TRACING 'POLICING' RATIONALES IN UN ADMINISTRATIVE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: CASE STUDIES OF UNTEA AND UNTAC

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Abstract

In this thesis, I draw on Michel Foucault's analysis of modern techniques of power and in particular on governmentality to analyze United Nations (UN) administrative peacekeeping missions. I argue that we can find traces of 'old policing' rationalities and practices manifested within the UN administrative peacekeeping missions stemming back to the first administrative mission of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) from 1962-63. I further explore the different governmentalities, and the correlated elements of police, in peacekeeping operations during the 1990s in special regards to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission. In this respect, I highlight both the continuities and discontinuities in policing practices that are sidelined to show that there is a much older legacy of police in peacekeeping. Sketching 'policing' rationalities in UNTEA's administrative mandate will show us how these 'policing' rationalities were transformed into neoliberal discourses in the UNTAC case. Moreover, to take the specific angle of studying 'policing' towards a critical approach of UN 'peacekeeping' I aim to highlight the issue of policing in global politics which surprisingly has been paid little attention in International Relations.

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List of Abbreviations

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ATC – Air Traffic Control

CCA – Central Consumers' Administration

FUNCINPEC – *Front Uni National pur une Camodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif*

KPNLF – Khmer People's National Liberal Front

KR – Khmer Rouge

MCRRC – Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia

SNC – Supreme National Council

SOC – State of Cambodia

UN – United Nations

UNMIK – United Nations

UNSF – United Nations Security Force

UNTAC – United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNTEAS – United Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium

UNTEAT – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

UNTEA – United Nations Temporary Executive Authority

WNG – West New Guinea

Introduction

When we think of police, there is an automatic association to what we believe to be the repressive feature of the state.[1] However, in a much broader sense, police[2] in history, has been more generally linked to what we now would consider the act of 'governance'.[3] Much literature has been written on the conceptual change 'police' has underwent over the course of history and even more so of its impact on modern day policing and the study of criminology.[4] However, there remains few literatures that use a governmentality approach to account for how the 'police concept' and its rationalities of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries have not altogether disappeared even though it has in the context of how states 'police' internal order entering the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In this paper, I draw on Michel Foucault's analysis of modern techniques of power and in particular on governmentality to analyze United Nations (UN) administrative peacekeeping missions. I argue that we can find traces of 'old policing' rationalities and practices manifested within the UN administrative peacekeeping missions stemming back to the first administrative mission of West New Guinea[5] (WNG) from 1962-63. A governmentality approach will allow for the micro study of power that operates within the administrative mandates of peace operations.[6] In this respect, a critical study analyzing solely administrative peacekeeping missions where the UN assumes executive authority of a given territory, in regards to tracing

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[1] Mark Neocleous, "Policing and pin‑making: Adam smith, police and the state of prosperity," *Policing and Society* 8, no. 4 (1998): 427.

[2] The reference of 'police' or 'policing' will be used in relation to 'governance' unless specified otherwise

[3] Michel Foucault, *Security, territory, population: lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78.* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 334.

[4] Mark Neocleous, 1998: 444-445; Werner Bonefeld, "Adam Smith and ordoliberalism: on the political form of market liberty," *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 2 (2013): 240; Marina Caprini and Kari M. Osland, "As Police Roles Grow in UN Peace Operations, Clearer Guidelines Needed," *IPI Global Observatory*, (2014). http://theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/701-as-un-police-become-part-of-peacebuilding-clearer-guidelines-are-needed.html

[5] Also known as West Irian.

[6] This thesis will use 'peacekeeping,' 'peace operations,' or 'peace building' as interchangeable terms. The scope of this thesis does not delve into the differentiations of these terms and what they entail.

policing rationales has not yet been pursued.

The appearance and ultimate embedding of pre-modern 'policing' rationalities on the international level leads us to question and critically analyze "the unproblematized discourse of modernity which is at the heart of both International Relations and Conflict Resolution theory and practice [which] demands that this objective knowing be uncontaminated by subjectivities, the contingencies of social life – although ironically the main purpose of modernity is to itself 'contaminate' social life".[7] With the propagation of neoliberalism taken hold of state policies as early as the 1970s, we can further explore the different governmentalities, and the correlated elements of police, in peacekeeping to account for different or similar administrative practices of peacekeeping operations during the 1990s where we see UN administrative missions again being reestablished. This focus in itself would highlight both the continuities and discontinuities between the old and new peace operations in relation to the existence/disappearance of the bipolar cold war structure and the rise of neoliberalism. However, this paper does not seek to link altogether the change of the bipolar structure to the change of administrative peacekeeping missions,[8] but to show the continuities and discontinuities that are sidelined and to show that there is a much older legacy of police in peacekeeping. The point of the present discussion is "to look at the UN not as an agent or normative institution, but as a space for transmitting, reinforcing, contesting, and actualizing in practice discourses that are imagined as 'norms' … [and as] a place where different and competing political agendas are negotiated, silenced, or

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[7] A.b. Fetherston, *Towards a theory of United Nations peacekeeping.* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2000): 190
[8] Much literature already assumes the transformation of peace operations to the end of the Cold War. See 'The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s: Adding Globalization to the Conventional 'End of the Cold War Explanation', by Peter Viggo Jakobsen and 'An Overview and Assessment of 1989-1996 Peace Operations Publications' by Cindy Collins and Thomas G. Weiss.

