chapter. As control variables I included their left-right position (11 point scale), their campaign efforts indicated by the number of hours they spent with campaigning in the week leading up to the elections, their position in the party, both in terms of informal networks (years they spent in the respective party) and in terms of formal positions (whether they were at any time member of the party's national leadership – dichotomous variable). Unfortunately, in the Hungarian candidate survey the socio-demographic variables were poorly recorded, and due to the substantial missing values I could not control for them. In the Romanian sample I controlled for education (four points, continuous) and ethnicity (dummy).

To explore the effect of the strength and consistency of ideological preferences I constructed a logistic regression model, with the dichotomous dependent variable of getting elected. In the baseline model I weighted the sample by the party size; since it was not representative to the competing parties as a whole (the frequency weights are available in the appendix). My sixth hypothesis required interaction terms of strength and consistency of ideological preferences with the party label under which the candidates competed. In logistic regressions, calculating interaction terms is not as straightforward as in linear models; therefore, in order to get an accurate estimate, I split my sample and tested my sixth hypothesis with the candidates who belonged to that specific party. For the analysis of the interaction terms the sample was not weighted by the party size, since it was representative at the level of individual parties.

Before I present my analysis, I need to account for an additional problem I faced, namely the low sample sizes. According to the work of Peduzzi et al. (1996) if p is the smallest proportion of successful and unsuccessful cases and k is the number of independent variables, then the minimum sample size in logistic regression should be:

n=10 \* k / p

In addition, according to Long (1997) n should not be lower than 100. These are required by the asymptotic properties of maximum likelihood estimates, which are only unbiased, efficient and consistent in case of a sample size as large as previously described. If these assumptions are not met, the estimates do not necessarily become biased, inefficient and inconsistent, but we do not know if they still proved an accurate estimate of the population parameters. In other words, in case of low sample sizes we do not know what happens with the logistic regression estimates.

My data violated this assumption when I broke it down to the individual parties, in two ways: the proportion of elected/unelected candidates was not small enough (in other words, in most cases there were only a very few unelected candidates represented), and in a few cases the sample size did not exceed 100 cases. In order to decrease this burden I did not control for any of the above control variables in the models used for estimating the interaction terms. I included in the appendix a table in which I present the required sample sizes and the actual sample sizes for each party with two independent variables so the readers are able to judge for themselves the extent they trust my estimates. I only fully met Peduzzi et al.'s and Long's requirements in the case of Jobbik from the Hungarian parties and in case of ARD from the Romanian parties. To ease the interpretation of the coefficients table IV.1 and IV.2 presents odds ratios (Exp (B) with the standard errors of log odds ratios (B).

| Table IV.1:Determinants of Candidates Getting Elected - Hungary 2010  |         |            |            |            |            |  |
|---|---------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--|
|   | M1      | M2         | M3         | <b>M4</b>  | M5         |  |
|   | General | Fidesz     | MSZP       | Jobbik     | LMP        |  |
|   | Model   | Candidates | Candidates | Candidates | Candidates |  |
| Left-Right Position   | 1.28*** |            |            |            |            |  |
|   | (0.05)  |            |            |            |            |  |
| Strength of Ideological   | .93**   | .93        | 1.00       | .91**      | 1.10       |  |
| Preferences   | (0.03)  | (0.05)     | (0.03)     | (0.04)     | (0.12)     |  |
| Consistency of  | .98     | .96        | 1.02       | .98        | 1.03       |  |
| Ideological   |         |            |            |            |            |  |
| Preferences   | (0.01)  | (0.03)     | (0.024)    | (0.02)     | (0.06)     |  |
| Hours spent with  | 1.02*** |            |            |            |            |  |
| campaigning   | (0.01)  |            |            |            |            |  |
| Years in Party  | 1.19*** |            |            |            |            |  |
|   | (0.02)  |            |            |            |            |  |
| National Leadership   | 1.74*   |            |            |            |            |  |
|   | (0.32)  |            |            |            |            |  |
| Constant  | 5.66    | 9.13*      | -1.46      | 6.46       | -11.32     |  |
|   | (3.06)  | (5.34)     | (3.44)     | (4.14)     | (12.39)    |  |
| Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>   | 0.39    | 0.03       | 0.05       | 0.11       | 0.05       |  |
| Ν   | 358     | 163        | 53         | 111        | 70         |  |
| at the second |         |            |            |            |            |  |

 $^{***}p < 0.001, \ ^{**}p < 0.01, \ ^{*}p < 0.05$ 

| Table IV.2:Determinants of Candidates Getting Elected - Romania 2012 |                  |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
|--|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--|
|  | M1               | M2                | M3                | M4                 | M5                 |  |
|  | General<br>Model | USL<br>Candidates | ARD<br>Candidates | UDMR<br>Candidates | PPDD<br>Candidates |  |
| Left-Right Position  | .83***           |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
|  | (.04)            |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
| Strength of Ideological  | .94**            | .91               | 1.03              | 1.08               | .97                |  |
| Preferences  | (.02)            | (.06)             | (.03)             | (.06)              | (.05)              |  |
| Consistency of   | .97              | .95               | 1.04              | 1.07*              | .98                |  |
| Ideological  |                  |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
| Preferences  | (.01)            | (.04)             | (.02)             | (.04)              | (.03)              |  |
| Hours spent with   | 1.01**           |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
| campaigning  | (.01)            |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
| Years in Party   | 1.15***          |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
|  | (.02)            |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
| National Leadership  | 1.24             |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
|  | (.28)            |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
| Education  | .70              |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
|  | (.38)            |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
| Ethnicity  | .02***           |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
|  | (.69)            |                   |                   |                    |                    |  |
| Constant   | 1130.17**        | 80697.34          | .01               | .01                | 13.03              |  |
|  | (2.86)           | (7.16)            | (4.24)            | (6.59)             | (6.02)             |  |
| Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>  | .35              | .04               | .06               | .06                | .01                |  |
| Ν  | 344              | 98                | 97                | 97                 | 64                 |  |

