

**EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION IN THE  
DECENTRALIZATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF  
MACEDONIA**

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## Abstract

*This aim of this thesis is to find what factors can explain the variation in the level of ethnic minority representation in local government offices, among the different municipalities in the Republic of Macedonia. To answer the research question, I conduct exploratory mixed method analysis using both secondary sources and fieldwork data. In the first phase of the research I conduct multivariate linear regression on thirty four multiethnic municipalities, aiming to see whether any of Lijphart's nine preferable conditions for enhancing consociationalism can explain the variation in the level of ethnic minority representation. During the second phase I engage in qualitative, thematic analysis on four municipalities, using concepts from the theory of representative bureaucracy, for the purposes of unravelling additional factors that affect the level of minority representation within local government offices.*

*The statistical analysis yielded that socio-economic differences between groups, internal threat, size of municipality, size of the majority group and the number of ethnic communities explain almost half of the variation in the level of minority representation. The thematic analysis revealed that in all four municipalities the level of minority representation is influenced by economic and organizational determinants, by the role of the mayor, the historical experiences and the salience of ethnic identity. Allocation of economic resources is the most important in Petrovec, whereas the political parties matter the most in Mavrovo-Rostusha. In Struga prevail the influence of the national government, while in Rosoman the historical experiences in combination with the socio-economic status of the groups.*

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## Table of Contents

ABSTRACT .....	I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	II
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	IV
LIST OF FIGURES .....	VI
LIST OF TABLES .....	VII
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 1. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	6
1.1 THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA: EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE OFA.....	6
1.1.1 The OFA Arrangements .....	6
1.1.2 Development of Decentralization.....	7
1.1.3 Non-discrimination and Equitable Representation.....	8
1.2 THE STATE OF THE ART: PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN DECENTRALIZED GOVERNMENTS.....	10
1.3 DECENTRALIZATION: CONCEPTUALIZATION.....	15
1.4 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: CONCEPTUALIZATION .....	15
1.5 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.....	16
1.5.1 Consociationalism .....	17
1.5.1.1 Consociationalism ‘Goes Local’.....	18
1.5.1.2 Favourable Conditions for Consociational Democracies .....	20
1.5.1.3 Linking Favorable Conditions with Proportional Representation .....	21
1.5.2 Looking for Additional Factors: Representative Bureaucracy .....	22
1.6 HYPOTHESES, VARIABLES, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONCEPTS .....	25
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	28
2.1 CASE SELECTION .....	28
2.2 DATA GATHERING.....	30
2.3 FROM ABSTRACT CONCEPTS TO CONCRETE INDICATORS.....	31
2.3.1 Getting the Numbers .....	31
2.3.2 Constructing ‘Grounded’ Questions.....	34
2.4 MIXED METHOD RESEARCH AND NESTED ANALYSIS .....	35
2.4.1 Nested Analysis.....	36
2.4.2 Quantitative Tools – Multivariate Linear Regression .....	37
2.4.3 Qualitative tools – Thematic Analysis .....	37
2.4.3.1 Validity and Reliability of Qualitative Data .....	39
CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS .....	41
3.1 PHASE ONE – STATISTICAL ANALYSIS .....	41
3.1.1 Finding a Fitting Model.....	42
3.1.2 Discussion of Findings .....	47
3.2 PHASE TWO: IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS.....	50
3.2.1 Nested Sampling .....	50

3.2.2 Locating Common Factors .....	52
3.2.2.1 <i>No Money to Correct the Mistakes of Previous Mayors</i> .....	53
3.2.2.2 <i>The Mayor has the Final Word Regarding Employments</i> .....	55
3.2.2.3 <i>Historical Experiences Determine the Influence of Power-sharing Institutions</i> .....	56
3.2.3 Petrovec: More Investments in Infrastructure, Less in Administration .....	56
3.2.4 Mavrovo-Rostusha: Religious Rather than Ethnic Differences .....	58
3.2.5 Struga: ‘Macedonians and Albanians Have Issues as Communities, not as Friends or Neighbors’ .....	59
3.2.6 Rosoman: ‘We are All Relatives Here’ .....	60
3.2.7 The Findings in a Nutshell .....	62
3.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH .....	63
CONCLUSION .....	65
APPENDICES .....	68
APPENDIX A: DATA .....	68
SECTION A: DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC MINORITY REPRESENTATION FROM 2006 TO 2011 .....	68
SECTION B: COMMITTEE FOR INTER-COMMUNITY RELATIONS.....	68
SECTION C: TYPES OF VIOLENCE CODED IN THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION AND EVENT DATASET; (ACLED); CODEBOOK: VERSION 1-2006.....	69
APPENDIX B: QUANTITATIVE DATA .....	71
SECTION A: DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES .....	71
SECTION B: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS .....	74
SECTION C: NESTED SAMPLING .....	74
SECTION D: DIAGNOSTICS .....	76
APPENDIX C: QUALITATIVE DATA .....	77
SECTION A: TOPIC GUIDE .....	77
SECTION B: CODING SCHEME .....	81
SECTION C: THEMATIC MAP .....	82
SECTION D: LIST OF INTERVIEWS .....	96
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	97

## List of Figures

Figure 1.	Preconditions of consociationalism and its constitutive elements .....	21
Figure 2.	Distribution of the scores for the Level of Minority Representation .....	71
Figure 3.	Distribution of the Scores for the Number of Minority Groups .....	71
Figure 4.	Distribution of the Scores for the Size of Municipality .....	72
Figure 5.	Distribution of the Scores for the Size of the Majority .....	72
Figure 6.	Distribution of the Scores for Balance Between Groups .....	73
Figure 7.	Distribution of Scores for the Socio-economic Differences .....	73
Figure 8.	Diagnostics for the Linear Regression Model I .....	76

## List of Tables

Table 1:	Descriptive statistics for the response and all explanatory variables .....	42
Table 2:	Correlation coefficients for the response with each of the explanatory variables .....	42
Table 3:	Multivariate OLS Regression Coefficients .....	43
Table 4:	Multivariate OLS Regression Coefficients Without Rosoman and Staro Nagorichane .....	45
Table 5:	Employment in the local governments by ethnicity, per year .....	68
Table 6:	Committee for Inter-Community Relations in the Municipalities from 2009 to 2012 .....	68
Table 7:	Correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables .....	74
Table 8:	Municipalities with no proportional representation .....	74
Table 9:	Municipalities with almost or exactly proportional representation .....	75
Table 10:	Municipalities with medium level of proportional representation .....	75
Table 11:	Municipalities with over-representation of ethnic minorities .....	76



## Introduction

Countries divided across various lines of cleavages are often prone to conflicts. Being a multiethnic country with a plethora of diversities, from cultural, religious to ethnic, the Republic of Macedonia did not manage to be an exception from this ‘rule’ and relented under the pressure of inter-ethnic disagreements. In January 2001, a small scale ethnic conflict occurred between the Macedonian Armed Forces and the Albanian National Liberation Army, setting the path for dealing with the Macedonian-Albanian ethnic relations. The end of the conflict was marked by the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (hereinafter OFA) in August 2001 – a document later transposed in the Constitution of the country. The OFA conceived the beginnings of a process of reforms, encompassed with changes in the organizational structure and the political system of the country, transforming Macedonia into consociational democracy (Ilievski and Wolff 2011).

In the discourse of multiculturalism, inter-ethnic co-existence is one of the fundamental points for a country’s stability and democratic development (Kis 1996; Linz and Stepan; Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007). Similarly, the purpose of the OFA was to achieve further peaceful development of democracy, by integrating the ethnic minorities (Lyon 2011; Bieber 2005a; Ilievski 2007; Stanisevski and Miller 2009). Importantly, power-sharing in consociational democracies should go beyond the cabinet and the parliament, and one of the crucial sectors where it should be implemented is the civil service (Lijphart 2008). Likewise, the OFA provisions and the principle of just and equitable representation of ethnic minorities in particular, were not only meant to be implemented on county level, but on local level, too.

Equitable representation was seen as one of the core means for integrating the ethnic communities, especially on the local level. In other words, the goal was to achieve

proportional representation of ethnic minorities within the administration. By providing institutional solutions for the different segments, the Macedonian local self-government would develop and improve, while the state's overall social and territorial integrity would be preserved (Wolff 2010).

In pursuit of achieving proportionality, the principle had to be included in the relevant laws, so as to ensure the institutions and the government respect it. Hence, in addition to transposing the principle in the Constitution, it also became part of several relevant laws. Bearing in mind that the OFA refers to all ethnic groups in the country, the aforementioned principle is expected to be beneficial for all minorities. Yet, out of all non-majority ethnic groups in the country, the biggest increase in the level of minority representation in the local governments is noticed for the Albanian minority (Appendix A, Section A, Table 1).

Notwithstanding the progress towards proportional representation has a different intensity for different ethnic groups (Risteska 2013), very few municipalities in Macedonia have high level of ethnic minority representation. More importantly, regardless of the entrenchment of the principle in the legal system as well as the various mechanisms existing to protect it, it remains puzzling why, 13 years after the implementation of the OFA, equitable representation is not achieved in most of the municipalities?

For a democracy to consolidate there should be “meaningful cross-community executive power sharing in which each significant segment is represented in the government [...]” (O’Leary 2005, 13). By having their representatives in the local public administration, ethnic minorities will have a sense of control over managing their own affairs (Lyon 2011). Looking at the events prior to and after the conflict, it seems rather straightforward why equitable representation appears to be ‘a privilege’ of the ethnic Albanians. Namely, the creation and implementation of the OFA was primarily a response to the ethnic Albanians’ demands.

Additionally, the effects from the 20% threshold stipulated in the OFA, giving additional rights to minorities making above 20% of the population<sup>1</sup>, proved to be rather harmful for the state (Kotevska and Novakova 2011; Lyon 2011; Rosulek 2011). The latter, together with the redrawing of the municipal boundaries in 2004 using gerrymandering, reinforced the centrifugal powers in the state and emphasized the division of Macedonia along ethnic cleavages.

Having said the above, it becomes clear why the largest minority in the country got the biggest piece of the rewards, compared to the other, smaller, minority groups (according to the last census from 2002, there are 64.18% Macedonians, 25.17% Albanians, 3.85% Turks, 2.66% Roma, 1.78% Serbs, 0.84% Bosnians, 0.48% Vlachs, and 1.04% others).<sup>2</sup> As Lyon points out, the “poor and inconsistent implementation of the consociational power sharing arrangements envisaged locally is another area where discrepancies in implementation of the law have affected the accommodation of non-majority community needs, particularly those of the smaller ethnic communities” (Lyon 2011, 102).

Most literature by far addresses proportional representation on a national level, explaining it through electoral laws, constitutional provisions and party structures (Bird 2003; Cohen 1997; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2008; Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007; Protsyk and Sachariew 2010; Ruedin 2009; Pitkin 1967; Christiano 1996; Guinier 1995). Nevertheless, having proportional representation on national level does not imply that the same will be the case on local level (Dehnert and Schenker 2007). Finally, given the different dynamics of local level politics, it seems intuitive that proportional representation would depend on factors other than those found important at country level. Thereupon, this thesis investigates **what**

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<sup>1</sup> See Articles 6.2., 6.5. and 6.6. from the Ohrid Framework Agreement

<sup>2</sup> State Statistical Office, 2002

**factors can explain the variation in the level of ethnic minority representation in local government offices, among the different municipalities in the Republic of Macedonia?**

Zooming into their ethnic structure, one can see that not all municipalities in Macedonia are the same. By that fashion, the majority of the population in one municipality can be Macedonian, but in another it can be the Roma, or the Turks. Equally important, some municipalities are more ethnically heterogeneous and are comprised of three or four ethnic groups, whereas others are more homogenous and are comprised of only two ethnicities. Focusing on the sub-national level, the units of analysis in this thesis are municipalities.

In order to increase the feasibility of this research, its scope had to be narrowed. Consequently, I do not account for all employments in the public administration (police, education, etc.), but only the *employments in the local government offices* or the employments of *local civil servants*, as denominated in the national legislation. Observing these employments solely strives from the importance of ethnic minorities to have representatives from their own ethnicity, within the administration of the municipalities they live in. This is not only beneficial for the ethnic minorities, but for democracy as well.

In answering the research question, I engage into exploratory, mixed method analysis (Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006) on thirty four multi-ethnic municipalities. Zooming into the concept of proportional representation, I depart from Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy. By modifying the theoretical assumptions according to the local level reality, I begin with testing if any of the nine preconditions for enhancing consociationalism can explain the variation in the level of ethnic minority representation in local government offices. I then turn to in-depth analysis of four deviant municipalities and look for additional explanatory factors, using concepts from the theory of representative bureaucracy.

The first chapter begins with a brief historical development of the events that shaped the dynamics of decentralization development and equitable representation, before and after the OFA. Before providing the conceptual and theoretical framework, I identify the gap in the literature by enclosing the state of the art. The second chapter explains the research methodology – the case selection and scope of the research, the data gathering, as well as the methodological approach. In chapter three, I present the empirical analysis along with the findings and a discussion.

## **CHAPTER 1. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **1.1 The case of the Republic of Macedonia: Equitable representation before and after the OFA**

The essence of constituting Macedonia's institutional structure after the declaration of independence in 1991 was the inclusion of all ethnic communities so as to preserve and ensure the future stability of the country. Yet, the group right of political and administrative representation was absent in the Constitution from 1991, resulting with underrepresentation of minority groups within the public sector, especially in respect to the Albanians (Daskalovski 2007; Stanisevski and Miller 2009; Lyon 2011).

The Albanian dissatisfaction reached a peak in January 2001, escalating into an ethnic conflict. The demands by the Albanians were mostly aimed towards reforms of the constitution, founding an Albanian state university, decentralization of the government and a more proportional representation in the public administration (Daskalovski 2004; Daskalovski 2007; Ilievski and Wolff 2011; Lyon 2011; Risteska 2013; Atanasova 2013; Bieber 2008). In order to 'bring back' peace, the Macedonian government made several changes within the legal framework of the country. Under the pressure of the international community, the end of the conflict was assured with the two main Macedonian and the two main Albanian parties signing the OFA.

#### **1.1.1 The OFA Arrangements**

Answering ethnic Albanians' demands for a more proportional representation required a process of reforms and adjustments of state institutions in accordance to the postulates of the newly implemented Framework Agreement. This, in turn, would ensure attaining a peaceful

environment through integration of the ethnic minorities, compromise and bargaining (Bieber 2008; Ilievski 2007; Ragaru 2008; Stanisevski and Miller 2009; Lyon 2011).

Based on several fundamental principles, the OFA suggests the following reforms:

- Development of decentralization;
- Non-discrimination and equitable representation of non-majoritarian ethnic groups;
- Special parliamentary procedures for voting on issues of direct concern to the ethnic groups;
- Reforms in the education and the use of languages; and
- Freedom for expression of the ethnic groups' identity<sup>3</sup>

The focus of this thesis being *equitable representation* in the *decentralized local self-government*, this chapter addresses the changes in the legal system of Macedonia, after the implementation of the OFA, in respect to these two issues.

### 1.1.2 Development of Decentralization

Approaching local development from the point of view of decentralization is a way to sustain multiculturalism in an ethnically and culturally diversified society (Horowitz 2007; Siljanovska-Davkova 2009). The development of decentralization was found essential for promoting respect for the communities' identity, as well as for encouraging citizens' participation in the democratic life<sup>4</sup>.

The local self-government in Macedonia is a single-tier system. Post OFA, the first step towards implementation of its principles was transferring competencies from national to local

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<sup>3</sup>Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia (2001) Framework Agreement, Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje

<sup>4</sup>Ibid, Article 1.5

level, enabled with the new law on Local Self-Governance (henceforth LLS) from 2002<sup>5</sup>. Two years later, in 2004, a new law on Territorial Organization was adopted, with which the number of municipalities was decreased from 124 to 84<sup>6</sup>, plus the City of Skopje<sup>7</sup> as a particular unit of local self-governance. Nonetheless, as the reforms to be made were extensive, the actual implementation of provisions from the newly adopted laws did not start until 2005 (Atanasova 2013).

### 1.1.3 Non-discrimination and Equitable Representation

Acknowledging that group-specific rights of ethnic groups allow them to maintain their culture and language, but also to feel like they are a constitutive part of the state (Kranz 1974; Offe 1998; Jovanovic 2005; Bochsler 2013), in line with the consociational theory of democracy, *the principle of non-discrimination and equitable representation* was seen as the core goal of the Agreement (Lyon 2011).

*4.1. The principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment of all under the law will be respected completely. This principle will be applied in particular with respect to employment in public administration and public enterprises, and access to public financing for business development.*”<sup>8</sup>

Although the OFA does not include a precise definition of equitable representation, in the Macedonian setting it is understood in the context of the consociational theory of democracy - namely, as proportional representation. Thus, the terms equitable and proportional representation are to be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. Accordingly,

<sup>5</sup> Law on Local Self-Government, Official Gazette 05/02

<sup>6</sup> From 2013 there are 80 municipalities, as the municipality of Kihcevo merged with three other adjacent municipalities

<sup>7</sup> The municipalities within the city of Skopje were reorganized and their number increased from 7 to 10

<sup>8</sup> Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia (2001) Framework Agreement. Government of the Republic of Macedonia: Skopje



within every municipality, the *proportion of employed people from the minority groups should reflect that minority's proportion of the municipal population.*

*4.2. "Laws regulating employment in public administration will include measures to assure equitable representation of communities in all central and local public bodies and at all levels of employment within such bodies, while respecting the rules concerning competence and integrity that govern public administration. The authorities will take action to correct present imbalances in the composition of the public administration, in particular through the recruitment of members of underrepresented communities. [...]"<sup>9</sup>*

Ensuring the implementation of the new rules, the following changes were made in the legal framework. Article 8, Amendment VI from the Constitution addresses the issue of equitable representation<sup>10</sup>. Article 3 of the Law on Civil Servants specifies the principle of just and equitable representation to be the basic principle for employment of civil servants, at the same time respecting the merit system<sup>11</sup>. Equally important are the coordinative and monitoring bodies established by the Government: the Secretariat for Implementation of the OFA, the Agency for protection of the Rights of Minorities Bellow 20%, as well as the municipal Committees for Inter-Community Relations (CICR). Finally, one of the core tasks of the Ombudsman is issuing yearly reports about the state of equitable representation in local governments.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid

<sup>10</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Official Gazette 52/1991, 1/1992, 31/1998, 91/2001, 84/2003, 107/2005, 3/2009

<sup>11</sup> Civil Servants Law, Official Gazette 59/2000, 112/2000, 34/2001, 103/2001, 43/2002, 98/2002, 17/2003, 40/2003, 85/2003, 17/2004, 69/2004, 81/2005, 61/2006, 36/2007, 161/2008, 6/2009, 114/2009, 35/2010, 167/2010, 36/2011, 6/2012, 15/2013, 106/213

## **1.2 The State of the Art: Proportional Representation in Decentralized Governments**

Referring to the ethnic minority political representation in the UK, Saggar and Geddes wrote that “[i]t is the local dynamics of race politics in the UK that are fundamental [...] because it is at the local level that the complex tapestry of British race politics has been woven.”(in Bird 2003, 8). To put it differently, a diverse society presupposes inclusion of representatives who bring new perspectives to the decision and policy making (Philips, 1995).