enacted…"[9]

I aim to provide a critical analysis of how police discourse and practices have manifested and changed within UN administrative peacekeeping missions. This will not only provide an additional perspective that sheds light on the rationalities used in UN administrative peacekeeping missions, but also uncover how these rationalities came into use in discourse and practice. It is important to note that in this paper I do not treat the "UN as a mere vector for state power nor as autonomous, but rather as a regime that diffuses multiple forms of governmentalities".[10] In this effort I will analyze the empirical cases of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in WNG, 1962–63 and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992–1993. An analysis of administrative peacekeeping missions within the critical theory literature with a few exceptions has been scarce and do not account for how policing rationalities have shaped the practices of administrative missions.[11] I aim to trace the 'policing' discourse that endured into UNTEA's administrative mandate, which supervised the civil component and security buildup within the country.[12] Sketching these 'policing' rationalities in UNTEA's administrative mandate will also show us how these 'policing' rationalities were transformed into neoliberal discourses reflecting a more natural way of 'policing' in the UNTAC case. Moreover, to take the specific angle of studying 'policing' towards a critical approach of UN 'peacekeeping' I aim to highlight the issue of policing in global politics which surprisingly

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[9] Laura Zanotti, *Governing disorder: UN peace operations, international security, and democratization in the post-Cold War era*. (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011): xi.
[10] Hans-Martin Jaeger, "UN Reform, Biopolitics, And Global Governmentality," *International Theory* 2, no. 1 (2010): 81.
[11] Though Simon Chesterman does not speak directly on the technologies of power behind administrative missions, he does provide a critical analysis of international actors in the statebuilding process, see Simon Chesterman, *You, the people the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
[12] Satish Chandra and Mala Chandra, *International conflicts and peace making process: role of the United Nations*. (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2006).

has been paid little attention in International Relations.[13] In the first and second chapters I review the relevant literature and set up the conceptual framework of how I use 'police' in regards to the rationalities of UN administrative peacekeeping missions. The subsequent two chapters will contain the empirical cases of both missions in regards to show both continuities and discontinuities of the policing rationale. In tracing policing rationales in both cases, a close examination of unpublished documents regarding these administrative missions from a UN archival search has been done. Complimentary to these documents, various published UN documents have also been included containing speeches and general information about these cases. These unpublished documents provide a more in depth account of administrative tasks that allows for such an analysis.

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[13] Daniel Pinéu, "The Pedagogy of Security: Police assistance and liberal governmentality in American foreign policy," (PhD diss., Aberystwyth University, 2009): 35

1. Overview of Literature

1.1. Introduction

Peacekeeping literature often classifies and analyzes UN peacekeeping missions under one umbrella or has classified them according to the three generations of peacekeeping missions[14] that go in parallel with the bipolar change in the international system in regards to the pre and post cold war periods. The UN's 'neutrality' and lack of will to become involved in the internal political affairs of countries during the cold war is highly emphasized and contrasted to the post cold war period. The contrasted behavior during the post cold war period has changed UN's involvement in conflicts that reflects the second and third generation missions we see today and subsequently call 'multidimensional'. However, there are two cases that are labeled exceptions to this 'neutrality' period during the cold war.[15] The 1960s missions in the Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Security Force (UNSF) in WNG are these two exceptions that are not categorized with the traditional missions of the cold war period as they show the UN exercising overreaching governmental authority and muscle. Thus, these exceptions can provide us with more information regarding the discourses that are not widespread amongst the conventional rationales that describe changes in peacekeeping missions. It also allows us to raise questions of the default understanding that "cold war ideological differences made it impossible for the United Nations to promote any particular model of domestic governance within the borders of individual states".[16] We do not necessarily have to accept this dominant view point that scholars accept such as Roland Paris who also describes that, "the political and ideological conditions of the cold war era helped to restrict the functional scope of peacekeeping to narrowly defined and

[14] See European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, "Definitions." http://www.eplo.org/definitions.html
[15] See Roland Paris, *At war's end: building peace after civil conflict*. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 14-15.
[16] Ibid., 15-16.

predominantly military tasks, such as cease-fire observation, and worked to limit the involvement of these operations in domestic affairs".[17] A governmentality approach will highlight the not so exceptional case of the UN administrative mission of WNG and provide us with a different understanding of how we perceive the act of governance from that of the commonly accepted belief of neutrality and the maintenance of a ceasefire. This requires us to go beyond and look at the overall impact of policing as peacekeeping in global politics.

1.2. Literature Review

The study of peacekeeping has accumulated a large mass of works, however within the international relations approach, critical peacekeeping is dominated by a more policy oriented, practical and operational level of analysis.[18] Moreover, peacekeeping from the broader theories of international relations have been studied from a largely statist perspective. These literatures describe a different story of the role international organizations play, but with the common peripheral view of the Leviathan within their analysis.[19] On the other hand, Realist theory literature categorizes peacekeeping and international organizations as a tool used by states acting out in their own interests.[20] While Liberal theorists for instance concentrate on democratic peace and another on the level of democracy in a country in relation to UN troop contribution.[21] Constructivists' analyze the importance of norms, knowledge, and institutional culture within international politics and security.[22] Finally,

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[17] Ibid., 15-16.

