

**WHAT'S IN A FRAME:  
THE MEDIA'S VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF A HUNGARIAN ROMANI  
SOCIAL MOVEMENT**

By

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## **ABSTRACT**

This study looks at the media's visual representation of the Roma Pride Day and march organized by "Ide tartozunk!" ("We Belong Here") Roma Community Network, more closely at the photos and the short video clips used to illustrate the news coverage on the march in the electronic media on the Internet and in the televised news casts. I focus my analysis on photographs because two-dimensional images, and especially photographs, are inherently connected to the three-dimensional space they seek to capture, and because one important aspect of social movements is that they translate the claims they make into a spatial idiom, where the occupied material space legitimizes claims for a symbolic space in society. In conceptualizing the socially produced space that social movements seek to (re)appropriate, I rely on the theoretical foundations of the work of Lefebvre, Soja, hooks and Bhabha. My analysis revealed that news reports privileged an episodic, as opposed to thematic, framing of the events, which drew attention away from the underlying reasons for protest, and apart from a few exceptions, did not represent the Roma marchers as belonging to the same shared space (i.e. social community) as non-Roma viewers of these images, and visually isolated them.

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## INTRODUCTION

On October 19, 2013, the “Ide tartozunk!” (“We Belong Here”) Roma Community Network, headed by Jenő Setét, organized the first Roma March in Budapest, Hungary, which, along with a similar march in Prague and other events organized in several European countries,<sup>1</sup> was meant to call attention to the continuing plight of the Romani people against discrimination and to celebrate and promote Roma culture and history both as a means of self-awareness and self-worth for the Roma, and as a way of earning the respect of the majority society (The Budapest Beacon, “Thousands March Peacefully on Roma Pride Day”). A crowd,<sup>2</sup> comprised mainly of Roma, Roma intellectuals, politicians, civil rights activists, well-known Roma musicians, and non-Roma sympathizers, marched from Mátyás tér to Blaha Lujza tér in the early afternoon, where several speeches were delivered and musical performances were to be held. Such an event, which brings together proud Romani people who, despite the hostile environment they live in, gather the courage to stand up and declare that they are proud to be Roma, afford ample opportunity to portray the Romani as strong and powerful, able and capable members of society.

According to the report of Bernáth and Messing (2013), the Hungarian media most often presents the Roma in connection with crimes, while coverage on discrimination has decreased since 2003, and news stories about minority rights and rights protection have virtually disappeared. It is against this backdrop that my analysis of the media representation of the Roma Pride Day and the March gains its significance. The March is a clear attempt from the part of the Roma at demonstrating their desire to be included in a society that has

<sup>1</sup> e.g. Turkey, Romania, Norway, Italy, France, Denmark, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Austria (“EGAM”)

<sup>2</sup> The different news sources give different figures as to how many participants marched together: Magyar Narancs talks about three thousand Roma, Nepszabadsag mentions almost a thousand, mandiner talks about more than a thousand, while 444! and other sources say 800. The news cast of ATV clears up the contradiction: according to the Magyar Távirati Iroda (the Hungarian national news agency), 800 people attended the march, while the organizers reported three thousand attendees.

been pushing them to its margins. As such, the March is a great opportunity for the media to represent the Roma in a different frame, one that instead of their poverty or alleged criminality,<sup>3</sup> stresses the agency, power, capability of the Roma. Therefore, the central question of my thesis is how the online daily and weekly news sites and TV newscasts represented the Roma March in their reports, and to what extent they managed to accord agency to the Roma, operationalized through the concept of ‘space,’ in their representations.

The March can be considered important for a number of reasons. First, one could reverse the question and argue that without exception every major news site and television channel considered the March important enough to cover it, and as argued later, the media are a key figure in the recognition of the significance of social movements. The event also attracted approximately a thousand to three thousand people, whose marched along Rákóczi út (one of the busiest roads connecting downtown and the outer districts) required the closing down of some of its lanes, and whom afterwards crowded Blaha Lujza Square, one of the important transportation hubs of the city. Moreover, although with all due partiality and bias, the main organizer of the event called the March “one of the greatest Romani movements of the past twenty years” (TV2, Tények).

But beyond these factors, “Ide tartozunk!” is an informal grouping that is not registered as an official organization, and therefore, has no official budget. “Ide tartozunk!” was responsible for the nation-wide census campaign that encouraged the Roma to declare themselves both Roma and Hungarian on the 2011 Hungarian census, for various commemoration events for the victims of the Roma murders of 2008-2009<sup>4</sup>, for organizing

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<sup>3</sup> Bernáth and Messing’s report highlights the visual techniques of television news casts where even when the perpetrator is unknown, visual clues implicate Roma in the crime

<sup>4</sup> During 2008 and 2009, a group of four committed a series of murders, targeting especially Roma families. Six people died, several others were injured.

flash mobs, counter-demonstrations to Jobbik<sup>5</sup> marches, etc. Mainly, “Ide tartozunk!” is the network of Jenő Setét, a Romani activist and social worker, which he has built up along the years, and it was primarily his friends and acquaintances all over the country that comprised it in the beginning.<sup>6</sup> The lack of political affiliation or stable monetary means do make this group weak as far as the scope of their effect goes; however, these weaknesses are also the group’s strengths, since even Roma politicians of opposing views gather at “Ide tartozunk!” events, and people in this small informal community chip in and contribute what they can to create their various projects. “Ide tartozunk!” is a purely civilian group that enjoys a certain amount of credibility among the Roma, evidenced by the success of their census campaign, which managed to bring together in cooperation almost all Roma organizations across the nation, including all the self-governments and three civil organizations (Népszava, “Lezárult a roma népszámlási kampány”).

Last but not least, the Roma Pride Day and the March are significant because they demonstrate how a group of Roma in Hungary attempt to counter dominant discriminatory discourses. The event shows that there are Roma who are not passive sufferers of domination but rather they claim agency and voice. In fact, the Roma Pride Day’s primary significance lays in the attempt of the Roma to speak for themselves. The Roma Pride Day shows the Roma reappropriating the labels Roma and Gypsy, reclaiming them from the negative prejudicial stereotypes and filling them with new positive content. The Roma Pride Day shows the power of the Roma voice. Therefore, it becomes important and interesting to see to what extent this voice gains expression in the media.

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<sup>5</sup> Jobbik is an extreme right-wing party that enjoys relative popularity, being the third most popular party with 16.67 % of votes in the 2010 elections. Jobbik is famous for its nationalist, anti-Roma, anti-Semitic rhetoric, and paramilitary organizations associated to its sympathizers.

<sup>6</sup> The network started with the census campaign, with which the Open Society Foundations trusted Setét, probably due to his extensive connections and contacts all over the country. The network still lives on as Facebook group, and Setét, the admin of the group, gladly accepts the request of anyone who would like to join.

In their study of the media representation of the Roma, Bernáth and Messing (2013) also point to the fact that the Roma are not given enough opportunity to talk directly, which is especially true of some right-leaning media, where only every other report that is about the Roma actually features a Roma voice, or quotes their opinion (Bernáth and Messing 2013, 34). Would the media deny the Roma voice in a case where the reported event is explicitly about voice? This question is central to my thesis. But even beyond the question whether the Roma are quoted in these articles and newscasts, the concept of space will help me operationalize the agency Roma are accorded in these reports. Tamara Steger's draft article (2013) on the Occupy Wall Street movement underscores "the importance of public space for 'having a voice,'" in fact, she asserts that "in the case of OWS, occupied space was discourse." The sociological concept of "space" has a long history in the social sciences. One of the most influential works in this regard is Henri Lefebvre's *The Production of Space* (1991 orig. 1974), in which the author argues for the social production of space and outlines a three-pronged analytical framework to understand space: representations of space, representational space, and spatial practices – perception, imagination, experience (McCann 1999). In my analysis, I will rely on Edward Soja's (1996) discussion of the Lefebvrian triad as well as on bell hooks' (1999) invitation to "the margin as a site of deprivation."

My study will be primarily concerned with the visual representation of the March, the photos and the short video clips used to illustrate the news coverage on the march in the electronic media on the Internet and in the televised news casts. Even though I will also consider the text that surrounds these images and apply the methods of critical discourse analysis to decompose those, I will devote my privileged attention to the images. I do so because one important aspect of social movements is that they translate the claims they make into a spatial idiom, where the occupied material space legitimizes claims for a symbolic space in society, and for the reason that the two-dimensional images, and especially



photographs, are inherently connected to the three-dimensional space they seek to capture. This way, I directly translate the analytical concept of framing used in media studies into the frame of the camera that captures the protesters.

I will embed my analysis in the wider sociopolitical context of the situation of the Roma in Hungary today. The idea of (re)claiming ‘space’ becomes meaningful with relation to notions of exclusion, domination of space by exclusionary forces and powers. Therefore, I will discuss the sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation of Roma, with respect to segregation, discrimination and prejudice. Finally, scholarship on the representation of the Roma in the Hungarian media will also inform my analysis and situate it in its wider context, providing the preliminary inventory of the type of frames used in connection with news reports on the Roma, which I will later use in my analysis. My hypothesis is that the Hungarian media in its representations, with a few exceptions, will probably fail to accord to the movement the amount and type of voice and space demanded by the marchers. Such a finding could point to the futility of identity politics to advance the minority cause in an atmosphere of heightened prejudice, where short of explicit hate speech, anything goes.

### **Media and public opinion**

Several scholars discuss the relationship of public opinion and the public sphere to the mass media. Rucht (1999) understands mass media to closely reflect public opinion and argues that mass media can be used to measure public opinion.. However, others also point out that the media are not a passive, neutral, objective mirror of events (Oliver & Meyer, 1999; Hall, 2006; Smith et al. 2001), and have their own agenda and own biases. The agenda-setting, opinion-forming influence of the media becomes highly important and problematic when we acknowledge that the language and images used in the media structure the opinions, attitudes and ideas of the public.

Gitlin (1980) argues that people only have access to knowledge of a limited part of their immediate world, for knowledge on everything else they need to rely on mass media, which in turn brings a “manufactured public world into [their] space. (...) [The mass media] names the world’s parts, they certify reality as reality” (2). Gitlin goes on to point out that “every day, directly or indirectly, by statement and by omission, in pictures and words, in entertainment and news and advertisements, the mass media produce fields of definition and association, symbols and rhetoric, through which ideology becomes manifest and concrete” (Gitlin 1980, 2). In a similar vein, Gamson et al. (1992) argue that with the massive abundance of visual (and verbal) representations of reality, the image assumes dominance and is often taken for reality. In such a situation, the producers of media do not need to want to consciously influence people because even without intention “a wide variety of media messages can act as teachers of values, ideologies, and beliefs and they can provide images for interpreting the world whether or not the designers are conscious of this intent” (Gamson et al. 1992, 374).

Stuart Hall (2006) describes best the way the media is involved in the construction of meaning and social reality, pointing out what could be conceived of as mere “technical issues,” for instance, how image and text work together, or how a news piece is converted into a ‘story,’ should be considered the result of particular patterns of selection and exclusion, based on a range of factors, from the particular organizational structure of media producers and the means available to them, to the specific choices made in using those equipments and tools available. This process Hall calls signification, which he sees as a social process, but not a neutral one, for it is a function of power, i.e. the ability to “signify.” Since “significations enter into controversial and conflicting social issues as a real and positive social force, affecting their outcomes,” there is a struggle over signification, “for it is the means by which collective social understandings are created – and thus the means by which consent for

particular outcomes can be effectively mobilized” (Hall, 2006). Therefore, social movements themselves are also involved in the “politics of signification,” the struggle over the “power to signify,” as they are trying to push for an alternative interpretation of social reality. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) point to the idea that the struggle over signification is actually a struggle over framing.

Framing is one of the key concepts of media studies that scholars rely on time and again; however, the concept often remains elusive (Gamson et al. 1992). For Goffman (1974), one of the earliest proponents of the concept, framing meant a “schemata of interpretation” which allowed for people “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” their experience, essentially assigning the corresponding meaning to it” (quoted in Benford & Snow 2000, 614). By far, the most detailed definition is the one that of Entman (1993), who sheds light on the process and the effect of framing: “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (quoted in Carragee & Roefs 2006, 216). However, the definition that factors in the hegemonic power relations and a struggle over signification is the one advanced by Snow and Oliver (1995), in which they contend that framing is a process that is inherently interactive, involving the participation of “movements, parties, media, governments and state apparatuses (including the police),” while it is also an “active, ongoing, and continuously evolving” process, in which social reality is constructed (quoted in della Porta 1999, 69).