 $^{***}p < 0.001, \ ^{**}p < 0.01, \ ^{*}p < 0.05$ 

Based on the results of tables IV.1 and IV.2 I can confidently refute  $H_5$ . Consistency of ideological preferences does not increases or decreases the likelihood of getting elected in any of the two countries, while the strength of ideological preferences only decreases the odds of the candidates being elected in both countries. In Hungary, an additional value on the 100 point scale index of the strength of ideological preferences decreases by 7% the odds for candidates to get elected, an estimate slightly smaller (5%) in the case of Romania.

I also failed to accept my sixth hypothesis, there is no meaningful variation in terms of how much candidates benefit from strong and consistent ideological preferences. In fact, candidates tend to lose by having powerful preferences, a finding which clearly emerges in the case of Jobbik. The candidates of the radical right Jobbik party have 8% loss in the odds to get elected the stronger their ideological preferences are. Although in my sample a very few of the candidates of the Hungarian party from Romania (UDMR) were elected, for them consistent preferences seemingly helped increasing their odds to win the mandate by 7%, a finding which worth investigating with the use of additional, larger samples.

In terms of the control variables, in Hungary plus one value towards the right of the 11 point scale increased the candidates' odds to get elected by 28%, while in Romania it had a similar effect in the opposite direction. In that case, plus one value towards the left of the scale increased the candidates' odds to get elected by 17%. Campaigning paid off to a great extent in both countries, every additional hour on the week before the elections led to an increase of odds to get elected by 3% in Hungary and by 1% in Romania. An additional year spent in the party increased the Hungarian candidates' odds to get elected by 19%, and by 15% in Romania. Controlling for the years they spent in the party the additional effect of taking part in the national leadership is not significant in Romania while in Hungary – with a marginally significant effect – it increased the candidates' odds to get elected by 74%.

In order to test  $H_7$  and  $H_8$  I needed to calculate the parties distance form their voters. I relied on the 11 points left-right scale on which both the candidates and the voters indicated their stance. Then, I calculated the following measure d, where  $\mu$  is the mean of the candidate positions and  $X_i$  is the left-right position of the individual voter:

### $d = | \mu - X_i |$

In order to model the variance of the resulting non-normally distributed continuous variable, I created a categorical measure, identifying those who were close to their party (within one point distance), those who were far (within three point distance) and those who were the furthest (more than three points distance). Figure IV.8 and IV.9 depicts in a descriptive manner the distance of the parties previously analyzed from their electorate, illustrating the ideological variance within the electorate of the different parties.



Figure IV.8 Distance of the Hungarian parties from their electorate - 2010



Figure IV.9 Distance of Romanian parties from their electorate - 2012

In order to test  $H_7$  and examine the extent to which this distance varies according to the strength and consistency of the voters ideological preferences, I conducted ordinal logistic regression analysis, with the previously introduced variable of three categories. To accept  $H_7$ , I expect that a significant part of its variance is explained by the variation in ideological preferences. Due to the small sample sizes I did not introduce any control variables. Table IV.3 depicts the results; for the sake of easier interpretation I changed the individual coefficients to odd rations ( $e^{\beta}$ ), but the standard error refer to the log odds ratios ( $\beta$ ):

| Table IV.3:Determinants of Parties Distance from their Voters |           |        |        |           |        |  |
|---|-----------|--------|--------|-----------|--------|--|
|   | <b>M1</b> | M2     | M3     | <b>M4</b> | M5     |  |
|   | USL       | ARD    | Fidesz | MSZP      | Jobbik |  |
|   | Voters    | Voters | Voters | Voters    | Voters |  |
| Strength of Ideological                                       | 1.01      | 0.98   | 1.03** | 1.02      | 1.00   |  |
| Preferences   | (0.01)    | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03)    | (0.03) |  |
| Consistency of Ideological                                    | 1.00      | 0.98** | 1.00   | 0.98      | 0.99   |  |
| Preferences   | (0.01)    | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02)    | (0.02) |  |
| Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>                                     | 0.01      | 0.05   | 0.03   | 0.11      | 0.02   |  |
| N   | 300.73    | 126.60 | 614.55 | 233.23    | 147.69 |  |

 $^{***}p < 0.001,\ ^{**}p < 0.01,\ ^{*}p < 0.05$ 

As the table shows, there is hardly any part of the voters distance from their parties which would depend on the consistency and the strength of the electorate's ideological preferences. The two significant relationships have a marginal magnitude and in the case of the Hungarian Fidesz it does not points in the expected direction. If anything, plus one point on the 100 points scale of the strength of their ideological beliefs increases the odds of Fidesz's electorate to be less represented by 3%. In the case of the Romanian ARD consistency points in the expected direction: consistent ideological stances decrease the odds of misrepresentation by 2%. Accordingly, in light of the weak evidence I failed to accept H<sub>7</sub>.

