Empowering People Power: The Effects of Foreign Support on Nonviolent Campaigns and Movements

By:
Matt Mulberry

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Supervisor: Xymena Kurowska

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Abstract:

If diversity of participation is indeed the chief indicator for success in nonviolent campaigns and movements, then what might this suggest about the variable importance of foreign support? Might one thus be able to argue that foreign support that increases participation may be effective while foreign support that inhibits a movement from inspiring mass participation within diverse sectors of the population, may reduce the movement's chances for success? Given these dynamics one could hypothesize that elements indicative of successful nonviolent struggle on the domestic level, namely participation, and diversity, are also important on an international level. This paper will analyze two cases, Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution, and the East Timorese Struggle for Independence, attempting to more precisely determine the degree to which foreign support may or may not effect the outcome of a nonviolent struggle.

Introduction:

Throughout the last century civil resistance movements have succeeded in bringing about fundamental political changes to societies across the world with an almost exponential frequency. Increasing acknowledgment of this trend has led the international community to question with increasing relevance the degree to which they, as external third party actors, may or may not influence the outcome of such movements. Conversely civil resistance movements, seeking to advance a certain domestic political agenda have looked outward to the international

community for assistance. The history of such a process has shown that both sets of actors have had limited successes in effectively synergizing with each other and have thus provided us with many cases exemplifying effective and ineffective foreign support for nonviolent struggle. The history has also shown that there are many different types of foreign actors capable of helping movements in many different ways, while at the same time movements can employ a variety of strategies and tactics for generating effective international support. Yet at the moment existing scholarship on the subject seems to provide no definitive argument for the degree to which foreign support may effect the outcome of a nonviolent campaign or movement.

So far relevant academic literature has been able to establish that external state and non-state actors, can play a pivotal role both as clients to a governing authority or as supporters to a movement seeking substantial change within a given political system. Current literature has also established that third party involvement can be an advantage but also a potential Achilles heel to popular movements but also to the regimes they're opposing.[1] For both parties foreign support may represent a source of material, financial, political, and human resources, however for movements, dependence on such resources may undermine the movement's political integrity within the domestic sphere. Any amount of foreign support may decrease the legitimacy of the nonviolent campaign or movement and provide its critics and opponents with fodder for potentially delegitimizing allegations. Such allegations, if effectively argued and promoted, may reduce participation, and thus effect the overall power of the movement. However scholars have

[1] Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) 11.

argued that diversity of support including multiple governments and nongovernmental organizations, both western and nonwestern, may deflate some of these claims.[2]

Foreign support may also be a potential vulnerability for regimes attempting to maintain power in the face of popular opposition. Foreign aid to an unpopular, repressive, and violent regime, can be targeted by a political movement with potentially disastrous implications for the regime and the supporting client states. If effectively implicated as the benefactor of human rights abuses, and mass repression, certain states may make the rational decision to withdraw support having calculated that the political consequences, both domestic and international, outweigh the initial benefits of support. Additionally over-dependence on foreign support may make both regimes and movements subject to the dictates or capacities of its patrons in such a way that an abrupt end to such support, or even a steady reduction may spell disaster.[3] Foreign support may also produce a conflict of interest whereby both movements and regimes may have to compromise certain goals, strategies, and tactics, in order to maintain good relations with patrons.

In addition to these observations certain pieces of existing scholarship stand out as important pieces of the puzzle that may be used to build a more parsimonious theory on how nonviolent struggle is effected by international actors. The first is the rather firmly established argument that foreign support is perhaps the most important variable in determining the success or failure of armed struggle. The second is that recent quantitative studies have demonstrated that within the last century nonviolent conflicts have been twice as likely to achieve success when

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[2] Maria Stephan eds., *Civilian Jihad Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East* (New York: Palgarve Macmillan, 2009), 101.

[3] Stephan, Civilian Jihad, 97.

compared to armed struggle. The third is that this same study found no correlation between foreign support and the success or failure of nonviolent struggle. And lastly that nonviolent conflicts are more likely to receive support from foreign state and non-state actors than their armed counterparts.

Also helpful is the fact that the existing literature on the subject has come a long way in establishing the essential dynamics of nonviolent conflict, and how these dynamics work to bring about political change on the domestic level. Because at its core nonviolent conflict functions upon the principle that political power is based on the consent of the population, a vast majority of civil resistance movements have achieved success by working primarily within the domestic sphere to create defections and weaken the regime's 'pillars of support.' Thus a vast majority of the scholarship on nonviolent conflict has been justifiably focused on how the dynamics of nonviolent conflict function on the domestic level to advance the goals of a movement.

In light of these aforementioned advancements related specifically to international support for nonviolent movements, and in concert with a strong consideration of foundational theories related to the workings of nonviolent struggle within the domestic arena, this paper will strive to advance the understanding of how the dynamics of nonviolent conflict function within the international arena. This will be done chiefly by arguing that the same indicators for effective nonviolent resistance, on the domestic level, namely participation and diversity, are also indicative of effective nonviolent struggle on the international level vis-a-vis foreign support.

This framework, given the scope and depth of this project, will unfortunately be applied only to a small fraction of all the historically relevant cases and examples. I have chosen to apply this framework of analysis to two cases, The East Timorese struggle for independence, and the

2003 Rose revolution. These cases were selected because the dynamics within each of them are fundamentally different thus providing a wider spectrum for analysis on the ways in which foreign support may effect the outcome of a nonviolent campaign or movement.

Chapter 1 – Reviewing Relevant Literature

The American Scholar Gene Sharp was amongst the first to academize the field of nonviolent action. His intellectual contributions to the study and practice of civil resistance were built upon foundations established by earlier writers and practitioners of nonviolence such as Mohandas Gandhi, Henry David Thoreau, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Most fundamentally, Sharp's body of scholarship, as well as subsequent literature stemming from it, has served to further solidify an alternative metric for state power, showing that such power is supported and dependent on the consent and cooperation of the population. Throughout the 20th century, hundreds of examples of the successful application of nonviolent power provided Sharp with empirical evidence upon which to base and test these theories. Much of this work culminated in Sharp's 2005 book *Waging Nonviolent Struggle, 20th century practice and 21st century potential.* Within this book 23 cases were examined in an effort to demonstrate how nonviolent struggle can function effectively within a divers set of conditions, regions, and time periods. However Sharp is perhaps

most known for his '198 methods' of nonviolent action effectively outlined in part two of his 1973 book titled *The Politics of Nonviolent Action.*

Examination of Sharp's body of scholarship with regard to the stated research question raises several implications related to the effects of foreign support on nonviolent movements and campaigns. Beginning with Sharp's most robust contribution to the field, his 198 methods of nonviolent struggle, one could posit that very few of these methods are designed explicitly to leverage support from foreign actors. Sharp's 198 methods of nonviolent struggle are broken down into several sub-categories; methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion, and methods of social, economic, and political noncooperation. Fifty-three out of sharp's 198 methods fall under the first category of nonviolent protest and persuasion. This category is defined by acts of civil resistance designed to communicate or expand the movement's message to a wider audience or to an adversary. It includes tactics such as public assemblies, formal public statements, group representations, symbolic public acts, pressures on individuals, drama and music, processions, and honoring the dead. Many of these tactics could be used to influence the actions and opinions of third parties, and indeed foreign state, and non-state actors.

The remainder of Sharp's 198 methods involve tactics of omission and commission designed to inflict measurable costs upon the object of resistance or regime. Tactics of omission, within the context of civil resistance, involve not doing something that an adversary wants or needs the population to do. Boycotts, strikes, stay-ins, and tax refusals are chief amongst these tactics. Inversely, tactics of commission involve doing something that an adversary does not want the population to do. Examples include types of nonviolent intervention such as, sit-ins, occupations, blockades, asset seizures, and other forms of civil disobedience such as public

gatherings, demonstrations, protests, direct violations of certain laws, political theater, mock trials and elections, and the creation of alternative political, economic, and social institutions. The majority of these tactics are designed to work domestically given that in most cases, nonviolent campaigns or movements aimed at political reform, target domestic opponents. Only seven out of Sharp's 198 methods are classified as 'international governmental action' they include tactics such as, changes in diplomatic and other representations, delay and cancellation of diplomatic events, withholding of diplomatic recognition, severance of diplomatic relations, withdrawal from international organizations, refusal of membership in international bodies, and expulsion from international organizations.

Taking a more comprehensive look at Sharp's theory of nonviolent power it can be argued the majority of these strategies and tactics are designed not to cultivate support from foreign actors but primarily to, expand the domestic base of participation. Because state power is innately contingent on popular consent, the degree to which the population will obey the edicts of authority is for Sharp, both the source and limit of political power. Specifically sources of power can be defined in terms of authority i.e. the ability to generate consent, human resources or the number of people willing to consent, the skills and knowledge of the cooperating persons, intangible factors such as culture, ideology, group psychology, and the religiosity of the population, material resources, and the ability to generate obedience, cooperation, and submission through the use of punishments and repression.[4] Nonviolent action works by eroding

[4] Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice 21st Century Potential* (Boston, MA: Porter Sargent Publishers, 2005), 29.

the human sources of power i.e. their 'pillars of support' by getting them to defect on to the side of the movement,[5] and it can be argued that the same may hold true for foreign support.

Despite the fact that only a small percentage of Sharp's tactics are nominally oriented toward the international community, many other tactics, especially those falling under the heading of 'methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion' can either intentionally or unintentionally shape the sentiments of international audiences. Additionally there have been a number of cases wherein support from a foreign government was critical for the support of an unpopular regime, and thus several notable cases demonstrating that withdrawal of such support, whether brought about by the actions of the nonviolent campaign or movement, or by other circumstances, has been decisive in bringing about the movement's success. While conversely there have been cases demonstrating how the acquisition of foreign support and or recognition has been the determining factor leading to the success of many campaigns and movements. Because many nonviolent political movements have made the strategic decision to seek out foreign support and recognition, have benefitted, and at times achieved victory because of it, foreign support must be acknowledged as an important variable effecting outcome of a nonviolent movement. But precisely how foreign support synergizes within the dynamics of nonviolent struggle is still largely undefined.

