

# THE FAILURE OF REGIME CONSOLIDATION IN IVORY COAST AFTER 1990

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## Abstract

The research attempts to provide an answer to a question why Ivory Coast – the most stable single-party regime among former French West African colonies – was failing to consolidate legitimate and stable regime after the third wave of democratization? It applies insights from elite theory on consensually unified elite formation and locates them within transition scenarios to draw a link between the logic of scenario and its implications for consensually unified elite formation. Then we use secondary sources, descriptive statistical information and interviews to reconstruct major developments within Ivorian elites to investigate the case of Ivory Coast. The investigation has revealed that regime opening emerged in favor of incumbents and it was the break of the historic “pact” between *Akan* and *Malinke*, which could explain regime legitimacy crises.

## Acknowledgements

Doing a research related to Africa is a challenge, especially if you are not African yourself. It is even a bigger challenge if you are from “developed” world, because you always risk falling into ethnocentric trap, which results in pre-determined scientific stereotypes and patronizing undertones in the text or which puts a limit to non-judgmental understanding of phenomena under investigation. This is particularly a case, when we are speaking about African political realities. I hope that I was able to avoid it in this thesis. I am sure it would not be possible without other people contributions.

Firstly, I would like to express my greatest gratitude to my supervisor professor Andras Bozoki, who was interested in the project and accepted to supervise it. I appreciate comments provided during various phases of writing – they indeed made my text more focused. Professor’s lectures were of extremely great value as they gave insights and helped to build theoretic foundations for this thesis.

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I remain responsible for all mistakes in the text.

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## List of abbreviations

FPI - Ivorian Popular Front (*Front Populaire Ivoirien*)  
PDCI - Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (*Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*)  
RDR - Rally of the Republicans (*Rassemblement des Républicains*)  
PIT – Ivorian Workers Party (*Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs*)  
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States  
JPDCI – Youth of Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (*Jeunesse du Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*)  
MFA – Movement of Future Forces (*Mouvement des Forces de l'Avenir*)  
UDCY – Citizens' Democratic Union (*Union Démocratique Citoyenne de Côte d'Ivoire*)  
UDPCI – Union for the Democracy and Peace in Ivory Coast (*Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire*)

## INTRODUCTION

This research will attempt to answer a question why Ivory Coast – a former French West African colony – was failing to consolidate legitimate and stable regime after the third wave of democratization? The answer to this question is puzzling indeed once we briefly take a look at some historic nuances of the country. It is an interesting case: prior to the third wave of democratization it managed to display the longest and the most stable single-party regime in French West Africa. The first President of Ivory Coast F. H. Boigny had managed to build the loyalty and support from local elites via centralizing party and via liberal outlook to agriculture related activities (more specifically, promotion of cultivating and acquiring land for plantations), which were the backbone of Ivorian economy. The economic crisis in the country in 80's evoked a dissatisfaction of population and paved the way for the opposition under the leadership of L. Gbagbo to advocate for regime opening and reforms. After the electoral reform in 1990, which legalized political parties, and the death of the president F. H. Boigny in 1993, the country had experienced two big challenges to regime legitimacy. The culmination of these challenges was manifested in two civil wars in 2002 and in 2010. The last crisis has brought to presidential power A. Ouattara, who was deprived from participation in presidential elections since 1995 due to the emergence of Ivorian identity crisis and his "impure" Ivorian origin.

This very concise review gives us few clues. On the one hand, it is clear that the dominance of F. H. Boigny had reached its limits with economic crisis and ruling elite had to accept demands to take an initial step and to open up undemocratic regime. Such attempt means that former ruling elites and their supporters had lost their monopoly of political, economic and military power. As a result they entered into



competition for power, status and influence with non-ruling elites, excluded or insufficiently provided with the benefits of single-party regime. In this respect, the regime opening could formally serve as a mean to decompress the potential revolutionary threat and at the same time to preserve some positions of elite members. On the other hand, the regime opening could have led Ivory Coast into so-called “gray zone”, which was symptomatic to number of sub-Saharan countries – a kind of amalgam of dictatorial and democratic elements, where political elites have a tendency to self-isolate from citizenry (Carothers 2002, 15). In our case regime displayed authoritarian tendencies after regime opening. The last two reports circulated by Freedom House provide a rough support for it – since 2012 Ivory Coast moved from “not free” to “partially free” status, although it cannot be considered as electoral democracy yet (Puddington 2013, 3; Puddington 2014, 19). In 1999 it was challenged by a successful coup d’état lead by General R. Guei, which meant that some fractions within elites were not satisfied and have not acknowledged new rules of political game.

These brief observations suggest that regime opening and attempts to transit towards democratic regime could have failed, because national elites were not unified at the very beginning of the process. This failure resulted in challenges to legitimacy of new regimes. Moreover, the emergence of each subsequent challenge might then be interpreted as unresolved elite unity issue and an attempt to change elite configurations, which again leads to new problems of regime legitimacy. These patterns contradict Carothers’ observation that *“feckless pluralism and dominant-politics have some stability. Once in them, countries do not move out of them easily”* (Carothers 2002, 13).

It is clear that in order to understand the failure of regime consolidation our investigation should be historically sensitive and address such issues as: the impacts of regime opening on national elite's unity and the impacts of challenges to regime legitimacy on national elite's unity. Thus the main research goal should center on formation of national elite's disunity after the third wave of democratization (i.e. after 1990 electoral reform in Ivory Coast). In this respect, national elites will be the main object of this study. The value of the research is that it could provide not only deeper understanding about national elite issues in contemporary, i.e. "post-colonial", "post-transitional", Ivory Coast, but also it could help to answer a secondary important and supplementing question: how configurations of national elite were changed due to regime opening and challenges to regime legitimacy? Indeed answer to this question could help to dig a little bit deeper into self-perpetuation of national elite's disunity. But why we should bother ourselves with a former French West African colony? The justification becomes clear once we put it into broader historical-regional context.

Between 1974 and 1990 countries in Central Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America tended to retreat from single party systems (Huntington 1991, 579). However results vary from stories of successful democracy consolidation to failures of new regime consolidation. Countries in Central Eastern Europe represent a success story, where the active involvement of civil society contributed to removal of communist ruling elites (Karklins and Petersen 1993, 588) and installation of multi-party systems (Bernhard and Kaya 2012, 4–5). In result, consolidated democratic or semi-democratic regimes now dominate in Central Eastern European region (Walker and Habdank-Kolaczowska 2012). A completely different picture emerges from the experience of African countries. During the third wave of democratization old ruling elite members often consolidated their power by co-opted transition or through

authoritarian reaction (Schraeder 1994, 80–1). It implies that these countries encountered a democratization failure at the beginning of attempt to transit.

Former French colonies in Africa are particularly worth attention. They had a very specific colonial experience compared to British colonies. In French colonies local elites were excluded from the governance, were not fully socialized into “Western” means of territorial administration and did not have much political power. Only selected local elite members, who were trained at colonist’s education system, were recruited into the lower ranks of colonial administration system (Mazgelytė 2013, 101–3). The education system created a gap between local elites, who were and were not socialized into French culture. In result, after independence in 1960 practically all the former French colonies struggled to achieve stable political regimes. Dynamics of political regimes in former French West African colonies are presented in the figure 1 (see below). It overtly points that the third wave of democratization, which supposed to open channels to the ruling elite and promote power sharing, has not prevented from regime fluctuations in the vast majority of these countries (with exception of Senegal). Ivory Coast, which displayed the most stable and the longest single-party regime, had also experienced the same phenomena of failed regime consolidation after an attempt to transit towards democracy.

Table 1 Dynamics of former French West African political regimes after independence<sup>1</sup>.

| Country             | Political regimes since independence and period of duration |                                |  |                                |   |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |                       |                        |
|---------------------|---|--------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
|                     | 1960-1974   | 1974-1989                      | 1989-1991                                  | 1991-1993                      | 1993-1996                                       | 1996                           | 1996-1999                      | 1999                           | 1999-2009                      | 2009-2010                      | 2010-2011             | 2011-till now (2012)   |
| <b>Niger</b>        | one party state   | military regime                | one party state                            | multiparty transition          | democracy                                       | military regime                | restricted democratic practice | transitional government        | democracy                      | restricted democratic practice | military regime       | democracy              |
|                     | 1960-1990   | 1990                           | 1990-1999                                  | 1999-2000                      | 2000-till now (2012)                            |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |                       |                        |
| <b>Ivory Coast</b>  | one party state   | multiparty transition          | restricted democratic practice             | military regime                | restricted democratic practice                  |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |                       |                        |
|                     | 1958-1984   | 1984-1990                      | 1990-1993                                  | 1993-2008                      | 2008-2010                                       | 2010- till now (2012)          |                                |                                |                                |                                |                       |                        |
| <b>Guinea</b>       | one party state   | military regime                | multiparty transition                      | restricted democratic practice | military regime                                 | emerging democracy             |                                |                                |                                |                                |                       |                        |
|                     | 1960-1963   | 1963-1966                      | 1966-1974                                  | 1974-1978                      | 1974-1978                                       | 1978-2000                      | 2000- till now (2012)          |                                |                                |                                |                       |                        |
| <b>Senegal</b>      | emerging democracy  | restricted democratic practice | one party state                            | restricted democratic practice | restricted democratic practice                  | emerging democracy             | democracy                      |                                |                                |                                |                       |                        |
|                     | 1960-1961   | 1961-1978                      | 1978-1991                                  | 1991-1992                      | 1992-2005                                       | 2005-2007                      | 2007-2008                      | 2008-2009                      | 2009                           | 2009- till now (2012)          |                       |                        |
| <b>Mauritania</b>   | restricted democratic practice                              | one party state                | military regime                            | multiparty transition          | restricted democratic practice                  | military regime                | democracy                      | military regime                | transitional government        | restricted democratic practice |                       |                        |
|                     | 1960-1968   | 1968-1976                      | 1976-1979                                  | 1979-1991                      | 1991-1992                                       | 1992-2012                      | 2012                           | 2012- till now (2012)          |                                |                                |                       |                        |
| <b>Mali</b>         | one party state   | military regime                | military regime + de facto one party state | one party state                | transitional government + multiparty transition | democracy                      | military regime                | transitional government        |                                |                                |                       |                        |
|                     | 1960-1961   | 1961-1963                      | 1963-1964                                  | 1964-1965                      | 1965-1968                                       | 1968 - 1969                    | 1969-1970                      | 1970-1972                      | 1972-1975                      | 1975-1990                      | 1990-1991             | 1991 - till now (2012) |
| <b>Benin</b>        | emerging democracy  | de-facto one party state       | military regime                            | de-facto one party state       | military regime                                 | restricted democratic practice | military regime                | restricted democratic practice | military regime                | one party state                | multiparty transition | democracy              |
|                     | 1960-1966   | 1966-1970                      | 1970-1974                                  | 1974-1977                      | 1977-1978                                       | 1978-1980                      | 1980-1991                      | 1991                           | 1991-2002                      | 2002- till now (2012)          |                       |                        |
| <b>Burkina Faso</b> | one party state   | military regime                | restricted democratic practice             | military regime                | multiparty transition                           | democracy                      | military regime                | multiparty transition          | restricted democratic practice | emerging democracy             |                       |                        |

The first time restricted democratic practice, emerging democracy or democracy was introduced in the country.

The second time restricted democratic practice, emerging democracy or democracy was introduced in the country.

Dates if they fall into S. Huntington's III wave of democratization interval (1974-1990)

<sup>1</sup> This table is created by me. Source: African Elections Database, 2012, <http://africanelections.tripod.com>. Former French West African colonies were identified from Diop M. et al., 1993, "Tropical and equatorial Africa under French, Portuguese and Spanish domination, 1935-1945", Ali A. Mazrui (ed.), "General history of Africa VII: Africa since 1935", California: UNESCO and Heinemann, pp. 60.

# CHAPTER 1 – IN DEFENSE OF ELITE-CENTERED APPROACH

## *1.1. Approaches to regime consolidation*

Since the working thesis states that regime consolidation was not achieved, because after regime opening national elites were not unified, we should focus on elite-centered theories. There are two research traditions related to elite issues in the context of regime changes – transitology and consolidology (Schmitter 1995). Researchers of transitions are more concerned with the beginning of the process, the process itself until: a) the democratic regime is formally accepted by major political actors; b) free elections are held. At the heart of such research are attempts to understand the conditions under which authoritarian regimes collapse and what is happening between incumbents and their opponents. Thus such researches are more driven by strategic undertones to facilitate dissolution of authoritarian regimes. Among the most prominent authors of this tradition are S. Huntington (Huntington 1991), D. A. Rustow (Rustow 1970) and G. O'Donnell together with P. C. Schmitter (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In short, these authors concentrate on two main elements: a) interaction between key actors – fractions within ruling elite and opposition – on the way from authoritarian to democratic regimes and b) shifted political power balance among key actors, which determines the emergence and the nature of transition. So transitology tradition emphasizes the importance of regime opening and is not very preoccupied what is happening next. Its basic logic has a tendency of optimistic outlook and a genuine belief in actors' ability to reach a final consensus on the illegibility of authoritarian regime.

Meanwhile the consolidation research tradition is more concerned with the outcome of transition, conditions for stable political regime. For example, J.J. Linz

and A. Stepan proposed relevant insights, which emphasize key national actors, public attitudes and legislative regulations as the most important components (Linz and Stepan 1996, 15). Other authors put a great emphasis on processes of consensus building within national elites and peculiarities of national elite configurations as crucial elements for regime consolidation success or failure (Burton and Higley 1987; Higley, Gunther, and Burton 1992; Lowell Field, Higley, and Burton 1997; Higley and Dogan 1998; Lengyel and Higley 2000). Thus for the tradition of consolidology regime opening signifies not an end and a final destination, but more a starting point for further efforts to promote, to build a stable regime.