The continuous struggle over framing allows social movements as well to propose their own interpretation of events and their experience, their own reality. Benford and Snow (2000) highlight the importance of agency and contention in their definition of framing and the struggle over framing, when they contend that framing “entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social movement organizations or movement activists. And it

is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may also challenge them” (614). The frames produced by social movements are referred to as collective action frames in the literature (Benford & Snow, 2000; Carragee & Roefs, 2006). It is important to stress that frames are not produced in “a political vacuum,” but rather the hegemonic power relations are heavily inscribed into them: “because the distribution of economic, political, and cultural resources shape frame sponsorship, studying the construction of reality through framing necessarily involves the examination of power” (Carragee & Roefs, 2006). It is with this idea in mind that Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) remark that frames reflect more the most powerful actors than the journalists’ ideas.

In this light, the relationship of social movements and the media is bound to produce a number of tense, conflicting, tenuous constellations. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) have mapped out so far in the most extensive manner the various facets of social movements’ relationship with the media. They argue that however mutual such a relationship be (since the media may also rely on social movements for a good copy), it is evident that social movements rely on the media more than the media are dependent on social movements. Therefore, they argue that the “burden of proof” is on the social movement to demonstrate that they are a force to reckon with, i.e. they deserve a column or a page in the news. In terms of the struggle over frames, Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) distinguish between an uncontested and a contested realm of frames. In the uncontested realm, the social construction of reality and its interpretation are taken for granted, and are taken as unquestioned descriptions of reality. In contrast, in the contested realm, there exists a struggle over meaning. The authors argue that it is the task of social movements to push issues from the uncontested to the contested realm. In a similar vein, Smith et al. (2001) argue that “social movement actors must justify why some chronic problem such as poverty or racial injustice

should receive more media attention today than it has in the past (...) [they need to] elevate routine issues onto media agendas” (1402). Both Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) and Smith et al. (2001), therefore, contend that social movements need to speak the language of the media, fashion their own language in part in “mainstreamese,” while trying to introduce just the right amount of contested, reframed content that enables them to reach a wide audience through the mass media, while still not losing their original message and radicalism (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993).

In fact, recognition by the media in the first place is an indispensable condition for the success of a movement. In this case, the agenda-setting function of the media becomes apparent, as they seem to preside over the decision what they deem important enough to include in their news. Oliver and Meyer (1999) conducted a study in Madison, WI, in which they compared police records of public events and the media representation these events gained (or failed to do so) in two local newspapers. They found that size and the presence of conflict (i.e. drama, but not violence itself) were the two most important factors that predicted media coverage. McCarthy et al. (1996) quote Lipsky (1968) to the effect that “if protest tactics are not considered significant by the media ... protest organizations will not succeed. Like a tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected” (494). But beyond the question of which protests make it into the news, which is subject to selection bias from the news producers’ part (Smith et al., 2001), there is an even more pressing matter at hand, namely, how the movements that do make it are portrayed. Smith et al. (2001) contend that “even then movements succeed at obtaining the attention of mass media outlets, media reports portray protests in ways that may undermine social movement agendas” (1398). This phenomenon is referred to as description bias.

Earl et al. (2004) suggest that “hard news” (the answers to those “WH” questions) are usually subject to omission, while “soft news” (impressions, interpretations of events) are

very much prone to bias. Smith et al. (2001) inform us that the mass media is likely to report events in a way that will be attractive to the widest audience possible; moreover, the “media gatekeepers[’] motivations, routines, and professional interests tend to support the status quo” (1401). Description biases in news reports arise in this context. One such misrepresentation is exemplified by Iyengar’s (1991) famous study on episodic and thematic frames (quoted in Smith et al., 2001): “By suggesting individual responsibility rather than social systemic causes of a problem, by portraying a problem without reference to its structural parallels and causes, or by emphasizing the drama of a protest even rather than the substance of protesters’ critiques, the mass media encourage shallow understandings of these issues and discourage the critical engagement of audiences” (1404). According to Iyengar’s (1999) study, episodic frames focus attention on concrete events of a protest, while thematic frames support a broader understanding of a problem in terms of its contextual causes, general trends of development. Social movements, by nature, stage an event, an “episode,” and aim to highlight the broader thematic concerns behind it, while hoping that the media follow suit and does not fail to emphasize the more general social problems underlying a protest (Smith et al., 2001). However, the evidence collected by Smith et al. (2001) reveal that less than 25% of the news reports they analyzed promoted a thematic frame.

Although selection bias is much better researched and understood, Earl et al. (2004) suggest that our incomplete understanding of description bias necessitates a more systematic exploration, and essentially my case study on the visual representation of the Roma Pride Day march seeks to further explore description bias. Also, Carragee and Roefs (2004) identify another gap in the existing literature when they argue that framing has been predominantly examined in the media, while the sponsorship of frames by social movements has garnered less attention. Consequently, they urge for more research on “how movements construct meaning through faming” and on “frame sponsorship and the interaction between the news

media and social movements” (225). Moreover, the extensive analysis of Oliver and Meyer (1999), reflecting on the factors that increase the likelihood of protests earning a spot in the local news, highlights the importance of the centrality of location, since news reporters are more likely to cover those events that are staged closer to where they work, i.e. downtown. However, they rightfully raise the problem of the accessibility of public space, which, they argue, is a function of social standing (i.e. power): “When people differ in their access to the places frequented or considered significant by news reporters, they will differ in their ability to reach a larger audience through public events.” Therefore, they argue, “much more attention should be given to where events occur and to the spatial as well as social accessibility of event to news reporters” (78). Finally, the privileged position of images in my analysis is born out of the conviction that images present a “more subtle form of meaning construction,” where representation is often taken for a true-to-life mirror-like depiction of reality, and the fact that they are also embedded “in some larger system of meaning” (i.e. they are participating in the “politics of signification”) is easily forgotten (Gamson et al. 1992, 374).

## **CHAPTER I: The Roma in Hungary Today: Segregation and Discrimination**

The idea of claiming (reclaiming) space is only meaningful when there is separation, segregation, discrimination, where the symbolic and physical spaces in society are unevenly distributed. With this idea in mind, I would like to discuss the situation of the Roma in Hungary today and in the past decades to paint a backdrop against which the “Ide tartozunk!” movement’s protest will appear in its better defined contours, and which will help us understand the reasons and the terms of the protest. The UNDP report of 2004, which examined five CEE countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria), suggests that these countries will be more successful members of the European Union when they can integrate their Roma population better in terms of education, employment and political participation (UNDP, 2004). Therefore, after briefly considering the situation of the Roma under state socialism and the effects of the regime change, I will turn to discussing the various trends that characterize the Roma with respect to their access to education, employment, and political participation. But beyond these more symbolic spaces of exclusion, I will also discuss housing segregation and ghettoization as the tangible physical imprints of larger societal issues that Roma face in Hungary.

However, before I would go any further, the most important theme and implication of the following discussion of the various ways in which Roma are segregated and discriminated against has to be highlighted. Without exception, all of the following authors felt urged to emphasize that the situation of the Roma with respect to their lower educational attainments, the unemployment they face and the ensuing consequences of poverty work as a vicious circle that traps Roma in their situation and reproduces the same circumstances in the following generations (Kertesi & Kézdi, 2005; UNDP, 2004; Farkas 2007; Babusik, 2007). These factors are intricately connected to their spatial segregation into the most economically disadvantaged regions, mostly small villages, of the country, and are in a mutually



intensifying relationship with the discrimination and prejudice of the non-Roma majority.

Ferenc Babusik expresses this idea so well when he stresses that “the territorial distribution of the Roma population, as a basic structural disadvantage, is intricately connected with lower educational qualifications, and with a higher rate of unemployment. These three factors strengthen each other in a circular fashion, [...] (and) for this reason, these very disadvantages are reproduced in the next generation. In case of the Roma population, the structural and the educational disadvantages, as well as the work market ones presuppose each other, but also mutually strengthen each other” (Babusik 2007,13).

### **State socialism and the regime change**

The socialist policy towards the Roma in Hungary started with the 1961 laws. As Szalai (2000) points out, no collective identities were permissible during state socialism; everybody was expected to dissolve in the solitary big collective of workers. The Roma, who had been living in isolated and segregated communities for decades (and sometimes maybe even centuries), fell outside the reach of state authorities and state propaganda; therefore, their integration into the educational system and the work force meant that finally they were available for inculcation with socialist ideology. Majtényi and Majtényi (2005) in their discussion of the socialist Roma policy in the early sixties, direct our attention to the how segregation was (re)produced for the Roma both in terms of the state-subsidized “reduced-value houses” that did not remedy the previous housing segregation issue, and also in channeling Roma students into remedial special classes that were supposed to help them catch-up with their peers. The authors point out that István Kemény in his first comprehensive study of the sociology of the Roma in 1971 had already called attention to the danger of segregation potentially being transformed into ghettoization. Moreover, Majtényi and Majtényi (2005) also describe the way the discourse of the welfare-dependent lazy Roma was created under state socialism, which emphasized that everybody enjoyed the same

opportunities, and denounced those who could not make the most of them, saying that the Roma, despite enjoying extensive welfare benefits, were (are?) reluctant to make an effort to improve their situation. This discourse is still alive today, although in the past years in Hungary the discourse of “Gypsy criminality” gained even more space, which prefigures the Roma as not only passive enjoyers of state benefits, but as active robbers and thieves, parasites that not only live off the state but also destroy private property.

As far as the employment of the Roma goes, as Kertesi (2004) explains it, the Roma did find employment during state socialism, primarily as blue collar and unskilled workers. In fact, the employment rate of Roma men in the seventies did not differ significantly from that of non-Roma men. The rising employment rate stabilized the economic situation of the Roma, who found themselves better integrated into Hungarian society, though clearly they were only allowed to occupy the margins. In fact, as Szalai (2000) points out, integration only became nominal as forced assimilation only transferred discrimination and differential treatment to the closed spaces of schools, work places and health care facilities. However, the point that Szalai makes is that in the absence of collective rights, the Roma were only able to vent their frustration and coat their complaints in the language of social disadvantage. After the regime change, when blue collar work became devalued and unavailable, and the Roma found themselves in a precarious economic situation, the clear separation of ethnic rights from social assistance aimed at alleviating poverty did not happen. In fact, poverty became ethnicized, which Szalai (2000), sees as “a potentially rather dangerous starting point for a society [...] (since such a collapsing of poverty onto ethnicity) socially ghettoizes the minority question, while at the same time it extremely ethnicizes the social question.” She goes on to argue that this way poverty becomes an ethnic question and a complete minority becomes transfigured into a burden of society. The danger lies in the fact that basic individual rights become interpreted in the frame work of collective or minority rights (Szalai, 2000). Where such a

discourse is alive and flourishing, it is easy for the majority society to divorce its putative interests from that of the struggling minority.

Connected to this idea is the increased visibility of the Roma, already entailed in Szalai's analysis, so minutely analyzed by Kata Horváth (2012) and Cecília Kovai (2012) in their discussion of the consequences of "naming the Gypsy" in a small Hungarian village in the northeast. When the local municipality decided to dissolve two Roma settlements in the framework of an EU project and move the Roma into the village, the dynamics between the Roma and non-Roma changed. Before, the Roma understood their places to be on the margins of the village as a result of a social consensus with the non-Roma, and consequently, they were not named as Gypsy openly, which gave them the power to negotiate what it means to be a Roma among themselves. But when the municipality moved the Roma into the village as Roma, established a club house for them, and the non-Roma children left the village school to be almost exclusively attended now by the Roma, the Roma became visible; they were started to be named as Gypsy. The non-Roma, who refer to themselves as 'Hungarians' experienced, in Horváth's words, a loss of space, "a brutal breach of the old order, a kind of loss of territory" because "the gypsy left his/her customary place, became visible, occupied a new place, and became a synonym of the changes and problem of an increasingly unpredictable world" (120). Therefore, as Kovai (2012) explains, the now widely used term 'Gypsy' does not only resonate with the old pejorative significations, but also with „a sense of threat and seeks to denote a 'place-or space-grabber.' ... Though the loss of space has not occurred as a result of fundamental and political changes in Gypsy-Hungarian relations, it is experienced as an 'intrusion into the space' of the majority and it is narrated through stigmatizing the Gypsies" (293).

As previously pointed out, this naming does not only make it difficult to aid the Roma and remedy their social situation because any such policy automatically gives birth to

resentment from the non-Roma due to perceived preferential treatment, but it also creates an impassable divide between Roma and non-Roma, a lack of common narrative as Horváth (2012) puts it. This lack of shared experience is most evident in the naming system Horváth and Kovai point out, the division between ‘Gypsy’ and ‘Hungarian.’ Today it is common to hear both among the Roma and non-Roma that the latter is referred to as ‘Hungarians,’ while Roma are most commonly referred to as ‘Gypsies,’ with all its pejorative connotations.<sup>7</sup> Although some users of these terms might not be conscious of it, these discursive distinctions imply that the Roma fall outside of the Hungarian cultural and political community, and reiterate the idea that “the Roma just do not belong here.” Such a notion entertained by the non-Roma majority translates into a number of concrete, material consequences, such as segregation in schools, in housing, and discrimination in employment opportunities.