Recent scholarship has however established links suggesting that nonviolent movements are more likely to win international support, both from states, and non-state actors such as NGOs, and advocacy networks, represent an advancement in defining the relationship between foreign support and nonviolent movements. Such a connection was also highlighted by Clifford

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[5] The term 'pillars of support' was first introduced by Robert Helvey, although in this context it is being used by Sharp to explain the essential dynamics of nonviolent conflict on the domestic level, see Sharp,*Waging Nonviolent Struggle,* 35.

Bob in his 2005 book, *The Marketing of Rebellion.* Bob arrived at such a hypothesis, while aiming to explore why certain movements, such as the movement for Tibetan self-determination, have received international recognition, attention, and support, while other similar movements such as the, Uyghur struggle against Chinese domination had received comparatively little. The overarching argument of his book outlines a framework within which political movements, both violent and nonviolent, make the strategic decision to seek out and cultivate international support from state and non-state actors.

Clifford Bob also outlines the process by which such relationships are formed and maintained, showing that there are both supply and demand side factors driving the formation of relationships between political movements and foreign state and non-state actors.[6] On the supply side you have NGOs, transnational aid and support organizations, based primarily in the West, that seek to legitimize their goals and principles, by linking up with, and serving causes that fit the profile of their mission, and their capacities.[7] Based on these factors certain cases may fall in line better with the Raison d'être of any given NGO, or aid organization, thus according to Bob, such organizations are more likely to support cases that provide the maximum amount of synergy between the two parties. The demand side of this equation is comprised of a wide variety of struggles, or causes, on or against a wide variety of issues or opponents, taking place in a wide variety of places. However, aware of the supply side criteria for support, many of these struggles, have become savvy navigators within the world of transnational aid and support organizations. Motivated by a desire to advance their cause, and attain against their competition, a portion of

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[6] Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 17.

[7] Kathryn Sikkink and Jackie Smith, "Infrastructures for Change: Transnational Organizations, 1953-93," in *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms,* Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 24-44.

the limited attention and resources offered by the outside world, many political movements have been committed to a strategy of victory through foreign support. Overall this argument implies that international support for nonviolent movements is initiated by movements themselves, and driven by strategic analysis and action.

Such a framework will require an examination of the structure and agency of transnational advocacy organizations, their role in international politics, and how they may go about determining whether a certain cause or movement receives international support. It has been shown movement initiatives alone are often are often insufficient harbinger of international recognition, attention, and support. Scholars specializing in transnational advocacy organizations often point to a small number of organizations that function as 'gatekeepers' that if actuated effectively will pave the way for other 'follower' NGOs to lend their support to a particular cause, or struggle.[8]

These vanguard organizations often occupy such a position due to their relative capacity to engage with groups on the ground, and maintain a vast network of relationships with people in the field such as community leaders, journalists, and government officials.[9]Through such credibility organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, or any other leading organization involved in a given field may, provide powerful endorsements, to a given struggle by projecting information widely, thus bridging the gap between the activists and organizers on the ground and global network of organizations, governments, and the media. Thus important questions arises on the extent to which international support for nonviolent campaigns

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[8] Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 145.*

[9] Ibid.,p. 145

and movements is dependent on established transnational advocacy networks. Are movements dependent on the attention of gatekeepers? And can they garner support independently?

An additional factors having to do with the actions of the regime must also be taken into account. The term 'backfire' has been used amongst social movement scholars to describe a phenomenon wherein violent repression of a movement works paradoxically to invigorate the movement, increasing participation, and thus the power and effectiveness of mass nonviolent actions. At times backfire can also work to galvanize the international community, and thus can in itself be a driver of international support or at the very least awareness. The workings of this phenomenon are also serve to reinforce the idea that the dynamics of nonviolent function similarly within domestic and international arenas, and thus the relatively complex relationship between repression and dissent, must be addressed as a potential factor, or series of factors, influencing international support.

> When unarmed insurrections are sustained in the face of violent repression, the 'political jiujitsu' dynamic may occur whereby the resolve of the challengers increases, the ability of the authorities to maintain control through repression decreases, and the support of third parties is generated.[10]

[10] Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 140.

Scholars have suggested that repression deployed during an ascending cycle of protest may actually increase momentum, while repression deployed during a descending cycle may be effective in suppressing nonviolent action.[11]

What makes external support effective? The question can be viewed in light of recent studies suggesting that domestic, not foreign participation, is the most important variable for determining the success or failure of nonviolent movements. Amongst such literature is the 2011 book, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* By Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. After analyzing the outcomes of more than 300 campaigns, both violent and nonviolent, taking place between 1900 and 2006, Chenoweth and Stephan found that nonviolent campaigns were twice as likely to accomplish their stated goals when compared to the success rates of armed struggle.[12] Chenoweth and Stephan have argued that nonviolent campaigns are statistically more successful than violent campaigns because the barriers for participation in the latter are higher. Higher barriers of participation i.e. the idea that fewer people are willing and able to be active and effective participants in an armed insurgency means that fewer people can be mobilized against the object of resistance.[13] Conversely nonviolent campaigns, given their lower barriers of entry, can mobilize a higher percentage of the population, which leads to greater morale and resilience, tactical innovation and diversity, expanded civic disruption, and the ability to inspire a greater number of loyalty shifts from the regime to the movement. [14]

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[11] Ibid., p. 42

[12] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 7.

[13] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 10.

[14] Ibid.,p. 10

Their data also suggested several other factors; that nonviolent campaigns, as opposed to armed struggle, were more likely to result in a sustainable democracy, with a lower possibility of relapse into civil war[15] and, most relevant to this particular question, that there was no correlation existing between foreign support and the success of a nonviolent campaign or movement.[16] It could be argued that all three of these findings also represent important advancements in understanding how foreign support effects the outcome of a nonviolent campaign or movement.

Other recent scholarship has identified nine different types of foreign support that third party actors my employ to assist nonviolent revolutions. They consist of moral, strategic, diplomatic, technical, practical participation, training, media coverage, education, and financial.[17] It has also been acknowledged that, one, or any combination of these nine types of support, my have five different outcomes ranging from counter productive, irrelevant, important, necessary, or sufficient.[18] This same body of scholarship also seeks to understand the impact of this support within three distinctive revolutionary phases, 'early, peak and post.' The central implication is that each type of support may have a different effect within each phase, one type of support may be critical in one phase and counterproductive in another.[19] It has however been acknowledged that further empirical research is needed to determine how different types of support function on a case by case basis to determine success.[20]

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[15] Ibid.,p. 10

[16] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 59.

[17] Jørgen Johansen, *Experiments With Peace,* (Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2010), 105.

[18] Ibid.,p. 107

[19] Ibid.,p. 110

[20] Ibid.,p. 113

Much of the literature on the subject has identified that the majority of foreign support for nonviolent campaigns or movements comes from three actors; foreign governments, transnational non-governmental organizations, and diaspora groups. Given their different capacities, each of these three actors may effect the outcome of a struggle differently thus it will be useful illustrate the ways in which each group may serve to advance the cause of a movement. It will be important to show that there are certain types of support that are exclusive to one group of actors, but that most forms of support are available to all three types of actors. Lastly it may be useful to outline some of the ways in which these key third party actors may go about offering their support for nonviolent movements. Such a process will serve to illustrate the diversity of means by which those actors may assist movements in advancing their domestic agendas.

The pro democracy movement in Iran has for a long time now relied on diaspora communities for facilitating communications needed to organize and execute domestic nonviolent actions. Such groups also help the movement circumvent the extensive communications restrictions imposed by the regime. They also played a key role in organizing nonviolent actions outside Iran, such as the 'Where Is My Vote?' campaign aimed at delegitimizing election outcomes in the eyes of foreign governments and non-state actors.[21] Diaspora communities also have the ability to organize mass nonviolent actions in support of their national cause in the countries that they're residing in. They may also play a key role lobbying foreign governments for support or doing more general advocacy work aimed at both state and non state actors. For example such advocacy work has been crucial for spreading international awareness on behalf of the West Papuan struggle for self determination.

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[21] Stephan eds., *Civilian Jihad,* 92

Foreign governments may provide assistance to nonviolent movements in a number of ways. They can provide havens for diaspora communities, leverage in regard to trade, aid, and technology, which can be used to pressure autocratic regimes working to suppress a given political or social movements through repressive policies or outright violence.[22] Some scholars have suggested a number of ways that foreign governments can help movements for human rights and democracy in particular, by making security assistance and other government-to-government aid and materiel transfers conditional upon improvements on human rights and democratic reforms.[23] Also foreign governments may, given the right conditions, use direct military intervention or the threat of such intervention, as a means to prevent the violent suppression of political opposition, or mobilized civilians. Recent initiatives such as the Responsibility to Protect may enhance the incentive for nonviolent movements to seek interventions in such a way, or conversely such a norm may give foreign governments political justification for intervention based on the violent suppression of a popular movement. The security of official diplomatic spaces, and lines of communication can also be offered to movements by foreign governments. Such spaces may provide fora for organizing, strategic planning, or the transfer of sensitive information to and from the outside world. Foreign governments may also provide fora for negotiations between the regime and the movement.[24] This is a form of foreign support aimed at conflict resolution, yet it still may indirectly be an advantage to the movement because it facilitates a safe and equal exchange of information between the movement and the regime.

