NOT SO NORMAL DONORS: DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION POLICIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES

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ABSTRACT

Over the last two decades CEE countries completed a giant leap from recipients of development assistance to foreign aid donors. Like older Western donors, they began to give aid to less advantaged states through bilateral cooperation. Unlike most Western donors though, they target their aid allocation towards Eastern and Southern Europe and not to the global South. Researchers usually do not spend much time dwelling on this issue. For scholars, the CEE aid allocation practices are all too self-evident on account of the political and economic interests of these countries, their comparative advantage in development, and their lack of logistical capacity in Africa. Moreover, an even more puzzling question has been overlooked altogether; this is the divergence in aid allocation toward Africa even within the CEE. Even though they still give more to Europe overall, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia give more to Africa than other CEE states. In this thesis, I problematize the notion that CEE development priorities can be taken for granted. I explore two research problems, the broader divergence of CEE countries from Africa and the within CEE divergence, by digging deeper into the social dynamics that have made the development practices of the CEE countries possible, with an emphasis on two case studies in Estonia and Slovakia. I add to the existing literature by examining how identity channels threats and aid priorities differently in different countries. I also argue that the normative environment is propitious for avoiding the norm of giving to Africa, allowing CEE countries space for maneuver. I further examine how NGOs and the OECD can be important norm entrepreneurs that influence CEE states' decisions. Moreover, healthy competition within the European region and low level of threat perception might lead states to turn towards Africa. The implications are that even though historically produced identities present a formidable obstacle to any attempt to diffuse development norms and practices, there are possibilities for influence even without groundbreaking historical events, if the EU and OECD better shape an unambiguous normative environment and NGOs make efforts to influence CEE countries when they hold sufficient expertise about a recipient country.

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INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades Central and Eastern European (CEE) states completed a giant leap from recipients of development assistance to foreign aid donors. Like older Western donors, they started to give aid to less advantaged states through bilateral cooperation. Unlike most Western donors though, they target their aid allocation towards Eastern and Southern Europe and not to the global South.[1] Researchers usually do not spend much time dwelling on this issue. For scholars, their aid allocation practices are all too self-evident for several reasons. First, the foreign policy priorities of the CEE countries have been situated in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. They have political and economic interests in the region. [2] Second, CEE states have considerably less to gain from cooperation with Africa than older Member States (MBs). Hence, they can "only draw on altruistic arguments of reducing extreme poverty".[3] Third, the path dependency approach predicts them to follow the communist inertia and maintain the previously existed political ties.[4] Fourth, they have 'comparative advantage' in the region where they can share their 'transition' experience. Cultural and linguistic affinities also make CEE countries (CEECs) more relevant in the region.[5] Fifth, lack of colonial and historical ties limits their institutional and organizational capacities.[6] Sixth, they are not "rich" enough to fragment their aid. Seventh, they have too

[1] Simon Lightfoot, "The Europeanisation of International Development Policies: The Case of Central and Eastern European States," *Europe-Asia Studies* 62, no. 2 (March 2010): 329–50.
[2] Ondřej Horký, *The Europeanisation of Development Policy: Acceptance, Accommodation and Resistance of the Czech Republic*, Discussion Paper (Bonn, Prague: German Development Institute, 2010), 13, http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/3329/pdf/DP_18.2010.pdf.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Balázs Szent-Iványi and András Tétényi, "Transition and Foreign Aid Policies in the Visegrád Countries: A Path Dependant Approach," *Transition Studies Review* 15, no. 3 (December 2008): 573–87.
[5] Martin Vittek and Simon Lightfoot, "The Europeanisation of Slovak Development Cooperation?," *Contemporary European Studies*, no. 1 (2009): 20–36.
[6] Szent-Iványi and Tétényi, "Transition and Foreign Aid Policies in the Visegrád Countries," 578.

few embassies and hence no logistical means in the region. Eighth, state do what they want to do with their money and do not care about opinion of others.

In this thesis, however, I take the position that the absence of the African dimension in CEE development policy is under-problematized and unjustifiably presented as too deterministic. The arguments mentioned above are certainly valid. But they do not present the whole picture. CEE states indeed have political and economic interests in the region. Their development engagement is "normal" behavior if we assume that countries primarily give aid following political and strategic considerations like post-colonial ties, political support, and trade.[7] But other scholars present "moral" factors as the underlying driver of development aid.[8] If some countries might indeed seem more pragmatic– like France, "others" appear to be more "moral" – like the Nordics[9].

National interest or colonial past cannot explain everything either. Austria, Ireland, Finland do not have much of a colonial past, if any, in sub-Saharan Africa. If countries were simply following their national interest, Austria, for example, would be giving the largest part of its bilateral budget to the Balkans, while Portugal would be giving more to Latin America or Northern Africa. But Austria and Portugal both give more to sub-Saharan Africa. Trade-driven/economic motivations for aid similarly leave much unexplained. For many CEE MSs, Eastern Partnership (EaP) and Balkan countries are not even among the top 10 or 20 leading trade partners[10].

[7] Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," *Journal of Economic Growth* 5, no. 1 (2000): 33–63; Alfred Maizels and Machiko Nissanke, "Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries," *World Development* 12, no. 9 (September 1984): 879–900; Peter J. Schraeder, Taylor Bruce, and Steven W. Hook, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French and Swedish Aid Flows," *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 294–323.
[8] David H. Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
[9] Alesina and Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?".
[10] See, for example, findings on inconsistent trade motivations for Hungary in Balázs Szent-Iványi, "Hungarian International Development Cooperation: Context, Stakeholders and Performance," in *Development Policies of Central and Eastern European States*, ed. Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň and Simon Lightfoot (London: Routledge, 2013), 50–66.

The income level / "richness" of a country alone cannot explain development choices either. In 2012, for example, Slovenia had noticeably higher GNI (in purchasing power parity),[11] than most other CEE Member States (MSs) and Portugal – Portugal still gives greater shares of the bilateral budget to sub-Saharan Africa. Czech Republic, Slovakia and Portugal have approximately equal GNI per capita. Poland and Hungary have approximately the same GNI but behave differently.

The argument that CEE MSs have a "comparative advantage" constituted by their transition experience, cultural and linguistic similarities is also prone to criticism. As Horky argues, transfer of the transition experience by CEECs in different political and temporal contexts is difficult and limited to restricted areas of public administration and civil society. Practical reliance on transition experience is very marginal. Hence, the transition experience argument is more of a myth than a reality.[12] Moreover, CEE states might have a comparative advantage in Africa because they do not have a colonial past and have not inherited a colonizer image.[13] Cultural and linguistic explanations might be countered by the fact that the donorship "business" has changed. New donors – like Brazil, India, Korea – successfully come to the regions where they have never been and rely on lingua franca – English or French.[14] After all, most CEE states have been sending considerable amounts of aid to Afghanistan where they have no prior connections or shared past. They could use their experience in Afghanistan to work in other regions in which they have not previously worked.

[11] See Appendix 3 for data.
[12] Ondřej Horký, "The Transfer of the Central and Eastern European 'Transition Experience' to the South: Myth or Reality?," in *Development Policies of Central and Eastern European States,* ed. Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň and Simon Lightfoot (London: Routledge, 2013), 17–33.
[13] Dominik Kopinski, "Visegrad Countries' Development Aid to Africa: Beyond the Rhetoric," in *Development Policies of Central and Eastern European States*, ed. Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň and Simon Lightfoot (London: Routledge, 2013), 43.
[14] Ibid., 42.

Finally, states do not always do with their money what they wish; they do care about the opinion of others. There are external and internal factors that would make CEE states want to go to Africa. On the external side, the EU, with its normative power ambition, would want them to be more "normal" and give to low income countries (LICs) rather than to middle income countries (MICs) of Eastern and South Eastern Europe. On the internal side, CEE states want to affirm their Western identity, part of which is constituted by being a norm-abiding donor.[15]

What is even more puzzling is that there is divergence within the CEE region. Some states (e.g. Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Poland) work with Africa in development, while others (e.g. Estonia and Lithuania) do not. All CEE states still give a larger portion of their bilateral aid budget to European countries. This enigma, why some states choose to put African countries on the list of partners at all, while others stay solely within the European region, remains unexplained.[16]

In this thesis, I address these two research problems, the broader divergence of CEECs from Western states and the within CEE divergence, by examining some of the conditions and social dynamics that have made the development practices of the CEECs possible. I will first add to the "self-evident" explanations of why CEE states do not work with Africa by saying that identity channels threats and aid priorities differently in different countries. Second, I will argue that the normative environment is propitious for avoiding the norm of giving to Africa. Turning to the question of within CEE divergence, I will examine how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) can be important norm entrepreneurs that influence

[15] Ela Drazkiewicz-Grodzicka, "From Recipient to Donor: The Case of Polish Development Cooperation," *Human Organization* 72, no. 1 (n.d.): 2013.
[16] See Appendices 2 and 1 for the list of development partner, program and project countries of CEECs and the graph on aid allocation of EU MSs.

CEE states' decisions. Moreover, healthy competition within the European region and low level of threat perception might lead states to turn towards Africa as well.

The structure of this paper is as follows. In the first chapter, I will establish the gap in the literature that I am addressing, set up the puzzle, my research questions and hypotheses. The second chapter will examine the hypotheses regarding why CEE states give less to Africa as a proportion of their bilateral budget than Western states, while in the third chapter, I will dwell on the divergent behavior within the CEE region. In the last chapter I will put the narratives together through the examination of two divergent cases of aid allocation – Estonia and Slovakia. I will then conclude with some reflections on the implications of this research.

Before getting further going though, let me take a moment to clarify a couple key concepts. First, throughout the thesis, I refer to aid allocations made to African countries. However, it should be emphasized that Africa here only serves as a referent for the low income countries more generally, as most LICs are located in Africa. Another reason for using Africa as a checkpoint is the EU commitment to increase aid to sub-Saharan Africa.[17] For the purpose of this thesis though, LICs and Africa are used interchangeably as CEE countries do not give to LICs in other regions with the rare exception of Cambodia or Laos.

Second, I will use the OECD definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA).[18] I will focus only on bilateral aid as states have little control over their multilateral assistance whereas bilateral aid is considered an instrument of foreign policy. Similarly, EU MSs have little control over their predefined contribution to the EU level development cooperation. Humanitarian aid is also excluded from the analysis as it is driven by another set of motivations.

Third, by CEE MSs are mean MSs that joined with the 2004 and 2007 enlargement waves – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia,

[17] See Chapter 1.2
[18] See Appendix 4.

Romania, Bulgaria. I exclude Malta and Cyprus as they face particular situation due to their geographic location, size and the need to accommodate conflict and mass migration.

CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW, THE PUZZLE, AND METHODOLOGY

1.1.Literature Review

As mentioned in the introduction, motivations to give aid vary from strategic, economic and political considerations to moral reasons. But regardless of the reason, where does the aid go?

The studies analyzing aid flows before 1990 demonstrate that foreign aid was given to recipients regardless of their income levels.[19] However, Bandyopadhyay and Wall[20] reverse these conclusions by demonstrating that countries with lower levels of income receive more foreign aid. Furuoka and Munir[21] examined evidence for 2000-2005 and showed that Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors tend to provide more money to poorer countries. Importantly, they also found that Sub-Saharan Africa emerges as a major recipient of aid pushing in the background countries in Europe, Central Asia and other regions.[22] This trend is the first step in setting-up my question: why do CEECs deviate from the trend?

CEE donors. Aid allocation

The journey of the CEE states from recipients of aid to donors is relatively well-documented.[23] CEE states face common challenges in their development assistance:

[19] Leonard Dudley and Claude Montmarquette, "A Model of the Supply of Bilateral Foreign Aid.," *American Economic Review* 66, no. 1 (1976): 132–42; William N. Trumbull and Howard J. Wall, "Estimating Aid-Allocation Criteria with Panel Data," *The Economic Journal* 104, no. 425 (July 1994): 876.

