

‘OF THE PEOPLE’:  
CIVIL SOCIETY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN  
POST-TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRATIC POLICYMAKING

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*Dedicated to Celeste, William and Edith:  
with gratitude for your lasting examples.*

## ABSTRACT

Democratic societies have traditionally primarily enabled citizen participation in the domain of electoral politics. However, the ‘participatory revolution’ introduced new opportunities and demands for citizen engagement in a broader array of political activity, and a corresponding ‘deliberative turn’ in political science has sought to integrate the interests of non-state stakeholders in governance activities such as policy making. Civil society groups are increasingly viewed as key stakeholders in the policy making process, which poses theoretical and practical questions regarding the potential for their intermediation between citizens and states. Existing research on the topic has generally focused on contexts of longstanding democracies. Yet recent analyses suggest that civil society actors in post-Communist Europe are more involved in policy making processes than previously thought.

This project analyzes secondary literature on public participation, democratic deliberation and civil society, in conjunction with primary data from interviews with civil society representatives in Serbia and Poland, in order to explain the prospects, opportunities and challenges for civil society participation in post-transitional contexts. It expands the understanding of civil society as an intermediary force, finding that civil society actors in both countries deploy a variety of methods in seeking to draw political attention to policy needs; to influence policy making processes; and to hold state institutions accountable for policy outcomes.

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## INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the ensuing political transitions in Eastern Europe appeared to signal a triumph of democratic values. In the past quarter century, topics of regime change and democratization have correspondingly received much scholarly and political attention. An exponential increase in funds allocated by Western donors, intended to strengthen and retrench democratic structures in transitional contexts, and an expansion of aid from non-Western democracies, illustrate the level of international emphasis. Meanwhile, social movements in the Middle East and North Africa demonstrated mass disenchantment with the political corruption, institutional unaccountability, and economic marginalization endemic to the longstanding authoritarian regimes in the region.

Political analysts have rightly cautioned against widespread tendencies to characterize all movement away from dictatorial rule as movement toward democracy. In particular, Carothers (2002) warned against the overreliance on paradigms of political transition by the democracy promotion community as leading to an oversimplified misrepresentation of complex local dynamics and, hence, ineffectual policies. Levitsky and Way (2010) further overviewed a number of hybrid regimes, which masked incumbent abuse of the state behind formal democratic institutions. Yet despite proper concern over the extent to which a change in regime and implementation of elections signifies a genuine commitment to democratic structures and norms, recent trends indicate the spread of the values of popular participation and representation implied by democracy. Thus, many of the regimes referenced by Levitsky and Way derive their claims to legitimacy from some form of democratic process, albeit manipulated.

Building on recent scholarly and policy attention to public participation and deliberation, this thesis sets out to elucidate the nature of civil society participation in policy making in post-transitional contexts. Democratic systems are commonly viewed as providing

a higher and more formalized level of institutional accountability to citizens than that offered by other political systems. The quality of this accountability has often been linked to an active civil society sector, which provides an intermediary space and formalized structure for public involvement, facilitating ongoing citizen participation in government. Although existing literature illustrates the importance with which the work of civil society is imbued, the ability of civil society organizations to fulfill this intermediary role seems dependent both on the extent of their access to policy making processes and decision-makers, and on the regularity of their communication with private citizens.

While Howard (2002) remarked on the weakness of civil society in post-Communist Europe, Petrova and Tarrow (2007) have recently suggested that civil society activity in the region is better understood through the relation of participatory and transactional forms of activism – and that although individual (participatory) activism is indeed comparatively low, organized (transactional) activism has been rather high. Furthermore, while analyses of post-Communist civil society tend to reference the historical lack of citizen participation, two countries confound this explanation: citizens mobilized in sustained resistance to authoritarian rule in Poland and in Serbia, precipitating regime change, yet following democratization have tended toward participatory withdrawal. It is the experience of civil society associations striving to influence policy making processes, following transitions from authoritarian rule and the reversal of mass civic engagement, which concerns this research. This raises the question: following mass social mobilizations and political transition, how does civil society intermediate between citizens and institutions?

An account of civil society participation in policy making bears relevance to at least three disparate, ongoing discussions: the problem of the ‘democratic deficit’; the merits and efficacy of deliberative democracy; and the prospective role of civil society in a democratic context.



First, the global expansion of key democratic values has, curiously, corresponded with an increasing democratic deficit in Western societies. One type of democratic deficit (broadly conceived as the delinking of citizen preferences from policy making outcomes) is the decrease in electoral turnout in Western democratic societies. Low turnout, identified by Lijphart (1997) as democracy's "unresolved dilemma," has raised concerns over the legitimacy of outcomes resulting from elections in which less than half of the voters have participated. Relatedly, Mair (2006) observes a general 'hollowing' of Western democracy – a mass withdrawal from electoral politics by voters and political parties in many of the same countries that boast the longest democratic traditions, and that have been most active in extolling democratic ideals around the globe. Mair argues that democracy in these countries is being "steadily stripped of its popular component," as voters retreat into "particularized spheres of interest," and political and party leaders shift "into the closed world of the governing institutions." The growing popular indifference to democratic politics, illustrated in voter apathy, and the disembedding of political parties from society contributes to the emergence of a "democracy without a demos" (Mair 2006: 45, 25)

However, identified deficits in the functioning of Western democracies extend beyond low electoral turnout. Fung (2006) notes four difficulties that affect the ability of electoral institutions to make government responsive to citizen preferences in the policy making process. These include unclear or unstable citizen preferences, perhaps due to limited information that constrains the formation of factually-grounded preferences; inadequate communication mechanisms to convey those preferences to politicians outside of elections; inability of electoral mechanisms, especially in the context of an imperfect democratic context, to hold politicians and administrators accountable for their decisions; and weak or dissipated implementation mechanisms, which may encumber effective policy outcomes.

Increased citizen participation in policy making processes has been proposed as a solution to the democratic deficit, by strengthening a link between citizen preferences and decision making deliberations. Much of the research on democratic deficits has been done on long-established democracies; however, contexts of transition from an authoritarian regime are likely to encounter similar gaps between citizen preference and decision making, even as efforts are made to integrate citizen perspectives through electoral and other mechanisms. By gathering qualitative data on the perspectives and experiences of civil society members who have participated in policy making processes in post-Communist societies, this study further explores the prospects and challenges for meaningful policy contribution in a context of recent democratization.

Second, Thompson (2008) notes an effective divide between normative theory and empirical research in the area of deliberative democracy: theorists and researchers “talk past each other” (Neblo 2005), and empirical research has often not fully engaged with theory. Specifically, a number of empirical studies based on narrowly construed experiments may have been too swift to dismiss the merits of deliberation (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Jackman and Sniderman 2006; Mendelberg and Oleske 2000). Thompson observes a need for empirical research into the conditions in which “deliberative democracy does and does not work well,” and into the extent to which unfavorable conditions might be changed. By overviewing discourses on normative theories of participation and of civil society, and by analyzing civil society feedback on the opportunities and challenges of existing modes of policy participation, this study seeks to contribute to the latter of the research gaps.

Finally, existing scholarly literature has tended to focus on the theorized role of civil society or on the mechanics of public participation. The perspectives of civil society representatives on the obstacles and challenges to their operationalization of this intermediary role have thus far been under-examined. Despite scholarly and policy attention to the role of

civil society in democracy, most analyses of civic engagement have relied on data reflecting on electoral turnout – while there has been little attention to the mechanisms for public involvement in policy making during inter-electoral periods. This project aims to bridge that gap by collecting qualitative data on the factors affecting civil society’s policy influence, and its role as an intermediary space, to better understand the extent to which civil society representatives view themselves as mediators of public interest and how they act on that role.