### **Education**

Kertesi and Kézdi (2011, 2014) explored the test score gap that extends between the Roma and non-Roma and found that controlling for parental education and family income and poverty together almost completely eliminate the test score gap. They repeatedly emphasize the fact that there are no ethnic causes that underlie this gap, and that the mediating factors are health, home and school environment: “We also show that the gap between Roma and non-Roma students attending the same school in the same classroom is 60 percent smaller than the national gap. When comparing children with similar home environments from the same school and class, we find that the ethnic gap in test scores becomes insignificant. Ethnic differences in the home environment are completely explained by social differences, and ethnicity in itself seems to play no additional role” (Kertesi & Kézdi 2014, 1). Therefore, the

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<sup>7</sup> It might be important to note here that in general the name Roma has not established itself firmly in Hungary, where the politically more active Roma might use it (along with scholars and those who want to appear to be politically correct), but in general, even Roma often refer to themselves as Gypsies.

authors point to “long-term socio-economic conditions” as the root of the difference, and claim that “one way to interpret these findings is that three-fourths of the raw mathematics gap and four-fifths of the raw reading comprehension gap would disappear if Roma and non-Roma students had similar social backgrounds” (Kertesi & Kézdi 2014, 8). However, another additional factor that potentially explains the rest of the gap is discrimination that often manifests itself in segregation.

Kertesi and Kézdi (2005, 2012) also probe into the phenomenon of school segregation and try to explain its causes and consequences. According the UNDP report of 2004, 19% of the Roma children attend segregated schools. Since this is an aggregate data for five CEE countries, we can also factor in Gábor Havas’ estimate with great credibility, who states the same figure to be around 30% in Hungary (Havas, 2008). Kertesi and Kézdi point to the fact that between 1980 and 2011 the segregation of Roma children in Hungarian schools increased tremendously. They attribute this increase to two factors: on the one hand, to the availability of choice on the educational market and the ability of non-Roma to commute, on the other, to the increase in the number of Roma students (Kézdi & Kertesi, 2012). (Gábor Havas (2008) notes in this article that since the 1980s, the number of Roma students has approximately doubled.) The authors also argue that segregation increases already existing inequalities as those attending segregated schools are bound to end up receiving a lower quality education, while the better-off parents, who are well informed about school choices, and can afford commuting their child to school on a daily basis, are more likely to enroll their child in an unsegregated, better-equipped school outside the school district (Kertesi & Kézdi, 2005). Therefore, the poor, who are unable to move and unable to commute, are left with the local segregated schools.

Babusik and Havas give a nuanced image of school segregation, carefully describing its various underlying mechanisms. One of the most common ways to separate Roma children

from the non-Roma are the so-called special remedial classes (also mentioned by Farkas (2007)), which were supposed to help the Roma children catch up with their peers in terms of their age-appropriate knowledge and skills. While it might be true that many Roma children start the first grade with a disadvantage in terms of their cognitive and learning skills (segregated living conditions also mean less kindergartens available for Roma children (Havas, 2008)), these remedial classes operate with lower teaching quality and lower expectations towards the children's learning outcomes, so that not only they are incapable to catch up with their peers, but they are set back seriously and basically lose their chances for attending a stronger high school. According to Babusik, Roma children are five to seven times overrepresented in these classes (Babusik, 2007); moreover, 30% fails to complete elementary school education, another thirty only completed elementary school, 20% finished vocational training, and only 11.4% graduates from high school (Babusik, 2007). Havas puts the figure of high school graduates between 4-5% (Havas, 2008). Per capita household income, in Babusik's analysis, has a strong effect on completing schooling, as 40% of those in deep poverty fail to complete elementary school and the rates of finishing higher and higher levels of schooling increases with each increasing tenth percentile in income (Babusik, 2007). Of course, income levels, as we shall see later, are in strong correlation with employment opportunities, which are in turn, affected by territorial and housing segregation.

In fact, as Lilla Farkas (2007), Ferenc Babusik (2007), and Gábor Havas (2008) point out, housing segregation bears a critical responsibility in school segregation. Havas states that "the territorial and housing concentration of the poorest, least educated population prepares the ground for school segregation, and not only makes it almost impossible to eradicate school segregation, but sometimes even decreasing it is just as improbable" (Havas 2008, 123). Babusik calls to our attention that 40% of the Roma who live in ghettos today do not complete their primary school education, and with increased desegregation, the chances of

Roma children finishing their education increases: “the extent of housing segregation has a fundamental impact on available work opportunities and on available wages, and thus it also influences the chances of completing one’s education” (Babusik 2007, 11).

Here we find the eternal theme of the sociological analyses of the situation of the Roma: the vicious circle. From housing segregation, through the previously mentioned factors of home environment and school environment, that are, as Kertesi and Kézdi remind us, influenced by family income, we arrive at lower educational possibilities for Roma children. (And later on, in the employment section, we will observe that lower educational levels in turn impact employment opportunities.) It is this very vicious circle that Lilla Farkas has in mind when she quotes the UN’s ECOSOC committee resolution on The Right to Education, Article 13: “Education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing other human rights. As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities” (Farkas 2007, 6). Education is one factor that can prevent poverty from being perpetuated and reproduced through the generations.

### **Employment**

There are various figures available to describe the employment and unemployment rate of the Roma both before and after the post-communist transition. As Kertesi and Kézdi explain (2011), at the beginning of the eighties, almost all Roma men were employed and therefore, there were no gaps in employment between Roma and non-Roma, while the lower employment rate for Roma women can be explained by higher birth rates among the Roma. After the transition, the work sectors were selectively hit by unemployment, and the blue collar workers suffered the more severe consequences. Since more Roma were occupied in that sector, an ethnic gap appeared in employment (Kertesi, 2004), which was around 40% in

1994, and has increased slightly since then because of the higher educational level of non-Roma (Kertesi & Kézdi, 2011).<sup>8</sup> The employment rate of Roma men, according to the same study, was about 32%, while the same figure for Roma women was 17%. Kemény and Janky (2003) arrive at similar figures when they estimate the employment rate of Roma men around 28% and that of Roma women around 15%. (The differences between the two pairs of figures could also be explained away by the 7 years of difference between data collection.) However, Kemény and Janky also provide income figures alongside the employment figures and state that the monthly per capita income in the Roma population was slightly more than 50% of that of the non-Roma population (40 000 HUF), and that the income of 56% of the Roma households did not reach the lowest tenth percentile of the national average (13 706 HUF) (Kemény & Janky, 2003). Kertesi (2004) also notes that the employment pattern of the Roma became typical of that of the Third World population, which is characterized by a low level of education, high unemployment rates, shorter spells of employment, and a higher rate of influx and outflow of employees to and from the work places. The Roma are unemployed for considerably longer time intervals, and they are primarily concentrated in jobs of more seasonal nature (Kertesi & Kézdi, 2011). Kertesi characterizes these employment tendencies as “highly unsable” (Kertesi, 2004).

As for the roots of these differences, the various authors invariably cite the same factors: educational level, territorial/housing segregation, and discrimination on the work market. Education appears to be the primary factor. Kertesi and Kézdi (2011) account for 30% of the employment gap in terms of education, and they stress that this figure is only growing since education figures more and more prominently in employment opportunities. They also cite statistical figures according to which “a total of 30 percent of Roma men and 44 percent of Roma women have less than an eighth grade level education, compared with the

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<sup>8</sup> Even today, 70% of Roma are employed as manual laborers, 22% as trained blue collar workers, and only 8% can be regarded as white collar workers, according to Kemény and Janky (2003).



corresponding national averages of 5 and 9 percent, respectively” (Kertesi & Kézdi 2011, 576). However, Babusik (2007) contends that not even education presents a guarantee for employment among the Roma. While in the 35-48-year-old age group, 72% of the high school graduates are considered active (with respect to their ability to participate in the labor market) and only 12% of them are employed, 64% of the vocational school graduates are active, but 32% are employed.

In light of this evidence, we do well to seek for alternative explanation for the high unemployment rates of the Roma in other factors, such as discrimination. Kertesi (2004) affirms that even once we control for education, gender and age, there remains 20-30% of the employment gap unaccounted for. One factor he cites in response this problem is the rational-choice thinking of employers who presuppose that they will be less likely to find a suitable employee among the Roma, which guides them in their thinking during the hiring process. Therefore, discrimination based on this statistical thinking lowers the cost of the hiring process (Kertesi, 2004); though Kertesi still condemns such a line of thinking on moral and legal grounds. Babusik (2007) uses a more blunt language and states that “more than 80% of employers are characterized not only by not employing Roma, but also by an unwillingness to do so, even if their qualifications are satisfactory” (Babusik, 2007). Moreover, companies do not employ Roma in managerial positions (even if they possess the necessary qualification), and mostly they are employed as manual laborers, where they earn less than the average income of non-Roma in their sector (Babusik, 2007).

Still, most authors cite territorial/housing segregation as the second most important reason to explain differences in employment rates among the Roma and non-Roma. Kertesi (2005) and Kertesi and Kézdy (2011) emphasizes that 60% percent of Roma live in villages (compared to 35% of non-Roma), and these villages tend to be the ones characterized as “remote” (with lack of easy access to towns or cities) economically depressed, and affected by

unemployment to a greater extent. Babusik (2007) estimates the figure of isolated Roma to be slightly more, 67.6%, and explains that in segregated neighborhoods we are less likely to find employment opportunities, as well as more likely to find Roma with lower educational qualifications; the two together explain why segregation reinforces unemployment. Kemény and Janky stress that already in 1993 job opportunities were severely restricted by regional and territorial differences, with half as many people employed in the eastern regions of the country as in Budapest or in Transdanubia. In some eastern regions of Hungary, only one fifth of working age men were employed; put it differently, Roma living in homogenous Roma neighborhoods find employment 22% of the time, while employment rates only rise to 39% for Roma living among non-Roma neighbors (Kemény & Janky, 2003). As seen before, lower employment rates are likely to affect children's school performance and are more likely to reproduce poverty among the future generations (Kertesi & Kézdi, 2011; UNDP, 2004).

Last but not least, another important aspect of the presence of the Roma in the labor market is their isolation into public employment projects. According to the UNDP report on Roma (2004), the Roma are overrepresented in such projects. These projects reinforce short term employment patterns and welfare dependency (Kertesi & Kézdi, 2011). Messing et al. (2013) more closely examined active labor market policies with a focus on the Roma, and found that Hungarian public works projects trap the unemployed in the cycle of seasonal works for welfare benefit, and does not help them (re)enter the primary labor market. Messing describes a “crowding out effect,” which she explains as public employment projects “interfere[ing] with the labour market equilibrium by (1) filling up regular positions with publicly employed (2) employing people whom they would have employed anyway” (Messing et al. 2013, 64). It is essentially in the interest of private employers to employ public workers, since their wages are significantly lower. Moreover, as Messing stresses, this

economically irrational behavior (e.g. employing 600 people where 6-8 machines could do the same job) most often only serves the purpose of improving employment statistics

### **Territorial/Housing Segregation**

Although her study discusses Roma ghettos in Romania, Enikő Vincze et al. (2013) provides a useful theoretical background to studying ghettos in her paper. Vincze uses the term ‘Gypsy ghetto’ as “an analytical construct for discussing the spatialization and racialization of social exclusion, respectively the different variations in which economic deprivation, racial stigmatization and spatial isolation intersect each other. The ‘Gypsy ghettos’ are constituted both as localized social settings (places in the physical space) and discursive conceptualizations of social divisions (commonplaces in public discourses)” (Vincze et al. 2013, 9). Such a conceptualization particularly appeals to me and fits well with the theme of this paper, since I understand space to be at once its material, physical reality and its metaphoric way of organizing thinking. However, Vincze’s most important point concerns the origin of the ghetto in the principles of market economy and capitalism:

The social and cultural formation of “Gypsy ghettos” mirrors a larger phenomenon happening across borders, that is the trend of territorialisation of social exclusion coupled with territorial stigmatization (Wacquant, 2007). These are processes by which precarious social categories (created by economic mechanisms and stigmatized by concepts that blame the poor for being poor) are placed into marginal (for the most of the time polluted) locative spaces. The vicious circle that ties inferiorized people to stigmatized places stems from the dynamics of uneven development in a globalized economy, which lacks the taming effects of state intervention and redistribution, as poverty can be criminalized and racialized, while the workings of the “free-markets” are featured as the keys of progress. (Vincze et al. 2013, 6)

Likewise, the Hungarian authors who discuss territorial segregation in Hungary invariably link its origins to the post-communist transition.