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[22] Ibid.,p. 96

[23] Ibid.,p 97

[24] Ibid.,p 97

Economic sanctions may also be a means by which leverage may be applied to a repressive regime. It has been shown that nonviolent movements are 70 percent more likely to receive aid in the form of economic sanctions when compared to violent campaigns.[25] However as scholars in the field have noted that extensive economic sanctions have tended to weaken elements of civil society that have the greatest capacity to bring about democratic change.[26] According to these scholars such sanctions make the population even more dependent on the regime, they also harm middle class and working class segments of the population that have historically been the leading social forces behind popular nonviolent struggles, and allow the regime to blame outside forces for poor economic conditions. However sanctions directed at undermining the financial and repressive capacities of the regime have had a positive effect.

The *Diplomat's Handbook for Democracy and Development Support* has been a developed as toolkit for diplomats hoping to provide foreign support to pro-democracy movements around the globe, many of them using nonviolent struggle as their chief means of resistance. The Handbook highlights several cases wherein diplomatic support to pro-democracy movements has played a central role in effecting the outcome of the struggle. The Handbook has also acknowledged both that nonviolent struggle has, over the past century, played a central role in many democratic transitions, and that foreign governments are in fact able to facilitate substantial assistance to such movements through official diplomatic channels. Such growing awareness within the diplomatic community is representative of the increasing importance of nonviolent struggle within international relations, but also an awareness that an understanding of the dynamics of nonviolent struggle is increasingly crucial for effective diplomacy.

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[25] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works, 53.*

[26] Stephan eds., *Civilian Jihad,* 96

Underlying these developments is the trend that domestic civil society, and transnational NGOs are playing and increasingly active role in shaping diplomatic agendas and practices. Convergence between these two forces represents new opportunities for movements seeking to cultivate international legitimacy.[27] But they're also creating new opportunities for foreign non-state actors. There are many ways in which foreign actors can support nonviolent movements, and such avenues of support are not necessarily exclusive to either state or non-state actors. Both foreign governments and NGOs, can assist a movement in efforts to create conditions that will either directly or indirectly increase the capacities of a campaign or movement. Such efforts may include; the transfer of skills and knowledge directly related to the strategies and tactics necessary for waging effective nonviolent struggle, creating a free and open media environment, supporting traditional/ indigenous fora for community organizing, basic improvements related to health and education, efforts to increase trade and economic activity, the creation of alternative institutions, technology transfers, and transferring information and communications, or by functioning as monitors general human rights conditions, corruption, or elections.

Additionally both NGOs and foreign governments may provide normative support for movements, through the promotion of knowledge related to human rights, norms of good governance, socioeconomic justice, and anti-corruption. Such support may provide intellectual fodder for a movement, and may allow the movement to make substantive appeals for participation that rest on 'universal' ideals of a just society. NGO's functioning to enhance the aforementioned capacities have been shown to have a positive impact on the struggle. However contemporary scholarship has pointed to the limited success of third party nonviolent

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[27] The Council for a Community of Democracies: *Diplomat's Handbook for Democracy and Development Support.* Published 2011

intervention through means of direct action i.e. active participation, of foreign activist groups, in nonviolent actions on behalf of an indigenous population.[28]

In total the current literature related to foreign support for nonviolent struggle has been most effective in showing that many different actors, can do many different things, to effect the outcome of a nonviolent campaign or movement. While on the domestic level Chenoweth and Stephan have effectively argued that that nonviolent struggle is more effective than armed struggle because lower barriers of entry, lower risks, and lower physical demands, mean that more people are willing and able to actively participate, and that the dynamics of nonviolent struggle, as opposed to armed resistance, also offer more avenues of participation, meaning that people participate in more ways. This paper will attempt to show that the same dynamics are present at the international level and are thus also benchmarks of effective foreign support.

By applying this framework to two cases, The East Timorese struggle for self determination, and the 2003 Rose revolution in Georgia, to see if it can be argued that, on both the domestic and international level, effective nonviolent struggle works chiefly by employing effective strategies and tactics designed to attract diverse participation on both the domestic and international level. Thus it can be argued that on both a domestic and international level, the dynamics of nonviolent struggle, as opposed to armed resistance, also offer more avenues of participation, leading to more people working toward the advancement of a common goal in more ways.

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[28] Stephan eds., *Civilian Jihad,* 100

Chapter 2 – Case Study: East Timorese Struggle For Independence 1975-2002

The East Timorese struggle for independence began in 1975 when another nonviolent movement, the Carnation Revolution, ousted Portugal's authoritarian government and replaced it with a democracy that, among other things, sought to put an end to more than 400 years of Portuguese colonialism. Free from Portuguese rule the East Timorese initiated the process of decolonization, but quickly came under threat from Indonesia after they formed their own series of increasingly left-leaning political parties. Since 1968 Indonesia had been under the control of President Suharto and his highly-centralized military regime known as the New Order. From 1966-68 the New Order sought to tighten its grasp on power by launching an anti-communist purge that killed an estimated half a million Indonesians and imprisoned 1.5 million more. Since coming to power the regime had justified repressive laws and savage atrocities against its own people by accusing them of harboring communist sympathies, or associating them with communism in general. The same would be true for East Timor.[29] Suharto undoubtedly saw this newly-emerging independent leftist government as a thorn in his side, but he also possessed very real fears that its presence might ignite separatist movements in other Indonesian-dominated areas of the archipelago.

Unified by the quest for self-determination, many of East Timor's political parties unified under Fretilin (the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor) which was the largest and

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[29] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 3.

most popular East Timorese political party of the time. Fretilin then declared East Timor's independence, and Indonesia invaded two months later in December of 1975. The UN Security Council swiftly acknowledged East Timor's right to self-determination by passing resolution 384 (1975) and 389 (1976). They also condemned the invasion and demanded that "the government of Indonesia withdraw all its forces from the territory without delay."[30]

But despite these facts the Indonesian military persisted. After quickly securing all of the territory's major strategic positions, including the capital city Dili, they turned their sights on the insurgents that had retreated into the mountains and were now encircled. During this phase the Indonesian Military made full use of advanced military technologies acquired from the West, and attempted to pound the guerillas into submission. By 1978 nearly 100,000 East Timorese soldiers and civilians had been killed the majority of which were killed in the initial Indonesian offensive and the rest were lost to the disease and starvation that ensued.[31]

Indonesia then completed the annexation of East Timor by calling it the "27th Provence" and setting up its own military government called the PGET or (Provincial Government of East Timor). It was supplemented by East Timorese militia groups that had jockeyed for power against Fretilin during the decolonization process, but lost due to the popularity of self-determination. This occupation ruthlessly repressed any form of resistance, and fearing international criticism, the territory was cut off from the rest of the world. Masking these atrocities meant that nothing; no aid, human rights observers, or journalists were allowed to enter

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[30] UN Security Council, Resolution 389 (1976) Adopted by the Security Council at its 1914th meeting, on 22 April 1976, 22 April 1976, S/RES/389 (1976), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1710.html [accessed 2 June 2014]

[31] Report from the Comissao del Acolhimento Vardade e Reconciliacio: *Conflict Related Deaths in Timor-Leste 1974-1999,* (Technical Secretariat, Dili, Timor-Leste http://www.cavr-timorleste.org)

and no civilian was permitted to leave.[32] However there was only one exception to this policy. Suharto encouraged the migration of nearly 100,000 Indonesian settlers to East Timor as part of his strategy of "Indonesiazation." The overall goal of this policy was to solidify the integration of East Timor, and reduce dissent, by diluting its cultural identity. Security personnel, bureaucrats, and Indonesian businesses migrants were included within this influx of immigrants, and they helped supplement the government, the security apparatus, and the economy with loyal staff.[33] By 1979 the armed resistance laid in tatters, most Fretilin commanders had been killed and their bases destroyed while Indonesia maintained control over 90 percent of the East Timorese population. During this time one of the few surviving Falantil commanders, Xanana Gusmao, took the helm of the resistance movement. Gusmao began to acknowledge the futility of armed resistance in the face of vastly superior firepower, but after traveling around to many East Timorese villages, and speaking to many of their inhabitance, he concluded that an overwhelming majority them still possessed the to will carry on with the resistance. After establishing this Gusmao began to rustle with the question of how exactly that resistance could take shape and be effective.

Gusmao understood that he was faced with the monumental task of rebuilding the resistance from the ground up which meant that some of the most basic concepts needed to be established. The first of which was the question of "what are we fighting for?" He needed a defining ideology that would unify the resistance, this meant coming up with a strategic answer to an ideological question. The ideology of Marxism only divided the country during the

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[32] Geoffrey C. Gunn, A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor (Manila and Sydney: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1994), 1.

[33] Ibid.,p 1.

decolonization process, and these divisions made them more susceptible to Indonesian invasion. Recognizing the importance of a establishing wider threshold, Gusmao decided that the movement's defining characteristic should be East Timorese nationalism and self-determination. Additionally, Indonesia had mandated that all East Timorese, many of whom were formerly non-religious, adopt one of the major monotheistic religions. A vast majority chose Catholicism based on their exposure to it via Portuguese colonization. They took well to it, and because all other institutions were destroyed, the Catholic Church was able to quickly fill the existing institutional vacuum.