[18] See Roland Paris, "Broadening the Study of Peace Operations", *International Studies Review* 2, no. 3 (2000): 27; Michael Pugh, "Peacekeeping and International Relations Theory: Phantom of the Opera?", *International Peacekeeping* 10, no. 4 (2003).

[19] Laura Zanotti, 2011.

[20] See Laura Neack, "UN Peace-Keeping: In The Interest Of Community Or Self?," *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 2 (1995); Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu, "Sharing The Financial Burden For U.N. And NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 2 (1998); Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler, "Peacekeeping and Burden-sharing, 1994-2000," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 6 (2006).

[21] James H. Lebovic, "Uniting For Peace?: Democracies And United Nations Peace Operations After The Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (2004).

[22] Michael Barnett, "The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty", *Global Governance* 1, no. 1 (1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, *The culture of*

Marxists use a structural economic perspective on the interactions between institutions and material conditions.[23]

There has been a steady growth of critical literature on peacekeeping since the cold war period.[24] This is in part due to recent calls to widen the study of peacekeeping towards a more critical lens.[25] Many critical writers have used the work of Robert Cox to divide the peacekeeping field and analyze it through a 'problem-solving' and 'critical' lens approach.[26] This strategy coupled with the end of the cold war and a rise of 'liberal peace' benchmarked a new critical debate on post war peacebuilding and state building. The liberal peace thesis has been criticized from many with its origins spawning from early thinkers such as John Locke and Immanuel Kant who advanced notions that liberal democracies would avoid conflict between each other while also appearing to be internally less violent than non-democracies.[27] Based on these very principles Woodrow Wilson helped establish the League of Nations.[28] However, with its demise following World War II, it wasn't until the end of the cold war that scholars like Mark Duffield assert, "liberal market democracy, as a political ideology, achieved clear hegemonic status internationally, substantially displacing socialist

national security: norms and identity in world politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Martha Finnemore, *The purpose of intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

[23] William I. Robinson, *Promoting polyarchy: globalization, US intervention, and hegemony.* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).

[24] Alan James, *Peacekeeping in international politics.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); Michael Barnett, 1995; Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 54; François Debrix, *Re-envisioning peacekeeping: the United Nations and the mobilization of ideology.* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

[25] A.b. Fetherston, "Peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding: A reconsideration of theoretical frameworks," *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 1 (1994); A.b. Fetherston, 2000; Michael Paris, 2000; Michael Pugh, 2003.

[26] Alex J. Bellamy, "The 'next stage' in peace operations theory," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (2004); Michael Pugh, "Peacekeeping and Critical theory," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (2004).

[27] See for more on liberal peace theory, Stephen Campbell, "Construing Top-down as Bottom-up: The Governmental Co-option of Peacebuilding "From Below"," *Explorations in Anthropology* 11, no. 1 (2011): 41.

[28] Ibid., 41.

and dependency theory models of appropriate international orders".[29] Under this backdrop of the post cold war, there is a rise in debate within the critical literature on liberal peacebuilding in post conflict states.

As we see in Mark Duffield's writing, neoliberal values and practices are present in today's conflict management and work towards widening and maintaining its hegemonic dominance in the global South.[30] Duffield and Pugh posit that these practices are not as emancipatory as they preach, but are a disguise for a means of governing disorder.[31] Duffield further remarks that the merging of security and development discourses make way for further intervention.[32] However, scholars like, Oliver Richmond consider a more emancipatory approach to be integral to the whole liberal framework and do not necessarily empower, but dominate.[33] Interventions based on establishing liberal peace have brought many to criticize it. These scholars question the assumptions of interventions - often termed in neutral and technical ways – in relation to the hidden source of power they entail.[34] For instance, Michael Pugh, Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, all argue that these development practices increase the inequality and violence that is seen in less developed states.[35]

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[29] See Mark R. Duffield, *Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security.* (London: Zed Books, 2001): 23-26.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., see also Michael Pugh, "The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 10, no. 2 (2005).

[32] For more of a biopolitical approach see Mark R. Duffield, *Development, security and unending war: governing the world of peoples.* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).

[33] Oliver P. Richmond, "Emancipatory Forms of Human Security and Liberal Peacebuilding," *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007).

[34] See Oliver P. Richmond, "Reclaiming Peace in International Relations", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 36, no. 3 (2008); Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War", *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006); B Jahn, "The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Part One", *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1, no.1 (2007a); B. Jahn, "The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Part Two", *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1, no.2 (2007b); Michael Dillon and Julian Reid. *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live.* (London: Routledge, 2009).

[35] See: Michael Pugh, "Peacekeeping and Critical theory," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (2004); Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, "Introduction: Thinking anew about peace operations," *International Peacekeeping* 11, (2004).