Ladányi (2011) sees a tendency both for suburbanization and ghettoization taking place in Hungary with a transition to market economy, and he explains it as the restratification and polarization of society inscribed in space. Ghettoizations, he elaborates,

characterized primarily those cities that were unable to make the postindustrial transition, and also those remote villages that fell further away from main currents of social and economic transformation (Ladányi, 2011). In a similar vein, Babusik (2007) states that the Roma in Hungary inhabit rural regions (65% of them live in settlement with less than 10,000 inhabitants), and those regions where the collapse of the heavy industry after state socialism fell was not replaced with the service industry or agricultural development. These regions, he goes on to say, preserve poverty and prevent social mobility, and can be described as “disadvantaged-but-not-out-of-own-fault,” where providing basic social services present significant difficulties.

Ladányi (2011) states that out of the population of Hungary, 17.8% live in segregation, out of which ethnic segregation is present in 15.4%. This figure corresponds to that of Babusik, who estimates that 44.7% of the Roma live in segregation (Babusik, 2007). The size and level of urbanization of settlements also influence the rate of segregation and ghettoization, so that while ghettoization is not characteristic of Budapest (only 4% of the Roma live in ghettos), still 19% of the Roma live in segregated neighborhoods both in Budapest and in smaller villages. Gábor Havas provides concrete figures to describe segregation and states that there are about 100 segregated settlements in Hungary that have irrevocably become Gypsy ghettos, and another 200 are steadily becoming similar communities. He also states that most of these settlements are to be found in the northeastern and southwestern regions of Hungary (Havas, 2008). It is worth noting it once more that Roma inhabit these disadvantaged regions in significantly greater proportions than their non-Roma counterparts, setting them up for failure on the job market and in the classrooms, preserving their poverty as inheritance for the future generations.

## **Political Participation**

The UNDP report (2004) on the Roma contradicts several taken-for-granted assumptions about the Roma and their participation in politics and the public life. First of all, the authors of the report counter the assumption that social interaction between the Roma and non-Roma are only sporadic by pointing out that “neighborhood relations and contacts mediated by children dominate interaction” and that Roma children are equally likely to play with non-Roma children. (This statement is, of course, rather broad in its reach, stating a highly generalized impression based on data from five countries.) Just as counterintuitive is the finding that Roma are mostly willing to cooperate with central governmental authorities and that they are less willing to do so with intermediaries (such as NGOs), but it is also true that “at present, Roma do not believe that their interests can be properly represented at the national political level through the democratic mechanisms established during the first decade of transition,” and that their interest is better represented at the local municipal level (UNDP 2004, 5).

Both Szalai (2003) and Kállai (2005) agree that with the creation of the Hungarian minority self-government system (as a result of the 1993 minority law *The Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities*), a groundbreaking and important institutional framework was instated, certainly for the Roma, because “for the first time in history, it granted Roma in Hungary a framework to articulate collective needs in an organized form” (Szalai 2003, 204). However, both authors point to the same shortcomings what concerns the function and functioning of this institution. One of the most important problems facing Roma minority self-governments is an insufficient demarcation of the scope of power and responsibilities between municipal governments and minority self-governments. The minority self-governments were created mainly to safeguard the minorities’ cultural autonomy, help them preserve their traditions and values. However, in case of the Roma, who face more pressing socioeconomic problems,

Roma minority self-governments are often demanded to act upon and try to resolve problems connected to welfare, employment, or health care (Szalai, 2003; Kállai, 2005). But both authors points out, funding is insufficient, and those in the minority self-government are not legally authorized to carry out these extra functions, which in turn leaves the Roma upset, feeling that those in power cannot adequate represent their interests.

Molnár and Schaftt (2003) also took the Hungarian Roma minority self-governments in the center of their scrutiny, focusing on how these networks reflect power relations and inequalities. Their study was based on a survey, which they sent out to all the various Roma minority self-governments and the focus of their inquiry was how different levels of institutional capacity affect the quality and quantity of presence and role these self-governments can play in the life of their communities. In line with the mandate of these self-governments, the most frequently reported programmatic area the various self-governments were involved in was cultural; however, the second most reported area was welfare, in line with Szalai's analysis that stresses the greater urge of Roma self-governments to address these concerns. These authors also corroborated Szalai's points about lack of funding and lack of clear definitions of the relations with the municipality governments. The main finding of the authors is that those Roma self—governments with greater institutional capacity and presence not only had amiable relationships with the members of the local municipal government but they also had ties to national organizations (e.g. through the National Roma Self-Government) they could rely on for funding.

However, political representation at the national level could be termed even more problematic. Kállai (2005) argues that the minority law does not provide for a sanctioning mechanism that would sufficiently address the problem of those breeching the law. He reminds us that the Constitutional Court has ruled twice already in favor of the Roma who were left without adequate parliamentary representation. Moreover, Vermeersch's seminal

work on the topic, *The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in Contemporary Central Europe* (2006), offers a variety of reasons why Romani parties were unsuccessful to secure enough votes to earn a seat in the parliament. While he points to a general disbelief from the part of the impoverished Roma that political participation would be able to remedy their circumstances, he also points out that political participation among the Roma (54%) is not significantly lower than that of among non-Roma in Hungary (around 60%). However, even more important is his argument that Romani political parties have so far only pursued symbolic politics, trying to unite the Roma under a common identity, and they have rarely tried to influence policy. Vermeersch recognizes “the intrinsic difficulty of developing a party program that is concrete enough to be mobilizing, but at the same time broad enough to appeal to the widely diverse demands and concerns springing from the heterogeneous circumstances in which Roma live” (Vermeersch 2006). He also points out the difficulty of reaching Roma who often live spread out, in isolated communities, cut off from means of mass communication.

Today, the Roma political representation does not only find itself isolated in the framework of Roma minority self-governments, excluded from national level politics (another form of symbolic spatial segregation), but the National Roma Self-government is headed by a Roma interest group called Lungo Drom, which does not enjoy the unanimous support of the Hungarian Roma community. Vermeersch (2006) chronicles the fragmentation of the Roma political elite after collapse of state socialism with the detailing of the initial opposition between MCDSz (Hungarian Roma Democratic Association) and Phralipe, shifting to an opposition between the Roma Parliament and Lungo Drom, then finally between Lungo Drom, which is recognized as the official representative body for the Roma, and the more radical Romani activist, who seek representation and an outlet for their voice (Vermeersch 2006). Most recently, the Hungarian government reformed the election law in such a way that

each minority group was only allowed one representative in the parliament. However, in order to vote for that representative, the minority voters were required to register in advance, and by registering they relinquished the right to vote for the national party list. Not only did the government only acknowledge Lungo Drom as the official representative body of the Roma, but they inscribed into electoral law the discursive ‘Gypsy’ vs. ‘Hungarian’ distinction, when they legally excluded the Roma from the Hungarian political community.<sup>9</sup>

### **Coda**

As a digestive to all the statistical data amassed here, let here stand a few general observations of the atmosphere of Hungary with respect to attitudes towards the Roma, in the form of two snapshots taken from the events of the past month. The earliest event concerns the verdict of a judge from the town of Gyula in the case of a law suit against an extreme right-wing organization called Szebb Jövőért Egyesület (Organization for a Better Future), and whether their activity can be considered against the law and the constitution. The organization is often considered the successor of the Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard), a nationalist paramilitary organization that can be connected to Jobbik, and extreme right-wing party currently sitting in the Hungarian parliament. Not only did the judge rule in favor of Szebb Jövőért Egyesület, arguing that marching in public space cannot be restricted, not even if the particular public space concerned is a Roma settlement, but in her closing statement she ventured to utter explicitly racist generalizations about the Roma, to the effect that “the ‘Gypsies’ do not constitute a racial category, but rather comprise a group of people who share the same lifestyle, irrespective of race, living separately from the population, without respect for the traditional values of the majority society or towards private property defended by law,

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<sup>9</sup> Of course, the situation is not as simple and straightforward, and the government was more cunning than simply being overtly exclusive. After all, the Roma were offered a sure seat in the parliament, so it is not like the government did not try to include them. And nobody was required to register, it was merely an option. So if the Roma chose not to register and thereby fragment their political power, it is, after all, their fault – the government could argue.



who are followers of a lifestyle characterized by avoiding work, and disrespecting private property and the basic norms of living together with others” (index.hu). The verdict points to two general trends in Hungary today. As the Publicus survey (2009) on anti-Roma sentiment also points out, to be anti-Roma has become the norm in the Hungary; furthermore, resonating with the judge’s justification, the majority of respondents believe that the Roma are reluctant to work, that there is such a thing as “Gypsy criminality,” and that they present a threat to Hungarian society. The second trend concerns the Roma, who have been living in fear since the Roma murders of 2008-2009. Szebb Jövőért Egyesület does not only march in public spaces to intimidate the Roma, but this verdict legitimizes such a use of public space that is at once meant to exclude and intimidate the Roma population.

The other snapshot concerns the just recently premiered documentary “Judgment in Hungary” by Eszter Hajdú, which chronicles the trials of the four suspects accused of committing the Roma murders between 2008 and 2009. Although it has not reached as a wide audience as it maybe should have, the documentary is important for keeping the issue in the consciousness of people, not letting them forget about the horrible events. The documentary points to three important issues about the case, the persecution and trial procedures. First, the judge, in this case as well, was openly racist towards the relatives of the victims during the procedure. Although some might argue that he was still relatively sympathetic and he had to keep order and discipline in the court room, it is also true that his behavior fits in with the general trend observable in the population: anti-Roma sentiment is the norm. Second, both the crime scene investigators and the paramedics (themselves non-Roma) were found to have failed to carry out their duties, and provided a horrible service to the Roma. It would be hard to argue that this could have been a unique case, and that Roma do not face discrimination on a daily basis in the various social service sectors. Finally, the most disturbing aspect of the movie was a conviction (real or imagined, irrelevant in terms of the consequence) of the

Roma that not all of those who were involved in the murders were actually sentenced. The fear persists among the Roma that some of the murders are free and live among them.

Not only do the Roma face segregation and discrimination in the educational system, on the labor market, in housing, and to some extent, in their political representation, but they also have to face the prejudice of the majority society that construes them as criminals, lazy welfare dependents, and in extreme cases, “animals” (Bayer, “Ki ne legyen?”). The most important theme to arise from this discussion is the cyclical nature of poverty, unemployment, and low educational level, which in turn are all influenced by structural forms of discrimination in terms of territorial and housing segregation. However, Roma are not only relegated to the economically depressed remote villages of the country, but in the public discourse, where their social standing (i.e. their space in society, if you will) is constructed, they also have to face a pariah status of society’s ‘parasites’, who are thought incapable and unfit to live among the non-Roma.

## **CHAPTER II – The Sociology of Space (spatial theories, media and space)**

The idea that space is not just a container of social actions but it is also shaped by sociality has a long tradition in the human geography literature. Such an understanding moves well beyond a conception of space that is purely physical and material, and rather foregrounds a notion of space that is ordered by cognitive/imaginative representations. By the nature of this ordering, spaces become sites of struggle between those who are imposing such an order on space, and those whom, as a result, are left excluded, unrepresented in these spaces. Exactly because of this differential engagement with space, Flyvbjerg and Richardson (1998) argued that the idea that “many spaces may co-exist within the same physical space is an important one” and, therefore, they called for the analysis of the discursive strategies of inclusion and exclusion as they relate to certain spaces (quoted in Richardson & Jensen, 2003, 7). In Nigel Thrift’s (2003) discussion, the relational aspect of space becomes important when we move beyond the idea of space as a container “to abandon the idea of any pre-existing space in which things are embedded for an idea of space as undergoing continual construction exactly through the agency of things encountering each other in more or less organized circulations: a relational view of space; in which, rather than space being viewed as a container within which the world proceeds, space is seen as a co-product of those proceedings” (96). But before arriving to a reconfiguration of space as a site of struggle over representation and power, it might be worthwhile to trace the development of spatial thinking through its most important stages.

### **Developments in spatial thinking**

Susan J. Smith (2005) and Edward Soja (1996) both describe the various turns in spatial thinking as a series of three steps. In Smith’s telling, for a long time the primary understanding of space was restricted to its materiality. The idea of this quantifiable space made it seem like you only had to measure space to understand social divisions, since space

readily reflects it. However, as Smith points it out such an understanding took the nature social difference for granted.

Smith describes the second stage of the development in spatial thinking as concerned with the question of how spatial arrangements actively produce and construct social reality, especially for those who are easily marginalized in society because of their race, class or gender. This new inquiry tried to probe into how the place people find themselves in limit their access to resources, services, opportunities, and in the end, reproduce existing power relations and categorization, but also impact self identification. Smith argues that the problem with this approach was that it took “privileged selves for granted” (28); at the same time, such an approach may be blind to certain differences (e.g. gender), while it also runs the risk of focusing too exclusively on others (e.g. on what it means to be *non* ‘white,’ while the idea of ‘whiteness’ is not investigated critically).