The first chapter of this study reviews the literature of participation in democratic decision-making that has sought to broaden policy making processes to the input of non-state stakeholders. The second chapter presents the evolution of deliberative democratic theory, and three models of governance – associational, collaborative and network – that have been proposed as mechanisms to incorporate the participation of non-state actors in policy making. Subsequently, the study overviews literature on civil society and the opportunities and challenges presented by its prospective role in deliberation. The fourth chapter expands on the existing literature by analyzing new empirical data on the opportunities and challenges facing civil society policy participation in Poland and Serbia. Finally, the conclusion examines the most relevant implications of the empirical research for future theoretical discussions.

Western electoral politics have historically tended toward mass engagement primarily at times of elections and referenda, with citizen participation less sought during the interim periods of governance. Barber (1995) notes that participatory government “involves extensive and active engagement of citizens in the self-governing process; it means government not just for but by and of the people.” I suggest that government “of” the people implies not state purview or power over citizens, but rather an ongoing governance process with decision- and policy making derivative from, and reflecting, the will and interests of the people. I argue that this is best ensured through the consistent representation of civic interests through civil society engagement in the policy development process.

## CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Held (2006: 1) remarks that the history of democracy is “complex and marked by conflicting conceptions” of what government by the people appropriately entails. Hosch-Dayican (2010: 20) notes that since state power in a democratic system is legitimized through the sovereignty of the people, “participation is the necessary link between the exercise of state power and the citizens’ will.” For much of history, voting was the main mechanism for popular participation in political decision-making. However, what Kaase (1984) refers to as the ‘participatory revolution’ in the late 1960s intensified and expanded citizen political involvement in the so-called ‘post-industrial’ democracies of Western Europe and North America. As a result, considerable scholarly attention was given to accounting for these participatory expansions and their implications for common notions of democracy. This chapter scrutinizes the participatory turn in democratic theory, introducing a theoretical background legitimizing citizen participation, and charting the emergence of modes of political activity, beyond electoral politics.

### ***Theories of Participation***

Gould (1988: 259) identifies political participation as “characterized by directed and immediate involvement in the process of decision-making by the individuals concerned... in this process, the authority of the individuals is not delegated to some representative but is exercised directly by them.” Political participation is viewed as desirable because it allows citizens to express diverse interests during the decision-making process, affords a greater degree of popular control over policy outcomes, and retrenches democratic values among participants. Citizen participation in the policy making process is widely viewed as enhancing the legitimacy of the process. Scharpf (1970, 1999) notes a distinction between input-legitimacy, which implies that a decision is legitimate when those who govern take the interests of the governed into account, and output-legitimacy, which implies that those who govern are

able to effectively advance the interests of the governed. Pateman (1970: 42) further comments that the participatory model might be characterized as requiring maximum input (participation) and resulting in output beyond the policy decisions, by contributing to “the development of the social and political capacities of each individual, so that there is ‘feedback’ from output to input.”

Inglehart (1971, 1977) argued that the participatory expansion was linked to the development trajectories of post-industrial societies, which facilitated “individual modernization.” Inglehart theorized that economic prosperity allowed citizens’ value priorities to move toward post-materialist values of freedom, self-fulfillment, and quality of life concerns, which inform new political objectives. Further, by facilitating increased education and improved information, economic prosperity would enable citizens to gain the skills and confidence to pursue these broadened political interests. According to this theory, therefore, citizens in post-industrial democracies will participate in political activities beyond elections both because their increased education levels, skills and information provide more capacity to directly pursue political objectives, and because emerging political actors and social movements provide new opportunities to advocate for political objectives corresponding to post-materialist values.

Modernization theorists argue that as citizen capacity and knowledge increases, citizen expectations of their political system also rise. This view has proven highly relevant to the context of political transition and democratization, despite theoretical debates over the implications of citizens’ higher civic expectations for sustainable democratic rule in post-industrial societies. Inglehart suggests that a better educated and informed citizenry may contribute to the improved functioning of democratic institutions, by demanding more direct channels to express their interests to authorities, and a corresponding greater responsiveness from authorities to those interests. Yet Huntington (1974: 177) postulated that individual

modernization was likely to result in a divergence between popular opinions of what the state should accomplish, and the real output of the state; if sustained, this gap could lead to “deep feelings of frustration, a reaction against existing political institutions and practices, and a demand for a new political system that could count and would do what had to be done.” Higher citizen capacity and increased expectations of the performance and accountability of state institutions, confronted with a failure of the state to meet those expectations, could thus foment discontent with existing political frameworks.

To the extent that the disjunct between citizen expectations and state performance has facilitated previous demands for democratization, it is noteworthy that the possible failure of state institutions to respond to the demands for increased civic participation is also seen as a potential factor of satisfaction with a democratic system. The section examines the evolution of typologies of political participation, which have sought to categorize and explain the emergence of new modes of political activity.

### ***Participation Beyond Electoral Politics***

Early research on democratic participation focused on voting behavior and voter turnout (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954); it was not until the 1950s that studies of political participation expanded to include a range of activities related to electoral, party and campaign activities. Thus, Lane (1959) identified six types of political participation, including fundraising, organized group activities, contacting officials, writing letters, working in election campaigns, and voting. Milbrath (1965) expanded this analysis, distinguishing eleven types of political action: voting, political discussions, trying to talk someone into voting in a certain way, wearing a button, contacting an official, donating money to a party, attending a political rally, contributing time to a campaign, active party membership, running for office, and holding office. Both Lane and Milbrath identified certain forms of political activity as more complex (requiring more time, effort and initiative) than others, and postulated that greater numbers of

citizens tended to participate in less complex forms of participation. Hosch-Dayican (2010: 48) observes that elite politics dominated this era of research, in which “the involvement of citizens did not go far beyond selecting and controlling government officials and the bulk of the citizenry focused on electoral and party activities as the main channels of participation.” This context shifted radically with the emergence of new, unconventional forms of political participation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, following which a number of models sought to distinguish between different types and dimensions of political participation. Many of these models sought to account for new forms of participation by dichotomizing between institutionalized and non-institutionalized, direct and indirect, legal and illegal, or legitimate and non-legitimate types of action (Gabriel and Völkl 2005).

A typology created by Verba and Nie (1972) was among the earliest to conceptualize electoral and non-electoral modes of popular participation – voting, campaign activity, particularized contacting, and communalist activities (Table 1). As new forms of political action emerged, contemporaneous attempts at categorization by social scientists struggled to keep up with shifting political realities. Thus, Verba and Nie’s typology soon drew criticism for limiting the scope of participation only to activities “within the system... with regular and legal ways of influencing politics,” not including protests or social movements (Verba et al. 1978: 48).

Table 1. Dimensions of political participation – Verba and Nie (1972)

	<b>Electoral Activities</b>		<b>Non-electoral Activities</b>	
	Voting	Campaign Activities	Communalist Activities	Particularized Contacting
<i>Type of interaction with elites</i>	Pressure	Information and Pressure	Information and Pressure	Information
<i>Conflict potential</i>	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Weak
<i>Scope of the outcome</i>	Collective	Collective	Collective	Individual
<i>Extent of own initiative</i>	Little	Moderate	Moderate to high	High

Source: Verba & Nie 1972, as outlined in Gabriel and Völkl 2005: 535

A later study led by Barnes and Kaase (1979) distinguished between ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ types of political participation, denoting the conventional or unconventional status of a participatory form based on its legality, legitimacy and institutionalization. Barnes and Kaase’s typology denoted sixteen separate forms of political action within this typology. Conventional political participation including engaging in political discussion, joining citizen groups, electoral activity, attending rallies, and contacting officials; unconventional political participation included signing petitions, joining boycotts, attending demonstrations, occupying buildings, and blocking traffic. Barnes and Kaase found that citizens tended to engage in multiple forms of activity while trying to influence decision-making, with most citizens shifting between conventional and unconventional forms of participation depending on their goal or on the social context. Barnes and Kaase found that unconventional or protest action was increasing, often among youth, and correlated to increased education, cognitive skills, and post-materialist values; they noted that the apparent link between post-materialist values and unconventional political actions could be a future source of tension in post-industrial societies.