Mac Ginty and Richmond go on to question the negative effects that are shown through the failures of liberal peace projects.[36] David Chandler goes in great detail to show how the Bosnian mission because of its top-down approach undermined the democratic process creating an environment of dependency and failed local ownership further calling statebuilding missions an act of 'empire in denial'.[37] However, scholars like Mac Ginty promote an alternative to the liberal strategies of peace such as traditional and indigenous approaches to peacemaking.[38] Michael Barnett has also proposed an alternative strategy, but uses a republican peacebuilding strategy based on developing "the republican principles of deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation to help states recovering from violence gather stability and legitimacy".[39] In the debate on the moral and appropriate use of liberal means in conflict torn states, Roland Paris is criticized for his acceptance of using the liberal framework.[40] Paris proposes an 'institutionalization before liberalization' strategy that emphasizes the need for strong institutional frameworks that would minimize the effects of introducing democracy and a market based economy.[41] However, Paris sustains that many of these criticisms are unwarranted and exaggerated as those who criticize the liberal peacebuilding project do not themselves totally reject the idea and also use liberal elements in their own thought.[42]

More recent publications of post-modern studies have been able to offer this area more insight on the dark side of benign peace operation activities. These literatures involving

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[36] Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, *The liberal peace and post-war reconstruction: myth or reality?*. (London: Routledge, 2009).

[37] See David Chandler, *Bosnia faking democracy after Dayton*. (London: Pluto Press, 2000) and David Chandler, *Empire in denial the politics of state-building*. (London: Pluto, 2006).

[38] Roger Mac Ginty, "Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace", *Cooperation and Conflict* 43, no. 2 (2008): 159.

[39] Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War", *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006): 89.

[40] Roland Paris, *At war's end: building peace after civil conflict*. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[41] See Ch. 10 in Roland Paris, *"At war's end: building peace after civil conflict"*.

[42] Roland Paris, "Saving liberal peacebuilding," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010).

the governance practices of international organizations such as Laura Zanotti's use of a Foucauldian framework to analyze how the discourses and practices of UN peacekeeping missions regarding security, peace, democracy, and good governance are normalized and used as a rationale for intervention on 'disordered' states.[43] Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, link the use of pastoral power to the European Union's police mission in Bosnia.[44] Feminist critical theory literature reviews gender mainstreaming[45] and sexual violence[46] in peacekeeping operations while others seek to use the UN discourse on gender to demonstrate its limits in application.[47] Finally, François Debrix presents peace operations as an ideology projected through public presentations of interventions through various media outlets.[48]

As it is widely mentioned throughout the peacekeeping literature, the cold war 'freed' the UN of the constraints of a bipolar international order that allowed it some sort of power over the governance of states.[49] This is where UN administrative missions become an interesting analysis in regards to the bipolar structural shift that is so often credited for the change in UN peacekeeping missions.[50] This change many call 'large-scale', 'comprehensive', or 'multi-dimensional' are the types of missions we see today. However, as peacekeeping literature focuses on the changes of how peace is kept and who is being

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[43] Laura Zanotti, 2011.

[44] See Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, *European Union peacebuilding and policing governance and the European Security and Defence Policy*. (London: Routledge, 2006).

[45] Audrey Reeves, "Feminist Knowledge and Emerging Governmentality in UN Peacekeeping," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 14, no. 3 (2012).

[46] Carol Harrington, "Governing peacekeeping: the role of authority and expertise in the case of sexual violence and trauma," *Economy and Society* 35, no. 3 (2006).

[47] Tarja Väyrynen, "Gender and UN peace operations: The confines of modernity," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (2004).

[48] François Debrix, 1999.

[49] Stephen Campbell, 2011.

[50] For more work on international administration see Simon Chesterman, *You, the people the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Bernhard Knoll, *The legal status of territories subject to administration by international organisations*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Carsten Stahn, *The law and practice of international territorial administration: Versailles to Iraq and beyond*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Ralph Wilde, *International territorial administration: how trusteeship and the civilizing mission never went away*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

protected, an examination of administrative peacekeeping missions on itself has not been covered by mainstream peace operations literature. Studying administrative missions is important in the overall peace operations literature because it provides us with a more detailed look of the how of 'policing' or 'governance' in UN peacekeeping missions.[51] Such an analysis can show how the "police as a political technology of rule is …both coercive and productive, aimed as it is at 'proper' liberal subjects, but also at liberalism's others (both internal and global)".[52] These 'others' comprise of "populations, groups and individuals deemed as the subjects of improvement or development, those in need of pastoral care, and those others who stand beyond the pale of liberal government and are as such the subject of what has been termed liberal 'despotism'".[53] Unlike 'regular'[54] peacekeeping missions whose rationale for setting up operational mandates and targets have changed with the bipolar shift, we cannot say the same for administrative missions which make them very unique in this type of analysis. The tactics or technologies used in administrative missions pre and post cold war reflect continuities and discontinuities in regards to policing rationales.

1.3. Administrative Missions

Within the literature on transitional administration missions, there are categorizations that are used to describe the nature and power of missions such as supervisory authority, executive authority, administrative authority, and monitoring operations.[55] It is often the

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[51] For literature on governing national and transnational spaces through police-minded and (neo)liberal rationalities and practices see: Wendy Larner and William Walters (eds), *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces*. (New York: Routledge, 2004); Markus Dirk Dubber and M. Valverde (eds), *The New Police Science: The Police Power in Domestic and International Governance*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); Markus Dirk Dubber and Mariana Valverde, *Police and the liberal state*. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008); Barry J. Ryan, *Statebuilding and police reform: the freedom of security*. (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011); Jan Bachmann, "Policing Africa: The US military and visions of crafting 'good order'," *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 2 (2014).