Smith, then, in her explanation of the third developmental stage in spatial thinking, turns to Edward Soja’s (1996) notion of the ‘thirdspace’ to explore an alternative approach that “encourages us to recognize not just that the social categories we once took for granted are not given in nature but made through practice, but also that this process of construction, this performance of identity, allows for the possibility of a redefinition and renegotiation of what the social world is like” (Smith 2005, 28). Smith echoes Soja’s and bell hook’s (1999) language, when she describes this new understanding of space as a “strategic location,” where new identities can be performed while rewriting the old categories. This strategic location per bell hooks, is the margin, which is turned into a resource for resistance, where the marginalized find their new voice and make it available for public to see - gaining representation. Smith emphasizes that these spaces are real and imagined, “geometric” and “metaphorical:” they at once signify the segregated ghetto and a different way of thinking that redefines the relationship between certain groups of people with respect to their economic,

political, social and cultural standing. As Smith argues: “Thirdspace is created by those who reclaim these real and symbolic spaces of oppression, and make them into something else” (Smith 2005, 29). Just exactly how we might conceive of space as both real and imagined, all at the same time, is best explained in Henri Lefebvre’s *The Production of Space* (1991).

### **Lefebvre and his triadic conception of space**

Soja (1996) in his discussion of Lefebvre’s work situates *The Production of Space* within his own theory of thirdspace. One of the key ideas of Soja’s work, a recurring theme of his book *Thirdspace* is the motif of ‘thirling-as-Othering,’ by which Soja seeks to deconstruct any idea that comes in a conventional binary form. He adopts it from Lefebvre himself, who argued that there is always “an-Other” to any binary (Soja 1996, 7). The idea of a third option gains significance in Soja’s work also in his discussion of the epistemological thirling of space and with relation to his discussion of the two illusions of space. Soja argues that spatiality has been always relegated to the background with respect to historicity and sociality. He contends that the way we gain understanding and produce knowledge of social life has always privileged time over space. Temporality rules the social sciences, even though Lefebvre’s work (originally published in French in 1974) and the work of others building on his have been around for decades. Space is the third/Other to historicity and sociality. However, spatiality remains isolated in its own discipline as Geography, while every science, including natural and social ones, has produced its own history.

Lefebvre famously conceived of space in a trialectic relationship between Spatial Practice, Representations of Space and Spaces of Representation (Soja retranslates the third one as such from the original French; the 1991 translation speaks of ‘representational space), that is perceived space (material), conceived space (mental), and lived space (social) (Soja 1996, 10). The lived space is at once a separate category of its own, distinct from the perceived and conceived spaces, and it also incorporates both of them, and as Soja points it

out, Lefebvre uses this term in both senses throughout his work. Soja goes further and explains the lived space as encompassing all spaces, the point being that this third category opens up the binary for an infinite amount of possibilities and configurations.

In Lefebvre's articulation Spatial Practices are in a dialectical relationship with social space, which is at once "a medium and an outcome of human activity, behavior, and experience" (Soja 1996, 66). What strikes me is that the description of Spatial Practices, although is in line with the materiality of Firstspace and the illusion of opacity, already points beyond an understanding of space as a container of sociality, and emphasizes the socially constructed nature of space, already foreshadowing the possibility of challenging the control of hegemonic power relations. Representations of Space, on the other hand, are best understood as an order or design imposed on space through the control over power of knowledge, and representation. The nature of the control is highly discursive in Lefebvre's formulation, which highlights the importance of the role of language at this level. In Soja's words, "In these 'dominating' spaces of regulatory and 'ruly' discourse, these mental spaces, are thus the representations of power and ideology, of control and surveillance" (Soja 1996, 67). The conceived space is, therefore, important in formulating how power factors in to our understanding of space: the imagined geography tends to become the "real" geography, with the image or representation coming to define order and order the reality (79).

The lived space, or Thirdspace, becomes important because it is the site of contestation, a location from which hegemonic spatial imaginings and discourses can be countered, deconstructed, and new alternatives can be formulated. As explained before, lived space is not only distinct from perceived and conceived spaces, but it also encompasses them. In Lefebvre's mind this space is subliminal, non-verbal (includes complex symbols), mysterious, unknowable and secretive. Soja describes it as the "clandestine or underground side of social life" (67), but also as "dominated, passively experienced and subjected" by the

imagination that tries to appropriate physical space. However, this is also the site of re-imagining space:

here we can find not just the spatial representations of power but the imposing and operational power of spatial representations; combining the real and imagined things and thoughts on equal terms, or at least not privileging one over the other a priori, these lived spaces of representation are thus the terrain for the generation of ‘counterspaces’, spaces of resistance to the dominant order arising precisely from their subordinate, peripheral or marginalized positioning. (Soja 1996, 68)

Soja claims that, just like Lefebvre, he also accords privileged importance to lived spaces in his discussion of space not just because it is often neglected, but because he wants to take a normative stance on the issue of space. Privileging lived space is a political choice because it is “a strategic location from which to encompass, understand, and potentially transform all spaces simultaneously” (69). Thirdspace is filled “with politics and ideology;” “with capitalism, racism, patriarchy, and other material spatial practices that concretize the social relations of production, reproduction, exploitation, domination, and subjection” (68); thirdspace comprises the dominated spaces, “the spaces of peripheries, of the margins and the marginalized,” and therefore, it is the chosen spaces for “struggle, liberation, emancipation” (Soja 1996, 68).

bell hooks in her essay collection *Yearning* (1999) also builds on Lefebvre ideas and in turn, Edward Soja adopts bell hooks term ‘spaces of radical openness’ as one of the attributes of his conception of Thirdspace. bell hooks turns to postmodern culture for a deconstruction of old “master narratives,” while also calling for a new language that would be vital for a critical voice: “Yearning is the word that best describes a common psychological state shared by many of us, cutting across boundaries of race, class, gender, and sexual practice. Specifically, in relation to the post-modernist deconstruction of “master” narratives, the yearning that wells in the hearts and minds of those whom such narratives have silenced is the longing for critical voice” (27). However, she does not only call for a new language, but most importantly for new habits of being, a recurring phrase in her essays: “Postmodern culture

with its decentered subject can be the space where ties are severed or it can provide the occasion for new and varied forms of bonding. (...) Much postmodern engagement with culture emerges from the yearning to do intellectual work that connects with habits of being. – a space for critical exchange; the central future location of resistance struggle, a meeting place where new and radical happenings occur” (31). bell hooks clearly identifies the margins as the “location of resistance struggle” and the place where the old and the radical new would meet.

Although Edward Soja argues that bell hooks also fits his model of thirding-as-Othering in as much as hooks wants to find the third option to extreme black nationalism and assimilation (basically an answer to the question “who we can be and still be black”) (Soja 1996, 97), in some other regards bell hooks holds on to binaries as her ideas about resistance are expressed in the binary frame of center and margin. It is important for hooks that the margin is not just a site of deprivation but also of possible resistance. However, she is not trying to romanticize the margin as a place where “the oppressed live apart from the oppressors as ‘pure’” (151). But rather she argues that speaking of the margin as a site of resistance is often silenced. The problem is that those who speak about the margin from the center speak as colonizers and they erase the space where the voice of the marginalized could be heard: the oppressed are not listened to: “We fear those who speak about us, who do not speak to us and with us” (152). If those in the margin are asked to speak, they are to speak of pain – of the margin as a site of deprivation. These stories are consequently turned into the stories of the colonizers in the center. “Re-writing you, I rewrite myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still the colonizer, the speaking subject, and you are now at the center of my talk. Stop. We greet you as liberators” (152).

Therefore, bell hooks emphasizes the margin as a site of resistance, but also as the place where those from the center could meet the marginalized:

I was not speaking of a marginality one wishes to lose, to give up, but rather as a site one stays in, clings to even, because it nourishes one’s capacity to resist. It offers the



possibility of radical perspectives from which to see and create, to imagine alternatives, new worlds... [mine is] a message from that space in the margin which is a site of creativity and power, that inclusive space where we recover ourselves, where we move in solidarity to erase the category colonizer/colonized. Marginality as a site of resistance. Enter that space. Let us meet there. Enter that space. We greet you as liberators. ( hooks 1990, 149-152)

For hooks, marginality is something explicitly and consciously chosen as the only possible way of challenging the order that the center seeks to impose. It is in the marginal space that a new kind of culture can be imagined that is inclusive of those who are marginalized. What appears to be the most important point in hook's description of the center-periphery relationship is that those in the center have to go to the margin, "enter that space;" a meeting of the two is only possible there, where the idea of liberation changes meaning from a colonial ironic 'doublespeak,' to a true liberation for everyone involved. So while bell hooks does not directly treat the problem of public space becoming abstract and homogenizing, pushing difference out to the periphery, she does offer the vision of a solution in postmodern culture that she sees forming on the periphery and which is able to rewrite the old master narratives, creating a new understanding of who the colonizers and the colonized are with relation to each other.

Homi Bhabha in *The Location of Culture* (1994) would argue along similar lines with respect to his idea of hybrid identities, which refers to Bhabha's notion that after an encounter like colonialism or imperialism, both colonizers and the colonized are changed, and their identities become hybrid. For Bhabha, hybridity is the alternative to multiculturalism and cultural diversity, well-meaning terms of inclusion that do not achieve their aims since they place cultures of difference into Western grids of understanding, thereby containing and controlling them. (This understanding is similar to bell hooks' notion of the center talking about the margin, authoring their narrative for them, instead of them themselves, which she sees as just another form of control.) The alternative to Bhabha appears to be cultural hybridity, an "international culture," where 'inter' refers to "translation and negotiation, the

in-between space that carries the burden of meaning of culture,” and he goes on to argue that, “by exploring this Third Space, we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as others of our selves” (Bhabha 1994, 38-9). This new in-between space can potentially serve as a space for representation as well, in Bhabha’s words “The process of cultural hybridity gives rise to something different, something new and unrecognizable, a new area of negotiation of meaning, and representation” (Bhabha 1990, 211). While ‘representation’ here is meant in the sense of description or portrayal, the idea of cultural hybridity also lends itself to representation in its politically charged meaning.

Don Mitchell (1995) also speaks to the opportunities for representation that public spaces afford, arguing after Lefebvre that public spaces often start out as representations of space, and as people appropriate them, they become spaces of representation. In this sense, public space is a site of constant battle between the opposing vision of ordering and reordering. In this notion, Springer also (2010) echoes Mitchell, when he argues that public space is “a battlefield between order imposed from above and those seeking “unscripted” interaction from below” (525). Mitchell’s article *The End of Public Space?* analyses the struggle of homeless people for their access to People’s Park in Berkeley, CA, and the importance for the homeless to be seen in public, which ensures their representation:

Yet public spaces are also, and very importantly, *spaces for representation*. That is, public space is a place within which a political movement can stake out the space that allows it to be seen. In public space, political organizations can represent themselves to a larger population. By claiming space in public, by creating public spaces, social groups themselves become public. *Only* in public spaces can the homeless, for example, represent themselves as a legitimate part of “the public.” Insofar as homeless people or other marginalized groups remain invisible to society, they fail to be counted as legitimate members of the polity. And in this sense, public spaces are absolutely essential to the functioning of democratic politics (Fraser 1990). Public space is the product of competing ideas about what constitutes that space – order and control or free, and perhaps dangerous, interaction – and who constitutes “the public.” (Mitchell 1995, 115)

In Mitchell’s formulation, to be seen is to be represented as part of the public, especially for the homeless, but also for other marginalized social groups, which are underrepresented in the

public sphere and pushed to the peripheries. In contrast to bell hooks, who invites the center to enter the margin, Mitchell believes in the margin going to the center and claiming representation there by reminding the center of the margin's existence.

Mitchell's understanding of the ideal of public space is essentially normative, for all social groups should be able to find access there to power and representation. And he also points to, if not a triadic, but dualistic understanding of public space to the extent that he considers public space to be the location for social interaction and political activities, which impose different visions of space, while at the same time he highlights its material nature, and the importance of occupying public space in order to stake claims for power. Springer also speaks to the importance of occupying material space; when quoting Howell (1993) he contends that "public space can also refer to the extent of sociopolitical interaction available to a person: 'space of appearance' or the space needed for people to be seen... action and speech require visibility; because belonging to any public requires at least minimal participation, individuals must physically come together and occupy a common space" (537). Furthermore, Mitchell's idea of a commercialized space echoes Lefebvre's concept of abstract space, with its homogenizing mission. In Mitchell's opinion, public spaces should afford "interactive, discursive politics" - the essence of a true democracy; however, public spaces have been taken over by commerce, where there is a greater desire for security, surveillance established strict control over behavior and interactions are carefully planned.