Within the literature on power-sharing, decentralization is often perceived a suitable mechanism for preventing ethnic conflicts in divided societies (Lijphart 1991; 2008; Papagianni 2007; Horowitz 2007), as it influences positively on the behaviour of competing groups by encouraging a rather positive perception of politics. According to Horowitz, creating sub-national units allow groups that are minorities on national level, but majority on local level, to manage their own local government in a way beneficial for them, which would “otherwise be foreclosed if the whole country was one undifferentiated territory” (2007, 958).

If properly designed, decentralization can also benefit the majorities, as their state institutions will gain bigger countrywide acceptance (Lake and Rothchild 2005; Lyon 2011). Nevertheless, Bieber argues that the success of the decentralized governments to improve inter-ethnic relations depends on the engineering of the institutional design at the local level (2005b). In that respect, albeit the post Dayton progress achieved in Bosnia, by comparing the city of Brcko and Mostar, he suggests that less formal, flexible systems of power-sharing work better than rigid consociational arrangements with territorial decentralization (Ibid).

Arend Lijphart placed proportional representation among the four fundamental characteristics of consociational democracies, arguing that it enables all groups to participate

justly in the political spheres (1975; 1991; 1996; 2008). Agreeing with Lijphart that proportionality should be introduced in the civil service too (Lijphart 1991; 2008), Sisk adds that introducing proportionality at all levels of decision making gives minority groups power, participation and influence that reflects their demographic structure in the society (1996).

Very few studies look at the under-representation of the different groups within a country (see Saggar and Geddes 2000; Kim 2004; Togeby 2008) and the scholarly work regarding proportional representation is predominantly done on country level (Guinier 1995; Christiano 1996; Cohen 1997; Pitkin 1967; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2008; Bird 2003; Lijphart 2003). For example, Marc Weller and Katherine Nobbs find that guaranteed minority representation is rather to be found in the legislative branch than in the executive or the judiciary branch, due to positive measures being more acceptable within the electoral process (2010). For that matter, larger proportion of the studies assessing proportional representation of ethnic minorities take the type of electoral system as their most important independent variable (Cohen 1997; Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007; Ruedin 2009; Protsyk and Sachariew 2010).

I strongly agree with Karen Bird when she points to the lack of empirical work observing micro-level factors that influence on the political opportunities of ethnic minorities. These factors are important for the national sub-units as they reflect the existing problems significant for the different ethnic groups in those sub-units (2003). What is more, and I concur with Bird, these sub-unit specific issues are more important than the macro-level factors in determining the political opportunities for ethnic minority, for the very sub-units (2003)

In explaining the dynamics of minority groups in Canada, Bird notes that groups which have either been excluded or marginalized from the decision-making at the national level find

the local level of politics more easily accessible (2004). She further argues that three factors explain why the level of proportional representation for minorities in Canada is substantively low: legally resident citizens have no voting rights, there is predominant usage of single-member districts and first-past-the-post electoral system and the party system itself is non-transparent (2004, 183).

The notion of proportionality is one of the key topics in the theory of representative bureaucracy. With an emphasis on the unelected officials (Evans 1974; Kennedy 2013), the theory argues that proportionality is crucial for effective functioning of bureaucracy. However, different scholars use different factors to explain the variation in the level of minority representation on local level. Goodie and Baldwin use variables such as the existence of a mayor belonging to a minority group, the strength of labour unions, the form of the government, the level of minority members' education as well as their percentage in the overall population, the population of the municipality, the municipal outsourcing and the per-capita businesses of citizens belonging to a minority community (2005). Marschall and Ruhil point to factors such as the distribution of government expenditures and public services (2007).

Stein uses political, organizational, demographic and economic variables (2009a). Accordingly, while the demography of the city matters, the organizational form of the municipal institutions has an impact too. The author argues that the mayor-council form is more responsive to racial and socio-economic cleavages than the council-manager form of government (Stein 2009b). Zhao and Lovrich argue the variation in proportional minority representation can be explained by the size of the minority, the (non)existence of affirmative action programs, the ethnicity of the mayor and the role of the police chief (1998). Some authors observe the role of parties, arguing that socialist and social-democratic parties are

usually more open to minorities (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). Others account for the broader cultural context, including factors such as religion, regional differences and socioeconomic factors, arguing that diversity should not be disregarded, but rather embraced (Ruedin 2009; Jones and Stewart 2012).

Looking at Macedonia, in depicting ‘the saga’ of equitable representation, numerous scholars agree that although progress is visible, the non-majority ethnic groups are still under-represented (Lyon 2011; Risteska and Daskalovski 2011; Atanasova 2013; Risteska 2013). Interestingly though, Risteska and Daskalovski conclude that while some of the inequalities present in the system have been removed with the OFA, the OFA itself was not able to address the systemic problems. As they say, “the main weaknesses of the political system in Macedonia today have not been caused by the Agreement, but either have earlier origins or came later, but some have been compounded by the Agreement” (2011, 23). They question whether the non-implementation of power-sharing mechanisms, especially those on local level, is due to the very mechanisms being ‘overly ambitious’ (2011, 23).

Facing major political and economic instability, people in Macedonia try to gain power by any means (Maleska, Hristova, and Ananiev 2006). Due to crucial changes in the administration and large rate of unemployment in the country, employing people from the ethnic minorities would indubitably mean that some ethnic Macedonians will lose a line of privileges and benefits, at the same time being exposed to the uncertainty of keeping their job. Consequently, there has been a notable “decline of popular support for more equitable representation in the public administration” (Stanisevski and Miller 2009, 567; Memeti 2008).

Another key point is the high partisanship, resulting with employment being highly dependent on party affiliation, under which circumstances - as Bieber observes - achieving equitable representation in the public service is by and large impossible (2008). In this case,

the incentive of the political parties is directed towards fulfilling personal agendas of the leaders, and neglecting the interests of the ethnic minority groups for most of the time. In fact, according to the results of a survey conducted in 2003, majority of the citizens find party affiliation as the key for improving at their carrier (Petkovska-Hristova 2003).

In explaining why, compared to the other ethnic minorities, the Roma and the Turks are falling substantively behind in the progress toward achieving proportionality, (Maleska, Hristova, and Ananiev 2006; Daskalovski 2007; Marija Risteska 2011; Kotevska and Novakova 2011; Lyon 2011; Atanasova 2013), Marija Risteska analysed the criteria applied by the central government for the recruitment of civil servants (2013) . She found that in different points in time, different criteria were applied. Hence, she distinguished a period of employments in accordance to the merit system, and period of employment according the spoils system. Importantly, she finds that during the spoils system period, out of all ethnic minorities, the ethnic Albanians were considered “insiders” and thus special places in the administration were secured for them only.

Overall, there is a lacks of coherent theoretical and research framework for assessing proportional representation of ethnic minorities on the local level. As Bloemraad and Schönwälder point out, little effort has been made to go beyond parliaments and explore this issue at other political organizations (2013). Considering this gap, this thesis aims to identify factors that influence on the level of ethnic minority representation, in the different municipalities in the Republic of Macedonia. In what follows, I conceptualize decentralization and proportional representation, as used in the thesis.

### 1.3 Decentralization: Conceptualization

Decentralization and local self-government are often used interchangeably within the political science literature. While decentralization is primarily a national, political, institutional, legislative and fiscal process, local self-government is an institution that provides services to its citizens (Nahem 2009). Nevertheless, the two terms will be used interchangeably in this thesis as well.

Perhaps the most commonly understood way in which decentralization reduces ethnic conflict is as giving territorially concentrated minority groups control over their own political, social and economic affairs (Lijphart 1977; Brancati 2008). Thereby, for the purposes of this research, decentralization is understood as “*a system of government in which there is a hierarchical division of power among multiple levels of government, where each level has independent decision-making power over at least one issue area.*” (Brancati 2008, 6).

### 1.4 Proportional Representation: Conceptualization

To begin with, it seems intuitive that before defining proportional representation, one must go one level up on the ladder of abstraction and explain representation in general. One of the most comprehensive discussion on political representation is offered from Hanna Pitkin (1967). She argues that each different usage of the term provides a different view of the concept (Pitkin 1967) - representation can have a broader or a narrower meaning, depending on the researcher's perception about it (Dovi 2011). Pitkin defines three different types of representation: formalistic, symbolic and descriptive. Most compatible to the way representation is used in this thesis is Pitkin's descriptive type of representation and it refers to the extent to which a representative resembles those being represented (1967).

Despite looking at representation mostly as a relationship between an elected official and its constituencies, some authors claim that democratic representation should not be understood exclusively as a simple agent-principal relationship (Mansbridge 2003). For instance, Melissa Williams argues that representation should be perceived as means for enabling relevant populations to express themselves, especially if that population is a historically disadvantaged group (2000).

Finally, Lijpharts' understanding of the concept of proportional representation refers to representation that reflects the structure of the population (1996). Combined, Mansbridge, Williams and Lijphart's concepts provide the understanding of the way proportional representation is used in the thesis: *Proportional representation understood not just as relationship between an elected official and its constituencies, rather as representation that reflects the structure of the population.*

## 1.5 Theoretical Background

In overcoming the lack of coherent framework for analysing the research question, I use several theoretical concepts related to the issue of ethnic minority representation. To this end, I start from Lijhart's theory on consociational democracy, by zooming into one of the four conditions, namely *proportionality* in civil service appointments. I test to see if there is a relationship between the nine preferable conditions for reinforcement of consociationalism and proportional representation. Being developed for countries and not municipalities, using this theory may seem inappropriate. Transferring it to local level is not implausible, if it is adapted to fit the framework for research on the local level.

Accounting for the preferable conditions is a good starting point, but it will solely not do. Given the different demographic structure of the municipalities and the development of



decentralization after the conflict, perhaps different factors influence proportional representation in different municipalities. Consequently, one should also account for party influence, political factors or affirmative action programs. For these reasons, I use some of the concepts of the theory of representative bureaucracy. In what follows, I explain the consociational theory and my adaptation of it. I then proceed with explaining the concepts of the theory of representative bureaucracy used in the analysis.

### 1.5.1 Consociationalism

In *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, Lijphart points that despite existing social segmentations, countries can be stable and democratic (1975). Accommodating the different groups and dealing with conflicts for which there exists a minimal consensus is indeed possible, but the elites need to be willing to cooperate to resolve the issues between the divided groups in the country (Lijphart 1975). Finally, the model of accommodation is suitable for other countries divided across different lines of cleavages – deeply divided societies have the possibility of being stable democracies if they fulfill the following consociational conditions:

- *Grand coalition governments* that have representatives of all major groups (linguistic/ethnic/religious...),
- *Autonomy of the groups*,
- *Proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments*, and
- *Minority veto* in respect to crucial minority rights and autonomy (1996; 1977; 2008).

Accordingly, for a country to be a successful consociational democracy, the failure of groups to agree upon crucial issues calls for inclusion of all important minority groups, rather

than all political parties (Lijphart 1996). For this to happen, *the principle of proportionality is the key factor* (Lijphart 2008).

#### **1.5.1.1 Consociationalism ‘Goes Local’**

While all four basic characteristics of consociationalism exist in Macedonia, in analyzing the mechanisms for minority protection at the local level one can also see that most of the consociational provisions are replicated, too (Lyon, 2011). While these characteristic do not have identical institutional form to those present on national level, there are notable similarities.

The prototypical example of *grand coalition* is the grand coalition cabinet, comprised by leaders of all significant segments of the society (Lijphart, 1977, 31). However, grand coalitions need not necessarily be in the form of cabinets in parliamentary systems. The cases with the Dutch and Swiss cabinets demonstrate their special position above the parliament and the political parties, allowing them to be “impartial mediators among the rival groups” (Lijphart 1977, 35). While somewhat different in terms of structure but also in terms of responsibilities, Macedonian municipalities have some kind of a ‘grand coalition’. Whereas the only directly elected functions are the Mayor and the Mayor’s Council, the Councilors list is not of open type, but predetermined by the party that nominates them. Hence, we cannot speak of a directly elected grand coalition.

What is more important here is the Committee for Inter-Community Relations (CICR), comprised of equal number of members from each of the ethnic minority groups present in the municipality<sup>12</sup>. This body, a product of the OFA, should be established in all municipalities that have at least one ethnic minority group that makes at least 20% of the municipal

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid, line 2

population<sup>13</sup>. Additionally, municipalities that are not legally bounded to form a CICR are allowed to do so, if the municipal Council and the mayor agree upon it. “These Committees represent a unique institutional frame for dialogue among the communities on the local level, within the municipalities” (Koceski 2007, 120). The CICRs deal with issues of interest to the ethnic minority groups in the municipalities, and are entitled to give suggestions for solving those issues to the municipal Council, who is obliged to review the opinions and decide upon them<sup>14</sup>.

*Segmental autonomy* – “the logical corollary to the grand coalition principle” (Lijphart 1977) – presupposes the minority is able to rule itself in areas of their concern, with federalism being a particular form of segmental autonomy (Ibid, 41-42). While Macedonia has not adopted federalism, it is a decentralized state. However, segmental autonomy at the local level would mean that, within each municipality, the minorities would possess autonomy to choose their own council or decide on their own for issues of their concern. Since ‘decentralization within decentralization’ seems very complicated and admittedly highly unreasonable, a certain kind of segmental autonomy is ensured with the ‘Badenter’ majority rule, elaborated below.

*Minority veto* in the municipalities is ensured with the so called “Badenter”, or double majority, for of interest to the ethnic minorities. . Issues related to culture, use of languages and alphabets that are spoken by minority groups that make at least 20% of the municipal population, the establishment and the use of coat of arms and the municipal flag<sup>15</sup> are voted with a majority from the Council members present at the meeting and a majority from the Council’s members that belong to a minority community.

<sup>13</sup> Law on Local Self-Government, Official Gazette 05/02, Article 55, line 1

<sup>14</sup> line 4 Law on Local Self-Government, Official Gazette 05/02, Article 55, line 4

<sup>15</sup> Law on Local Self-Government, Official Gazette 05/02, Article 41, line 3

Finally, as already demonstrated previously, *proportional representation* of all ethnic minority groups also applies to employments in the civil services at the local level. Hence, in the Macedonian context, it seems feasible to speak about the existence of ‘local consociationalism’.

#### ***1.5.1.2 Favourable Conditions for Consociational Democracies***

For Lijphart, consociational democracy is likely to be implemented or reinforced if countries fulfill nine background factors:

- *Absence of a solid majority* that would prefer majority rule over consociationalism,
- *Absence of large socioeconomic differences among the groups,*
- *Absence of too many groups,* so the negotiations among them are easier,
- *Groups should be roughly the same size,* so there is a balance of power among them,
- *The total population should be relatively small,* hence decreasing the complexity of the decision making process,
- *There should be a mutual external threat for the groups,* as this might promote unity,
- *Overarching loyalties* that could decrease the particularistic loyalties,
- *Geographical concentration of the groups,* so there is a possibility to use federalism as to promote autonomy, and
- *A tradition of compromise and accommodation* that will foster consociationalism (Lijphart 1977, 55–103; 1996, 262–263).


Lijphart finds the first two of the nine favorable conditions the most important (2008). Nevertheless, these nine conditions are to be regarded as neither necessary, nor sufficient for consociational democracies. “[A]n attempt at consociationalism can fail even if all the background conditions are positive, and it is not impossible for it to succeed even if all of

these conditions are negative” (Ibid: 5). Having said this, we should observe these conditions as only *favorable* or *facilitating*. Consequently, the scope of the first phase of this research is limited to doing an exploratory instead of confirmatory analysis.

### 1.5.1.3 Linking Favorable Conditions with Proportional Representation

By the consociational logic, the nine preconditions should be used as explanatory variables for how well countries function and manage their conflict situations. Then how can one use them to explain variation in the level of representation of ethnic minorities?

Figure 1. Preconditions of consociationalism and its constitutive elements



In order for a country to be consociational democracy, all four consociational characteristics must be present (Lijphart 1996; 1977; 2008). Thereby, if we look at consociationalism as a concept, grand coalition, autonomy of the groups, proportional representation and minority veto are its constitutive elements (Figure 1). Logically, by

influencing consociationalism, the preferable preconditions influence on each of its constitutive elements.

Following the above logic, the preconditions should facilitate each of the four consociational characteristic. As I am interested in proportional representation, I observe how the nine preferable conditions are related to it. Accordingly, my hunch is that those municipalities who meet the nine conditions will have higher level of ethnic minority representation within the civil service.

The sixth preferable condition holds that external threat initiated or reinforced consociationalism. Many countries – among which Holland, Belgium, Lebanon, Switzerland and Austria – have either initiated or strengthened the existing cartel of elites in times of international crises, especially during the First and Second World War (Lijphart 2008). Similarly to the adaptation of the theory itself to fit the local reality, the sixth condition needs to be modified. Specifically, when speaking about municipalities, the threat is more likely to come from inside, as a conflict between the ethnicities, rather than between different ethnicities from another municipality. Therefore, it is more intuitive to look at *internal rather than external threat*.

### **1.5.2 Looking for Additional Factors: Representative Bureaucracy**

This thesis relies on one of the three different approaches to ‘representative bureaucracy’ – the public administration literature, within which bureaucracy and democracy are reconciled and the emphasis is on equal opportunities (Groeneveld and Van de Walle 2009). Coined by Donald Kingsley, the term representative bureaucracy refers to *administration that is representative of the population* (Kingsley 1944; Krislov 1974; Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, and Nicholson-Crotty 2011). When the bureaucrats and citizens

share demographic characteristics and values, the former tend to pursue policies that are beneficial for the latter (Kranz 1974; Selden 1997; Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, and Nicholson-Crotty 2011; Jones and Stewart 2012; Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). Diversity develops the most at the local level, through the local authorities' responsiveness to the local problems and needs of the minority groups (Jones and Stewart 2012), hence the importance of analysing representative bureaucracy locally.

There are two types of bureaucratic representation, as defined by Mosher (in Meier 1993). *Passive representation* - the employees resemble the demographic characteristics of the population, and *active representation* - bureaucracy whose outcomes are beneficial for those who are being passively represented (Meier 1993, 393). Given the scope of the thesis, I am interested in the passive type of representation. While there are several determinants of passive representation, I focus only on those used in the research.