More recently, Teorell et al. (2007) have provided a further classification of modes of political participation (Table 2). This typology identifies five types of political participation (voting; consumer participation; party activity; protest activity; and contacting). Drawing on Hirschman (1970)’s analysis of citizen responses to dissatisfaction, Teorell et al. distinguish types of political participation based on the mechanism of influence (exit-based vs. voice-based). A further distinction is made based on the nature of the channel of expression (representational vs. extra-representational).



Table 2. Five-fold typology of modes of political participation – Teorell et al (2007)

Mechanism of Influence		Channel of Expression	
		<i>Representational</i>	<i>Extra-Representational</i>
	<i>Exit-Based</i>	Voting	Consumer Participation
	<i>Voice-Based</i>	<i>Non-targeted:</i> Party Activity	<i>Non-targeted:</i> Protest Activity
		<i>Targeted:</i> Contacting	

Source: Teorell et al. (2007: 341)

Norris (2007) also proffers a new distinction, dichotomizing between “citizen-oriented” and “cause-oriented” political activity. The former predominately relates to electoral and party activities, and the latter to specific issues and policy concerns. Norris notes the erosion of the boundary between the social and political spheres, evidenced by the “new politics” of globalization, environmental protection, multiculturalism, and gender equality.

### Conclusion

This chapter has tracked the evolution of theories and realities of political participation beyond electoral and party politics to new modes of activity. Specific participatory forms vary, and citizens may shift between ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ forms and participate in a range of political activities to pursue goals. However, the steady expansion in participatory theory suggests that there has been an increasing citizen demand for channels through which to communicate their interests and preferences to political decision makers.

Most of the scholarly attention to modes of political participation has examined forms in Western democracies. Yet the topic suggests an implication that is highly relevant to the post-transitional context: if increased public participation in policy making improves the responsiveness of decisions, the legitimacy of the process and the accountability of the political system, then including broader input in policy making should assist in promoting democratic consolidation.

## CHAPTER TWO: DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE

Deliberative democratic theory draws on the expanded notion of citizenship suggested by the participation literature – that is, that citizens have a justifiable claim to participate in political activity beyond voting, such as decision making. This chapter overviews deliberative democratic theory, and presents three models of democratic governance emphasizing the participation of non-state stakeholders in policy making.

### *Types of Deliberation*

Thompson (2008: 498) notes that all theories of deliberative democracy are predicated on a “reason-giving requirement,” wherein “citizens and their representatives are expected to justify the laws they would impose on one another by giving reasons for their political claims and responding to others’ reasons in return.” While there are differences among deliberative theories as to “what counts as an adequate reason, how extensive the reason-giving forum should be, whether procedural norms are sufficient, and the desirability of consensus as a goal” (Benhabib 1996; Besson and Marti 2006; Bohman and Rehg 1997; Elster 1998; Fishkin and Laslett 2003; Macedo 1999), all deliberative theories reject “conceptions of democracy that base politics only on power or interest, aggregation of preferences, and competitive theories... [which] do not give sufficient weight to the process of justifying to one’s fellow citizens the laws that would bind them” (Thompson 2008: 498). Thus, della Porta (2005: 340) identifies deliberative democracy as a “communicative process based on reason,” which “is able to transform individual preferences and reach decisions oriented to the public good.”

Hendriks (2006: 487) observes two diverging streams, micro and macro, in the deliberative democratic literature. Micro-deliberative theorists “concentrate on defining the ideal conditions of a deliberative procedure” and provide “limited discussion on who should deliberate.” Such theorists include Bessette (1994), Cohen (1997) and Elster (1997), and “encourage civil society to engage in collaborative practices, usually with the state.” Macro-

deliberative theorists, on the other hand, “emphasize informal discursive forms of deliberation, which take place in the public sphere,” and focus on “unstructured and open conversations outside formal decision-making institutions.” These theorists, including Benhabib (1996), Dryzek (1990, 2000), and Habermas (1996) are more likely to “advocate that civil society should work discursively outside and against the state.”

Habermas’ (1996: 307-308) ‘two-track’ model of democracy envisions two levels of deliberation: opinions formed in the public sphere are transmitted through ‘currents of public communication’ to the state, where more formal deliberation occurs in courts and parliaments. On a pragmatic level, this is illustrative of what Thompson (2008) identifies as a structural problem of the division of labor in deliberative democracy, noting three different approaches to resolving this problem and incorporating deliberative elements in the democratic framework. ‘Distributed deliberation’ assigns different aspects of the ‘deliberative task’ to different institutions, holding them to different deliberative standards (Goodin 2005). While the distributed deliberation model allows a recognition of the comparative advantage of different institutions in promoting different aspects of deliberation, the segregation of different aspects is practically unlikely. ‘Decentralized deliberation,’ as exemplified by the Porto Alegre Participatory Budget, establishes unified deliberative processes in different institutions, but focuses on “very local goods and needs,” rather than encouraging “citizens to think about the greater good of the city, the just trade-offs between jurisdictions or the good of the city through the long arc of time” (Fung 2007: 179). Thompson (2008: 515) observes that proponents of decentralized deliberation must seek “more effective ways to encourage a broader perspective in the local deliberations and to integrate the decentralized bodies into a deliberative process at central levels of the political system.”

‘Iterated deliberation’ illustrates the capacity of deliberative democracy for self-correction (Gutmann and Thompson 2004). According to Thompson (2008: 515), the process

of iterated deliberation commonly entails the following steps: “A political body (which may or may not be deliberative) proposes a policy to a deliberative body, which returns a revised version of the policy to the original body. That body revises the policy again and submits it for further consideration to the deliberative body before it is enacted.” The steps may be repeated through multiple phases, and may also include other stakeholder institutions.

### ***Constraints***

Some deliberative democratic accounts have identified a conflict between participation and deliberation itself (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004; Cohen and Fung 2004). One study of political networks, which examined the exposure to oppositional political perspectives through political talk, found that deliberation under these circumstances provided some of the postulated benefits, including recognition of the legitimacy of opposing viewpoints, greater tolerance, and greater empathy for political opponents (Mutz 2006). Yet this study also suggested an inverse relationship between deliberation and participation – the more citizens discussed politics with people whose views differed from theirs, the less likely they were to engage in political activity. Thompson (2008: 512) comments, “The moderate attitudes encouraged by deliberation weaken some of the most powerful incentives to participate.”

While deliberative democracy was initially developed within political theory, normative accounts have since been outnumbered by empirical studies seeking to test the hypothesized benefits of deliberation. Empirical studies on deliberative discussions have produced mixed conclusions (for overviews of studies, see: Chambers 1996; Della Carpini et al. 2004; Janssen and Kies 2005; Ryfe 1005; Sulkin and Simon 2001). Among the more skeptical of conclusions, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 191) argue that “real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively, can exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials among those deliberating, can make people feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, is ill-suited to many issues and can lead to worse decisions than would

have occurred if no deliberation had taken place.” Jackman and Sniderman (2006: 272) concluded that deliberation does not lead to “better grounded judgments – that is, judgments that reflect one’s considered view of the best course of action all in all,” but leads “many people to ideologically inconsistent positions.” Further, a study by Mendelberg and Oleske (2000) on discussions of race in town meetings found that deliberations held in the integrated, multiracial meetings had negligible impact in lessening conflict, increasing mutual understanding, or reducing group-interested arguments.

### ***Models of Participation***

Cooper et al (2006: 78) note that the evolution of calls for a governance-based approach to policy making implied that “the process of governing should no longer be understood as the sole business of government but as involving the interaction of government, business, and the nonprofit (or nongovernmental) sectors.” The broadened scope of political participation and increasing acceptance of the value of cooperation between state and non-state actors in policy deliberations and decision making have led to at least three distinct conceptualizations of participatory models: collaborative governance, associational governance, and network governance. This section briefly explores each of these models.