Susan Ruddick (1996) is interested in how difference is negotiated in public spaces, and similar to Mitchell, she also highlights the interactive possibilities that public spaces can offer as a site "for encounters between individuals or groups who might not otherwise meet. Such spaces allow, at least in theory, a place "where one ... risks encounter with those who are different, those who identify with different groups and have different forms of life (Young 1990a)" (133). Ruddick also speaks Soja's language in rejecting dyads in identification and

instead, she advocates a focus on the “relational nature of identity... [which allows one to] look across categories to the ways in which people interact within and across matrices of power ” (139). Her other important idea concerns the scale of public space, and Ruddick argues that local spaces can “jump scales” to become at once local and national; therefore, they become important sites of staking claims at large for the whole society in the “construction, mediation, and regulation of social identities” (140).

### **Media and space**

Most importantly, several of these above mentioned authors also discuss the role of the media in creating representations of space. Sayer (2000) emphasizes the performative nature of discourses with respect to the materiality of society and argues that “Our insistence on the material and spatial embedding of social relations in no way implies that discursive relations can be ignored, for communicating and representing are of course actions in themselves (Sayer 2000, 183). Ruddick (1996) argues that “as a minimum first step we must become mindful of how these images [stereotypes] serve to prefigure unplanned encounters, to reaffirm constructs and images of subject and object, to “catch the imagination” of the public. In this regard, an analysis of the media becomes a critical tool in instructing the public how it should think about such encounters. It is one discursive medium through which such images are generated and maintained, representing interactions to the public at large” (139).

Curiously enough, Nigel Thrift (2003) discusses four kinds of spaces in his article *Space: the Fundamental Stuff of Human Geography*, and while the order attached to them are not significant, Nigel’s third space is what he calls image space. He argues that “What is certain is that images are a key element of space because it is often through them that we register the spaces around us and imagine how they might turn up in the future. The point is even more important because increasingly we live in a world in which pictures of things like news events can be as or more important than thing themselves, or can be a large part of how a thing is

constituted” (100). This point echoes Mitchell (1995), who argues, after Hartley (1992), that “a ‘public’ that cannot exist as such is continually made to exist in the pictures of democracy we carry in our heads: ‘The public in its entirety has never met at all...;’ yet ‘the public is still to be found, large as life, in the media... Representative political space is literally made of pictures – they constitute the public domain” (120). Therefore, if the images of the media dictate to the large extent what constitutes public, gaining representation there, and the quality of representation gained, has crucial consequences for the nexus of power and social structures. This idea allows Mitchell to argue that if “unrepresented in our images of ‘the public,’ they [the homeless, in the case] are banished to a realm outside politics” (120).

However, both Mitchell and Springer argue that occupation of material space needs to come before appearance in media. Entry first through the media is problematic because lot of it is privately owned, governed by profit considerations and marginal social groups do not have the access to these; however, “by taking public space, social movements represent themselves to larger audiences” (Mitchell 1995, 125). He goes on to argue that “indeed, these movements are premised on the notion that democratic (and certainly revolutionary) politics are impossible without the simultaneous creation and control of material space” (123).

Springer’s argument makes the important distinction between public sphere and public space, and considers the media as part of the first one, as public sphere is a more abstract notion to mean social life. In contrast, public space, he argues, is literal, material, physical space.

Springer argues that public space cannot be created in the abstract; the claim for representation first has to be made in material space. Although Springer’s understanding of space does not coincide with the Lefebvrian triad, it is possible to transform Springer’s ideas about the public sphere/public space distinction into an important claim Lefebvre would concur with, namely that lived space includes both material and imagined spaces; therefore, claiming representation in one helps rewriting representation in the other. It is for this reason

that media features centrally in my analysis as well, as a measure of gauging the success of this particular Roma movement in gaining visibility in the public sphere.

### CHAPTER III – The Roma in the Hungarian Media

Probably the earliest and still influential study on the media image of Roma was prepared by Lilla Vicsek (1997), who examined about 340 articles published on the Roma in the various print media between March 1 and June 30, 1995. Already (or rather still, in 1995) Vicsek notes that the Roma are primarily presented as a problem, and she makes the comment that such a strong emphasis on Roma as a problem could be potentially dangerous, because it might make it seem like the situation of the Roma is hopeless and there is no possibility for improvement. Furthermore, she also emphasizes the fact that a lack of contextual discussion of the background to the problem of the Roma make it appear as if the Roma were to blame and it runs the risk of ethnicizing their social issues. Vicsek also touches on other significant themes of later Roma image research, namely that the Roma garner some positive attention in the media as artists, but the individual Roma artists are often recognized as a non-representative example, an exception to the rule, while the image presented in the media about the Roma political elite also fails to change the attitude of the majority towards the Roma, as the Roma politicians most often appear in the media in connection with their inadequacies (Vicsek, 1997).

Vera Messing (2003), in her comparative study of the media coverage of two attempts at segregation, one in Miskolc in 1989, and one in Székesfehérvár in 1997, explores further themes and general trends in the image of the Roma in the Hungarian media. On both occasions, the Roma were presented as a homogenous group, a faceless crowd, and even though such a categorization significantly diminished by 1997, the Roma were still not given opportunity in the news reports to speak for themselves. Messing also identifies the discursive strategies – the privileged use of passive and intransitive syntax – that conceal the responsibility of the local actors (usually municipal governments) and focuses attention on the subjects of the action, the Roma, thereby, once again, framing social issues in an ethnic

manner. Finally, Messing also highlights the preponderance of stereotypes in the news reports in both cases, which further strengthen stereotypical preconceptions about the Roma regarding their passivity, criminality, poverty. Most interestingly, Messing notes that the stereotypical representation of Roma in connection with criminality decreased during eight years after the transition; however, her later study with Gábor Bernáth (2013) will detect a resurgence of the topic.

A bigger comprehensive report, which Messing co-authored with Gábor Bernáth (1998), examines the 1996-97 media representations of the Roma in a more detailed fashion with methodological rigor. However, the findings are the same as before: the Roma are routinely portrayed as a problem, using stereotypical images, while they are presented as faceless members of a homogenous group (60% of the time), and they do not get to speak for themselves (75% of the time). However, the study did find that compared to other Eastern European countries, explicit hate speech is not common in Hungarian mass media, except for the media products that attract a limited number of extremists. Also novel is the finding that apparently news editors are aware of the limited representational repertoire that Roma are afforded, nevertheless, they remain incapable of changing their practices due to their lack of contact with Roma communities. The authors add that news editors also lack a certain consciousness about the sensitive nature of representing minority issues in the media (Bernáth & Messing, 1998).

A host of studies on Roma media representation also appeared, which centered around one specific event or type of report. Anikó Vida (2000) examined reports in the Hungarian police media, and in her sample, she found seven articles which made a connection between Roma and criminality, but instead of simply describing the perpetrators, the articles “place the issue in a wider contextual frame and pronounce their opinion concerning the whole Roma community.” (Not to mention the fact that the articles also showcase an extensive collection



of stereotypes about the Roma as well.) Tamás Terestyéni (2004), while examining the media reports around the 2002 parliamentary elections that mentioned the Roma, found that 40% of the time, only non-Roma (mostly politicians) spoke in matters concerning the Roma, and that negative news items dominated the reports (29%). However, even more interesting and relevant is Vera Messing's article about the media coverage of the Jászladány school segregation scandal (2005). Although media coverage mostly favored the Roma (partly because a number of important actors, e.g. the Ministry of Education raised their voice in their favor) and the reporting was much more balanced, with much less "faceless crowd" type of representation, Messing's most important finding was that the protests of the non-Roma received more coverage in the news and the focus of the reports were the content of their protest. In contrast, the ethnic origins of the Roma protesters were routinely emphasized, in a manner that glossed over the cause of their protest and ran the risk of strengthening already existing stereotypes about the Roma. Moreover, Messing found that the president of the Roma minority self-government of Jászladány consciously employed the media because it was only nation-wide attention that seemed to move forward his case against the local mayor, despite the fact that such a tactic severely hurt the relationship of the two parties (and that of the Roma and the non-Roma of the village) in the short run (Messing, 2005).

The Roma also share the perception that they mostly appear in the media in a negative context, framed as a problem for society. Bernáth and Messing (2001) asked the Roma about their media consumption habits and their impressions about their own media representation. The baseline of their investigation was the following question: "With respect the Hungarian majority media, the question is inevitable whether they offer representation of the Roma in roles that afford them to be regarded as integral parts of the society, and parallel to this, whether these representations allow the Roma to feel pride because of their identity." Unfortunately, this is not the case. Eight out of ten respondents shared the view that the

television only presents the Roma in connection with problems, while nine out of ten thought that it would be the responsibility of television to also show the good aspects of the life of the Roma. The respondents also emphasized the importance of a media personality of Roma origin (e.g. a news anchor) that could help disperse stereotypes about the Roma, while more than half of them agreed with the statement that the television does not present a realistic image of them. Bernáth and Messing emphasizes, “fifty percent of a half-million group of people see themselves represented on TV that they find insulting.”

Bernáth and Messing’s (2013) most recent comprehensive media report on Roma representation examines data from 2011. Compared to the news reports of 1997, criminality saw a resurgence due the extreme right-wing rhetoric of ‘Gypsy criminality’ gaining ground in public discourse. In fact, Bernáth and Messing warn that a ‘mainstream public discourse’ has also developed that is just as prejudiced and racist as the extreme right, but racism is only discussed in connection with the extreme right, which runs the risk of isolating racism there while a similarly racist mainstream public discourse is left unchallenged. The authors also lament that the civil agents, who formerly played an important role supplying a more balanced representation of the Roma to the media, have virtually disappeared, while the topic of discrimination has vanished as well. In its stead, we find the blaming of the poor for their own circumstances. The two dominating issues in the media are majority (national and local) politics, which feature Roma as the target of policies (33%) and crime (37%). However, the authors also detect two important developments: the faceless, gaping crowd representation of the Roma in print media has gradually lost ground, and at the same time, more Roma voice is heard in the news (40% as compared to the previous 30% in 2000, and 27% in 2003). Based on content analysis, the most common topics with respect to the Roma are poverty, anti-social and deviant behavior, and the talented ‘good Roma’ (but as the name also implies, this image fits with the previously discussed ‘good Roma’ as an exception, whose appearance in the

news leaves the negative views of the majority towards the Roma intact). With respect to cross-categorization (whether Roma individuals appear only as Roma, or they are defined also by some other qualities, based on which they could be “one of us”), Bernáth and Messing report slight improvements, although there are considerable variations among the news sources. In the news casts of television channels, the authors observed that although there is increasing opportunity for cross-categorization, still, manipulation and insinuation is just as predominant, which operate with visual stereotypes. The visual shorthand for a Roma settlement became the dirt road and dilapidated houses, and the idle, gaping crowd image, compared to the print media, has not lost ground in TV reports. Moreover, emotional framing on television is usually reserved for non-Roma victims, as opposed to Roma ones; and editorial framing, the sequencing of news pieces is also used to insinuate Roma criminality.

In light of the brief overview of the representation of the Roma in the Hungarian media, it is evident they are most often presented as a problem to society and in connection with crime. Furthermore, their anti-social, deviant behavior is also often highlighted, along with the poverty they face. However, these news pieces are rarely discussed in a thematic frame, which sheds light on the broader societal tendencies that inform, for instance, the poverty of Roma. In what is to follow, the question becomes whether the Roma Pride Day march managed to call attention to these contextual issues and whether it was able to promote a different frame about the Roma, which allowed them to be seen as valuable members of society, producers and contributors. The biggest question of my analysis is whether these older frames here overshadow the representation of the march, or if the message of the movement, the acknowledgment of the many contributions of the Roma to Hungarian history and art, will find expression and audience as a result of the media representation of the march.

## CHAPTER IV – The media representation of the march

My analysis will proceed in a manner that is attentive to both framing and the use of space in the media representations of the Roma Pride Day and the March. The two most important questions in terms of framing is whether the movement garner episodic or thematic frames (Smith et al., 2001), and whether it can move the issue of the Roma from the uncontested to the contested realm of frames (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993), i.e. whether they can elevate a routine issue, such as the inequality, discrimination and segregation that the Roma experience every day, into a media agenda (Smith et al., 2001). In terms of space, my main question is whether the photographic and filmic representations of the March afford the creation of a ‘thirdspace,’ a “space of radical openness” that strives to revise the hegemonic power relations in the social world and allows for the representation of the Roma as members of the same social and political community as the majority society.

### Methodology

As for the theoretical framework of my visual analysis, I will use Theo van Leeuwen’s chapter ‘The Visual Representation of Social Actors’ from his book *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis* (2008). The basis for visual analysis, as van Leeuwen explains with reference to Roland Barthes, is that a photo represents reality in a mechanical manner; therefore, multiple interpretations are possible of a single photo. But even more importantly, a picture can never be taken for granted as the singular accurate representation of reality, reflecting it as it was encountered: every picture frames reality in a different manner, already interpreting it, calling attention to what is important and significant about it. In the end, every picture needs interpretation (van Leeuwen 2008, 136-137). The most useful concepts introduced by van Leeuwen are social distance, social relation, and social interaction, which refer to the distance of the object from the viewer, the vertical and horizontal angles of a photo and the gaze of the object, respectively.