In order to test my final hypothesis  $H_8$ , I constructed a similar ordered logit model, but in this case for all the electorate of the eight parties<sup>14</sup>. In the baseline model I included measures to desegregate most of the socio-demographic groups I expected to be misrepresented. In the additional models, I included the interaction terms with the most marginalized groups of the respective societies to see if the magnitude of their misrepresentation decreased once they share strong and consistent ideological preferences. In both models, political interest is used as a control variable, since as a major driving force of political attitudes, after controlling for its effect, I am able to give a conservative estimate of the effect of ideological preferences. Although non-voters (a group which was among the most under-represented in both countries) is not a socio-demographic category and therefore it sticks out from the rest of these, not-voting is typically linked with socially marginalized groups, therefore – as an indirect effect – nonvoters still fit the profile of socially marginalized groups. Tables IV.4 and IV.5 present the results (the parameter estimates are in odd ratios):

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Hungary: Fidesz, MSZP, Jobbik, LMP; Romania: USL, ARD, UDMR, PPDD

| Table 1V.4:Determinants of V                       | oters Distance Iro | om their Parties - | Hungary 2010 |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|
|  | <b>M1</b>          | M2                 | M3           |
| Strength of Ideological                            | 1.03**             | 1.03               | 1.02         |
| Preferences  | (0.01)             | (0.01)             | (0.02)       |
| Consistency of Ideological                         | 1.00               | 1.00               | 0.99         |
| Preferences  | (0.01)             | (0.01)             | (0.01)       |
| Age  | 1.00               | 1.00               | 1.00         |
|  | (0.00)             | (0.00)             | (0.00)       |
| Political Interest                                 | 1.14*              | 1.14               | 1.15*        |
|  | (0.08)             | (0.08)             | (0.08)       |
| Women  | 1.02               | 1.01               | 1.03         |
|  | (0.13)             | (0.13)             | (0.13)       |
| Employed   | 1.61***            | 1.62***            | 1.62***      |
|  | (0.14)             | (0.14)             | (0.14)       |
| Non-Budapest residents                             | 1.75***            | 3.85               | 1.71***      |
|  | (0.17)             | (3.72)             | (0.17)       |
| No High School Diploma                             | 1.30**             | 1.29*              | 0.18         |
| <b>C 1</b>   | (0.14)             | (0.14)             | (2.81)       |
| Not Voting   | 0.65**             | 0.63*              | 0.63*        |
| -  | (0.26)             | (0.26)             | (0.26)       |
| Budapest*  |                    | 0.98               |              |
| Strength of Preferences                            |                    | (0.04)             |              |
| Budapest*  |                    | 1.02               |              |
| Consistency of Preferences                         |                    | (0.02)             |              |
| No High School*                                    |                    |                    | 1.01         |
| Strength of Preferences                            |                    |                    | (0.03)       |
| No High School*                                    |                    |                    | 1.02         |
| Consistency of Preferences                         |                    |                    | (0.02)       |
| Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>                          | 0.09               | 0.10               | 0.09         |
| Ν  | 1000.89            | 1000.89            | 1000.89      |
| $^{***}p < 0.001, \ ^{**}p < 0.01, \ ^{*}p < 0.05$ |                    |                    |              |

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| Table IV.5:Determinants of Voters' Distance from their Parties - Romania 2012 |         |  |  |  |
|---|---------|--|--|--|
|   | M1      |  |  |  |
| Strength of Ideological Preferences   | 1.00    |  |  |  |
|   | (0.01)  |  |  |  |
| Consistency of Ideological Preferences  | 0.99**  |  |  |  |
|   | (0.01)  |  |  |  |
| Age   | 1.01    |  |  |  |
|   | (0.01)  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest  | 1.16    |  |  |  |
|   | (0.11)  |  |  |  |
| Women   | 0.88    |  |  |  |
|   | (0.17)  |  |  |  |
| Employed  | 0.86    |  |  |  |
|   | (0.20)  |  |  |  |
| Rural-Urban   | 0.94    |  |  |  |
|   | (0.18)  |  |  |  |
| Hungarian Ethnicity   | 0.33*** |  |  |  |
|   | (0.32)  |  |  |  |
| No High School Diploma  | 1.20    |  |  |  |
|   | (0.20)  |  |  |  |
| Not Voting  | 0.37**  |  |  |  |
|   | (0.45)  |  |  |  |
| Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>   | .083    |  |  |  |
| Ν   | 511.17  |  |  |  |
| $p^{***} = 0.001, p^{**} = 0.01, p^{*} = 0.05$                                |         |  |  |  |

In Hungary, as the baseline M1 model shows, from the preferences of marginalized groups only non-Budapest respondents and respondents who did not have a high school degree are misrepresented. The odds of being further away from their parties increased by 75% for the former category and by 30% for the latter category. These are quite large effect sizes, and as the interaction terms in M2 and M3 show, they are not decreased by consistent or strong ideological preferences.