Having the peculiarities of transitology and consolidology in mind, intuition tells that for our investigation both elite-centered approaches might be useful and could complement each other. However a starting point should be the second one, because it is closer to research goal. In our case the opening of the single-party regime was already initiated and the country adopted a multi-party regime during the third wave of democratization (the major concern of transitology), but the problem is that this new regime encountered challenges to its legitimacy. In this respect, consolidology approach is more suitable.

Surely by choosing elite-oriented approach we should not ignore alternative explanations, which are not so focused on national elites and not of clear-cut sociological nature. The example could be a discussion between J. J. Linz and D. L. Horowitz about stable democracies. Both authors claim that institutions determine stability of democratic regime. Linz argues that parliamentary systems tend to promote stability, meanwhile Horowitz claims that presidential systems are capable to perform well too (Linz 1992, 119; Horowitz 1992, 204). Indeed peculiarities of institutional design are important for access to power and for power sharing among


political elites. The problem with this approach is that its scope is limited to political level only, i.e. it is more suitable to detect possible tensions within political elites, and it fails to integrate, for example, military or economic level. Moreover, as it puts formal political institutions into the center of attention the approach completely ignores and is not capable to grasp anthropological peculiarities of African societies. It means that informal political institutions like traditional chiefs or leaders, who are still present in such societies, are left out of sight. Insights from consolidology offer a broader scope as it can cope with other national actors. Since our case overtly points to important role of military, it supports a better suitability of consolidology approach.

Few remarks on the current situation of elite-centered research on African countries should be mentioned as well. It lacks attention. Basically, researches on Central Eastern Europe have overshadowed the research on African experiences after the third wave of democratization. Among the existing literature it is worth to mention an investigation on electoral success of former dominant parties in Africa by J. T. Ishiyama and J. J. Quinn (Ishiyama and Quinn 2006), which addresses the problem of former ruling elite's monopoly of political power. An informative collection of essays related to democratization challenges in various African countries is provided by L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (Diamond and Plattner 1999; Diamond and Plattner 2010). However they are rather based on general observations and not that much on deeper research. They also do not discuss national elite unity issues. Thus this research is making a contribution to the existing literature with a different approach and explanation in relation to regime consolidation.

## 1.2. A model of consensually unified national elite

A very comprehensive theoretic model representing interrelation between national elite and regime consolidation is proposed by Higley and Lengyel (the figure 2 below). These authors and others refer to national elites as persons, who are holding top leadership positions in various sectors of the country (Burton and Higley 1987, 296; Lengyel and Higley 2000, 2). The model depicts various national elite configurations. As the study is concerned to prove the thesis that Ivory Coast is struggling to achieve consolidated regime, because its national elite lack unity, we will concentrate on the blue quadrant of the model, representing an ideal type of national elite unity.

**Table 2 Model explaining possible elite configurations, regime outcomes and means sustaining those configurations<sup>2</sup>.**



The notion of consensual national elite rests on two dimensions: elite differentiation and elite unity. For the consensual national elite differentiation means

<sup>2</sup> Adapted from: Higley J. and Lengyel G. (2000) "Elite configurations after state socialism", in Higley J. and Lengyel G. (ed.), *"Elite configurations after state socialism – theories and analysis"*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pp. 7.



that elite is heterogeneous and autonomous, i.e. it is composed of elites from various sectors within society. Autonomy suggests a lack of overlapping between different functional elites. Elite unity level encompasses “*shared beliefs and values as well as specific norms <...> about political access, competition, and restrained partisanship*” (Lengyel and Higley 2000, 2). Also the same level includes channels and networks, which allow elites to get an access to key decision-making centers<sup>3</sup>. An important supplementing element for the consensual elite is the process of classic circulation. When this process is present, national elites can be replaced in a regular peaceful manner. The replacement is happening within all elite sectors, rather than within restricted sector. The process is based on a high level of social mobility, i.e. new elite members do not come from elite itself, but rather from more distant social positions (Lengyel and Higley 2000, 3).

This model is comprehensive and includes useful core-concepts, which are necessary to understand peculiarities of consensual national elite. However it is a little bit static in a sense, that it provides possible “diagnosis” of national elites, but this model does not explicitly explain the formation of consensually unified national elite in the context of regime opening. Thus the following few chapters will be dealing with this issue. Firstly we will discuss possible regime opening scenarios. Then we will discuss their implications for elite circulation. It will be supplemented with insights how classic circulation is being achieved after regime opening. The next two parts will follow the same logic in relation to elite differentiation and elite unity. After the discussion of consensually united national elite formation in the context of regime opening, we will have a revised theoretic explanation. In the next step we will connect it with democratization peculiarities in African countries. It will be discussed

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<sup>3</sup> Authors have not clearly defined what are those key-decision making centers. I interpret these centers as key-political institutions like President, Parliament and Government.

in a comparative manner within the frame of revised theoretic explanation. Finally, we will have more African-sensitive explanation.

## CHAPTER 2 – REGIME OPENING SCENARIOS: TOWARDS CONSENSUALLY UNIFIED ELITE FORMATION

When there are attempts to open-up a regime of the country and abandon authoritarian rules of the game for the sake of democratic, it can happen in a variety of ways. The possible regime opening scenarios (types) can be distinguished by looking into major actors and groups involved into this dynamic process. For more clear specification it is useful to refer to S. Huntington's classical classification of transitions into transformation, transplacement and replacement (Huntington 1991). Also it is useful to include more recent insights proposed by Stradiotto and Guo, who builds on S. Huntington and distinguishes conversion, cooperative transition, collapse and foreign intervention (Stradiotto and Guo 2010). The latter type is an innovation since Huntington.

The scenario of **transformation or conversion** presumes that regime opening emerges from initiative of the ruling elite. It is possible, because the ruling elite experiences internal tectonic shifts in terms of attitudes towards regime. The fragmentation of attitudes crystallizes fractions of standpatters (against regime opening) and reformers (in favor of regime opening). The opposition outside the ruling elite is also present, but it is not capable to lead regime opening (Huntington 1991, 590–601; Stradiotto and Guo 2010, 17–18). The success of such regime opening type lies in reformers' interaction with standpatters and opposition. The interaction with standpatters is oriented into their neutralization as competitors or as saboteurs of the reform. One of the ways to achieve that is to attract them to support reformers. The second way is to replace them in top elite positions with members or supporters of reformers' fraction (Huntington 1991, 599). What these processes suggest is that we have an internal qualitative reconfiguration not only within ruling

elite positions, but also within other key-elite sectors (i.e. power elite, if we used Ch. Wright Mills terminology) prior to the regime opening. Another important aspect of this strategy is the involvement of opposition for cooperative actions with reformers. However as conversion presumes a marginal role of opposition, reformers have much more influence to shape the final framework of the regime opening. On the other hand, the involvement of opposition acts as a facilitating force for broader alliance, which supports regime opening. An important detail, which could be noticed about transformation is the possibility of interactive variation. Reformers' relation vis-à-vis standpatters or opposition theoretically may lean towards one or another. The failure of standpatters' inclusion into reformers fraction raises the importance of entering into more intense interaction with opposition. At the same time it slightly reduces the possibility for reformers to shape the whole process of regime opening and preserve better positions within ruling and other elites after. Meanwhile the success of standpatters' inclusion into reformers fraction marks a total or nearly total change of incumbent elite and might put aside, exclude interaction with opposition. In result, the conversion is fully under reformers control and it can contribute to preservation of positions within ruling and other elites.

The second scenario is **replacement or collapse**. Replacement emerges when strong opposition contributes to the collapse of the ruling elite or overthrows it. Like in transformation ruling elite might be fragmented into standpatters and reformers as well, nevertheless standpatters are stronger and suppress reformers, which allows removing internal antagonisms (Huntington 1991, 602–607; Stradiotto and Guo 2010, 18–19). The success of replacement lies on two distinct interactions. The opposition to the ruling elite relies on support from citizens. Meanwhile standpatters are losing support from military (Stradiotto and Guo 2010, 19). This

regime opening scenario shows that it is bringing major qualitative changes in ruling elite configurations, because all incumbents are ousted. Moreover, as it indicates the break between military elites and incumbent elites, it might be crucial for the interaction dynamics between military and opposition. On the one hand, they might have a possibility to form an alliance and cooperate. In this way opposition is still holding the lead of regime opening. It might result in total subsequent exclusion of incumbents and acknowledgement of new ruling elite's legitimacy by military elites. On the other hand, tensions between opposition and military elites could also form due to possible threat to their positions. Finally, there might be an even more complicated outcome if we take into consideration a remark by Huntington that right after replacement opposition becomes divided over the rules of the new regime (Huntington 1991, 606). In this situation an alliance between fractions of opposition and military elite could form by excluding other opposition fractions, which contributed to regime opening. Or the military elite might not cooperate with any fraction of opposition and take regime under its own control.

**Transplacement or cooperative transition** is the third possible scenario. The regime opening is lead by ruling elite and opposition. Again, the condition is ruling elite's fragmentation into standpatters and reformers and the presence of opposition. However the peculiarity of transplacement is that opposition and reformers are not prepared to initiate regime opening – the former are not strong enough and the latter are not weak enough. Such situation is resolved by negotiating regime opening (Huntington 1991, 608–615; Stradiotto and Guo 2010, 18). In this scenario the realization depends on citizens' support for opposition and force structures' support for the ruling elite. Moreover, ruling elites are expected not to be threatened after regime opening (Stradiotto and Guo 2010, 18). Such regime

opening scenario suggests the strength of the alliance between military elite and ruling elite in general, as authors do not specify relation to a particular incumbents' fraction. Nevertheless, theoretically we might assume that military elite is leaning towards standpatters, because it involves in repression of citizens protests, which are expressing their discontent with regime. But because citizens' support for opposition prevails even in the context of repressions, it might facilitate internal tensions within military elite. In result, if military elite is in alliance with standpatters, it could not be strong. For this reason negotiations with opposition could emerge as an acceptable option. The fact that regime opening should not exclude incumbent elites means partial qualitative changes in elite configurations. In result, the new ruling elite might become a mixture of incumbents and newcomers. As for other elites the same peculiarity could prevail.

Finally, the fourth scenario involves **foreign intervention**. This type of regime opening is completely different from the first three, because neither local elite, neither opposition does take part in it. Since there are no reformers or opposition to standpatters, the foreign military intervenes to remove incumbents from power (Stradiotto and Guo 2010, 19–20). As the foreign country is the central player of regime opening, the further processes within the country of intervention might shaped by it. The scenario and regime opening concept presumes that the foreign actor should be the one, which itself is not authoritarian. If it was so, it could not perform a regime opening – it would be more an installation of a new authoritarian elite. But since we hold on to an assumption about intentions to open regime, it is clear that in such situation the former ruling elite is considered as illegitimate and might all be excluded from accession to power, because if it was considered as legitimate the intervention would not have occurred. As in replacement scenario, this

one sharply reconfigures ruling elite. Since it is presumed that reformers and opposition were non-existent prior to regime opening, the new ruling elite might become representatives from suppressed informal opposition to standpatters. Reconfiguration of other elites might not be very radical, because it could raise their discontent and encourage tensions with newcomers: a) within ruling elite and b) within echelons of other elite sectors.

### ***2.1. Implications of regime opening scenarios for elite circulation***

Regime opening scenarios presented and discussed above implies the major categorical distinction between old and new elites, i.e. pre-regime opening, post-regime opening. Thus, when talking about elite circulation we should take into consideration that observation. The recruitment into elite may occur from the old-systemic “pool”, which is referred in elite reproduction thesis, or from a new one, which is related to elite circulation thesis (Szelényi and Szelényi 1995, 616). Finally, the understanding of elite as an entity composed from various sectors is also important, because regime opening firstly and most importantly affects circulation of the ruling and the political elite<sup>4</sup>. Indeed the evidence on elite circulation in postcommunist Eastern Europe demonstrated the retreat tendencies of incumbents and recruitment from upper layers of non-elite. The same retreating was observed with those, who held top bureaucratic positions prior to regime-opening. However there were indications about persistence and migration of old elites to economic elite because of privatization (Szelényi and Szelényi 1995, 622–623, 636). Thus, what this example suggests is that regime opening indeed tends to contribute to elite

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<sup>4</sup> I use these terms not as synonyms, although both are based on positional elite understanding. I define ruling elite as those at the top official political institutions like Presidency, Government, and Parliament. Meanwhile I interpret political elite as a broader term, which encompasses those belonging to the ruling elite, members of Parliament, top members of political parties.

circulation, but it can still leave space for elite reproduction in specific elite sectors. Since authors have not made a reference to modes of transition, in the following paragraphs we will have to make some theoretic considerations.