Intuitively, we are not meant to and are less likely to sympathize with people presented to us in a long-distance shot, while someone on a close-up might just appear as “one of us” (van Leeuwen 2008, 138). So the distance of the object from the viewer affects the viewer’s sense of connection, literally and figuratively, the proximity to the person depicted on a photograph. The vertical angle in a photograph is suggestive of power relations between object and viewer: looking down on people straightforwardly implies the superiority of the viewer, while looking up to someone suggests deference to the object’s higher position. In a similar manner, the horizontal angle is indicative of involvement: facing someone in a full frontal manner conveys direct involvement and the possibility of communication, while a sideways portrayal cuts off the possibility of engaging with the object. Finally, social interaction refers to the gaze of the objects of in the picture. Those who do not look into the camera are offered up to our gaze, while those looking at the viewers make a demand on them. Furthermore, van Leeuwen highlights how the certain roles in which social actors are represented, the generic or specific nature of their representation, their depiction as an individual or in a group, and their categorization as a type also provides numerous occasions for visual othering, which correspond to Bernáth and Messing’s terminology of cross-categorization and the image of the idle, gaping crowd.

As for the analysis of the text that accompanies the photographs and the videos, I will use Teun van Dijk’s (2000) discourse analytical approach. Van Dijk highlights such strategies as nomination, which refers to careful and deliberate lexical choices, since “choosing one word rather than another often has contextual reasons, such as the opinions of the speaker about a person, a group or their actions” (39-40). He also mentions the frequent use of passive voice with respect to minorities, which suggests that they are the powerless, passive objects of others’ actions, while minorities usually appear in an active sentence construction with an emphasis on their agency in matters of crime. In addition, the

nominalization of verbs (van Dijk brings the example of ‘to discriminate’ vs. ‘discrimination’) also helps in covering up the perpetrator-victim relationship. But van Dijk also warns that, since explicit racism is unacceptable and not tolerated, racist meaning is often conveyed “between the lines” (40). Such statements rely on an assumed and widely shared common knowledge to bridge the logical gap between two seemingly unrelated sentences. Finally, van Dijk also emphasizes the hyperbolic use of metaphors that exploit a similar shared basic understanding or consensus on certain issues. (For instance, then immigrants are referred to as “an army of immigrants,” then not only their number is exaggerated, but their actions are construed as carefully planned and deliberated, but even more importantly, presenting a threat (43).)

Since on the photographs and in the short video clips on TV, mainly the Roma are featured, and since the majority society is non-Roma, furthermore this particular social movement aimed its message at them, my criterion for a favorable representation of the march in terms of the envisaged ‘space of radical openness’ signifies a framing that allows for the possibility of inclusion, i.e. the represented Roma actors include the non-Roma viewers in a shared, common space. However, it is important to recognize that it is not primarily the Roma marchers that are responsible for the act of inclusion; rather, it is the lens of the photographer and the editor that decides which photographs to use as illustration who together insinuate a barrier between the viewer and the marchers, or exhibit a lack thereof in emphasizing the marchers’ proximity to the viewers, as if the viewer was one of the protesters. The commentary and written accounts that accompany these images are likewise capable of playing up or playing down the perceived proximity of the marchers to the listeners or readers.

In what is to follow, I will present the analysis of fourteen newspaper reports and five televised news casts. In my selection of newspaper articles, I included in not-all-

encompassing manner all the major news sources, dailies and weeklies with an online edition, i.e. Népszabadság, Index, Origo, Magyar Narancs, !!444!!!, Blikk, HVG, kurucinfo, Hírhatár, Metropol, Hír24, Magyar Hírlap, 168 óra. Altogether, I ended up with eighteen articles, but three were press releases promoting the event beforehand, and one was a duplicate article in Népszabadság, featuring a different photograph as illustration. The two Népszabadság articles were coded as one with two photographic illustrations. Népszava also presents a unique case as it also published a separate piece on the issue, which consists only of a photo album. Since this study is primarily concerned with the analysis of photographs, I included the album in my analysis. The sample included a kurucinfo article, the mouthpiece of the extreme right-wing in Hungary, to be analyzed as a “control group,” registering the expected hateful manifestations, and measuring the bias of other news reports in light of this expected outlier. As for the television news, my sample includes the news reports of MTV1, the national public media channel, TV2, RTL Klub, the two biggest commercial channels, and also HírTV and ATV, two news channels. MTV2 broadcasts the same news as MTV1, and Duna TV, another public interest channel did not feature the protest among its news reports. As for EchoTV, another news channel, their newscasts from last October were not available on their website, so I was not able to include it in my sample. Both in case of the news articles and the newscasts, the texts and the images were analyzed separately, and then in each case, the two were compared and contrasted for additional effect.

## **Findings**

### *Print media*

In terms of the texts, out of the fourteen articles, eleven are based on the report of MTI (Magyar Távirati Iroda, the Hungarian national news agency), evidenced by either the acknowledgement of the source, and/or the repetition of complete sentences, phrase structures and also images detectable among the news pieces. Only Népszabadság, Magyar Narancs, and

Hír24 created their own reports of the event, illustrated by their own photographs. (Here we can include the photo album of Népszava as well; however, its longer news piece was also adopted from the MTI copy.) Among the MTI adopters, the biggest outlier was Index, which only published a four-and-a-half-line piece on the event without photographic illustration. This serious lack of attention, which can be easily explained as Index exercising its agenda setting function in cherry picking news of greater import, was also augmented by a distortion of facts. Index's headline reads "Roma marched in silence," while the last sentence of the report states that "there were no speeches delivered [on Blaha Lujza tér]." As evidenced by other reports, the crowd of marchers repeatedly yelled "Opre Roma!" ("Up Roma!"), the slogan adopted by the International Romani Congress, while the crowd was also reported to be singing songs. As for the speeches on Blaha Lujza tér, several of them were delivered, and the MTI names at least four people who spoke up and delivered a short address to the crowd. While the Index coverage cannot be called downright hostile, their silence, or rather their frugality with words, also indicates a stance on the issue. By not affording space for the Roma to represent themselves on the columns of its pages, Index refused to recognize the protesters and their message as important and relevant to be shared with wider audience.

One of the most interesting aspects of the news pieces is the number of protesters reported. The numbers vary between "about 800" and 3000. As the ATV newscast clarifies, MTI reported 800, while the organizers of the event counted 3000. The most sympathetic voice, Magyar Narancs reported the 3000 put forward by the organizers, but the other two independently reporting news sources, Népszabadság and Hír24 also show great variation, Népszabadság reporting "about 1000," while Hír24 giving account of "several hundred" protesters. However, the most significant and noteworthy is the variation between those newspapers that relied on the MTI account, for even among them we see a variation from "about 800" (!!444!!!, kurucinfo, Hírhatár, Metropol, Magyar Hírlap, 186 óra, Népszava)



through “more than 1000” (Blikk, HVG) and “one or two thousand” (Index) to “approximately 2000” (Origo). The numbers are only indicative in the extreme ends, with Magyar Narancs, the most sympathetic report giving account of 3000 people, while kurucinfo, as expected, only reluctantly admits 800 marchers.

In terms of the framing of the event, episodic frames clearly dominated the accounts of the march, which is true not only of the MTI report that supplied the story to many of the newspapers, but also of Népszabadság and even Magyar Narancs, which stroke a more sympathetic tone in its coverage. The news reports were preoccupied with the description and discussion of the immediate events of the protest, which meant that indication of the broader thematic concerns of the march, i.e. the plight of the Roma with the segregation and discrimination did not appear in their reports. Instead, the organizer of the event, Jenő Setét was only quoted on what he, no doubt, wanted to promote as a new framing for the Roma: the numerous contributions of Roma to Hungarian history and culture. However, such a circumstance is most unfortunate considering that the main message of the event in this case appears as the subjective private opinion of individuals. The MTI report, whose words appear in most newspapers, was particularly prone to this type of framing, where everything that could be termed the message of the protesters was presented in reported speech. Magyar Narancs presented the only exception, where between two sentences reporting the words of Setét, a declarative sentence temporarily extends the frame of the statement beyond the opinion of Setét into general relevance.

The march itself was explicitly linked to the ideas relating to space in a variety of ways. Not only did the Város Mindenkié Csoport (The City Belongs to Everybody Group), who happened to be protesting the same day, join the Roma protesters, but Setét framed this march as the legacy of the one held in Miskolc exactly a year before, where Setét and his network was protesting against extreme right-wing marchers intimidating the local Roma.

Occupying that space on Blaha Lujza tér did not only have an immediate significance at a micro-level, but by extending the scale of the protest (Ruddick 1996), the marchers directly addressed issues on the national level, since such intimidation campaigns in the form of extreme right-wing groups marching down the streets of Roma settlements is quite common in several different communities across Hungary. But the march was more than just reclaiming public space and cleansing it from intimidation, since the route of the march outlined a clear invitation of everybody into the margin (hooks, 1996), the heart of the eighth district. In her discussion of the various insider and outsider representation of the eighth district, commonly thought of as the ghetto of Budapest, Eszter György (2009) defines the Magdolna quarter, bounded by Nagyuvaros utca – Népszínház utca – Fiumei út– Baross utca – Koszorú utca – Mátyás tér, as the “most troubled” out of all the quarters of the district, and refers to the streets around Mátyás tér as the ones responsible for the iconic images of the eighth district ghetto. Therefore, by inviting the marchers to gather at Mátyás tér, Jenő Setét invited them to the heart of the eighth district, to the margin in bell hook’s formulation. Then together, the protesters left the heart of the ghetto, and marched to the “relative” (and symbolic) center of the city, Blaha Lujza tér, one of the important transportation hubs of Budapest. Such a symbolic act in itself is an attempt at creating a “hybridity” (Bhabha, 1994), and a hybrid space that is inclusive of both Roma and non-Roma, while marching to the center brings to mind Mitchell’s (1995) emphasis on gainging appearance, and by that, also representation in public space.

As for the treatment of space and the level of inclusion afforded by the articles, it was only Magyar Narancs and Népszabadság, two of the three independently reporting papers, that managed to draw the readers into the march and make them feel like they were marching with the protesters. They did so primarily through a novelistic attention to details in their descriptions. For instance, Népszabadság describes a small incident between an observer, a

Roma woman, who does not want to allow her daughter to join the march, saying “This is going to end badly.” (This example also points to the previously described atmosphere in Hungary, where the extreme-right marches regularly to intimidate the Roma, and the Roma are afraid to publicly declare their identity.) But Népszabadság also provided a detailed description of the truck at the head of the march, and other jokes circulating in the crowd. The description of the march in Magyar Narancs was just as detail-packed, with the author also describing what the marchers said to each other. Therefore, it was not only the detailed description but also the raising of the voice of the everyday folk, the nameless marcher into the newspaper account that created an atmosphere of a shared experience between reader and marcher.

However, there is also example for the contrary, namely the march being isolated in space, contained and distanced from the reader. <sup>444</sup> states that the “marchers in the eighth district number 800 people.” While arguably this statement is factually true since both Rákóczi út and Blaha Lujza tér can be construed as the borders of the district, failure to mention Blaha Lujza tér, since it is one of the important hubs of the city, and placing the protest squarely in the eighth district appears to be a serious downplaying of the scale of the protest. As stated before, the eighth district is where most Roma live in Budapest, in relative segregation, so placing the march purely there is an act of diminishing the influence of the march by mapping the segregation of the Roma onto itself.

As for the analysis of the images, it is worthwhile to start with those produced by MTI, since mostly these are featured across the majority of the news reports. Two of the MTI photos represent the crowd of protesters, attempting to illustrate its extent (and the “crowd type” of image from Magyar Narancs is used here as a point of contrast). While all of these images use a higher vantage point, looking down on their objects for the obvious reason of such a perspective being the only one that is able to feature a lot of people in its frame, there

are striking differences between the various “crowd” type photos. Magyar Narancs remains the most positive in its representation, taking on the crowd from a full frontal angle, showing involvement and engagement with it, while also featuring the most number of people and still preserving the individuality of the ones closest to the viewers (the children in the front row have a personality of their own, some look bored, some look happy, some look away, etc.).