In terms of the other socially marginalized groups, it is somewhat reassuring, that age and gender does not result in misrepresentation. The effect of being employed increases the odds of being misrepresented by around 60%, which might at least partially be because parties balance out the socio-economic inequalities (the references category included not just the unemployed but pensioners and students as well). Non-voters are also well represented, the odds for them to have preferences which are not well represented decreases by 35%. Representing this category has a primary importance for any of these parties, since they are the part of the electorate which at the moment the survey was recorded was not willing to vote, thus parties might be able to persuade them and gain their support more easily than the support of those who already made up their mind.

As far as the strength and consistency of preferences is concerned, the effect of the former in the general model reinforces the findings of table IV.3 and it is probably driven by Fidesz's voters. Political interest is also marginally significant and it increases the odds of misrepresentation, a finding probably driven by the relative ideological radicalism of the politically interested segment of the electorate.

In Romania, as opposed to Hungary, none of the socially marginalized groups appear significantly misrepresented. On the contrary, for ethnic Hungarians the odds of being well represented increases by 67%, a finding probably explained by the single party which represents an overwhelming majority of them and which as an ethnic party has less constrains to adjust its general left-right ideological appeal<sup>15</sup>. In the Romanian case too, the preferences of non-voters are well represented, the odds for them being close to their party increases by 63%, an effect considerably larger than in the case of Hungary, probably driven by USL's appeal to the median voter (figure IV.5). I believe the lack of finding for misrepresentation of socially marginalized groups of voters is driven by the previously described self-selective nature of the left-right labels in the Romanian case. 20% of respondents who voted for these parties did not identify

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>The appeal of UDMR, the ethnic Hungarian party is based on a much lower extent on ideological grounds, exemplified by the party's easiness to enter coalitions with other parties on the left and on the right side of the spectrum.

on the left-right scale, and in light of previous research, non-identifiers were very likely to disproportionately consist of socially marginalized groups.

In the case of Romania, the main effect of strength and consistency of ideological preferences also reinforces the findings of table 3.3. The marginal significance of the consistency of preferences is probably driven ARD's voters. Although, similarly to the case of Hungary, these effects of ideological preferences have a minor magnitude and they are only marginally significant.

In light of these findings and the weak evidence provided by the Hungarian non-Budapest residents and under-educated people I reject H<sub>7</sub>, since the preferences of some of the above socially marginalized groups (e.g. unemployed, non-voters) are well represented. Therefore, the extent to which societal marginalization is reinforced by political underrepresentation depends on the specific societal category and it does not emerge as a general trend. As for H<sub>8</sub>, I reject the hypothesis, since based on the case of the socially marginalized groups for which I tested the hypothesis, strong or consistent ideological preferences did not decrease the degree of the misrepresentation of their preferences.

## V. Discussion of the Results and Conclusions

In the current chapter I summarize and explain the main results of the empirical analysis in light of the theoretical framework. I discuss the descriptive part as well as the results of the individual hypothesis tests of the empirical analysis. In light of the chosen operationalization and research design of the study I also discuss the limitations of the current research as well as the generalizability of its findings. I conclude with the contribution the current analysis makes for future research.

I believe the main findings of both empirical chapters raise doubts about the validity of my main research question. Perhaps asking which country is characterized by higher levels of programmaticism is not the best question. The first empirical chapter, the comparison of the Hungarian and Romanian cases with other European countries, already made evident that programmaticism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, a finding reiterated by the second empirical chapter, the detailed analysis of the two countries with different samples of respondents and ideological survey items.

The only case when the two dimensions of programmaticism mapped by the current research, consistency and strength of ideological preferences followed the expected pattern concerned the role of historical legacies in the aggregate, between country analyses. The first two hypotheses, referring to the order between the Western European and Central and Eastern European countries, as well as within the CEE countries, were confirmed by the European Election Study recorded in 2009. Twenty years after the 1989 regime change, on average CEE countries were characterized by lower levels of consistency and strength of the ideological preferences of their electorate than the average of Western European countries (table III.1). Moreover, within the CEE group, the pattern follows the one expected based on the typology

of the socialist regimes developed by Herbert Kitschelt (table III.2). In this sense, my results point towards accepting the continuity hypothesis of the role of the socialist legacies in the CEE transition.

However, even on the level of the aggregate pattern and historical legacies, the multidimensionality of programmaticism became evident. The first figure of the current study (Figure III.1), the scatter plot of the country means on the two dimensions of programmaticism already illustrates the tradeoff between consistency and strength of ideological beliefs. In this sense there were at least three groups of countries which can be distinguished: (1) the ones where low levels of consistency characterized ideological beliefs of great strength<sup>16</sup>; (2) the most numerous group where somewhat consistent beliefs characterized ideological preferences of moderate strength<sup>17</sup>; (3) and countries where very consistent beliefs characterized ideological preferences of low strength<sup>18</sup>. The analysis of variance for my third hypothesis test (table III.3) indicated some nuances of this typology: consistency of ideological beliefs varies according to individual parties, but the strength of preferences primarily varies according to national contexts.