*Political parties* are one of the most important factors, as they can act as “either gatekeepers or facilitators” (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013, 574) of minority groups' participation. Party ideology plays an important role as well. Leftist parties are usually more open to minorities and more supportive for ethnic minority issues (Eelbode 2010; Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). Finally, the role of the mayor as an elected official is to represent the interest of the electorate (Zhao and Lovrich 1998), and if he is to secure another term in office then he must act in a way that would encourage the municipal population to vote for him.

Increasing minority representation can be initiated not only by the authorities, but also from the citizens. For instance, citizens make use of court suits against municipalities to increase their representativeness (Stein 2009a). Thus, *enforcement* makes another important factor. Nevertheless, in the context of my research enforcement is understood less radically, in terms of *citizens' complaints* to the mayor in respect to unemployment issues. On the other

hand, governments can adopt affirmative action programs for hiring minority candidates (Zhao and Lovrich 1998) or they can organize training camps and seminars for minority members to increase their value on the labour market.

The *structure and economic status* of both the institutions and the population influence the responsiveness of the institution to ethnic issues. If the minority group(s) make larger part of the demographic structure, their part of the labour pool would increase, thus the elected officials would need to recognize their minority constituencies (Stein 2009a). On the other hand, institutions with more branches have a more complicated structure; therefore more employees are needed to run the different sectors (Ibid). When it comes to the economic status, the richer the institution the more available resources for new hires (Goode and Baldwin 2005; Marschall and Ruhil 2007; Stein 2009a). Similarly, higher socio-economic status of the population makes it more tolerant towards minority issues (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013; Stein 2009a).

In order to get ‘the big picture’ one needs to go beyond formal institutions and look at the *broader cultural context* (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). The relations between different ethnic groups vary in different regions of a country, making historical experiences significant (Ruedin 2009). Similarly, if the ethnicity of a certain group is socially salient due to reasons such as armed conflict for example, the other ethnic communities would marginalize that particular ethnic group more than they would do so to other ethnic groups (Eelbode 2010; Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013).

Having identified additional factors to help answering the research question, I present the hypotheses that will be tested in the quantitative analysis, and those hypotheses that cannot be tested, rather explored through qualitative inquiry.



## 1.6 Hypotheses, Variables, Qualitative Research Questions and Concepts

In mixed method research, ‘hypothesizing’ is different for the quantitative and qualitative analysis. In the former, one introduces hypotheses, whereas for the latter, the research is guided by a research question and sub-questions (Creswell 2003). Consequently, quantitative analysis includes *testing hypotheses* and qualitatively-oriented analysis *generates hypotheses* (Ulichny 1991; Creswell 2003). In the following, I present the hypotheses and variables for the first phase and the research questions and concepts for the second phase of the analysis.

H1: The smaller the size of the ethnic majority, the higher the level of proportional representation of ethnic minorities.

H2: The smaller the socioeconomic differences between the groups, the higher the level of proportional representation of ethnic minorities.

H3: The higher the number of ethnic groups, the higher the level of minority representation.

H4: The bigger the balance between the groups, the higher the level of minority representation.

H5: The smaller the municipality, the higher the level of ethnic minority representation.

H6: The existence of an internal threat will increase the level of minority representation.

H7: The existence of a tradition of compromise and accommodation of the ethnic groups in the municipal administration will increase the level of minority representation.

Accordingly, the response variable is level of ethnic minority representation. There are five explanatory variables: size of majority, socioeconomic differences, number of ethnic groups in the municipality, group balance, size of municipality, internal threat and tradition of compromise and accommodation.

The central question guiding the qualitative inquiry is **what is the influence (if at all) of the political, organizational, economic, demographic and cultural determinants, as well as that of overarching loyalties and territorial concentration of ethnic groups, over the level of minority representation in local governments?** Guided by the motivation to obtain information on more specific issues, there are three sub-questions:

Which are the most common determinants that affect the level of representation of ethnic minorities across municipalities?

What impacts the most on the level of minority representation in municipalities with *high* level of representation?

What impacts the most on the level of minority representation in municipalities with *low* level of representation?

In the second phase of the research, guided by the theoretical concepts from both theories utilized in the research, I collected data on several determinants, which have been organized in seven groups: *political, organizational, economic, demographic and cultural determinants*. The *political* determinants include the party influence, the role of the mayor,

enforcement and affirmative action programs. The *organizational* determinants refer to the institutional organization, the size of the municipal workforce, but also to issues related to the employment process, for example the merit system. The economic development of the municipality constitutes the *economic* determinants. *Demographic* determinants are the territorial concentration of groups, the size of the ethnic groups and the socio-economic status of the population. Lastly, the *cultural* determinants refer to overarching loyalties, historical experiences and the ethnic identity of ethnic group.

Given the theoretical framework, but also based on my hunches as an ‘insider’, I assume that the economic and cultural determinants will have an impact on minority representation across all municipalities to be investigated. I further assume that the latter determinant will be the key one in municipalities with both high and low level of minority representation. Finally, I assume that the rest of the determinants will have different impact at different municipalities. In the next chapter I acquaint the reader with the process of case selection, the operationalization of variables, and present the methodology used for gathering and analyzing the data.

## CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

So as to answer the research question I employ a mixed method research (henceforth MMR). Having no previous research that examines variations in ethnic minority representation on local level from the point of view approached here, I modestly try to make the first steps towards developing a generalizable theory for consociational countries. In the following I explain each step of the research methodology, for phase one and two respectively.

### 2.1 Case Selection

The two research phases follow different sampling logic. In choosing municipalities for this phase I set two conditions with which municipalities had to comply. In the first phase, as to be part of the research, a municipality had to have at least one ethnic minority group. Additionally, the minority group(s) should make at least or equal to 10% of the overall municipal population. While my initial hunch was to go with a threshold of 20% (as stipulated in the OFA), I settled with 10% since choosing the former would mean significantly delimiting the number of cases to work with. The capital city of Skopje is the only municipality that satisfies the two conditions, yet is omitted from the sample, as it is a particular unit of local self-governance, further divided in ten municipalities. Instead of taking Skopje as one municipality, I observed its ten constitutive municipalities separately.

Although the above criterion for case selection limits the inferential power of the research to some and not to all municipalities in Macedonia, it is adequate given the conditions under which the municipal restructuring was done. Tailoring the municipal boundaries according to the principle of gerrymandering aimed at accomplishing higher concentration of the Albanian population in some parts of the country. “Insisting on

boundaries of municipalities conditioned on an ethnically based census, the OFA avoids [the] citizens' principle and reinforces nationalism on both sides. The census results initiated bargaining over the municipality borders alongside ethnic lines. Therefore, the decentralization process in accordance with the OFA was painful for both sides." (Rosulek 2011, 79).

Nevertheless, this does not make the overall research invalid as such, as it still aims to map potential factors that would explain the variation of ethnic minority representation in ethnically diverse municipalities where and important for the stability of the democracy in the country. Consequentially, the sample consists of the following 34 municipalities:

*Butel, Gazi Baba, Chair, Shuto Orizari, Brvenica, Valandovo, Vasilevo, Vrapchishte, Gostivar, Gradsko, Debar, Dojran, Dolneni, Zelenikovo, Jegunovce, Karbinci, Kichevo, Konche, Krushevo, Kumanovo, Mavrovo-Rostusha, Petrovec, Radovish, Rosoman, Resen, Sopishte, Struga, Staro Nagorichane, Studenichani, Tearce, Tetovo, Centar-Zhupa, Chashka and Chucher-Sandevo.*

In the second phase, I conduct purposeful sampling, based upon the results of the multivariate analysis conducted in the first phase. First, all 34 municipalities were divided into four categories (Appendix B, Section C) based on their scores on the response variable: municipalities with 0% of representation; municipalities with almost or exactly proportional level of representation; all those between 0% and 90% level of representation; and municipalities with over-representation. Initially, after conducting the statistical analysis and looking at the descriptive statistics (Appendix B, Section C), I will look for municipalities where the data is contrary to the general trend showed in the multivariate regression, that is, municipalities that appear as outliers in respect to the empirical findings. Accordingly, one municipality from all four categories will be selected.

## 2.2 Data gathering

The data gathering was through secondary sources and fieldwork research. For the quantitative analysis, data was acquired from the last country Census (2002), the Ombudsman's Report on Equitable Representation in Local Governments (2012), from the Association of the Units of Local Self-Government of the Republic of Macedonia - ZELS (2012), the data for unemployment from the Agency for Employment (2012), as well as from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. While using data from the 2002 Census seems fairly outdated, the State Statistical Office has updated the data in accordance to the territorial reorganization of municipalities with the Law on Territorial Organization of Municipalities from 2004.

With the intention to look for other factors that influence the level of ethnic minority representation in local governments and gain a more complete understanding of the phenomenon (Creswell 2003; 2009; Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006), I conducted interviews in four municipalities. The data body consist of four interviews with the mayors of the municipalities of interest, obtained during April and May, 2014. All of them were audiotaped and fully transcribed verbatim. While the transcriptions are in Macedonian, those quotes used for constructing the thematic map were translated in English. The interviews were done using a topic-guide of semi-structured nature (Berg 2009), divided into topical stages. This type of topic guides provided enough flexibility in exploring additional issues that were found important for each of the four municipalities. The list of all interviews can be found in Appendix C, Section D.

## 2.3 From Abstract Concepts to Concrete Indicators

In conducting analysis, one must depart from abstract theoretical concepts and create measurable variables and observable indicators (Adcock and Collier 2001), depending on the type of analysis. This section presents the operationalization of the variables used for the quantitative analysis and the questions designed for obtaining the qualitative data.

### 2.3.1 Getting the Numbers

Calculating the *level of ethnic minority representation* was a threefold step. First, using the Census data for each municipality separately, I obtained the number of inhabitants belonging to the minority group(s) that make at least or equal to 10% of the population. All numbers were then converted into percentage. The next step was getting the number of local self-government employees from the minority group(s) (that pass the 10% threshold), for each of the 34 municipalities separately. These numbers were also transformed into percentages.

The final step was combining the data from the first two steps, so as to see to what extent the number of employed people in the local self-government offices reflects the overall number or minority group(s) from the population in each municipality. This would enable me to see the level of minority representation in each municipality, articulated in percentages. The calculation is done according to the following formula:

$$\frac{A}{B} * 100\%$$

where A is the percentage of people belonging to ethnic minorities that are employed in the local self-government office, and B is the percentage of people belonging to ethnic minorities in the municipality or in other words, the proportion that should be employed in the local self-government office.

Looking at the level of representation for each ethnic minority separately is not the aim of the research, but rather looking at the representation of ethnic minorities in general. Thereby, operationalizing the dependent variable according to this formula gives a clear picture of where each municipality stands in terms of minority representation.

The 2002 Census provided the data for the following explanatory variables. The *size of the majority* (in percentages) was already given in the Census. For the variable *number of ethnic groups in the municipality*, I added the number of ethnic groups that make at least or equal to 10% from the population (including the majority), for each of the municipalities separately. *Size of municipality* is operationalized as the number of overall population for each of the municipalities separately. *Group balance* is calculated as the difference between the size of the majority and the size of the minority group, in percentages. In municipalities with more than one minority group, I calculated the difference between the size of the majority and the size of the largest minority group.

For the *Compromise and Accommodation* variable, I looked at whether the municipality has or has not yet established a CICR. The establishment of this body, as explained in the first chapter, is mandatory for some municipalities only, yet not all of them have established it. On the other hand, there are municipalities who are not legally obliged to, but have established it so as to ease the negotiations between ethnic groups and to show understanding for the issues concerning the ethnic minorities. Hence, it is a good indicator of whether there is a tradition of compromise and accommodation. The data for this variable was obtained from the Community Development Institute.

*Internal Threat* refers to whether or not direct violence has occurred in a given municipality, during the 2001 armed conflict. The data was obtained from Version One of the



Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project<sup>16</sup>. While the dataset accounts for seven types of violence (Appendix A, Section C), for the purposes of the research this variable was constructed as dichotomous, where all seven types were coded as ‘occurrence of direct conflict’. In municipalities where there was no violence, it was coded as ‘no direct violence has occurred’.

Finally, the socioeconomic status of a person or group is usually conceptualized as a measure combining income, education and occupation (see Grusky 2008). Albeit the ongoing disagreements on how to best operationalize it, “the fundamental conceptualization involves access to resources” (American Psychological Association 2002, 5). Nevertheless, getting precise, per household data on the three abovementioned indicators requires lengthy and expensive surveys. At the same time, employment means getting income, which provides access to resources. Therefore, *socio-economic differences* are operationalized as differences in unemployment level between ethnic groups, per municipality, in percentages.

The data was obtained from the Agency for Employment, upon request, for 2012 year and calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the unemployment level of the majority and that of the minority group. In municipalities with more than one minority group, I calculated the difference between the unemployment level of the majority and that of the minority with highest or lowest unemployment level<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> Available at: <http://www.acleddata.com/data/versions-1-3-data-1997-2012/archived-data/>

<sup>17</sup> If the majority ethnic group had a smaller unemployment rate than some of the minority groups, I calculated the difference between the unemployment level of the majority and that of the minority group with highest unemployment rate. Conversely, if the majority had a bigger unemployment rate than some of the minority groups, I calculated the difference between the unemployment level of the majority and that of the minority group with lowest unemployment rate.

### 2.3.2 Constructing ‘Grounded’ Questions

Constructing a topic guide for interviewing requires a lot of attention to wording the questions, they should be short, concise, specific enough and yet with ‘grounded’ terminology, (Berg 2009, 112–116 ; Legard and Keegan 2003, 155 ; Weiss 1994, 74 ). Before turning to asking the main questions, I started with warm-up questions (Berg 2009, 113; Hermanowicz 2002, 488) through which some background, contextual information about the mayor was collected. The semi structured nature of the topic guide enabled me to ‘play’ with the ordering of the main questions, and adjust them for each municipality separately. Each theme from the topic guide covered a separate theoretical concept which I wished to get information about.

Since for two of the nine favourable conditions from the theory of Consociational Democracy – *territorial concentration of the groups* and *overarching loyalties* – were difficult to quantify and there was no data available for them, they were assessed in the interviews. After asking a few questions about power-sharing institutions in general, I asked the mayors to tell me whether the different ethnic groups lived in different regions of the municipality or they are dispersed around the territory. They were asked to speak how they think this influence the inter-ethnic relations among the citizens as well as on the municipal employers. In terms of overarching loyalties, we discussed whether the citizens find the well-being of their ethnic group more important than that of the municipality in general. As all mayors have an open day for meetings with citizens and they get involved in their day-to-day activities, they were competent to answer this question.

The rest of the main questions were organized around examining the political, organizational, economic, demographic and cultural determinants. In regard to the *political determinants*, I asked questions about the influence of the mayor and the political parties on

the level of ethnic minority representation. I was interested to know how these two (if at all) influenced, what was the intensity of the influence and what the consequences of it were. In addition, I asked whether the citizens complain about their unemployment and if the municipality undertakes any actions to resolve these complaints. Further questions were asked about affirmative action programs, whether the municipality has had them and what the outcomes from such programs were.

For assessing *organizational* determinants, I asked question about the municipal council and the CICR's work, related to the issue of proportional representation. We further discussed how the process of employment unfolds and what is required from candidates for employment. The questions about the economic development of the municipality, the allocation of economic resources and how these influence on the size of the municipal workforce helped in gathering information about the *economic* determinants.

Another cluster of questions addressed the *demographic* determinants. I asked how the size of the municipal population, but also the size of the majority and minority groups influences the inter-ethnic relations and hence, indirectly, proportional representation. In addition, we discussed the socio-economic status of the municipal population. Finally, the questions about the *cultural* determinants included discussions about the history of the relations between the ethnic groups living in the municipality, their every-day interactions and the majority group's attitude about the ethnicity of the minority group(s). The complete topic guide is provided in Appendix C, Section A.

## 2.4 Mixed Method Research and Nested Analysis

'Marrying' the quantitative and qualitative method seems reasonable from the point of view of avoiding limitations of using one method solely (Caruth 2013). Albeit its complexity,

embedding the research into a MMR enables richer insight into the phenomenon of interest, allowing for further generation of more questions (Creswell 2003; 2009; 2012; Hong and Espelage 2012; Caruth 2013; Frels and Onwuegbuzie 2013). Using MMR is motivated by the aim to achieve complementarity, completeness, to develop additional question, expand the knowledge gained from a prior method, to compensate for the weaknesses of employing only one method, or to obtain a diversity of viewpoints (Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala 2013; Creswell 2009; Frels and Onwuegbuzie 2013). Whatever the reasons behind the researcher's decision to employ MMR, they must be carefully justified (Benge, Onwuegbuzie, and Robbins 2012).

The relatively small sample size does not allow using many explanatory variables that can predict the variation in the dependent variable. Thereupon, finding the reasons behind the variation in ethnic minority representation in local governments in Macedonia requires turning to in-depth analysis of several municipalities that are extreme or outlier cases. Nevertheless, choosing which municipalities should be analyzed in-depth must come after determining some general knowledge about the overall trend and the dynamics of the phenomenon. In other words, quantitative analysis precedes the qualitative analysis.

#### **2.4.1 Nested Analysis**

Developed by Lieberman, nested analysis is one of the different types of MMR (see Creswell 2012), combining large N statistical analysis (LNA) and in-depth, small N analysis (SNA) of one or more cases contained within the large sample (Lieberman 2005). Ideally, the LNA should “ultimately lead to quantitative estimates of the robustness of a theoretical model” (Ibid: 436), whereas with SNA one can proceed with “comparisons of cases and/or process tracing of causal chains within cases across time, and in which the relationship between theory and facts is captured largely in narrative form” (Ibid: p. 436). The SNA can be

of two types, depending on the results from the LNA. If the statistical analysis yields robust results, then the next phase is “Model-testing Small-N Analysis. Conversely, with weak results from the quantitative analysis, the appropriate type of SNA is “Model-building Small-N analysis” (Ibid: p. 436).

### **2.4.2 Quantitative Tools – Multivariate Linear Regression**

Choosing the type of quantitative analysis should depend mostly on the nature of the data – “depending on whether the outcome is understood to be graded or dichotomous, and whether the hypothesized relationship is understood in probabilistic or deterministic terms. One may use multivariate regression analysis; fuzzy set/qualitative comparative analysis (FsQCA); bivariate/correlation analysis, or simply descriptive statistics to analyse the scores on the dependent variable” (Lieberman 2005, 438).

Given the nature of my data and the relatively small sample, complex multivariate regression analyses would not fit. However, given that all but two variables – which are dichotomous - are measured on a continuous scale, conducting multivariate linear regression and combining the results of the analysis with descriptive statistics is adequate and feasible. For finding a model that would be parsimonious enough, yet would fit the data and yield robust results, I used the *method of backward selection*. I start with a model including all seven explanatory variables and I remove the variables with the smallest predicting power, one by one, until I find a fitting model that passes the threshold of the p-value  $< 0.05$ , at the same time explaining a ‘good’ portion of the variance in the response variable.