#### ***Collaborative Governance***

Ansell and Gash (2008: 544) define collaborative governance as “a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.” Most scholars emphasize the inclusion of non-state stakeholders, particularly representatives of key interests, in the collaborative governance model (Smith 1998; Connick and Innes 2003; Reilly 1998). According to this model, all stakeholders engage directly in decision making: “[C]ollaborative governance is never merely consultative. Collaboration implies two-way communication and

influence between agencies and stakeholders and also opportunities for stakeholders to talk with each other” (Ansell and Gash: 546). Collaborative forums strive toward consensus, although public agencies may have the final decision making authority.

The collaborative governance model is thus multilateral and consensus-oriented. Ansell and Gash (544) distinguish collaborative governance as an alternative policy making approach to “the adversarialism of interest group pluralism and to the accountability failures of managerialism.” While some conceptual overlap is noted with classic definitions of corporatism, and with associational governance and “policy network” approaches, the collaborative governance approach is distinguished from these by virtue, respectively, of its inclusion of a broader range of stakeholders, its inclusion of participants other than formal associations, and its explicit formalization of stakeholder inclusion in decision making.

#### *Associational Governance*

Associational governance models emphasize the active contributions of civil society associations to issues of governance. According to this view, associations are critical to achieving broader inclusiveness in collective decision making, given their operation at “accessible decentralized levels...” and thus “citizens can participate more fully and with greater knowledge of the affairs being discussed” (Martell 1992: 166). Associationists propound that associations ought to be given a considerably larger role in “quasi-public functions in support, or in place, of the state” (Elstub 2007: 16). Indeed, Hirst (1994: 20-21) argues that “voluntary self-governing associations [should] gradually and progressively become the primary means of democratic governance of economic and political affairs.” Meanwhile, Cohen and Rogers (1995: 55) suggest that associations be provided a role in “(1) the formulation of policy, (2) the coordination of economic activity in the shadow of policy, and (3) the enforcement and administration of policy.”

Some identify an associationalist governance approach as the best opportunity to scale a responsive deliberative democratic framework to social complexities. Elstub (2007: 14) argues that civil society associations present “suitable locations for governance, providing the principle of subsidiarity is applied; that they can provide effective information and representation; increase and improve the provision of information; ... contribute to public discourses in the public sphere; and can foster key political and civic skills and dispositions.” Fung and Wright’s (2003) Empowered Participatory Governance model would seem to support this argument. Fung (2003: 529) comments, “Associations not only breathe life into this variety of participatory democracy, but formal, direct, and deliberative opportunities to influence public policy and state action create incentives for individuals to create and maintain secondary associations (Baiocchi 2001).”

### *Network Governance*

Klijn and Skelcher (2007: 587) define a ‘governance network’ as “public policy-making and implementation through a web of relationships between government, business and civil society actors... [and] are often associated with new hybrid organizational forms... including quasi-governmental agencies, public-private partnerships, and multi-organizational boards.” Sørensen and Torfing (2005: 197) elaborate on this concept, defining a governance network as:

“a relatively stable horizontal articulation of *interdependent* but operationally *autonomous* actors, who interact through *negotiations* that involve bargaining, deliberation and intense power struggles, which take place within a *relatively institutionalized framework* of contingently articulated rules, norms, knowledge and social imaginaries that is *self-regulating* within limits set by external agencies and which contribute to the production of *public purpose* in the broad sense of visions, ideas, plans and regulations.”

Sørensen and Torfing comment that governance networks are being newly recognized by central decision makers as an efficient and legitimate governance mechanism. Governance network theorists argue that networks allow for innovative linkages between units of

democratic governance; furnish a functionally organized supplement to territorially organized representative institutions; and promise to increase the flexibility of democratic institutions (Jessop 2000; Esmark 2003; Rhodes 1997; Kooiman 1993). Many liberal democracy theorists would view governance networks as a potential threat to values of political equality and individual liberty, and even governance network theorists “tend to agree” that such networks “suffer from the absence of open competition, legitimacy problems, and the lack of transparency, publicity and accountability” (Sørensen and Torfing 2005: 200). Concerns have particularly been raised over the level of ‘democratic anchorage’ of governance networks. Responding to this, Sørensen (2006) argues that to the extent that such networks are connected to political constituencies and a set of democratic norms, they are democratically anchored. Further, Edelenbos et al (2010: 50) note that although governance networks challenge the ‘primacy of politics’ in complex decision making, the reality is that “political decision making does not any longer take place solely in the political arena.”

### ***Conclusion***

Just as the concept of political participation has expanded from voting to a host of other activities, so too has the concept of governing expanded from government, comprising a rather small range of state institutions, to governance, including a broader array of non-state actors in processes such as policy making. Deliberative democratic theory has therefore drawn considerable attention as a method of integrating citizen preferences and interests into the policy making process. Most empirical studies have focused on small communities or on experiments, and have tended to be less positive about the merits of deliberation than theoretical accounts. The development and implementation of deliberative models in contexts such as Porta Alegre have generally been successful, but the local, community-focused nature of such efforts might suggest that those particular approaches to deliberation may not easily scale to the national context.



Despite these reservations, the literature abounds with theorized attempts to integrate non-state actors into the governance process. The three deliberative models – distributed, decentralized, and iterated – and three governance models – collaborative, associational, and network governance – presented above illustrate the extent to which scholars increasingly acknowledge the potential contributions of non-state actors to the process of policy making. Yet it should be noted that these examples have been developed in the context of established democracies, and have not been discussed in the context of political transition and regime change. Building upon this framework, the next chapter explores a specific category of non-state actor – civil society – and how its role and policy participation has been construed in the literature.

### CHAPTER THREE: CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society is conceptualized as a public space, between the political and the private spheres, in which social solidarity between citizens may be forged. The literature charts two diverging perspectives on the nature of civil society, both of which are of relevance to the understanding of the sector's role in post-transitional contexts. This chapter first briefly reviews the associational and contentious theories of civil society, then discusses the implications of these theories for civil society organizations in the context of transition and post-transition, and as a participant in the policy making process.

#### *Association and Contention*

Enlightenment theorists viewed civil society as an 'independent sphere of fellowship' reinforcing the evolving view of the state as accountable to citizens (Alexander 1997). As such, civil society was counterposed to 'political society' – Hegel, for instance, considered civil society as the “sphere of conflicting relations between needs and rights, policing and association” (Fine 1997: 21). Both the associational and contentious views of civil society have built upon these understandings. Fung (2003: 535) denotes associational and contentious theories of civil society as 'tame' and 'mischievous', succinctly reflecting the respective arguments that the independent associations formed within civil society foster civic virtues, build social capital and strengthen democratic relations, and the alternate view that independent civic associations best address social and political inequalities through agitation, protest, and disruption targeting the framework within which these inequalities are embedded.

Associational views of civil society link individual freedom in society with intermediary associations, which “prevent despotism of parties or the arbitrary rule of a prince” (Tocqueville 1969: 192). Civil society as an associational space is viewed as critical to countering the potential atomization and isolation of individuals (Hoebner Rudolph 2000). Thus, Putnam (1994) argues that civic associations have internal effects on their members,

facilitating trust, cooperation, and the creation of social capital.

Antonio Gramsci propounded the theory of civil society as a zone of social contention, conceptualizing it as a space from which any effective struggle against tyranny, coercion and hegemony must originate. Gramsci postulated that the modern state system manufactures consent through convincing citizens that “the continual perfecting of the present system,” rather than the radical reconceptualization of the system itself, would ultimately best address socioeconomic inequalities (Buttigieg 1995: 12). Instead, Gramsci argued, any substantive challenge to the modern state must come from within civil society. This contentious view aligns with Hendriks’ (2006: 494) view of macro deliberation, under which approach “civil society is called on to play an unconstrained and even oppositional role against the state by engaging in acts of communication... to stimulate counter-knowledge and ask critical questions.”