Hungary and Romania belonged to two different types of countries; moreover, they were an outlier in their own groups. Hungary is the country in the 2009 EES sample, where respondents had the lowest consistency score coupled with ideological preferences of great strength. Romania on the other hand, belonged to the second category of moderate consistency and strength of ideological preferences, but within those countries it was characterized by the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Greece, Ireland, Hungary, France, Slovenia, Finland, Cyprus

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Italy, Malta, Estonia, Czech Republic, Sweden, Luxembourg Denmark, Poland, Austria

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Belgium, Spain, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, Lithuania

low level of consistency. The difference in the two types of programmaticism the two countries represents defined the patterns further revealed by the rest of my hypothesis tests.

Accordingly, in Romania, where the national context is characterized by preferences of moderate strength, parties were associated with an electorate of varying strength and consistency of ideological preferences (table III.4). A similar pattern did not emerge in Hungary, which led to not accepting my third hypothesis. As long as strength and consistency of ideological preferences at the level of different parties in Hungary plays a role in party politics, the link refers to candidate selection and representation. Namely, the candidates of the radical right Jobbik party had less chance to get elected the stronger their ideological preferences were (table IV.2), and the voters of the major party of the time (Fidesz) were less represented the stronger they felt about their ideological views (table IV.3). In the case of the former, stronger ideological preferences probably mean candidates with more extreme views of an already ideologically radical party, in the case of the latter, the strong ideological preferences of their electorate might be less represented because of the party's appeal to the median voter. Both examples show that once the strength of ideological preferences is broken down to the level of individual parties, the primary distinction it makes is between voters with ideologically radical or moderate preferences. Consistency of ideological preferences did not play a role in Hungarian party politics, therefore I rejected my H<sub>5</sub>, H<sub>6</sub>, H<sub>7</sub>, and H8.

The Romanian pattern is slightly different in this sense. Based on the 2009 EES sample, parties were associated with an electorate which had ideological preferences of different levels of strength and consistency (table III.4). In this respect, strong ideological preferences – broken down to the level of different parties – decreased the chances of parliamentary candidates getting elected, a finding probably driven by the candidates of the wining party alliance, the Social-Liberal Union (table IV.2) which primarily attracted the median voter of the electorate
(figure IV.5). Consistency of ideological preferences in the Romanian case only increased the chances of the ethnic Hungarian party's candidates to get elected (table IV.2), and in the case of voters it decreased their distance from what the parties represent (table IV.5), a finding probably driven by the voters of the main right-wing alliance of the time: ARD (table IV.3).

I believe the two countries' example underpins the importance of the aggregate analysis and the between country typology. On the one hand, both cases illustrate that once strength of the ideological preferences is broken down to the level of individual parties (which is not its primary reference group - table III.3), it only makes a distinction between the parts of the electorate which shares extreme/moderate ideological preferences, and therefore its link with programmaticism weakens. On the other hand, the different role that the consistency of ideological preferences plays in these two countries shows that it only varies party by party if it is coupled with ideological preferences of generally less strength (Romania - Figure III.1). In such a context it helps candidates to gain parliamentary mandate (table IV.2) and empowers the electorate as a whole in gaining representation for their ideological preferences (table IV.5). However, once on the general – national – level ideological preferences are characterized by a greater strength (Hungary - Figure III.1), the role of consistent ideological preferences vanishes.

From a normative perspective, the analysis transmits a mixed message. In both countries parties are remarkably representative of their electorate's left-right preferences, but it remains unclear what these labels represent. Especially in Hungary, left-right identification highly correlates with feelings towards party leaders (figures IV.1 and IV.2), and in neither of the two countries they are strongly linked with ideological preferences (figures IV.3 and IV.4). Overall, the correlation patterns point towards the primary role of charismatic linkages, over programmatic ones. This general finding was reiterated by my fourth hypothesis test, according to which candidates do not have stronger or more consistent ideological preferences than the

electorate (figure IV.6 and IV.7). The hypothesis tests of  $H_8$  also point in this direction, since marginalized societal groups did not gain better representation of their ideological preferences even if they had consistent or strong ideological preferences (table IV.4 – M2 and M3), although their preferences on average were not more poorly represented than those of other groups (table IV.4 – M1 and table IV.5 – M1).

Although linkage mechanisms and programmaticism are not expected to vary from one election to another (see the still emerging role of historical legacies), the generalizability of the current analysis is limited by the two time points analyzed in case of both Romania and Hungary. The validity of the findings might also be limited by the operationalization of programmaticism, since in order to measure consistency of ideological beliefs I projected an a priori understanding of left-right positions on the ideological items. Although the operationalization section of the theoretical chapter explains why relative measures were not conceptually appropriate to analyze and compare consistency and strength of ideological preferences across cases and datasets, the validity of my measures at least partially remain an empirical question. In this sense, apart from the results presented above (especially the first two hypothesis tests), the fact that low correlations between stances on ideological items and left-right self-positioning were results replicated on two independent samples of ideological items, recorded in different time points with different respondents of both countries (appendix of the III. Chapter and figures IV. 3, IV.4), provides empirical evidence for the validity of these measures.

I believe the primary contribution of the current research is also what provides its limitation: it is one of the first studies which links the abstract concept of programmatic linkages with empirical indicators available in almost all election studies. Moreover, it provides an answer to one of the main gaps of the literature on linkage mechanisms: to what extent linkage mechanisms and programmaticism in particular vary according to parties and to what extent it is a property of the national context. The current research also places the Hungarian and Romanian cases relative to other European countries and it maps the role of programmaticism in the party competition and patterns of ideological representation of the two countries.