### **2.4.3 Qualitative tools – Thematic Analysis**

With the purpose of unravelling additional, common factors that influence the level of ethnic minority representation in more than one municipality, I apply *cross-case thematic*

*analysis*. This type of analysis will enable identifying existing patterns or themes (Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Braun and Clarke 2006; Gibbs 2008) that appear in the data. In thematic analysis, the interest is the content of the speech, thus the accent is put on *what* is said, rather than *how* it is said (Riessman 2008).

For understanding why some municipalities appear as outliers or extreme cases, I perform *within-case thematic analysis* (Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Gibbs 2008, 48). Unlike the cross-case analysis, the case studies will be utilised for finding municipality-specific factors that influence the level of ethnic minority representation. It is by describing particular cases in details, their setting and the contextual conditions, simultaneously using multiple sources of information, that an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of interest can be provided (Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Creswell et al. 2007; Gibbs 2008).

The coding of the data follows a hybrid coding logic. I derive the themes both deductively and inductively (Braun and Clarke 2006, 88–89; Gibbs 2008, 42–46; Saldana 2012, 229). Using a ‘theory guided inquiry’ (Riessman 2008, 74), I first code the themes that arise from both the consociational and the theory on representative bureaucracy. After getting familiarized with and investigating the data in details, I coded the ‘novel themes’ (Ibid) occurring directly from the data. What is more, unlike the usual practise of identifying themes at either semantic or latent level (Braun and Clarke 2006), the occurring themes are identified at both levels. I try to go beyond the semantic content of the interview data and examine the underlying, latent present ideas (Ibid). The complete coding scheme is presented in Appendix C, Section B.

#### **2.4.3.1 *Validity and Reliability of Qualitative Data***

Validity and reliability are the key issues causing ‘crisis in legitimation’ within qualitative analysis (Marsh and Stoker 2002, 203). To ensure the produced knowledge indeed reflects the reality, one must have an unbiased sample frame (Ritchie and Lewis 2003, 274). Therefore, the sampling procedure was based upon the regression findings, which neutralized potential sampling bias to a certain extent. Additionally, I ensured the interviewees could freely express their views without interrupting them, or asking double-barreled, leading questions (Weiss 1994; Legard and Keegan 2003).

To ensure internal validity, I followed the constant comparison approach (Gibbs 2008, 96). By going back and forth through the data I could double-check the content before making any explanations and conclusions. Triangulation was used where possible, using external sources to check whether the obtained information was true (Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Hammersley 2008). As a Macedonian citizen, being an ‘insider’ helped me to a significant extent as I was able to recognize particular events and situations mentioned by the mayors from having heard or read about them in the media.

Thinking about internal reliability, what one can only do is provide clear conceptualization of the concepts to be explored and be cautious in interpreting findings, making sure they really reflect what the data shows (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). The external reliability, however, is harder to deal with. Ethnic issues will always be culturally embedded to a certain extent and being an ‘insider’ also makes me part of an ethnic group. Consequently, the interviewees could try to provide socially desirable answers or exhibit socially desirable behavior (Foddy 1993). If my ethnicity was other than Macedonian, the answers I would get might have been different, probably depending on the ethnicity of the

mayor I interviewed. Nevertheless, as it is impossible to completely eliminate my bias, I try to integrate it and be conscious and cautious about it.



## CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The mixed methods exploratory analysis aims to find which factors have an impact on representation of ethnic minorities in local governments. The multivariate regression will unravel whether any of the nine preferable conditions influence the phenomenon of interest, while the qualitative thematic analysis will contribute to the obtained findings from the statistical analysis by depicting additional factors. The latter will also be used for exploring whether ethnic minority representation is influenced by different factors in different municipalities.

### 3.1 Phase One – Statistical Analysis

Before turning to analysis of the data, I present the descriptive statistics for all the variables. As shown in Table 1, the most frequent level of ethnic minority representation is 0%, found in seven municipalities (Figure 1), the highest level is 224.77%, whereas the mean level of representation is almost 56%. The smallest municipality has 3426 inhabitants while the biggest has 105 484. The biggest majority makes almost 90% of the municipal population, the smallest makes roughly 40% and the mean size of the majority is slightly above 67%. The balance between the largest and the smallest ethnic group ranges from 9.25% to 72.33%, while socioeconomic differences go from 0.02% to 21.39%. Finally, most of the municipalities in the sample are comprised of only one ethnic minority group, have not established a CICR (Appendix A, Section B) and did not experience direct conflict. Figures with distribution of all variables can be found in Appendix B, Section A.

*Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the response and all explanatory variables*

Variable	Mode	Mean	St. Deviation	Min.	Max.
Level of Minority Representation (%)	/	55.84	5.302359e+01	0.00	224.77
Size of Municipality	/	24696.32	2.749559e+04	3426	105484
Size of Majority (%)	/	67.47	1.327323e+01	35.90	89.21
Number of Ethnic Minorities	1	/	5.054327e-01	1	3
Group Balance	/	45.09	2.051193e+01	9.25	72.33
Socioeconomic Differences	/	6.24	6.062146e+00	0.02	21.39
CICR	1*	/	/	/	/
Internal Threat	2**	/	/	/	/

Note: \*CICR is established; \*\*Conflict has not occurred

### 3.1.1 Finding a Fitting Model

In looking for a relationship between Lijphart's preferable conditions and the level of minority representation, I start with correlation analyses between the response variable and each of the explanatory variables. Given the small correlation coefficients (Table 2) one can see that there is no bivariate relationship between any of the explanatory variables and the response.

*Table 2: Correlation coefficients for the response with each of the explanatory variables*

Independent Variable	Level of Ethnic Minority Representation		
	Correlation coefficient	p-value	Valid Sample
Size of municipality	0.1172	0.5091	34
Size of majority ethnic group (%)	-0.01636	0.9268	34
Number of ethnic minorities	0.1475	0.4050	34
Committee for Inter-Community Relations	-0.09082	0.6095	34
Internal Threat	-0.1385	0.4348	34
Balance between the Groups	-0.04885	0.7838	34
Socio-economic Differences	0.1396	0.4311	34

The first multivariate linear regression model includes all explanatory variables. The results (Table 3, Model 1) indicate that none of the variables are statistically significant. Moreover, their beta coefficients are very close to zero, indicating that the changes in the level of representation, for every increase of the explanatory variables for one unit, are very small, therefore I recoded the variable size of municipality in a way that one unit change refers to hundred citizens<sup>18</sup>, instead to one (Table 3, Model 2). While the recoding did yield higher estimates, the explanatory variables explain only 9% of the variance at the level of representation, and the p-value of the overall model fit does not pass the threshold of  $<.05$ , indicating the model is unfitting.

*Table 3: Multivariate OLS Regression Coefficients*

	Estimates	St.Error	t-value	Pr(> t )
<b>Model 1</b>				
Intercept	-3.042e+01	9.360e+01	-0.325	0.748
Size of municipality	2.067e-04	3.902e-04	0.530	0.601
Number of minority groups	2.839e+01	2.650e+01	1.072	0.293
Size of majority	8.705e-01	1.130e+00	0.770	0.448
Socio-economic differences	1.001e+00	1.732e+00	0.578	0.568
CICR (2)	-3.707e+00	2.762e+01	-0.134	0.894
Internal threat (2)	-2.467e+01	2.644e+01	-0.933	0.359
<b>Model 2</b>				
Intercept	-30.42168	93.59515	-0.325	0.748
Size of municipality (in 100 citizens)	0.02067	0.03902	0.530	0.601
Number of minority groups	28.39487	26.49537	1.072	0.293
Size of majority	0.87048	1.13023	0.770	0.448
Socio-economic differences	1.00059	1.73221	0.578	0.568
CICR (2)	-3.70700	27.61828	-0.134	0.894
Internal threat (2)	-24.67183	26.43796	-0.933	0.359
Note for both models: N=34; R-squared =0.09; p-value= 0.83				

<sup>18</sup> The recoding was done by dividing the number of inhabitants with 100

Looking at the diagnostics (Appendix B, Section D), one can see that the distribution of residuals is slightly skewed to the left and linear regression assumes normal distribution (Plot 1). There is a slight deviation from normality for the higher values of the level of representation (Plot 2), and their predicted values are slightly scattered, indicating that there is more error, hence the smaller predictive value of the model. Most likely, these explanatory variables are not the best predictors for the cases that are not expected to have high scores on the dependent variable, in regard to the other cases in the sample.

Cook's distance (Plot 5) indicates there are three outliers in the model, the municipalities Dolneni, Rosoman and Staro Nagorichane<sup>19</sup>. Dolneni seems to be an outlier as compared to the other municipalities the size of the majority groups is very small (almost 36%), yet this is not a good enough reason to exclude it from the model. On the other hand, based on the diagnostics, my assumption is that Rosoman and Staro Nagorichane appear as outliers due to their high level of representation (224.77% and 112.82% respectively). Given the above explained diagnostics, it seems the first step towards finding a fitting model would be to remove these two municipalities and analyse them in-depth.

To test for multicollinearity between the explanatory variables, I used both Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) and the Correlation Coefficients (Appendix B, Section B). There are five moderate correlations between the explanatory variables significant at  $\alpha$  levels ranging from 0.1 to 0.0000, which is not problematic. What appears problematic is the almost perfect correlation ( $r = .96$ ) between the *size of majority* and *group balance*, significant at  $\alpha=0.0000$ . As most of the municipalities in the sample are comprised of one majority and one minority group only, one can see why these two variables are correlated. In any way, one of these variables needs to be excluded from the model. While *group balance* has a smaller VIF

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<sup>19</sup> Dolneni, Rosoman and Staro Nagorichane are 0.2, 0.6 and around 0.17 standard deviations from the mean, respectively. I follow a more conservative threshold for what defines an outlier ( $D < 4/n$ ), in my case it should be smaller than 0.12 standard deviations.

coefficient than *size of majority*, guided by the theoretical framework, I decided to exclude the former. According to Lijphart, the existence of a non-dominant majority is one of the two most important preferable conditions (2008), which is what *size of majority* measures.

Having removed the two outliers and the *group balance* variable, I proceed with backward selection, removing the variables with the least predictive power, one by one.

Table 4: Multivariate OLS Regression Coefficients Without Rosoman and Staro Nagorichane

	Estimates	St.Error	t-value	Pr(> t )
<b>Model 3</b>				
Intercept	53.55685	50.02129	1.071	0.2945
Size of municipality	0.04583	0.02066	2.219	0.0358 **
Number of minority groups	18.30085	14.01695	1.306	0.2036
Size of majority	-0.52565	0.61511	-0.855	0.4009
Socio-economic differences	1.65344	0.92912	1.780	0.0873*
CICR (2)	-3.19283	15.23617	-0.210	0.8357
Internal threat (2)	-23.30343	13.86581	-1.681	0.1053
Note: N=32; R-squared =0.49; p-value= 0.006576 Significance codes: * 0.1; **0.05				
<b>Model 4</b>				
Intercept	56.86101	46.59023	1.220	0.2332
Size of municipality (in 100 citizens)	0.04578	0.02027	2.258	0.0326 **
Number of minority groups	18.31428	13.75667	1.331	0.1946
Size of majority	-0.58319	0.54021	-1.080	0.2903
Socio-economic differences	1.62761	0.90382	1.801	0.0833*
Internal threat (2)	-23.33602	13.60762	-1.715	0.0983*
Note: N=32; R-squared =0.485; p-value= 0.002728 Significance codes: * 0.1; **0.05				
<b>Model 5</b>				
Intercept	10.49026	18.10146	0.580	0.5670
Size of municipality (in 100 citizens)	0.04601	0.02033	2.263	0.0319 *
Number of minority groups	28.03405	10.43299	2.687	0.0122 **
Socio-economic differences	1.42156	0.88614	1.604	0.1203
Internal threat (2)	-28.09180	12.91421	-2.175	0.0385 *
Note: N=32; R-squared =0.46; p-value= 0.001676 Significance code: * 0.05; **0.01				

**Model 6**

Intercept	13.79470	18.48230	0.746	0.4617
Size of municipality (in 100 citizens)	0.04186	0.02073	2.019	0.0531 *
Number of minority groups	32.43728	10.34442	3.136	0.0040 **
Internal threat (2)	-26.72082	13.24303	-2.018	0.0533 *

Note: N=32; R-squared =0.41; p-value= 0.001765

Significance code: \* 0.05; \*\*0.01

Out of the four linear models, I find **Model 4** (Table 4) to be the most adequate. Its explained variance for the response variable and the p-values are roughly similar with Model 3, yet by removing the influence of the CICRs internal threat becomes significant at  $\alpha = 0.1$ . Although only three out of the five variables appear significant in Model 4, if one removes the least significant variable - size of majority - from the model, the explained variance decreases. If the removal of least significant variables proceeds until reaching a model where all variables are statistically significant (Model 6), then the explained variance further decreases. Regardless of the marginal difference in the explained variance (slightly less than 3%) between the fourth and fifth model, it seems that the size of the majority ethnic group has an effect in the 32 municipalities, even if this effect occurred randomly. Finally, while model six may appear as the most appropriate on first glance, there is almost 9% difference between model four and six's R-squared, which points to the importance of the two additional variables present at the former and absent in the latter model.

Provided that the idea behind this research is to unravel as many factors as possible that impact on ethnic minority representation, it seems natural to choose a model with five instead of three explanatory variables. Thereupon, with 95% confidence, we can say that 48.9% of the variation in the level of ethnic minority representation is explained by the size of municipality

and that of the majority group, the number of minority groups and the socio-economic differences between them, as well as by the existence of internal threat.

### 3.1.2 Discussion of Findings

Going back to the Lijphart's theory, he points that non-dominant majority group and small socio-economic differences are the two most important preferable conditions (Lijphart 2008). Seemingly, these two factors are indeed important for the Macedonian municipalities, yet the effect of the *size of the majority group*, albeit in accordance with the theoretical expectations, appears statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the effect of *socio-economic differences* is significant at  $\alpha=0.1$ , hence with 90% confidence we can say that, after accounting for all other factors, for every increase of the socio-economic differences between the groups for 1%, the level of ethnic minority representation increases for 1.63.

Perhaps having higher unemployment differences makes the group which is better off more tolerant towards ethnic groups, allowing for the latter's employment in the civil service (Stein 2009a; Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). Additionally, higher differences in unemployment rates imply that some ethnic communities have secured their access to resources fear less the other groups. Yet, as Chong and Kim suggest, "[i]ndividuals who believe social mobility is possible are less likely to identify with their current group because they feel the boundaries between groups are permeable and that hard work, education, and other investments will allow them to move to a higher status group" (2006, 337).. Consequently, ethnic identification becomes less salient, creating a more cooperative and friendly inter-ethnic life within the municipalities. As a result, employment of ethnic communities in the civil service becomes something that the majority group does not oppose, rather embraces, in the spirit of cooperation and accommodation of the ethnic minority needs.

The effect of the *number of minority groups*, although in line with the expected theoretical assumptions, appears statistically insignificant. However, the analysis uncovers that *size of municipality* is significant at  $\alpha=0.05$ . More specifically, every increase in *the size of municipality* for 100 citizens translates into an increase of the level of minority representation for 0.04, after accounting for all other variables. The direction of the effect, however, is in contrast to the theoretical underpinnings. While accommodating minority groups is expected to be easier in municipalities with smaller inhabitants, since the decision-making process is less complicated there (Lijphart 1977, 55–103; 1996, 262–263), it is not counterintuitive to think that bigger municipalities yield higher level of minority representation. To begin with, a bigger municipality needs larger municipal administration to manage it. Subsequently, larger administrations provide more employment opportunities (Stein 2009b). The smaller Macedonian municipalities, especially those located in rural areas, usually have smaller budgets and often avoid employing additional people for particular job positions if those tasks can be done by the existing employees.

The influence of *internal threat* is the second variable significant  $\alpha=0.05$ . It appears that, holding all other variables constant, the level of representation is for 23.34% lower in municipalities that were not directly affected by the conflict, compared to the municipalities that experienced direct violence. Taking into account the historical events, the positive influence of experiencing direct conflict over the level of ethnic minority representation does not come as a surprise. As Weller and Wolf argue, carefully designed self-governments which provide a ‘genuine self-governance’ to the minority groups are a good way to preserve the territorial integrity of the state (2005). What is more, the chances of political deadlock are higher in municipalities where groups have been involved in ethnic violence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), hence creating a common political process for all groups can enhance the chances for building a cooperative relationship between them (Rothchild 2008). Given that in



most of the municipalities affected by the conflict the dominant minority is the Albanian, the fear of re-occurring violence apparently had a positive effect on the elites' agreeing to cooperate and integrate the ethnic minority.

The findings indicate that some of the preferable conditions indeed influence proportional representation in Macedonian municipalities to a significant extent, yet I concur with Lijphart that they are not sufficient (2008). What is more, looking at how much variance in the level of ethnic minority representation is explained by the preconditions in the different models (Table 4), it seems that 'the more the merrier' holds true as well. Interestingly though, the most statistically significant explanatory factor is the size of the municipality, followed by socio-economic differences and the internal threat. However, it seems that only one of the three predictors is in line with the theoretical framework, namely internal threat. **Hence, the findings confirm hypothesis six, while the second and fifth hypotheses are refuted.** While the direction of the effects of *size of majority* and the *number of minority groups* are as hypothesised, the data does not show enough evidence for either of the two variables. Therefore, the first and the third hypotheses cannot be confirmed.

In a nutshell, the regression analysis revealed statistically significant results at  $\alpha=0.05$  – almost 50% of the variation in the level of ethnic minority representation is explained by the municipal size, the size of the majority group, the number of minority groups and the socio-economic differences between them, and by the existence of internal threat. While only the first, fourth and fifth factor are statistically significance, omitting the remaining two variables decreases the significance the socio-economic differences and internal threat, as well as the portion of explained variation. The next step is locating additional factors that impact the level of ethnic minority representation.

## 3.2 Phase Two: In-depth Analysis

This phase of the research focuses on conducting both within and cross-case thematic analysis. What I have learned during the fieldwork research is that one cannot assess complex inter-ethnic issues such as minority representation simply by using quantitative analysis. Examining the political dynamics, I found that the determinants adopted from the representative bureaucracy theory indeed influence on the level of minority representation within municipal administration. Admittedly though, not all factors are of the same importance in the municipalities.

After getting familiarized with the data, I constructed additional themes that prevailed in the interviews. Allocation of economic resources was added as a subtheme within the economic determinants, whereas the influence of power-sharing institution and the influence of the CICRs in particular, were added to the political determinants. Lastly, inherited administration became a subtheme within the organizational determinants. The complete coding scheme as well as the thematic map can be found in Appendix C, Section B and Section C. Before I proceed with the thematic analysis, I explain how I derive the nested sample of four municipalities.