**Conversion.** The discussion of conversion scenario had revealed that reformers fraction of ruling elite is a central player. Subsequently, depending on their relation to standpatters and to opposition the recruitment to the ruling and other elites may have a little bit different consequences. In the case of standpatters' inclusion, the internal ideological regrouping within ruling elite emerges as reformers take power from standpatters, but do not fully exclude converters. As this regrouping is occurring from the ruling elite itself, analytically we should speak more of reproduction than of circulation. Under these circumstances regime opening indeed could change the composition of the ruling elite and could indicate circulation of a very limited degree in it. Moreover, if we took into consideration the previous observation, that reformers are replacing members of other key-elite sectors in order to get a support and prevent acts of reversion, we could speak about a continuation of reproduction with ideological adjustments. It would not necessarily mean that a new circulation in key-elite sectors after regime opening would follow immediately. The reason is the presumed weakness of opposition in conversion scenario. If opposition is weak, it could not manage to overshadow reformers' within ruling elite and reshuffle positions within key-elite sectors. As reformers are selecting pro-democratic members for key-elite positions, the opposition is provided with an argument assuring support and intentions for changes. The emergence of alternative channels to the ruling elite might have more visible or less visible qualitative inputs for a circulation of the ruling elite. The determinant of qualitative inputs could be origins of opposition and newly formed political parties: the less connected they are



with counter-elite – the more visible circulation could emerge. Thus, conversion is offering a reproduction in key-elite sectors and more visible, but not extensive, circulation within ruling elite, because of recognition of political parties and their weakness vis-à-vis incumbent party.

Finally, if we remembered an alternative that reformers might have to cooperate with a weak pro-democratic opposition before regime opening, it is possible that it could follow with a selection of opposition members into some sectors of elite to guarantee support for reformers. It might be that recruitment could be done not into key-elite sectors, because the opposition is not very strong and not crucial for reformers. Granting them key-elite positions prior to regime opening could facilitate their strengthening and weaken reformers. In result, reformers could lose the leading role of the process. In this respect, the reproduction on the base of reformers into key-elite sectors prior to regime opening is more favorable strategy for reformers. Again, selecting reformers from the ruling elite to key-elite sectors and recruiting members of opposition to other elite sectors assures the opposition with reformers' intentions for changes. In result, the circulation in key-elite sectors might be limited, some qualitative changes might occur due to inclusion of opposition. As for the ruling elite the circulation would be shaped in the same manner like in the case of standpatters' inclusion – plausibly more visible, but non-extensive circulation.

**Collapse.** The replacement scenario removes ruling elite, thus the composition of the new ruling elite is determined by opposition. Here we should take into consideration two parameters: a) opposition vis-à-vis possible inclusion of former ruling elite and b) military elite support for opposition (as it was an important element in replacement scenario). Firstly, the extent of ruling elite's recruitment might be determined by opposition. If the opposition delegitimizes incumbent's party

and excludes incumbents from possibility of being recruited to the new ruling elite, then circulation is extensive. However the qualitative changes due to such circulation again could be determined by the social base of new channels to the ruling elite. Another option of the opposition is to allow incumbents to be recruited to the new ruling elite. In result, the circulation might be a little bit less extensive, but still significant taking into consideration demonstrated citizens' support for opposition to open regime. Such type of option might be constrained if military elite is expressing an extreme opposition towards incumbents. Due to this tension opposition might not want to jeopardize itself as potential ruling elite and choose to exclude incumbents from a possible entrance to ruling elite.

The scenario of collapse gives some hints on circulation outside the ruling elite as well. Differently from the conversion, the collapse does not presume regrouping in key-elite sectors prior to regime opening. Thus in the context of regime opening the new ruling elite enters into environment, where key-elite sectors are filled by elites of the former regime. Under such circumstances newcomers might initiate replacement in key-elite sectors as they might be aligned with the former regime. Bearing in mind that military elites were opposing incumbents, such option could get their support. Moreover, because of military elites' opposition to incumbents, the collapse might not contribute to their circulation. In the case of emerging internal tensions within, it could contribute to their circulation non-extensively. Thus the collapse scenario gives us few hints about circulation. The circulation of the ruling elite could be extensive; meanwhile circulation within military elite might be limited. Finally, the circulation in other key-elite sectors might also emerge.

**Cooperative transition.** The center of transplacement scenario is the ruling elite and the opposition, who are leading it together. As it involves negotiations of both sides and also foresees a non-threatening of the ruling elite after regime opening, it gives clear hints about power sharing between both sides. Since there is an assumption that ruling elite is not threatened, it means that regime opening might not destroy the former channel *per se* and actually leave it as a legitimate entrance. Also it means that representatives of former ruling elites, which include fractions of reformers and standpatters, might not be excluded from a possibility to compete for positions in the new ruling elite. However there is a problem – a built-in conceptual tension between standpatters and a new regime. For this reason this fraction might still have to undergo conversion in order to enter a competition after regime opening. In this respect, it would contribute to a new constellation of the ruling elite after regime opening. Thus we could speak about the intermingling of reproduction (because of recruitment from reformers' and converted standpatters') and circulation (because of recruitment from opposition) within ruling elite.

If we would try to look into other key-elite sectors analytically, we should take a non-threat to ruling elites after regime opening as an important element. It might be possible that in order to open regime and to ensure no harm for incumbents the opposition and the ruling elite might agree for a pre-opening reconfiguration in key-elite sectors. It means that these sectors might experience reproduction on the ruling elite's base as well as circulation on the opposition base. Such option could guarantee the preservation of positions for both participants. Also it could serve as a buffer for attempts to quickly reconfigure key-elites (i.e. to involve in a winner-takes-it-all game) by the new ruling elite after regime opening. Thus the regime opening

might mean a combination of reproduction and circulation, but not very extensive because of the buffer created before opening.

Finally, we should take a brief theoretical look at military elites as they appeared as important possible allies of standpatters' fraction. Since we considered that before regime opening ruling elites might reproduce themselves in other key-elite sectors, it would mean that military elites would lose the centrality as allies. To preserve their positions they could convert to supporters' of regime opening and of new regime or could attempt to take over regime opening. As a result, regime opening would not contribute to their circulation. In order to secure regime opening, participants of cooperative transition might leave an option for these elites to reproduce in other key-elite sectors or stay and reproduce within military elite by ideological conversion. These two options could again be buffers to secure regime opening and could contribute to circulation and reproduction at the same time before opening and the same but not extensive tendencies after regime opening.

**Foreign intervention.** The scenario of foreign intervention focuses on removal of the ruling elite. Since it is a foreign force, which is initiating regime opening in other country, it is not able to claim its representatives for ruling elite positions. For this reason the possible recruitment is happening from suppressed opposition during regime opening. The scenario does not foresee reconfigurations prior to regime opening. As the incumbents are deprived from theoretical accession, an extensive circulation might characterize the new ruling elite after regime opening.

The ruling elite is a primary target of foreign intervention, but this scenario does not explicitly explain intervention in other key-elite sectors. Nevertheless, we can make few analytical considerations. Firstly, since only the foreign intervention is capable to remove incumbents from the ruling elite, we can assume that military

elites and ruling elites might have a strong alliance. Thus a removal of the ruling elite could be accompanied by changes in military elite to secure a new regime and to block the return of incumbents with a military force. Like in cooperative transition military elites might have a possibility to convert themselves to new supporters of the regime and remain in their positions and reproduce. Also military elites might be granted an option to transfer into other elite sectors and reproduce there after regime opening is being made in order to prevent a possible use of force from them. Thus military elites might have possibilities for a guarded (regulated) reproduction. Secondly, we should take into consideration a dual process of circulation and reproduction in other key-elite sectors. We can make an assumption that after accession of the new ruling elite, i.e. after regime opening, it can encourage a circulation within key-elite sectors in order to block a continuation of reproduction of elites, who supported the former regime.

To sum up this section we can see different implications of transition scenarios for elite circulation (table 3). Conversion scenario favors reproduction of former elites, but only those who adjust themselves ideologically. Collapse scenario favors circulation in elites, except military elites. A combination of elite reproduction and of elite circulation can appear in cooperative transition scenario. Finally, in foreign intervention scenario elite circulation might evolve, except in military elites.

**Table 3 Transition scenarios and their implications for elite circulation<sup>5</sup>**

| Transition scenario | Implications for elite circulation  |
|---------------------|---|
| Conversion          | <p>Ruling elite – reproduction after regime opening and more visible circulation.</p> <p>Military elite – no clear implication.</p> <p>Other key-elite sectors – ideologically adjusted reproduction prior to regime opening if standpatters cooperate with reformers. Reproduction</p> |

<sup>5</sup> Table is created by me based on analysis of transition scenarios.

|                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
|                        | and limited circulation after regime opening if standpatters cooperate with reformers. Ideologically adjusted reproduction and limited circulation prior to regime opening if reformers cooperate with opposition. Reproduction and limited circulation after regime opening if reformers cooperate with opposition.   |
| Collapse               | Ruling elite – extensive circulation after regime opening if incumbents are restricted to compete; mostly circulation and some reproduction after regime opening if incumbents are not restricted to compete.<br>Military elite – no or very limited circulation after regime opening.<br>Other key-elite sectors – circulation after regime opening.  |
| Cooperative transition | Ruling elite – reproduction (due to conversion) and circulation after regime opening.<br>Military elite – buffered circulation and reproduction before regime opening. Combination of a small scale circulation and reproduction after regime opening.<br>Other key-elite sectors – buffered circulation and reproduction before regime opening. Combination of a small scale circulation and reproduction after regime opening. |
| Foreign intervention   | Ruling elite – extensive circulation after regime opening.<br>Military elite – guarded (regulated) reproduction after regime opening.<br>Other key-elite sectors – circulation and limited reproduction after regime opening.  |

## ***2.2. Insights on classic elite circulation after regime opening***

Our main interest is possibilities for classic elite circulation after regime opening and its' interrelation with transition scenarios. For comparative purposes we should refer to the concept more broadly, although it was presented in few paragraphs before (see 1.2). Higley's and Lengyel's model emphasizes three important elements when explaining classic elite circulation: a peaceful and gradual replacement of national elites, replacement in all elite sectors and high level of social mobility (Lengyel and Higley 2000, 7).

The first element emphasizes the process of continuity and the absence of tensions during the power transfer. As changes within national elites cannot be very sudden, it means that the replacement of old members and the recruitment of new

members should be non-extensive. Thus, the essence of this conceptualization allows a degree of reproduction and circulation, because only both processes ensure gradual replacement. Moreover, the gradual nature of elite replacement and its implication for continuity hints that replacement should appear not as a single time event, but it should be happening with some level of regularity. The peaceful transfer of power appears as another important part of the first element. When the recruitment of national elite members is happening and there are no tensions to give a position to a new person, when the incumbent accepts the transfer of power to a new person and it is without any threatening attempts, when the new person does not threaten an incumbent to leave the position, then we can speak about the mutual acceptance of the legitimacy of the replacement by outgoing and by incoming national elites.

The second element encompasses the scope of replacement. The requirement of replacement to occur in all elite sectors is built on the assumption that national elites are specialized and can be distinguished from each other. If we take that into consideration, the replacement of elites should not be restricted with a particular elite sector. In this respect, it would be difficult for specialized and narrow clique within a particular elite sector to emerge. At the same time it would mean that a formation of counter-elite vis-à-vis specific elite sector could contribute to the decompression of potential tensions and attempts to impose an extensive circulation.

The third element refers to a high level of social mobility. Basically, this conceptual element understands the social structure of few social layers. The social mobility then refers to recruitment of new people to national elites who are not from elites themselves, but rather from those layers in society, whose distance to elite is higher, i.e. they are not recruited from the closest layers to elite. It means that social

system and particularly social layers of society are supposed to be formed in a way, where boundaries of layers allow diffusion and there are no strict boundaries to “migrate” from one layer to another.

The analysis of transition scenarios’ implications for elite circulation after regime opening allows concluding that cooperative transition is closest to the classic elite circulation conception, because like in classic elite circulation it could be characterized by a combination of reproduction and circulation. Also, from the analytical point of view, it has the greatest potential for replacement in all elite sectors.

### ***2.3. Implications of regime opening scenarios for elite differentiation***

If we want to talk about regime opening and its’ implications for elite differentiation, we should take into consideration that differentiated elite is composed from various sectors within society, which do not overlap with each other (see the model in 1.2). Basically, it implies that if prior regime opening national elites were overlapping in all or some sectors, the regime opening should change national elite configurations and make it specialized and distinguishable. Earlier we referred to Szelényi and Szelényi observation on old elites’ transformation to economic elites because of privatization (Szelényi and Szelényi 1995, 622–623, 636). We can notice the indication of the differentiation process, because it clearly states that old elites have retreated from previous sector and settled in another sector. The same idea about elite differentiation is reflected in Hankiss discussion on Grand Coalition as means to keep elites united in Eastern Europe. Basically, he observes that it is made of autonomous partners. This interpretation presupposes the necessity of separate



elite sectors to form a coalition under new regime (Hankiss 1990, 234). But what are our transition scenarios implying for elite differentiation? Let's discuss each of them.

**Conversion.** In general, the scenario of conversion could offer a limited extent of elite differentiation. If we followed the analytical proposition about reformers relationship vis-à-vis standpatters and opposition, we should come to two distinct conclusions.

Firstly, if we are talking about reformers and standpatters, we have to take into consideration previous observations that reformers are replacing members in other key-elite sectors in order to get a support and to prevent acts of internal reversion by standpatters. This logic of replacement of members in key-elite sectors means that reformers are trying to dissolve the interconnectedness and overlapping between incumbent standpatters and elite members in those other key-sectors. By doing this they do contribute to autonomy of other elites from incumbent standpatters and make dividing line between sides clearer. However, a selection of new members to ensure the support for reformers is again a creation of interconnectedness and a promotion of overlapping between new players and recruited ones. For this reason, after regime opening elite differentiation might be limited and old overlapping might be replaced with new overlapping tendencies.