Some have questioned whether civil society is necessarily positively connected with the quality of a democratic state, and warned against assigning normative value to an essentially neutral zone. Foley and Edwards (1996) argued that the associational ‘civil society argument,’ that a dense network of civil associations contributes to the efficacy of the democratic state through internal effects on participants and civic mobilization in support of public causes, was unconvincing due to the elusive nature of relations between civil society groups and state institutions. Meanwhile, although the contentious role of civil society and social movements has been often referenced as an explanatory factor in the Eastern European transitions, Chambers and Kopstein (2001) noted not all civil society groups are inherently pro-democratic – some, indeed, may work to counter transition.

Recent characterizations of civil society have sought to account for the multiple modes of activity undertaken in the sector. Thus, Merkel and Lauth (1998) identified six functions of contemporary civil society, including: (a) protecting against the state’s encroachment on the private sphere, thereby safeguarding a private and a social space; (b) monitoring and

controlling state power; (c) encouraging the democratic and participatory socialization of citizens and the recruitment of democratic elites for the state's decision-making bodies; (d) opening up channels for the development, aggregation and articulation of common values and social interests outside the political parties and parliaments; (e) contributing to local democracy-building; and (f) encouraging overlaps in the membership of civil society groups, organizations, initiatives and movements to help ameliorate or overcome entrenched lines of conflict within a society. Fung (2003: 515) likewise identifies six ways in which civil society associations enhance democracy: “through the intrinsic value of associative life, fostering civic virtues and teaching political skills, offering resistance to power and checking government, improving the quality and equality of representation, facilitating public deliberation, and creating opportunities for citizens and groups to participate directly in governance.”

There is considerable diversity between civil society groups, and in the social contexts within which they operate, which may demand different action strategies. Moreover, Jacobsson and Saxonberg (2013: 5) emphasize the flexibility of associations themselves – “scholars have tended to have an ‘either/or’ attitude toward social movement organizations: either they engage in contentious politics or in other activities, such as becoming service organizations or self-help groups... they are in fact often both.”

### ***Civil Society in Transition***

In the early 1990s, civil society was widely acclaimed as integral to the democratic movements in Eastern Europe. Yet as Howard (2002: 157) remarks, outside expectations that high levels of civic mobilization would translate into an “unusually strong and vibrant” civil society in the region have been confounded by its “relative weakness.” Empirical analyses on the ‘weakness’ of civil society in post-Communist Europe, often based on World Values Survey data, have tended to focus on citizen membership in voluntary organizations – and have identified lower rates of participation in such organizations in post-Communist European

countries (Howard 2002).

Some scholars criticized these studies for their assumption that Western-developed assumptions of civil society were, normatively and practically, transferable to other, non-Western contexts (see Hann and Dunn 1996). Yet the reality of low citizen political participation remains. Tworzecki (2008: 51) offers one possible explanation of the mass withdrawal from political participation following opposition movement success in engaging citizens. He notes that while the Solidarity movement opposed the Communist regime, “its commitment to the idea of political pluralism was questionable at best.” Tworzecki suggests that mass participation was enabled in part by the accessible ‘black-and-white politics’ of the resistance movement, but that political participation became a more complicated and difficult endeavor following the introduction of free elections and a multiplicity of parties.

Recently, a set of compelling critiques has charged that studies of post-Communist civil society have, due to an overly narrow conceptualization of civic action on an individual basis, consistently failed to reflect the activity of associations in the region. Cox (2012: 1) notes that the ‘weakness’ of post-Communist civil society is commonly viewed as stemming from two sources: low popular involvement in civil society organizations, and “a lack of influence of civil society on governments and policy-making.” Petrova and Tarrow (2007: 79) argue that considerations of civil society should more accurately recognize two “relational aspects of activism,” which comprise:

- 1) “Participatory activism,” or, “the potential and actual magnitude of individual and group participation in civic life, interest group activities, voting and elections,” and,
- 2) “Transactional activism,” or, “ties – enduring and temporary – among organized non-state actors and between them and political parties, power holders and other institutions.”

Petrova and Tarrow note that although surveys and studies of individual groups in post-Communist Eastern Europe may indicate low rates of individual participation, there seems to be a higher rate of transactional activism than has previously been measured – specifically in the areas of “coalition formation among single issues, network formation, and negotiation with elites on the part of civic groups” (p. 80).

Due to the relative novelty of this observation, whether the tendency toward transactional activism is a positive or negative trend has not been fully explored. Cook (2007: 15) describes interest groups, ‘organized elite welfare stakeholders,’ advocating for their ‘societal welfare constituencies’ in the absence of ‘dense societal interest-group networks.’ While legitimate concerns may be raised over whether low levels of mass participation, coupled with high levels of ‘intergroup transactions’, may contribute to an elitist political system, Tilly’s (2004: 35-36) argument that democracy is characterized by a space for protected state-society consultation, and that expanded consultation tends to increase demands for increased government capacity, suggests that in the context of political transition, transactional activism by even a limited number of civil society organizations may gradually increase public demands for more participation. Short of that, as Petrova and Tarrow comment, there is at least some prospect for greater accountability: “power holders confronted by organizational elites with weak followerships are nevertheless more constrained and may be more responsive than power holders faced by inert or alienated citizenries” (p. 80).

Alvarez (1999) cautions that the inclusion of civil society organizations in policy making may present unanticipated challenges to the organizations themselves, as well as to the causes they promote. Alvarez warns that the professionalization (or ‘NGOization’) of certain social movement groups may inhibit their ability to promote social change or to engage in more contentious activities. Examining the case of Latin American feminist organizations, Alvarez finds three reasons for concern: “states and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs)

increasingly have turned to feminist NGOs as *gender experts* rather than as citizens' groups advocating on behalf of women's rights," which threatens to reduce the political contributions of feminist NGOs to technical, rather than substantive, in nature; "neoliberal states and IGOs often view NGOs as *surrogates for civil society*, assuming they serve as 'intermediaries to larger societal constituencies,'" although this selection of certain NGOs as consultants on policy matters denies others, especially those critical of the agenda, access to policy debates; and "*states increasingly subcontract feminist NGOs* to advise on or execute government women's programs," possibly jeopardizing the ability of such NGOs to critically monitor policy and advocate for deeper reforms (p. 181).

### ***Implications of Civil Society Policy Participation***

A number of scholars have acknowledged the added value offered by civil society associations to the policy making process. Salamon (1995) commented that associations can evaluate policy-relevant information, supporting legislative processes and implementation. Sissenich (2010: 16) observed that civil society associations "are able to articulate the interests of specific and often marginalized societal groups, in marked contrast to political parties, which must appeal to broader audiences and therefore simplify and flatten policy discourse." Schmitter (1993) noted that civil society associations could promote the accountability and transparency of state authorities. However, the opportunity structure for participation differs considerably between contexts, and civil society organizations therefore must "adapt their tactics to the strategic opportunities presented in a given political context" (Sissenich 2010: 15).

Those strategic opportunities are largely determined by three factors identified by Mansfeldova (2006: 23) as critical to an 'enabling environment' for civic engagement in policy making: a regulatory framework, a political and institutional setting, and "a civic culture... which affects the way civil society organizations and public institutions engage in policy

dialogue, advance systems of social and public accountability, and cooperate in providing public services.” Depending on the resulting environment, Pleines (2005: 30) has identified four strategic tactics through which non-state actors may seek to exert influence on policy making – these are: (1) cooperation (i.e. exchanging information and opinions, and coordinating policy measures); (2) confrontation (i.e. mobilizing public opinion and legal action to put pressure on state actors); (3) legal state capture (i.e. legal donations to state actors, securing appointment of supporters to state office); and (4) illegal state capture (i.e. illegal donations to state actors and corruption).