[20] Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Howard J. Wall, *The Determinants of Aid in the Post-Cold War Era*, Working Paper Series (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2006).

[21] Fumitaka Furuoka and Qaiser Munir, "An Empirical Analysis of the Motivations behind Foreign Aid Distribution," *The IUP Journal of Applied Economics* X, no. 2 (2011): 28–39.

[22] Ibid., 29–30.

[23] Sven Grimm and Adele Harmer, *Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid. Aid Donorship in Central Europe*, HPG Background Paper (London: Overseas Development institute, 2005), http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/418.pdf; Ondřej Horký and Simon Lightfoot, "From Aid Recipients to Aid Donors? Development Policies of Central and Eastern European States," in *Development Policies of Central and Eastern European States*, ed. Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň and Simon Lightfoot (London: Routledge, 2013), 1–17; Evelin Andrespok and Andres Ilmar Kasekamp, "Development Cooperation of the Baltic States: A Comparison of the Trajectories of Three New Donor Countries," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 13, no. 1 (April 2012): 117–30.

designing policies, setting priorities, increasing the volume of ODA, strengthening institutions, and establishing a position within the EU donor community.[24]

The main factors of aid allocation for Visegrad states are considered to be geographical proximity, earlier relations (Soviet period), and security commitments (through NATO)[25]. In line with my research problematic, Szent-Ivanyi argues that aid allocation in the region is not primarily influenced by the level of poverty or previous performance of recipient countries.[26] Explaining why not, Szent-Ivany suggests that CEE states might have different motivations to give aid, and thus, behave differently from established DAC donors. Kopinsky[27] goes on and examines specifically aid allocation to Africa by Visegrad countries. He finds that although Visegrad states have committed to development in Sub-Saharan Africa these policies are little more than rhetoric.

International influences

The OECD is considered to have a more indirect influence on CEECs by shaping the EU development policy and directly and indirectly pressuring the CEECs to adopt specific practices of international cooperation.[28] However, the mechanism of DAC membership adds to the OECD influence has not been elaborated upon.

The EU accession is considered to be the main driver towards the establishment of ODA.[29] However, EU influence after the accession seems to be very low. Several researchers applied the Europeanization and socialization framework to trace the adoption of the EU practices in CEE states. There is a unanimous conclusion that Europeanization of the

[24] Maja Bucar and Mojmir Mrak, "Challenges of Development Cooperation for EU New Member States," in *ABCDE World Bank Conference* (Bled, Slovenia, 2007), 1–34, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDESLO2007/Resources/PAPERABCDEBucarMrak.pdf.
[25] Balázs Szent-Iványi, "Aid Allocation of the Emerging Central and Eastern European Donors," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 15, no. 1 (2012): 65–89.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Kopinski, "Visegrad Countries' Development Aid to Africa: Beyond the Rhetoric."
[28] Horký and Lightfoot, "From Aid Recipients to Aid Donors? Development Policies of Central and Eastern European States," 2–3.
[29] Lightfoot, "The Europeanisation of International Development Policies," 332.

development policies of CEE states is very shallow. Although the CEE officials have learned the rhetoric of the EU and DAC, there is little sign of implementation. Countries often act against such EU principles as poverty-orientation, untied aid, and focused aid. [30] They fall behind primarily in such areas as the quantity of aid; the geographical focus and priority given to aid; and the institutions responsible for development policy.[31] This shallow implementation is explained as being derived from limited socialization of the CEE states. This limited socialization in turn is attributed to low domestic resonance with the development acquis and weakness of domestic norm entrepreneurs.[32]

NGOs

Civil society in the CEE states is generally considered to be underperforming and less developed than civil society in "old" EU MSs.[33] Bucar[34] comes to similar conclusions but from a post-structuralist point of view. Unlike in the West, civil society in Slovenia risks losing its function as a watchdog and lobbyist. NGOs are often dependent on the government for funding and tend to ally with the government, which might lead to further depoliticization of the foreign aid and disengagement of the public. Given that civil society is recognized as a major contributor to the development cooperation[35] CEE development policy consequently misses this critical contribution.

[30] Szent-Iványi, "Hungarian International Development Cooperation: Context, Stakeholders and Performance"; Vittek and Lightfoot, "The Europeanisation of Slovak Development Cooperation?"; Horký, *The Europeanisation of Development Policy*.
[31] Lightfoot, "The Europeanisation of International Development Policies."
[32] Simon Lightfoot and Balázs Szent-Iványi, "Reluctant Donors? The Europeanization of International Development Policies in the New Member States: Reluctant Donors?," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, March 2014, 1–16.
[33] Tanja Börzel, "Why You Don't Always Get What You Want: EU Enlargement and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe," *Acta Politica* 45, no. 1–2 (2010): 1–10.
[34] Maja Bučar, "Involving Civil Society in the International Development Cooperation of 'New' EU Member States: The Case of Slovenia," in *Development Policies of Central and Eastern European States*, ed. Ondřej Horký-Hlucháň and Simon Lightfoot (London: Routledge, 2013), 83–100.
[35] Marjorie Lister and Maurizio Carbone, "Integrating Gender and Civil Society into EU Development Policy," in *New Pathways in International Development: Gender and Civil Society in EU Policy*, ed. Marjorie Lister and Maurizio Carbone (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 1–14.

A recent study carried out in nine CEE states gives a thorough insight on the role of civil society in development cooperation and aid effectiveness. The authors note that civil society could play a much greater role in development cooperation and give a detailed account of non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) activities and challenges they face.

1.2. An effort at problematization and addressing gaps in the literature

Overall, there are several gaps in the literature that I will address in the thesis. First, the current patterns of aid allocation of CEE are mostly taken for granted, even though they should not be for several reasons. CEE states are not totally independent in their foreign policy. The main culprit in the sovereignty deficiency is the EU. Although debates about states' resistance to Europeanization of foreign policy are far from being over[36], most agree that there are certain restrictions on the freedom of foreign policy action on MSs.

Whereas "hard" EU laws are clearer and less debatable cases of EU influence on states, soft laws have power as well.[37] Most regulations regarding development assistance in the EU are soft norms. Bilateral ODA is the competence of states and hence the Commission has only limited means to influence it. Nevertheless, MSs commit to certain requirements although they are not sanctioned in a legally defined way for not obeying them.

To join the EU, new MSs were obliged to establish development cooperation departments and start giving out development aid. All MSs have to follow the EU development cooperation acquis including European Consensus on Development. According to the Consensus, "the primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the

[36] See, for example, Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
[37] For more on soft law, see Gerda Falkner et al., *Complying with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)."[38] Although EU norms allow MSs to focus on the areas and countries where they can add value and where they have comparative advantage – which often means targeting middle-income countries, the EU prioritizes least-developed and other low income countries. The EU as a whole and all MSs have committed to increasing the budget for development cooperation to 0.7% of GNI by 2015. The countries that joined after 2002 committed to increase their development cooperation budgets to 0.33% of GNI by 2015. "At least half of this increase in aid will be allocated to Africa, while fully respecting individual Member States priorities' in development assistance"[39]. Hence, combination of EU insistence and public commitment by the MSs would be expected to lead to increased focus on Africa.

More importantly, the EU values a status as a normative power. The EU cherishes its ideational force and, as I. Manners influentially defined it, its "ability to shape the conceptions of "normal" in international relations".[40] By committing to maintain high flows of aid to sub-Saharan Africa, the EU has attempted to make it "normal" to help the poorest. Promotion of norms is placed in the center of EU relations with the world but also with its own MSs. If the EU wants to keep the normative power crown (and it does), it gets to be able to inspire consistent behavior of its MSs.

CEE states also would be expected to give to Africa or other LDCs because they care about the symbolic power and social meaning of being a donor who is recognized by both recipients and other donors.[41] Donorship advances the states who give to the top of the global hierarchy of power by giving donors more and more control over social and political life of

[38] European Parliament, Council, Commission, "The European Consensus on Development," *Official Journal of the European Union*, no. C46/1 (2006).
[39] "Council Conclusions on 'First Annual Report to the European Council on EU Development Aid Targets'" (Council of the European Union, 2011).
[40] Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): 239, doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00353.
[41] Drazkiewicz-Grodzicka, "From Recipient to Donor: The Case of Polish Development Cooperation."

the recipients.[42] CEE states attribute particularly strong importance to these relations as they experienced probably most intense and rapid shift from being those who need assistance – means from being at the bottom of the hierarchy – to being those who are capable of and choose to provide assistance – meaning advancing to the top of the hierarchy.[43] To be recognized by the donor community, new members have to follow the established norms.[44]

Therefore, one problem is that the divergence of the CEE and old MSs in development priorities has been overlooked altogether. Where explanations are available, they are not irrelevant, but they are incomplete and remain too often at the surface level. For example, while Lightfoot and Szent-Ivany suggest that Visegrad socialization in EU development policy has not taken place simply because of lack of CEE participation in meetings and lack of domestic resonance for development in Africa, this ignores the active politics through which CEE countries have engaged to maneuver around EU expectations. It has, in fact, not always been easy for CEE countries to avoid aid allocation to Africa, to pursue self-interest or domestic preferences under this game of EU rules. In a similar vein, the existing literature has not adequately examined the social mechanisms of OECD and EU influence toward the CEE. Even while direct pressure may not be observed on the surface level, it is worth digging in and considering more indirect channels of influence. Existing studies also do not account for or adequately appreciate the nuances regarding the influence of NGOs on CEE development policy. Rather than being dismissed in one lump, there is space to dig much deeper to understand the success and failure of NGOs in specific contexts in wielding influence over CEE geographic development priorities. Another unexplored and plausible angle to consider CEE aid allocation is the role of security threats, not as

[42] Clive Barnett and David Land, "Geographies of Generosity: Beyond the 'Moral Turn,'" *Geoforum* 38, no. 6 (n.d.): 1065–75.
[43] Drazkiewicz-Grodzicka, "From Recipient to Donor: The Case of Polish Development Cooperation."
[44] A.Maurits Van der Veen, *Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

"objective" drivers of policy, but as constituting perceptions that are first channeled through different historically produced identities before they shape development priorities. Finally, the abovementioned studies focus on Visegrad states as they are most advanced in the region. While it is useful to consider them separately, there would also be great value to put them in a comparative perspective with other CEE states. Doing so may allow us to highlight how some differences that have emerged within the CEE and make an analytical effort at tracing their sources. With this in mind, I now highlight my two puzzles, one of which has not yet been considered by scholars, this is the divergence in aid allocation toward Africa even within the CEE.

1.3.Two puzzles in search of resolution

As I have already alluded in previous discussion, in this thesis, I explore two research questions. The first concerns a divergence in aid allocation to Africa between the old EU MSs and the CEE. Although the EU has not adopted any express regulation that Africa should receive more than other regions, there is a pattern among EU MSs leading in this direction. However there is a difference in patterns between old MSs and those that joined in 2004 and later. All the old EU MSs, except for Greece, give proportionally more money to Africa. Importantly, sub-Saharan Africa receives more than Northern Africa. All the "new" MSs give proportionally more to European countries– either Eastern Partnership countries or southern neighbors – and to Afghanistan, which is connected to the NATO mission there.

More interestingly, there is divergence in aid allocation patterns within the CEE MSs. Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia give more to Africa than other CEE states, although they still give more to Europe. Visegrad states and Slovenia have African and low-income Asian countries as partner countries whereas others do not. What explains this divergence within the region? An easy answer will be that states are different and have different interests.

Nevertheless, I believe that there are enough similarities between CEE states to find common factors that would help understand their behavior in development cooperation.