## Appendix – III. Chapter

Pearson correlation between the mean of the positions across the nine ideological items and left-right self-identification – EES 2009:



Measures:

Ideological preferences – EES 2009

|  | Strongly | Agree | Neither         | Disagree | Strongly | REF | DK |
|--|----------|-------|-----------------|----------|----------|-----|----|
|  | agree    |       | nor<br>disagree |          | uisagiee |     |    |
| Immigrants should be<br>required to adapt to the<br>customs of [country].          | 1        | 2     | 3               | 4        | 5        | 7   | 8  |
| Same-sex marriages<br>should be prohibited by<br>law.                              | 1        | 2     | 3               | 4        | 5        | 7   | 8  |
| Private enterprise is the<br>best way to solve<br>[country's] economic<br>problems | 1        | 2     | 3               | 4        | 5        | 7   | 8  |
| Major public services and<br>industries ought to be in<br>state ownership.         | 1        | 2     | 3               | 4        | 5        | 7   | 8  |

| Women should be free to     | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
|-----------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| decide on matters of        |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| abortion                    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Politics should abstain     | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
| from intervening in the     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| economy                     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| People who break the law    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
| should be given much        |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| harsher sentences than      |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| they are these days.        |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Income and wealth should    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
| be redistributed towards    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| ordinary people             |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Schools must teach          | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
| children to obey authority. |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| EU treaty changes should    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
| be decided by referendum    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| A woman should be           | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
| prepared to cut down on     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| her paid work for the sake  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| <del>of her family.</del>   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Immigration to [country]    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
| should be decreased         |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| significantly.              |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |

Political knowledge battery – True/False answers

|   | True | False | REF | DK |
|---|------|-------|-----|----|
| Switzerland is a member of the EU.            | 1    | 2     | 7   | 8  |
| Every country in the EU elects the same       | 1    | 2     | 7   | 8  |
| number of representatives to the European     |      |       |     |    |
| Parliament.                                   |      |       |     |    |
| The European Union has 25 member states.      | 1    | 2     | 7   | 8  |
| Every six months, a different Member State    | 1    | 2     | 7   | 8  |
| becomes president of the Council of the       |      |       |     |    |
| European Union.                               |      |       |     |    |
| The education minister of [country], is [name | 1    | 2     | 7   | 8  |
| of the minister].                             |      |       |     |    |
| There are [false number] members of the       | 1    | 2     | 7   | 8  |
| parliament of [country].                      |      |       |     |    |

Party identification:

1. Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? If so, which party do you feel close to?

Political Interest:

To what extent would you say you are interested in politics? Very, somewhat, a little, or not at all?

Four point scale, Romania scores 0.5 above the 2.5 points European average, before the 2.7 average of Hungary. Higher level of political interest is characteristic to Eastern European countries.

Measures of candidate surveys:

| HU: Those who           |  |  | Public safety is more important   |
|-------------------------|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| commit crimes also      |  |  | than anything else – the          |
| have rights; the police |  |  | efficiency of law enforcement     |
| should respect the      |  |  | has priority over the human right |
| rights and dignity of   |  |  | of crime offenders                |
| people taken in         |  |  |                                   |
| custody.                |  |  |                                   |
|                         |  |  |                                   |

|  | Completely disagree $\longleftrightarrow$ Completely agree |   |   |   |   |
|--|--|---|---|---|---|
| RO: Those who break the law should receive stricter punishments.   | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| HU: Protection of the environment should<br>be taken more seriously, even if it hinders<br>economic development/RO: Stronger<br>measures should be implemented to<br>protect the environment | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| HU/RO: Women should benefit from<br>preferential treatment when they apply for<br>jobs and promotions.   | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Where the scale was different in the two surveys I made the necessary adjustment before calculating the consistency scores.

Test of H<sub>3</sub> - Distribution of the Dependent Measures





Cases weighted by v100 sample weight per country (calibrated)



Cases weighted by v100 sample weight per country (calibrated)





Cases weighted by v100 sample weight per country (calibrated)



Cases weighted by v100 sample weight per country (calibrated)

# Appendix – IV Chapter

#### Survey Items for ideological preferences

#### Hungary

Positional items for both the parliamentary candidates and the general electorate