Secondly, if we are talking about reformers and opposition, we should refer to new key-elite sector members' selection. When reformers have to form a kind of cooperation with opposition for counterbalancing standpatters, changes in key-elite sectors might evolve around the reformers' base and changes in other elite sectors might develop around the opposition base. This two-way replacement technique could prepare elites for a partial differentiation. On the one hand, we could speak about the tendency of autonomy from incumbent standpatters in key-elite sectors.

On the other hand, we could refer to formation of new interconnectedness and possibilities of overlapping between new players and recruited ones in these sectors. However, possibilities for autonomy could evolve best in those elite sectors, where opposition members are being recruited. Taking these aspects into consideration, we could make a conclusion that after regime opening elite differentiation indeed might be partial: limited in key-elite sectors, but clearer in other elite sectors. At the same time we should highlight the fact that if after regime opening opposition takes a share in the ruling elite, we could speak about the possibility of clustered overlapping on opposition and reformers' base.

**Collapse.** This scenario offers a variety of possibilities for elite differentiation in key-elite sectors and a clear implication for elite differentiation in military elite sector. Since military elite is expressing a clear opposition towards incumbents before regime opening, it already hints that this elite sector is getting detached and might be autonomous. When the opposition opens regime, likely, it does not impose replacement in order to safeguard their own positions and in order to avoid possible tensions with military elite. For these reasons, the opposition might sustain the autonomy of military elites, which means that military elite differentiation might be clearly manifested.

When we are talking about autonomy in key-elite sectors, we should refer to interplay between two elements: a) exclusion of incumbents from ruling elite; b) openness of key-elite sectors for replacement process. If incumbents are excluded from possibilities to enter the ruling elite, if the opposition does not marginalize them from the possibility to enter (or remain) into key-elite sectors and if key-elite sector members are not replaced on the opposition base only, then we could observe a break of overlapping between elite sectors. In this respect, we could speak about

high degree of elite differentiation. However if key-elite sector members are replaced on the opposition base only, while some incumbents are also allowed, then some overlapping on opposition base might appear and elite differentiation might not be fully expressed. But if newcomers initiate replacement in key-elite sectors and are excluding incumbents from competition for ruling elite and for key-elite positions, then possibilities for elite differentiation might be constrained – the new overlapping and interconnectedness might form. Finally, even if incumbents are not excluded from possibilities to enter into ruling elite and even if some incumbents are allowed to get or remain in key-elite positions, still the overlapping on opposition base might appear, while overlapping on incumbent base might be very limited.

**Cooperative transition.** In cooperative transition scenario the differentiation might be problematic, because of power sharing between opposition and incumbents. If we take into consideration the fact that both sides might initiate pre-opening reconfiguration in key-elite sectors and after regime opening enter the ruling elite, then it becomes clear that indeed elite overlapping might continue. The peculiarity of such overlap is that it might be related to both: incumbents and opposition. Thus, after regime opening in some key-elite sectors there might be an overlap with incumbents and at the same time differentiation vis-à-vis opposition, while in other key-elite sectors the contrary might appear. In short, we could speak about the possibility of clearly clustered overlapping and of partial autonomy of key-elite sectors right after regime opening.

However, if we referred to military elites in this scenario, we could identify a potential contribution to elite differentiation. Because military elites are important allies of standpatters' fraction and because participants of cooperative transition might aim to leave an option for the members to stay within military elite, they could

become partially autonomous. On the other hand, if these elites are given an option to enter other key-elite sectors instead of staying within military elites, then we could speak about the contribution to differentiation in other key-elite sectors and the overlapping in military elite on the new elite base. Thus, again we could speak about clustered overlapping and about partial autonomy.

**Foreign intervention.** The scenario of foreign intervention might offer a combination of differentiation and overlapping. Firstly, we should recall that incumbent ruling elites are removed and newcomers are replacing them after regime opening. The replacement of key-elite might occur due to members of new elites. As a consequence, the process of replacement might be closely linked with these members and could show signs of overlapping. Thus, what we could have then is the overlapping in key-elite on a base of the new ruling elite and the detachment, the differentiation from the incumbent elite.

Secondly, if we referred to military elites in foreign intervention scenario, we could identify their potential contribution to increase differentiation. If military elites are left with a possibility to declare their support for a new regime and to remain in their positions, then they could remain autonomous from newcomers and we could speak about their differentiation. If an option to transfer their positions into other elite sectors is given to them, then again we could speak about the differentiation of these sectors and the prevention of overlapping on the new ruling elite base.

Since we discussed all four possible transition scenarios and their implications for elite differentiation, we can state that these scenarios indeed hint for diverging results (see table 4). Conversion scenario favors overlapping or clustered overlapping. In collapse scenario after regime opening we could expect overlapping with exception of military elites and if incumbents are not deprived from entrance in

other key-elites. The latter contributes to differentiation. Cooperative transition favors clustered overlapping in key-elite and military elite sectors on incumbent and opposition base. Finally, if the former regime is changed by foreign intervention, the overlapping might occur in key-elite sectors on newcomers' base and differentiation could happen in other elite sectors and in the military elite if former military elites are allowed to enter there.

**Table 4 Transition scenarios and their implications for elite differentiation<sup>6</sup>**

| Transition scenario    | Implications for elite differentiation   |
|------------------------|--|
| Conversion             | Continuation of overlapping tendencies in key-elite sectors but on reformers base or clustered overlapping on reformers base (in key-elite sectors) and on opposition base (in other elite sectors).   |
| Collapse               | Overlapping on opposition base mostly, but high differentiation if incumbents are allowed to enter key-elites and are excluded from the ruling elite. Autonomy of military elites.   |
| Cooperative transition | Clustered overlapping in key-elite sectors on incumbents and on opposition basis and partial autonomy in general. Clustered overlapping in military elite and contribution to differentiation, if military elite has an option to transfer their positions to other key-elite sectors. |
| Foreign intervention   | Overlapping on the new ruling elite base in key-elite sectors after regime opening, but differentiation might occur in other elite sectors if former military elite has an option to transfer their positions there. Differentiation might be manifested in military elites.           |

## ***2.4. Insights on elite differentiation after regime opening***

In the section above we were trying to find the interconnectedness between regime opening scenarios and elite differentiation. However it is useful to look at it in a more detailed manner in order to evaluate, which transition scenario of all discussed is the most favorable for differentiation. Lengyel's and Higley's model assumes heterogeneity and autonomy of elites (Lengyel and Higley 2000, 7). Thus if

<sup>6</sup> Table is created by me based on analysis of transition scenarios.

we want to talk about differentiated elites after regime opening, we should consider these two elements.

Firstly, the heterogeneity of national elites refers to the plurality, which means that elites should be perceived not as a singular and a monolithic formation, but rather as a formation from elites from various sectors within society. It also implies that these elites are distinct from each other on functional and activity level. We could call this distinction as specialization in specific fields, which then comes to the close resemblance of V. Pareto interpretation of elites. The conceptual understanding of elites as specialized and as heterogeneous, makes a very clear link with autonomy. Secondly, the autonomy of elites suggests that there should be a lack of overlapping between different functional elites. Basically, it means that members of a particular elites sector are not present in another elite sector. Under such conditions we could speak about the possibility of maintaining these elite sectors without direct dependency on other elite sector. At the same time the fact of differentiation means dissolution of power from narrow elite clique and also means more niches for new members of elites. The regime opening is supposed to encourage elite differentiation and abandoning tendencies of overlapping.

In all our transition scenarios the process of changes is evolving around the incumbent ruling elite, the newcomers to the ruling elite (i.e. opposition), and military elite vis-à-vis other key-elite sectors. Thus, we have to take into consideration these players when speaking about the most favorable transition scenario for elite differentiation after regime opening, which means that regime opening should contribute to differentiation in military elite and other key-elite sectors. From our scenarios' analysis we can observe that two scenarios, which come closest to elite

differentiation, are collapse and foreign intervention. However each of these scenarios is suitable if there are some modifications.

In the collapse scenario military elites can theoretically maintain their autonomy, because incumbents are deprived from the ruling elite and are not overlapping with the opposition. However the real contribution to differentiation is, if incumbents are deprived from the ruling elite, but are able to enter other key-elite positions and have a safe exit from former positions, but still maintain the elite status. In result, we could have differentiation in key-elite sectors after the regime is opened. At the same time this condition prevents from winner-takes-it-all situation, where the winner in this case is the opposition.

In the foreign intervention scenario, like in the collapse scenario, military elites can maintain their autonomy too if they support the new regime and if are allowed to stay there by new members of the ruling elite. The differentiation in other elite sectors besides military elites might be realized, but only if military elites are allowed to enter other elite sectors. Thus, the foreign intervention scenario could contribute to differentiation, but on a more limited extent than the modified collapse scenario.

To sum up, since we could speak about the potential suitability of two transition scenarios for elite differentiation, we should note that the collapse scenario theoretically could offer more differentiation than the foreign intervention scenario.

### ***2.5. Implications of regime opening scenarios for elite unity***

We have reached the final component of the theoretic model on consensually united elite. Elite unity is not related to structural elements of elite *per se*, like: functional distinction or social composition (which was the case for the differentiation and for the circulation), but is more a reflection of cultural commonalities among its

members. The common beliefs, values related to the functioning of the state are the elements, which describe a state of mind. In our case the concern are “*shared beliefs and values as well as specific norms <...> about political access, competition, and restrained partisanship*” (Lengyel and Higley 2000, 2) among elites in the context of regime opening. Basically it means that elites should have a common agreement about these aspects. Before moving to discussing theoretic implications of regime opening scenarios for elite unity, it is worth to refer to few observations on the issue.

Burton and Higley are talking about elite settlement, which is very closely linked to the concept of elite unity. The main idea is that elites are presumed to be divided and disagreeing about the peculiarities of the proper ruling. Elite settlement is a resolution of these divisions by a sudden compromise among disputing elite fractions as a mean to resolve a political crisis and a deadlock between elite fractions. The result is a written agreement on new rules of political rule, which is accepted by all participants of negotiations (Burton and Higley 1987, 295–300). Higley and Pakulski refer to the importance of the pro-Western orientation among all elites and the solidarity for the national interest as important facilitators for beliefs’ and values’ cohesion. The same authors mention direct transformation as an alternative way to elite settlement. It emphasizes that the break from the single ideology and the consensus on values and on political norms might be achieved in round table discussions among the key-elite and when elites perceive their cooperation as a national liberation from the foreign hegemony (Higley and Pakulski 1992, 111–114). Both ways of value and norms cohesion outlined by the authors are oriented towards the processes evolving in a close proximity to the regime opening, in other words – these are short-term related. However for the continuation of elite



unity we can take a look at elite classification provided by Wasilewski. The very basic idea is that at the regime opening elite of transition is operating. The source of the unity is the willingness to abandon previous regime and the agreement on fundamental values and on the rules of the new regime. After regime opening it is changed by elite of transformation, whose unity is kept together by following the vision articulated by elite of transition. It is achieved during the implementation of reforms. Finally, elite of consolidation ensures the stability of the established regime by habituating the rules of the regime (Wasilewski 2001, 135). Thus, it is important that elites shared the commitment not only to open the regime, but also subsequent elites had a will to conform to established rules. Now let's see the implications of regime opening scenarios for elite unity.

**Conversion.** The scenario of conversion identifies the internal split among reformers' and standpatters' fractions within ruling elites on fundamental rules of the political rule. Thus, there is a lack of elite unity. When we referred that reformers might attempt for inclusion, it means that both opposing sides are involving in deliberations and reformers are trying to persuade to accept their promoted values and norms of political regime. As reformers are stronger than standpatters, reformers' vision of the regime is superior to standpatters' vision. Thus, the final outcome of this process is less a common and negotiated vision of values and rules of the new regime, but more a replacement of the old values with the new values of reformers fraction. Also because reformers might attempt to replace some members in key-elites with supporters, it is again an indication of lack of negotiations and more of a forced attempt to simulate value consensus. The process we could identify here is the attempt to engineer the elite of transition. Since reformers are replacing members in key-elites before the regime opening, it also might contribute to the

creation of elite of transformation, who could implement reforms according to the values and norms set by reformers during the regime opening. As for elite of consolidation, the habituation of the rules might be problematic due to a simple reason: because the regime opening is more a result of a single actor decisions – reformers fraction, which seems to disregard standpatters and opposition as equal partners for deliberation.

However if standpatters' inclusion into reformers fraction fails, the interaction with opposition becomes a matter of importance. Although in this scenario opposition is involved, reformers still have more weight in discussions on rules of the new regime. Moreover, it can involve the opposition, who already supports similar or not very different values and norms as reformers. In this respect, again we could speak about the replacement of the old values with the new values from the reformers' fraction side. At the same time the process might be less superior, because if reformers are taking key-elite sectors and gives other elite sectors to opposition, it still should involve a degree of negotiations and common consensus for sharing among both sides. Thus, prior regime opening reformers with the involvement of some opposition are creating the elite of transition. The placement of reformers fraction supporters' in key-elites and inclusion of pro-reform opposition into other elites might be a step towards elite of transformation after the regime is opened. Although we could speak about a sense of unequal cooperation, but if both sides do share pretty similar values concerning the new regime and agree on it, which is followed by regime opening, then we could also indentify a kind of potential for elite of consolidation under the condition that standpatters and other opposition members later on accepts the new rules for political conduct.