[52] Daniel Pinéu, 2009: 36.

[53] Ibid., 36; For an additional analysis on pastoral power, see Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, 2006.

[54] Peacekeeping missions that are not categorized as administrative missions.

[55] See: Michael W. Doyle, 'War-Making and Peace-Making: The United Nations' Post-Cold War

change in the international structure that is most heavily emphasized attributing to these different categorizations of peace operations. The literature of post-conflict reconstruction from the 1990s and onward conceptualizes this "increasing trend towards rebuilding governance structures through assuming some or all governmental powers on a temporary basis".[56] The UN has also distinguished itself within this trend with the release of UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's 1992 Agenda for Peace highlighting the new challenges the UN faces, as conflicts now resemble intra-state conflicts and require the UN to take on responsibility "beyond military and humanitarian tasks to include the promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government".[57] With this bipolar change in the international system post-1989 peacekeeping missions are attributed with spreading "neoliberalism techniques of management… such as 'structural adjustment', 'good governance' and 'civil society'".[58] However, as the UNTEA mission of WNG is treated as an exception[59] or barely mentioned at all[60] in relation to the change of the bipolar international system, it contains techniques and rationalities of policing that we can also find in administrative missions post cold war thus showing continuities of governance.

Using a critical approach we can understand the "nature and significance of these operations for our understanding of international politics"[61] and show the continuity of policing practices by not just simply by attributing them to the changing nature of

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Record', in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001): 529.

[56] Simon Chesterman, "Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1, no. 1 (2007): 4-5.

[57] Ibid., 5.

[58] John Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 36, no. 3, (2008): 601.

[59] See Roland Paris, 2004: 14-15.

[60] Wet, Erika De, "The Direct Administration of Territories by the United Nations and its Member States in the Post Cold War Era: Legal Bases and Implications for National Law." In *Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004.

[61] Oldrich Bures, "Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping." *International Studies Review* 9, no. 3 (2007): 408.

peacekeeping missions with the international structure. We can trace elements of such continuity in the course of UN peacekeeping missions as only several territories were placed under direct UN administration including: the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) 1962-1963, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 1992-1993, United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) 1996-1998), United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 1999-2008 and United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 1999-2002.

International administration often entails state building as the dominant activity that is meant to be only temporary in its aim at building political institutions associated with the state.[62] However, statebuilding "goes beyond traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates, and is directed at constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security".[63] This is why such administrative missions post cold war are categorized in part as state building since they encompass a wide range of activities. However, it is also important to note that this 'statebuilding' was also an important feature in the UNTEA mission as such statebuilding practices entail measures that are not meant to dominate others, but to "enhance their capacity for action, and to direct it".[64] It is "the claim of expertise in the optimizing the lives of others" that becomes a claim to power that we can see inherit in these administrative missions.[65] It is in the next chapter where the 'policing' concept will be clarified and show how it will be applied in the empirical cases.

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[62] Niels Van Willigen, "International administration and institutional autonomy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo," *East European Politics* 28, no. 4 (2012).
[63] Simon Chesterman, 2005: 5.
[64] Daniel Pinéu, 2009: 225.
[65] Ibid., 225.

2. Conceptual Framework

2.1. Governmentality

The study of governmentality has grown over the past two decades since the publishing of Foucault's lectures.[66] Governmentality more generally is referred to as the 'conduct of conduct' or the 'art of governing'. "It was subsequently re(de)fined by liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth, and neoliberalism in the twentieth, centuries."[67] It is this process that Foucault describes as the 'governmentalisation of the state' in which we can observe a "dramatic spread of bureaucracy coupled with statistics, surveys, social sciences and other calculative practices".[68] These practices used in the administrative peacekeeping missions have become a source of power when used to govern requiring a system to "classify, and quantify their subjects, constructing them as 'populations', sorting them into administrable categories like 'unemployed' or 'immigrant', routinely intervening in their daily lives in ways that seek to rationalize their general well-being".[69] Policing, Foucault recalls, is one of the earliest forms of governmentality that uses a "set of means necessary to make the forces of the state increase from within".[70] It is only capable of this through a type of power that constitutes itself in "interior spaces of social, economic and political forces as knowable domains".[71] The scope of this paper seeks to expand governmentality to an analysis

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[66] Ibid. See for further works on governmentality: Andrew Barry, *Foucault and political reason: liberalism, neo-liberalism, and rationalities of government*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1996); Thomas Lemke, "Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique," *Rethinking Marxism* 14, no. 3 (2002); Graham Burchell, *The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault*. (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 2009); Alexandra Jayne Innes and Brent J. Steele, 'Governmentality in Global Governance', in Levi-Faur, David (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); William Walters. *Governmentality*. (London: Routledge, 2012).
[67] Hans-Martin Jaeger, 2013: 30.
[68] Daniel Pinéu, 2009: 9.
[69] Ibid., 9.
[70] Ibid., 137.
[71] Ibid., 137.