Thus, I will address two research questions:

1. *In comparison with Western European states, why do CEE MSs give a greater percentage of their bilateral aid budget to European countries, which are mostly middle-income countries, and less to low-income countries, specifically Africa?*

2. *Why do some CEE MSs work with and give more to LICs, specifically Africa, than other CEE MSs?*

It is very important to have good answers to these questions. By answering them, we may gain not only a better theoretical understanding of development aid decisions in the CEE, but may be able to highlight some possibilities for change in these practices in the future, changes that presumably some actors might want or not want. Through closer examination, we may further learn some lessons regarding the mechanisms of socialization in the EU and OECD, NGO influence in development, and how security threats channel development priorities differently in different countries, all elements that are tangibly linked with CEE development decisions. The broader divergence and within group divergence in giving to Africa, therefore, presents an invaluable analytical opportunity to discern how certain mechanisms of Europeanization have worked and may be better tweaked in the future to promote certain goals.

1.4 Methodology

To address the questions, I conducted interviews in Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia. I corroborate my findings with textual analysis of official documents and statements and secondary literature, some elements of discourse analysis, and face-value data analysis. In other words, I rely on what constructivists refer to as triangulation (mixed methods in

positivist terminology) – using multiple methods to ensure an incisive account and cross-verify the data from different sources[45]

I conducted semi-structured interviews with officials from Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), representatives of think tanks and NGDOs. These are the people who are involved in formulation and implementation of development assistances. I attempted to balance the voice of the officials with the voice of civil society and think tank members.

I treat CEE countries as a group. Some other researchers separate CEE countries into groups – Visegrad (+Slovenia), the Baltic states, 2007 accession states.[46] However, I agree with those who believe that despite their diversity in donorship practices, CEE countries face similar challenges with regard to development assistance[47], that there is not enough evidence to create alternative groupings[48] and hence, that these countries can be studied together.[49]

Moreover, I believe that treating them as separate groups in isolation might be counterproductive for my purposes. The states' behavior in donorship is not written in stone. I believe that there are possibilities for change. Treating states as separate groups fixes the differences. But treating them as one group makes it possible to understand how certain behavior can be transferable to other states. The caveat here is that examination of the region as a whole might make statements too general and too conceptual. That's why I also run two case studies. They shed light on how the factors that I believe matters – perception of security, NGOs, socialization, and norm entrepreneurs – are interwoven in a specific country.

[45] For more on triangulation Vincent Pouliot, "'Sobjectivism': Toward a Constructivist Methodology," *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 2 (2007): 359–84. In

[46] Studies that used this methodology, see, for example, Maria Francesca Vencato, "The Development Policy of the CEECs: The EU Political Rationale between the Fight against Poverty and the near Abroad" (PhD Thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven), accessed May 31, 2014, https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/1979/1008/2/phdthesis-mfv07.pdf.

[47] Grimm and Harmer, *Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid. Aid Donorship in Central Europe*.

[48] Bucar and Mrak, "Challenges of Development Cooperation for EU New Member States."

[49] Lightfoot, "The Europeanisation of International Development Policies."

For my case studies I chose Estonia and Slovak Republic. These countries are on different ends of the continuum. In Estonia, the factors conspired to keep Estonia focused on the neighborhood. In Slovakia, the contingencies made LICs program countries and Kenya the largest single recipient of Slovak aid.

CHAPTER 2. NOT GIVING TO AFRICA: PERCEPTIONS AND CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY

Leaving most empirical findings for the case study chapter, in this chapter I will propose generalized and conceptualized answers to the first research question:

In comparison with Western European states, why do CEE MSs give a greater percentage of their bilateral aid budget to European countries, which are mostly middle-income countries, and less to low-income countries, specifically Africa?

2.1."Objective" security:

My **default hypothesis 1-1-1** states that *CEE states give less to Africa because the threat to their security is coming objectively from the Balkans or Eastern Europe, while* Western European states give more to Africa because the threat to their security is coming from African countries. This hypothesis is based on the premise that states respond to structurally conditioned security threat and allocate foreign aid to the locus of the security threat attempting to prevent or terminate the security breach.[50]

To define the target aid recipients in line with this hypothesis, one need to know what threatens the state and where the threat is located. In general, there is observable convergence among Western states in prioritizing certain threats. While little open reference made to the possibility of conventional aggression and the need to strengthen territorial defense, Western European states focus on combating international terrorism and preventing dissemination of

[50] On changing nature of security threat, see Robert I. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002): 85–96. Peter Burnell, "Foreign Aid Resurgent: New Spirit or Old Hangover?," in *Building the New International Financial Architecture: Issues, Challenges and Agendas*, ed. Tony Addison and George Mavrotas (London and Helsinki: Palgrave-Macmillan/UNU-WIDER, 2005).

weapons of mass destruction; responding to climate change or extreme poverty throughout the world that generates organized crime and migration.[51]

Besides the remote instabilities, significance of which is magnified by globalization, European states also look at their backyard. The first priority is expected to be the Balkans where the prospects of stability are uncertain.[52] Hence, for the states that are located closer to the Balkans considerations of security might be important drivers of foreign aid to the region.

Whereas there have been no violent conflicts in other areas of immediate neighborhood[53], there is a perception of possibility of one. Again, the perception of feasibility of aggression or conflict differs. The Baltic states and Poland are seriously concerned about their physical security that might be threatened by Russia. After the 2008 war in Georgia that Poland and the Baltic states succeeded in persuading the NATO to develop for them first contingency plans since the end of the Cold War.[54] Believing that their physical security is at risk, Eastern European states are expected to use development aid as an instrument to stabilize the region.

Conventional security explanation does not explain however why similarly situated older EU MSs do not similarly follow their structurally presupposed interest. It does not explain why Italy and Austria, for example, nevertheless give proportionally more aid to sub-Saharan Africa. Austria would be expected to focus on the Balkans as much as Hungary or

[51] See, for example, "Defence Policy Guidelines" (German Ministry of Defence, May 27, 2011).; "Austria. Securirty and Defence Doctrine," 3, accessed May 30, 2014, http://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=3604.; Federica Di Camillo and Interview8 Marta, *National Security Strategies: The Italian Case*, Working Paper (Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute, n.d.).; "Spanish Security Strategy. Everyone's Responsibility," 2011, 2–3, http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/nr/rdonlyres/ef784340-ab29-4dfc-8a4b-206339a29bed/0/spanishsecuritystrategy.pdf. "White Paper 2006 on Germany Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr" (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006).; "Spanish Security Strategy. Everyone's Responsibility," 26–29, 3.

[52] See security strategies cited above.

[53] The conflict in Ukraine is not included into the analysis as the available data on aid allocation does not cover the year 2014.

[54] Ian Traynor, "WikiLeads Cables Reveal Secret NATO Plans to Defend Baltics from Russia," *The Guardian*, December 6, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/06/wikileaks-cables-nato-russia-baltics.

Slovenia does. Italy would be concerned both about the Balkans and Northern Africa taking into consideration migration flows from there. Finland also seems to disrespect its security and strategic interests in the neighborhood.[55]

The conventional security explanation, hence, leaves us with an incomplete picture of what drives the states – whose perception of threat of annihilation is arguably completely rational and that in any case have small budgets to prevent the threat – to routinely and persistently care about keeping their small stakes in the region. It does not tell enough about why structurally similarly situated states behave differently in development aid allocation. For a deeper understanding of this "why", I now turn to identity and ideational factors to check whether it explains what is ignored by physical security argument. I argue that identity plays a significant role in channeling specific threats to the foreground for each European MS, thereby in turn constituting the possibility for different aid allocations. What matters here is the perception and understanding of threat, which is driven not merely by the structural position of the states but also by their understanding of the Self and their digesting of history.

2.2.Security of the Self

My **Hypothesis 1-1-2** states that *CEE states give less to Africa as they act upon "who they are" and the need for stability of "who they are".*

On the surface, security strategies and development policy documents of CEE states largely resemble the EU level ones in their reliance on security and development nexus and addressing the issues of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and crime.[56]

[55] As expressed in "Finland's Foreign and Security Policy," *Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland*, accessed May 30, 2014, http://www.formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=32280&contentlan=2&culture=en-US.

[56] Compare the documents in the previous section with,e.g., Estonian and Slovak strategies. For discussion on security-development nexus, see, eg.Björn Hettne, "Development and Security: Origins and Future," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 1 (2010): 31–52.

But to understand the development aid practices in Central and Eastern Europe, one should look beyond the rhetoric about security threats posed by terrorism, organized crime, and migration. Because of their unique histories and the Cold War heritage, the range of security threats for the CEECs diverges from that of Western European countries to include other threats too. In particular, their sense of belonging to Europe and continued fear of the past heightens their sensitivity to threats in the neighborhood, as compared with other European countries.

The notion of ontological security can particularly help us understand how identity foregrounds problems in the neighborhood for the CEECs, but not to the same extent for Western European countries. States are concerned about their ontological security.[57] As J.Mitzen put it, "states not only seek to secure their territory and governance structure; they also seek to secure their identity as a particular kind of actor".[58] Ontological security might be more important than physical security as it affirms "how a state sees itself" and "how it wants to be seen by others"[59]. States seek consistent understanding of the "Self", which is maintained and constituted through a certain narrative. This narrative frames the routinized foreign policy actions.[60] I treat development aid as part of the foreign policy actions that are grounded in and are aimed at maintaining the consistent identity of the states. By routinizing its development assistance, CEE states constitute and maintain the narrative of their consistent "Self". Daily practices and routine of giving aid reiterates how they see themselves and provides the "sense of continuity" of their unstable and recently disrupted identity. Definitely, the logic of routinized giving serves the identitary needs of the Western states as

[57] Bill McSweeny, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jef Huysmans, "Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier," *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (n.d.): 226–55.
[58] Jennifer Mitzen, "Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security," *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 2 (2006): 272.
[59] Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations. Self-Identity and the IR State* (London: Routledge, 2008), 2–3.
[60] Ibid.

well. I will demonstrate, however, that the CEE states have certain shared constituents of their identity that are not as salient for identities of Western European states.

How does ontological security make CEE states different from Western European states? For CEE states, the feeling of instability and discontinuity of their identity, the feeling of ontological insecurity, is particularly acute. After centuries of being "othered" and often occupied or colonized, Central Europe celebrated the interwar period that brought sovereignty and national statehood as justice long owed to them. Their search for identity in relation to more powerful neighbors finally received prospects for success. Soviet occupation and socialist times crossed out their aspirations. Central Europe found in the West a logical ally. Identification with the West gradually transformed into the cornerstone of identity.[61]

Since 1990s, CEECs have been trying to reinstate themselves as a "particular kind of actor" and re-acquire the identity that they believed was lost during the socialist times. But unlike other Western states, they build their current identity on the relatively fresh memory of the times of the lost identity and in opposition to what oppressed it. This makes CEECs more vulnerable and receptive to any threat to their new identity. Fear of instability of this new identity substantiates the need to constantly reaffirm it and remind of who they are through daily relations with others.

The mechanism of identity maintenance works through routinized foreign policy actions, which make self-identity predictable and stable. Donorship is especially salient area of foreign policy as it allows the states to reiterate who they are both through reference to one's Western, democratic, and moral character and confirmation of this character by others. Through following the script of donorship CEE states acquire internal and external stabilization of their self-identity.

[61] For more on "Other(s)" in Central Europe, see Alexandra Tieanu, "From Alterity to Identity : A Central European View of Europe at the End of the Twentieth Century," *Journal of the LUCAS Graduate Conference*, no. 1 (2013): 20–31.

CEECs are different from Western European states not only in their greater need for ontological security. They are also different in their available knowledge and ideational resources that they believe help them be successful in donorship. They need ideas to pursue through foreign aid and experience to accomplish it. These ideas are in turn informed by who they are. With the emphasis on democratic constituent of their identity, the process of stabilization develops in reference to democracy. To reiterate the democratic component of identity through donorship they feel a need for democracy to be part of their foreign aid projects. The non-democratic "other" located in the neighborhood brings the risk of the return to the Central Europe's own past, which they try to escape. Consequently, post-socialist countries offer ideal environment for both using donorship as an identity stabilization mechanism and counteracting the perceived ontological threat.