Gusmao recognized the church's influence as a popular, not to mention legal, ideology; but he also recognized its value as preexisting organizational structure that the resistance movement could tap into. Because of this the movement adopted the values of Catholicism and redefined its struggle for self-determination as an endeavor to fulfill them. The Vatican would affirm this by identifying this new entity as independent from the Indonesian Church, which by default was a refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The church also encouraged the movement to reestablish its identity from an armed, leftist, guerrilla insurgency, to a popular struggle for justice and peace. Bishop Martinho Lopes da Costa consulted Gusmao explaining that adopting the latter would give the movement a number of strategic advantages, and he did so at the cost of his job. In 1983 the church pulled him from East Timor after facing years of pressure from the Indonesian government. But Gusmao had already absorbed these ideas and was now beginning to articulate them. In 1984 Gusmao's message called "What is National Unity?" described his vision of a movement that would unite all East

Timorese based on a common national identity and "establish a new common platform for national independence with other nationalist movements."[34]

Despite his new rhetoric, and the population's willingness to resist, Gusmao was still unable to unite the population under Fretilin. His goal wouldn't begin take shape until 1987, when he would officially step down as the commander of the Fretilin's armed wing and establish a new structure of resistance under a new name. It was called the CNRM or (Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Maubere) and it was made up of three divisions, an armed front, a diplomatic front and a clandestine front. The armed front was made up of former Falantil commanders and headed by Gusmao, who also functioned as the head of the CNRM. The diplomatic front was led by former journalist Jose Romos-Horta it was based in Portugal, and it served to advocate the movement's cause in international diplomatic forums.[35] The clandestine front was the division responsible for heading the underground civil-resistance movement within East Timor. Its ranks were mostly filled by the East Timorese youth and students but it also included anyone who wanted to resist but could not or would not take up arms.[36]

It was still a movement united under catholic values and the goal of achieving self determination but, unlike Fretilin, it wasn't a single party, dominated by a single ideology, whose sole strategic focus was armed resistance. This was the CNRM's most important distinction. It

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[34] Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R, Shalom eds.: *Bitter Flowers Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community.* (Oxford: Roweman and Littlefield Publisher INC. 2001), 20.

[35] Stephan Maria J. "*Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self- Determination Movements. (PhD. diss, Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2005), 63.*

[36] Ibid., p *61.*

could now become a 'popular movement' because it was now a movement that everyone could actually participate in.

Through the mid 80s the threat of repression remained too severe to organize any significant actions, violent or nonviolent, against the Indonesian occupation. Instead the movement focused on increasing its organizational capacities and this task fell largely upon the students and youth of the Clandestine Front. Unlike the movement leaders who had to remain in hiding because of their connections to the armed resistance, they could operate in the open. They mostly functioned as the eyes and ears of the commanders that were up in the mountains. They gathered information but also helped to spread the movement's message into the population centers.

But there was still a great deal of risk involved, so they organized themselves into cells that functioned independently from one another but had the same nominal goal. Inter-cell communications were also highly protected and limited. This rather complex organizational structure meant that if a cell was infiltrated the Indonesian military could only acquire information pertaining to one cell. [37]

By 1988 the clandestine front had built a base of support large enough to begin thinking about planning nonviolent actions. Meanwhile the movement's decreased emphasis on armed struggle had given Suharto the confidence to open up more than half of the territory's provinces to preselected outsiders. First on the list of new visitors was Pope John Paul II, and the movement recognized this as a great opportunity to stage their first nonviolent action.[38]

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[37] "*An Introduction to the National Council of the Maubere Resistance*" http://www.ci.uc.pt/timor/cnrm.htm

[38] Stephan Maria J. "*Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self- Determination Movements. (PhD. diss, Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2005), 61.*

On the day of the Pope's visit activists from the clandestine front, mostly students, gathered in the crowd. At the end of the gathering they ran to the front unveiling pro-independence banners and shouting pro-independence slogans. Security forces could not react quick enough, and the students were able to get there message into the international media. Most were able to slip back into the crowd before being captured by Indonesian security forces, but the ones that caught were then tortured and killed.[39]

Despite these losses the movement regarded this seemingly small and symbolic action as a major success because they were able to accomplish their stated goal. But it also emboldened the movement by giving it the confidence and motivation to stage additional actions. But its largest success was unforeseen; it served to increase participation by sparking public interest in the movement both domestically and internationally.

The clandestine front sought to capitalize on this momentum by planning their second major action. It would be timed to coincide with the U.S. ambassador's visit to Dili and would allow them to make an appeal to the one country who wielded considerable influence over Indonesia. On January 17, 1990 roughly 200 members of the clandestine front waited for the ambassador outside his hotel in Dili and presented him with gifts and a petition demanding that the US end its support for the Indonesian occupation. The ambassador stopped and listened to their grievances, this made this action a success even though the gathering was violently repressed when the ambassador left.[40]

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[39] Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R, Shalom eds.: *Bitter Flowers Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community.* (Oxford: Roweman and Littlefield Publisher INC. 2001), 36.

[40] Irena Cristalis: *East Timor: A nation's bitter dawn,* (New York, Zed Books. 2009), xii.

Their next initiative involved smuggling Australian Journalist Robert Domm into the mountains of East Timor so that he could conduct an interview with Gusamo. This would be yet another way of letting the world know that East Timorese resistance was still alive and well, and it would also boost the moral of the East Timorese population. The clandestine front successfully smuggled Domm into the country in June of 1990, and shortly after his reports were published in a number of prominent international news outlets.[41] This was also seen as a great success, but it did cause the Indonesian government to step up their efforts to catch Gusamo. Because of this he decided to move out of hiding in the mountains and into Dili where he could blend in with the population, and also work more closely with the increasingly successful clandestine front.
In October 1991the Indonesian Government sternly objected to a proposed visit from members of the Portuguese Parliament who had planned their visit to coincide with a visit from the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights on Torture. The objections caused Portugal to cancel their visit and the movement publicly protested in response, Indonesian military reacted by violently suppressing the demonstration which resulted in the killing of one protestor.[42]

A few weeks later on November 12, 1991the movement organized the largest pro-independence public demonstration since its formation; several thousand East Timorese, from all walks of life, turned out in Dili to protest the death of this demonstrator. Under the pretext of a memorial service citizens marched from the Motael church, which was also the site of the protestor's death, to the Santa Cruz Cemetery. Along the way the march evolved into a loud yet peaceful demonstration; citizens began chanting pro-independence slogans, and waving pro-independence banners. Once the marchers entered the cemetery truckloads of Indonesian soldiers

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[41] Mark Aarons, and Robert Domm: *East Timor: A Western Made Tragedy,* (Michigan: Left Book Club, 1992), 14.

[42] Irena Cristalis: *East Timor: A nation's bitter dawn,* (New York, Zed Books. 2009), xii.

arrived at the gates effectively blocking their escape. They then opened fire on the crowd that was trapped within the cemetery walls, when the shooting stopped roughly 250 east Timorese civilians were killed.[43]

In attendance were three journalists that had chosen to visit East Timor despite the cancelation of the Portuguese delegation. Two of them were attacked and beaten severely when they tried to intervene while the third, British journalists Max Stahl, captured the massacre on video, and although the Indonesian government seized and destroyed most of the evidence from that day he was able to smuggle his tapes out of the country after burying them and recovering them later. The footage was then broadcasted around world on nearly every major news network, generating widespread international outrage, leading to awareness, which represented the seeds of international action.[44]

This new surge in international attention that followed in the wake of the Dili Massacre was a boon to the movement's own strategy of "internationalization." This strategy involved finding ways to establish their narrative within the international community because they believed that doing so would cultivate support for their movement abroad, which could in turn lead to increased international pressure on the New Order regime.

One of the most significant effects of this footage was the fact that it inspired the formation of East Timor solidarity groups in places that the movement had once thought to be indifferent. One of the most strategically significant organizations, the East Timor Action Network or (ETAN), was subsequently founded in the United States. Its goal was to advocate for

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[43] Amy Goodman, "Massacre: The Story of East Timor", Democracy Now! January 28, 2008 Accessed June 3, 2014 http://www.democracynow.org/2008/1/28/massacre_the_story_of_east_timor

[44] Ibid., http://www.democracynow.org/2008/1/28/massacre_the_story_of_east_timor

the independence of East Timor and push to end U.S military aid to Indonesia. They did this by attempting to educate more U.S. citizens on the issue while organizing protests and other forms of nonviolent persuasion. They were also very successful at lobbying key members of the U.S Congress, who in 1992, organized a hearing on Indonesia's human rights violations in East Timor. This hearing then resulted in a vote that would effectively end U.S support for Indonesian military training.[45]

Another dimension of this strategy was "indonesiaization" the goal of which was to cultivate support for the movement amongst Indonesians, the majority of whom had little knowledge of the New Order's atrocities in East Timor. Since the early 80s the Indonesian government had allowed a group of East Timorese students to study in Jakarta in hopes that doing so would help foster their integration into Indonesian society. In 1988 a group of these students, associated with the Clandestine Front, formed an underground pro-independence cell in Jakarta. It was called The National Resistance of East Timorese Students or (RENETIL) and like the student leaders within East Timor it had a highly decentralized organizational structure to protect it from infiltration. Its main purpose was to function as the movement's link to the outside world by passing on information to critical outlets in Jakarta, and send information back to the movement inside East Timor.[46]

Indonesian students had been leading their own pro-democracy movement against the Suharto regime since the early 70s, and after members of that movement heard about the Dili Massacre they realized that both movements shared a common enemy. An alliance with the pro-

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[45] Stephan Maria J. "*Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self- Determination Movements. 63.*

[46] Irena Cristalis: *East Timor: A nation's bitter dawn,* (New York, Zed Books. 2009), 321.

democracy movement provided RENETIL with new opportunities for advancing the East Timorese cause within Indonesian society. They were also able to gain access to the pro-democracy movement's network of Indonesian dissidents, intellectuals, academics, and professionals.[47] The relationship was symbiotic; information coming from East Timor reinforced the Pro-democracy movement's assertions about New Order despotism. Indonesian Pro-democracy activists also learned a lot about nonviolent action from the comparatively better organized East Timorese who had developed their particular blend of strategies and tactics in response to harsher conditions of repression. Somewhat ironically, most of these knowledge exchanges took place within prisons. Activists from both movements would often leave prison with a greater understanding of strategic nonviolent action than when they arrived.[48]

This paradox of incarceration would take new shape in November of 1992 when Xanana Gusmao was captured by Indonesian forces and sentenced to life in prison. He was sent to a prison in Eastern Java but went on a hunger strike until he was transferred to a prison in Jakarta. There he could be closer to other political prisoners and RENETIL activists, and with the help of Australian activist Kristy Sword who functioned as his messenger and later became his wife, he could while in prison be almost just as effective at leading the resistance as he was when he was hiding out in the mountains. Being in prison also meant that he could receive visits, during his sentence he was visited by many journalists along with prominent members of the international community, one of them being Nelson Mandela. This increased access to Gusmao helped to

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[47] Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R, Shalom eds.: *Bitter Flowers Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community.* 33.

