

“A WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING”
**Political socialization within family and perception of undemocratic actions in
a democratic regime**

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Abstract

One could expect that in a society which went through decades of an undemocratic rule, those brought up in home environment with an atmosphere against this rule would punish a democratically elected government for undemocratic actions. This is because people are able to see between the lines and rationally scrutinize content of the rule and not only its surface. On the other hand it might be said, that the people are happy with the surface and as long as the rhetoric of the government is bashing the previous system, the undemocratic actions of this government can go unnoticed. This study examines those two scenarios in the context of the post-1989 Hungary. The survey embedded experiment was conducted on a sample of 1500 respondents with two experimental conditions and one control condition. In each condition the respondents are informed, that the present Hungarian government exercises power that allows it to introduce undemocratic changes in law. In the two experimental conditions, two examples of such changes are mentioned: one in accordance with the pre-1989 communist party ideology and one against this ideology. The degree to which respondents were exposed to the anti-communist socialization during adolescence is measured. The linear regression analysis is conducted with opinion about the present government being the dependent variable. The results show, that people with the anti-communist socialization background favor the present government more no matter what kind of undemocratic actions the government carries on. The results support thus the idea of a man with political attitudes based on emotions attached to the symbol of democracy vs. non-democracy early on in life rather than on reason and taking into account actual proceedings of a government. Possible alternative explanations of the findings are provided.

Keywords: political socialization, family, Hungary, democracy

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Introduction – emotions and reason in political action

The question that motivates this work is of how do people make political choices and what might be considered as predominant in formation of their attitudes if it comes to judging government's actions: reason or emotions (Chong, 2000). Long tradition of inquiry in political science tended to promote reason as the main source of judgment starting with political philosophers of analytical tradition and ending with various models of behavior taken from game theory and economics. Emotions, if at all taken into consideration, were treated rather as an obstacle, a noise that should be harnessed with rationality and conscious actions (in political science e.g. Downs, 1957; Blais, 2000; in psychology: Lazarus, 1991).

Literature on political behavior focused so far to a larger extent on the division between instrumental and expressive motivation for taking up political actions (for an overview see: Bartels, 2010). Instrumental motivation is supposed to make people undertake political actions that have no intrinsic value but serve as means toward achieving some further goal. Expressive motivation on the other hand pushes people to do things because of reasons that are different from the ones an activity is meant for. Downs in his classic book *An economic theory of democracy* (1957) was exploring motivation to vote in electoral systems and came to the conclusion that democracies would not survive if people voted having in mind only their contribution to the elections' outcome.

Instrumental and expressive motivation are sometimes wrongly interpreted as reasoned and affective motivation, respectively. For example, Abraham Maslow in his *Motivation and Personality* (1970) defines instrumental behavior as “always a means towards a motivated end” in comparison to expressive behaviors which “either have nothing to do with either means or

ends, [...] or else [...] come close to being end-in-themselves behavior” (p. 70). Nevertheless, he also adds that “[w]e must be careful [...] to avoid sharp, either-or dichotomizing. Most acts of behavior have both an expressive and [an instrumental] component” (p. 63). In a situation when both components can be found in every behavior one can wonder what is the purpose of making the distinction. Although it might be, that actions triggered by expressive motives correlate with a higher amount of emotions (since those actions are themselves intrinsically rewarding), and instrumental motives are usually accompanied by emotionless, those correlates neither logically result from the nature of expressive and instrumental motivation, nor do they solely cause one or another of them. For those reasons, in political science literature both instrumental and expressive motivation is treated as based largely on reason, the former one representing a sort of higher level of complexity (Toka, 2009).

Emotions were for a long time not welcomed in the scholarly discourse dominated by reason. Nevertheless, in the last few decades researchers started looking at emotions as having more positive value than just being a noise and contributing to the good judgment not less than reason. In the field of psychology perhaps one of the first to raise the issue was Robert Zajonc (1980). On the other hand, among the more interesting and popular works dealing with the subject within the field of political science one can find *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment* by George Marcus, Russell Neumann and Michael MacKuen (2000). The authors argue that there is an efficient interaction of affect and cognition in making political judgment. According to them, emotions are always present in political judgments and they work through two systems: the disposition and surveillance one.

The role of emotions in politics was mentioned by several other authors as well. Sears (1993) speaks about emotions which allow people to stick to their deepest beliefs, values and attitudes.

On the other hand, it is easy to manipulate people with emotions (Edelman, 1985; Jamieson, 1992) and lead them astray from what they would usually like to do in the ‘cool state’ (Elster, 2000). The issue was also thoroughly examined by Marcus (2000) who says that emotion “[...] enables past experience to be encoded with its evaluative history” as well as “contemporary circumstances to be quickly evaluated” (p. 221). He sees emotions both as an anchor for behavior and attitudes, and as a tool for *ad hoc* evaluation.

The question of how do people anchor their behavior and attitudes becomes especially interesting in a post-communist space in a place like e.g. Hungary. The country provides researchers with an excellent context for research on the effects of emotions and reason on political judgment because of its diverse history. After the turmoil of the second world war, a period of transition to communist rule started. In the November 1945 free elections The Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (*Független Kisgazda, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt*) got 57% of votes, they were nevertheless not allowed to rule by themselves. The Hungarian Communist Party (*Magyar Kommunista Párt*) led by Mátyás Rákosi was included in the ruling coalition and soon started applying the salami tactics of cutting off partners in the government to ultimately, renamed as The Hungarian Working People’s Party (*Magyar Dolgozók Pártja*), solely exercise power in the government as of 1949. After the 1956 revolution in Hungary János Kádár became the General Secretary and held the role until 1988. The communist rule was present in the country for roughly forty years. After the 1989 transition one could observe rapid shifting of options on the political stage, with many new formations coming up and many old ones perishing. From 2010 though the country is ruled by a conservative coalition of Fidesz and Christian Democratic People’s party (KDNP) who together have more than two-thirds of seats in

the parliament and thus constitute a supermajority which gives an ability to e.g. change the constitution.

One might expect that people with anti-communist sentiments would sympathize with the right-winged government. On the other hand, the ruling coalition has potential to abuse its power in an undemocratic way. In fact, Fidesz-KDNP did introduce significant changes in the constitutions that were highly criticized by the international community for being undemocratic. The power abuse could have been sometimes named as being in line with the pre-1989 system (e.g. changing electoral rules in favor of the ruling party) and sometimes against it (e.g. praising the role of Christianity and tradition for the nation). Such a situation creates many stimuli citizens can be susceptible to. Namely, assuming their anti-communist upbringing they can be (1) opposed to any undemocratic actions, (2) opposed to actions that resemble the previous rule but not mind conservative abuse of power or (3) not opposed to any undemocratic actions and happy with a democratically elected government.

This setting gives an outstanding opportunity for conducting a study looking at the interplay of affect and cognition in people's judgment of the rulers. Particularly, I look at effects of family socialization into politics and its effect on judging the present government. The study has the following order: in the first chapter of the thesis I introduce theories of cognitive development (Piaget, 1981; Phillips, 1969; van der Veer and Valsiner, 1994; Vygotski, 1986) and afterwards try to situate the development of conceptual thinking and emotions in the context of identity's development. After that I give a brief overview of the works in the field of political socialization and present available literature on political socialization in Hungary. There is not much of such literature and it is mostly from the time just after the 1989 transition. Nonetheless, it gives an overview of the relations between official party line propaganda and the relation to it within a

household. To trace the effect of political socialization, in the study I ask potential voters about their parents' attitude towards the communist regime. The literature on political socialization even though relatively old, is nevertheless relevant for this study which as its explanatory factor has attitude towards the pre-1989 regime. In general, political socialization is expected to provide with emotional component of attitudes towards the present non-communist government in Hungary. After having an understanding of the theories and looking at them in the context of political socialization I will propose hypotheses that will constitute the last part of the first chapter.