**Collapse.** This scenario builds on the assumption that there are fundamental differences between opposition and the ruling elite about the appropriate political regime. Since it is opposition, who is leading regime opening, it means that internally it could be sharing not only the desire to install a new regime, but also it might have the same understanding and same beliefs concerning the new regime. The strength of the opposition vis-à-vis incumbents might also be a result of prior negotiations and consensus on the very basic elements of the new regime. It is important to note that in the context of military's elite detachment from incumbents the opposition could have to deliberate with military on the new regime too. In result, it would mean that the opposition could not impose its values, but it should have to undergo a kind of consensus building. Thus, at the removal of incumbents, they could already be characterized and operate as transition elites.

As the replacement with the new regime supporters in key-elite sectors might occur only after the regime is opened, it means that transformation elite might emerge only then. On the one hand, if opposition needs to replace members in key-elite sectors with supporters, it could reflect a lack of consensus towards peculiarities of the new regime with key-elite sectors. In this way, the elite of transformation would be engineered under the guidance of the opposition. On the other hand, if the opposition is more liberal towards the replacement and leaves the possibility for the incumbents to enter key-elite positions, it could be a result of negotiations with the incumbents. Similarly, if we considered it as a result of discussions, we should conclude that there was a kind of acceptance of the new values from the incumbents' side. The same applies if incumbents are not excluded from the competition for the ruling elite positions. In result, we could say that such moves could contribute to building of the transformation elites. As for the elite of

consolidation we should carefully consider the strength of the alliance between the opposition and the military elites as a facilitating force. If they succeeded to maintain the same beliefs and values concerning the regime, it could indeed help to habituate new rules and values of the regime for the incumbents.

**Cooperative transition.** We already mentioned that cooperative transition scenario involves the ruling elite and the opposition as the principal actors during the regime opening. Since the regime opening is negotiated by them, it means that both representatives are involved in adjustments of new regime's vision. Also it means that the process involves a relatively broad set of interests. In this respect, a new regime is a result of the mutual effort and consensus. However the elite of transition might face some challenges in implementation of the fundamental rules agreed upon the regime opening, because the scenario of cooperative transition presumes the existence of standpatters and the possibility of their involvement in competition to enter the ruling elite again. Thus, it might be difficult for transformative elites to follow the initial vision if standpatters remain unconverted and do not accept new values and norms. In result, the emergence of consolidation elite might also be problematic.

Moreover, we should take into consideration military elites since they appear as an additional important element, when we are talking about cooperative transition scenario. If military elites denounce their relation to standpatters, and the opposition together with the reformers' fraction gets their support and acceptance of the new regime, then we could speak about the broader consensus. Also it could contribute to transformation and consolidation elite building. However if military elites do not accept to share the values and norms after regime opening and they remain on the side of standpatters, they could threat the whole transformation elite and block the

habituation of rules of the new regime. In result, we could refer to the possibility of another attempt to change a regime.

**Foreign intervention.** In the foreign intervention scenario we can speak about essential differences concerning understanding of the proper values, norms and political regime prior to the regime opening between the foreign force and the incumbents (otherwise the foreign intervention would not happen). Before the intervention is being made, negotiations and deliberations with incumbents might have been held. However we can assume that both sides were not able to reach a consensus. Also it could mean that foreign forces might have negotiations with the opposition to polish the vision of the new regime. It is possible that in this process the main guide could be the foreign country. In this respect, the opposition could have to comply with their values and norms concerning the new regime. What we could observe then is that transition elite could be composed on the foreign and on the local base, although the former is not directly becoming a part of the new ruling elite later.

After the regime is opened, the foreign force might be indirectly involved in discussing or in monitoring the progress of the elite of transformation in order to secure a further implementation of the framework. Thus, we could speak then about the facilitation of acceptance of new regime's values and norms. The very presence and the possibility of the foreign intervention in case of deviation from the vision of the new regime could also contribute to incumbents' conversion. On the other hand, if incumbents are not willing to convert even under the foreign country's presence, but manage to maintain the support of the military elites, there is a possibility of entering into an alliance with another foreign force, which has similar values and the same outlook towards the regime as the incumbents. In result, we could speak about

the potential threat to the realization of reforms and to the habituation of new rules of the regime. However, if the foreign force and the opposition reach an agreement with military elites and they retreat from the incumbents and acknowledge the new regime and its values, they expand the base of regime supporters. As an outcome, elites of transformation and elites of consolidation could have better possibilities to develop.

Following the discussion of all transition scenarios, we can briefly conclude what each scenario implies for elite unity (see table 5). In conversion scenario the best potential to achieve elite unity is if regime opening and further processes of elite building are happening in cooperation between the opposition and reformers. The scenario of collapse raises the importance of consensus between the military elites and the opposition for the formation of elite unity. In cooperative transition scenario a big potential for elite unity emerges, because it involves a broad base of actors reaching a consensus on the new regime. The maintenance of the further unity is reached by allying the military elites. The last transition scenario – foreign intervention – needs the involvement and monitoring of the foreign force in the formation of elite unity after regime opening.

**Table 5 Transition scenarios and their implications for elite unity<sup>7</sup>**

| Transition scenario | Implications for elite unity  |
|---------------------|---|
| Conversion          | Reformers attempt for a forced value consensus with standpatters or the moderate value consensus with the opposition. Elites of transition and elites of transformation are engineered under the guidance of the opposition. Habituation is problematic, because the opposition and standpatters are not equal partners of negotiations. The potential for elites of consolidation, because reformers and the opposition chosen for cooperation share similar values. |
| Collapse            | Broad consensus within opposition. Deliberations with the military elites contribute to the consensus building and the operation of transition elites. Elites of transformation are guided by the opposition. The alliance between  |

<sup>7</sup> Table is created by me based on analysis of transition scenarios.

|                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
|                        | the military elites and the opposition facilitates elites of consolidation.  |
| Cooperative transition | New regime as a result of mutual consensus between opposition and reformers. Broad base for elite of transition. Gaining support from military elites' contributes to the support base extension and to the development of transformation and consolidation elites.  |
| Foreign intervention   | The new regime is the result of negotiations between the foreign forces and the local opposition. The framework is guided by the foreign force. Transition elites are composed on the foreign and on the local opposition base. The monitoring by the foreign force facilitates elites of transformation. An agreement with military elites contributes to the development of transformation and consolidation elites. |

## ***2.6. Insights on elite unity after regime opening***

Since we have finished the discussion on implications of transition scenarios' for elite unity, we can now refer to the final point about the possibilities of elite unity after regime opening. Previously it was emphasized that elite unity is manifested in common values and norms about the regime. When there is an attempt to open a regime and change it, there are few important aspects to be mentioned, which become clear from the analysis: a) how broad is the supporting base among participating actors in polishing the fundamental rules of the regime (which is possible only if participants share close visions and are able to reach a consensus); b) the transmission and following of these rules in practice. If we took into consideration these observations, we could then see that scenarios imply for a different possibilities and challenges for elite unity.

Firstly, it is clear that conversion strictly on the incumbents' base, i.e. reformers and standpatters, is limited to narrow negotiations. Since it is not directly involving outsiders with different outlook and preferred norms towards regime, the extent of values', norms' conversion might be limited as well. In this respect, it is difficult to speak about the diffusion of new values and subsequent habituation of the

new regime by opposition. Of course we could remember that reformers might involve some opposition, but we have to remember that still the opposition is in a subordinated position vis-à-vis reformers. For this reason, the diffusion would be limited and it would result in problematic habituation.

Secondly, if we referred to the collapse scenario, we could identify the same problem as in conversion. In this case the source would be the opposition and the incumbents would be the subordinated ones. In this respect, the crafting of the new regime by the opposition would disregard the incumbents and could contribute to the habituation problems. However, in this scenario as a great importance emerges a creation of an alliance with the military elites. Thus, if it is successfully created, it means not only broader base of consensus, but also a degree of values' and norms' adjustment.

Thirdly, we can see that cooperative transition involves a broader set of participants and that a new regime emerges as a result of different values' and norms' adjustment process. Since this adjustment process is done at the very beginning in negotiations, it sets an acceptable vision to follow for all participating sides. For this reason, for them it can be easier to habituate it. At the same time, the alliance between the opposition and reformers might be a clear signal for them about the willingness and the unity for a new regime. Thus, subsequently, it could facilitate the support from the military.

Fourthly, as the foreign intervention scenario involves an outside force, which dominates the whole process, the major risk of this scenario is the fact of the foreign intervention itself. Although it can involve values' negotiation with the opposition, but it can impose values, which might be very contradicting to the country in question. Moreover, if we are speaking about the monitoring of further implementation



processes after regime opening is being made, the controversy of independence and colonialism or hegemony might emerge. That is why the new regime might be jeopardized and the possibility of other foreign intervention might be put on the agenda. In result, it we could have a new rupture of the regime.

Taking into consideration all the implications of transition scenarios for elite unity, we can make a conclusion that the most favorable scenario for elite unity is cooperative transition, because of the reasons outlined above: consensus among broad set of actors and the potential of this consensus to facilitate habituation. With this observation we have arrived at the final point of the whole chapter, where we should try to connect transition scenarios with the formation of consensually united elite.

Since the model of consensually united elite consists of three main elements: classic circulation, elite differentiation and elite unity, it means that we should look which transition scenario comes closest to the realization of the whole model. We have learned that classic circulation could be best achieved through cooperative transition. The same transition scenario is favorable for elite unity formation. But differentiation could be best encouraged by the collapse. Taking into consideration that no other transition scenario comes closer to consensually united elite than cooperative transition, we should conclude that cooperative transition could be the most favorable. Even if it is not the most favorable scenario for differentiation, it still does not exclude differentiation as such. We noted that it could foster differentiation and reduction of overlapping on the incumbents and the opposition base in other elite sectors, if military elites from the former regime are allowed to transfer their positions. In this respect, we can take this observation as partially sufficient for elite

differentiation and conclude that cooperative transition is the most favorable for the formation of consensually united elites.

## **CHAPTER 3 – CONSENSUALLY UNIFIED ELITE FORMATION: THEORETIC ADAPTATION FOR AFRICAN CONTEXTS**

When talking about regime opening and its' consequences for African elites we should take into consideration an observation made by Bratton and Van de Walle. The authors claim that neopatrimonial practice is a distinguishing peculiarity of African pre-opening regimes. The main feature of such regimes is personal relationships within political structures (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 459). If we transferred this observation to the discussion on elites, we could imply that under such conditions elite members are bonded together by personal relations. By being personally connected to the recruiters they serve as supporters of the established regime. These elite members encircle key-elite members (the recruiters, the ruling elite) and create a kind of a buffer zone, which is protecting the core. Such structure of elite relations means that under neopatrimonial conditions there might actually be some formal differentiation of elites. Nevertheless this differentiation could not be able to transcend the dependency, which is programmed within the logic of personal relationships, i.e. even if various elite sectors could be identified and on the surface they lacked overlapping, they still could not be fully autonomous, because the appointee is related to the core elite members, who performed the selection. Moreover, as elite members' selection is determined by belonging to the network the line between elite circulation and elite reproduction becomes blurred, because everything depends on the personal network of the elite member, who is performing recruitment. Thus, the main point is how widely and deeply that network penetrates into social layers of society.

If the network is narrow and does not go outside elites, then indeed we could speak about reproduction. But if network is wider and encompasses other social

layers, it means that we could speak about the biased circulation, which is happening in neopatrimonial African regimes before the opening. Such monolithic peculiarity of the structure implies a potential for regime opening to emerge outside established networks. Bratton and Van de Walle claim the same (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 461). As a result, the regime opening is a challenge for such type of structure and relationships between incumbent elite members.

Moreover, since the regime opening potential relates to the outsiders of incumbent elites, the opposition becomes one of the key players in change. If we looked at previous scenarios, which we discussed in the chapter before, we could imply that cooperative transition, collapse or foreign intervention scenarios or scenarios alike might be possible in African contexts then. Subsequently, it means that there is a possibility for consensually unified elite formation as well. However we should make some specifications here.

If collapse and foreign intervention might be driven without any involvement of incumbent elite fractions, cooperative transition needs to involve fractions from incumbent elites. Since core elite members maintain their positions by selecting elite members on personal relationship basis, the emergence of fractions within is complicated. On the one hand, the incumbent selects appointees, which will support established regime and by doing this will preserve their elite position. On the other hand, the dependence of appointees might be interpreted as a source of potential tensions, because appointee to elite might be deprived from the possibility to enter the very core of elite. Thus, if we want to speak about the emergence of fractions, we should refer to distinction between the core of elite and the outer circle of this elite, i.e. appointees. The loss of bonds with the core elite creates a favorable theoretic

opportunity to involve with outsiders of incumbent elites and opt for cooperative transition, which provides a plausible way to consensually unified elite formation.

By observing four types of neopatrimonial regimes in African countries Bratton and Van de Walle distinguished four patterns of regime openings. The two of them could qualify for the cooperative transition – regime openings performed in plebiscitary one-party systems and regime openings performed in competitive one-party systems. For the first case the authors outline that regime opening is initiated by oppressed loosely organized opposition and the ruling elite. The rules of the new game are set at the national conference (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 477–478). However since the opposition does not constitute the unified force vis-à-vis the incumbent elites, the outcomes of the national conference might be at the rulers favor. Subsequently, even if the regime opening was made after negotiations between the opposing sides, after regime opening the incumbents might still remain in their positions, maintain continuation of previous practices and protract habituation of new regime rules. For the second case the authors outline that regime opening is initiated again by the opposition and the ruling elite, however no common space for elite and opposition members is created, i.e. there is no national conference or broad negotiations (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 483–484). In result, the regime opening is made without deliberation on the rules of the new regime. The single aim of such regime opening is the fact itself of letting the opposition to enter into competition with incumbents. In this respect, we could claim that after such regime opening there might be difficulties in formation of consensually unified elite, because the opening is concerned only with legalization of additional channels to the ruling elite and it seems not to be concerned with the general vision of the rules. Thus, it might be difficult for elites later on to agree on rules, reforms and follow them.