[48] Ibid.,p 39

further advance the east Timorese narrative within the International community, and his ability to continue functioning as a leader kept morale high and the movement intact.

Meanwhile RENETIL continued its clandestine operations in Jakarta. In 1993 they created the Student Solidarity for Democracy in Indonesia or SMID in conjunction with the students of the pro-democracy movement. The goal of this new organization was to advance cooperation between the two movements. They also infiltrated the IMPETTU, a legally recognized organization for East Timorese students studying in Indonesia. It was set up by the Indonesian government to help indoctrinate East Timorese students into Indonesian culture but once they infiltrated it, RETNEIL activists began to politicize it and take control of its leadership. From 1993 onwards the IMPETTU would be dominated by pro-independence students while maintaining the façade of an officially recognized organization.[49]

Increased organizational capacity meant they could more effectively execute nonviolent actions in Jakarta. On November 12, 1994, on the third anniversary of the Dili Massacre, and during U.S President Bill Clinton's visit to Jakarta for an APEC summit, a group of East Timorese students charged the wall of the U.S embassy. About half of them, 29 in total, made it to the other side and began an occupation that lasted 12 days. It was another action that successfully got the East Timorese struggle for independence into the international spotlight.[50]

Later that year the first Asian-Pacific Conference on East Timor was held in the Philippines it was the first gathering of the international solidarity community and it strengthened the ties between them. In 1995 the first ever Indonesian solidarity organization dedicated exclusively to East Timor was created, and they organized frequent demonstrations

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[49] Irena Cristalis: *East Timor: A nation's bitter dawn,* 321.

[50] Ibid.,p 5

that were supplemented by participation from the pro –democracy movement. In December of 1995 RENETIL activists joined them for a protest in front of both the Dutch and Russian embassies but waved the banner of the IMPETTU. In 1996 U.K Plowshares activists entered a military base and successfully "disarmed" a series of Hawk fighter jets that had been ordered by the Indonesian Military. They left behind a video on Indonesian human rights violations in East Timor as an explanation for their actions. They were eventually caught and their trial received significant media attention, but after several powerful testimonies, one of them being from Jose Romos-Horta, the jury decided that they were not guilty.[51]

Later, in December of 1996, Jose Ramos-Horta and Catholic Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo were awarded the Nobel Prize for their successful efforts in bringing the East Timor issue to international attention. This was another major victory that brought even more international attention and legitimacy to the East Timorese cause. It was also a cause for celebration, but student activists gathered instead to talk about how they could use this event to advance their strategic goals.[52]

Meanwhile their colleagues in the Indonesian pro-democracy movement were gaining steam. Since the fall of communism Suharto lost the ability to justify the severe repression of domestic dissent based on alleged communist sympathies. This, above all else, helped to decrease the fear that was previously inhibiting the pro-democracy movement from organizing mass demonstrations. The pro-democracy movement was also successful in adopting the East Timorese strategy of "internationalization" as well as other methodologies pertaining to

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[51] Angie Zelter: *Civil Society and Global Responsibility: The Arms Trade and East Timor* (2004 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi), Vol 18(1): 125–140

[52] Press Release - Nobel Peace Prize 1996. Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2013. Web. 2 Jun 2014.

organizational structures, and tactics. This meant that they were becoming more effective at organizing nonviolent demonstrations, and increasing their base of support amongst Indonesian citizens. Things would get worse for Suharto in 1997 when the Asian finical crisis caused the Indonesian currency to lose 20% of its value on the international financial markets. This created conditions that would be favorable to both movements. Many people in Indonesia attributed the crisis to New Order corruption and mismanagement, and those in Indonesia whose tolerance for Suharto rested solely on his relatively favorable economic performance record now had little reason to stand behind him. Students of the pro-democracy movement took advantage of this and launched a final campaign of nonviolent action that eventually lead to Suharto's resignation in May of 1998.

The sudden end to 30 years of New Order hegemony in Indonesia created conditions that were more advantageous for the pro-independence movement but did not solidify its success. Knowing this the movement continued building it's capacities, even while Suharto was tittering on the brink of resignation representatives from all East Timorese opposition factions convened in Portugal, and for the first time, unified to forming a single opposition organization headed by Gusmao, called The National Council of East Timorese Resistance or CNRT. Although some were opposed to this decision they knew that the strategic advantages of this unification far outweighed personal and ideological differences at this moment in time.[53]

Suharto handed power over to Vice President Habibie who understood that his success as a president depended on his ability to restore Indonesia's national integrity; a task that could not be accomplished without a peaceful resolution to the situation in East Timor. In June of 1998 he

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[53] Irena Cristalis: *East Timor: A nation's bitter dawn,* 42.

offered East Timor special autonomy but because this meant that East Timor would only achieve nominal independence the offer was swiftly rejected by the East Timorese. They instead took advantage of the fact that they could now openly exercise political expression and began organizing a campaign calling for a national referendum on independence.[54]

No longer faced with the threat of infiltration, students scrapped the complex, decentralized, organizational structure of the past and reorganized into a more offensive posture. In June of 1998 all of the student groups united and formed The East Timor Student Solidarity Council. In conjunction with the newly formulated organization of East Timorese woman also known as FOKUPERS, they began to travel around the country campaigning in anticipation of a national referendum on independence. Students in Jakarta flexed also their muscles and held the largest pro-independence student demonstration to date which consisted of about 2000 students. This powerful counteroffensive overwhelmed the already feeble Habibie government which now understood that a popular referendum would be the only way to produce a legitimate answer to the question of East Timorese independence. An agreement was signed on May 5, 1999 that allowed a UN-supervised referendum to take place on August 30th of that same year. This was another significant victory but there was little time to waste, the movement had to do a lot of campaigning before the August 30th referendum. Students again led the charge, going door-to-door, publishing news papers and pamphlets and broadcasting radio programs. They had to compete against the pro-integration provincial government that had more resources at its disposal.[55]

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[54] Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R, Shalom eds.: *Bitter Flowers Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community.* 56.

[55] Stephan Maria J. "*Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self- Determination Movements. 65.*

The movement made headway as the August 30th deadline approached, and when the pro-integration government realized that its propaganda campaign was going to be unsuccessful, they began a campaign of mass violence and terror designed to frighten the population from voting for independence. Determined not to fall into the trap of armed conflict Gusmao ordered the movement to maintain nonviolent discipline, which they did. They remained focused on the August 30th date and continued campaigning while helping the population register to vote.[56] When the August 30th deadline finally arrived, 80% of voted in favor of independence. But the victory was overshadowed by the Indonesian military's scorched-earth policy of retreat. But despite Indonesia's attempt to destroy the infrastructure and kill the citizens of what was now considered to be another country, but Gusmao chose to maintain nonviolent discipline and not deploy his insurgents. The Indonesian parliament soon voted to recognize the referendum. The UN then deployed a mission of peacekeepers along with a temporary transitional government to East Timor. This UN force would take care of basic administrative and security needs while the East Timorese government built up its capacities. Two years later, in May of 2002, East Timor became a new independent nation.

2.1 Analysis:

In most cases nonviolent conflict works based on the premise that the ruling authority is dependent on the consent of a certain portion of the population in order to maintain power. Because of this nonviolent movements work to target these 'pillars of support' by convincing them to defect to the side of the movement or at the very least withdraw their consent from the

[56] Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R, Shalom eds.: *Bitter Flowers Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community.* 58.

regime. These dynamics were not wholly in place in the case of East Timor given the fact that the East Timorese population was resisting a foreign occupation bent on exterminating the population, supplanting them with Indonesians, and absorbing any remaining inhabitance into an entirely foreign system. All of these factors, not to mention East Timor's imposed isolation, and the comparatively extensive levels of domestic brutality and repression, rendered opportunities for civil resistance within the domestic arena not only extremely risky, but also almost nonexistent.

However the struggle to overcome these seemingly incalculable disadvantages forced the East Timorese to adopt a novel and unique strategy for winning independence; a strategy based largely on the cultivation of foreign participation. Thus this case is exemplary of the potential for effective nonviolent struggle within the international arena. Its also representative of the diversity of strategic and tactical options available not only to the movement, but also to the foreign actors that have decided to grant their support. Because this case shows the importance and power of diverse participation on the international level, one might be able to deduce that the essential dynamics of nonviolent conflict, to a certain extent are present in both the domestic and international theaters. This raises significant questions in light of Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan's finding that no correlation exists between external support and the success or failure of nonviolent campaigns or movements.

The case is unique in its ability to inform the debate concerning the overall variable importance of foreign actors in nonviolent struggles, and particularly whether or not movements possess sufficient power and agency to achieve victory without foreign assistance. Because unlike East Timor, most nonviolent movements are against domestic regimes that are dependent

on the population's consent, and a nonviolent movement can be effective by focusing almost entirely on winning diverse participation within the domestic arena. Thus the dynamics of most movements would suggest that no; foreign support, is not necessarily an essential factor for success.