In the second chapter I present definitions of some important concepts and issues connected with operationalization of variables. I first define the concept of attitudes and write about what do I mean by speaking about an 'attitude', 'concept' and 'meaning'. I then turn to some measurement issues that might turn problematic. After that I describe the data, construct statistical hypotheses and finally analyze the data. It turns out that there is a clear relationship between political socialization in one's household and her attitude towards the present democratically elected government. There is nonetheless no effect of added information about undemocratic actions performed by the government, which supports the hypothesis of a voter driven by emotional 'anchors' taken from home.

In the third and final chapter I discuss the results I have obtained. Due to the previously mentioned issues connected with operationalization, the results should be treated with caution. They nevertheless constitute an interesting piece of data on the effects of socialization in the post-communist setting of the present day Hungary. After discussing the results the conclusion follows.

Chapter 1. Political socialization and attitudes' formation

In this chapter I firstly introduce theories that give foundation for forming the final problem tackled in this work. Particularly, I introduce insights from theories about intellect development which results in an ability of forming abstract concepts. This theoretical background can help to understand how people start to be able to conceptualize political ideas and how do they climb to the highest level of abstraction while speaking about politics. After that I introduce theories which deal with how attitudes towards politics might be incorporated in one's identity. Then I give an insight in the literature on the role of family in political socialization. After giving a general overview, I focus on Hungary examining the available literature on political socialization in this country. Finally, I draw on the theories and present hypotheses I want to examine in the study.

1.1. Theoretical background

Below the theoretical foundations of intellectual development and identity formation are presented. I show two different approaches to the intellect development, one of which stresses the role of innate structures and the other looks closer at the role of the environment in the development of formal thinking. After showing the two streams of theories I frame them within the individual's identity.

1.1.1. Intellectual development in the first two decades of life

There is a discussion between scholars as to what extent intelligence is innate and how much the environment impacts intellectual development. Among the main proponents of the group claiming that intellectual development is a realization of a pre-programmed plan is e.g. Jean Piaget or Noam Chomsky. The group giving more credit to the environments' impact hosts scholars such as Lev Siemyonowich Vygotsky or Burrhus Frederic Skinner. Below I present an

overview of theories advocated by proponents of the two approaches, namely of Piaget and Vygotsky.

Jean Piaget (1981, for an excellent review of the theory see: Phillips, 1969) understands intellect as a structural form which goal is to organize and adapt to the environment. According to him, the intellect's development is equal to realization of genetically programmed potentiality in the environment one lives in. The four units in the development of intelligence are: sensimotor period, preoperational period, concrete operations period and formal operations period. In the first period which lasts for roughly two years a child goes through stages of simple reflexes, first habits' acquisition, circular reactions phases and internalization of first schemata. Many properties of humans are present in their embryonic form at this stage: intentionality, goal orientation, creativity. Although very interesting, this period will not be discussed in detail as it is not directly connected to the topic of this study.

In the preoperational period lasting until some seven years the child thinks mainly symbolically. The period is characterized by egocentrism i.e. a child is unable to acknowledge any perspective different from its own. Also different forms of magical thinking are present here and transductive (from specific to specific) reasoning replaces the inductive (from specific to general) or deductive (from general to specific) one. Because of this last characteristic, the child at this stage is particularly susceptible to conditioning and reinforcements. Particular symbols can be easily associated with pleasant feelings and can be thought of as causing those feelings, even though the two are non-related.

The concrete operations' period lasts until around 11-12 years and the main development to be observed here is the occurrence of proper logic. Thoughts resemble a lot those of adults, but

logical operations cannot be abstracted and thus a child can rely only on concrete material. Formal operations such as transitivity or conservation (substance being the same despite changing shape) are present, they are nevertheless applied only to concrete material and cannot be extrapolated to abstract ideas the political realm is inhabited with.

The final formal operational stage lasts through adolescence and it is only now that a person can apply formal operations to formal material i.e. abstracted concepts. Piaget draws attention to the importance of hypothetico-deductive reasoning which is honed at this stage and contributes to a possibility of acquisition of the new kind of knowledge as well as accumulation of conceptual knowledge in one's system of world's representations. At this stage the proper intellectual life can finally start.

An important contribution of Piaget's theory is to bring in to the discourse on intellectual development the concept of *schemata* – tools with which people operate to function in the world. The concept was one of the hallmarks of the movement in epistemology which finally resulted in the so called 'cognitive revolution'. Piaget calls himself a constructivist and treats schemata as social constructs. In his theory though the schemata are being developed according to a genetic path of development that is assigned to every human being with a negligible influence of the environment.

Although presenting a brilliant line of argumentation, Piaget in his insightful works focuses mainly on the individual and relatively neglects her environment. It is not important in which setting a person grows because the ability of constructing schemata develops independently from it. The role of society was considered by him as much weaker than in works of other scholars

focused on development of thinking. One such scholar was L.S. Vygotsky who proposed the theory of socio-historical development of higher mental functions.

Vygotsky used to produce his theories in the first part of the twentieth century and was contemporary of Piaget. Unlike the Swiss scholar, the author nevertheless saw a much greater role in the environment when explaining the development of higher mental functions. Vygotsky (1986; reprints of his work can be found also in van der Veer and Valsiner, 1994) challenged the popular in his times view which claimed that from about 3rd year of life on, there are no new forms of thinking that are developed and it is only due to the changing content and quantity of associations between ideas that development and fluency in abstract concepts occurs.

According to the author, although at first sight the way children and adults use concepts are the same, in fact the mechanisms at play in the two instances are different. Children and adults are able to communicate by means of words, but the way in which they assign meaning to the words differs in a way similar to how pre-operational and concrete stage of Piaget's intellect's development correspond to the stage of formal operations. For Vygotsky, as well as for Piaget, it is the period of adolescence where abstract thinking develops. The two scholars differ though in conditions under which it is possible for the most mature form of thinking to occur. Piaget considers it as a realization of a pre-programmed scenario. For Vygotsky, formal thinking is able to develop only in an environment guiding an individual throughout the process. That means that only embedded in socio-historical context of her community is a person able to start seeing signs (such as words) as carriers of an abstract meaning. Vygotsky also distinguishes phases a person goes through to finally reach the full thinking capacity. The way to the abstract thinking consists of three such phases, each being divided further into separate stages.

The first phase of concept formation described by Vygotsky is called the phase of heaps. In this stage a child uses signs to point to objects in a syncretic way i.e. not distinguishing between them. Everything that is in the child's perceptual field is named by a given sign. Objects signified by the sign are not connected in any systematic manner; they represent rather a randomly chosen pile. The conglomeration of the objects is vague and cannot be explained by means of logic. There are three stages that can be observed in this phase. The first is the trial-and-error stage where meaning of symbols is assigned to objects randomly and without any rule. The second is the syncretic stage where designates of a symbol are gathered together based on their closeness in space and time. The final stage of the first phase is the two-step syncretic stage where symbols from the second stage are gathered together instead of objects.

Second is the phase of complexes. Here different objects are bind by a symbol according to their objective characteristics. The main difference between complexes and concepts is that the former ones are not build according to the rules of logic, but are based on concrete and factual commonality of designates. Children use different strategies while dealing with objects, and in effect different types of complexes come up. There are particularly five such types distinguished by Vygotsky. Associative type of complexes is created in a manner similar to family resemblance: one trait is chosen and objects that have it are included in the complex, just as the surname assigns a person to her family. Collection type complexes are based on differences within a practical commonality. Objects of different colors or exemplars of kitchen utensils would be connected into a collection. Chain complexes are formed according to self replacing rules that change throughout the process of creating a complex. After several alterations, designates of a symbol might have nothing in common. Diffuse complexes are based on a kind of hunch rather than an explicit and crystal clear rule. Such complexes might be find even in

practices of social scientists under the name of 'stretched concepts' (e.g. Sartori, 1970). Finally pseudoconcepts serve as a bridge between complex thinking and concept thinking. On the surface they are indistinguishable from concepts, they are however different from them in that they always correspond to a symbol's meaning that is already established and given by the adults' world. In other words, children at this stage are unable to create a concepts, and instead of re-creating a meaning that is given to a symbol they just internalize the meaning that is already provided.