The particular identity informed through historical legacies also defines their overall perception of threat. CEE states differ from the Western states in being more alert towards the East and potential conflict coming from the East.

Thus, analysis of the history of Central European states and peculiarities of its identity helps better understand the drivers of donorship practice in the region. CEE states follow the need to stabilize their identity through foreign policy routines that are focused on perceived ontological threat. The perception of physical insecurity becomes reliant on the ontological threat. Because the threat is perceived as coming from the East, CEE states would have to overcome certain cognitive dissonance if they were to give to engage in donorship practices outside the region.

2-3. Resistance to norm diffusion

In this section, I will examine how the external normative environment for the CEECs provides space for maneuver in how they channel their identity driven behavior.

I propose **Hypothesis 1-2** that states *that CEE MSs are able to avoid the norm of giving to LICs and to legitimately focus on Eastern and Southern European countries because the EU tries to promote competing norms – aid effectiveness and giving to LICs*.

Europeanization: socialization, and conditions for norms diffusion

Taking into consideration that EU *development acquis* is a set of mostly soft unenforceable norms, the expectation that CEE states are to give aid to the LICs rests on the assumption that there is a norm, which is diffused to CEE states and in which CEE states are socialized. But are the conditions created in the EU sufficient for this diffusion to occur and for CEE states to accept the norm?

The processes of norm convergence, state adaptation to norms and corresponding policy change within the EU context have been defined broadly as "Europeanization". I will refer to the following two approaches to Europeanization: top-down, associated with downloading, and bottom-up, associated with uploading. I will define top-down Europeanization as "a process of incorporation in the logic of domestic discourse, political structures and public policies of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined in the EU policy processes'.[62] The bottom-up Europeanization refers to the reverse process: influences of states on EU policies.

Braun[63] suggests that there are two roads to Europeanization of MSs and state socialization into EU norms: via officials participating in the EU level processes and via norms entrepreneurs. The first pathway is explained through the socialization literature[64] and

[62] Kyriakos Moumoutzis, "Still Fashionable yet Useless? Addressing Problems with Research on the Europeanization of Foreign Policy," *JCMS* 49, no. 3 (2011): 612.
[63] Mats Braun, "EU Climate Norms in East-Central Europe: EU Climate Norms in East-Central Europe," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 52, no. 3 (2014): 445–60.
[64] Jeffrey Checkel, "International Institutions as Community Builders," in *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, ed. Jeffrey Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jan Beyers, "Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials," in

examines how civil servants collectively construct a logic of appropriateness for MS action. Explanations for the second pathway derive from the literature on norm diffusion.[65] Touching upon both of these pathways, Lightfoot and Szent-Ivanyi[66] looked at socialization and top-down Europeanization as a mechanism of the transmission of norms of development acquis in Visegrad countries. They came to the conclusion that V4 countries did not adopt the norms because of an unconducive environment for socialization – there was deficient participation of domestic officials in the processes of EU policy formulation and implementation leading to low legitimacy of development acquis in new MSs.

Adding to this existing framework on CEE socialization, I will focus on the norm diffusion approach and conditions that made possible *uploading* by CEE states of their agenda. The lack of adoption of EU development norms was not just about lack of participation in meetings, but also was constituted by active politics on the part of the CEECs to weave their way toward greater flexibility in their development focus. Before we examine how precisely the CEECs wedged out this flexibility though, we must first considered the normative environment that made this maneuvering possible.

Finnemore and Sikkink identify several conditions that make international norms successful. States must seek to enhance their reputation by adopting international norms. Norms must be universalistic, specific, and unambiguous and be congruent with belief systems that transcend specific culture and political concepts.[67]

Some of these requirements apply to the norm of giving to low income countries (LICs), specifically Africa. States seek international legitimation to enhance their reputation

International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, ed. Jeffrey Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[65] Marta Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917; Kai Alderson, "Making Sense of State Socialization," *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 3 (2001): 415–33.

[66] Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, "Reluctant Donors?".

[67] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 907.

and esteem[68]; it is also a universalistic norm that appeals to the Western values of human dignity, and solidarity.

However, giving aid to Africa is only a part of a set of norms that comprise the development acquis. The norm 'giving to Africa' might conflict with other norms, particularly 'aid effectiveness'. CEE states often make an argument that they have to choose between Africa and effectiveness. They cannot deliver effective aid in Africa where, as Polish official put it, they "do not have embassies and know very little about the countries".[69] The aid effectiveness ensured through the CEE states' cultural knowledge about Eastern European countries and transition experience becomes recurrent part of national strategies for development.[70] Hence, CEE states can claim their normative compliance through abiding by one out of two competing and contradictory norms.

Second, poverty eradication is not a specific norm. It is an umbrella super-norm.[71]Many measures fall under the poverty eradication strategies in different sectors. Moreover, CEE states used the changing situation in the global donorship landscape to decouple poverty eradication principle from LICs.[72] With the emergence of non-Western donors like China, Russia, Brazil and graduation of countries like China and India from WorldBank LIC group, the argument that millions of people in formally middle-income countries live in poverty receives powerful support from emerging actors and acquires rhetorical soundness. Giving to MICs hence becomes a legitimate practice.[73]

The Czech presidency came very timely in 2008. Skillful management of the agenda and alliance-building allowed the CEE states to channel their rhetorical argument, incorporate

[68] See Section 2.2 and Chapter 1.
[69] Interview6
[70] See, for example, Multiannual development cooperation program for 2012-2015, Poland.
[71] For 'super-norm' concept, see Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and David Hulme, "International Norm Dynamics and 'the End of Poverty': Understanding the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)," *Global Governance* 17 (2011): 17–36.
[72] For debates on poverty eradication and LICs v. MICs, see Simon Maxwell, *Too Much Aid to Middle Income Countries? The EU's Aid Allocation Conundrum* (EDCSP, 2011).
[73] On how states construct normative arguments, see Chapter 5.1. Estonia.

the Eastern dimension in the EU development preferences and thereby accommodate their foreign policy priorities.[74]

Hence, CEE states have a possibility of rhetorical action created by unspecification of the 'poverty eradication' norm and existence of what they present of conflicting norms – 'giving to Africa' and 'aid effectiveness'. This served as a condition for CEE states to upload their preferences to the EU level and argue that their behavior is legitimate. Normative constraints imposed by social structure were not rigid enough to 'normalize' CEE states'.

[74] Horký, *The Europeanisation of Development Policy*, 21–22.

CHAPTER 3. IN-REGION DIVERGENCE

In this chapter I will state my answers to the second research question: *Why do some CEE MSs work with and give more to LICs, specifically Africa, than other CEE MSs?*

3.1. In-region socialization.

Further drawing on socialization effects, I will introduce the following hypothesis 2-1:

Countries are likely to be pulled towards the leader state in terms of EU development practices in their socialization group. Countries in the peer group with the most exemplary state in following EU development norms are more likely to give to Africa.

I will try to demonstrate that there **is two-vector socialization in CEE**. One vector is outward looking –CEE states socialize within the EU. The second vector is inward-looking – some CEE states socialize within smaller inside-CEE groups. Although I was not able to establish direct causal links between inner-CEE socialization and decisions to initiate development cooperation with Africa, it might be possible to attribute cooperation with Africa to sub-regional socialization and competition.

Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary have had African countries as priority countries since the early 2000s. The Baltic states and Bulgaria do not list African countries nor LICs other than Afghanistan as priority countries. Romania allows for possibility of projects in Northern Africa after 2011. Slovenia announced the launch of cooperation with Cape Verde and supports occasional projects in Africa. What makes the Visegrad4 more Africa-oriented?

The most visible arena for socialization for Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, is cooperation through Visegrad group. Although it is not firmly institutionalized and Visegrad states often have divergent foreign policies, it is an important platform for discussion and comparison. First, officials at high and lower levels meet regularly to coordinate their activities in the EU anddiscuss the work of Visegrad Fund. Officials

acknowledge that it is "a mechanism of coordination" that keeps them "updated on what others are doing and how they are doing things".[75] In other words, there is a creation of shared reference space and shared knowledge of what is possible in development cooperation.

Second, closer cooperation also goes hand in hand with "healthy competition"[76]. The states are motivated to keep up the pace the others are setting. As soon as there is a "leader" state, the competitor state tries to catch up, creating the "crowd effect" and leading everybody in a similar direction. As an interviewed Polish official acknowledged, "Poland cannot fall behind Czech Republic". The same official also admitted, with some regret, that "Poland has learned and is yet to learn from Czechs in development cooperation area.[77] The learning element is even more apparent in the case of Slovakia. A Slovak official shared: "When I do not know how to do something I ask the Czechs."

The competition and crowd effect became apparent again when three Visegrad countries made a decision to join OECD DAC. Czech Republic was the first one to announce the decision to join. A Polish official noted that "for years many [officials in Poland] were convinced that DAC is useless and requires too much paperwork". Hence, Poland made no efforts to convert its observer status into full membership. But after "we learned that Czechs are joining DAC, it took us two months to do the same."[78] Similar logic led Slovakia to join. Slovaks saw that "everyone is joining", so "we could not say that we will not join".[79]

For Slovakia, and apparently, for other states in the region, "everyone" means three or four states (Hungary has recently fallen behind, which, as a Slovak official argued, might be "connected to the effects of financial crisis in the country and IMF loans"[80]). Not giving to

[75] Interview7
[76] Interview6
[77] Interview6
[78] Interview6
[79] Interview8
[80] Interview8

Africa was not an option in this particular group context. Giving to Africa, even if the amounts are mostly symbolic, is perceived as part of donorship practice. When asked why they decided to give to Africa, officials from Slovakia and Poland used the wording of the international norms: "development aid targets poverty, and most poor countries are in Africa."[81] Officials from Czech Republic also attributed the existence of an African dimension in their development policy to the "clear EU push".[82] The shared assumption of appropriateness of cooperation with non-European countries, which existed in a shared reference space, explains why these countries, unlike other CEE countries, followed this push.

For non-Visegrad CEE states, on the contrary, not giving to Africa was an option. They have not had the second-tier socialization and did not have an alternative socialization platform lead by an "excelling" peer.

3.2. NGOs

Relating back to the topic of domestic norm entrepreneurship, I introduce hypothesis 2-2:

If civil society organizations have a greater say in formulating state's development policy and have prior involvement in the recipient country, the state is more likely to establish development cooperation with the recipient country.

The literature agrees that NGDOs in CEE are generally underdeveloped, dependent on the government, and hence, expected to side with it.[83] Furthermore, NGOs are expected to work in the neighboring countries because of previously established connections, linguistic and cultural similarities.

[81] Interview7
[82] Szent-Iványi and Tétényi, "Transition and Foreign Aid Policies in the Visegrád Countries," 579.
[83] See Chapter 1.1.

Nevertheless, it turned out that under certain conditions NDGOs play an important role. Although systematic information about activities of CEE NGOs in the beginning of the 2000s is not available, some provisional conclusions can be nevertheless drawn to create hints for further deeper investigation.

Even in the states that ran development cooperation programs during the socialist era, foreign aid programs were interrupted and institutional memory to a large degree lost.[84] Despite the fact that CEE states received a lot of organizational support from Canadian International Development Agency and other agencies, no one clearly knew what to do and how to do it. But as in a typical situation of organizational uncertainty and critical juncture[85], NGOs with specialized expertise and ideas that resonate with norms and goals benefited from propitious environment of high receptivity. NGOs with a demonstrated record of working in non-European countries had an opportunity to enter the discussion and convince the decision-makers that cooperation with Africa is feasible. Moreover, they could engage in rhetorical action by referring to the international norms of giving to the LDCs and framing the emerging development policy in terms of poverty reduction, global solidarity, and cooperation with Global South.[86]

Countries with more developed NGOs in general might also be more likely to turn to African or other LICs for similar reasons. First, more advanced civil society is likely to have more organizations with diverse interests including those who work in Africa. Second, they have a potential to serve as a partner to the government, especially in the common for the region situation when development cooperation departments are understaffed and rely on civil society for the implementation of the projects. They also create demand for the governmental money. Hence, the government is more likely to establish a real, rather than

[84] Szent-Iványi and Tétényi, "Transition and Foreign Aid Policies in the Visegrád Countries."
[85] Hillel Soifer, "The Causal Logic of Critical Juncture," *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 12 (2012): 1572–97.
[86] For how this scenario may play out, see Chapter 4. Slovakia.

paper based only, dialogue with the civil society and have its voices heard. Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia are cited as countries with more advanced civil societies and institutionalized functioning dialogue between civil society and the government.[87] Coincidentally or not, these countries also have non-European countries as their past and current priority or partner countries (Slovenia recently started institutionalized cooperation with Cape Verde).