### 3.2.1 Nested Sampling

Following the sampling procedure explained in chapter two, I construct five groups of municipalities, according to their scores on the response variable. The first group consists of all municipalities with no ethnic minority representation and the municipality of Petrovec, with a score of 8.18% (Appendix B, Section C). Considering what leads to higher level of minority representation according to the regression results, most of the municipalities in this group are expected to perform bad in terms of minority representation. **Petrovec** however, is

the only municipality with a non-dominant majority and more than two ethnic groups. In addition, compared to the other municipalities, one could say Petrovec has relatively high socio-economic differences, yet, the level of minority representation is very close to zero.

Seventeen municipalities are with moderate level of minority representation (Appendix B, Section C). The municipality of **Chair** seems the most interesting of all, as it possess only one of the characteristics that lead to high minority representation, yet has a relatively high score on the response variable (77.92%). This being said, it becomes the second municipality to be subject of in-depth, qualitative exploratory analysis.

Going to the third group of municipalities with almost proportional representation (Appendix B, Section C), most of the municipalities comply with the necessary conditions this level of representation yielded by the regression analysis, except for Brvenica and Tetovo. Being the only municipality with completely proportional representation, **Tetovo** seems like an interesting case for in-depth analysis.

Lastly, from the group of municipalities with over-representation of ethnic minorities (Appendix B, Section C), two have been already selected on the basis of being outliers in the regression models – **Rosoman** and **Staro Nagorichane**. The remaining municipality – **Struga** will also be analyzed in the second phase of the research.

As this phase of the research included conducting interviews with the municipal mayors, getting some of them to agree to meet with me proved as a very difficult task. The mayors of Chair and Staro Nagorichane were not available in the period during which I conducted the fieldwork, nor were they willing to agree to be interviewed over the phone. Getting access to the mayor of Tetovo confirmed what Adler and Adler said about elites - they “have several layers of shields that can keep social scientists at bay” (Adler and Adler

2012, 520). Not only could I not interview the mayor, but even getting in touch with her proved impossible in any way.

While there was no other municipality to replace Staro Nagorichane, as together with Rosoman they were the only two outliers, I looked for municipalities to be studied instead of Tetovo and Chair. Notwithstanding my commitment to the methodological ‘rules’ of case selection in mixed methods, the decisive factor was the willingness and availability of the municipal mayors to take part in my research. Finally, Chair was replaced with Mavrovo-Rostusha (hereinafter Mavrovo), but no replacement was found for Tetovo.

Mavrovo is an interesting case on its own as it has rather low level of ethnic minority representation (37.47%.) while satisfying three of the five factors that should lead to high level of representation. Nevertheless, what happens in Tetovo and Staro-Nagorichane could be partly explained done through Struga and Rosoman. Tetovo and Struga are similar in terms of having an Albanian majority group of roughly the same size (approximately 60% in Struga and 70% in Tetovo) and a Macedonian minority. They are both large cities and had direct conflict experience. In both Rosoman and Staro Nagorichane, on the other hand, the majority group is Macedonian and almost the same size in both places, the minority group is Serbs, and they are roughly the same in terms of their size.

The final sample of municipalities to be subject of in-depth, qualitative analysis consists of *Petrovec, Mavrovo, Struga and Rosoman*.

### **3.2.2 Locating Common Factors**

The cross-case thematic analysis revealed that the economic and organizational determinants matter the most for the representation of ethnic minorities in all four municipalities. While all mayors indicated that overarching loyalties are present in their

municipality, the influence of this factor on minority representation has a different intensity for different municipalities. Historical experiences and influence of power-sharing institutions prevail as significant in all municipalities, though in a different way. Finally, the most influential factor from the political determinants, in all municipalities but Mavrovo, seems to be the role of the mayor.

### **3.2.2.1 *No Money to Correct the Mistakes of Previous Mayors***

To start off, lack of economic resources is seemingly the main culprit for the non-proportional level of representation of ethnic groups. Yet, for understanding the big picture, explaining the influence of organizational determinants must precede the explanation of the economic determinants' influence. In that respect, when asked what is the reason behind the current situation of employment of ethnic groups all mayors pointed to the problem of inherited administration:

*"I inherited all of the staff, they are all still here, nobody was expelled and I even employed new staff." (Interview 1)*

*"Well, that is inherited from the previous structures. When I came, it [minority representation] was zero percent." (Interview 2)*

*"When I came in office I had four employees out of which 50% were Serbs, there is no proportionality there." (Interview 3)*

*"This over-employment of a certain ethnic community [...] is inherited from the former system and the new system until 2005, as I said. And now the situation is known to all international factors here." (Interview 4)*

Even though all four mayors have employed several new civil servants to fix the imbalances, they are reluctant of making drastic changes as "they do not want to cause social problems" (Interview 4) since employing new staff would have to come at the expense of the

old staff and some of the current employees would have to be expelled (Interview 1). Even if one does not take these statements for granted, for politicians are keen on blaming the former structures, considering the Macedonian case, the above claims do not come at surprise. When mayors run for office, they do not run along with a team with whom they will work during their mandate. Given that their aim is govern more than one term, mayors are careful with the first impression they leave (Zhao and Lovrich 1998). Therefore, it seems intuitive that they will not go into firing the old administrative staff as soon as they set foot in the office.

Three mayors reported they accounted for ethnic diversity when making changes in respect to the municipal workforce (Interview 2, 3, 4), but as one of them said, “since I came in office, in the past years I hired several members of ethnic minorities [...], but I cannot do everything overnight, of course. I need to ensure financial resources to pay the new employees” (Interview 2). Although financial resources are problem in all four municipalities, this reflects differently over the employment of ethnic minorities in the different municipalities. In Mavrovo and Petrovec, where there is low level of minority representation, the mayors believe that increasing the investments will open new job positions and consequently improve the minority employment (Interview 1, 2).

In Struga and Rosoman on the other hand, where the *majority* is underrepresented, the mayors say that employing majority members so as to achieve proportionality will leave them with very little money for undertaking other projects (Interview 3, 4). Although the focus of this research is representation of ethnic *minorities*, these two cases further enhance the importance of economic resources and their influence on proportional representation (Goode and Baldwin 2005; Marschall and Ruhil 2007; Stein 2009a).

These findings raise several questions. It would be interesting to observe how the level of ethnic minority representation is affected by the economic and organizational determinants

over time. Thereupon, one hypothesis for further research can be *foreign investments increase the level of ethnic minority representation in the local governments in Macedonia*. Similarly, inspired by the claims of the mayor of Struga, conducting a longitudinal study can trace back the changes in the administrative workforce done by different mayors and show whether there were after the implementation of the OFA, drastic changes were made within the employments in the local governments. Thus, another hypothesis can be *the administration went through a drastic change of staff after the implementation of the OFA*.

### **3.2.2.2 The Mayor has the Final Word Regarding Employments**

Looking at the political determinants, it appears that the influence of political parties, affirmative action programs, the national government and the citizens' complaints is not common for the municipalities, but depends on the existence of other factors, such as cultural determinants. That notwithstanding, being the person who has the final word in respect to employment decisions the mayor affects the level of minority representations in all four municipalities. As one of the mayors tells:

*"If we have to choose from 5-6 candidates, I should choose, because at the end my head will be 'on fire'. They will work for me, and if I choose the candidate, my head is at stake, that's how we say here. And that is true, if you create your team you want it to be a team that will bring you success. This position is not forever, the citizens can vote you very easy, but they can also vote you off easy."*  
(Interview 3)

The above interview excerpt illustrates that if economic resources are available for new employments, the final decision will be the mayor's. As much as they can initiate ethnic minority employments (Interview 2), they can also disregard the CICR's candidate suggestions (Interview 2), or set specific hiring requirements that will benefit particular ethnic group (Interview 4). However, this does not imply that in municipalities with lower levels or

minority representation the mayors influence less than they do so in municipalities with higher level of representation, as these decisions do not *solely* depend on the mayors' will. These factors are inter-related and we cannot fully isolate the role of the mayor from the influence of the economic determinant, as showed in the above quotation.

These findings, however, do not reveal much detail about the role of the mayor. Given that accounting for inter and intra-group dynamics is not within the scope of this research, it would be challenging to examine whether the mayors' influence on the level of minority representation is with the same intensity when they are in their second mandate, or when they are only one term in office.

### ***3.2.2.3 Historical Experiences Determine the Influence of Power-sharing Institutions***

Regardless belonging to different groups of determinants, historical experience and the influence of power-sharing institutions are tightly related in influencing the level of minority representation. While these factors affect the level of representation in all four municipalities, no particular pattern can be found across the cases. Nonetheless, in combination with other determinants, some pattern is likely to be found. For this reason, the impact of these factors over the level of minority representation will be assessed for each municipality separately. In the following, I present the results of the within-case thematic analysis, through four municipal case studies.

### **3.2.3 Petrovec: More Investments in Infrastructure, Less in Administration**

The mayor of Petrovec argued that he has the most important role in increasing the level of ethnic minority representation in the municipality. Insisting that the initiatives for employing minority member are exclusively his (Interview 2), he believes that the great deal of foreign investments he has arranged will result with a complete proportional representation



on the long run. Nevertheless, he pointed that the municipality made an affirmative action draft program, whose aim is to increase the citizens' value on the labor market:

*"We have already drafted that programme and it will be realized soon. The municipality of Ilinden already has it, they are a step ahead of us, and we are following their footsteps [...] We will build a new building for that purpose, where professors will further educate young people that already have some basic knowledge in a particular field." (Interview 2)*

However, it seems that the mayor's focus is predominantly on improving the municipal infrastructure and less on improving the minority representation. He pointed that he invests in all inhabited areas, "no matter if the ethnicity is Muslim or Orthodox" (Interview 2) and whenever there was a ribbon-cutting event, citizens of all ethnic groups would show up to acknowledge and support his work. Seemingly, overarching loyalties do exist in the municipality. Accordingly, to express his gratitude to the citizen about their care for the municipality, the mayor indeed accounts for all ethnic communities (Jones and Stewart 2012).

Petrovec did not experience direct violence during the 2001 conflict, and as it appears, there were no tensions between the Macedonian and the Albanian citizens of Petrovec either (Interview 2). Consequently, power-sharing institutions are perceived positively among the citizens - "we are a municipality to take an example from" (Interview 2) told the mayor proudly. Perhaps the non-violent past, good inter-ethnic cooperation and overarching loyalties made people less concerned about being proportionally represented in the local government and put less pressure for employments in the municipal administration on the mayor. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the main reason behind the extremely low level of minority representation in Petrovec comes is due to allocating the municipal resources in improving the infrastructure. Having set that as a priority, the mayor acknowledged that there is lack of economic sources for hiring new people.

### 3.2.4 Mavrovo-Rostusha: Religious Rather than Ethnic Differences

Comprised of three ethnic communities: Macedonians, Turks and Albanians, the mayor said that power-sharing institutions indeed increased the trust and cooperation among ethnicities (Papagianni 2007, Boose, 2005 in) yet “the dynamics characteristic for the national level - the mistrust between some, let’s say not nationalities, rather religions, more specifically the distrust between Macedonians and Albanians - are reflected in our region as well” (Interview 1). I have come to learn from the interview that there is very little coordination between the municipal bodies in respect to the issue of minority representation. This is partly because there is not much pressure from the national government about employment and partly because both citizens and the municipal elite perceive the differences between communities more in terms of religion than ethnicity. Additionally, the mayor does not think that the municipality will benefit particularly from proportional representation; he rather finds it will increase the municipal costs as all working materials would need to be print in multiple languages. Nevertheless, as the mayor points:

*“If there were more resources, we do not really see how ethnicity would matter, although it should be noted that there are not many Albanians who are educated and could be employed. Most of them live in the near-by villages and only have primary education, or maximum a high-school diploma.” (Interview 1)*

Albeit facing with the problem of under-educated people, the mayor admitted they never initiated an affirmative action program so as to increase the level of educated Albanians in the municipality. However, the mayor locates the main reason for the low level of minority representation in the fact ethnic belonging is a not a fixed attribute, but rather depends on the people’s feelings of belonging to a particular group: “You may employ someone thinking he is Macedonian, and he declared as a member of the Turkish or Albanian ethnic community” (Interview 1).

More importantly, it appears that in Mavrovo there is a high party pressure regarding employments, which confirms that under such circumstances the chances of having a more proportional municipal workforce are very unlikely (Bieber 2008). What is more, the mayor acknowledged that the level of ethnic minority representation can be possibly increased, if an Albanian or Turkish party came to power: “the party leadership wants you to employ party members, to acknowledge the people who were actively working for the party. And that is how it is” (Interview 1).

### **3.2.5 Struga: ‘Macedonians and Albanians Have Issues as Communities, not as Friends or Neighbors’**

In Struga, a municipality with an Albanian majority, cultural and political determinants matter the most. I have located three most important factors that influence the level or representation in the municipality, namely the salience of ethnicity, historical experiences and the national government’s influence. To start off, the 2001 conflict tightened the relations between the Macedonians and the Albanians. While tensions among citizens were not invisible, if one had the chance to visit Struga shortly after the conflict, one could see the citizens quickly replaced ‘us’ and ‘them’ with ‘we’. As the mayor pointed, the ethnic belonging of citizens becomes visible only during elections (Interview 4) as parties put pressure on their constituencies. However, the tensions between the Macedonian and Albanian elites are still present and visible:

*“We still bear the consequences of the work of that system. And I think of the system existing up to 2001, when there was no just and equitable representation. I don’t see a minister or the Prime Minister to apologize to this nation; it is time that they apologize. I would, if I did something bad with my politics [...]. There is nothing wrong in that, it is civilized.” (Interview 4)*

Disappointed by the Macedonian elite for looking at ways to prevent the work of the Albanian elite, even in a municipality where there is an Albanian majority, even almost fourteen years after the conflict, the mayor explained how their hands are tight when it comes to making municipal decision regarding allocation of economic resources. The main problem seems to be the amount of taxes the national government returns to the municipality. Subsequently, if this amount increases, the municipality will be able to plan on their own how to allocate the money, consequently providing more finances for new employments (Interview 4).

To this end, it becomes apparent that the high level of ethnic minority representation in Struga is a result of the influence of the national government. Based on my knowledge as an ‘insider’, I assume this is the case in every other predominantly Albanian municipality, including Tetovo, which demonstrates the significance of the saliency of ethnic identity (Ruedin 2009; Eelbode 2010; Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). As a result of the historical experiences with the Albanian community, so as to prevent the work of the municipal administration in Struga; the Macedonian government uses various means, from control over the budget, to preventing decisions from being voted utilizing the Badenter rule,. The latter, instead of preventing majorization became a means for “preventing us to vote something for our constituencies, and that includes all of them [the citizens], because like this we are being blocked for everything” (Interview 4).

### **3.2.6 Rosoman: ‘We are All Relatives Here’**

Being the municipality with the highest level of representation of ethnic minorities, the case of Rosoman is particularly interesting. Given the historical experiences between the Macedonian majority and the Serbian minority, they live happily in cohesion, as the mayor

told with joy (Interview 3). The over-representation of the minority group appears due to three determinants: cultural, demographic and economic.

The mayor emphasized that the residents of Rosoman never had any ethnic problems, and what is more, they do not look at themselves as Macedonians or Serbs:

*“Outsiders may perceive us like Macedonians and Serbs, but in Rosoman we are all relatives. So I have many Serbian cousins, Macedonian as well, we are completely mixed. The Serbs moved here somewhere around the twenties and ever since, they constantly mix with the population of Rosoman. Today you will not find a Serb without Macedonian ancestors.” (Interview 3)*

Even more interesting, the mayor reported that the citizens have never felt the need to separate along ethnic lines, which is “the key for success” (Interview 3) in their municipality. In addition to this cohesion, the crucial factor for the exceptionally high level of minority representation seems to be the socio-economic status of the groups. An interesting fact about Rosoman is that it produces 1% of the world production of peaches (Interview 3), thus the wealth of the municipality. As the mayor reported, the vast majority of the residents grow peaches and grapes and they have constant income:

*“The citizens of Rosoman have quite high average personal income. So when everything is good in the economy, then it is like they say about marriage – if there are money, there are no quarrels. [...] No one complains now. That is why I said economic welfare influences a lot. Now, only people that cannot work to me, those who are social cases, sometimes someone lazy too. [...] But the latter are very, very rare.” (Interview 3)*

The above quotation can be utilized to demonstrate a particular pattern of influences of the factors. Having their plantations, all citizens secure their financial resources. The historical experiences resulted with a complete integration of the Serbs and no inter-ethnic disputes. Taking into account that almost all families are of mixed origin, ethnic belonging

became irrelevant for the citizens of Rosoman (Interview 3). Therefore, when ethnicity is not salient and people are wealthy, it seems trivial for anyone to complain about the overrepresentation of Serbs or the underrepresentation of Macedonians. Maybe the high socioeconomic status has made the residents even more tolerant towards ethnicity (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013; Stein 2009a). Nevertheless, what truly matters is that the employees are citizens of Rosoman (Interview 3). Interestingly though, in describing the harmonious relationship between Macedonians and Serbs, the mayor made a parallel with the Serbs and Macedonians in Skopje, Kumanovo and Staro Nagoricane:

*“Well, I don’t think that there is a tension between Serbs and Macedonians anywhere in Macedonia. Even in Kumanovo and Skopje, even in Staro Nagoricane where I go often to visit them, you never know who is a Serb and who is a Macedonian. I have had the chances to visit these places; they do not differentiate themselves by ethnicity.” (Interview 3)*

I believe the overrepresentation of Serbs in the municipality of Staro Nagoricane can be explained with the same factors as in Rosoman, given that the Serbs are the only minority group in the former municipality. However, I would not jump to conclude that the same applies to Kumanovo, and most certainly not to Skopje. In the former municipality there is also an Albanian minority and the municipality had a direct experience of the 2001 conflict. In Skopje the situation is much more complicated and complex.

### **3.2.7 The Findings in a Nutshell**

The thematic analysis revealed that lack of economic and organizational determinants have impact on the level of ethnic minority representation in all four municipalities. Seemingly all mayors have inherited the administration from previous mayors and are now facing lack of economic resources in order to be able to employ new staff. What is more, the role of the mayor appeared as the most important political determinants, while the other

factors have different intensity in different municipalities. Lastly, the qualitative analysis revealed that historic experiences and salience of ethnicity shape the influence of power-sharing institutions within local governments, and subsequently have an effect on the level of representation of ethnic minorities.

Looking at the different municipalities, I found that the main reason for the low level of representation in Petrovec is the allocation of economic resources on investments in infrastructure, leaving no budget for new hiring. In Mavrovo-Rostusha, the main factor appears to be the influence of political parties. Combined with the lack of economic resources, the party pressure on the mayor to employ party members, does not leave enough room for other employments. The influence of the national government is what mostly determines the dynamics of over-representation of the Macedonian minority group. In Rosoman, on the other hand, the historical experiences in combination with the high socio-economic status of the groups, result with over-representation of the Serbian minority group.