of the global, 'beyond the state'[72] using UN administrative peacekeeping missions as an analysis of how old policing rationales are present and how they are also later transformed into liberal governmentalities on the global level. "A focus on governmentality provokes us to ask how particular governmental programs are devised, the techniques they assemble, and how they are transformed or fall apart".[73] It is in these efforts to govern, that the UN seeks to act as a benevolent actor where rationalities and technologies are developed in ways that would lower the degree of resistance in regards to intervening on behalf of promoting "the will to improve" in order to bring "welfare and productivity up to new standards".[74] Such neoliberal governmentality practices seek to "promote market principles and entrepreneurialism" through techniques that indirectly govern populations.[75] These efforts to govern global spaces through police-minded and neoliberal rationalities and practices are what this paper seeks to explore.[76]

2.2. Policing

Studying the changes in police discourse over history shows us how in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries police used to entail a focus on increasing the internal wealth and splendor of the state through the administration of everyday life.[77] The state in this context is also understood together with civil society. Thus, where population is concerned the state is also concerned. Police were accorded tasks to numerous aspects of society some of which entail an all encompassing list as Foucault mentions: "religion, morals, health and subsistence, public peace, the care of buildings, squares, and highways, the sciences and the

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[72] See William Walters and Wendy Larner, *Global governmentality: governing international spaces*. (London: Routledge, 2004).
[73] Tania Li, "Beyond "the State" and Failed Schemes", *American Anthropologist* 107, no. 3 (2005): 388.
[74] Ibid., 388.
[75] Hans-Martin Jaeger, 2013: 28.
[76] Moncef Kartas, "Post-conflict Peace-building – Is the Hegemony of the 'Good Governance' Discourse Depoliticising the Local?," *Lecture, Annual Conference of the Nordic International Studies Association (NISA)*, (Odense, Denmark, May 24, 2007).
[77] Michel Foucault, 2007.

liberal arts, commerce, manufacture and the mechanical arts, servants and laborers, the theater and games, and finally the care and discipline of the poor, as a considerable part of the public good".[78] However, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries shows us an important transformation of the police concept towards what we now identify as the repressive tool of the state in charge of maintaining law and order through the prevention of crime and disorder. This transformation involved the division of these police domains, which also occurred simultaneously with Adam Smith's move "away from the identification of police as a positive condition of the good polity whereas he begins to identify the constitutive feature of social life as self-seeking individuals operating through a civil society guided only by the hidden hand".[79] This separation of the liberal economic rationale from the state makes way for the 'natural process of the market' to take hold also thus distinguishing the state from civil society, a distinction that encouraged liberalism to define the market as the operating principle behind civil society.[80] This is the most evident in the discourse that emerges from the birth of the neoliberal economic system and its modification on human governance in broadly liberal democratic societies.[81] In order to sustain these practices, effective order becomes the matter of police in which free markets are dependent on.[82] Police are "endowed to watch, record, control, and regulate the legal activities of the market …using liberal mechanisms designed to protect against health threats, to manage and not to control populations, and to foster economic expansion… instead of acting as a punishing mechanism attempting to create docile citizens".[83] "In brief, the new governmentality, which in the seventeenth century thought it could be entirely invested in an exhaustive and unitary project

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[78] Ibid., 334.
[79] Mark Neocleous, 1998: 444-445.
[80] Ibid., 444-445.
[81] Gail Lewis, *Rethinking social policy*. (London: Open University in association with SAGE Publications, 2000): 234.
[82] Werner Bonefeld, 2013: 240.
[83] Andrew Johnson, "Foucault: The Politics of the Police." *Conference, Biennial Brennan Graduate Student Conference in Philosophy Justice: Foundations and Crisis*, (Chicago, March 26, 2010).

of police, now finds itself in a situation in which it has to refer to the economy as a domain of naturalness: it has to manage populations, it also has to organize a legal system of respect for freedoms, and finally it has to provide itself with an instrument of direct, but negative intervention, which is the police".[84]

Today the literature focuses mainly on how the "police concept … refer[s] to an institutionalized force for the prevention and detection of crime," in order to discuss this rising 'police' quality in UN administrative peacekeeping missions.[85] This more restricted and more 'negative' meaning of police is contrasted with the more interesting, broader and more 'positive' police centered on the welfare or happiness of the citizenry.[86] Marianna Valverde points out that the story of this decline of a totalizing police is made to coincide with the rise of liberal logics of rule.[87] However, as she and Mitchell Dean both concur,

> …one should not overplay the distinction between policing and liberal modalities of rule…[as] liberal forms of rule do not displace or do away with the earlier notion of police, but rather propose a new format of policing, and [t]his new form is a no less comprehensive police than the old one but rather it deploys techniques and agencies located within civil society rather than merely issuing regulations, and thus must rely on knowledge of economic, social and other processes outside the formal sphere of the state.[88]

It is in this effort where I claim that UN administrative missions contain the elements of the old policing rationale behind its practices. Jacques Ranciére's analysis of police that he developed from Foucault agreeably places the term of police in relation to techniques of governance.[89]

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[84] Michel Foucault, 2007: 354.
[85] Marina Caprini and Kari M. Osland, 2014.
[86] Daniel Pinéu, 2009.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Andrew Johnson, 2010: 26.

