CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2014
| Author | Manson, Dylan Nicol |
|---|---|
| Title | Are associative political obligations possible? |
| Summary | Political obligation regards the moral relations between members of a polity and the polity itself. Often it is more narrowly construed as the moral obligation to obey the law; however, it may also include an obligation to vote, to defend one’s polity from attack, or even obligations of protest and resistance. In this thesis I analyse whether political obligation can be derived from our relations to polity members. In particular, I concentrate on Ronald Dworkin’s theory of associative political obligation. Unique to associative political obligation is its non-voluntary character, I contend this feature gives Dworkin’s theory a substantial advantage over rival theories. His argumentative method is to show how the necessary and mutually sufficient conditions he describes in paradigmatic cases of associative obligation are appropriately similar to conditions that can arise in a polity; in this way he attempts to derive political obligation from the standard examples of role obligation. First I will show that the consent and fair-play theories of political obligation fail to be useful due to the degree of voluntariness each requires, this is precisely where Dworkin’s theory has the advantage. After defending associative obligations from A. John Simmons’s sceptical position, I describe Dworkin’s theory in detail, and go on to defend it from key objections: first, I argue Thomas Nagel gives a reasonable defence of Dworkin’s assumption toward partial treatment of polity members. Second, I give reason to believe that the possibility of generating unjust obligations is not a threat, and that the intimacy that is desirable toward family members is not required for a polity. Third, Leslie Green claims that the obedience that political obligation requires cannot be justifiably derived from the obedience that is sometimes required in associative obligation. I show why this is simply not true, there is examples of the relevant kind in ordinary role obligations. My discussion shows that the objections ordinarily raised against Dworkin fail. In launching my own criticism I accept Dworkin’s analysis of role obligations, but argue that this does not result in a theory of political obligation that can show how a sufficiently high number of the populace is politically obligated. Familial associative obligations are the most important for Dworkin since they are the only other source of non-voluntary obligations. Associative political obligations are also non-voluntary so the family is the only source where this vital component can be derived. Michael O. Hardimon’s conception of role identification shows why this derivation cannot be done: familial association almost always obligates because it is so hard to fail to identify with a conception of our familial roles that constitutively includes obligations; political association, on the other hand, need not obligate because we can easily renounce identification with conceptions of our polity that would obligate us this way. I believe that associative political obligation is possible, but it fails to account for the generality of application that any successful theory of political obligation requires. This leaves Dworkin with an ideal theory, but one which fails to meaningfully instruct us how to act. |
| Supervisor | Rippon, Simon Ian |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2014/manson_dylan.pdf |
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