Nevertheless, there might be some space for habituation, if we took into consideration the observation of Bratton and Van de Walle. They note that in competitive one-party systems the ruling elites are familiar and habituated with the process of competition, although it is happening within single party boundaries. Thus after regime opening it might be easier to habituate the competition (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 484). But again it does not guarantee the definition and habituation of other rules.

What these highlights suggest is that indeed regime opening patterns, which operated in African contexts and which appear to resemble cooperative transition, in fact, are problematic and challenging to formation of consensually unified elites. Indeed, if we refer to some details, the regime opening scenarios pose two major problems. In the first case – it is the dispersion of the opposition, which is not able to fully realize its potential in national conference, unlike if it was cohesive within. In the second case – it is the “quick shock” to the system, when elections are organized without deeper deliberations between parties participating in regime opening. Both of these challenges result in non-fully cooperative transitions, which also mean that the formation of consensually unified elite in such contexts is stuck and that new established regimes might face attempts of being changed.

## CHAPTER 4 – THE CASE OF IVORY COAST

For empirical investigation the case of Ivory Coast is selected. This particular country is chosen because in French West African region it represents the least unsuccessful consolidation after the third wave of democratization. Within other countries of the region it reflects the general problem of regime legitimacy (coup d'état, two civil wars). At the same time it implies that during the course of post-regime opening in 90's it could have become the most successful to tackle elite disunity, because its single-party system managed to keep the regime stable before the regime opening emerged in the agenda. It means that, although Ivorian elites were not consensually unified during the course of the time, a bonding principle was operating, which prevented the ruling elite from being challenged or removed. However the development of events after the regime opening, especially after 1993, suggests not only a lack of agreement and habituation on the rules of a new game, but also we could interpret it in the light of a non-fully cooperative transition. These developments, which we will discuss in the chapter later, are the outcomes of unsolved disagreements within elite when the "window of opportunity", i.e. regime opening, had emerged.

The selection of the case is indeed based on the dependent variable, however since it is a more qualitatively and in-depth oriented study, such selection is appropriate. D. della Porta acknowledges this way of selection as legitimate (Della Porta 2008, 210). As our research considers theoretic model a very integral part for the explanation of the phenomena under investigation, i.e. that consolidation failed, because elites were not unified during regime opening. For this reason we select a case, where elites could have had better chances to be unified, but were not. We

base our selection on most likely single case design (Levy 2008, 12). Ivory Coast is exactly the case for the reasons presented in the first paragraph.

We will begin our case investigation with historical background prior to regime opening in 1990 and continue with subsequent development since 1990. The discussion in each section guided by information collected in relation to three dimensions mentioned in theoretic part<sup>8</sup>. The information was collected from secondary sources, from documents on National Assembly and Government composition since 1990 until 2012, from interviews.

Secondary sources were used as additional factual source of information concerning peculiarities of Ivorian elite development. Documents were used to create 2 databases on National Assembly and Government members. Each database was used to generate information about membership circulation and reproduction since 1990, other information – like ethnicity or social background of members was not accessible during the period of the fieldwork.

In addition to documents and secondary sources, 10 informal in-depth unstructured interviews were organized in Abidjan between 2014 05 06 – 2014 05 29 with: representatives of international institutions, representatives from local civil society organizations, local experts in political sociology, and representatives from various sections of political elites<sup>9</sup>. The duration of interviews was between 40 minutes and 3 hours. Some interviews were in English, the rest were in French. Interviews mostly covered elite selection, roots of elite disagreements, conflicts and regime legitimacy issues. We should note that not all intended informants were accessed; however interviews with experts counterbalance this issue.

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<sup>8</sup> Table 10 in appendices.

<sup>9</sup> Exact list of interviewed people and their affiliations could be provided only by request.



#### **4.1. Historical peculiarities of Ivory Coast between 1960-1990**

In order to solve Ivorian puzzle we should not ignore historical context of Ivory Coast before 1990. The period of 1960-1990 will enable us to locate the configuration of local elites and to better understand their starting positions in 1990 and later on. Few key-points should be mentioned here.

Ivorian independence from France in 1960 brought F. H. Boigny and his party Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (*Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*, PDCI) to the center of political arena. F. H. Boigny was not a newcomer to politics and the state administration. Before becoming a leader of independent Ivory Coast he was a minister in several French governments (Tiabas 2009, 13). Coming from the colony and being a member of local Ivorian elite he was involved in the highest level of colonists' administration. It was there where he was able to learn and habituate the principles of state management. French colonial management principles were based on the idea of power centralization and concentration. At the top of this hierarchy were colonists. The local elite, whose members were assimilated into French cultural *clichés*, was included into the lower ranks of local colonial administration (Mazgelytė 2013, 101–103). When before the collapse of colonialism French had opened gates for political representation in colonists' parliament, it was the opportunity for rising local political elites to organize themselves and demand the independence from France. At that time in Ivory Coast there were few emerging political parties, however it was PDCI with F. H. Boigny, who took the central position and co-opted emerging leaders and parties into PDCI. By doing this he unified the opposition on the anti-colonists, liberation platform and prevented the possibility of ethnic

secessionism right after independence (Ivory Coast has got 60 ethnic groups)<sup>10</sup>. Such way of PDCI entrance into political arena of independent Ivory Coast has begun a long period of their and *Akan* (Ivorian southeastern ethno-cultural group) domination within the highest echelons of the ruling elite.

When Ivory Coast became independent, PDCI aimed to preserve their leading positions, which were gained during pre-independence. It did so by creating a single-party system, where PDCI was the only one recognized political party. Other political parties were ignored or dismissed, although constitution formally allowed their existence<sup>11</sup>. In this way the opposition was suppressed and the single entrance to the ruling elite was through PDCI. The peculiarity of this party was its organizing principle: centralization and ethnic inclusiveness (Schachter 1961, 300,302; Kilson 1963, 264).

F. H. Boigny concentrated the power into his hands and became the central figure of decision making within the party and the state. Due to the centralization of the party not much autonomy was left for a number of lower units' leaders within the party. But at the same time being a loyal member of the party became a matter of value if we considered that positions within party were assigned from above and not by deliberations from below. Moreover, the same principle was employed by creating a list of members for the National Assemblies, which made elections only a formality. Key-elite members of the state – like managers of state companies – were selected from PDCI as well<sup>12</sup>. As for the Ivorian Government, during the first years to get the support for the new regime President F. H. Boigny formed the Government by granting positions for the leaders of political parties, which were co-opted into

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<sup>10</sup> Informant no. 4.

<sup>11</sup> Informant no. 8.

<sup>12</sup> Informant no. 3 and no. 9.

PDCI<sup>13</sup>. Any rising tensions between the leader and his appointees or those, who were deprived from positions in the ruling elite or in key-elites, were solved by removing them from positions, suppressing opinion or incarceration (Tiabas 2009, 20–21).

Despite the fact that PDCI was based on ethnic inclusiveness, there were ethnic favoritism tendencies when it came to distribution of political positions. Since the very beginning of F.H. Boigny's rule (he himself was *Baoule*, which belongs to *Akan* ethno-cultural group) *Akan* had a stable majority among members of the Government; the same tendency was prevalent within National Assembly. It was then followed by *Malinke* (northern ethno-cultural group, where the ethnic group of *Dyoola* is the dominant among others) and later on by *Krou* (western ethno-cultural group), which had never outnumbered *Akan*<sup>14</sup>. Thus the management of the state and the vision of the way it should be managed were shaped by *Akan* without broader negotiations with others. Although other ethnic groups were also recruited into the ruling elite, these did not have much power. What we could observe here is that F. H. Boigny's way of the state management was like a transformed version of centralized colonial administration – in this case colonists were replaced by *Akan*, who built the loyalty of other ethnic groups by granting them some space within ruling and political elite. The mechanism of centralized party and measures against opposition was one of the reasons why such system of ethnic favoritism could work. However we should not forget that besides the political and the ruling elite support there should be the support of other elites as well. For this reason it is very important to refer to F. H. Boigny's outlook on economic course of the country.

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<sup>13</sup> Informant no. 4.

<sup>14</sup> Informant no. 9.

After independence the President continued exploitation of cocoa and coffee plantations for the export, which were profitable sources of revenue during colonial times. To keep this business profitable and working F. H. Boigny employed a liberal outlook to land cultivation and purchasing, which was a distinguishing feature in the context of socialist ideas influenced former colonies in Africa. This enabled internal and international labor migration with an aim to profit from plantations. Due to such politics the development of plantations was shifting from *Akan* regions in the southeast and to *Krou* region in the west (Akindes 2004, 8–11; Mazgelytė 2013, 110). This kind of agricultural opening has some important implications for elites.

Firstly, the possibility to involve into profitable plantations and raw material export business created a niche for the emergence of the economic elite. In this sense it was an alternative possibility for those, who did not become the ruling elite, to become elite of other sector. Secondly, as plantations could be developed not only in *Akan*, but *Krou* regions as well, it enabled an ethnic mixing of the economic elite. Thirdly, in paralel to the liberal access to the plantations and exprot business the state companies were involved in it as well, which resulted in the emergence of the overlapping between the economic elite and the ruling or the political elite (Akindes 2004, 11–12). If we took this observation into consideration, we could speak about possible tensions within economic elites. On the one hand, the formation of economic elite could happen autonomously and could not necessarily be linked with political circles. On the other hand, overlapping tendencies could provide a better and preserved access to resources, which would enable to preserve the power of the ruling and political elite and limit its circulation. In result we could speak about the possibility of fragmentation within economic elites. Fourthly, since F. H. Boigny supported the openness of Ivorian economy not only to locals but also to foreigners

—especially those coming from France (Akindes 2004, 12) – it created a new channel for economic elite. This means that the local economic elites, which did not have ties with political sphere, were placed in-between the foreign and the political-economic elites, and it could be interpreted as a buffer to the ruling elite and accumulation of power. Thus, the way F. H. Boigny has designed the economic management of the country has created partially autonomous and at the same time overlapping economic elites. It provided an alternative and constrained channel for aspiring elites outside the close circles to PDCI or to *Akan*.

Finally, we should refer to another very peculiar and important characteristic of Ivorian society – the hierarchy of ethno-cultural groups and their place within social structure, which justified the architecture of independent Ivory Coast. The main idea is that *Akan*, *Malinke* and *Krou* ethno-cultural groups have their own place within Ivorian society. *Akan* were on the top of the power pyramid. They were considered as appropriate to be rulers. Below were *Malinke* and *Krou*: the former were traders and the latter were soldiers<sup>15</sup>. The eligibility of *Akan* to be the leaders was rooted in understanding that their traditional society was organized into kingdom with clear leadership succession. Meanwhile *Krou* was not eligible, because it did not have kingdom tradition and because their leaders were elected in councils. As for *Malinke*, although they had a tradition of kingdom, the origins of their kingdom were argued to be not within Ivory Coast<sup>16</sup>. For this reason it were *Akan* people, who proclaimed themselves to be the most politically experienced to rule the country. Within such framework of society we could clearly see the differentiation between military, economic and ruling elites. As the person could be regarded as belonging to a particular ethnic group, the problem of overlapping was automatically dismissed. At

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<sup>15</sup> Informant no. 1 and no. 3.

<sup>16</sup> Informant no. 7.

the same time such structure limited elite circulation by narrowing down the circle for recruitment to the ruling elites. As the previous observations on PDCI tactics and F.H. Boigny economic course of the country reveal, the conceptual understanding of the society was partially realized with some modifications on ethnic superiority, which made it more subtle and not so radical.

This was the structural context of Ivorian elites, which seemed to be working until 1980. But in 80's due to declined prices in cocoa market, the country had experienced economic crisis<sup>17</sup>. It could be interpreted as a threat not only to the ordinary population, but also to economic elites, because they as an alternative power accumulation source vis-à-vis the ruling elites were threatened too. For this reason their support for the legitimacy of the ruling elite could easily become questionable. The opposition used the crisis as the opportunity to step into political arena. In 1982 L. Gbagbo (*Krou* ethno-cultural group) together with intellectuals started to criticize F. H. Boigny's regime and established a political party – Ivorian Popular Front (*Front Populaire Ivoirien*, FPI) to demand a legalization of political competition and a shift from France favoring relations to defending Ivorian interests. After the emergence of FPI F. H. Boigny attempted to co-opt L. Gbagbo (and other key-opponents), but L. Gbagbo stayed in the opposition to regime<sup>18</sup>. The confidence to stay within opposition could have been fostered by the fact of collapsing Ivorian economy and also by reforms within PDCI.

In 1980 PDCI started the dissolution of centralizing power and liberalization of members' selection to the National Assembly, to mayor's offices and to certain sections of PDCI. However F. H. Boigny remained party leader and his positions were not touched by internal reforms and *Akan* managed to preserve the majority in

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<sup>17</sup> Informant no. 4.