### ***Conclusion***

As discussed previously, accounts of deliberative democracy and participatory policy making have implied different roles for civil society associations – some encouraging collaboration with state institutions, and others promoting a more contentious and discursive approach. This chapter has presented distinct theories of civil society’s associational and contentious roles. It has found that these theories may pose a false dichotomy in view of recent scholarship indicating that civil society associations adapt their tactics based on their own capacities and in response to the varying political opportunity structures afforded by their contexts.

In the post-Communist context, these tactics include a higher rate of participation in transactional forms of activism, including through policy consultations and exchanges with institutional elites, than had previously been indicated in studies of individual rates of civic engagement in the region. Despite low mass public engagement, civil society associations are playing an active role in the region. Research suggests two main challenges for civil society transactional participation in the post-communist context: first, environmental factors may encumber effective participation in policy making processes, and second, transactional cooperation with state institutions may limit the ability of civil society associations to deploy



a full range of associational and contentious tactics.

## CHAPTER FOUR: CIVIL SOCIETY, POLICY MAKING AND PARTICIPATION

This study has thus far demonstrated the established recognition that democratic citizens have a justified claim to participate in a range of political activities extending beyond electoral engagement. In particular, the integration of citizen participation in policy making processes are themselves increasingly understood as best entailing the involvement of both state and non-state actors. Civil society organizations, which inhabit a space in which associations are formed and contention is waged, with generally acknowledged positive democratic implications, may constitute a key participant in policy making processes. Comparatively high levels of transactional activism in post-Communist Europe illustrate the potential for civil society organizations to play an active role despite low rates of individual civic participation in the region.

Building on this framework, this chapter turns to an empirical analysis of interviews conducted with representatives of civil society organizations in Warsaw, Poland, and in Belgrade, Serbia. A total of seven semi-structured interviews were conducted with interlocutors representing organizations working on distinct policy areas, including public information, transparency, youth, migration and security. All of the organizations were established after the end of Communism; the Serbian organizations were initiated as independent associations in the 1990's, whereas the Polish organizations were founded after 2000. The interlocutors – four women and three men – were born between 1970 and 1990; therefore, much of their advanced schooling and professional experience occurred during and after transition.

This chapter first presents a brief overview of the post-transitional background and key areas of civil society activity in Serbia and in Poland, and proceeds to analyze the themes emerging in the interviews. Despite the differences between the Serbian and Polish contexts, several topics recurred in discussions, regarding the participation and intermediation of civil society actors; approaches to cooperation with state institutions; state institutional legacies

from the pre-democratic period pertaining to transparency, accountability and openness to cooperation; roles of foreign actors, particularly the European Union, vis-à-vis domestic policy deliberations; perceived trends within the civil society sectors of the countries; and the sustainability of objective voices within the civil society sectors.

### ***Contextualizing Post-Communist Comparisons***

Jacobsson and Saxonberg (2013) rightly note the breadth of differences between political institutions, state-society relationships, and resulting political, legal and economic opportunity structures in different post-Communist countries. Indeed, the experiences of Poland and Serbia during and following Communist rule are markedly divergent in many ways, including economic development, foreign relations, experience of war, and democratic consolidation. Yet popular protests and opposition movements played critical roles in precipitating regime change in both Poland and Serbia.

Ekiert and Kubik (2001) note that Poland is the only country in which protest and mass opposition, epitomized by the Solidarity movement, was critical to overcoming the Communist regime. Organized protests continued in the aftermath of tradition; Ekiert and Kubik conclude that organized collective protests present a “legitimate and moderately effective strategy for conducting state-society dialogue” in the context of transition, when conventional participation channels such as political parties or interest groups are underdeveloped. Despite this, civic engagement is now low; explanations of poor political participation have included Communist legacies and the socialization of citizens into passiveness (Howard 2002); dissatisfaction with the performance of the existing system (Mishler and Rose 1997) and the relatively underdeveloped middle class (Paczynska 2005). Gajewska (2012: 118) notes that recently established Polish organizations gravitate toward utilizing media tools and focusing on educational and discourse to conduct politics, rather on the traditional forms of participation which relied on gaining leverage through the “power of numbers.”

While Poland, after the disintegration of the Communist system, immediately embarked on liberalizing political reforms, the Serbian transition from socialist to democratic rule was overshadowed by a decade of authoritarian rule. Bieber (2002) characterizes the political system of the Milošević period as a hybrid regime, characterized by unfree and unfair multiparty elections. Thus, “unlike other transitional countries, which usually saw a broad anti-Communist coalition in the first free election, the opposition, with an extreme nationalist and a liberal wing, could not mount a unified challenge to Milošević in the first elections,” confirming the dominance of the socialist party and protracting the fragmentation of the opposition (Bieber 2002: 74). Bieber identifies four ways in which civil society associations were instrumental in the protest movements: citizen mobilization (for voter participation as well as for protest participation), information gathering (such as opinion polls), formulating alternative policy agendas, and uniting the opposition. However, Bieber notes, in the aftermath of regime change, Serbian civil society organizations commonly confronted three obstacles: continued dependence on external funding; a loss of purpose following the ousting of Milošević; and the absorption of former opposition activists into new state structures.

Civil society activism in pre-transitional Serbia and Poland developed in the limited independent political space afforded to autonomous and anti-nationalist associations. Following the democratic transitions of Eastern Europe, however, a new challenge confronted civil society groups: the redefinition of their role “from opposition *to* the state to engagement *with* the state” (Kostovicova 2006: 23). The remainder of this study will examine how the new role of engagement with the state has been defined and pursued by organizations seeking to influence policy making processes.

### ***Opportunities for Policy Participation***

Models for participatory deliberation do not generally include the perspectives of non-state actors on what approaches are likely to constitute realistic and effective input.

Interlocutors identified a number of challenges to their meaningful policy participation, even when a formal opportunity structure (public consultation) existed. These included informal barriers, including user-unfriendly technology, limited timeframes for response, and bureaucratic procedures. In contexts without a formal opportunity structure, interlocutors identified a range of approaches to influence policy development, including targeting middle management employees, educating public officials, building popular demand, using personal connections, deploying unconventional action, and understanding foreign influence.

### *Public Consultation*

Interlocutors in Poland commonly referenced the legal requirement that all legislation be subjected to public consultation prior to being introduced for a vote. State institutions initiate consultations at two levels, which in theory allow feedback from the public and from a group of ‘social partners’ – selected civil society organizations with expertise on the topic. However, one interlocutor reported, “there is a general feeling that the consultations are just pro forma.” There was an overall sense that public consultations often take place when the documents under review are already in the final stages before approval, at which point it is usually too late to make a real impact.

- *Citizen Consultation:* In most cases, Polish state institutions make draft legislation available on a web portal to which citizens can submit feedback. Yet many interlocutors criticized the complexity of the web portal as inhibiting citizen feedback, commenting that “*a normal person [doesn’t] make forty clicks to get into the portal,*” and that “*average citizens don’t have a chance*” to effect a change during the consultation process.
- *Civil Society Consultation:* Civil society organizations may be selected as ‘social partners’ of relevant Polish ministries, and then be solicited to provide input to policy consultations. Yet the experience of one interlocutor indicates a possible focus on the

form, rather than substance, of the consultative process with social partners: “[Often] you get a letter and you have [a short window] for comments.” This interlocutor recalled being unable to meet the short turnaround time provided by one invitation for consultation; afterward,

*“I read the parliamentary documents... It says six organizations consulted, I saw the name of my organization and I protested [because we had not participated]. But... we got [the invitation], so we were on the list. They have an impressive list of civil society consulted... It’s impossible to track who took [active] part in the consultations.”*

### *Institutional Cooperation*

Civil society associations operating outside of the formal opportunity structure for policy participation, either due to not being selected as a ‘social partner’ or due to operating in a context where public consultation is not a required legislative phase, cited several strategic tactics through which policy influence was sought.