|  | 1   | 2                            | 3  | 4             |  | 5   | 6   | 7                                   |                  |  |
|--|---|------------------------------|--|---------------|--|---|---|-------------------------------------|------------------|--|
| The<br>nee<br>fore   | The flow of foreign capital/investmentsIt does not matter if capital/investments areneeds to be controlled, since it renders underforeign, as long as it help production andforeign interest the Hungarian economy.creates jobs |                              |  |               |  |   |   |                                     |                  |  |
| Higher education should be freely provided   |   |                              |  |               |  | Tuition fees need to be introduced to cover<br>the costs of higher education. |   |                                     |                  |  |
| Roi<br>gov<br>con<br>faci  | Roma people should be supported by the Roma people are responsible for their own government more than others in order to problems, which they have to solve compensate the discrimination they are themselves.                  |                              |  |               |  |   |   |                                     |                  |  |
| Rel<br>stay  | igion is a p<br>away from   | rivate affain<br>the affairs | the state state state state state state states are states at the states of the states are states at the state states at the state at the state at the states at the state at t | hould<br>ch   | For societal morals, it is required that the state should supports the Church. |   |   |                                     |                  |  |
| Those who commit crimes also have rights;<br>the police should respect the rights and<br>dignity of people taken in custody. |   |                              |  |               | Pub<br>any<br>enfo<br>righ   | lic safety<br>thing else,<br>prcement ha<br>t of crime o                      | is more in<br>the effici<br>s priority o<br>ffenders. | mportant the ency of leaver the hum | ian<br>aw<br>ian |  |
| Lists of members of the former communist secret service should be published.   |   |                              |  |               | The<br>show  | se lists sho<br>uld move on   | uld not be<br>and leave the                           | published,<br>he past behin         | we<br>nd         |  |
| The<br>exp<br>tax  | e state sho<br>enditures e<br>es  | ould spend<br>ven if this i  | more on<br>mplies raisi  | social ng the | Tax<br>imp   | es should l<br>lies cutting   | be decreased<br>social expen                          | d even if t<br>ditures              | his              |  |

Likert scale items: On this block the candidates had a reversed scale

|  | Completely disagree $\longleftrightarrow$ Completely |   |   |   |   |  |
|--|--|---|---|---|---|--|
|  | agree  |   |   |   |   |  |
| Protection of the environment should be  |  |   |   |   |   |  |
| taken more seriously, even if it hinders | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |  |
| economic development                     |  |   |   |   |   |  |
| Women should benefit from preferential   |  |   |   |   |   |  |
| treatment when they apply for jobs and   | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |  |
| promotions.                              |  |   |   |   |   |  |
| It should be the government's duty to    | 1  | 2 | 2 | 4 | F |  |
| ensure a workplace for everyone.         | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |  |
| Women should be free to decide on        | 1  | 2 | 2 | 4 | F |  |
| abortion.                                | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |  |

### Survey Items for ideological preferences – Romania

For the parliamentary candidates:

|   | Completely disagree $\longleftrightarrow$ Completely agree |   |   |   |   |
|---|--|---|---|---|---|
| Those who break the law should be punished by more severe sentences.                      | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Politicians should abstain from intervening in the economy                                | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Protection of the environment should be taken more seriously                              | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Women should benefit from preferential treatment when they apply for jobs and promotions. | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Immigrant workers are good for Romania's economy.   | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The income tax should be reduced for people earning less than the medium wage             | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The Labor Code should be modified to increase workers' protection                         | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Introducing the copayment of medical services is necessary                                | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| The gold extraction project at Rosia<br>Montană should start                              | 1  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

For the general electorate:

|   | Completely disagree <i>Completely</i> |   |   |   |   |  |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|--|
|   | agree                                 |   |   |   |   |  |
| The austerity measures should be replaced | 1                                     | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |  |
| by measures stimulating the economy       | 1                                     | Z | 5 | 4 | 5 |  |
| The current level of contribution to the  |                                       |   |   |   |   |  |
| social security system needs to be        | 1                                     | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |  |
| decreased.                                |                                       |   |   |   |   |  |

|   |   |   |           | Completely disagree |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |
|---|---|---|-----------|---------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|
| The state should redistribute the<br>income of those who are the most<br>well off towards those who are the<br>worst off    |   |   |           | 0                   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9  | 10 |
| We should allow people of<br>different races or ethnicities to<br>come and live in Romania or to<br>settle here permanently |   |   | 0         | 1                   | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |    |
| Romania should help poorer states to develop  |   |   | er states | 0                   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9  | 10 |
|   |   |   |           |                     |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |    |
| 1   | 2 | 3 | 4         | 5                   |   | 6 |   | 7 |   | 8 | ( | 9 | 10 |    |

| The differences in income should be decreased                                      | The differences in income should be increased to encourage individual effort |
|--|--|
| Private property should extend and develop   | The state's property should extend and develop                               |
| State should take more responsibility for the welfare of everyone                  | Every individual should take more responsibility for their own welfare       |
| Competition is a good incentive for people to work harder and to develop new ideas | Competition is a bad thing, it gets the worst out of people                  |

Pearson correlation between the mean of the different parties' electorate's ideological preferences and left-right identification (Figure IV.3, IV.4):

|  |                          | Electorate | Candidates |
|--|--------------------------|------------|------------|
| FIDESZ-MPSZ - KDNP -<br>Fidesz – Hungarian Civic | Ideological Positions    | 4.98       | 5.58       |
| Alliance   | Left-Right self-position | 7.81       | 7.42       |
|  | Pearson Correlation      | .112**     | .170*      |
| MSZP - Hungarian Socialist<br>Party              | Ideological Positions    | 4.43       | 4.66       |
|  | Left-Right self-position | 1.62       | 1.53       |
|  | Pearson Correlation      | 0.02       | -0.13      |
| Jobbik - Movement for a<br>Better Hungary        | Ideological Positions    | 5.50       | 6.38       |
|  | Left-Right self-position | 7.47       | 8.60       |
|  | Pearson Correlation      | 0.09       | 0.07       |
| LMP - Politics Can Be                            | Ideological Positions    | 4.47       | 5.23       |
| Different  | Left-Right self-position | 4.01       | 3.91       |
|  | Pearson Correlation      | .394*      | .334**     |
| Other Party                                      | Ideological Positions    | 4.68       | 5.75       |
|  | Left-Right self-position | 4.99       | 6.67       |
|  | Pearson Correlation      | 0.07       | 0.98       |
| Not Voting                                       | Ideological Positions    | 4.75       |            |
|  | Left-Right self-position | 4.65       |            |