<sup>18</sup> Informant no. 4 and no. 8.

the Gouvernement. In result, although PDCI remained as a single channel to the National Assembly, voters decided the final composition of the National Assembly by choosing from multiple candidates. The members of the party were granted a possibility to determine leaders of sections by themselves (Tiabas 2009, 35–38). The liberalization of the party, the promotion of renewal, but the preservation of the top-leadership in the party and the Gouvernement, shows that F. H. Boigny and the ruling elite was challenged from within and it was a response: a) to deal with emerging challengers and b) to remain in control of the state at the same time. These changes and economic crisis gave an opportunity for the opposition to demand recognition and reforms. The violent mass protests in Abidjan in 1990 (Reyntjens 1991, 48) and La Baule conference of African state leaders and France had pushed Ivory Coast like other French African countries to open up the regime<sup>19</sup>.

#### ***4.2. Tensions within political elite and state disintegration after 1990***

In 1990 political parties were officially recognized, presidential elections and elections to the National Assembly were organized, however it has not guaranteed a smooth and transparent political game between the incumbent and the new aspiring ruling elites. The regime opening was done without deliberations with the opposition about elections or key-reforms within the state, which means that PDCI aimed to remain in power and was stronger than opposition (including FPI) to control regime opening. Indeed we could observe that actually there was fragmentation and no strong unity within opposition, because 83 political parties were registered after their official recognition (Tiabas 2009, 47). For this reason PDCI was successful in taking repressions against new political parties, which included disruptions of electoral campaigns, granting financial support from state funds only to PDCI and changing

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<sup>19</sup> Informant no. 2 and no. 6.

rules of election. The last change was very important, because it issued electoral cards to foreigners and allowed them to vote – before that only those, who were members of PDCI, could vote<sup>20</sup>. As F. H. Boigny was liberal towards foreigners with his economic policy, he expected to capitalize their support during elections. And because there was no independent electoral commission (elections were administered by Internal Affairs Ministry)<sup>21</sup> and opposition was not strong enough, elections to the Presidency and the National Assembly were favorable for the incumbents. However there are few important points to be made in reference to changes within National Assembly and Government after elections in 1990.

Although F. H. Boigny and PDCI succeeded to preserve their positions, it did not mean that regime opening made no changes within political elites. There were signs of circulation within National Assembly – the majority of parliamentarians were new in a sense that they were not members of previous National Assembly (table 6). However this circulation and renewal did not changed the fact that *Akan* ethno-cultural group was the highest in numbers<sup>22</sup>.

**Table 6 Persistence of incumbents from previous National Assembly within 1990 – 1995 National Assembly**

|       |      |       | Was in National Assembly |             |
|-------|------|-------|--------------------------|-------------|
|       |      |       | No                       | Yes         |
| Party | FPI  | % (N) | 88.90% (8)               | 11.10% (1)  |
|       | PDCI | % (N) | 68.50% (111)             | 31.50% (51) |
|       | PIT  | % (N) | 100.00% (1)              | 0.00% (0)   |
|       | UND  | % (N) | 100.00% (1)              | 0.00% (0)   |
| Total |      | % (N) | 69.90% (121)             | 30.10% (52) |

The majority of the new Government members in 1990 were recruited neither from the previous pre-opening Government, neither from the previous National

<sup>20</sup> Informant no. 7 and no. 8.

<sup>21</sup> Informant no. 7.

<sup>22</sup> Informant no. 9.



Assembly<sup>23</sup>, which means that they could be coming outside the very core of the ruling and the political elite. It also indicates a lack of continuity of the ruling and the political elite. On the other hand, ethnic favoritism remained – *Akan* was the majority<sup>24</sup>. Thus, although regime opening allowed the entrance of new PDCI members, they still mostly were coming from *Akan* ethno-cultural group. *Akan* superiority in political field remained unchallenged. In order to remain on the top F. H. Boigny surrounded himself with his allies in Prime Minister, Speaker of National Assembly, PDCI, and state force leadership positions. However the balancing between renewal and continuation of ethnic loyalties has not prevented from tensions, which emerged together with the economic reform and the death of F. H. Boigny.

Since Ivory Coast still had problems in economy, the new tax reform for citizens was introduced by Prime Minister A. Ouattara in order to increase money collection to Ivorian budget. The main idea was the differentiation of taxes according to the origin of Ivorian resident. Ivorians paid less, residents from ECOWAS (i.e. Economic Community of West African States) paid more, others coming outside ECOWAS had to pay the highest amount. The reform has not reached its initial goals and has put foreigners' support for PDCI in danger. Subsequently, the collection of electoral cards from foreigners was organized. In result, it created tensions within population – it was difficult to distinguish if a resident is a foreigner or Ivorian, because surnames could be similar<sup>25</sup> (for example, those coming from Burkina Faso).

The second source of tensions emerged when the President has died in 1993 two years before the Presidential and National Assembly elections. The country

<sup>23</sup> Table 10 and 11 in appendices.

<sup>24</sup> Informant no. 9.

<sup>25</sup> Informant no. 7.

experienced a leader succession crisis between A. Ouattara (Prime Minister) and H. K. Bedie (Speaker of the National Assembly). According to Ivorian constitution H. K. Bedie had to become a temporary President, however A. Ouattara did not agree with constitution rules and wanted to be declared as a temporary President<sup>26</sup>. H. K. Bedie received support from the party members associated with *Akan* ethno-cultural group and he has banned A. Ouattara's supporters representing mostly northern Ivorian ethnic groups, i.e. *Malinke*. As a result, a new party Rally of the Republicans (*Rassemblement des Républicains*, RDR) emerged. A split of PDCI then drew clear ethnic lines within political elite. FPI was already associated with *Krou* ethno-cultural group (especially *Bete* ethnic group). It was kind of an outsider in F.H. Boigny's ruling elite architecture and was more able to accumulate power as economic elites during the plantation expansion in western parts of Ivory Coast. Even in the context of regime opening it was not strong enough to co-opt the support of all opposition forces and counterbalance PDCI. However RDR, which had a northern ethnic groups' image, could become a real threat for PDCI and *Akan*, because it could use the opportunity of tensions emerged due to tax reform and electoral cards collection to gain support in 1995 elections.

The ethnic cleavages within political elite were deepened when H. K. Bedie started escalate a question of Ivorian identity (*Ivoirite*) and eligibility of candidates to participate in elections. It resulted in A. Ouattara's exclusion from participation in presidential elections due to questionable origin. At the same time the signal was given to northern ethnic groups about their "impurity" and "unsuitability" to become ruling elites<sup>27</sup>. Although this move of H. K. Bedie was a targeted to deprive A. Ouattara from access to power, the emergence of national identity issue was also a

<sup>26</sup> Informant no. 4, no. 5, no. 7 and no. 8.

<sup>27</sup> Informant no. 4 and no. 7.

breaking point with F. H. Boigny's ideology of diversity acceptance within country. The reason is that although former President practiced ethnic exclusivity, but his economic policy and understanding of Ivorian citizenship had managed to make this exclusivity not so visible. Under F. H. Boigny the concept of Ivorian was understood as "*ou*" ("or"), which meant that to be Ivorian is to be a descendant of Ivorian mother or father<sup>28</sup>. Taking into consideration the fact that his liberal economic outlook to agriculture was favorable for foreigners and was a source of attraction of immigrants from Burkina Faso and Mali (Akindes 2004, 10), H. K. Bedie's support for the concept of Ivoirity as "*et*" ("and", i.e. mother and father are Ivorians) meant that significant part of population became marginal and less valuable citizens. Also it was a threat for the economic elites, which could be classified under "*ou*" category. On the other hand, within the context of continued economic crisis after 1990, it was a reassurance for "*et*" economic elites on preservation of their positions. Although this observation is theoretic and there is no empirical justification, we can look how the escalation of *Ivoirite* was reflected in political and ruling elites.

In 1995 RDR and FPI created Republican Front to destroy the monopoly of PDCI and to boycott elections to National Assembly and Presidency<sup>29</sup>. However it did not have a fundamental impact: H. K. Bedie remained as the President and PDCI as the majority in the National Assembly. The majority of National Assembly members were newcomers like in the previous National Assembly. Meanwhile, we could speak about possible emigration of political elites from PDCI party, because an increased number of former National Assembly members in FPI and RDR could be

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<sup>28</sup> Informant no. 3 and no. 4.

<sup>29</sup> Informant no. 7 and no. 8.

observed (table 7). Speaking in terms of ethno-cultural composition, there is some evidence about the persistence of *Akan* as the majority<sup>30</sup>.

**Table 7 Persistence of incumbents within 1996 – 2000 National Assembly (starting from the pre-opening National Assembly)**

|       |       |       | Was in National Assembly |             |
|-------|-------|-------|--------------------------|-------------|
|       |       |       | No                       | Yes         |
| Party | FPI   | % (N) | 63.20% (12)              | 36.80% (7)  |
|       | JPDCI | % (N) | 100.00% (1)              | 0.00% (0)   |
|       | PDCI  | % (N) | 71.60% (101)             | 28.40% (40) |
|       | RDR   | % (N) | 69.20% (9)               | 30.80% (4)  |
| Total |       | % (N) | 70.70% (123)             | 29.30% (51) |

If we look into recruitment patterns to the Government between 1993 and 1999, we could see that again selection occurred not from former National Assembly members, but there was an increasing tendency to select former Government members starting with the pre-opening Government. Moreover, if in 1993 it was around 40 percent, the Government cabinet created in 1999 August 10 had only 2 Ministers out of 30, who were not Government members before<sup>31</sup>. The majority of Government members during 1993-1999 were *Akan* – there was no sharp reduction of *Malinke*, who could be supposed to be threatened by *Ivoirite*<sup>32</sup>. Thus, what the dynamics of the National Assembly and the Government reveal is that there were no radical changes in terms of circulation within political and ruling elites. The exception could be the Government in 1999, which demonstrated reproduction of ruling elites. But even with this exception one could observe that escalation of *Ivoirite* has left ethno-cultural composition unchallenged.

At the end of 1999 before the scheduled elections in 2000 a *coup d'état* against the President and the Government was made. Officially, military representatives aimed at improvement of deteriorating military officers' and soldiers'

<sup>30</sup> Informant no. 9.

<sup>31</sup> Table 10 and 11 in appendices.

<sup>32</sup> Informant no. 9.

conditions and release of political prisoners from opposition (IRIN 1999). The fact that military elite took a power from PDCI leader means that there were cleavages between the ruling and the military elite and the real aim of the *coup d'état* was to dissolve PDCI monopoly within Government. In the following Presidential elections the military general R. Guei restricted RDR and PDCI candidates from participation, only FPI candidate L. Gbagbo was allowed to participate as an opponent. After elections he declared himself a winner, but shortly was overthrown by FPI. L. Gbagbo became the President<sup>33</sup>.

During his short rule R. Guei indeed has made radical changes in recruitment to the first Government in 2000 January 4 – only one member was a Minister before. Also the share of former National Assembly members in the Government has also increased a little, if compared to previous ones. This means that R. Guei was aiming at Government's renewal and removal of professionalizing Government members. However in 2000 May 18 he reshuffled the cabinet of the Government and included more former Government members<sup>34</sup>, which means that he entered into agreement with former ruling elites. Although currently we are not able to identify their affiliations with political parties or ethno-cultural groups, we could refer to *coup d'état's* aim to remove PDCI from the ruling elite. This means that he could have chosen ministers either from RDR, either from FPI.

When L. Gbagbo became the President, his first Government was tending to recruit outside the Government and outside the National Assembly<sup>35</sup>. The composition of the National Assembly was FPI dominated, but the reproduction on former National Assembly members' base remained too – because of PDCI (table 8).

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<sup>33</sup> Informant no. 3 and no. 5.

<sup>34</sup> Table 10 and 11 in appendices.

<sup>35</sup> Table 10 and 11 in appendices.

**Table 8 Persistence of incumbents within 2000 – 2010 National Assembly (starting from the pre-opening National Assembly)**

|       |                       |       | Was in National Assembly |            |
|-------|-----------------------|-------|--------------------------|------------|
|       |                       |       | No                       | Yes        |
| Party | FPI                   | % (N) | 90.6% (87)               | 9.4% (9)   |
|       | Independent candidate | % (N) | 40% (2)                  | 60% (3)    |
|       | MFA                   | % (N) | 100% (1)                 | 0% (0)     |
|       | PDCI                  | % (N) | 69.4% (68)               | 30.6% (30) |
|       | PIT                   | % (N) | 100% (4)                 | 0% (0)     |
|       | RDR                   | % (N) | 80% (4)                  | 20% (1)    |
|       | UDCY                  | % (N) | 100% (1)                 | 0% (0)     |
|       | UDPCI                 | % (N) | 69.2% (9)                | 30.8% (4)  |
| Total |                       | % (N) | 78.9% (176)              | 21.1% (47) |

However RDR were not satisfied with the election of L. Gbagbo and were trying to organize protests for new elections, which allowed A. Ouattara to participate<sup>36</sup>. Within the context of rising tensions with RDR he included their members into the Government, but in 2002 another attempt of *coup d'état* was organized, which developed into civil war and split the country into the northern part controlled by rebels named New Forces and the southern part controlled by National Armed Forces loyal to L. Gbagbo<sup>37</sup>. This split could be interpreted as a culminating point in Ivorian political and military elite disunity. The fact of two military camps indicates not only disintegration of Ivorian military and its inability to recognize the regime as legitimate, but also it is a reflection of unresolved regional post-conflict issues. There are some observations made that both fighting sides were recruiting mercenaries: New Forces from Burkina Faso and Liberia (Skogseth 2006, 18) and National Armed Forces from Liberia (Security Council Committee 2011, 15). Since these countries themselves did not have a solution to integrate their own ex-combatants either to military, either to labor market, it became a pool of supporters for conflicting Ivorian political elites.