Finally the third phase leading to development of concept thinking consists of three stages. In the first stage of abstracting and singling out a child learns to put aside particular traits from the whole picture and to choose symbols' designates with respect to the traits, or according to the highest resemblance of traits. Second is the stage of potential concepts where symbols bear still no sign of intelligence and are rather a result of repetition. In effect, it is e.g. extremely difficult for an adolescent to give a definition of a concept. In the third and final stage the real concepts based on abstract reasoning are established. A person in this stage is able to individually construct a meaning for a symbol, use one symbol for different meanings and many symbols for one meaning.

An important fact is that the ability of concept thinking does not disqualify other types of thinking i.e. thinking in complexes or heaps. Complexes are still present and often used as convenient and quick heuristics that are often time much more efficient than concepts. Thus, when put in a situation of judgment, a person can arrive at very different answers depending on

which mental faculty does she ‘use’¹. This can be a worrying fact, especially when making an important choice, e.g. if it comes to important political decisions.

The two streams of thought presented above differ in terms of origins of higher mental functions in that Piaget’s theory sees them more as a realization of genetic endowment and Vygotsky points out to the environment as the major factor accounting for the shift in thinking from concrete to abstract. They both nevertheless agree in treating symbols as tools that are used for passing meanings from one individual to another as well as for finding a meaning in symbols given in different circumstances.

After getting acquainted with the theories of intellectual development, it is possible to look at some concepts that are old to politics in a new light. Freedom or tradition can be seen here as both abstract concepts that could have been acquired only after a long way of development. People can construct the concepts in their minds and be able to tell, which concrete behaviors represent the spirit of freedom or tradition. The emotional attachment to them is nevertheless acquired long before the possibility of abstracting appears. Pre-operational stage of Piaget or thinking in complexes as described by Vygotsky are present much earlier than ‘formal’ way of thinking and many emotions and feelings can be associated to symbols before they are grasped in a properly ‘intellectual’ manner.

Both the emotional attachment to symbols and the ability to give abstract meaning to them contributes to a form of ideology a person sympathizes with. It is also a substantial part of one’s identity which starts developing along with development of formal thinking i.e. during adolescence.

¹ It is mostly not up to a person to choose which faculty would it be.

1.1.2. Attitudes towards politics and identity formation

Attitudes towards politics and values which are present in political discourse are often internalized in one's conception of his 'self'. Freedom and tradition are both concepts which occupy an important place in ideological systems – the former being usually associated with the liberal spectrum and the latter with the conservative one. Both liberalism and conservatism constitute in large one's ideology which could be described after Andrew Vincent as “[...] bod[y] of concepts, values and symbols which incorporate[s] conceptions of human nature [...]” (1992, p. 16). This cluster of cognitive representations (mentioned in the definition ‘concepts’) and emotions attached to them (a.k.a. ‘values’) are sometimes the main driving force for individuals in what they do.

Ideology might be thought of as a principal component of identity, formation of which was a subject of extensive study of Erik Erikson (1968). In fact, Erikson mentions ideology in his works on formation of identity. Drawing on his epigenetic theory of development he mentions a need for a “self made” ideology (p. 133) as opposed to the ideology imposed by the big systems of thought widely spread in his time. Such described ideology appears to the author to be a “guardian of identity” (p. 133). In his system of stages of development in the life cycle, the time of puberty and adolescence is the time when identity starts to be formed. Some sort of ideology is, according to Erikson, necessary for the youngsters so that they could devote themselves to it. Ideological commitment is necessary as an initial anchorage in the social world of minds where personality without identity ceases to exist.

Erikson's study on ideology should be seen in a broader context of his writings on personality development in the lifespan. His theory of human development in the life cycle stems from

Freud's theory of child development, but exceeds it and encompasses all human life until the old age (1963, 1968). Erikson divides life in eight stages with an antagonism central for each of them. Different antagonisms are central for different stages of development, they all nevertheless play a role in all the stages a person goes through. Table 1 presents Erikson's model with eight life periods, antagonisms central for them as well as strengths and virtues gained after them when a balance between the antagonisms is kept.

Table 1. The Erikson's epigenetic model of personality development

Life period	Central antagonism	Gained virtue
I. oral/sensory (0-1 years)	Basic trust vs. mistrust	Drive and hope
II. muscular/anal (1-3 years)	Autonomy vs. shame, doubt	Self-control and will power
III. locomotor/genital (4-6 years)	Initiative vs. guilt	Direction and purpose
IV. latency (6-12 years)	Industry vs. inferiority	Method and competence
V. puberty and adolescence	Identity vs. role confusion	Devotion and fidelity
VI. young adulthood	Intimacy vs. isolation	Affiliation and love
VII. adulthood	Generativity vs. stagnation	Production and care
VIII. maturity	Ego integrity vs. despair	Renunciation and wisdom

Source: own work, based on Erikson, 1963, p. 273-274

Despite the broad scope of his studies, Erikson is mostly known from his works on adolescence and identity formation. Identity forms in the time of puberty and adolescence as a result of gaining virtue of being able to devote oneself to particular ideas. It builds on previously acquired skills and abilities. A person who is potentially easily able to construct her identity and devote to some ideology should be able to trust people and ideas, control herself and be autonomous, show initiative and be competent. In case of some unresolved antagonisms from earlier stages, the formation of identity is still possible, it is nevertheless a non-standard way of development.

The claim that ideology is important in the time of identity formation i.e. during a person's adolescence, finds support in the works on development of intelligence presented earlier (Piaget,

1981; Phillips, 1969; Vygotsky, 1986). Together with adolescence there comes the time, when formal thinking or “real” concepts can be formed. Nevertheless, the emotional attachments tend to be formed much earlier. A child does not need to be able to abstract the idea of freedom or tradition to feel emotionally touched when experiencing events connected with tradition or signs of freedom. They are emotionally touched, because they connect the events with significant persons around them being touched. The significant persons are often found in family.

1.2. Political socialization

When parents in Hungary before 1989 speak in their households about the government in presence of their children, two things are passed on to the children. Firstly, the one-party rule can mean things like censorship, particular stance on religion issues, relation towards tradition and so on. A teenager with a newly acquired capacity of abstract thinking can formulate in his mind, based on inquiries or through just being around when conversations on such topics take place, concepts of political liberalism, conservatism, communism and so on. Firstly, symbols are imprinted in a person’s mind. A symbol can be treated as a complex (e.g. “communism is the party”) or as a concept (e.g. “communism is a political regime that...”). The second thing that is passed on is an emotional attitude towards those symbols and this emotional attitude is passed much earlier (e.g. Sears, 1993). In the following subsection I present literature on political socialization with a separate part given to political socialization in Hungary.

1.2.1. Findings on political socialization from the US

Socialization, no matter if political or not, involves by its nature communication. Mueller in his *Politics of Communication* (1973, esp. p. 45-72) shows the way in which different socio-economic settings influence how communication within households is carried out, and how things as simple as having conversations over the dinner table might influence further

development of thinking. He brings in a well known work of Bernstein (1962) who distinguishes between elaborated and restricted linguistic codes which “[...] are regarded as functions of different social structures. The codes are considered to entail qualitatively different verbal planning orientations which control different modes of self-regulation and levels of cognitive behaviour” (p. 1). Bernstein links his work to that of Vygotsky and implies, that poor environment pushes people to thinking by means of complexes (or using concrete operations of Piaget) rather than concepts (formal operations).