So from now on I will use the word *police* or *policing* as noun and adjective in this broader sense that is also 'neutral,' nonperjorative. I do not, however, identify the police with what is termed the 'state apparatus.' The notion of a state apparatus is in fact bound up with the presupposition of an opposition between State and society in which the state is portrayed as a machine, a 'cold monster' imposing its rigid order on the life of society… The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise… Policing is not so much the *'disciplining'* [my emphasis] of bodies as a rule governing their appearing, a configuration of *occupations* and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed.[90]

The concept of police in this governmentality approach "allows for a much broader understanding of policing as a liberal relation of power, and as a modality of rule".[91] Police becomes the "mode of conducting conduct; police deals with living, and more than just living".[92] What we will see in chapters 3 and 4 is the shift of administrative practices from the actual enforcement of public order towards techniques of technical assistance. The latter then seeks to mobilize local populations so that they actively participate in the creation of their own governance.

2.2.1. Peace as Law and Order

The Treaty of Westphalia 1648 and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 are examples where European leaders came together to devise a plan for peace on the continent that ultimately created a knowledge or expertise for 'peace' or 'conflict management'. The peace devised by these events was symbolic in that peace was made in the minds of European powers creating what is now considered the dominant concept of peace – the liberal peace. As Foucault thoroughly demonstrates in his lectures,[93] he describes "police as the purely domestic ordering of the kingdom", but also references that "police is not a strictly domestic

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[90] Ibid., 26.
[91] Daniel Pinéu, 2009: 73.
[92] Andrew Johnson, 2010: 26.
[93] See chapters 12 & 13 in Michel Foucault, *Security, territory, population: lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.).

governmentality".[94] It is in the "European equilibrium of states established by the Treaty of Westphalia where Foucault argues we can see police in action".[95] This idea of a European balance of power between states in the international dimension of police he entitled as a, "triple relationship between the system of European balance and police".[96] In this relationship there consists three dimensions:

> The first dimension is morphological: (...) the problem of European equilibrium has as its main objective the maintenance of a balance despite the growth of the state (...), the problem of the police is how to ensure the maximum growth of the state's forces while maintaining good internal order. Foucault calls the second relation between police and European balance of power a relation of conditioning, and elaborates: One can only effectively maintain the balance and equilibrium in Europe insofar as each state has a good police that allows it to develop its own forces...Consequently one must see to it that there is good police, even in other states. European equilibrium begins to function as a sort of interstate police or as right. European equilibrium gives the set of states the right to see to it that there is good police in each state. Finally, Foucault suggests, there is an 'instrumental' relationship, since both the science and practice of early modern police and the balance of power relied on detailed, actionable knowledge of each state's growth and capabilities, and therefore both relied on (indeed were instrumental to the development of) statistics.[97]

"This quasiinternational law doctrine justifying intervention in what were not yet called failed states was formalized, Foucault claims, in the 1815 Treaty of Vienna".[98] "This establishes that the police of other states is a legitimate object of concern for a state's foreign policy, lest it breed 'imbalance' or disorder in the society of states...which would then denote that the exercise of 'good police' is predicated upon, and dependent on, a series of technical knowledge (such as statistics), which are themselves a constitutive technology of rule".[99] This turn towards the focus on the condition of states' internal forces becomes a rationale for the internationalization of policing and thus administrative missions. The use and rationale of

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[94] Mariana Valverde, "Genealogies of European states: Foucauldian reflections," *Economy and Society* 36, no. 1 (2007): 171.
[95] Ibid., 171.
[96] Daniel Pinéu, 2009: 86.
[97] Ibid., 86.
[98] Mariana Valverde, 2007: 171.
[99] Daniel Pinéu, 2009: 87.

domestic policing techniques can be seen on the supranational level of how states are categorized in regards to their ability to govern. It is in this idea that the UN could perform 'policing' activities in its quest to maintain global order that "Lestor Pearson with the support of UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, proposed peacekeeping as a solution to the Suez crisis in 1956".[100]

2.2.2. Peace as Good Governance

The rationalities for governance in terms of administrative peacekeeping missions post cold war "mirror the good governance discourse and the securitization of underdevelopment".[101] These rationalities are heavily based on the 1994 Agenda for Peace reiterating the notion that "without development there is no prospect for lasting peace".[102] The agenda for peace promoted by UN Secretary – General Boutros-Ghali linked "individual human rights, a nation's financial welfare and other internal conditions …with [the] external spheres of international jurisdiction, particularly peace and security".[103] It also symbolizes a big step away from how the UN was perceived during the cold war as 'inactive' or 'neutral' since the agenda also "notes that 'democracy is necessary for peace'… [and] that the precondition for democratization is the existence of a state with the capacity to create the conditions for democratization".[104] However, "the UN does not impose democracy, but provides technical assistance either in form of development as good governance, or in the form of peace and state-building as good governance".[105] Technical assistance and various development rhetoric display neoliberal rationales emphasizing how the "global markets and the new prominences of international institutions can be seen as a response to the problem of how to govern the world when even the poorest are no longer dependents of subjects but

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[100] Barry J. Ryan, "Reasonable force: the emergence of global policing power," *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 2 (2013): 449.
[101] Moncef Kartas, 2004.
[102] Ibid., 11.
[103] Jarat Chopra, 1999: 22.
[104] Moncef Kartas, 2004: 12.
[105] Ibid., 12.