It indeed does not make much sense to have cooperation with countries whether the state has neither diplomatic representations (and many CEE states have no or very few diplomatic missions in Africa) nor domestic NGOs as potential reliable implementers of the state's programs. The recent survey of the role of civil society organizations in development cooperation in CEE indicated that countries like Latvia and Bulgaria have very few visible NGOs who have interest and capabilities to work with Africa.[88] Hence, cooperation with Africa becomes unfeasible and is ruled out.

3.3. EU and DAC: Mechanisms of influence

I already touched upon the effects that socialization has on donors' behavior. In this section, I will look at socialization of states within two institutions – the EU and OECD DAC. It is often difficult to separate the influences determined by participation in the work of the EU and OECD as most of the EU states are members of OECD and DAC. I am, however, more interested in the mechanisms of dissemination of soft norms in these two institutions and their perceived legitimacy and expertise. I assume, following Kim and Lightfoot, that

[87] David Kral, ed., *The Role of Civil Society in Development Assistance and Aid Effectiveness* (Sofia: Center for Economic Development, 2013), 9.
[88] Kral, *The Role of Civil Society in Development Assistance and Aid Effectiveness*.

CEE states have a high level of "DAC-ability" – willingness to adhere to DAC-standards.[89] Hence, my **Hypothesis 2-3** states that

States that are OECD DAC members are more likely to give to Africa than those who are not OECD DAC members.

Only 6 CEECs are members of OECD: Czech Republic (1995), Hungary, Poland (1996), Slovakia (2000), Slovenia, Estonia (2010). Membership in OECD does not lead to automatic membership in the DAC. To join the DAC, the states have to have appropriate policies and institutional capacities to deliver development assistance, and system of monitoring and evaluation. Upon acceptance, the members commit to follow DAC Recommendations, submit ODA statistics and information, participate in meetings and Peer Reviews. OECD states can be observers at DAC meetings.

Although there is no direct requirements from the DAC to give certain amount to Africa or have a certain proportion of aid to LICs to be eligible for membership, social mechanisms of norm dissemination and the DAC's power to define the content of the donor identity might shed some light on why certain CEECs look more favorably at development cooperation with non-European countries.

First of all, not all CEECs are members of OECD and not all of OECD members are also DAC members. Five out of the six OECD members from the region have sub-Saharan African countries as their partner countries, while three out of four DAC CEECs work with LICs.[90] The correlation between being OECD member and giving more to Africa and LICs might be attributed to the fact that OECD members are generally wealthier than non-OECD members. However, there are non-OECD member countries in the region that have higher

[89] Soyeun Kim and Simon Lightfoot, "Does 'DAC-Ability' Really Matter? The Emergence of Non-DAC Donors: Introduction to Policy Arena: Does 'DAC-Ability' Really Matter?," *Journal of International Development* 23, no. 5 (2011): 711–21.
[90] Appendix1.

income (measured as GNI per capita)[91], but do not have development cooperation partners from outside of Europe or post-Soviet Central Asia. Lithuania and Latvia in recent years, for example, have become richer than Hungary and Poland but have not announced plans to give outside Europe. Moreover, Lithuania has a bigger aid budget than Slovakia. Furthermore, relative affluence and giving to African countries is not self-evident or transcendental relationship. If more affluent countries consider it necessary to give to LICs, they follow a social norm, which may be attributed to the fora where richer countries interact and determine the norms of social appropriateness. The most specialized forum for development cooperation is OECD DAC.

Both OECD and EU rely on soft law and norms.[92] However, there are several differences that might be observed between the OECD and the EU with respect to development cooperation and CEE countries.

First, OECD is a more exclusive and more demanding community. OECD is often criticized for its exclusiveness and being a closed club of wealthy Western states. DAC is even more exclusive. Membership in the "elite donors club" sends a stronger symbolic message than that of the EU.[93] The DAC is the "main point of reference" in foreign aid and global relations of power.[94] Hence, membership in DAC implies stronger association with

[91] Appendix3.
[92] On instruments of OECD governance, see Kerstin Martens and Anja Jakobi, *Mechanisms of OECD Governance. International Incentives for National Policy-Making?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Sebastian Paulo and Helmut Reisen, "Eastern Donors and Western Soft Law: Towards a DAC Donor Peer Review of China and India?," *Development Policy Review* 28, no. 5 (2010): 535–52.
[93] CEE countries often refer to DAC as "elite donor club", "elite club of world donors". Eg.: "Slovakia Becomes 27th Member of the Elite Club of World Donors," *MFA of Slovakia*, accessed May 31, 2014, https://www.mzv.sk/servlet/content?MT=/App/WCM/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_CACD708CB9D56CF2C125763500336AEF_EN&TV=Y&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=EN&PAGE_NEWSVIEW-MINISTERSTVOJDRK-7XHUD9=12&TG=BlankMaster&URL=/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/%28vw_ByID%29/ID_D6C6CCFE3F45CCBFC1257BEA001E0CC5; "Press Release: Czech Republic Becomes a Member of Elite Donor Club," accessed May 29, 2014, http://www.concordeurope.org/235-czech-republic-becomes-a-member-of-elite-donors-club.
[94] Drazkiewicz-Grodzicka, "From Recipient to Donor: The Case of Polish Development Cooperation," 72.

development norms. All the officials who I interviewed mentioned the symbolic meaning of the DAC membership, being "part of the club", as well as the opportunity to "have more say worldwide".[95] Although DAC does not explicitly ask its members to focus on LDCs, it is a "regular topic of discussions during the DAC meetings."[96]

Second, the DAC has stricter and more focused reporting and statistics system. Both the DAC and the EU include in their reporting surveys questions about cooperation with Africa. Both publish the results. However, unlike joint development progress reports by the EU, the DAC conducts thorough peer-reviews of the countries every few years on rotating basis. The peer review mechanism presents a tool of social control and normalization of behavior.[97] Everybody "has to pass the exam" once in a while.[98] It does not entail financial or legal consequences in case of violation of commitments, but the idea that "they will publish that you failed" and concerns about negative information encourage states to take peer reviews seriously.[99]

Third, the DAC is more specialized and perceived as more legitimate in its attempts to have a say in national development policies. The EU does not have legal competencies over bilateral development cooperation of MSs. Lightfoot and Szent-IVanyi[100] also demonstrated that the EU does not have procedural legitimacy because officials from member states are not fully socialized. As a result, the EC's attempts to influence bilateral development cooperation of states are perceived as illegitimate encroachment on national sovereignty. Most of the interviewees in Estonia, Slovakia and Poland claimed that the EU does not say much about national development cooperation policies or at best gives some recommendations that no one pays much attention to. The DAC, on the other hand, has the specialization in donorship

[95] Interview6
[96] Interview7
[97] Fabricio Pagani, "Peer Review as a Tool for Co-Operation and Change," *African Security Review* 11, no. 4 (2002): 15–24.
[98] Interview8
[99] Interview8
[100] Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi, "Reluctant Donors?".

and legitimacy to overview the progress towards the commitments that the states made. All the interviewees from the DAC-member CEE countries were aware of the commitments made as part of the DAC accession process. It also adds to the DAC legitimacy that there is a certain "OECD-isation of the EU development" policy: the EU often takes OECD recommendations and adds them to the development acquis.[101]

Hence, encouragement and endorsement of certain state policies by the specialized and legitimate DAC, even if implementation of these policies is not required from the states, serves as a better motivation than normative communications by the EC and closed discussions in the Council of the EU. Definitely, this motivation often depends on how much the state wants to be praised and for what – on their DAC-avility. Not all member states decided to undertake the DAC commitments in exchange for symbolic message and advancement in the power hierarchy. For example, despite extended invitation and long communication with the DAC about accession, Hungary has not yet decided to join the DAC and commit to the recommendations.[102] Besides, there are different priorities within DAC and the EU (eg, untying aid, focusing aid on three sectors), compliance with which might bring bigger ideational and recognition rewards. Nevertheless, taking comparative perspective on the DAC and the EU and their mechanisms of supervision of norm compliance and perceived legitimacy to implement these mechanisms adds another, albeit a relatively thin, layer to the understanding of why some CEE countries look more favorably at the cooperation with non-European countries.

3.4. The level of perceived insecurity

Following the discussion in Chapter 2 and the logic of the identity-security nexus, I argue that *states who feel less threatened will be more likely to give money to non-European*

[101] Lightfoot, "The Europeanisation of International Development Policies."
[102] Interview7

regions (**Hypothesis2-4**). This perception of threat, in turn, is constituted by the extent that plausible threats are channeled through historically produced identities. The focus on the European neighborhood in some countries therefore can be explained by their greater fear and weariness about a return to a precarious non-democratic past, a feeling that was particularly exacerbated by recent events and crises in the region.[103] And although we might expect, from their European identities, that they would also give to LICs, for these countries, as already discussed (Chapter 2 Section 3), giving aid to the neighborhood still accords with its obligations for poverty reduction. The level of fear in these countries combined with the congruency in values therefore made aid allocation in the neighborhood the most logical choice. For other countries (e.g. Czech Republic and Slovakia), meanwhile, events and crises in the region have been translated into political culture differently. Not only has socialization brought these countries closer to Western Europe (Chapter 3 Section 1), but they have also been more distanced from weariness of Russia. The identity of these countries therefore has constituted a wider range of possibilities for aid allocations. The European neighborhood is not the only option, but rather Africa has always been a possibility for development focus too. In the case studies, I discuss more comprehensively how security threats have been translated through the national identities of Estonia and Slovakia, thereby enabling diverging development focuses in the two countries.

[103] For a possible placement states on the continuum in relations with Russia, see,e.g.,M Leonard and N Popescu, *A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations* (ECRP, 2007). who identify 'Friendly Pragmatists'(Bulgaria, Hungary,Slovenia,Slovakia), 'Frosty Pragmatists'(Czech Republic,Estonia,Latvia, Romania), 'New Cold Warriors'(Lithuania,Poland).

CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDIES

5.1. Estonia

Security

The story of Estonian nation and Estonian sovereignty is a story of interruption and search for continuity. For centuries, Estonians were ruled by foreign powers. The independence acquired in 1918 was based on a strong claim of national sovereignty. In this early stage of nationhood Estonians construct their vision of themselves as "inherently European"[104]. The Soviet occupation was more than merely another geographical aggression. With hopes for independence already in mind, Estonians perceived the Soviets as the negative "Other"[105]. Although Russia is not an equivalent to the Soviet Union, it is perceived as USSR's successor. Russia inherited from the USSR the role of the negative "other" for Estonia and of an existential threat to both its physical sovereignty and distinctive Estonian identity. Even in the post-Soviet era

Estonian identity is represented as an identity under a constant existential threat from the neighbouring alien civilisation. Because Soviet occupation pulled Estonia forcefully into the culturally alien Slavic world, Estonia must today purify itself from these alien influences and reclaim its western character[106].

History made Estonians concerned with security. It made them seek continuity – in physical security, in sovereignty and identity. The biggest promise of continuity came from the West. The 'return to Europe' narrative with its emphasis on danger became the central narrative in Estonian public and political discourse since 1980s[107].