### **3.3 Limitations of the Research**

Like all researches, this one is not immune to limitations. First, it seems too fast to jump in concluding that we would find the same factors influencing minority representation in similar municipalities to the four investigated qualitatively. Second, a better analysis could be performed if some of the variables used in the quantitative analysis were operationalized differently. For example, the socio-economic differences could be operationalized as the difference between the unemployment level of the majority group and the weighted level of unemployment of the minority groups.

Moreover, the sample size is a limitation itself, as it does not allow for more complex models to be performed using more explanatory variables. That being said, applying the same

analysis on all 84 municipalities in Macedonia may reveal additional findings. The qualitative inquiry can also be applied on a larger sample, where, for example, at least two municipalities from each group would be selected. It will increase the validity of the findings and it would provide a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of interest.



## Conclusion

Bringing peace back after the Macedonian-Albanian conflict from 2001 was ensured with the signing of the OFA. Based on several fundamental principles contained in the document, the Republic of Macedonia begun the reformatory process. Non-discrimination and equitable representation of ethnic minorities were seen as the core goal of the OFA. In particular, the principle assumed proportional representation of the ethnic communities within the administration on both national and local level. Nevertheless, almost fourteen years after the OFA, not all municipalities comply with it.

The lack of coherent and comprehensive theoretical framework for assessing proportional representation on the local level has inspired me to find what explains the different levels in ethnic minority representation within the local governments in Macedonia. In pursuit of overcoming the shortcomings of using a single method research framework, I decided to engage into exploratory mixed method research.

I started off with a hunch that maybe the nine preferable factors for enhancing consociationalism have an impact on one of consociational democracies' constitutive element, namely proportional representation. I begun by conducting multivariate linear regression, on thirty-four municipalities, using the nine preferable conditions as explanatory variables. The results confirmed my hunches – some of the preferable conditions indeed explained almost 50% of the variation in the level of ethnic minority representation across municipalities.

I found that the level of minority representation increases as the socio-economic differences of the group increase, and that higher level of representation are more likely to be found in municipalities where direct conflict had occurred, holding all other variables constant.. Additionally, after accounting for all other factors, I found that the level of minority

representations increases as the size of municipality increases, too. While the size of the majority group and the number of minority groups explain do increase the overall explained variance of the model, they are not statistically significant.

For the purposes of revealing additional factors, I used five determinants borrowed from the theory of Representative Bureaucracy and I applied thematic analysis on four municipalities: Petrovec, Mavrovo-Rostusha, Struga and Tetovo. The analysis revealed that the level of minority representation is influenced by the lack of economic resources and by organizational determinants, by the role of the mayor, the historic experiences and the salience of ethnic identity. Furthermore, I found that allocation of economic resources on investments in infrastructure is the most important factor in Petrovec, whereas the influence of political parties matters the most in Mavrovo-Rostusha. In Struga prevail the influence of the national government, while in Rosoman the historical experiences in combination with the socio-economic status of the groups.

Albeit the limitation of the study, these can be the first steps towards developing a more generalizable theory for studying the representation of ethnic minorities on local level. While I would not jump into making inferences from the findings of the qualitative analysis, I believe they provide a solid starting point for understanding the dynamics of minority representation, at least in the four investigated municipalities. The findings open a lot of questions for further fruitful discussions. To begin with, it would be challenging to examine under what circumstances economic resources are allocated for minority employments. As most of the current mayors are member of the same party – VMRO DPMNE - a conservative party, it would be interesting to test Bloemraad and Schonwalder's claim that *leftist parties are usually more supportive for ethnic minority issue* (2013) in another time where some of the appointed mayors belong to a leftist party.

Inspired by the comparison with other municipalities where Serbs reside by the mayor of Rosoman, it would be interesting to compare the relationship between historical experiences and level of minority representation in municipalities where only Serbs and Macedonians reside and in such where there is an additional ethnic community. Further research can be also done on examining the influence of the national government over the level of minority representation in municipalities with different number of ethnic minorities.

Finally, I will return to Saggar and Geddes who wrote that “[i]t is the local dynamics of race politics in the UK that are fundamental [...] because it is at the local level that the complex tapestry of British race politics has been woven.”(in Bird 2003, 8). With this study, I hope that I have at least managed to emphasize the importance of studying proportional representation on the local level, and inspired at least one person to engage in research on the topic.

## Appendices

### APPENDIX A: DATA

#### *Section A: Development of ethnic Minority Representation from 2006 to 2011*

Table 5: *Employment in the local governments by ethnicity, per year*

<b>Ethnic Group</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Macedonian	84,1	82,1	77,2	78,7	77	79,8
Albanians	9,9	12,6	14,7	14,8	15,8	13,6
Serbs	1,4	1,3	1,4	1,4	1,2	1,2
Bosniaks	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,2
Turks	1,2	1,2	1,5	1,3	1,5	1,5
Roma	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3
Vlachs	0,5	0,8	0,8	0,8	0,7	0,7
Other	2,4	1,1	0,8	0,7	0,7	0,7
Did not say	/	/	3	1,7	2,3	1,9
<b>Total Number</b>	<b>1824</b>	<b>2030</b>	<b>2481</b>	<b>2563</b>	<b>2784</b>	<b>2792</b>

Source: Civil Servants Agency, Yearly Reports from the Registry of Civil Servants

#### *Section B: Committee for Inter-Community Relations*

Table 6: *Committee for Inter-Community Relations in the Municipalities from 2009 to 2012*

<b>Established (26)</b>	Butel, Chair, Shuto Orizari, Brvenica, Valandovo, Vrapchishte, Gostivar, Debar, Dojran, Dolneni, Zelenikovo, Jegunovce, Karbinci, Kichevo, Konche, Krushevo, Kumanovo, Mavrovo-Rostusha, Petrovec, Sopishte, Struga, Staro Nagorichane, Studenichani, Tetovo, Chashka, Chucher Sanevo
<b>Not Established (8)</b>	Gazi Baba, Gradsko, Vasilevo, Radovish, Rosoman, Resen, Tearce, Centar Zhupa

Source: Community Development Institute, 2011

*Section C: Types of Violence Coded in the Armed Conflict Location  
and Event Dataset; (ACLED); Codebook: Version 1-2006<sup>20</sup>*

*1 - A battle resulting in no change of territory.* This event describes a battle in which the literature notes no transfer of territory. By default, all territory belongs to and is controlled by the government. Unless specifically noted, all battles result in no territory transfer. If there is a battle in rebel controlled territory and it does not result in the government regaining the territory, this battle event type should be chosen. Note that although the term ‘battle’ is used here to describe different kinds of encounters/events involving the parties, e.g. ‘the ceasefire is broken’, it must necessarily be a violent event containing at least two actors.

*2 - A battle resulting in a transfer of territory to the rebel actor.* This event is recorded when the literature notes that the rebel is in control of an area after a battle with the military. It only is for rebel holdings, since by default, all territory is controlled by the state.

*3 - A battle resulting in government forces recapturing rebel held territory.* Unless the rebel wins the conflict, all territory should, at some point, be returned to the control of the state. Although a battle technically should occur, it is not completely necessary as the main point of this is that territory is returned to control over the governing side. Whether this event is coded at the day of a peace agreement or other dates noted in the literature, all rebel-held territory events must have a matching government regains territory event unless 1) the rebels win or 2) the conflict is still occurring. The date of government regaining territory must be after the date of rebels gaining territory if it is the same territory.

*4 - Another event type, which is more of an associated footnote, is a territorial transfer to the rebels* at an unknown date. This event is necessary because not every territory transfer

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<sup>20</sup> Available at [http://www.prio.org/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/Code\\_book.pdf](http://www.prio.org/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/Code_book.pdf)

to rebels will be found in the literature. At some point, the literature may note that territory was won back by the governing forces but no record of it having been lost is recorded or found. At that point, this territorial transfer event will be noted as having had occurred at a previous date. This date will be somewhat arbitrary and should be noted as such in the notes form. These events must precede government regaining territory (when territorial control by military is restored). This event type is rarely chosen due to the lack of information.

*5 - A rebel base or headquarters established.* This event is coded when the rebels take over a territory and establish a base or headquarters (with or without a battle). If a headquarters is established, note this in the notes field as headquarters are of more importance than bases.

*6 - Rebel activity that is not battle related/ Rebel presence.* This event is necessary as the literature will note a lot of instances where rebels were active without military presence to counteract the rebels. However, unlike the event type one-sided violence, rebel presence notes that rebels may be active in a town- hiding, recruiting, organizing etc- without reference to violence between government and rebels, rebels and rebels, or rebels and civilians.

*7 - One Sided Violence.* This event type records all activity where either rebel or government actors perpetrated violence upon unarmed people/civilians. Violence includes injury or killings, etc. This event designation is different from rebel presence as violence must be recorded in this instance.

## APPENDIX B: QUANTITATIVE DATA

### Section A: Distribution of variables

Figure 2. Distribution of the scores for the Level of Minority Representation




Figure 3. Distribution of the Scores for the Number of Minority Groups




Figure 4. Distribution of the Scores for the Size of Municipality




Figure 5. Distribution of the Scores for the Size of the Majority






Figure 6. Distribution of the Scores for Balance Between Groups





Figure 7. Distribution of Scores for the Socio-economic Differences



## Section B: Correlation coefficients

Table 7: Correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables

	Size of municipality	Size of majority (%)	Number of minorities	CICR	Internal Threat	Group Balance	Socio-economic Differences
Size of municipality	1	-0.1261 (0.4773)	-0.09112 (0.6083)	-0.07907 (0.6567)	<b>-0.4039</b> <b>(0.0179)</b>	-0.1088 (0.5403)	-0.1822 (0.3025)
Size of majority (%)		1	<b>-0.5822</b> <b>(3e-04)</b>	<b>0.5709</b> <b>(4e-04)</b>	0.2247 (0.2015)	<b>0.9615</b> <b>(0.0000)</b>	0.006754 (0.9698)
Number of minorities			1	-0.2917 (0.0942)	0.1539 (0.3848)	<b>-0.4181</b> <b>(0.0139)</b>	0.2848 (0.1026)
CICR				1	0.1539 (0.4158)	<b>0.5929</b> <b>(2e-04)</b>	0.07988 (0.6534)
Internal Threat					1	<b>0.2872</b> <b>(0.0996)</b>	0.1611 (0.3626)
Group Balance						1	0.08222 (0.6439)
Socio-economic							1

Note: Numbers in brackets indicate the p-value; The correlation coefficients and p-values in bold indicate a significant correlation

N = 34

## Section C: Nested Sampling

Table 8: Municipalities with no proportional representation

Municipality	Level of Representation (%)	Size of Municipality (m <sup>3</sup> )	Size of Majority (%)	Number of Minorities	CICR	Occurrence of Conflict	Balance between the groups	Socio – economic differences
Valandovo	0	11890	82.67	1	Yes	No	71.46	8.15
Vasilevo	0	12122	82.15	1	No	No	64.33	13.20
Gradsko	0	3760	77.77	1	Yes	No	65.4	11.60
Dojran	0	3426	77.09	1	Yes	No	65.36	0.96
Zelenikovo	0	4077	61.86	1	Yes	No	32.28	1.79
Karbinci	0	4012	79.76	1	Yes	No	61.61	8.53
Radovish	0	28244	84.1	1	No	No	69.72	3.75
Petrovec	8.18	8255	51.44	2	Yes	No	28.58	7.23

Table 9: Municipalities with almost or exactly proportional representation

Municipality	Level of Representation (%)	Size of Municipality (m <sup>3</sup> )	Size of Majority (%)	Number of Minorities	CICR	Occurrence of Conflict	Balance between the groups	Socio – economic differences
Brvenica	93.28	15855	61.62	1	Yes	No	24.37	5.80
Krushevo	94.20	9684	62.79	2	Yes	No	41.48	19.08
Gostivar	97.45	81042	66.68	2	Yes	No	47.09	10.59
Dolneni	97.74	13568	35.9	3	Yes	No	9.25	1.67
Tetovo	100.60	86580	70.32	1	Yes	Yes	47.16	0.62
Chucher Sanevo	104.78	8493	47.32	2	Yes	Yes	18.76	12.82

Table 10: Municipalities with medium level of proportional representation


Municipality	Level of Representation (%)	Size of Municipality (m <sup>3</sup> )	Size of Majority (%)	Number of Minorities	CICR	Occurrence of Conflict	Balance between the groups	Socio – economic differences
Chashka	17,88	7673	57.28	1	Yes	No	22.05	0.55
Vrapchishte	18.67	25399	83.18	1	Yes	No	70.74	0.02
Butel	28,19	36154	62.25	1	Yes	No	37.06	0.35
Gazi Baba	32,53	72617	73.67	1	No	No	56.45	1.71
Jegunovce	34,87	28244	55.26	1	Yes	Yes	12.24	3.50
Mavrovo	37,47	8618	50.46	2	Yes	No	19.36	6.04
Sopishte	41,65	6565	60.18	1	Yes	No	25.84	1.10
Centar Zhupa	42,67	6519	80.1	1	No	No	67.68	3.64
Studenichani	43,58	17246	68.38	2	Yes	No	49.33	4.83
Kumanovo	43,68	105484	60.43	1	Yes	Yes	34.56	0.84
Kichevo	45,52	30138	53.55	1	Yes	No	23.02	3.82
Debar	53,34	19542	58.07	2	Yes	No	38.06	21.39
Konche	56,33	3536	85.1	1	Yes	No	70.37	8.44
Shuto-Orizari	58,05	22017	60.6	1	Yes	No	30.28	2.93
Tearce	68.04	22454	84.39	1	No	Yes	72.19	0.53
Resen	68,35	16825	76.07	1	No	No	65.39	19.82
Chair	77,92	64733	57	1	Yes	No	32.87	0.44

Table 11: Municipalities with over-representation of ethnic minorities

Municipality	Level of Representation (%)	Size of Municipality (m <sup>2</sup> )	Size of Majority (%)	Number of Minorities	CICR	Occurrence of Conflict	Balance between the groups	Socio – economic differences
Staro Nagorichane	196	4840	80.7	1	Yes	No	61.57	9.51
Struga	112.82	63376	56.85	1	Yes	No	24.76	14.49
Rosoman	224,77	4141	89.21	1	No	No	72.33	2.59

## Section D: Diagnostics

Figure 8. Diagnostics for the Linear Regression Model I



## APPENDIX C: QUALITATIVE DATA

### *Section A: Topic Guide*

This research aims to map factors which influence on the level of ethnic minority representation in the local governments, within the municipalities in the country. I am particularly interested to investigate why some municipalities have indeed achieved proportional representation of ethnic groups, while in others this principle has not yet been fully achieved. The research is conducted in two phases. The first phase consisted of performing a statistical analysis on thirty four multiethnic municipalities, to test whether some of the conditions affecting the maintenance of the stability of consociational democracies are relevant not only at the national at local level, too. The results indicated that several municipalities, including this one, are particularly interesting. Therefore, in the second phase of the research I conduct interviews with the mayors of those municipalities, which will be further analyzed qualitatively.

I am conducting this research for the purposes of my Master thesis. I am a student at the Department of Political Studies at the Central European University in Budapest. Before we start, I would like to ask for your oral consent to audiotape the interview. That will enable me to have your complete answers and relevant details of our conversation, which will significantly improve the quality of analysis. The audiotaped interviews will be later fully transcribed. While I will be the only person who will have access to the audio tape, the transcript of the interview I will be available to me and to my supervisor - Professor Zsolt Enyedi. In any way, I would like ensure you out that this interview will not influence your reputation or in any way affect your integrity. Nevertheless, I would also like to ask for your permission to quote some of your answers, if necessary, to support my arguments elaborated

in the analysis. If you agree to be quoted, I will not refer to you by your first and last name in the text of the thesis, but as 'the Mayor of the municipality'

The questions I will ask are of open-ended nature, thus I encourage you to give complete and detailed response. If you do not understand some of the questions, please feel free to ask for a more detailed explanation. Your participation in this interview is on a voluntary basis, and if you wish to withdraw from it at any time, your decision will be fully respected. If you have any questions prior to the start of it, I will be happy to answer.

1. I would like to start by asking you to tell me something more about you and your career within the public administration?
2. This is your (insert years) term as mayor. Which projects would you say were the most significant during your mandate?
3. In what kind of activities are you participating mostly, as mayor of your municipality?
4. Do you often meet with the citizens of the municipality to talk about their problems?
5. In general, it is considered that power-sharing institutions create trust and increase the cooperation between the ethnic groups. Would you say this is the case with this municipality?
6. According to the OFA, the municipalities need to respect the principle of just and equitable representation. What benefits do think your municipality has (would have) from having proportional representation of ethnic minorities?
7. What do you find necessary for proportional representation?
8. The level of ethnic minority representation in your municipality is very low/very high. What would you say is the main reason for that?
9. (Depending on the level of representation):

- a. Did the employees at executive positions make any initiatives that lead to achieving this level of representation?
  - b. Did the employees at executive positions make any initiatives to solve the issue of low ethnic minority representation?
10. Would you say that the cities are familiar with the situation of ethnic minority representation within the municipal administration?
11. Have you ever thought of establishing a CICR?/ How would you explain the work of the CICR in your municipality?
12. How do you think the CICR can help in establishing proportional representation?
13. Does the municipal Council ever discuss the question of proportional representation?
14. How would you say the number of inhabitants is influencing the relations between the different ethnic groups?
  - a. Would you say the citizens from different ethnic groups know each other and communicate well?
15. In respect to the territorial concentration of ethnic communities in the municipality, are the ethnic groups concentrated in particular parts of the municipal territory?
  - a. Does that affect the inter-ethnic relations in the municipality?
  - b. And does it influence over the inter-ethnic relations among the municipal employees?
16. What would you say citizens find more important: the well-being of their ethnic group in the municipality or the well-being of the municipality itself?
  - a. Are there any differences between the different ethnic groups in respect to the previous question?
17. Does the level of economic development of this municipality influence the level of ethnic minority representation?

18. Are there frequent changes in the number of employees in the municipal administration?
19. What do you find most important for a candidate to possess in order to be employed in the local government office?
20. Do you have open days for meeting with the citizens of your municipality?
  - a. Do they complain about unemployment?
  - b. Which ethnic group complains the most about unemployment?
21. What was the level of ethnic minority representation at the time of the previous mayor?
  - a. Did you influence in any way to change that situation?
22. Is your municipality relatively free from the national government to decide on questions regarding proportional representation?
23. Who has the final say in respect to employment in the municipal administration in your municipality?
24. At the meetings of your party, do you talk with the other members about the issue of proportional representation?
  - a. What are the opinions of the other party members?
25. Are there any party pressures to employ people that belong to a particular ethnic community at the municipal administration?
26. Have you ever cooperated with an international organization or an NGO about projects related to proportional representation of ethnic minorities?
  - a. (where applicable) What was the result of that cooperation?
27. Have you ever implemented any positive discrimination programs for the purposes of increasing the level of employees who belong to an ethnic minority group?
28. Do you think the size of the majority group influences the level of minority representation in the municipal administration?