As a result of different linguistic codes, political socializations in working and middle class’ families has different paths. Particularly, the working class’ members seem to be more apathetic and subordinate towards power and they tend to share opinions propagated by public channels whereas the middle class seems to be more critical and tend to speak about politics by means of ‘private’ (as opposed to ‘public’) language i.e. in their own words. It is not surprising when taking into account that elaborated linguistic code allows for abstraction of meanings from symbols and expressing this meaning in other words (i.e. with different symbols). It also allows for hypothesizing how transfer of values could proceed in different households between regime changes from the one-party rule to democracy as happened in e.g. Hungary.

It could be, that in households with the elaborated linguistic code at use people would use reason more while people brought up with the restricted code used in their households would just copy what they had heard without much reflection involved. “Foremost among agencies of socialization into politics is the family”, wrote in one of the first comprehensive studies on political socialization Herbert H. Hyman (1959, p. 69). Studies quoted by him show transmission of single attitudes e.g. how favored a party is, they nevertheless fail to show transmission of what he calls “clusters of views” (p. 74) and what in the context of this study can be called ideologies

(Vincent, 1992, p. 16). As to evidence about passage of attitudes towards parties, there is a number of studies with the most popular being perhaps the Michigan studies (Campbell et. al., 1960). Generally, whatever would be at stake in studies on attitudes, quantitative studies often time show positive correlations. Especially taking party identification, it seems that a man is born into his partisanship. That does not nevertheless have to be the case when speaking of ideology.

What is called ideology in other studies, Dawson and Prewitt (1969) call “The Political Self” and state that “[a]cquiring [it] is a natural corollary to general social maturation” (p. 19). In the view of the authors the political self’s development comprises of political orientations put in three distinct categories. The first category encompasses orientations towards political entities like a (un)favored party. These orientations can be described in terms of sentiments. Second category is less basic and involves knowledge of and emotional attitudes towards broader political orders like e.g. multiparty system. Finally, the last category encompasses attitudes towards certain political programs, policies and actions.

One of the places where the political self is being formed is family. A family is presented here as an example of a primary group which is “small, informally structured, and characterized by personal and deep emotional relationships between members. [It] generally involve[s] a high degree of face-to-face contact” (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, p. 105). The authors correctly understand the fact that political orientations crystallize already at the 8th year of age. What should be underlined is that at that time a political orientation is based purely on emotional attachment to particular symbols and it is only a few years later that it becomes an intellectual phenomenon.

Another important fact is that although families have a strong impact on development of political self, other factors need to be taken into account as well. Strong propaganda which was present under communism might have had much effect on how political ideology is passed throughout generations. In the case of parents' attitudes different from the party line, children could have been shaped by the propaganda rather than by the opinions reflecting ideologies of parents. Alternatively, they could have developed a sort of schizophrenia and while officially claiming one thing, secretly they would follow their parents' footsteps. Yet another option would be for the whole families to withdraw from political life both formally and in informal discussions. In this situation, children would take from home attitudes toward political issues that are weak (if any) and not clearly defined.

But is it only a totalitarian regime like e.g. communism, where the public sphere is filled with politics? In the present world with expanded mass media one is exposed to politics practically all the time. Additionally, politicians are aware that to win the next round of elections they need to win votes from the opposition, which makes the competition even more acute. It might be then that, although different in character, political propaganda is not less present in a democratic regime. This might be particularly true to 'politicized' nations such as e.g. Austria or Hungary. The next section is thus sacrificed to how the situation appears to look like in Hungary before and shortly after the 1989 transition.

1.2.2. Findings on political socialization in Hungary

The topic of political socialization in Hungary was explicitly tackled by Ildikó Szabó (1989). According to the author, political socialization in Hungary had a different path of development than in Western countries due to radically different environment in which formation of attitudes and acquisition of knowledge about politics took place. "Hungarian political socialization [and]

its macro-level features can only be understood in the basic historical, political and cultural context that establish its different character” (p. 10). Above all, communism has spread over most of the public matters. Until 1953 the idea of a ‘new socialist man’² was pushed forward, and even though there was a bit less of political socialistic omnipresence after the 1956 revolution, the spirit of socialism sneaking into people’s houses was longstanding. That being said, it should be noted that after the events of 1956 and together with the beginning of the so called Goulash communism and Janos Kadar’s rule, interference in people’s private matters relatively lightened as exemplified by the official slogan of the party leader: “anyone not against us is with us”.

In terms of family political socialization a pattern with two characteristics could have been noticed before 1956. First, families generally wished to distance themselves from politics considered as something dangerous. Second, and as a consequence, parents avoided politics and political disputes to save themselves and their children from internal conflicts that would result from incongruence of official party line and private opinions about politics (Szabó, 1989, p. 66). It was believed, that exposing children to views that are not confirming the official ones might bring disadvantage to the children.

After 1956 Hungary experienced both changes in the official party line and reforms in the economic sphere. Introducing some forms of private ownership was indispensable from the economic point of view and in a way encouraged by the party. Nevertheless, the situation of political socialization remained where it was before the revolution. Children were now taught that if it comes to politics, it is better to stay passive or to “maintain a politics-free (non-politicizing) private sphere” (p. 69). This social realm was seen as something obsolete to deal with, and the

² In communist countries the words ‘communism’ and ‘socialism’ were often used interchangeably (with the preference of the latter one). In this work I also use those words interchangeably.

newly emerged economic opportunities were indicated as a way to go. As a result, in both pre- and post-1956 periods formation of political ideologies was discouraged.

Empirical studies cited by Szabó seem to confirm, that matters of politics and involvement in public life were not important to young people in the late 80's. One of the effects of parents' political socialization strategy was that politics were separated from everyday life. A study from 1982³ showed that 32% of 14 years old children never speak about politics with their parents, 51% speaks rarely and only 17% frequently. Other studies presented by the author all show, that family plays a rather passive and insignificant role in political socialization, when compared to other institutions.

Strategies developed by Hungarian families to deal with the socialist unrealistic promises of providing them with everything necessary for prosperity are labeled by Istvan Harcsa (1992) as "defense mechanisms" (p. 60). Harcsa focuses on activities in the economic sphere of life and intra- as well as inter-family support, treating "the socialist system" as external force to people's lives. "[F]rom the point of view of inter-familiar cooperation [...] every generation considers the state their common 'opponent.' This is so because within the state economy, their labor is underpaid and thereby funds needed for supporting the family are drained away. When [families] see the same state as a distributor of resources, in contrast, they consider it as a common 'milk cow.' The interests are the same in both cases" (p. 63). This notion of "the party" seen as the environment in which people live rather than something that represents society's will is a characteristic sign of distancing from politics that are reduced to a sort of obstacle one needs to deal with in everyday life or incidental bonus in gathering resources.

³ Unfortunately, references are not provided in the work of Szabó (1989).

Other notions of how political socialization in Hungary in the 80's comes about can be found in a neat English language review of literature written in Hungarian language proposed by Máté Szabó (1991). The author mentions here “the following keywords: lost youth, negative identity and distracted socialization” (p. 65). Lost youth refers to the generation which is disinterested with politics because of its centralized and bureaucratic character and turns into radical movements like anarchism instead. Negative identity is a result of weakening social ties within family seen more as an economic unit, as well as leaning towards secularization in the face of the church allied with the government. In such environment, the young people cannot develop fidelity to any social system they could be devoted to (Erikson, 1968). Their political socialization is distracted by forces that are contradictory to each other thus creating a mess that results in young adults unable of critical judgment and abilities to participate in social life. As a result of all that, youth does not consider local matters as matters of politics and externalize politics to what is seen as ‘global’ and ‘unreachable’ and in any case a ‘not my cup of tea’ sort of thing.