[104] Pille Petersoo, "Reconsidering Otherness: Constructing Estonian Identity," *Nations and Nationalism* 13, no. 1 (2007): 127.
[105] Ibid., 128.
[106] Merje Feldman, "European Integration and the Discourse of National Identity in Estonia," *National Identities* 3, no. 1 (March 2001): 11.
[107] Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*, 2nd ed. (London: Yale University Press, 1994), 374; Feldman, "European Integration and the Discourse of National Identity in Estonia," 9.

In the 1990s, Estonia resolutely turned towards those who can provide it with physical and ideational security – the NATO and the EU. Security and identity were in the center of the discourse on NATO and EU integration, they were given higher priority than prospective economic benefits[108]. Estonia looked at NATO with hopes that it will "provide a security umbrella against a highly perceived Russian threat"[109].

The perception of threat did not go away after Estonia joined NATO. However, the perception of threat in Estonia was different than that in the West. As Kadri Liik noted, 'it is sometimes difficult to explain Estonia's Russia-problem to Western Europeans for the simple reason that Russia experienced by us is so different from Russia experienced by them'[110]. Estonians were "an irritant at NATO meetings, insisting to eye-rolling ambassadors from Western Europe" that Russia was a revanchist power[111] and that Estonia, and with it the Western world, are in danger. In contrast to the more appeasement-partnership oriented Western analogues, National Security Concept of Estonia gives a straightforward characteristic of Russia as a revanchist power and an evident threat:

Russia defines its interests departing from restoration of its status as a major global power, and occasionally does not refrain from contesting other countries. In addition to political and economic means, Russia is also prepared to use military force to achieve its goals.[112]

[108] Merje Kuus, "European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 1 (2002): 92.
[109] Toomas Riim, "Estonia and NATO: A Constructivist View on a National Interest and Alliance Behaviour," *Baltic Security & Defence Review* 8 (2006): 40.
[110] Cited from Maria Malksoo, "Decentring the West from within: Estonian Discourses on Russian Democracy," in *Decentring the West: The Idea of Democracy and the Struggle for Hegemony*, ed. Viatcheslav Morozov (Surrey and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), 157–74.
[111] Jackson Diehl, "Ukraine's Wake-up Call for NATO," *The Washington Post*, April 28, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jackson-diehl-ukraines-wake-up-call-for-nato/2014/04/27/1cb65dbe-ce03-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c_story.html.
[112] "National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia," May 12, 2010, http://www.vm.ee/sites/default/files/JPA_2010_ENG.pdf.

Estonia also strives for ontological consistency. Perceiving Russia as the civilizational other[113], it needs to be consistently democratic and Western and to protect its democratic and Western identity. To stop the civilizational Other and to act upon what Estonia is, the country directs its development cooperation to the neighboring region.

The link between security and development is articulated in various official documents. The National Security Concept and national development strategy are cross-linked. Each contains a section on development and security respectively. Although this nexus is not indigenous to Estonia, the specific perception of threat determines that the countries targeted by Estonian development aid will be different from the ones that are targeted by Western states. As an Estonian member of government affiliate think tank put it,

The reading of security threat in Estonia is very different from the reading of security in Western Europe. In our reading, development cooperation helps promote western values and democracy, brings down authoritarian practices of governance and therefore contributes to the security of Estonian neighborhood – neighbors become more predictable, easier to communicate with, and keep agreements. Russia is getting more and more democratic neighborhood, which in the long term influences democratization of Russia. Fears of large scale Arab or African migration that are influencing the agenda in Southern Europe is not part of Estonian discourse. Migrants from those countries do not come to Estonia.[114]

This quote highlights two important things. First, Estonia's choice of development cooperation partners is driven by the Russia's threat. The perception of this threat is highly present in Estonia whereas development cooperation of the Western states is based on different security considerations. Hence, the priority countries are different. Second, this choice is driven by Estonian identity. Estonia attempts to promote Western values and

[113] Kuus, "European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia," 97.
[114] Interview3.

democracy and at the same time reiterates who it is in relations to the Other though daily routinized practices.

In general, linking security and development is perceived as a useful and evident link. According to an Estonian MFA official working with development assistance, "it's a smart approach. Security and development are interlinked. Ukraine is a good example"[115]. Interestingly, it is Ukraine, and not Afghanistan, that comes up in conversation about security and development. It again demonstrates that Estonia is more concerned about Russia's aggression and non-democratic presence in the neighborhood than about Afghanistan where Estonia has troops on the ground and which is the largest recipient of Estonian aid. In general, despite the amounts of money spent on it, development aid in Afghanistan is not the central part of development cooperation. The launch of development cooperation with Afghanistan was a "political decision"[116]. It is unclear whether Estonia will stay in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of troops. "Political decision must be made about engagement in Afghanistan but the aid volumes will definitely decrease"[117]. Again, it indicates that Afghanistan is not internalized as a genuine threat to Estonia that would need Estonian engagement.

Normative rhetoric

Hypothesis 1-2 indicates that CEE states are expected to engage in rhetorical action to legitimize their deviation from the norm in pursuit of self-interest. In accordance with the section above, I consider that the Estonian self-interest is to ensure its physical and ontological security through stabilizing relations with the neighbors.

As I discovered during the field research, CEE states heavily lobbied the Commission and the Council to include "transition experience" into the EU documents. Moreover,

[115] Interview1.
[116] Interview1.
[117] Interview1, confirmed in interview5.

"Estonia was among the leaders to include transition experience in the agenda. It was difficult for small states to do so."[118] The small states do not have as much influence as older states. However, it was possible to identify the ways in which Estonia engaged in rhetorical action to promote its perceived interest. First, Estonians build the argument around aid effectiveness and its contradiction to the norm of giving aid to sub-Saharan Africa. According to an official from Estonian MFA, "it does not make any sense to give money to Africa. It is not valuable there. The value of money is higher in Moldova."[119] A similar argument was mentioned by a think-tank member: "Estonia has main expertise in post-soviet countries. Estonia can be most effective and active in those countries"[120]. Another one added that "the emphasis on Eastern Partnership countries is good and right. In sub-Saharan Africa, we know nothing about them. We can't help them, we don't know how it works there, their mentality".[121]

Second, Estonia uses the leeway provided by the lack of specificity of the 'giving to the poor' norm. It decouples "the poor" from the LICs. Officially, Estonia's strategy for development cooperation "is based on general international development agreements and goals, for instance, the UN Millennium Development Goals as well as the development policy decisions and guidelines of the EU."[122] "The overall goal of Estonian development cooperation is to contribute to the eradication of world poverty and to attaining the Millennium Development Goals."[123] Estonia emphasizes that it provides assistance to Afghanistan and hence is loyal to the general poverty eradication goals: "Since 2006 Afghanistan has been one of the most important countries of destination of Estonia's bilateral development cooperation" as "The need for assistance in Afghanistan is great and Estonia's contribution to help one of the poorest countries of the world is most

[118] Interview4.
[119] Interview1
[120] Interview3
[121] Interview4
[122] "Strategy for Estonian Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid 2011–2015," 3, accessed May 30, 2014, http://www.vm.ee/sites/default/files/Arengukava2011-2015_ENG.pdf.
[123] Ibid.

welcome."[124] Hence, it presents itself as a complier with the international and European priority of giving to the poorest[125]. However, the Strategy continues that "most of [people living in poverty] live in sub-Saharan Africa and in the least developed countries of South Asia, but poverty is limiting development outlook also in medium-income Eastern Partnership countries in the proximity of Europe."[126] The claim is further substantiated by arguments that "according to the UN human development index, these states are also one of the poorest in the European continent" and "these countries are still facing great development challenges such as the reduction of poverty."[127] Similar rhetoric is mentioned during the interviews. "It is difficult to explain [why Estonia is giving aid to MICs]. But there is poverty in Eastern Partnership countries as well.<…>Among the former Soviet states there are definitely few countries – particularly in Central Asia – that by all means developing countries. But also South Caucasus – Georgia, Armenia – still need lots of assistance.<…> Besides, Estonia gives aid to Afghanistan".[128]

Hence, Estonia is able to both maintain the image of a good donor that respects international norms and follow what it perceives is in its interests. Estonia legitimizes its current practices through rhetorical action. Other states and the EC become rhetorically entrapped and cannot severely "shame" Estonia. As a result, in line with hypothesis 1-2 it is not expected to give to non-European countries.

In-region competitive socialization

Unlike Visegrad countries, Estonia is not a member of regional organization that would focus, at least partially, on development cooperation. There is a tradition to treat Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia as the Baltics group. However, out of the three, Estonian

[124] "Strategy for Estonian Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid 2011–2015."
[125] It will be interesting to follow the changes in Estonian discourse regarding the giving to the poorest norm after cooperation with Afghanistan is discontinued or significantly reduced with the withdrawal of the troops.
[126] "Strategy for Estonian Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid 2011–2015," 11.
[127] Ibid., 18.
[128] Interview3

development cooperation policy is the most advanced[129]. Hence, there is no noticeable socialization-inspired healthy competition in the region that would give Estonia incentive to "catch up". Thus, in line with hypothesis 2-1, Estonia is not giving to sub-Saharan or other non-European countries.

Civil society

To evaluate the influence of NGDOs on the Estonian relations with LICs, one should first look at the general role of civil society in Estonian development cooperation. On paper, Estonian development assistance policy is based on cooperation with civil society: "Civil society organisations play an important role in Estonian development cooperation by participating in policy formulation, preparing and implementing concrete projects and presenting the subject matter to the Estonian population."[130] A MFA official confirmed that civil society is participating in policy formulation and implementation.[131] However, a representative of Estonian NGDOs expressed concerns that "they [MFA] listen but the question is how much our opinion will be used".[132] Civil society in general seems to play an important role in Estonian development cooperation. As explained by an Estonian think-tank member,

One must take into consideration the smallness of Estonian state institutions, smallness of MFA. MFA simply needs additional expertise and manpower from civil society organization. It is important because in some other European countries the implementation of development cooperation project is concentrated on the state institutions. The model where civil society organizations are used and *predominantly* used is not self-evident everywhere. But Estonian system is built on cooperation between MFA and civil society organizations.[133]

[129] Andrespok and Kasekamp, "Development Cooperation of the Baltic States."
[130] "Principles of Estonian Development Cooperation," 2003, http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/8323.
[131] Interview1
[132] Interview5
[133] Interview3

Another member of an NGO-contractor of the state further noted that "NGOs are participating [in development cooperation] relatively actively. Civil society is solid partner for the state. Earlier the state looked at civil society suspiciously. Now civil society has developed into a good partner for the state".[134] Thus, potentially NGOs in Estonia can have an influence on the state. The question is how much they focus on Africa.

At the time of the establishment of Estonian development cooperation in the late 1990s, civil society in Estonia did not have either much influence nor expertise and connections outside Europe. However, situation is different now. According to the member of the NGDO platform, "some – not all – of our organizations want to include Africa [in the priorities]. Estonian NGOs work in African countries – Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Mozambique, Angola. <…>NDGO community is bigger and stronger now, established contacts with different countries in the world. Partner countries will come up". When asked about changes that NGOs would want to bring to the Estonian development cooperation, the same person mentioned that "maybe we should work more in poorer countries".[135] This clearly indicates that there is growing interest in working with non-European and poorer countries accompanied with growing expertise of Estonian NGDOs in the area.[136]

The combination of growing interest in LICs and specifically Africa and the NGO-based implementation model there is, hence, decent chance that Estonia might include cooperation with African countries into its priorities.

[134] Interview4
[135] Interview5
[136] For more about the role of civil society in Estonia and NGOs critique of low level of cooperation with LDCs (p. 107), see Evelin Andrespok, "Estonia's Development Cooperation from a Civil Society Perspective," in *Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010*, ed. Andres Kasekamp (Tallinn: Estonian foreign policy yearbook 2010, 2010), 101–22.