29. Does the ethnic structure of the employees change when the number of employees in the municipal administration changes?
30. (depending on the level or representation):
  - a. Knowing the work of your municipality, do you think that the current situation of ethnic minority representation should change?
  - b. Knowing the work of your municipality, how long do you think it would take to achieve proportionality in employment in the municipal administration?
31. Looking at the long run, do you think the ethnic groups will react about the level of ethnic minority representation within the municipal administration?
32. Finally, do you think that I have missed out something important that you would like to discuss?

### *Section B: Coding Scheme*

1. Economic determinants
  - a. Economic development of municipality
  - b. Allocation of economic resources
2. Political determinants
  - a. Role of the Mayor
  - b. Role of the Political parties
  - c. Enforcement
  - d. Affirmative action programs
  - e. Power-sharing institution
    - i. Influence
    - ii. CICR
    - iii. Benefits of proportionality

3. Organizational Determinants
  - a. Change in Size of municipal workforce (here or in economic determinants?)
  - b. Employment criteria
  - c. Inherited administration
4. Cultural Determinants
  - a. Historical experiences
  - b. Saliency of ethnicity
  - c. Overarching Loyalties
5. Demographic determinants
  - a. Size of the ethnic groups
  - b. Socio-economic status of groups
  - c. Territorial concentration of ethnic groups

*Section C: Thematic Map*

<b>Political determinants</b>	
<b>Mayor</b>	Now we are talking frankly, I maybe can do and to satisfy the administration, I can tell to ten people to declare themselves as Turks, and the criteria are behold, or to declare as Albanians three – five people out of 33 – 34 we have, and there the criteria are met. Neither the Secretariat would ask me nor anyone I don't know whoelse, the Ombudsman, that there has a problem with us. So we can also do that, as a fiction, because they the people are the same. (Interview 1)
	So I employed a director an Albanian, in the Department of Urban Planning, an Albanian, a Bosniak for driver, I have one employee a Turkish woman, for the first time, and the director also of the Municipal Utility is a Bosniak, and until yesterday it was not. Well, now I do one, so to say, in all activities, I look to have representation of Albanians too (Interview 2)
	Employment Initiatives: No, it's only my initiative (Interview 2)
	They [the CICR members] always say: 'whatever we discuss and do, everything is in the hands of the mayor'. But I respect that, and I cary it out in practice, they can talk whatever they want and do what they want. (Interview 2)
	So above all, when I ran [for major] I promised that there will be employment of all nationalities. In the first term what I promised, I can say that I realise it 80%, because of that I pass the second candidature

	so easily. Because what I promised, people knew that I will accomplish it in the next four years. And people trust me. You can lie to a man once, not a second time (Interview 2)
	But if I face a selection for one post let's say, still I have to choose too. Why do I say this, I think these people should correspond most, and who would be competent to evaluate them. However, if I am given the opportunity to select, I would have chose (Interview 3)
	If we have to choose from 5-6 candidates, I should choose, because at the end my head will be 'on fire'. They will work for me, and if I choose the candidate, my head is at stake, that's how we say here. And that is true, I you create your team you want it to be a team that will bring you success. This position is not forever, the citizens can vote you very easy, but they can also vote you off easy. But I still think that for us, I even said this at ZELS, we have a problem. I think the mayor needs to bring in his team management and go with it to the polls, and then it would be different. I support that American model, where the policeman, the lawer, the financier, they come and leave with me. Then you will not have over-representation and you will have enough work to do. The people at executive position you bring with you will leave with you if you are not successful, but they will also stay with you for years if they do their job well. (Interview 3)
	Well there is no one to tell me, you know why, because I'm the one who decides what to do. If it is a worthy staff that works out is being paid for, why should I replace him, then something would bragged to me, because ultimately the result is expected from me, because I'm coming before the citizens for testing. So if function well, if I'm increasing the budget every year, why would I change something that works. And until now there was no pressure and I think it would not happen. (Interview 3)
	For example, for now it could easily be settled if in the announcement, for example, I request the knowledge of both the Albanian language and Macedonian or Turkish language, in the municipal administration. If we go by the logic that the administration is, and that should be the logic, I see that we still can not escape of what was in the past, that the administration is serving the citizens and not the other way round, because here we still believe that citizens are what is called... then that administrator who works should speak the language of the citizen and thus will have no such prejudices as we have them now (Interview 4)
	The problem is until 2005, although Macedonia was a democratic country that had ratified the Agreement for, the Convention on Human Rights, etc., what is embedded in the Constitution, in the Municipality of Struga was forbidden to employ Albanians until 2005. Since 2005 onwards, since there is a mayor an Albanian, each new employment, the representation is improved. (Interview 4)
<b>Parties</b>	Honestly, more such initiatives are showing the political parties, especially from other ethnic communities, otherwise in the public administration there are not really so many such initiatives. And not that, perhaps those that are heads of units, still may be there the decisionmaking is political, whether it is, whether will the mayor decide or the political parties... more politics is deciding... (Interview 1)
	Maybe we look at employments from a political point of views, but still. And the people here are a special problematic, You may employ

	<p>someone thinking he is Macedonian, and he declared as a member of the Turkish or Albanian ethnic community. (Interview 1)</p> <p>The party leadership wants you to employ party members, to acknowledge the people who were actively working for the party. And that is how it is (Interview 1)</p> <p>Well, I don't know, it needs a longer period, or a change of the leadership of the municipality, from the party of another ethnic community. Maybe then they will press them to register themselves as Albanians in order to get employed (Interview 1)</p> <p>for now when we go to such meetings it is always discussed about the problems that the municipality has about organization of the projects, about the arrival of investors, about the implementation of projects and investments, about such issues [...] every time we go we grumble about our problems and our problems are the development of projects, the conversion of agricultural land into construction land. So our problems are resolving, we are finding common language at 'upstairs', to resolve them (Interview 2)</p> <p>We do not have, see, there, maybe 20% of our members are Serbs. Particularly the analytics was done by a young child, a Serb. Again, I have no answer to that question, we do not divide us on that national basis (Interview 3)</p> <p>No, no, not at all. Really, there are not. Even I'm sure, since I bargained with the municipal committee here, that the employment in the municipal administration be exclusively without interference by anyone from the Party. I can't hire a lawyer in the Municipality who is an economist, he must be a lawyer (Interview 3)</p> <p>Even if it passes at the first majority, afterwards only the Macedonians should vote, they need, half of them need to vote to change the names of the streets. They do not want to do that. Now, why they don't want. So, they are told by their political parties from the center not to do it, although we do not have to go with the names of the Albanians, etc., for example we have laureates of the Struga Nights of Poetry, all laureates, we'll put the names of those laureates, which will be interesting (Interview 4)</p> <p>In my Party, it is discussed, and one member of my party has come out with a new agreement we seek, in order to sort out these problems. We are asking for a real consensual democracy, to endorse the budget with consensus too. So that this CICR is not only an advisory body, but to have the right to vote. Only in this way, Macedonia might have a way out, like this not. Only in such a way, we can develop Macedonia evenly. In this regard, normally that we always talk about equitable representation, it is part of that Agreement, isn't it. So, we talk. Little is talk about the equitable representation in the municipalities, more is talk about the equitable representation in all institutions of the State (Interview 4)</p> <p>VMRO-DPMNE requires employing solely Macedonian, and SDSM too. Turkish party wants employing Turks, Albanian party seeks employing Albanians (Interview 4)</p>
<b>National government</b>	<p>Perhaps it comes often from the Secretariat of the OFA or the Ombudsman, that here we do not have enough staff on ethnic grounds and so on, but there is no such pressure. Most of the pressure are usually of the type – hire someone close to me, someone mine, mostly</p>

	it is like that... ((Interview 1)
	No, no, absolutely, at least in administration. Even in the appointment of directors, such as the director of the public utility or in the Municipality. So, they are looking above all to be quality and not corrupted people, that is what they look for at most. Active, that will successfully work at the place where they will be, and thus to help the party too. So if a person is successful, it is beneficial for the Party too, otherwise to suggest don't take this one or that one, really there was no such thing ((Interview 1)
	We are fully at liberty here, so it is my personal decision. I do not have any pressure, neither from the central government nor from the Councilors. They know that I realistically see the things and therefore I don't have any problems so far (Interview 2)
	Nobody has interfered until now to tell us what and how to do it. So far, I have not experienced anything like that, someone to call me and to tell me.... Until now, we do not think so, for minorities [...] Indeed, there were two persons in Rosoman employed with the quotas by the state, because they have here his party. And I think that, in the (Ministry of) Agriculture, they employed one woman and another one in the part of the Inspectorate, sanitary inspector, both from Rosoman. But, the girl's father is Macedonian, the mother is Serbina. The other one the opposite, their father Macedonian (Interview 3)
	No, I think they too, what you have as information on the proportional representation, that dat is sent both to the Ombudsman and the CICR, we send reports nonstop. They are seeing this and so far, no one has called to say there is a problem there, or something like that. Until now, no one in these years complained for that matter. They see that naturally the relationships are as such, and if it is all good, to let go well ((Interview 3)
	Therefore I'm telling you that, it is difficult to require such responsibility by the municipalities, when municipalities are already centralized in every aspect, and when the policies are lead by the central government, to stimulate the development of certain municipality, and on the other hand, to prevent the development of another municipality. And this should be loudly and clearly said, you said you would not use my name, you are free to use it, this is not something new that I am saying. (Interview 4)
	I do not think that this is done only with Albanians, but we are in a situation when we need to fill these job positions. Now, unfortunately, this can be done, if we want to regulate this problem, this can be done with, and if you have the money, and the money are with the central government, because 97.5 % of the VAT paid in Struga goes to the central government and now they have to adopt an action plan to once and for all settle this proportional representation everywhere, and that includes the municipality too. Not like this, to announce competitions, as to make it what was something like the lottery last year. You remember, in the forest enterprise, was that needed? And they select all of those and are telling me, c'mon hire some 5 cleaners in the kindergarten, and there I need some other staff, which I don have it yet, because they are not letting me to hire (Interview 4)
	No, in the municipal administration the last saying is of the municipality. The central government has it if you are talking about employment, but the municipality can not hire if there are no funds.

	<p>(Interview 4)</p> <p>When we talk about the institutions, we should begin to talk about the municipalities, because municipalities in Macedonia are literally centralized. What is one (...) the Agreement that was made with the OFA for decentralization of power, simply everything is centralized, starting with the budget, starting with the education, even though the responsibilities have been given to us, again the decisions are made by the Ministry of Education and Science and Urban Planning, although we are issuing the licences, allowing to (...) draft the projects. (Interview 4)</p> <p>Therefore I'm saying that a lot of things at the moment are centralized, normally you have very little in your hands to do something in this regard, to relax the relationships, to do some things for the ethnic groups that are living here (Interview 4)</p> <p>Literally, we live, the western part, the municipalities with majority of Albanian citizens, they live as colonies. Why do I say this? The answer is in the budget, each year endorsed by the central government, the Assembly that adopts the budget. These citizens are contributing by filling the budget, according to the last census with 25%, and in return, they get only 3 or 4%. (Interview 4)</p>
<b>Affirmative Action programs</b>	<p>I do not know ... I do not know whether we had such projects. There was one project for the interethnic tolerance in the schools. It is a project that we are involved for several years, meaning that the schools are having a multi-ethnic cooperation. (Interview 1)</p> <p>We, so, ideas and initiatives that are coming, whether it is from ZELS or other institutions, we accept them. However, own initiative in this regard, some project, we did not have. (Interview 1)</p> <p><i>So no investment in educating and preparing of a new staff –</i> Well, now, it is not educated ... not educated . (Interview 1)</p> <p>Well exactly those industrial zones that I made, so I have made the biggest industrial zone in Macedonia, 202 hectares, there is the future not only of the Albanians and the Bosnians, but of all, starting with the Macedonians, ending with the Romas . (Interview 2)</p> <p>We have already drafted that programme and it will be realised soon. The municipality of Ilinden already has it, they are a step ahead of us, and we are following their footsteps. They already made centers for educating people for particular jobs, but we do not have the conditions for that yet. But we plan to build a new building for that purpose, where professors will further educate young people that already have some basic knowledge in a particular field. ((Interview 2)</p> <p>No, there was no such thing in our municipality, so I will say, there was a high level of employment of ethnic minorities, even flattering. (Interview 3)</p> <p>We cooperate with the UNDP, you were present when I extend an agreement, that we have a joint project with the UNDP for employing of people who have a need of social character, but in addition it takes into consideration the equitable representation, but it does not happen with some four employees, we do all the projects. We have the American project, where we jointly with the American Embassy have recruited young people from Struga, an Albanian, a Macedonian, a Turk, etc., but again three or four. So with this kind of cooperation with the international community we can give an example, we can not</p>

	solve the problem (Interview 4)
<b>Enforcement</b>	<p>No, the citizens really complain about unemployment, i.e highest percentage of people who come to seek admission, request employment, but they do not require employment of the Albanians or Macedonians, Turks, but for themselves, so... Although there are doubts in the sense that we have no one from Vrbjane... that is particular example of Vrbjane, because there was really no consent of the population that the public utility works on the issue of hygiene in the village. That is why we did not hire any man, since we does not taking care of the hygiene there. I do not know, it is a bit more complicated to work with some villages, so we don't have employees in the public utility. (Interview 1)</p> <p>Mostly older people are coming, who know to seek employment for his their son or grandson. But, most of them are coming to request resolution of the infrastructure problems, whether property issues, of problems with the neighbors about the border lines, eaves and so on, in good part such of the problems for which people are coming, and for ethnicity I didn't pay attention who is coming (Interview 1)</p> <p>Yes, there are different requirements, they are coming. [...] Also for employment, mister ayor this and that, and we have here a list of individuals. We employed a lot of people in the municipality. They come for any need ((Interview 2)</p> <p>Well, at the moment all groups complain. Those who are most risky I try to help them first, those who are socially disadvantaged (P11)</p> <p>This relaxed atmosphere in the Rosoman is felt, you don't have preasure, there is no tension, I do not think anyone's heard of Serb saying – I'm disadvantaged, no such thing happened. (Interview 3)</p> <p>Yes, yes, the complained infront of ....., but now there is no one to come, haha. Out of 300 aplications, 250 have been employed; those 50 have not passed the test and probably has quite many of those to whom it doesn't suited to apply only for cards. (Interview 3)</p> <p>I meet with people every Friday. And now, literally, from the first to the last, all require employment, and I have no place to put them, I'm not the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, nor am I the Ministry for Attracting Investments, am I? And, to organise some debate, believe me that no one will ask me about issues that are very important for the city, they will ask me for employment. And everyone know to tell you - I have a son, a daughter, I have a master's degree. We have a lot of masters now, don't we, and all seek employment. Normally that is a good topic to be open, but it is not opened because there would be some consequences (Interview 4)</p> <p>The Albanians will encourage that – we have been discriminated, now you need to shut-up and not get a job, right? Macedonians on the other hand will complain, why now, what's done is done in the past is done, why we now have to, so... (Interview 4)</p> <p>All complain. Those who are proportionally represented and those that are not represented, since the employment is personal, it is not ... (KD: Ethnic) common or ethnic. And in one community where an Albanian says hire me, not the other Albanian, ant the other way round a Macedonian who says, let me have a job because my neighbor who is also a Macedonian, he has five employees, I have none. There are those who say give kick that Macedonian so Albanian could enter, but</p>

		those are requirements of the citizens, not things that you make (Interview 4)
<b>Power-Sharing Institutions</b>	<b>Influence</b>	<p>We are a Municipality to show. We just had elections, so we have somewhere around 500-600 votes for DUI, DPA, Bosniak parties, that are not in the coalition with us and they vote for VMRO - DPMNE. Voted why? – because I'm always with the people. And many people respecting you have voted for your party. So for what I've done the people are paying back in some way, because they have not been neglected ever [ ... ] that is where every mayor should be careful, because once you make a mistake, maybe unconsciously, but tomorrow you will hear rumors – the mayor let the children of the Orthodox religion to recite, not from the Muslim. That is where most residents are looking not to be neglected. (Interview 2)</p> <p>In the second round we establish a coalition with the Bosniak Party and with another Macedonian party, and together we defeated the then candidate, so now for the second term it was far far easier, without any coalition. Simply, the second term I pass smoothly because of what I have done in the first term the people saw and voted, virtually all residents of the municipality of Petrovac voted. My counter candidate had 1,000 votes; I had 3,670 votes, a huge difference. People know to appreciate, to evaluate, and what I did on the whole territory of the Municipality of Petrovac bear fruit, and that is the confidence of the citizens of our community ((Interview 2))</p> <p>I think there is confidence [among groups], although the dynamics characteristic for the national level - the mistrust between some, let's say not nationalities, rather religions, more specifically the distrust between Macedonians and Albanians - are reflected in our region as well (Interview 1)</p> <p>Cooperation, as I've said, with the Serb Democratic Party is at a very high level (Interview 3)</p> <p>But when looking back, we respect each other, even chatting with the administration I think we initiate to form following some model, a joint body for inter-ethnic cooperation and the answers of the Serbs was - 'If you want to have problems let's establish'. So we function flawlessly. Until now, at least. (Interview 3)</p> <p>Another absurdity of OFA is that when you talk about equal representation, and the second is the decisionmaking. The principle of Badinter that is adopted to prevent majorization of smaller ethnic community, in the local government was converted in principle that prevents the majority to realise its right. What it means? For example, Struga that is with majority of Albanians, and has not even a single street with someone, a man or an influential man, an Albanian figure from the past, right? All streets are wit Macedonians, Serbs, Roma, Albanian no one. We still have JNA street, but we don't have, still we have Marx and Engels, Marshal Tito. And now me, though I want to have, because we are a tourist town, to display the names of streets, what will I display JNA. Why these things are not changed, because in Struga the Macedonians should vote with the double majority. Even if the first majority pass, afterwards only Macedonians should vote, they need half of them to vote to change the streets. They do not want to do that. (Interview 4)</p> <p>Literally, the principle that was supposed to prevent majorization became a principle preventing us to vote something for our</p>



		constituencies, and that includes all of them, because like this we are being blocked for everything (Interview 4)
	<b>CICR</b>	<p>It is a little problematic since here the Councilors or Committee Chairmen being councillors, somehow are not much providing information or report to the Council [...] The held regular meetings, often schedule, participate in workshops, several times they asked to go to seminars together, at the central level. [(Interview 1)</p> <p>Maybe they could help with solving this problem, because really that question is not well settled, and I know it is so (Interview 1)</p> <p>See, not that I'm a mayor, but the dance is lead by the head. So the regardless how much the Committee wants and makes efforts, if the mayor does not keep the Committee on the right track, the Commission will be helpless. The road is open for the Commission, wherever it goes, in any village, the door is open for that Committee, we have no ethnic problems here (Interview 2)</p> <p>Well, the biggest contribution to ... to recommend me a quality staff. So not only to take, to hire anyone, and now here I hired that and that of Albanian ethnicity, he works in the municipality [...] So you need to offer quality people, a list should be given that will be compiled, and on that list what people have studied and slowly slowly to employ people (Interview 2)</p> <p>To the lawyer Lazar Simonovic, I'm telling him let's establish, and he's telling me – if you want to have problems establish it. I didn't know what he meant then, but I conform. So, do you have problems to form one body, should a problem be born, so why you need such a body, say where something does not work? So I said well, I do not know, I think, well, why to establish it. I think it is their assessment, I'm willing to do that (Interview 2)</p> <p>It is not my job to interfere in Commissions, when they should hold meetings, since this can not be understood by the experts. And the Councilors, they think I need to worry so that they make decisions, etc. . And when to summon, they may decide. That is the purpose why there is a mayor and why there is a Council - to have a control. I only manage with their decisions, nothing else. And also the Commission. The Commission is elected and now if they expect me to find them topics to discuss for, no problem, I will find topics. But when I had a problem with the church in Oktisi, surely you've heard, haven't you, the Commission didn't gathered ( C9 - 10 ) . I did my part as a mayor, I run to the Orthodox and to the Muslims, to handle that situation. (Interview 4)</p> <p>Yes, yes, yes ... if in that Committee participate respectable citizens, citizens who want good for this society, who will know in general that there are not the ones who decide about the problems that should be resolved in the Parliament, they are not parliamentarian, they are just members of the Committee to take care of relations between citizens, to not have any projects or anything that would jeopardize the relations neighbor with neighbor. (Interview 4)</p>
	<b>Benefits of proportional representation</b>	I honestly do not think that would benefit, that it has a benefit in that part, for the reason that even the keeping of the books, or the conduct of the administration and the Council is in the Macedonian language, and if there is , that another language would be introduced, which would mean an additional burden, expences, although we had in the