- *Targeting Middle Management:* Both Serbian and Polish interlocutors noted the importance of building relations with institutional representatives at the sub-political level, in order to communicate information and maximize impact. A Serbian interlocutor related seeking “*allies within the public institutions, state institutions, who were not politicians... we discovered quickly that you have a middle management within various institutions who know a lot but who are not visible.*”

Similarly, a Polish interlocutor observed:

*“We had a good cooperation with the ministry – not the highest-level clerks, but in the middle. This is the best way for an NGO to work – cooperate with those staff at the ministry who don’t have a political background, and they will stay in office after the elections.”* When seeking to communicate information at

the political level, the interlocutor continued, “*we [contact] politicians that are more active or that we think can be easy to convince, and then we try to meet with them.*”

- *Educating Officials*: Serbian interlocutors recalled past challenges of advocating for policy reforms following political transition. One recollected that, as the first NGO in the country to deal with a specific policy topic:

*“Quite frequently we had to first educate people what the concept was, and then offer the change... Especially early after the fall of Milošević, we were doing conferences, organizing seminars for different groups like mid-ranking officials of institutions, media, MPs, and so on, sharing experiences from [the rest of] Europe, explaining the concept and bringing experiences from abroad... Much of it was initially to create a demand by helping to create a policy community, bringing different actors together, and also by making them share a conceptual understanding.”*

- *Mobilizing Public Demand*: Another Serbian interlocutor similarly recollected initiating public discussions around the topic of visa liberalization:

*“In 2005, when we started... to discuss the work our government had to do to achieve visa liberalization, no one was discussing this issue. We started a series of projects... to create political will, and to persuade government institutions that they could do something to change it... One of the aims was to create a practical policy document, to provide concrete recommendations for what the state has to do. We [also] wanted to engage citizens [to] think about the benefits if the government achieved all of this. We had roundtables all around Serbia... through these campaigns, we [identified] various groups in our society who*

*argued that we needed visa liberalization. Politicians started to see it as a political priority, that if they achieved something in that area it could be a big success in the process of European integration. And then things started to move.”*

- *Using Personal Connections:* Effective communication with state employees and decision-makers may be more easily initiated if civil society representatives are well-connected, possibly allowing for policy influence outside of the official policy making process. A Polish interlocutor observed:

*“My personal view is that what really works to make a difference is, either you have good personal connections and they are interested to listen to you and your advice, or you make it via pressure. Some NGOs [with] good connections [can try] to enlighten and educate the public institutions before they start working on legislation, so that they know what should be done. I believe this is still how you can make the biggest impact.”*

- *Deploying Unconventional Approaches:* Although interlocutors in both countries identified a need for civil society to build relations for policy cooperation with state institutions, Polish interlocutors also remarked on the potential of unconventional approaches, whether on their own or in conjunction with conventional actions, to draw official attention to overlooked policy needs. In particular, interlocutors repeatedly referenced the responsiveness of decision-makers to the prospect of public protests and social scandals. One interlocutor cited a recent social movement by “*parents of handicapped children*,” who:

*“occupied the parliament, living in the corridors with their children, who require 24-hour care, to finally push the parliamentarians to [subsidize this*



*care] ... The parents made a big campaign with a lot of famous people, singers, actors ... thousands of people signed the petitions.” As a result, “the parliament needed to finally give them something to get rid of them from the corridors, because it was all over the media ... the minister had to meet with them ... That’s the thing that really makes a difference: if you try to make a scandal out of it ... Not in the official ways, but rather make yourself loud. That works.”*

- *Understanding Foreign Influence:* Both Serbian and Polish civil society representatives identified foreign actors, especially European institutions, as playing an important role in their efforts to advocate, guide, inform and monitor policy making and implementation. Modes of foreign influence included education and exchange of experiences at the civic and state levels and direct and indirect pressure.

A Polish interlocutor identified an ongoing reform at the European level as facilitating the organization’s closer cooperation with a domestic government institution:

*“Our ministry [approached us to meet]. Week after week, we had meetings with them, going through [the legislation] article by article and saying what’s good, what’s bad. I think that is one of the best practices that our administration had. It was hard work, but [afterward] we made public information requests to see the negotiations in the Council of Europe, and we could see in places where our communication worked.”*

A Serbian interlocutor identified the interaction between European and domestic government representatives as contributing to new opportunities for policy influence:

*“Foreign will helps you to create the internal political will. I’ve seen the change in how the debate continues once they see that Europeans think the same [as our organization] ... You have to be patient and you have to be ready. Sooner*

*or later [domestic institutions] will see the necessity to use your capacity and to listen to you.”*

This interlocutor commented that external influence is expected to become more formal as the government develops an action plan for the negotiation of European *acquis* chapters, which will enable civil society actors to monitor the pace and implementation of reforms.

### ***Challenges of Policy Participation***

Interlocutors in both Serbia and Poland identified institutional opacity, limited funding and potential disengagement from citizens as major recurring challenges for civil society efforts to analyze the policy context, monitor implementation of existing legislation, and maintain objectivity.

#### ***Institutional Opacity***

With some regularity, transparency failures were framed as resulting more from a lack of understanding on the part of institutional representatives as to the nature of public information and accountability, which might be rectified through greater education. Thus, civil society actors in Poland and Serbia listed instances of responding to these tendencies through freedom of information requests, litigations, and improving cooperation with institutions.

- *Freedom of Information Requests:* Several interlocutors in both Poland and Serbia mentioned filing freedom of access to information requests in order to procure public information, with varying degrees of success. A Serbian interlocutor related an experience of having sent freedom of access to information requests for data from several state institutions; in response, “*we got some useful evidence, a lot of useless answers, and some silence - to some of our questions they didn’t respond, and others they answered wrong on purpose.*”

- *Litigation*: Some civil society associations pursue litigation when state institutions fail or refuse to comply with their freedom of access to information requests. Although litigation is a last resort for many civil society organizations, it has the benefit of helping to strengthen the framework of democratic accountability. Thus, a Polish interlocutor described efforts to track down the expert advice that influenced a recent pension system reform:

*“It was a crucial reform, because they prolonged the working age, delayed when you can go to retirement. While signing the bill, the president said in his statement that it was a very difficult and controversial decision, but that he had consulted experts and based on this advice he made the decision to sign it... [Since] based on the advice of these experts he made decisions that will affect the lives of all the Polish society, we wanted to see their opinions [and] arguments. We requested through freedom of information the publication of the expertise that influenced the decision of the president. They answered that it was an internal document and they cannot publish it. We answered that it was paid by public money, so we are the owners also and we want to see it, and if it was the main reason affecting the decision of the president, we wanted to see the basis of that decision. We had to go to court – all the courts at all levels ruled in our favor, that it was public information and they needed to publish it.”*

Another Polish interlocutor mentioned a project, regarding aggregated data collected by the intelligence services:

*“[Poland] has five intelligence services... We wanted to know how much they were asking for data from telecommunication companies. Some of the intelligence services gave it to us, it wasn't a problem, but the army intelligence services said 'no,' and they said they don't have public money [so are not bound*

*by freedom of information regulations]... Also, they said, the whole act of freedom of information is unconstitutional... We want to put this in front of the constitutional tribunal.”*

- *Creative Incentives:* A Serbian interlocutor referenced an innovative approach to educating institutions on the merits of sharing information and potential reputational damage caused by opacity:

*“We organized a group of consultations at the start [of the project] with representatives of different institutions that we were evaluating... It was a way for us to improve our data and for them to get familiarized with what we came up with... A lot of our research was on transparency, which let them know what was expected, and that the research was affected by the lack of transparency.”*

The interlocutor further commented that an additional incentive was provided by the project’s ‘naming and shaming’ of different state institutions, which sparked competitiveness among the institutional representatives, who sought to outperform one another.