The OECD, the EU, and the image of donor

Estonia started foreign aid activities in 1998. An MFA official confirmed that there are "quite direct linkages to the accession to the EU. Development cooperation is part of the game."[137] However, it does not mean that the status of donor and international recognition as a donor is not important for Estonia. Estonia does want to become "a unique donor country that supports international development goals and builds on generally recognised principles of development cooperation<…>and with whom the other donor countries are willing to cooperate."[138] Moreover, there is a belief that "if Estonia hadn't join the EU, Estonia would have anyway had some foreign aid budget."[139] For Estonia, it is important to "show that you are now a donor, that you are a developed country and able to provide help"[140]. One interviewee mentioned that "image-building is the most important" motivation for development cooperation.[141] Another one added that development aid has a "promotional value for the politicians advertising how we moved from the recipient to donor thanks to the great leadership by our politicians and our party".[142] Moreover, development cooperation has an important symbolic dimension of expression of values: "For a small country, development cooperation and humanitarian aid is very political. Take Ukraine now. By giving aid to Ukraine now, we demonstrate that they care."[143]

Hence, Estonia does strive for good international reputation and attributes high importance to donor identity. But does it receive sufficient external incentives to follow as many international norms on donorship as possible?

[137] Interview1
[138] "Strategy for Estonian Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid 2011–2015," 3.
[139] Interview1
[140] Interview1
[141] Interview3
[142] Interview4
[143] Interview1

Estonia is not a member of DAC and has only joined OECD in 2010. Therefore, because of the little time passed I expect little socialization to occur to influence Estonian partner countries priorities.

It was mentioned that the EU was important in establishing development cooperation in Estonia. However, Estonian officials perceive Estonian development aid as a "national issue and a self-assessment." Member states "follow general rules, which are value based, otherwise – states choose their geographic and sector focus themselves."[144] The EU is also perceived as having little influence or attempt to influence Estonian geographic priorities. At best, "the EU influence is there but it's not direct". "They sent questionnaire that asks about amount of aid given to sub-Saharan Africa, women, children, etc. And the most points Estonia covers."[145] A similar perception is wide-spread among NGOs. As one NGO member put it, "Estonia was able to convince the partners that it's okay to give money to EaP. There is no condemnation whatsoever. The EU is not trying to influence Estonia. Estonia is trying to balance by giving money to weak states through multilateral organizations. Humanitarian aid also helps to avoid condemnation. Estonia is totally independent [in deciding geographical priorities]."[146]

Thus, there is no perceived influence from the OECD and the EU that would keep Estonia on "giving-to-the-poorest" track. In line with hypothesis 2-3, Estonia is not giving to African or other LICs.

To sum up, hypotheses 1-1, 2-4 predict Estonia is not likely to decrease its emphasis on post-Soviet states and to start cooperation with non-European partners because of physical security concerns reinforced by the need to protect its identity from the threat associated with

[144] Interview1
[145] Interview1
[146] Interview4

the non-democratic non-Western neighbors. Estonia also does not perceive that international organizations have much legitimacy or interest in its geographic priorities. Civil society was not ready to offer the government expertise in non-European regions. However, the growing expertise of Estonian NGDOs in Africa might have an impact on the formulation of the new development strategy next year.

5.2. Slovakia

Security and development

Security element in the Slovak development cooperation policy and discourse in general is not as pronounced as in Estonian discourse. Slovakia has had a more twisted root towards the West and hence, not so dichotomized relations with the Eastern neighbors. Unlike in the Baltics and Poland, "Russia phobia is not a prevalent phenomenon in Slovakia".[147] This is connected to historically less dramatic relations with Russia and Russia-positive government in Slovakia after the 1993 dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The authoritarian Meciar government in the 1990s was disqualified from the EU and NATO enlargement, which made it look to Russia for support. Instead of being the Other, Russia "was expected to provide security guaranties to Slovakia's neutrality".[148] Moreover, the memory of the 19th century pan-Slavism and rise of the Slovak national elite supported by Russia makes Slovaks more Russia-friendly. Whereas Czechs got rid of "Russian illusion" during the 1968 suppressions and Poles never had it, Slovaks based their national idea in the 1990s on the legitimacy of Russia-supported Slavic revival idea from the 19th century.[149] Importantly, in contrast to other CEE countries, there is also no strong association of today's

[147] Alexander Duleba, "Slovakia's Relations with Russia and Eastern Neighbours," in *EU-Russian Relations and the Eastern Partnership : Central-East European Member-State Interests and Positions*, ed. Gábor Fóti and Zsuzsa Ludwig (Budapest: Institute for World Economics of the HAS, 2009), 11.
[148] Ibid., 8.
[149] Ibid., 11.

Russia with the Soviet Union in Slovakia. This makes Slovakia a unique "quasi-Russophile" country in the region.[150]

In 1998, Dzurinda government took a sharp turn in its relations with Russia to speed up the EU and NATO accession. However, the first and second Fico government returned to a more friendly stance.[151]

The situation in the Western Balkans became of concern to Slovakia in the 1990s. Slovakia and Slovak representatives played an important role in the resolution of the crises in the Balkans.[152] The importance of the Western Balkans with the unstable security situation correlates with Slovakia's decision to make Serbia a development cooperation program country. However, the perception of the security situation changed in the recent years, as well as evaluation of Serbia's needs. As a result, Slovakia removed Serbia from the program countries list in the strategy for 2014-2018.

The low perception of physical or identitary threat from neighboring countries corresponds to almost no mentioning of security concerns in the development cooperation documents".[153] Unlike Estonian partners who believe that connection between security and development "is not a hidden agenda" and who "openly and transparently say it"[154], the interviewed officials in Slovakia do not notice security concerns in Slovak development cooperation and do not cite security as a determinant of aid allocation.[155] Again, cooperation with Afghanistan is treated as "political decision".[156] As Slovakia does not perceive a strong threat to their identity, it is less preoccupied with the region and more free than Estonia to

[150] Ibid., 12.
[151] Ibid., 10–21.
[152] Alexander Duleba, "Slovak Foreign Policy after EU and NATO Accession," in *Panorama of Global Security Environment 2010*, ed. M Majer et al. (Bratislava: CENAA, 2010), 35–47.
[153] "Medium-Term Srategy for Development Coopertion of the Slovak Republic for 2014-2018," 2013, 2, http://www.mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_844BDE60BA6C7E25C1257C86004A2955_EN/$File/Strednodoba%20strategia%20ODA%20SR%202014-2018_UK_11_02_2014.pdf.
[154] Interview4.
[155] Interview8, Interview7
[156] Interview8

choose among a wider range of partners. Although Slovakia still focuses primarily on the eastern and southern European countries, they are the largest donor to Africa in the region if calculated in percentage of total bilateral aid budget.[157]

Normative rhetoric

Hypothesis 1-2 would expect Slovakia to engage in rhetorical action to legitimize development cooperation with the countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern neighbors of the EU where Slovakia has foreign policy interests.[158] For Slovakia, the job is much easier as since the very beginning of their foreign aid policy Slovakia provides aid to Africa. Hence, the issue is not so acute for them. Still, they emphasize their transition experience as the legitimation for working with European countries. The Strategy for development cooperation for 2009-2013 mentions that "when providing development assistance, Slovakia intends to build in the up coming years on its comparative advantages, especially its experience from the transition to a democracy and market -oriented economy"[159] and that "the basic rules [of ODA] include aid effectiveness, coherence and flexibility."[160]

However, overall Slovakia does not directly link aid effectiveness and European countries. It simply does not need this explanation to legitimize their work. In official Slovak discourse, poverty eradication is associated with low income countries, whereas development cooperation with European countries has other objectives. This is different from Estonian and Polish discourse where poverty eradication also serves as justification for providing aid to European partners. The following passage demonstrates how the poverty reduction is framed in Slovakia without including MICs into the goal:

[157] Cite numbers
[158] For more on Slovak foreign policy interests see, for example, "Annual Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Foreign Policy in 2011," 2012, http://www.foreign.gov.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_346A40CE50972BF8C1257A99003266FB_EN/$File/en_VS2011_web.pdf.
[159] "Medium-Term Strategy for Official Development Assistance of the Slovak Republic for the Years 2009-2013," 4, accessed May 31, 2014, http://eng.slovakaid.sk/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Medium-Term-Strategy-2009-2013-EN.pdf.
[160] Ibid., 8.

Having committed itself to the fulfilment of the UN Millennium Development Goals in compliance with the main objective of EU development cooperation, i.e., poverty reduction, the Slovak Republic endeavours to contribute to reducing poverty in developing countries and to promoting their sustainable development. In the case of middle income countries, to which Slovakia provides development assistance, the crucial objective is their sustainable development based on good governance, respect for human rights and addressing political, economic, social and environmental issues.[161]

Moreover, Slovakia took effort to prove that it can be effective outside Europe. As it came up during interviews, "the DAC was very surprised that Slovakia is giving money to Kenya and Afghanistan. <…> People from the DAC said that if Slovakia wants to stay there, it should know what it is doing there."[162] To prove its effectiveness in Africa, Slovakia refers to the acquired expertise and tradition of being effective: "our NGOs have been working in Kenya and Sudan since 1996. We built schools, hospitals, etc, have tradition of cooperation."[163]; "We are small donor in Kenya, but can achieve some results even with such a small budget".[164] Slovakia has also found its comparative advantage in Africa: Slovakia "has no historic ties that can often complicate development" and hence is not perceived as a colonizer.[165]

In-region competitive socialization

Slovakia is a member of Visegrad group. The mechanism of socialization functions through "regular meetings of state secretaries and meetings on lower levels"[166].

Discussions about development cooperation are often done in comparison between these countries. When asked about competition between the countries in the region,

[161] Ibid., 9.
[162] Interview8
[163] Interview7
[164] Interview8
[165] Vittek and Lightfoot, "The Europeanisation of Slovak Development Cooperation?," 28.
[166] Interview7

interviewees mentioned that Slovakia has close relations with Czech Republic. Czech Republic is "more of a partner to cooperate with and to get ideas"[167]. Nevertheless, there is an unwritten record about who is better in which specific sector of policy: "Czech Republic has concise development policy. In some areas they do better than we do. In process cycle, for example. But in other areas we are better than Czech Republic. With Poland we are at the same level."[168] Although the Slovak interviewees did not name the behavior of other states in the region as the primary reason for launching cooperation with Africa, they are aware of how much money their neighbors give to African countries and with which specific countries they work. They also know that Slovakia is ahead of other countries in the region in the terms of percentage given to Africa out of total bilateral budget.

Civil society

Civil society in general plays an important role in Slovak development cooperation. From the very beginning of Slovak ODA, civil society played important role for several reasons. First, Slovak development cooperation department and later agency "does not have enough human resources and expertise to carry out the projects".[169] Second, "the fact that the topic of ODA did not significantly attract the attention of the political or financial elites, since it was not part of the EU membership negotiations and there were no significant sums of money involved, was one of the important factors that actually enabled greater involvement of CSOs/experts".[170] Third, Slovak NGOs working in development sector organized themselves into the national umbrella organization in 2003.[171] It was done at an early stage enough to become founding members of the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development. This makes NGOs powerful norm entrepreneurs well-connected on the

[167] Interview8
[168] Interview7
[169] Interview8
[170] Peter Brezáni, "Studies by Country: Slovak Republic," in *The Role of Civil Society in Development Assistance and Aid Effectiveness* (Sofia: Center for Economic Development, 2013), 106, http://cps.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/publications/cps-joint-pub-oda-civil-society-report-2013.pdf.
[171] For more on the Slovak NGDO platform, see http://www.mvro.sk/en/.

transnational level. As a significance and expertise of Slovak NGOs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NGDO Platform. The memorandum granted the]Platform the status of an official partner of the Ministry in formulating and reviewing strategies of development cooperation.