		<p>previous Council, members that were declared Albanians and who spoke Albanian language and a Turk who spoke Turkish, so we had a translation of materials, at least for those at the meetings of the Council and the minutes were done in three languages – for the Turkish we have an obligation, while with the decision of the Council we did also in Albanian, although the Councilors who have requested that, were much more fluent and literate in speaking Macedonian language than some Macedonians (Interview 1)</p> <p>I think that the Turks had been satisfied, I do not know how much are the Albanians. I do not think it would be some benefit. Given the fact that the municipal population speaks Macedonian language, and a village or two speak Albanian, population don't speaks other language (Interview 1)</p> <p>Personally, I think it is very wrong thesis to employ on an ethnic quota, and to stay at home and receive a salary. So, what happens today in Macedonia, people are paid and somewhere waiting to be employed by ethnic quota. And that leads to a dangerous situation. It leads many people to declare not Macedonians, to find some background by grandparent and declare whether Bulgarian, a Serb, Roma, Albanian, to succeed (Interview 2)</p> <p>Firstly, it needs to be defined what is equitable and proportional representation, because so far I do not see it functioning anywhere, do I, or have tens of thousands of Macedonians who are employed in the central government, and has thousands of Albanians who are also employed in the central government, but these Albanians are sitting at home and someone gives them a salary, does not want to see them in the institutions, and these others are working, do they (Interview 4)</p>
<b>Economic Determinants</b>		
<b>Economic development of municipality</b>		<p>If there were more resources, we do not really see how ethnicity would matter, although it should be noted that there are not many Albanians who are educated and could be employed. Most of them live in the near-by villages and only have primary education, or maximum a high-school diploma, (Interview 1)</p> <p>Investments are coming far faster, they are faster realised, because of what I know and what other people speak (Interview 2)</p> <p>So naturally, I told you one example, a sort of a joke, but true. At the session of the Council I said that we have 70 investors, and each month we will have at least one milestone that will employ so many people. [...] Therefore, in this respect, not only we will employ our people here, Macedonians, Turks, Albanians, Bosnians, all but will take people from Zelenikovo [...] And that's why I say that we will not choose Macedonians or Albanians, but for 3 years we'll have no one from our community that is unemployed (Interview 2)</p> <p>The more projects the more people will work. Specifically, the girl of Turkish ethnicity I assigned her for those projects, legalization of illegal buildings. And in the next 3 years she will work only on those issues. And not only on those, now in the meantime she was trained for B - integrated permit and is working on the permits for companies ((Interview 2)</p> <p>When I became mayor, the budget was somewhere around 8 millions, before 9 and something, when I became the mayor up to fantastic 30 millions in 2013. Every year, so to say I have managed to collect one</p>

	more budget. One of the few municipalities that are making rebalance of the revenues and it makes me especially proud to say that really without compromises we fight to collect the revenues and to deliver services to citizens (Interview 3)
	Well, enhancing of investments, the investment to employ the population, is really needed. To build a little more private investment, to invest in some of the jobs ... and thus will improve the ethnic balance (Interview 1)
	Money. First, you need to change the Law on budget [...] I think the best solution would be to increase the percentage of VAT that is returned to municipalities. Switzerland is a developed country just because of these reasons, there is a good infrastructure for exactly this reason. ((Interview 4)
	It will increase because in this way we will be able to plan ourself, not someone else to plan for us, who for example, spend hundreds of millions of euros to build a plaza in the center of Macedonia. If we would have this opportunity, then such things would not be happen, we would have one monument in every city, not to have hundreds of monuments in the Center, not in a single town. I think this is the best solution, in such a way, decentralization of power, value of a society. The more decentralized power more values can be obtained. (Interview 4)
	Rosoman is one of the few municipalities in the country, where unemployment is well below the average for the country, not to say that 400 people from Veles, Strumica, from everywhere come to work on the peach plantations, everyone are employed (Interview 3)
	I believe that economic development can affect people not to feel the difference, not to look whether more Macedonians or Serbs are employed. Imagine now Macedonians to jump and say - you have more Serbs employed than Macedonians. But they don't saying that, no one, because they have money, because there is some economic welfare, employed in many places (Interview 3)
	The same is here, if we know how to run the politics, if we relax them a little in the economy, if we resolve the economy issues of the poorer layer, I believe we will not have problems of ethnic nature. (Interview 3)
	I have one, because my two brothers are in America, one works, for example the school where my brother works, the school has \$ 30 million budget, me as municipality I have planned 13 millions Euro and the question is whether I will collect those money. So that is the issue of employment (Interview 4)
	The economic resources are also a problem, but not so big and expressive, if I can certainly I will employ one urban planner in the municipality (Interview 3)
<b>Allocation of Economic Resources</b>	Indeed, in the sense of some savings, they agreed at my request not to do translation, though still perhaps not much, but still it was somewhat expense. [...] But I don't think it would benefit if we had introduce here even a complete records and the administration and the Council if they had two or possibly three languages, it will be only cost for us as a municipality we are not able to have such additional costs ((Interview 1)
	If we accept 30% Albanians and Bosniaks, that is 10 more people and

	I need to pay all of them, I don't have that much finances. (Interview 1)
	But, the budget does not need to increase, it depends how much you want to allocate for salaries (Interview 4)
	I think it is good, if we only give money for employment and for all that a municipality needs to have, then we would not build anything. (Interview 3)
<b>Organizational Determinants</b>	
<b>Changes in size of municipal workforce</b>	No, when I came, I employed three muslims. . (Interview 1)
	I don't know, there were two, now there are three out of eight employed in total, hence, it's not four and therefore we have lower average in the last report. I also have a made which is Serbian by parents' birth, but she declares herself as Maceodnian. . (Interview 3)
	Part of the municipal administration retired, and there are few new people. In regard to nationality, we employed one Albanian, one bosniak, one turk, I mean in the municipal administration . (Interview 2)
	On two occasions we made chages in the systematization, i.e. explanding the duties or employing fairly big part in the municipal administration, what led to an increase on the supply side, that is the duties towards the population, so I believe we are improving. . (Interview 1)
	<i>So, you did not make any big changes in the administration?</i> Yes, I can say that . (Interview 1)
	Since I came in office, in the past years I hired several members of ethnic minorities [lists them], I am starting to hire new people, but I cannot do everything over night, of course. I need to ensure financial resources to pay the new employees. . (Interview 2)
	So, I found a municipality with 4 employees, now we are 8 . (Interview 3)
	To repeat, there are some from the party of the serbs SDS. I didn't fire them. I just made them do their job in a professional manner. As they met their responsibilities and worked well, I don't have problem and I don't feel them like Serbs. (Interview 3)
	Don't expect that I will fire all the employed here and employ new ones because the Laws don't permit that. I am gradually working now on improving proportional representation in Struga and from the time I became a Mayor, I employed Albanians, Roma and Macedonians. I am trying to establish a principle for employment, but I will need other factors to come at play (Interview 4)
<b>Employment criteria</b>	The professionalism and the initiation of criteria that are put in the systematization, the law on public administration and labor relations (Interview 1)
	No. First we employed people for the places we needed at the time, Second, we pay attention that there is representation for the villages, so that not all people are from Rostushe, Skudrinje and I don't know where else. (Interview 1)
	I pay attention on the norms that wre are entitled to respect. We have 23% Albanians, 17% Bosniaks, and we are starting that process. For that, we need a particular number of Albanian and Bosniak employees,

	and that goes gradually, nothing can be done over night (Interview 2)
	I need people of quality, not just people that will work, to count them as numbers and say, hey the Mayor hired him (Interview 2)
	The education, of course, the skills and capabilities of the candidates. If I need a lawyer, I cannot hire mathematician. That's it, to fulfil the criteria (Interview 2)
	There are 2% of Turks, I already employed one of them, one girl, and now I will give him labor certificate because the girl is really good. (Interview 2)
	We have a system that works in Rosoman for a long time now, first we employ our people. A lawyer is a lawyer, whether it is Albanian, Serbian, or Bulgarian or Macedonian ((Interview 2)
	I don't know, I usually hire them through Employment Agencies and I have selected quite a big number from them, regardless of where he comes from. When I would feel that the employee would not be a good worker, I would give him exercises to check. Whenever I would feel that it is actually well educated I would hire them so as to boost the capacity of the administration ((Interview 3)
	I don't decide, the lawyer decides because he knows at best how things work, I am not a lawyer, it is him who was making the decision in the Committee. Of course, the choice is no mine, but if there is something illegal, I would stop it. (Interview 3)
	Professionality. The more professionals I have the easier it will be for me to manage and work as a mayor (Interview 4)
<b>Inherited Administration</b>	Well, I inherited all of the staff, they are all still here, nobody was expelled and I even employed new staff. What is the administration like now... well it is the same, however people declared their ethnicity, they are still the same people. Maybe there is a change in how they declared themselves; I don't think there is another change. (Interview 1)
	When I came here there was neither an Albanian, nor a Bosniak hired. (Interview 2)
	Well, that is inherited from the previous structures. When I came, it [minority representation] was zero percent (Interview 3)
	Plus, I came to find a very bad situation, in Proaqua [a firm], the real need for employees is no more than 70 people, I found a situation with 270 employees. In the Communal Hygiene there are over 150 employees and the need is 60-70 employees...I have that many in the administration. ((Interview 4)
	I have found a situation of over-employment. And now, I should declare a redundancy of workforce in order to fix this. If I do that, and I still hesitate because I do not want to cause social problems, if I do that then it will solve much of this proportional representation ((Interview 4)
	This over-employment of a certain ethnic community, it does not matter now, we are talking about phenomena and it would not be nice to name them, but they are not a result of one mandate. Well, it is inherited from the former system and the new system until 2005, as I said. And now the situation is known to all international factors here. ((Interview 4)
	When I came in office I had four employees of which 50% were Serbs,

	there is no proportionality there. ((Interview 3)
<b>Cultural Determinants</b>	
<b>Historical experiences</b>	I don't think there is any problem in the inter-ethnic relations, although sometimes you can feel it, but we try, as a municipality to minimize those things (Interview 1)
	Even when the conflict occurred, there were no riots among the Macedonians and Albanians in the municipality (Interview 2)
	In our municipality, the mutual one prevails, generally it is built mutually and the citizens see that (Interview 1)
	The municipality before all. Another point I want to make, I make my investments regardless of whether the people are Muslims or Orthodox. Hence, I invest in every settlement, and the Orthodox never said 'Mayor why are you investigating there, there are Bosniaks and Muslims (Interview 2)
	You cannot say that this particular ethnic community has a special problem which we can solve by gathering together. Hence, every citizen of Rosoman has the same problem, regardless whether he is Macedonian or Serbian, either there is or there is not sanitation. ((Interview 2)
	The second one (municipality) of course. If you have for yourself, and your neighbour doesn't, you don't feel good from the inside. And I think it is very important that we see the municipality as our mutual treasure, regardless of ethnicity That ethnic diversity can be a grace for us. (Interview 4)
	There is a phenomenon in Macedonia. Albanians and Macedonians do not have problems as neighbors or friends, but they have problems as ethnic communities (Interview 4)
	We still bear the consequences of the work of that system. And I think of the system existing up to 2001, when there was no just and equitable representation. I don't see a minister or the Prime Minister to apologize to this nation; it is time that they apologize. I would, if I did something bad with my politics or if some of my predecessor did something bad to some Macedonia here, or to a Roma, or to an Albanian. There is nothing wrong in that, it is civilized. (Interview 4)
	20 years they vote like that in Macedonia, Macedonians for a Macedonian party, and the Albanians for Albanian (Interview 4)
<b>Saliency of ethnicity</b>	I think here, yes, the percent of Albanians is not proportionally represented, but as a municipality we have a specific problem, people are Macedonian Muslims and they declare as Turks (Interview 1)
	That feeling of ethnic belonging, that we should not differentiate each other by ethnicity is very strong, and I think that is the key for success (Interview 3)
	About proportionality, I don't claim that it didn't come as a consequence of the 50-years governing of a different system, which employed Macedonians and not Albanians (Interview 4).
	. What the mayor of Vevchani asked, that all signs written in Albanian are removed, for me he is only a coward (Interview 4)
	You know what is interesting in Struga, the ethnic composition of the municipality reflects the ethnic composition of the state. If there are approximately 60% Macedonians on national level, here the Albanians are approximately 60%. So we are inverted compared to the country.

	And... this is mentioned very little. If you insist on talking in percentage, then let's talk in percentages (Interview 4)
	We have a system that works in Rosoman for a long time now, first we employ our people. A lawyer is a lawyer, whether it is Albanian, Serbian, or Bulgarian or Macedonian (Interview 3)
<b>Overarching Loyalties</b>	
	In our municipality, the mutual one prevails, generally it is built mutually and the citizens see that (Interview 1)
	The municipality before all. Another point I want to make, I make my investments regardless of whether the people are Muslims or Orthodox. Hence, I invest in every settlement, and the Orthodox never said 'Mayor why are you investigating there, there are Bosniaks and Muslims (Interview 2)
	You cannot say that this particular ethnic community has a special problem which we can solve by gathering together. Hence, every citizen of Rosoman has the same problem, regardless whether he is Macedonian or Serbian, either there is or there is not sanitation. (Interview 3)
	The second one (municipality) of course. If you have for yourself, and your neighbour doesn't, you don't feel good from the inside. And I think it is very important that we see the municipality as our mutual treasure, regardless of ethnicity
	That ethnic diversity can be a grace for us. (Interview 4)
<b>Demographic Determinants</b>	
	You don't know how he declared and now he will come to get a job, he declared as Albanian, and maybe next year he will declare himself in another way. It is a complicated situation (Interview 1)
	The majority of the citizens are Macedonian Muslims (Interview 1)
	Yes, we are a small municipality, it is true, but I don't think that matters, we have been together all century and we learned to tolerate each other (Interview 3)
	Of course it matters, every time there are local elections ethnicity matters (Interview 4)
<b>Socio-economic status of groups</b>	The citizens of Rosoman have quite high average personal income. So when everything is good in the economy, then it is like they say about marriage – if there are money, there are no quarrels. (Interview 3)
	No one complains now. That is why I said economic welfare influences a lot. Now, only people that cannot work come to me for help, social cases, sometimes someone lazy too. [...] But the latter are very, very rare. (Interview 3)
<b>Territorial concentration of ethnic groups</b>	The region of Mavrovo is mostly comprised of Orthodox Macedonians; the Albanians live from Zhirovica onwards – Vrbjani, part from Zhirovica and Upper River, although there are very few people in those villages, the region of Dolna Reka is comprised of Muslim Macedonians, and Turks. Here – Bitushe, there are Orthodox Macedonians, Rostushe has few Orthodox (Interview 1)
	Except for Dolno and Sredno Konjari where 100% of the Albanians reside – half Albanians half Bosniaks, we also have homogenous places, for instance GornoKonjari – you cannot find Muslims there.

	However, Katlanovo, Rzanichani, Vodnjanci, are more mixed, but with a lower concentration of muslims, maybe 10 to 15% (Interview 2)
	There are a lot of people in Rosoman who have Serbian surnames, yet they declare themselves Macedonians. What I am saying is that we may really be one of the most unique municipalities with no salient categorizations, in the sense that here there are Serbs. At our place, our neighbours are Serbs and Macedonians – mixed. There are no getoes here (Interview 3)
	There isn't a quart where you can find serbs only, I mean neighbour to neighbour they are all mixed, here you cannot find five houses where only serbs reside (Interview 3)
	We have both clear and mixed places. Homogenous villages, both Macedonian and Albanian. But there are also mixed. (Interview 4)
	Well, no, when they go to the other ethnic group for holidays, it means there is coexistence, and no incidents. In Petrovec incidents never happened (Interview 2)
	We all live together, in Rosoman it is like that, we perceive like that, in all parts of the municipality (Interview 3)
	In ethnically clean villages there are no ethnic problems. In ethnically heterogeneous villages there are. (Interview 4)
	No no, the conflicts are more along party lines than along ethnic lines haha (Interview 1)
	No no, that cannot happen, they know what I will say, everyone who fights is to blame. There cannot be only one guilty person for the fight (Interview 2)

### *Section D: List of Interviews*

<b>Number of Interview</b>	<b>Municipality</b>	<b>Date</b>
Interview 1	Mavrovo-Rostusha	30 April 2014
Interview 2	Petrovec	2 May 2014
Interview 3	Rosoman	7 May 2014
Interview 4	Struga	9 May 2014



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