Szabó sees the role of family in the process of political socialization as counterproductive and perpetrating political passivity of youth. Atomist families are economic units rather than what was called in communism ‘the basic tissue of society’, and are preoccupied with production and consumption, especially after the post-1956 reforms towards a quasi-private enterprises. Thus, young members of those families present a defensive attitude towards politics and tend neither to participate in them, nor to discuss them.

From this review the picture which appears is that of young post-transitional generation indifferent if it comes to politics and treating it instrumentally as means towards reaching

economic goals. Political self had a hard time in the last years of Hungarian communist system, and political identity generally could develop in a rudimentary form rather than to the fullest.

1.3. Final conclusions and theoretical hypotheses

The picture that emerges is of politically desensitized family in a highly politicized context of communist system replaced by democratic system with many parties raising and perishing and politics around every corner of the public sphere. Here, the political scene is not stable, that though is not to say that politics are not present in public discourse. In fact, many Hungarians nowadays claim that there is even more politics in the public sphere than there was before the transition. And even though families are perhaps relatively desensitized if it comes to participating in political events, it is hard to imagine that they have no opinions about political issues which, next to religion, are among the most emotionally loaded and abstract topics to speak about.

Theories of cognitive development and facts about political socialization at home seem to suggest, that attitudes taken out from home hold and can be observed in people's behavior. Thus, the hypothesis of this work is that the attitude of parents towards the Hungarian communist rule from before 1989 will account for how people think of the present government. This can happen in several ways. First, children socialized in a household with the anti-communist atmosphere can get an emotional anchor and dislike 'totalitarianism' vs. like 'democracy'. In this version of 'shallow' symbolic politics a trend that could be observed is that people from anti-communist environment would generally prefer the present government which is democratically elected even when it exercises undemocratic actions.

Secondly, emotional component of attitudes might represent a ‘deeper’ version of symbolic politics. In this case not ideologies (totalitarianism-democracy) would be emotionally loaded, but rather some less abstract concepts. If communism was usually prone to coerce freedom and abandon tradition, then anti-communist home atmosphere during growing up would make an individual appreciate actions that are directed towards the opposite. If the ‘deep’ version of symbolic politics holds, then undemocratic actions of the government can be appreciated or not, depending on what kind of actions are they. In this scenario, for a person who is brought up in the spirit of opposition to the pre-1989 regime, undemocratic actions towards preservation of culture might be welcomed while those towards coercing freedom of expression might be condemned.

Finally the strongest component of an attitude might be not the emotional one in the first place. In this version, a person who is brought up in a spirit of anti-communism is expected to have a deep understanding of what communism as a representative form of a totalitarian regime is. Such an educated individual will under no condition accept an undemocratic action or any action leading to undermine the status of a state as being democratic.

This investigation is concerned with how political socialization through the institution of family influences perception of the ruling coalition. In particular, it is hypothesized that *(1) political socialization will account for how the present government is perceived in that the more anti-communist the parents were, the more appreciated the present government is*, and *(2) different information priming judgment of the government will differentiate how it is judged*. The second hypothesis has three different variants that will be explicated in the chapter. The government can act undemocratically in a manner that the pre-1989 would act, in the opposite manner, or it might not act undemocratically at all.

Chapter 2. Empirical investigation of cognitive and emotional component of attitudes

The three possible forms that attitudes can have are ready to be observed in the empirical material that was gathered for this study. First I proceed with presenting definitions of concepts I am using in the analysis. After that I go on to operationalization of the concepts and construct statistical hypotheses that are going to be tested. In the last part of this chapter the analysis is being conducted and results are presented.

2.1. Definitions

To understand the subject better it is necessary to give some definitions. Since no abstract scientific concept comes alone without a theoretical context, some theoretical foundations of the definitions will follow. The definitions I am now going to present are those of “attitude”, “concept” and “meaning”. The concept of attitudes is widely studied in social psychology and political science, yet often one can find unclear findings resulting from using the term in a vague way. The definition of “concept” and “meaning” are tightly tied with the socio-historical theory of concepts formation proposed by Vygotsky (1986).

2.1.1. Attitude

In *The Psychology of Attitudes* (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993) an attitude is defined as “*a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor*” (p. 1, italics as in the original). As many concepts in psychology, attitudes are described as hypothetical constructs which are latent and “not directly observable but can be inferred from observable responses” (p.2). In other words an attitude is something that can only be observed through investigation of its effects in life of individuals.

Attitude is a psychological tendency which might be long lasting, ephemeral, innate or learned as well as of high or low importance. It usually has some evaluative component considered to be its crucial feature. An object is favored or disfavored based on the evaluation process which can be of cognitive (rational calculation of costs and benefits) or emotional ('gut' feeling) nature. In the field of political attitudes, the emotive component of an evaluation is usually of greater importance than its cognitive element. Evaluation is also considered to constitute a considerable part of its object's meaning. That is, whenever an object symbolizes something, it immediately enters the world of meanings that is characteristic for adult people's thinking processes. The world of meanings is never value free, and so are not symbols that represent it. Finally, 'a particular entity' from the definition might be an abstract object such as liberalism, a concrete one such as a chair.

Another take on attitudes that departs from seeing them as forces that both explicitly and implicitly exercise power over people's minds is given by cognitive approaches (e.g. Cunningham et. al., 2007). An attitude in this view are seen as a "relatively stable set of representations" (p. 738). The concept of mental representations is one of the fundamental building blocks of philosophy of mind and modern cognitive science and are defined as information-bearing structures stored in the mind/brain that constitute cognitive states (Pitt, 2013). In result, attitudes would be seen here not as external forces that push people towards certain actions, but rather as a sort of a neural circles' bundle that is reflected in mind as a set of representations forming the attitudes.

In this work I will understand attitude after Eagly and Chaiken (1993) as a tendency for evaluating an object based on rational calculus and/or emotional relation to it. Giving higher

value to one option or another always means choosing (alternatively a potential for choosing) so I include the behavioral component in the definition.

2.1.2. Concept

Concepts are a kind of symbols that people use in everyday life. They are abstract and result as an outcome of a developmental process that starts when a person is born and completed itself at around 12 years of age. Scholars in the field of intelligence development described the process thoroughly (Piaget, 1981; Phillips, 1969; Vygotsky, 1978, 1986; Veer and Valsiner, 1994). Roughly speaking the ability of concepts' construction is preceded by periods of sensorimotor period and concrete operations period before it arrives to formal operations period (Phillips, 1969). The first two periods are less dependent on the environment in the sense that presence of enough number of stimuli often proves to be enough for the development of skills in those periods. The period of formal operations acquisition is however much more dependent on the environment and its quality in that abstract functions cannot develop without a proper environmental stimulation (Veer and Valsiner, 1994).

At the age of puberty there are many revolutions taking place in person's mental development. Next to obvious biological changes and a newly acquired ability of thinking in a formal way as well as constructing abstract concepts, a person starts forming her identity (Erikson, 1968). This exceptional combination of biological, psychological and social factors has its reflection in young people's interests. These often gravitate around utopian ideas, general worldviews and forming opinions. Thus it might be rightly assumed, that in the time of adolescence concepts like 'tradition' or 'freedom' are often coined in a person's mind.

However the concepts can occur only in the time of adolescence, they are present as symbols long before. A child hears about some things that they are traditional and about some behavior that they coerce freedom. Even without full cognitive understanding and abstracting the concepts, a child can easily attach emotional valence to them.

2.1.3. Meaning

Every fully developed concept has its abstract meaning. In case of formal concepts it is usually their definition. Nevertheless, also natural concepts that occur in everyday life have such abstract meaning even though it is less structured. What appear to be a concept but has no formal meaning can be called after Vygotsky (1986, p. 96-145) a complex. Complexes are concrete groups of objects that are bind together according to one rule or another. Their meaning is not formal and thus cannot be extrapolated into other situations. Nevertheless, they manage to work well in people's lives as a sort of heuristic. Their function is different in kind and do not suffice in some sophisticated situations, it is nevertheless sufficient for many everyday ones. Vygotsky notices, that the fact that abstract thinking developed does not exclude other forms of thinking from being used.