### *Limited Funding*

Interlocutors in both Poland and Serbia noted the importance of funding to sustaining meaningful civil society contributions to policy processes. Poland has a system of public funding for civil society organizations, while Serbia does not.

One Polish interlocutor commented, “Polish NGOs are pretty much dependent on public funding,” before remarking on the high degree of regulation and bureaucratic requirements associated with this type of funding. The interlocutor noted that certain types of activity, such as culture and sports, may be seen as more innocuous, and thus attractive, targets of public funding than policy relevant activities such as advocacy or monitoring. Furthermore, the interlocutor continued, “It is difficult to keep political independence” as a recipient of

public funds, however: “on the local level, [typically] the only funding you can get is from institutions; sometimes it’s very difficult, because you have just the one source of money that you can get, so you have to figure out how to be friends [with the institution].”

Overall, interlocutors in both countries agreed that civil society actors who engage in policy-relevant activities such as research, advocacy or monitoring tend to rely on private or international foundations for financial support.

### *Popular Disengagement*

The emergence of a civil society ‘elite,’ disengaged from citizen interests, was a recurring theme. One Polish interlocutor identified a common problem among civil society organizations as being so focused and specialized that it contributed to a gap between the lives and expectations of “ordinary people” and the “experts.” Meanwhile, a Serbian interlocutor expressed concern over the rising influence of ‘right-wingers’ on the post-transition generation, and the lack of attempts by more liberal civil society actors to engage this trend – “We are actually... civil society elite.” The interlocutor traced the emergence of a civil society elite to the overthrow of Milošević, when “we lost our enemy” and when the aftermath of transition saw many who had been involved in the opposition movements become gradually disconnected from the interests and priorities of citizens.

### *Conclusion*

Civil society participation in policy making processes in Serbia and in Poland shifts between formal and informal approaches, depending on available opportunities. Although civil society actors may have a greater ability to influence policy development than individual citizens, their potential for impact is considerably more constrained by the state and transitional legacies than might be inferred from participatory models. In particular, it should be noted that the existence of formal opportunity structures for policy participation, such as public consultations, does not imply the substantive and effective integration of civil society.

This research indicates that civil society organizations demonstrate high levels of activity and engagement in policy analysis, advocacy, and monitoring. In the absence of consistent opportunities for their formalized participation in policy making, and also in conjunction with them, civil society representatives reported adopting a variety of approaches to influence policy. These have included fostering cooperation with middle management of relevant state institutions; educating officials on certain topics and creating a policy community around those topics; building and mobilizing public demand on key policy topics; capitalizing on personal connections; utilizing unconventional approaches as an advocacy tool; and monitoring the influence of international governance structures on the domestic policy context. There is reason to believe, given the number of interlocutors who described encountering challenges of institutional opacity when trying to access public information, and the explanations given by state representatives, that some institutions continue to struggle with the relations of accountability implied by a democratic system.

## CONCLUSION

The participatory revolution in democratic thinking, which took place in the latter half of the last century, radically expanded notions of citizen engagement beyond electoral politics to comprise new modes of political participation, combining social, political and economic concerns. Following this broadening of the concept of political participation, and against the backdrop of declining voter turnouts and increasing criticisms of democratic deficits in post-industrial societies, scholarly attention turned to the engagement of citizens into policy making processes.

The extent to which deliberative democratic mechanisms signify prospective and realistic solutions to the problems of democratic deficits may be better understood pending further empirical research. Nonetheless, the importance of integrating citizen preferences into policy making processes on an ongoing basis is increasingly accepted among scholars and policy makers alike. Civil society is widely acknowledged as a valuable partner in the new era of governance, and a variety of participatory models seek to integrate non-state actors into policy making processes. The findings of this study suggest, however, that such models underestimate the potential importance of informal institutional barriers to broadening participation. Notably, at the point that civil society interlocutors report that the public consultations are perceived as being pro forma, rather than as opportunities for the meaningful and influential communication of interests and citizen preferences, then it appears that the approach to policy making participation falls short of the deliberative and governance models presented above.

The preceding investigation of civil society engagement in policy making processes in Serbia and Poland indicates that just as civil society groups have sought to redefine their roles from critical opposition to constructive engagement with the state, so too should state institutions explore possibilities for redefining their relation with civil society. Civil society

associations may bring an added value to the policy making process through their articulation of particular social interests and presentation of independent research and analysis on policy related issues. Most accounts of participatory policymaking and deliberation have been framed in the context of longstanding democracies, but this research shows that input from civil society associations is perhaps even more needed in post-transitional policy making efforts. This research suggests that civil society associations aspiring to influence policy in post-transitional societies must maintain considerable flexibility, shifting between a wide range of activities far outstripping that envisioned by most deliberative models as well as many conceptualizations of civil society. These activities include engaging in formal policy consultations, fostering relationships with state institutions and building on personal connections in order to communicate information to decision makers, educating state officials and mobilizing public demand around identified policy needs, recognizing the influence of foreign governance structures in creating openings to influence domestic policy, and incorporating conventional or unconventional activities into the participatory repertoire.

Civil society associations operating in post-Communist Europe have confronted a distinctly different environment for engagement than have their counterparts in other regions, largely due to low rates of participatory activism. Although civil society is typically envisioned as an intermediary force, capable of aggregating citizen preferences, this may be considerably more difficult in contexts with such low rates of individual participation. Thus, one Serbian interlocutor noted the emergence of a “civil society elite,” more likely to engage in cooperation with political elites and policy makers than with members of the public. Following the democratic transitions, civil society associations previously active in resistance movements were confronted not only with the need to pursue cooperation with state institutions in the new political systems, but also with the gradual professionalization of the sector; interlocutors in both Serbia and Poland commented on the NGO-ization of certain civil society actors following



transition. It may be expected, therefore, that civil society organizations in the region would struggle to intermediate between citizens and states. In fact, the pattern of engagement has in many cases aligned closely with Cook's (2007) description of the advocacy efforts by organizations promoting the interests of their 'societal welfare constituencies' even without the dense membership networks traditionally conceived as an integral element of associational civil society.

This study suggests a need for future research into the factors that determine the openness of state institutions to establishing meaningful channels to integrate input from citizens and civic associations. The recognition by civil society associations of the possible merits of contentious or unconventional movements in drawing domestic attention to policy needs is noteworthy, and suggests that civil society engagement in a post-transitional space may encompass a variety of activities seeking to achieve policy outcomes. The influence of external governance structures in creating domestic policy openings, whether by encouraging state institutions to seek out advice from civil society actors, or by requiring the public identification of reform benchmarks, thereby enabling civil society actors to monitor the implementation of necessary reforms, is equally noteworthy. However, in post-transitional societies where membership in those external structures is not an overarching goal of foreign policy, external influence over domestic political will may be diminished.

At the outset of this study, linkages between its theme of civil society participation in policy making and three different discussions in the literature were identified: the problem of the 'democratic deficit'; the merits and efficacy of deliberative democracy; and the prospective role of civil society in a democratic context. In answer to the first discussion, the research results presented here suggest that the involvement of civil society actors in policy deliberations may, by fostering input-legitimacy, help ensure continued responsiveness between

constituency preference and state action, regardless of mass participatory activism or withdrawal, and thus may help to rectify the deficit.

With regard to the second discussion, the examination of new interview data on the inclusion of civil society in policy making processes in post-Communist contexts has further explored the unfavorable conditions for policy participation and potential for change, affording fresh insight into the approaches utilized by civil society actors to communicate preferences and interests to decision makers.

It is to the third discussion, though, that this study has proven most relevant: discussions with civil society representatives regarding their efforts to participate in policy processes and to hold the state accountable and transparent have illustrated the dynamic, dialectical layer of public engagement comprising shifting opportunity structures and correspondingly changing modes of engagement.

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