|           | Pearson Correlation      | .235** |  |
|-----------|--------------------------|--------|--|
| Undecided | Ideological Positions    | 4.68   |  |
|           | Left-Right self-position | 4.74   |  |
|           | Pearson Correlation      | -0.04  |  |

|                                       |                              | Electorate | Candidates |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------|------------|
| USL - Social Liberal Union            | <b>Ideological Positions</b> | 4.43       | 5.32       |
|                                       | Left-Right self-<br>position | 3.97       | 5.75       |
|                                       | Pearson Correlation          | 0.03       | 401**      |
| ARD - Right Romania Alliance          | Ideological Positions        | 4.65       | 4.32       |
|                                       | Left-Right self-<br>position | 7.75       | 8.23       |
|                                       | Pearson Correlation          | 0.13       | 0.11       |
| UDMR - Democratic Union of Hungarians | Ideological Positions        | 4.40       | 5.34       |
| in Romania                            | Left-Right self-<br>position | 6.10       | 6.57       |
|                                       | Pearson Correlation          | 0.23       | 0.14       |
| People Party – Dan Diaconescu         | Ideological Positions        | 4.24       | 5.60       |
|                                       | Left-Right self-<br>position | 4.26       | 5.22       |
|                                       | Pearson Correlation          | -0.13      | 251*       |
| Other party                           | Ideological Positions        | 4.54       |            |
|                                       | Left-Right self-<br>position | 5.12       |            |
|                                       | Pearson Correlation          | -0.23      |            |
| Not Voting                            | Ideological Positions        | 4.28       |            |
|                                       | Left-Right self-             | 5.49       |            |
|                                       | Pearson Correlation          | 0.03       |            |
| Undecided                             | Ideological Positions        | 4.49       |            |
|                                       | Left-Right self-             | 5.52       |            |
|                                       | Pearson Correlation          | -0.07      |            |

Frequency weights for candidate surveys:

| Parties |  | Candidates     |         | Observed       |              |        |
|---------|--|----------------|---------|----------------|--------------|--------|
|         |  | not<br>elected | elected | Sample<br>size | Mandates won | Weight |
| Hungary | Other  | 0.00           | 3.00    | 3.00           | 0.00         |        |
|         | FIDESZ-MPSZ -<br>KDNP                                  | 15.00          | 149.00  | 164.00         | 263.00       | 1.60   |
|         | MSZP   | 18.00          | 35.00   | 53.00          | 59.00        | 1.11   |
|         | Jobbik   | 83.00          | 28.00   | 111.00         | 47.00        | 0.42   |
|         | LMP  | 61.00          | 9.00    | 70.00          | 16.00        | 0.23   |
| Romania | USL - Social Liberal<br>Union                          | 11.00          | 105.00  | 116.00         | 395.00       | 3.41   |
|         | ARD - Right<br>Romania Alliance                        | 81.00          | 28.00   | 109.00         | 80.00        | 0.73   |
|         | UDMR - Democratic<br>Union of Hungarians<br>in Romania | 88.00          | 12.00   | 100.00         | 27.00        | 0.27   |
|         | People Party – Dan<br>Diaconescu                       | 54.00          | 28.00   | 82.00          | 68.00        | 0.83   |

Observed and required sample sizes for tables IV.1 and IV.2

| Parties |  | Candidates     |         |                            | smallest                                    |   |
|---------|--|----------------|---------|----------------------------|---|---|
|         |  | not<br>elected | elected | Observed<br>Sample<br>size | proportion<br>of<br>elected/non-<br>elected | Required<br>Sample Size<br>with two IVs |
| Hungary | Other  | 0.00           | 3.00    | 3.00                       |   |   |
|         | FIDESZ-<br>MPSZ - KDNP                                       | 15.00          | 149.00  | 164.00                     | 0.09  | 218.67                                  |
|         | MSZP   | 18.00          | 35.00   | 53.00                      | 0.34  | 58.89                                   |
|         | Jobbik   | 83.00          | 28.00   | 111.00                     | 0.25  | 79.29                                   |
|         | LMP  | 61.00          | 9.00    | 70.00                      | 0.13  | 155.56                                  |
| Romania | USL - Social<br>Liberal Union                                | 11.00          | 105.00  | 116.00                     | 0.09  | 210.91                                  |
|         | ARD - Right<br>Romania<br>Alliance                           | 81.00          | 28.00   | 109.00                     | 0.26  | 77.86                                   |
|         | UDMR -<br>Democratic<br>Union of<br>Hungarians in<br>Romania | 88.00          | 12.00   | 100.00                     | 0.12  | 166.67                                  |
|         | People Party –<br>Dan<br>Diaconescu                          | 54.00          | 28.00   | 82.00                      | 0.34  | 58.57                                   |

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