Blikk (MTI)



!!444!!! (MTI)



Magyar Narancs

In contrast, MTI photos featured in Blikk and in !!444!!! manage to diminish the power and importance of the crowd and the March. The photo featured in Blikk not only uses the most skewed horizontal angle, depicting the marchers from sideways, and exhibiting an almost complete disengagement with them, but it also leaves a significant amount of space empty in the foreground on the left-hand side, leaving the impression that there were not so many participants after all. However, the absolute distancing of the viewer from the objects of depiction happens through the boy in the lower right hand corner, who, with his back to us, is

filming the crowd. The boy completely blocks the viewer from the crowd, creating a barrier between the two, leaving absolutely no room for connection and inclusion of the viewer. The readers of Blikk are not meant to sympathize with the March and the marchers, of whom everyone is just one in a homogeneous and not so significant group. While the !!444!!! photo shows engagement with the marchers in that it places the viewer right in front of the marchers, still, as in the Blikk photo, there is a barrier between the viewer and the objects of the photo. In this case, the line of the camera man and the two men with their backs to us present the barrier by blocking us from the marchers. For the viewer, there is no chance of being included a common space with the marchers.



!!444!!! (MTI)



Népszava



!!444!!! (MTI)



Magyar Narancs

In the next two pair of photos, the ones on the left-hand side were taken by MTI and published by !!444!!!, while the ones on the right-hand side come from Népszava and Magyar Narancs, to provide points of comparison to the MTI images. The first pair of photos depict



protesters, holding up signs. The MTI photo represents its protester from a distance, from the side and from above, in a voyeuristic manner that leaves no opportunity for the viewer to empathize with her. In contrast, the Népszava photo is a close-up taken from below that allows the viewer to examine the facial expression of the protesters and feel included among the crowd of marchers, sharing with them a common space. The second pair of images show Jenő Setét, the main organizer of the event, delivering his speech. The key difference between the photos is what van Leeuwen calls social distance, created by the differential use of long shots or close-ups. Both the Magyar Narancs and the !!444!!! photos show Jenő Setét from a relatively frontal view. However, the long distance shot of !!444!!! seems to even out the elevated position of Jenő Setét, who appears to be at eye-level with the viewer on the !!444!!! photo. Not only is Setét at a longer distance from the viewer and his relative power and status is diminished by the eye-level horizontal angle, the heads and the arm of one of the audience members once again creates a barrier between us viewers and the prime object of interest on the photo. Whatever Setét is talking about, the message feels completely lost for the viewer of in case of the !!444!!! image, while the Magyar Narancs photo makes us feel like we can hear his words.



Hír24



Népszabadság

The next set of photos were published by Hír24 and Népszabadság, respectively, and they deserve attention because they did not feature the images of MTI in their reports, and because they treat space in manner that is not inclusive of the viewers. In both cases, the people depicted in the photographs are offered up to the viewers' gaze since they are shown from the side, directing their gaze outside the frame. On the Hír24 photo, the vertical lines of the sign and building lead the viewer's gaze to the center of the photo, where a crowd of people are standing. However, most importantly they are turned with their backs to us, excluding us from their circles. In a similar fashion, the two signs on the Népszabadság image present barriers between us and the protesters. This way the photographers make the viewers incapable of realizing a certain shared experience with the marchers, who exist in a different space from the viewers.



Népszava



Népszava

The images published in the Népszava album offers points of strong contrast. In case of the first photo, we see a woman from a nearly frontal position, from an angle from below in a close-up. We see here engagement, empowering, and proximity with the depicted of object, but more importantly we feel like we are in the crowd, standing right next to her. We share the space with her and the other marchers. In this regard, the next photo is even more significant because the vantage point of the photographer clearly includes the viewer in the circle of Roma women, who are depicted in the role of producers of food. The shared

common space, the coming together of Roma marchers and supposedly non-Roma newspaper readers happens in these photos.

### *Television newscasts*

Similar to the print media, the newscasts only employed episodic framing, which was true of even of the two most sympathetic reports of the march, those given by TV2 and ATV. The enthusiasm of the TV2 for the march is marred partly by the fact that one of their reporters was the presenter at the event, and consequently, he is extensively featured in their report. (However, arguably his dominating presence in TV2's newscast is on the whole beneficial, since it provides cross-categorization (Bernáth and Messing, 2013) and showcases Roma in various roles, as valuable members of the Hungarian society.) ATV produced the most thematic-like framing by featuring the employment discrimination plight of the Roma in the newscast lead, and in the form of a short interview with a young woman who has experienced it. Still, even this thematic-like framing attempt is diminished by the fact that similar to the print media, the message of the protest is isolated in quotations from the participants, presented to the viewers in the form of an opinion. Otherwise, the text of the commentaries did not feature anything significant, except for HírTV's one comment. The news anchor in HírTV, as his closing comment to the protest noted that "No disorderly conduct ("rendbontás") occurred [at the protest]." Such a comment, which requires some reading "between the lines" (van Dijk, 2000), builds on the underlying assumption (also common in media accounts featuring the Roma (Bernáth and Messing, 2013)) that the Roma are criminals, and that they present a threat to societal order. Furthermore, HírTV was by far the most effective in isolating the message of the protesters, since after its own commentary, the newscast presented Jenő Setét, explaining the message of the protest. However, the news anchor did not introduce Setét and did not offer commentary on his words afterwards, as if Setét delivered his message in vacuum: a clear case of isolation and segregation.



An aspect of newscasts discussed by Bernáth and Messing (2013) is editorial framing, which refers to the choices news editors make in sequencing reports. The authors discuss this tool in connection with newscasts insinuating Roma as perpetrators of crime in seemingly two unrelated events only through the sequencing of media reports. In the case of the march, the most common editorial framing involved a diminishing of the importance of the Roma Pride Day events by presenting it only after other protests of significantly less participants. TV2, RTL Klub and HírTV all gave accounts of either the public employee's protest for higher wages or the demonstration of the previously mentioned "A Város Mindenkié Csoport." However, the most questionable and dubious editorial framing occurred in the MTV1 newscasts, where the report on the protest was preceded by a small local festival that celebrated the Hungaricums (the "deservingly" world-famous products of Hungary, sources of Hungarian pride), stating the importance of preserving the values of the Hungarian people. Some might argue that this sequencing is coincidental; however, the Roma are routinely contrasted in Hungarian public discourse with the non-Roma, to whom it has become customary to refer to as 'Hungarians.' Conscious of the exclusionary tendencies of the 'Hungarian' versus 'Roma' distinction, such an unfortunate paring of news items can easily contribute to the segregation and isolation of the Roma as outside the social and political community of Hungary.

The 'faceless crowd' type of representation was quite common in the MTV1 and RTL Klub newscasts, while TV2 and ATV made several attempts at individualization and cross-categorization (see Appendix for images). In the TV2 report, there are several close-ups of the protesters, while the previously mentioned Roma reporter and a laywoman also get to speak. The crowd of protesters is not only presented as a group of individuals, but TV2 also finds opportunity to present Roma as not just Roma, but also successful news reporters and everyday people like us. In a similar vein, although ATV starts its report with a long-distance shot,

giving account of the numbers of the marchers, in the next consecutive shots, it present closer and closer images of the protesters, highlighting their individual features. Furthermore, besides Jenő Setét, and L.L. Junior, a famous hip hop musician of Roma origin, ATV also gives voice to two laypeople, with the added emphasis on the message that that Roma are people “just like us.”

The images that want to disprove this statement are primarily to be found in the HírTV newscast, which features two frames about fat Roma men standing around in the first case, and holding shabby, impromptu signs in the second. The men confirm to the stereotypes of Roma men as maffiosos, men who are up to no good and manage to carve out a prosperous life for themselves in illegal ventures. Even if playing up these stereotypes were not the aim of the HírTV news editors, the static, idle nature of the men standing around and the hurried, unappealing signs they are holding clearly discredit the march, an event characterized by great mobility. All the more so because several other newscasts, for instance that of ATV and TV2, feature the Roma flags being waved by enthusiastic protesters. Another point to note in this regard is the unwaved flag presented by MTV1, which joins the rank of the HírTV newscast in presenting the Roma march as as static event. Furthermore, the flag shown in the foreground of that image also presents a barrier that cuts off the rest of the protesters in the image. In terms of inclusivity in space, only the newscasts of TV2 and ATV offered images that offered the viewer a feeling of being part of the crowd, which they achieved through close-ups from an eye-level view with the crowd of marchers.

## CONCLUSION

This study aimed to contribute to the research on the description bias of the media in connection with its representation of social movements. Furthermore, the study also tried to situate the discussion of the media representation of social movements in the framework of spatial thinking. Reflecting on the spatial turn in sociology, my aim was to highlight the ways in which the Roma Pride Day March engaged with space in its material reality, sought to transform it, thereby achieving a transformation of the symbolic spatial arena of the Hungarian society. In the conceptualization of space, I relied on Henri Lefebvre, Edward Soja, bell hooks and Homi Bhabha's understanding of the social production of space and its consequences for social movements. Of particular interest to me were Soja's concept of 'thirdspace,' bell hooks' understanding of the margin as space of radical openness and of resistance, and Homi Bhabha's articulation of 'hybridity.'

My analysis of the media focused on the visual representation of space, since photographs inherently reflect (and reflect on) space. After a discussion of the interrelated nature of housing segregation with the poverty, exclusion and discrimination of the Roma in the work places and schools, I considered the existing knowledge on the media representation of Roma in Hungary. Situating my study in the well-established contours of segregation, prejudice, and criminalization of the Roma in the media, I analyzed the photographic and filmic representations of the march published in the online print media and broadcasted on television, with an eye fixed on the ways in which the Roma protesters were envisaged and framed as sharing the same space with the non-Roma viewers, i.e. as members of the same social and political community as the non-Roma majority society.

In my analysis, I found that both the print media and the television newscasts privileged an episodic, as opposed to thematic, framing of the events of the Roma Pride Day. Without exception, all the accounts of the events were primarily concerned with detailing the

circumstances of the march, while the message of the protesters were forced into the reported speech type of description of the main reasons why this march happened. The majority of the print media relied on the copy written by the MTI (the Hungarian national news agency), and only *Népszabadság*, *Magyar Narancs* and *Hír24* took the time and effort to send their own reporters to the venue. While in the texts of the articles, *Népszabadság* and *Magyar Narancs* were the most effective in creating a common shared space for the protesters and the non-Roma readers, mainly through employing detailed descriptions and quoting the unknown protesters, *Népszava* managed to present the most inclusive photographic rendering of the events by routinely using close-ups from a lower vantage point that makes the viewer feel like she is one of the marchers in the crowd. The organizers also situated the march squarely in a spatial framework by framing it as the legacy of a protest in Miskolc exactly a year before, which responded to the intimidating marches of extreme-right wing organizations.

True to Bernáth and Messing's (2013) findings, the newscasts on TV were found to be operating with the 'faceless crowd' type of imagery much more; however, both ATV and TV2 made rigorous attempts at presenting the marchers as individuals, not just members of a homogeneous crowd. In fact, both channel managed to provide cross-categorization (Bernáth and Messing 2013) in their reports, when they portrayed Roma as successful professionals and everyday people, "one of us." Only ATV and TV2 achieved visual and spatial inclusivity when they framed the marchers in close-up shots at an eye-level.

The weakness of this study is its purely qualitative and explorative nature. The study of this material could potentially benefit from pushing the analytical method into a more quantitative field by coding the various aspects of framing as variables, and applying this fix standard in the evaluation of the different photographs and frames of filmic records. Another important aspect of this (and similar) social movement(s) is its engagement with and use of social media. "Ide tartozunk!" exists as a Facebook group, and it would be worthwhile to

explore the benefits and limitations of such a framework for a social movement. Smith et al. (2001) acknowledge the importance of alternative news sources and ways of communications for social movements, through which they can promote their issue in a separate forum and hopefully push their issues up in the end to the public sphere, making it unavoidable for mainstream media to pass over. Tsfati and Peri (2006) argue, that nonmainstream media can serve as an alternative media for those pushed to the peripheries when mainstream media are heavily influenced by power relations. Furthermore, they also raise the idea that nonmainstream media can equally serve as a site where social change is initiated, from where social movements take off. However, fragmentation and segregation is just as equally likely. Johnson et al. (2009) discuss blogs as having the potential to create “communication ghettos where people go to support their own opinions and attack opposing ones, leading to increased polarization of political views.” However, as Bernáth and Messing (2013) note, the aim of minority media should be to reach a wider audience, if their recognition claims want to succeed. Finally, a comparative analysis of this march with other similar events and their media representation would further strengthen the conclusions we could draw from this analysis.

The findings point to the disappointing conclusion that according to the media, the majority of non-Roma are not receptive to and empathetic with plight of the Roma, which have further implications for the Romani movement and its pursuit of a politics of recognition. However, promising news reports here and there pointed to a tiny minority among the non-Roma, who already imagine a common, shared space with the Roma.

## APPENDIX

*“Faceless crowd” type of photos*



MTV1



RTL Klub



*Individualization and cross-categorization*



ATV



ATV



TV2



TV2

*Roma stereotypes*



HírTV



HírTV



*The unwaved flag*



MTV1

*Spatial inclusion*



ATV



TV2

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