<sup>36</sup> Informant no. 4.

<sup>37</sup> Informant no. 4 and no. 5.

The armed conflict was aimed to be resolved by mediation of international elite. It resulted in round table, which involved representatives from Ivorian key-political parties and rebels. Since it involved all conflicting sides and provided a space for deliberations, it resulted in Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement in 2003 January 23. The parties agreed to form a transitional Government, which included representatives of all Round Table participants, to organize new elections, to reform military and to disarm (Linas-Marcoussis Agreement 2003). The majority of new transitional Government was never in the Government before, but some reproduction of ruling elites remained and few members from former political elite, i.e. from National Assembly, were selected<sup>38</sup>. Despite the fact that a pact between elites was made, the implementation was problematic, because there was a lack of recognition of Government members related to New Forces and lack of will to implement disarmament (Security Council Committee 2003, 6–7). In result, the work of transitional Government was jeopardized (Security Council Committee 2004, 3–4). The representative of New Forces G. K. Soro and the President L. Gbagbo had had to enter new negotiations and sign Ouagadougou agreement in 2007 March 4. This agreement aimed to encourage disarmament, identification of Ivorian population and preparation for Presidential elections, which were delayed in 2005 (Security Council Committee 2007, 4,6–7).

Elections to the Presidency and to the National Assembly were confirmed in 2010, although disarmament was not fully executed<sup>39</sup>. A. Ouattara, who was denied to participate as a candidate to the Presidency since the death of F. H. Boigny, was finally allowed to enter the competition. However the opening of the gates for A. Ouattara has not prevented from post electoral crisis – after the second round of the

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<sup>38</sup> Table 10 and 11 in appendices.

<sup>39</sup> Informant no. 6.

Presidential run-off between A. Ouattara and L. Gbagbo Independent electoral commission has failed to deliver election results on time. The announcement of results was given to Constitutional court, which annulled votes from 6 northern constituencies by L. Gbagbo's request and announced him as a winner<sup>40</sup>. Meanwhile A. Ouattara backed by western and African community was announced a winner by electoral commission. In result, a vacuum of power emerged – each of winners claimed their victory. It provoked open armed conflict between the National Armed Forces and New Forces, which resulted in ethnic targeting of civil population and removal of L. Gbagbo (Mazgelytė 2013, 114–115).

The entrance of A. Ouattara to the Presidency has brought significant changes within political and ruling elites. Firstly, FPI boycotted elections. Secondly, when we look at the composition of National Assembly (table 9) we can see that RDR has a majority. However the real change is very high circulation of National Assembly members, even PDCI delegates were not reproduced from National Assemblies starting from the pre-opening National Assembly, which means that PDCI party might be experiencing internal changes. Again, if we look at changes within three Governments under A. Ouattara, we can observe the tendency of co-opting former Government members and limiting circulation<sup>41</sup>.

**Table 9 Persistence of incumbents within 2011 – 2015 National Assembly (starting from the pre-opening National Assembly)**

|       |                       |       | Was in National Assembly |            |
|-------|-----------------------|-------|--------------------------|------------|
|       |                       |       | No                       | Yes        |
| Party | DIALOGUE              | % (N) | 81.8% (9)                | 18.2% (2)  |
|       | Independent candidate | % (N) | 100% (5)                 | 0% (0)     |
|       | ESPERANCE             | % (N) | 100% (8)                 | 0% (0)     |
|       | PDCI                  | % (N) | 86.2% (75)               | 13.8% (12) |
|       | RDR                   | % (N) | 97% (130)                | 3% (4)     |

<sup>40</sup> Informant no. 7.

<sup>41</sup> Table 11 in appendices.



|       |       |       |                |           |
|-------|-------|-------|----------------|-----------|
|       | UDPCI | % (N) | 88.9% (8)      | 11.1% (1) |
| Total |       | % (N) | 92.5%<br>(235) | 7.5% (19) |

Although we do not have strong empirical evidence about ethno-cultural patterns, we should make some observations. It is obvious, that at least a new discourse in relation to ethnic loyalties is emerging – key-elites and state administration positions are being taken by *Malinke* (more specifically, *Dyoula*)<sup>42</sup>. This northern ethno-cultural group is considered as RDR supporters. Moreover, the perception about these new appointees is diverging from the common understanding about elite recruitment. They seem to be selected not from elites or reach positions without a steady growth of the career, because political elites are not able to recognize them<sup>43</sup>. It means that on the one hand, there might be some tendencies of de-elitism and deeper circulation. On the other hand, as ethnic links are so emphasized, ethnic favoritism and patrimonialism could be building up. Thus, what could we see then is a transformed version of F. H. Boingny's cultivated *Akan* superiority, i.e. what could be happening is *Malinke* and *Akan* swap. This might be indeed a case if we took into consideration the fact that FPI is on the political margins and PDCI maintains a coalition with RDR.

<sup>42</sup> Informant no. 3, no. 5, no. 8 and no. 9.

<sup>43</sup> Informant no. 5.

## CONCLUSIONS

We have reached a part, where the answer to question – why Ivory Coast was failing to consolidate legitimate and stable regime after 1990 – should be provided. What the case of Ivory Coast reveals is that indeed regime opening was not based on deliberations and rather it was an attempt of incumbents to preserve their positions. The regime opening itself resulted in circulation of National Assembly (political elite), but reproduction was more prevalent in the Government (ruling elite). Regime legitimacy crises have not radically changed recruitment patterns there. However if we looked at pre-regime opening and post-regime opening elite development peculiarities, we should make a strong reference to “pact” between ethno-cultural groups.

Our discussion for the period of 1960-1990 reveals that a “pact” between *Akan* and *Malinke* existed. It could have been working for two reasons: a) both ethno-cultural groups had kingdom tradition, which means that their conception and vision of the rule was alike, thus the centralization and persistence of the ruling elite in single-party regime could have been acceptable; b) the understanding of functional differentiation of ethno-cultural groups was reinforced by liberal economic course, which facilitated the distinction between ruling (*Akan*) and economic elites (*Malinke*). The economic crisis in 80's was a challenge to functional differentiation of ethno-cultural groups, while internal liberalization of PDCI was a conceptual challenge.

The period after 1990 could be considered as a break of “pact” between *Akan* and *Malinke* and a struggle to claim power. The “pact” was broken with ideological transformation of PDCI, which retreated from support of diversity and was a conceptual threat for *Malinke* and for functional differentiation of ethno-cultural

groups. The transformation did not offer *Malinke* anything in return. We can argue that subsequent crises of regime legitimacy were attempts to claim power by one of “pact” parties. What is happening now in Ivory Coast could, probably, be labeled as a transformation of the old “pact” between *Akan* and *Malinke*, because they might have swapped places. However there is a problem here, if we referred to their conceptual understanding of the rule. It is incompatible with the conceptual context of opened-regime, thus again there might be problems with power transfer. Rather it (opened-regime) is more favorable for *Krou*, because their traditional conception of the rule is fundamentally different from *Akan* and *Malinke* and is actually more compatible with democratic regime. Thus, the further regime stability might be determined if indeed *Malinke* and *Akan* will be able to maintain a “pact”, because the root of challenges to legitimacy was there.

As a consequence of such “pact” the prospects to maintain a really open regime (in terms of *Krou* involvement) might again be limited. The way to overcome it would require finding a way to accommodate *Krou* and their traditional conception of the rule as well. In this respect it would mean a creation of an alternative, maybe a kind of hybrid understanding of the appropriate regime for Ivory Coast, which would not necessarily be in compliance with other democratic regimes.

These insights could also be used when discussing regime legitimacy challenges in other African countries. Regime opening and subsequent challenges to regime legitimacy might emerge also because of more deeply rooted understandings of the rule within ethno-cultural groups. Elites then, who are struggling to establish stable regimes or who are struggling to maintain power, might be sharing completely different beliefs and values, which are not directly connected to a particular political ideology. These values and beliefs concerning the way of ruling might be a cultural

peculiarity. If such peculiarity is encompassing a particular ethno-cultural group, the acceptance of alternative might be considered as a threat to identity. That is why broader “pacts” and cooperative regime openings could have been problematic and unsuccessful.

# Appendices

## Appendix A. Tables

**Table 10 Identification of consensually united elite**

| Concept               | Concept dimensions  | Description of dimension  | Indicators   |
|-----------------------|---|---|--|
| Elite differentiation |   | Different elite sectors could be identified. Elites from distinct sectors do not overlap with each other - elite members from one sector do not simultaneously hold elite position within other sector.   | The proportion of coincidence of elite positions (by elite sector).  |
| Elite unity           | Shared values about rules of political game.                        | National elites have the same value orientation towards participation in politics possibilities for various actors; towards current rules for accession to political elites; towards current rules of political power transfer; towards the ideal regime for their country. | The proportion of support (by elite sector) towards: a) electoral law; b) constitution. The incidence of support for the same country future vision (by elite sector). |
|                       | The access to key decision-making centers via networks or channels. | Key decision-making centers maintain communication with national elites.  | Incidence of common meeting spaces, events for national elites.  |
| Classic circulation   | Wide circulation  | Elite membership changes occur accross various elite sectors.   | The proportion of new elite members in the most important elite sectors.   |
|                       | Deep circulation  | New elite members are not selected from elite. Members with non-elite background are present within elites.   | The proportion of new elite members with non-elite background (by elite sector).   |
|                       | Gradual circulation   | Members of elite are replaced regularly, but not all at once.   | The proportion of new elite members after the replacement (by elite sector).   |
|                       | Peaceful circulation  | The transfer of elite positions does not involve violence.  | Incidence of violent acts towards old or new members of elite during the transfer of positions (by elite sector).  |

**Table 11 Persistence of incumbent National Assembly members within Government cabinets (starting from the pre-opening National Assembly)**

|         |                   |       | Was in National Assembly |           |
|---------|-------------------|-------|--------------------------|-----------|
|         |                   |       | No                       | Yes       |
| Cabinet | 1990 November 30  | % (N) | 100% (19)                | 0% (0)    |
|         | 1993 December 15  | % (N) | 92.9% (26)               | 7.1% (2)  |
|         | 1998 August 11    | % (N) | 87.1% (27)               | 12.9% (4) |
|         | 1999 August 10    | % (N) | 100% (30)                | 0% (0)    |
|         | 2000 January 4    | % (N) | 76.2% (16)               | 23.8% (5) |
|         | 2000 May 18       | % (N) | 88% (22)                 | 12% (3)   |
|         | 2000 October 27   | % (N) | 82.6% (19)               | 17.4% (4) |
|         | 2001 January 24   | % (N) | 92.6% (25)               | 7.4% (2)  |
|         | 2003 January 25   | % (N) | 84.6% (33)               | 15.4% (6) |
|         | 2005 December 28  | % (N) | 84.4% (27)               | 15.6% (5) |
|         | 2006 September 16 | % (N) | 100% (31)                | 0% (0)    |
|         | 2007 March 04     | % (N) | 100% (31)                | 0% (0)    |
|         | 2010 December 05  | % (N) | 100% (13)                | 0% (0)    |
|         | 2010 February 23  | % (N) | 96.4% (27)               | 3.6% (1)  |
|         | 2010 March 04     | % (N) | 100% (28)                | 0% (0)    |
|         | 2011 June 1       | % (N) | 86.1% (31)               | 13.9% (5) |
|         | 2012 March 13     | % (N) | 100% (37)                | 0% (0)    |
|         | 2012 November 22  | % (N) | 96.6% (28)               | 3.4% (1)  |
| Total   |                   | % (N) | 92.6% (473)              | 7.4% (38) |

**Table 12 Persistence of incumbent Government members within Government cabinets (starting from the pre-opening Government)**

|         |                   |       | Was in Government |             |
|---------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------------|
|         |                   |       | No                | Yes         |
| Cabinet | 1990 November 30  | % (N) | 78.9% (15)        | 21.1% (4)   |
|         | 1993 December 15  | % (N) | 60.7% (17)        | 39.3% (11)  |
|         | 1998 August 11    | % (N) | 51.6% (16)        | 48.4% (15)  |
|         | 1999 August 10    | % (N) | 6.7% (2)          | 93.3% (28)  |
|         | 2000 January 4    | % (N) | 95.2% (20)        | 4.8% (1)    |
|         | 2000 May 18       | % (N) | 52% (13)          | 48% (12)    |
|         | 2000 October 27   | % (N) | 73.9% (17)        | 26.1% (6)   |
|         | 2001 January 24   | % (N) | 22.2% (6)         | 77.8% (2)   |
|         | 2003 January 25   | % (N) | 66.7% (26)        | 33.3% (13)  |
|         | 2005 December 28  | % (N) | 53.1% (17)        | 46.9% (15)  |
|         | 2006 September 16 | % (N) | 12.9% (4)         | 87.1% (27)  |
|         | 2007 March 04     | % (N) | 20.6% (7)         | 79.4% (27)  |
|         | 2010 December 05  | % (N) | 38.5% (5)         | 61.5% (8)   |
|         | 2010 February 23  | % (N) | 10.7% (3)         | 89.3% (25)  |
|         | 2010 March 04     | % (N) | 21.4% (6)         | 78.6% (22)  |
|         | 2011 June 1       | % (N) | 50% (18)          | 50% (18)    |
|         | 2012 March 13     | % (N) | 5.4% (2)          | 94.6% (35)  |
|         | 2012 November 22  | % (N) | 17.2% (5)         | 82.8% (24)  |
| Total   |                   | % (N) | 38.9% (199)       | 61.1% (312) |

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