With the three definitions provided the topic of this study can be put as follows: people are able to assigning meaning to symbols in the process of conceptualization. They can hold attitudes towards conceptualized symbols i.e. concepts endowed with meaning, or towards symbols themselves. Thus, depending on the epistemic faculty used (operating with mere symbols or concepts), an attitude towards the same symbol in the two instances can be radically different.

2.2. Operationalization issues

To look at the attitude towards the present Hungarian government, the subject is basically asked to give her opinion about the present government by ticking an adequate point on a 7-point likert scale. In the same way political socialization is traced by asking about parents' opinion of the communist rule before the 1989 transition. Three priming conditions are designed to look at the principal component of the attitudes towards the government and are presented in the table 2 below. All the three items need some further discussion due to possible shortages and limitations.

Table 2. Three versions of the item given to two experimental groups and the control group

Version	Item*
1. Neutral version	"The present Hungarian government had a two-thirds majority in parliament since 2010 and thus could change any law as well as the constitution. What is your opinion like about any government having a two-thirds majority?"
2. Version where acting vice versa the communist regime is pointed out (the 'against' version)	"The present Hungarian government has had a two-thirds majority in parliament since 2010 and thus could change any law as well as the constitution. <i>For example, it added an entirely new preamble to the constitution that talks of the "role of Christianity in preserving the nation" and the "crimes committed under the rule of communist dictatorship".</i> What is your opinion like about any government having a two-thirds majority?"
3. Version where acting as the communist would act is pointed out (the 'congruent' version)	"The present Hungarian government had a two-thirds majority in parliament since 2010 and thus could change any law as well as the constitution. <i>For example, it disallowed paid election advertising by political parties on commercial radio and television channels and redraw the boundaries of constituencies in a way with which the opposition parties strongly disagreed.</i> What is your opinion like about any government having a two-thirds majority?"

* italics indicate parts that differentiate between the versions

Source: own work

As to the attitudes measurement, it must be noted that measuring such latent variable with a single item is not the most common practice. Among problems that might appear together with it are a high measure error, systematic error and not capturing the whole concept, as well as lack or validity and reliability of measurement (Anastasi, Urbina, 1997; Cronbach, Meehl, 1954). Nevertheless, due to the large sample size in this study and a relatively simple subject of study it

is expected, that the measurement will give sufficiently accurate results that reflect people's real attitudes towards the government.

The problems related to measuring the support for the government occur as well in measuring parents' attitude towards the communist rule before 1989, and are additionally followed by another problem. Namely, the information that is obtained here is an information about the subjects' *reflection* of their parents' attitude towards the previous system. There is one main problem connected with such approach. The subjects might not remember correctly what was the political socialization atmosphere at their homes and might falsely report this fact. Additionally there might be a systematic bias in reporting lack of sympathy towards the pre-1989 government resulting from conformism.

Because of those issues the result of the analysis should be looked at with special attention and conclusions drawn from them should be tentative.

2.2. Data description

The data was obtained from a survey conducted in Hungary in early April 2014 shortly before the Hungarian parliamentary elections by the Median survey agency from Budapest on behalf of scholars affiliated with Central European University, European University Institute, Harvard University and The Université du Québec à Montréal. The survey had a pre- and post-election wave and contained items required for a few research projects. Among them there were several embedded experiments i.e. several items having more than one version where different versions were randomly distributed in the sample. The technique of survey embedded experiments proved to be a valid way of obtaining reliable data especially when comparing them with the common in

social sciences studies on student samples which are in many ways problematic (Sears, 1986; Peterson, 2001).

Despite its obvious advantages i.e. cost efficiency and large sample that can be studied, survey embedded experiments have also downsides. Some scholars suggest that the results obtained with this method should be interpreted with caution in order to avoid the false positive error (Gaines et. al., 2007; Barabas and Jerit, 2010). In other words, even if statistically significant relationships will be found, they should be treated with caution.

On-line surveys are usually characterized by lack of randomization in that they are filled usually by persons that are younger, male and relatively well educated (Evans and Mathur, 2005). In many respects, they nevertheless show not to be worse than regular surveys (Van Selm and Jankowski, 2006) with being much more time and money efficient at the same time. It seems thus that online survey embedded experiments can serve as a good method for obtaining reliable and valid data for supporting scientific theorizing.

It needs to be noted, that while ensuring randomization of experimental conditions an error occurred in that there was a full correlation between some conditions from different experiments. It means that e.g. the “A” condition from one experiment was assigned always and only to a person to whom the “A” condition from another experiments was assigned. This fact can have an influence on the results of each of the experiments due to various effects such as e.g. priming, and thus cannot be neglected.

The part of the survey used in this study was conducted a few days before the Hungarian parliamentary elections 2014. Due to the nature of the study and question asked, persons whose parents do not have a substantial experience of living under the communist regime while the

persons where in their adolescence were excluded from the analysis. Practically speaking, persons who were born not earlier than in 1945 were not taken into the analysis. It resulted in the years of age of respondents ranging from 69 to 19. After this procedure, from the initial sample of 1500 subjects who took part in the survey there were 1485 left, 739 males and 746 females which constituted 49,8% and 50,2% of the sample, respectively.

Support for the present Hungarian government was taken here as the dependent variable and was measured by asking a question: “What is your opinion about the present Hungarian government led by Viktor Orbán?”⁴. To answer this question, the standard likert type scale was provided with the following answers: 1 – “very favorable”, 2 – “rather favorable”, 3 – “neither favorable, nor unfavorable”, 4 – “rather unfavorable” and 5 – “completely unfavorable”. The mean response to this question was 3,53 with standard deviation of 1,33 and median of 4. That means that generally in the sample population the present government was seen rather unfavorably.

There were six variables that were included in the study to control for effects of potentially influential factors accounting for the governmental support. Next to already described sex, among them there was age of the respondents. As said previously it ranged from 19 to 69 years with the mean being 47 years and the standard deviation of 11,36 years. Next, respondents were asked a question “How much are you interested in politics?” with possible answers as follows: 1 – “Very much”, 2 – “To some extent”, 3 – “A little bit” and 4 – “Not at all”. The mean from answering this question was 2,46 with standard deviation of 0,93, showing that the participants were quite interested in political issues. Another factor that was controlled was respondents’ level of education. It was measured by asking the respondents to pick from provided choices by thickening the relevant square. The options were as follows: 1 – “Less than 8 years of elementary

⁴ All the questions were in Hungarian language. Here, their translation are presented.

education”, 2 – “Completed 8 years of elementary education”, 3 – “Completed vocational school”, 4 – “Some secondary school”, 5 – “Completed secondary school”, 6 – “Some university-level education, without degree”, 7 – “College degree or BA” and 8 – “University degree or MA”. The mean obtained from answering to this question was 5,62 with the standard deviation of 1,65 and median 5. The level of income was controlled for with asking about an average total monthly household net income with the following options provided (in thousands of Hungarian forints)⁵: 1 – “20 or less”, 2 – “21 – 40”, 3 – “41 – 70”, 4 – “71 – 100”, 5 – “101 – 150”, 6 – “151 – 200”, 7 – “201 – 300”, 8 - “301 – 500” and 9 – “More than 500”. The mean for this variable was 5,92 with the standard deviation of 1,72 and median of 6. Finally the index of religiosity designed by Miklós Tomka (Tomka, Zulehner, 1999) was introduced. The respondents were asked to pick from the available options the one that best suits them. The options ranged as follows: 1 – “I am religious, I follow the church”, 2 – “I am religious in my own way”, 3 – “I can not tell whether I am religious or not”, 4 – “I am not religious” and 5 – “I am definitely not religious, I have different beliefs”. People turn out to be on average undecided about their religion, scoring 2,93 with the standard deviation of 1,24.