But the case of East Timor given its central focus on the cultivation of international actors might suggest that certain struggles are entirely dependent of foreign participation, thus they have no agency or power, outside of the international community. However a closer look at the East Timor case may suggest that this is not in fact true. Firstly the international community was, for a majority of the struggle, almost entirely uninterested in the plight of the East Timorese. In order to win sufficient international support the movement was forced to expend enormous amounts of energy, take on enormous risk, and be enormously creative. Support came because the East Timorese exercised their agency, and knowledge of the international system and were thus able shape events in their favor. Without this ability the movement would have most probably remained off the international radar, and entirely unsuccessful.

Secondly it could be argued that the ability of the movement to cultivate such an effective and extensive international support network was entirely dependent on domestic solidarity. For most movements against domestic regimes, this level of solidarity (roughly 80% of the population as gauged by August 30, 1999 referendum on independence) would in itself be more than likely to bring about victory.

However given the unique dynamics of the East Timorese struggle it seems apparent that strong domestic solidarity, and cooperation was not enough to defeat a foreign occupier. Thus it could be further argued that effective levels of international solidarity would not have been out of

reach if pre-existing internal disagreements in regard to religion, ethnicity, ideology, and strategy, were not successfully set aside by Gusmao and his appeal for unity on the basis of self-determination. Additionally, based on Clifford Bob's assertion that, nonviolent movements are much more likely to win international support, it could be hypothesized that achieving sufficiently diverse international support, would have most probably been impossible if the movement remained committed to a strategy of armed insurgency. Key elements within that international support network such as the Catholic Church, and international activist organizations such as the US based East Timor Action Network, and the UK Plowshares activists, would have most likely not taken action on behalf of a violent insurgency.

This case also suggests that nonviolent movements can win effective and divers participation from the international community by understanding that strategies for winning domestic participation can apply to the international level, but must be applied and deployed in light of key differences existing between the two audiences. The actions of the Clandestine Front in fostering significant international attention in the wake of the Dili Massacre is exemplary of how a movement may effectively do this. The movement clearly understood that phenomenon known as 'backfire' could also work to increase participation on the international level, but that the phenomenon works somewhat differently between domestic and international theaters, and key to the success of these initiatives was the movement's knowledge of these differences.

In this example it was the recognition that international audiences, unlike domestic audiences, require more vivid, and perhaps dramatic evidence of injustice, evidence capable of rising to the top of the international media headlines, and getting the attention of an

overstimulated audience.[57] This piece of evidence was effective at attracting international attention because it showed extreme violence through the medium of video and thus was able to communicate Indonesian atrocities with a certain vividness previously unmatched by the horror stories and casualty figures from the comparatively much more brutal massacres of the past. It was this vividness that shocked the international community out of its state of apathy and forced it to begin to acknowledge the injustices taking place in East Timor.

Chapter 3 – Case Study: The 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia

On November 3, 2003 demonstrators gathered in Tbilisi's Freedom Square to protest the allegedly fraudulent results of Parliamentary elections held on the previous day. Twenty days later, the president of Georgia Edurad Shevardnadze was forced to resign after this initially small series of demonstrations evolved into a national civil resistance movement to defend Georgia's constitution and restore democracy.

The official results of the 2003 parliamentary elections placed Shevardnadze's New Georgia party in first place followed by the National Movement party lead by Mikheil Saakashvili.[58] These results sharply contrasted a series of independent parallel vote tabulations carried out by a number of domestic exit polls, Georgian independent media, and international

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[57] Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion, 26.*

[58] "Progovernment bloc wins parliamentary election in Georgia – state TV," Georgian State Television Channel 1, November 2, 2003, trans. in BBC Monitoring.

election-monitoring organizations such as the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy.[59] According to these organizations Saakashvili was in fact the winner, and this news allowed him to unite the opposition, more effectively and direct popular mobilization.[60]

On November 9th Saakashvili and other movement leaders met with Shevardnadze but the meeting produced no conclusive negotiations. During the talks Shevardnadze stated "I do not intend to resign at the demand of individual politicians and a few dozen young people waving flags. If there were at least a million people, it would have been different." The opposition took this statement as a challenge, and within just a few days generated one million signatures for a petition demanding Shevardnadze's resignation.[61]

Meanwhile civil disobedience was intensifying, Saakashvili, aided by the activist group 'Kamra' or 'enough,' began organizing Georgians from all over the country. Many of them converged on Freedom Square to participate in daily acts of nonviolent resistance. During one such action thousands of Georgians formed a human chain around the Parliament protecting it from illegitimate parliamentarians. These actions, in addition to exit poll results, and speeches made by opposition leaders, were covered by Georgia's independent media channels. And this coverage helped to further increase participation, and ensure that the revolution remain nonviolent.

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[59] "Official Georgian election results at odds with parallel vote count figures," Rustavi-2 TV, November 3, 2003, trans. in BBC Monitoring.

[60] "Georgian opposition bloc wins most votes in parliamentary election - exit poll," Rustavi-2 TV, November 2, 2003; "'Updated' exit poll results released in Georgia," Rustavi-2 TV, November 2, 2003; and "Official Georgian election results at odds with parallel vote count figures," Rustavi-2 TV, November 3, 2003, trans. in BBC Monitoring.

[61] *The Guardian* (London), 10 Nov. 2003 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/10/russia.nickpatonwalsh Accessed on June 3, 2014

Artists, musicians, and intellectuals also urged people to join the opposition, while students formed civil disobedience committees on university campuses. These committees, were part of a more extensive and pre existing organizational infrastructure that was established by student leaders, nonviolent political action groups such as Kmara, and networks of intellectuals, university professors, artists, poets, and journalists in the years leading up to the revolution. After Shevardnadze attempted to manipulate the elections in 2003 this organizational infrastructure worked to channel an influx of outraged Georgians into an effective, unified, and disciplined nonviolent movement.

By November 20th Georgians were pouring into Tbilisi in mile-long car convoys that paralyzed the city. The next day Freedom Square was packed with roughly 100,000 Georgians demanding Shevardnadze's resignation and that the election results be over turned. They also persisted in using tactics of nonviolent disruption to prevent the illegitimate parliament from convening. These included additional human chains, and street blockades made from trucks, busses, and other heavy vehicles that were towed into strategic entry points surrounding Freedom Square.

When these blockades were bypassed by parliament members and security forces, the crowd tried to persuade opposition parliamentarians not to take part in the first session, fearing that their participation would legitimize the government. When this also failed movement leaders realized direct disruption of the parliament session was the only remaining option. They stormed the rear of the building, chanting slogans, and waving Georgian flags, pouring in during Shevardnadze's opening speech. Shevardnadze was whisked away by his body guards, where

upon which he announced a state of emergency and issues an order to the security forces to begin a violent crackdown.

This crackdown was never carried out, and having lost the support of the military and the police Shevardnadze was now powerless. The next day, November 23, 2003, Shevardnadze resigned shortly after meeting with opposition leaders and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. Upon hearing this news the nearly 100,000 Georgians, occupying central Tbilisi, erupted in jubilation and then devoted their formidable organizational capacities to celebratory ventures including rock concerts and fireworks shows.

Soon after the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that the 2003 parliamentary elections were in fact illegitimate and the leading opposition figure in parliament, Nino Burjanadze, took over as president. Mikheil Saakashvili then assumed the presidency after an overwhelming victory in elections taking place in January of 2004.

The grievances that incited the relatively rapid an peaceful ouster of Edurad Shevardnadze had long been simmering in Georgian society. From 1972 to 1985 Edurad Shevardnadze served as the top government official in Soviet Georgia under the title of First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party. It was his effectiveness in fighting corruption and overall integrity as a leader that warranted his promotion to the post of Soviet Minster of Foreign Affairs; a position which he occupied from 1985 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Following the implosion of the USSR he returned to his native Georgia to serve as chairman of the parliament until 1995 when he was elected President of Georgia.

Relative to other post-Soviet states, Shevardnadze's government was tolerant of certain political freedoms, and thus was hailed by western governments as a model of successful post

soviet democratization.[62] However, from his own perspective, such freedoms were superficial; they were byproducts of political calculations designed to drum up equally superficial adulations from western leaders. Shevardnadze himself called it policy of 'managed democracy'[63] the central aim of which was to disguise the fact that a small network of elites, close to Shevardnadze's government, dominated Georgia's political and economic life through a series of informal relationships. Thus to most Georgians his regime was defined by corruption, nepotism, clientelism, facilitated by though, fixed elections, a puppet parliament, and tangential political parties.

This system was beginning to take a serious toll on the population in the years leading up to the revolution. Corruption had shrunk the government's revenue, and funding for nearly everything from services, pensions, education, and even salaries for civil servants was drying up. These conditions caused corruption to spread for it was the only means through which civil servants could earn a living. In 2001 civil society groups began calling attention to the decaying state of Georgia's government and identifying Shevardnadze's government as its root cause. These criticisms were proving to be quite potent and Shevardnadze reacted by attempting to liquidate Rustavi-2, the nation's leading independent media organization. This triggered the first mass protests and woke many Georgians up to the severity of the situation. Shevardnadze eventually capitulated and backed away from his attempt to first shut down and then buy out

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[62] Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash eds.: *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Nonviolent Action From Gandhi to the Present, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 320.*

[63] Giorgi Kandelaki,: *Georgia's Rose Revolution a Participant's Perspective,* (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, Special Report 167, July 2006), 3.