The interviews confirmed that the MFA "listens to NGOs and their opinion is taken into consideration".[172] Although "MFA's opinion is of course the first one, NGOs still can influence it. If NGOs strongly object, MFA tries to achieve compromise".[173] Not to create the wrong impression, it should be mentioned that Slovak NGOs experience typical for the region problems. "They are very dependent on Slovak money and do not suggest major changes in the system."[174] Nevertheless, Slovak NGOs played and still play a crucial role in Slovak development cooperation with Africa.

It was due to the NGOs that cooperation with Africa was launched in the first place. "Before 2003 [when Slovakia started ODA] we had some NGOs that were already implementing activities in Kenya for three-four years. We started to support them and realized that it works there."[175] Observing the success of Kenyan and also South Sudan projects, the MFA "made a shift 2 or 3 years ago and started giving more money to Africa. And there is definitely still pressure from NGOs to give even more money to Africa."[176]

Importantly, NGOs keep exercising influence on the MFA with regard to Africa. NGOs are successful norm entrepreneurs who use normative arguments to keep the MFA in Africa. According to an MFA official, "[MFA] wanted to get rid of South Sudan but NGDOs platform said 'no way, we have to stay there because it's a least developed country. As a result, we decreased funds to South Sudan but stayed there".[177]

[172] Interview8
[173] Interview7
[174] Interview8
[175] Interview8
[176] Interview8
[177] Interview7

The OECD, the EU, and the image of donor

Slovakia joined the OECD in 2000, the EU in 2004, and the DAC in 2013. The late newcomer to the accession group, Slovakia attempted to approximate its development cooperation priorities to the DAC and EU recommendations.[178] As all new MSs, Slovakia took on commitments of the EU development acquis. Slovak development aid also "complies with international documents, treaties and declarations to which it has acceded".[179]

The accession to DAC was particularly celebrated. The donor identity and symbolic and more real power of advanced donor status seems to be of high importance in Slovakia. DAC membership is perceived as a "symbolic conclusion of ten year's integration into the international donor community".[180] There seems to be a unanimous understanding of what membership in DAC means for Slovakia. When I asked one of the MFA officials about it, the person seemed to be surprised that something can be unclear here: "don't you understand? Everybody wants to join DAC." The official continued:

"The DAC is the most influential platform for coordination of development policies where all big world players in development policies are. You can influence their decision. Everyone wants to be DAC member. It gives you a very good image. Being an observer is not the same. You can be present but you do not have a vote, cannot decide. While as a member, you have a right to make comments, change standards, attitude".[181]

To accede to the DAC, Slovakia undertook a series of commitments listed in DAC review of the Slovak Republic. As admitted by an official, "Slovakia was not ready to join DAC, it joined prematurely"[182] "There was a strong political will to accept the DAC's

[178] Vittek and Lightfoot, "The Europeanisation of Slovak Development Cooperation?," 23.
[179] "Medium-Term Strategy for Official Development Assistance of the Slovak Republic for the Years 2009-2013," 5.
[180] "Medium-Term Srategy for Development Coopertion of the Slovak Republic for 2014-2018," 4.
[181] Interview7
[182] Interview8

invitation to join. We committed to a lot of things to get the membership".[183] Remarkably, there was "a strong political influence by the OECD for us to join"[184]. OECD extended invitation to join DAC to Visegrad countries and Slovenia and pushed them towards making high commitments that they otherwise were not planning to make. The DAC did not make it a requirement for Slovakia to give aid to low-income countries – but maybe because Slovakia already does so. However, Slovakia has to fill out regular progress reports which include questions about Africa. And according to the officials, "OECD knows well who gives to Africa and how much, and take it into consideration". [185]

The DAC's peer review mechanism is also perceived as "much more strict" and important for the image as "no one wants the DAC to publish negative information about you".[186]

In general, attention in Slovakia seems to be focused on the DAC and the need to act in line with the DAC guidelines. No or little reference is made to the EU. Although DAC did not push Slovakia into certain commitments towards Africa, Slovakia committed itself to having Kenya and South Sudan as program and partner countries. The upcoming in 2016 peer review of Slovakia will also examine how Slovakia performed in these countries. The MFA thinks it is a "good idea" and "there is no considerations to withdraw from Kenya as it is a LIC. Slovakia committed to poverty eradication and the majority of poor people live in Africa"[187]. And as Slovakia "does not want the DAC to publish negative information about it", there is high probability that it will stay in Africa and perform well.

[183] Interview7
[184] Interview7, Interview8
[185] Interview7
[186] Interview7
[187] Interview8

Thus, low level of perceived threat, comparative thinking, socialization within the region, DAC norms and influence of NGOs are factors that predisposed Slovakia to development cooperation with Africa.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I put the CEE tendency of marginalizing Africa in development cooperation against the European trend of giving the largest shares of bilateral aid budget to sub-Saharan Africa. I explained how Western and Eastern European aid allocation is constituted by interests that are in turn shaped by identities that are historically contingent. As identities diverge, so too do aid allocations, even for countries operating in the same environment or region. I demonstrated that contrasting identities have led to diverging aid allocations between Western and Eastern Europe. Next, I demonstrated that this divergence from the general European practice was possible because normative environment for the CEECs provides space for maneuver in how they channel their identity driven behavior. More precisely, CEECs played on the norm of aid effectiveness to legitimize their violation of what they presented as a conflicting norm – giving to sub-Saharan Africa.

After that, I examined why some CEE states give more to Africa than others. I presented the arguments that states that perceive less ontological threat from the neighborhood, states that socialize in a peer group with a strong leader, states where NGOs have more access to the process of formulation of development policy and prior engagement in the recipient country, and states that are members of OECD DAC are more likely to establish bilateral development cooperation with African or other non-European LICs.

I presented two cases on different ends of the "giving to Africa" continuum. In Slovakia, the level of perceived ontological threat from the region is low. Slovakia socializes within the Visegrad group where several members have a "healthy competition" and has NGOs that had been involved in Africa since the 1990s and have an access to the development policy formulation process. Moreover, Slovakia is an OECD DAC member. This is as close as possible to the ideal conditions for a CEE state to embark on bilateral development cooperation with Africa. On the other end of the continuum is Estonia. Estonia

has very high level of perceived ontological threat coming from the East. It is not socializing in a close peer group, is not an OECD DAC member, and did not have NGOs active in Africa when its development cooperation was first established. However, given the growing interest and expertise among NGDOs in working in Africa, it will be interesting to see if NGDOs succeed in changing government's opinion.

The thesis certainly has limitations. Due to time and capacities limitation, I only explored one side of the relations between the state and international organization. Comparing the findings received at the state level with the information acquired at the EU or OECD level would definitely add more balance to the data presented. Expanding the case studies to countries where only one or two "factors of success" are present would make it possible to establish relative weights of the hypotheses.

Nevertheless, we may draw some contingent conclusions and prescriptions from this analysis. First, countering previous findings, under the right conditions, NGOs actually might be able to wield influence on development priorities in the CEE. In recent years, more and more Estonian NGOs have turned to Africa. The expertise developed in the recent years and growing number of interested NGOs makes it possible to raise the voice and remind the government about poverty-reduction commitments and related norms (interviews with Estonian NGO workers). It remains to be seen whether the pro-African NGO mass in Estonia is critical enough to overcome decisive governmental unwillingness to go anywhere outside the post-Soviet space unless they are pushed by NATO commitments. The opportunity comes as soon as later this year when Estonian government starts consultations for the preparation of the next development cooperation strategy (The previous one covered 2010-2015).

Second, there are implications for understanding how the EU and DAC may be better normative entrepreneurs. In the case of development policy, Europeanization has been made shallow on account of the skillful maneuvering of CEE countries around ambiguous and

competing EU norms. If the EU wants to prevent shallow internalization of norms in the future, then it would need to take a more active entrepreneurial position and change socialization patterns. These organizations though may also think about ways to maximize their indirect "image" power, particularly toward those countries that are not necessarily automatically drawn in on an issue.

Third, perhaps the most important lesson is that history presents a formidable obstacle to any attempt to diffuse norms and practices. While there are possibilities for strategic interventions to change the pathway of CEE development, as just outlined, these moves will operate within historically entrenched identities that strongly shape countries' preferences and options. Certain identities will inevitably favor closer integration to EU priorities. Over time, if more countries are to converge toward EU and DAC practices such as the development emphasis on Africa and LICs, this might most likely come from positively reinforcing events and circumstances that allow countries to move beyond their precarious pasts.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. Geographical allocation of aid





Appendix 2. Development cooperation partner countries of CEE states

Development cooperation partner countries of CEE states for three check point periods – accession time, intermediate period (2006-2008), current priorities. If the priority countries have not changed, the information is not duplicated. I used countries' own classifications into different statuses – priority partner countries, project countries, program countries, etc.

Bulgaria
2008
Priority partner countries: Armenia, Macedonia, Georgia, Kosovo and Serbia, Angola

Czech Republic
2010
Priority partner countries: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Moldova, Mongolia
Project countries: Georgia, Cambodia, Kosovo, the Palestinian Autonomous Territories, Serbia

2004
Priority partner countries: Angola, Zambia, Vietnam, Mongolia, Yemen, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Iraq, Afghanistan

Estonia
2014
Priority partner countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus
2006
Priority partner countries: Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Afghanistan
1998
Priority partner countries: Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Ukraine

Hungary
2008
Priority partner countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Palestinian Authority, Serbia, Vietnam
Project countries: Cambodia, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Ukraine, Yemen
International commitments: Afghanistan, Iraq

2006
Priority partner countries: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vietnam
Other partner countries: Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Palestinian Authority
Least developed countries: Ethiopia, Yemen, Cambodia, Laos
International commitments: Afghanistan, Iraq

Latvia
2014
Priority partner countries: Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Afghanistan
2004
Priority partner countries: Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus

Lithuania
2014
Priority partner countries: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Afghanistan
2007
Priority partner countries: Afghanistan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan

Poland
2012
Priority partner countries: Belarus, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, Libya, Tunisia, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ruanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Palestinian Authority
2007
Priority partner countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Georgia, Iraq, Moldova, Vietnam, Palestinian Authority, Belarus, Ukraine, Tanzania
2004
Priority partner countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Georgia, Iraq, Moldova, Vietnam

Romania
2012
Priority partner countries: Moldova, Georgia, Egypt, Belarus, Afghanistan
Other contributions: Egypt, Tunisia, Libya
2007
Priority partner countries: Moldova, Georgia Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq

Slovakia
2014
Priority partner countries: Afghanistan, Kenya, Moldova
Project countries: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Ukraine
Special country: South Sudan

2009
Priority partner countries: Afghanistan, Kenya, Serbia
Project countries: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam

2003
Priority partner countries: Serbia and Montenegro
Project countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

Slovenia
2010
Priority partner countries: Montenegro, Macedonia, Moldova, Cape Verde Islands

2008
Priority partner countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia
Project countries: Moldova and Ukraine

Appendix 3

GNI per capita, PPP (current international dollars), 2012



Appendix 4. ODA definition

The DAC defines ODA as "those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are:

i. ***provided by official agencies***, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and
ii. each transaction of which:

a) is administered with the promotion of the ***economic development and welfare of developing countries*** as its main objective; and
b) is ***concessional in character*** and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)."

Appendix 5. Code of interviews

Interview 1: Interview with a senior MFA official working with development assistance in Estonia, April 2014. (Kaili)

Interview 2: Interview with a senior MFA official in Estonia, April 2013. (Volmert)

Interview 3: Interview with a think tank member in Estonia, April 2014. (Vahur)

Interview 4: Interview with a think tank and NGO member in Estonia, April 2014. (Ekke)

Interview 5: Interview with a NDGO member in Estonia, April 2014.

Interview 6: Interview with a senior MFA official working with development assistance in Poland, May 2014. (Hofmokl)

Interview 7: Interview with a senior MFA official in Slovakia, May 2014. (Marcela)

Interview 8: Interview with a senior official in Slovakia, May 2014. (Lucia)

Interview 9: Interview with an NDGO member in Slovakia, March 2014.

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