The first independent factor is the family political socialization. It represents a stable and crystalized attitude towards the democratic system (as opposed to the communist one). The factor is measured by the variable obtained from asking the question “When you were a teenager, how favorable or unfavorable was your parents’ personal opinion about the communist system that existed in Hungary before 1990?”. Possible answers to this question were: 1 – “very favorable”, 2 – “rather favorable”, 3 – “neither favorable, nor unfavorable”, 4 – “rather unfavorable” and 5 – “very unfavorable”. The second independent factor was represented by the item directly preceding the item asking about support for the present government (dependent variable). It had

⁵ One thousand forints is approximately 3.30 euro or 4.5 dollars as of June 2014.

three forms that used to describe the power of the present government and point out different examples of the government using the power. The item was presented in the table 2 above. It served as a primer and answers to it are irrelevant for this study, thus they are not going to be reported here. For the clear view of the scores' meaning, all the likert-scale variables are presented in table 3.

Table 3. The Likert-scale measured variables with their content and dimensions' direction⁶

Variable	Content	Dimension
Interest in politics	How much are you interested in politics?	1 - Very much ... 4 - Not at all
Education	What is your highest educational attainment?	1 - Less than 8 years of elementary ... 8 - University degree or MA
Income	Please mark which of these categories your total net household income falls into?	1 - 20 thousand Ft-s or less ... 9 - More than 500 thousand Ft-s
Religiosity	Out of the following statements which would describe you the best?	1 - I am religious, I follow the church ... 5 - I am definitely not religious, I have different beliefs
Political socialization	When you were a teenager, how favorable or unfavorable was your parents' personal opinion about the communist system that existed in Hungary before 1990?	1 - Very favorable ... 5 - Very unfavorable
Attitude towards the government	What is your opinion about the present Hungarian government led by Viktor Orbán?	1 - Very favorable ... 5 - Completely unfavorable

Source: own work

⁶ The original questions were asked in Hungarian language.

2.3. Statistical hypotheses

Two hypotheses can be posed based on the described data and underlying theories. One of them is straightforward and the second one splits into possible scenarios. First and a rather obvious hypothesis is that (H1) the ‘political socialization’ variable will account negatively for the support for the present government, therefore it will have a negative beta factor in the equation with 95% of confidence. Thus, the hypothesis to be tested is that (H0¹) *there is no relationship between political socialization and the opinion about the government.*

A more complicated and interesting issue is of how different experimental conditions will account on the support for the government. Based on the theories of cognitive development, three scenarios are possible. First, people can think in categories of fully developed abstract concepts when giving opinion about the government. In this ‘cognitive’ scenario people, when given an information about undemocratic actions of the government, should treat the government as undemocratic. Thus it can be hypothesized that (H2a) the ‘political socialization’ variable in experimental conditions will account positively for the opinion about the government. This is because for a ‘cognitive’ subject the democratically elected government that acts undemocratically should resemble the pre-1989 rule and therefore the more anti-communist socialization was, the more anti-government attitude there is.

The second hypothesis is the one of selective cognitive assessment. Here, (H2b) the ‘political socialization’ variable in the ‘congruent’ version of condition will account positively for the opinion about the government, but in the ‘against’ condition there will be a negative relationship between the ‘political socialization’ and the dependent variable of governmental support. The rationale behind such hypothesis would be that people from anti-communist background will

notice undemocratic actions when they are in accordance with what communist would do, but such undemocratic actions will go unnoticed when they are directed towards anti-communist agenda. This hypothesis, if true, would create indeed a puzzle, it is nevertheless the least probable hypothesis.

An alternative is that neither H2a nor H2b will turn out to be true. It will imply, that the hypothesis of emotionally driven people is true. In this scenario, (H_0^2) *there is no relationship between experimental conditions and the opinion about the government*. No matter how undemocratic the actions of the democratically elected government are, they will be unnoticed under the cover of democratically elected government. It will imply, that the realm of politics despite being one of the most abstract public spheres, works in people's minds mainly by means concrete thinking and emotional attachment to symbols rather than their meaning.

2.4. Data analysis and results

To test the statistical hypotheses the linear regression was conducted. The two models that will be further discussed are presented in table 4. Model 1 presents two independent variables and their interaction, whereas model 2 has no interactions included.

In terms of control variables, in both models age accounts negatively on the attitude towards the government. In other words, older the people like the coalitions led by the prime minister Orbán less. It might be assigned to the sentiment after the 'good old times' present in older strata of the population in the post-communist spaces. There is no effect of interest in politics on attitudes towards the government, but more educated people like the government less. It might be that education overtakes the effect of interest in politics. More educated people see more things that could work differently in the country and are thus more critical towards the government. Finally,

more religious people tend to like the government more. It is understandable since the ruling coalition of Fidesz and Christian Democrats is openly conservative and praising Christianity.

Table 4. Two regression analysis models with the governmental support as the dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Sex	-0.037 (0.068)	-0.036 (0.068)
Age	0.007 (0.003)*	0.007 (0.003)*
Interest in politics	0.006 (0.037)	0.003 (0.037)
Education	0.076 (0.021)**	0.076 (0.021)**
Income	-0.039 (0.02)	-0.038 (0.02)
Religiosity	0.258 (0.026)**	0.258 (0.026)**
Political socialization	-0.427 (0.054)**	-0.339 (0.032)**
‘against’ version of condition	-0.415 (0.212)^	-0.047 (0.079)
‘congruent’ version of condition	-0.384 (0.209)^	-0.061 (0.08)
Socialization*’against’	0.143 (0.076)^	
Socialization*’congruent’	0.127 (0.076)^	
Adjusted R ²	0.1419	0.1406

Values in brackets indicate the standard error

^ p<0.1

* p<0.05

** p<0.01

After looking at the results of the analysis, the hypothesis H0¹ can be rejected. It means that there is a negative effect of political socialization in that the anti-communist attitude accounts negatively anti-governmental attitude. In other words, the more anti-communist attitudes as a result of political socialization from households people have, the more pro-government attitudes they show. The H0² cannot be rejected with 95% confidence, it is significant only with p<0,1. With 90% of confidence it might be said, that both experimental conditions when introduced

make the government look better for the people. Also socialization effect in the experimental conditions is made milder in comparison to the control condition. That is, in the experimental groups people with anti-communist background were less pro-governmental because part of the load was overtaken by the condition itself. Although interesting, those results need to be discarded since they do not meet the criteria that were set.

Additionally, when the interaction of the two independent variables is included in the model, there is a slight increase of its fit. Nevertheless, ANOVA conducted to trace improve of the model fit gives results of $F(2, 1473) = 2.14; p > 0.05$. Thus, taken together with the effect of interactions with confidence lesser than 95% inclines to reject the model 1 as less parsimonious from model 2.

Chapter 3. Discussion

The Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski used to say that a good citizen is the one breathing down government's neck to act in favor of the people. The conclusion which can be drawn from this study is that citizens fall far from this ideal. It is perhaps even more surprising in a country where communism was spread for almost half of the century. On the other hand, the long period of deliberative and conscious civil society fading away could be easily seen as contributing to this state affairs. Can one say that citizens have not learned from their past experience and that the transition that took place in Hungary and elsewhere in the regions meant only a change of the propaganda form? It seems that the government, when having sufficient power, can carry on with whichever resolutions it wants and like a wolf in sheep's clothing can turn against the ones who elected it without them knowing it. How can it be?

Indeed, the context of political socialization in Hungary described before should be mentioned again to help explain the findings. Families which moved away from politics started treating this realm as an external actor independent from their own actions. Perhaps the major shift that had happened after the 1989 transformation in politics was simply too fast-paced and was not followed by an immediate shift in people's mentality (e.g. Skapska, 1997). On the other hand, the Hungarian protests of 2006 which had occurred in response to the leak of a private conversation of the prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány about lying to win the elections and misconduct of his government seems to disregard this explanation of the study's results.