Rustavi-2, but these attempts effectively made it impossible for Shevardnadze to continue to play the role of democratic reformer.[64]

So he abandoned it all together in favor of more flagrant corruption and election rigging. In 2003, the International Monetary Fund suspended all aid programs within Georgia due to rampant corruption. Shevardnadze's decision to engage in election rigging during the 2003 parliamentary elections could be viewed as an act of desperation, when understood within the context of this increasing foreign and domestic backlash against his anti democratic actions.[65] However it is important to note that prior to 2003 political parties alone did not have the ability to successfully oppose Shevardnadze's government. They were controlled by powerful political and economic elites, and their energetic posturing, leading to an occasional albeit insignificant victory, had never been a source of formidable, much less organized, political resistance. It merely served to enhance the democratic facade that Shevardnadze was facilitating.[66] Thus opposition political parties never presented a threat to Shevardnadze's government until grass roots organizations, civil society groups, students, and the larger Georgian population, became politicized, organized, and then mobilized. This popular mobilization was well under way by the time Shevardnadze, attempted to rig the November 2003 parliamentary elections, and without its existence there would have been no organizational infrastructure in place to manage and direct the ensuing popular outrage.

While most Georgians acknowledged the presence of injustice within the system, and undoubtedly possessed a desire to change it, Georgia's political culture was not initially

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[64] Ibid., p 4.

[65] Cory Welt,: *Georgia's Rose Revolution From Regime Weakness to Regime Collapse.* (Stanford: Stanford University Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law Stanford University, 2006), 12.

[66] Ibid., p 3.

conducive to popular participation in political action. Understanding the degree to which the Shevardnadze government was entrenched, most Georgian citizens, especially the youth, harbored a great deal of distrust and skepticism regarding the effectiveness of conventional political opposition. The popular perception was that those who entered Georgian politics did so out of their own self-interest. Because these third parties did not provide an avenue for effective organic grass-roots political organization, new frameworks for political activity began to emerge.[67]

The youth organization Kmara, meaning 'enough' in Georgian, was one example of this new phenomenon. It was founded in the year 2000 by a group of reform-minded university students seeking to root out corruption in Georgia's university system. Another group calling itself the Student Movement of Georgia organized itself in response to Shevardnadze's attempt to shut down Rustavi-2 October 2001. The two groups worked together to organize mass student-led protests which eventually succeeded in impeding Shevardnadze's effort to shut down Rustavi-2. Popular backlash against Shevardnadze was exacerbated by the fact that Gorgi Sanaia, Georgia's most popular TV journalist, who worked for Rustavi-2, was murdered in July 2001, and many Georgians believed that his killing was politically motivated.

Pressure from these two groups not only succeeded in preserving the existence of Rustavi-2, but it also forced Shevardnadze to fire his entire cabinet. Most significantly, these events succeeded in convincing many Georgians that viable and effective alternatives for political change were coming into existence, and that these outside-the-system methods were actually pretty effective.

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[67] Ibid., p 6.

Following events in 2001 both groups began to grow in numbers but continued to focus their efforts on fostering political engagement amongst fellow students, NGOs, and Georgian voters. This effort was spearheaded by a committee of artists, musicians, poets, and intellectuals that came to be called 'Art-Com' for short. They traveled around, mostly to universities, holding workshops focused on the strategies and tactics of nonviolent resistance. Often times 'civil disobedience' committees would spring up in their wake, many of them led by members of the student body that were also part of Kmara.[68]

Kmara, as well as other student groups used humor as a tactic to spread their message and make further appeals to Georgian citizens. One Kmara activist later wrote:
"In any repressed society, apathy can be broken when people are caught unaware by appeals for their participation. For many this meant viewing Kmara's humorous messages making fun of the regime or learning about and benefiting from Kmara's "positive" actions, such as rock concerts, book collections for schools, and rubbish collection. These kinds of activities produced some tiny feeling of participation among ordinary citizens who might never have voted before. In the end, all these mechanisms and incentives produced a group of young people with extremely high motivation, courage, and knowledge of "quality activism," capable of carrying their pleas for more political involvement to all parts of Georgian society."[69]

Kmara activists also noted how their unique organizational structure also appealed to many Georgians. The group was structured horizontally, meaning that there were no nominal leaders or hierarchy, decisions were made democratically, and any member could propose an idea or action. As one participant put it, "This allowed more participants greater leeway for action.

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[68] Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash eds.: *Civil Resistance and Power Politics,* 325

[69] Giorgi Kandelaki,: *Georgia's Rose Revolution a Participant's Perspective, 8.*

Each could find his or her right "fit" in the movement." While this structure did extend the length and intensity of weekly brainstorming sessions, it paid off by catalyzing many of Kmara's creative and humorous ideas. Ideas such as Kmara's staging of a mock funeral in the state chancellery garden to disrupt the unveiling Shevardnadze's new economic policy. And the hanging of large banners on busy Tbilisi streets depicting Shevardnadze's government being flushed down the toilet.[70]

This overall approach to resistance was inspired by strategies and tactics that had been shown to be effective in previous nonviolent struggles taking place under similar conditions. Much of this influence came from the Serbian opposition movement known as Otpor whom just three years earlier in 2000 successfully ousted Slobodan Milosevic. Over the course of 2003 several meetings were held between members of of Georgian opposition groups, Kmara chief among them. Between the first-anti Shevardnadze demonstrations in 2001 and the fall of Shevardnadze in 2003, this bold and energetic opposition was successful in incrementally overcoming the sense of fear and apathy that was paralyzing Georgian politics.[71]

However, the new movement also needed a political face, and they found it in Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili served in parliament as a member of the Shevardnadze-controlled Union of Citizen's party, but was known as a vocal and staunch critic of government corruption. He resigned from parliament in October 2001 amidst the widespread popular backlash against Shevardnadze's move to disband Rustavi-2. Shortly after he formed the United National Movement Party and with the help of Kmara Activists, began to radicalize the political discourse and encourage widespread political participation amongst many once-apathetic Georgian voters.

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[70] Ibid., p 5.

[71] Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash eds.: *Civil Resistance and Power Politics,* 324

The relationship between Saakashvili's National Movement Party and civil society/ student based groups like Kmara was symbiotic. Saakashvili was highly focused on expanding the movement's message, and building trust within the general population. The anti-Shevardnadze rallies in 2001 showed that student groups, the urban masses, and activist groups like Kamara could only expect to achieve limited successes without mass popular support. But Saakashvili was able to appeal to the lower-middle classes, Georgia's provincial populations, and middle aged Georgians in a way that Kamara could not. On the other hand Saakashvili's alliance with new grassroots political organizations such as Kamara gave him a degree of authenticity that distinguished him from the typical charade that characterized Georgian opposition politics. The UNM also benefitted by embracing many strategies and tactics pioneered by Kamara, and this allowed them to develop a more bold and effective approach to organization and communication. [72]

Through these relationships the Saakashvili and UNM learned how to make the most out of every increment of political space afforded to them by the government. Kamara helped the UNM organize and execute meetings, rallies, and other political events in areas formerly deemed politically 'safe' for Shevardnadze. But these presumptions were consistently proven false by the mere fact that large crowds of enthusiastic local supporters were often present at such gatherings. Through these gatherings the UNM came to understand the degree to which provincial Georgians felt alienated from the political process and thus began to recognize ways in which these populations could be engaged and if necessary mobilized.

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[72] Giorgi Kandelaki,: *Georgia's Rose Revolution a Participant's Perspective, 9.*

During the final two months of the campaign preceding the November 2003 elections, Saakashvili recalled holding 225 meetings, roughly 7 per day, the majority of which were held in the most remote rejoins of Georgia. Saakashvili anticipated the likely prospect that Shevardnadze would commit electoral fraud and manipulate the results of the upcoming election thus, he conducted these meetings with the primary goal of increasing support and participation for a campaign of nonviolent struggle based not around his candidacy but in support of higher democratic ideals.

Such lofty ambitions meant that Saakashvili and his United National Movement needed strategic and tactical support from groups like Kamara. But Kamara was by no means reduced to the role of junior partner, in fact there was no formal partnership at all. Throughout the movement, both Kamara and the UNM party did share the same goals but their methods varied greatly. This lack of an official partnership meant that Kamara could still function as a quasi-political force and attack the current government using tactics that would be politically costly to a mainstream candidate like Saakashvili.

In April 2003, Kamara organized a march of 500 students from Tbilisi State University to the state chancellery. The goal of the march was to protest the government's alleged intention to rig the upcoming November elections in favor of president Shevardnadze's New Georgia Party. They also sought to draw attention to the fact that, Shevardnadze along with many top officials in his New Georgia Party, had strong high-level connections to the old Soviet order. The students marched carrying old Soviet flags and foux Soviet-style political banners depicting the faces of Shevardnadze and many top New Georgia Party officials. It was a clever mix of humor an irony and it established Kamara reputation as an unconventional political actor.

The government was flatfooted and indecisive in responding to the challenges posed by Kamara. Shevardnadze's intelligence services attempted to discredit Kamara by spreading rumors about the organization. But this disinformation campaign quickly backfired because these rumors were inconsistent. They got people talking and thinking about Kamara, but were unsuccessful in libeling Kamara as anything concrete. This made people believe that this organization, which at its peak only consisted of a roughly 3000 activists, was much larger and more powerful than it really was.

Seeking to further engender this myth, Kamara activists painted the phrase 'Kamara' thousands of times, over the course of one night, across Tbilisi buildings, walls, roads, and street signs. The graffiti became the top news story, and the next morning Georgians saw the phrase spelled out across the front page of every national news paper. The government deployed an armada of municipal vehicles and ordered their crews to clean the streets. But they quickly withdrew them after realizing that such a reaction made them look even more feckless. The graffiti remained, and over time began to increase. Soon after Kamara graffiti appeared in all of Georgia's major cities.[73] This was an example of what some practitioners call a 'dilemma action' because it imposed a lose-lose situation upon the government.