It seems that people are not completely blind to the misconduct of their government, and do notice news about malfunctioning in some circumstances, e.g. when widely broadcasted in

media. When though an information of the same kind is brought to their attention just once, it makes no difference for the governmental support. The emotional attachment to a mere label of democracy is too strong for the rational judgment to break through (Edelman, 1985, Sears, 1993).

In this situation, a hope for coercing incumbents not to overuse their power is to have citizens who not necessarily judge rationally, but in decisive moments use heuristics and cues (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001), or take advantage of the social networks and local leaders around them (Ryan, 2011; Sokhey and McClurg, 2012). Investigation done in a single and short experimental situation does not take into account those factors. As is always the case with the experimental design, internal validity comes at the cost of external validity. Although the results of the study are robust, extrapolating them on the outside world should be always done with caution. Perhaps in a more real-life situation people would use those helping strategies to make judgments they would do, if having an unlimited time and full information for making up their mind.

An overwhelming amount of studies shows, that people are generally quite ignorant if it comes to politics (Bartels, 2010) which is confirmed in this study. It should be nevertheless noted, that it is not a common situation when a government has a potential of introducing undemocratic rules, and even less common is to put a person in such an artificially created situation as in this study. Because of the fact, that the whole study was encapsulated in three questions, it might have been hard for the respondents to concentrate on the actual content and thus the content could have been potentially misinterpreted.

Assuming that respondents paid enough attention, the results obtained could have yet another explanation. Given that the subjects could sense that something is wrong in the experimental conditions, they could have disregarded it due to a sort of division of labor present in democratic

multi-party systems. In this context, the opposition is usually the one monitoring for the incumbents not to undertake suspicious actions. Perhaps then the respondents came to a conclusion that the actions given in the two experimental conditions are in order with the democratic rule because otherwise they would have been stopped by the opposition.

These alternative explanations of the results are speculative, and it would be interesting to conduct follow-up studies of the topic. Particularly, introducing more robust scales of political socialization and governments' support could help to get more unambiguous results and extending vignettes in the control and experimental conditions could catch attention of the subjects better which could alter the results or cause additional inquiries. Finally, a post-experimental semi structured interviews could add to the results' interpretation.

Despite all the drawbacks the results show without doubt the effect of political socialization on perception of the present government in Hungary. Additionally, it can be said with high certainty that when provided with a short and concise information about undemocratic actions undertaken by the government, people do not change opinions about the government no matter what was their political socialization environment. Those results support the theory of people not always using their high cognitive abilities. It seems that if activities that are not favored by the electorate do not occur on a massive scale, the government may enjoy a free ride as a result of citizens' absent-mindedness.

Summary

This study was motivated by deliberation about to what extent people are led by reason and to what extent by emotions in their political judgment (Chong, 2000). Scholars in the field of political science used to favor predominantly reason in their inquiry and treat emotions as an obstacle and a counterproductive human faculty. Especially Downs (1957) cultivated an approach to studying political behavior which centers on reasoning for extracting maximum utility from a political activity. His ideas about human actions seen as instruments for achieving desired goals were further elaborated and resulted in a distinction between instrumental and expressive motivation. The distinction is now widespread in political science literature, but often time is misinterpreted in that it seeks in expressive motives lack of reason and instrumentality. It needs to be nevertheless said that both instrumental and expressive motivation is mainly a reasoned enterprise (Toka, 2009).

Although not being in the mainstream literature, a discourse about emotions as tools in political judgment is present in political science as well and currently constitutes a growing field of research (Sears, 1993, Marcus, 2000). Emotions are seen in it as having two main functions. First, because of their ability to move masses of people they can serve for introducing major political changes. Charismatic leaders can also use them to manipulate people. The second way in which emotions can be perceived is looking at them as a sort of anchor for attitudes towards particular symbols. This approach sees emotions as much milder states that give an emotional flavor to what people see in the world, and makes them choose one thing over another due to ‘gut’ feeling. This ‘anchor’ is often gained throughout socialization process at home.

In this dissertation two intellectual development’s theories having different ontology were presented. Jean Piaget’s (1981) structural theory focuses more on innate structures that realize

themselves throughout life resulting in the ability for abstract thinking, while Lev Siemionovich Vygotsky's socio-historical theory (1986) stresses more the importance of the environment in the development of higher mental functions. Both the theories see the ability of formal thinking as the final stage of intellectual development and both of them also stress that emotional attachment to symbols which later become endowed with meaning precedes creation of the meaning itself.

Emotional attachments to and intellectual elaboration on abstract ideas lead in adolescence according to Erik Erikson to formation of a first 'private' ideology and constitution of one's identity (Erikson, 1968). This process is based on previously acquired trust, autonomy, initiative and competence and is intimately tied with the closest social environment of an individual. The ideology of an individual often incorporates opinions and ideas which were gravitation around the individual until the age of puberty. Thus, in this study it is assumed that to have an insight into one's opinions about ideas such as freedom or tradition, one should turn to opinions about those notions in one's home at the time the subject was young.

American studies have often showed, that people are born into their party and that they act as rather unreflective voters. This study intended to shed some light on political socialization in the post-1989 Hungary. This context is interesting because of the major regime change which happened 25 years ago. In this setting political attitudes cannot be simply passed on to offspring, but attitudes towards values such as tradition or freedom can be expected to have their way through generations.

The study was conducted in April 2014 in Hungary. The sample consisted of 1500 respondents who were asked a number of questions. The political socialization was measured by asking to rate on a 5-point likert-type scale the respondent's parents' attitude towards the communist rule

by the time the respondent was a teenager. Attitude towards the government was measured by asking to rate on a 5-point likert-type scale what does a person think of the present government led by Viktor Orban. To trace to what extent reason takes part in the attitude towards the government three version of the priming questions were constructed and asked. In the control version of the primer respondents were informed, that the present Hungarian government has two-third majority in the parliament and can introduce significant changes in the constitution. In the first experimental version, the information about changes of the law towards preserving tradition and role of Christianity was given. In the second experimental version, the information about changes of the law towards disallowing paid party advertising before elections and changes in constituencies was given. Answers to the question were not included in the analysis, but conditions themselves were included as a factor variable in the regression equation. Additionally there was a number of control variables in the analysis.

The linear regression analysis was conducted and its results show that people brought up in an anti-communist environment generally like the government more. There is also no difference between both experimental conditions, and each experimental condition with the control condition. That means that even though people are informed of undemocratic actions of the present government in Hungary, they do not change their attitude towards it. This fact serves in favor of the general hypothesis stating that the sphere of mass politics is dominated by emotions and sentiments rather than reason. There are nevertheless alternative explanation of the obtained results.

First, changes in the socio-political order might have been too swift for the citizens to adapt and turn into devoted citizens who would scrutinize the government in detail at each call. The relevant literature shows, that decades of communism turned individuals into rather passive

citizens who distance themselves from the ruling elites which are treated as an entity external and unavailable for the people to influence. Another explanation could be that the experimental situation was too short and did not allow respondents to properly focus their attention on the content of the experimental primers. Perhaps if the experimental item would be more complex and measuring political socialization and attitude towards the government more robust, other facts would come up.

The particular strength of this study was to look at the political socialization in a country where a major change in political regime had occurred. Most of the research from the field of political socialization is done in the US and deals mainly with partisanship in the well established two-party system. There is a great scarcity of studies on socializing into political attitudes in any other environment. This study might be seen as a tentative try to tackle the issue in another, different than the two-party system, setting. More interestingly, the regime change which happened in Hungary and in general in the CEE region is unlikely to happen in the next decades elsewhere. Some works on political socialization in this setting were presented in the 1.2.2. subsection of the first chapter, nevertheless studies about it done with methodological rigor are lacking and this work is perhaps one of the first works of this kind.

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