Through such actions Kamara found a way to use more effectively utilize Georgia's semi-free press against Shevardnadze. Kamara also understood that the use of humor, irony, or sarcasm, made these dilemma actions, extra appealing to journalists, and audiences alike. This proved to be an effective and ultimately efficient means through which Kamara could

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[73] iorgi Kandelaki,: *Georgia's Rose Revolution a Participant's Perspective, 7.*

disseminate its message, break though political disconnect, and keep Shevardnadze off balance. This characterized Kamara's strategy in the months leading up to the November 2003 elections.[74] When these semi-independent media channels began releasing information suggesting that Shevardnadze had manipulated the November elections, Kmara activists, in conjunction with other student leaders became the vanguards of what would soon become a nation-wide protest action. They entered Freedom Square in Tbilisi and began protesting in front of the parliament building. They chanted, waved banners and gave speeches directing political rhetoric toward Shevardnadze and other members of the now illegitimate parliament. But during these initial stages these vanguard activists knew that it was far more important to capture the attention of the nation's media then the politicians themselves. Trusting that the nation's media would carry their message into nearly every home in Georgia they inserted appeals for popular support and participation and hoped that their two year campaign to overcome widespread political apathy and disconnect would pay off.

Events would later suggest that it did. Although exact figures are unclear it appeared that the size of these protests grew exponentially during the period between the first vanguard protests following the announcement of electoral fraud, and the resignation of Shevardnadze roughly 20 days later. Hundreds of thousands of people poured into Tbilisi from the provinces in mile-long truck convoys. Many of them had at one point or another heard Saakashvili speak in their community or had been humored by a news story describing Kmara's latest attempt to poke fun at government hypocrisy. The this pre-established narrative of nonviolent resistance served as an example for how newly actuated participants, interested in partaking in the current

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[74] Ibid., p 7

campaign, could and ultimately should participate. It was also a narrative that arguably a wide variety of Georgians saw themselves fitting in to.

The hundreds of thousands of Georgians that entered Tbilisi in the days leading up to Shevardnadze's resignation provided organizers and activists with enough of a critical mass to engage in large scale nonviolent resistance that was capable of enacting measurable costs upon the government. The large scale demonstration was also in essence both a nation-wide strike and physical occupation of the nation's roads and capitol city. It was this fact that ultimately left Shevardnadze with no choice but to resign.

3.1 Analysis:

As stated previously, these cases were selected because the dynamics within each of them are fundamentally different, and thus provides a wider spectrum of analysis on the ways in which foreign support may effect the outcome of a nonviolent campaign or movement. The most stark of these differences lies in the fact that unlike East Timorese who were fighting a foreign occupation, the Georgians, in their effort to improve the socioeconomic and political conditions within their country sought the ouster of a domestic regime i.e. a regime dependent on a certain degree of popular consent. Thus the struggle in Georgia can be characterized as a more traditional civil resistance movement achieving success by working primarily within the domestic sphere to create defections and weaken the regime's 'pillars of support.' This was evident in the fact that Georgian security forces refused to carryout the crackdown on demonstrations, ordered by Shevardnadze in his last hours in office.

Nonetheless the events of Georgia 2003 work to further showcase how the core dynamics of nonviolent of struggle, namely diversity and participation, may overlap between domestic and international arenas. If the East Timor case illustrated how nonviolent movements may go about amassing, harnessing, and deploying the power of diverse international participation. Then the events in Georgia somewhat conversely illustrate how foreign support can be effective when it assists a movement's capacity to amass diverse participation in the domestic arena, and channel it toward effective political resistance.

Some additional noteworthy differences between the East Timorese Struggle For independence and the struggle to oust Shevardnadze regime. Firstly, as opposed to East Timor, the International community was comparatively more aware, engaged, and to a certain extent invested in improving Georgia's socioeconomic and political conditions.

Unlike the East Timorese the Georgians did not need to devote astronomical amounts of energy to to the cultivation of foreign support. It was largely already there. From 1995-2000 the United States spent roughly $US700 million on aid to Georgia; a large portion of it allotted for the purpose of strengthening Georgia's democratic institutions, and civil society organizations. The EU also contributed €385 million, from 1991 to 2003 for similar purposes.[75]

Arguments citing western financial aid as the chief enabler of the revolution often fail to effectively evaluate the real impact that such aid had upon the popular movement, and thus the degree to which it determined the outcome of events in 2003. Above all else, Foreign support for democratic initiatives and the growth of civil society was never intended to spark regime change via electoral revolution. Western aid was a boon to the Shevardnadze government for its

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[75] *Country Strategy Paper 2003-2006 & TACIS National Indicative Program 2004-2006 Georgia* (Brussels: European Commission, 23 Sept. 2003), 5.

existence helped bolster the facade of democratic governance thus enabling him to continue reaping the benefits of corruption. Much like the nominal participation of blunted political parties, the presence of a 'vibrant' civil society, free independent media, and international election monitoring organizations, this aid only served to increase his legitimacy as president.

Furthermore little if any of this western aid ever trickled down to the grassroots level or to the provinces. The funding sustained what some writers have called a 'third sector, made up of the Westernized, and educated, Tbilisi elite who navigated the city in convoys of expensive foreign luxury cars. They did however attempt to promote democratic ideals, freedom of the press, civil liberties, and education, but the degree to which they were successful in diffusing these ideals in to Georgian society was minimal due to their extreme disconnect with the general population, and to the fact that the population generally resented them. The ineffectualness of this third sector can be illustrated by the mere fact that, during its decade-long existence Georgia only became less democratic, and the government only became more corrupt.[76]

Because there seems to be no consensus on the precise degree to which foreign support contributed to the ousting of Shevardnadze, fresh analysis is in order. The degree to which foreign supported initiatives, aimed at diffusing the norms of anti corruption, political pluralism, and economic justice were successful is hard to identify. Surly the sufficient presence of such values fueled the existence and proliferation of popular grievances associated with the Shevardnadze regime, but its hard to measure the degree to which such values were preexisting or present due to the active influence of outside actors. Thus we are forced to look at the specific

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[76] Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, *Civil Resistance and Power Politics,* 330.

effects of indefinable projects such as funding for Rustavi-2, and the existence of international election monitoring organizations.

Both projects were undeniably instrumental in contributing to demise of the Shevardnadze regime. International election monitoring organizations were key in establishing the existence of fraud in the November 2003 elections, and without such affirmations the movement would have undoubtedly faced difficulties generating the participation necessary for an effective electoral revolution. Additionally, the existence of Rustavi-2, especially its role in broadcasting not only the discrepancies in the vote count but also, the resulting protests, and the the movements's appeals for country-wide participation in such protests, was undoubtedly key for the success of the ensuing electoral revolution.

Its important to keep in mind that electoral revolution was the movement's back up plan. Throughout most of the struggle, the movement pursued a strategy based chiefly on conventional means i.e. 'electoral' opposition in the form of Mikheil Saakashvili's bid for office and that the movement made a strategic shift and began fully pursuing a strategy nonviolent resistance only after Shevardnadze attempted to rig the November 2003 elections in his favor. Foreign support in the form of assistance for Rustavi-2, independent international election monitoring organizations, and even, in transferring essential strategies and tactics of nonviolent resistance through organizations such as Otpor, were just as useful for supporting the campaign of Mikheil Saakashvili as as they were in supporting the subsequent campaign of nonviolent resistance. Mikheil Saakashvili would later go on to estimate that before 2003 90 percent of the Georgian population would would not go out on the streets to protest against electoral fraud.[77] Additionally

[77] Zurab Karumidze and James V. Wertsch eds., "Enough!":The Rose Revolution in The Republic of Georgia, 2003 (New York: Nova Science, 2005), 23.

the largest demonstrations of supporters occurred after president Shevardnadze had already resigned.

It is also important to acknowledge that 'electoral revolution' did not occur randomly, or on its own but was instead the result of strategic planning done by the movement in the run up to the election. Such planning was conducted by assessing forecasted assets in relation to forecasted conditions, should electoral fraud occur.[78] Thus within this process foreign support was most directly significant in that it effected the conditions upon which such planing was based, it never dictated the specific form of political action. Thus the presence of an 'electoral revolution' was less to due to with the fact that foreign aid was incrementally changing societal conditions, and more due to the fact that the strategic agenda put forth by domestic opposition organizations was created in light of these conditions.

[78] See working paper by Cory Welt,: *Georgia's Rose Revolution From Regime Weakness to Regime Collapse.* (Stanford: Stanford University Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law Stanford University, 2006), 36.

Conclusion:

Both the East Timorese struggle for independence, and the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, were successful because the dynamics of effective nonviolent conflict, namely diversity and participation, characterized the nature of international involvement. The overall goal of this project was to attempt highlight certain characteristics, of effective foreign support, that may serve to explain the lack of correlation existing between foreign support and the success or failure of nonviolent campaigns and movements. All these dynamics previously mentioned, participation, diversity, backfire, pillars of support, should be understood, by movements, and third parties alike, as existing with relevance in both the domestic and international theaters of nonviolent struggle, and thus effecting the outcome of the movement visa a vis foreign support. This paper has also attempted to show that nonviolent struggle when compared to armed struggle, are more likely to receive foreign support, because akin to the domestic level, the dynamics of nonviolent struggle offer potential supporters more avenues of participation, at a lower cost. Overall a more in depth understanding of these dynamics may help third party state and or non-state actors in their effort to cultivate more productive relationships with nonviolent campaigns and movements. Such progress will be built on the understanding the following implications of these findings, namely; that certain forms of foreign support may backfire and damage a movement, that support that may in general hurt domestic and international participation is negative, the dynamics of nonviolent conflict provide foreign actors with a variety of foreign support options, and that depending on the struggle foreign support may be more or less effective if administered in different forms, and lastly that given these dynamics nonviolent conflict cannot be instrumentalized by foreign actors, because on a domestic level it's

successful only when people choose to partake based on the substantive arguments of them movement leaders, thus the substantive appeals for domestic participation are a movement's most important assets, and should be taken into account.

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