'citizens' of formally independent states".[106] Under neoliberalism, 'good governance' offers a means of intervention based on statistics and calculation that are used to compared development and growth to that of higher developed societies, thus concealing rationales we see in the old policing concept.[107] This often involves expert knowledge being used to remedy the situation in the construction of peace creating space for society to be governed.[108] "These practices and discourses have rapidly become a normalized part of our understanding of the liberal peace".[109]

2.3. Conclusion

Studying UN administrative peacekeeping missions with a 'policing' lens shows continuity of the old policing concept alongside liberal technologies that are employed in the post cold war period. What we will see in the following two chapters are the cases, which will examine the discourse, and rationalities that support this continuity while also showing discontinuity. Policing of populations is not just seen at the domestic level, but also at the international level through the technologies and rationales that are transmitted by these missions. Hence, we find liberal governmentality techniques at the supranational level. By uncovering these techniques of practice in administrative peacekeeping missions, we can move away from the problem-solving framework towards a more critical approach in how we apply such practices that have been deemed 'essential' in the peace or state building processes. In the following two chapters, both missions of UNTEA and UNTAC will be examined in special regards to the administrative mandate and practices that ensue.

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[106] William Walters and Wendy Larner, 2004: 9.
[107] Ibid., 9.
[108] Oliver P. Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace*. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 18.
[109] Oliver P. Richmond, "Critical Research Agendas for Peace: The Missing Link in the Study of International Relations," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 32, no. 2 (2007a): 264.

3. UNTEA

3.1. Introduction

UNTEA represents the first UN administrative peacekeeping mission that nonetheless took place in the midst of the cold war. Against what was commonly thought, the cold war period did not prevent the mission from becoming established nor its wide reaching administrative mandate. Authors on UN administrative missions speak of UNTEA regarding its attributes and categorization within peace operations[110] while others have written on the UN's political involvement[111] in the mission or in some cases on its anomaly[112] within the time period of 'traditional' peacekeeping missions. It is within this case study where I take a different approach and examine how the rationales of administrative missions have come about in a time where the governance of another territory is seen as an attempt of colonialization or neocolonialization. This mission is crucial in how we understand the governance practices of UN administration missions and how it can be conceptualized in terms of containing traces of an 'old policing rationale'. This chapter will first present a historical background with the contextualization of the mission's mandate, and then examine several unpublished UN documents regarding the UNTEA mission. Through these documents, we can see how the mission contains rationalities of the original concept of the old police, a concern with 'the maintenance of good order within the state' with such attentiveness to the 'happiness, comfort, welfare, and hygiene' of the state.[113] Such acts like providing the West Papuans Police Service with khaki uniforms in an effort to 'improve their appearance and raise their morale' show such practices behind this rationale.[114] The concern

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[110] Simon Chesterman, 2005; Carsten Stahn, 2008.

[111] John Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969 the anatomy of betrayal*. (London: Routledge, 2003).

[112] Jarat Chopra, 1999: 44.

[113] Barry J. Ryan, 2013: 436.

[114] United Nations Archive. S-0682 Subject Files of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West Irian (UNTEA) 1962-1963. Box S-0682-0001. Folder S-0682-0001-01

of good order and happiness of the state we will see is predominant in many of the governmental practices employed by UNTEA.

The old police concept as elaborated in the theoretical framework, reflects Adam Smith's work in his *Lectures on Jurisprudence* before his turn to writing the *Wealth of Nations*, describing "the main task of government as 'promoting the opulence of the state', defined as police: 'whatever regulations are made with respect to the trade, commerce, agriculture, manufactures of the country are considered belonging to the police'".[115] Furthermore, Smith states "it is the proper running of the market – the cheapness and supply of commodities – that is the most important branch of police".[116] It is this concept of police that is regarded as positive in the respect that it is thought to "make a contribution regarding the best form of police – the promotion of cheapness and plenty".[117] This is where the practices of UNTEA, for example, are concerned with producing a sufficient number of individuals for the work place. These documents show that this task is precisely calculated to the very number of persons needed to 'carry out basic services'.

3.2. UNTEA Historical Background

UNTEA in WNG[118] from 1962 to 1963 is the first administrative peacekeeping mission of its kind that the UN had embarked on. An agreement was made by both the Netherlands and Indonesia regarding the transfer of authority over WNG to Indonesia who would then subsequently hold a vote for the Papuan people to determine whether or not they would like to be a part of Indonesia. This conflict is embedded in the colonization history of the island that is today called New Guinea. Today the island is divided into two parts, Indonesia (WNG) and Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea was a colonial territory of

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Administrative Services - Admin 000(3) - West New Guinea (Irian Barat) Police Service 1962-1962. "*Police Uniforms*". 13 December 1962.

[115] Mark Neocleous, 1998: 428.

[116] Ibid., 428-429.

[117] Ibid., 430.

[118] Also known as West Irian.

both Britain and Germany and did not achieve its independence until 1975. WNG along with

the territory of the Dutch East Indies was under Dutch rule, however, 1949 after a four-year

struggle that the Dutch East Indies gained their independence to then become recognized as

Indonesia. After gaining independence, the "UN involvement in WNG began with the

formation in 1949 of the UN Commission on Indonesia…establishing the 'Round Table

Conference' at The Hague, resulting in an agreement to transfer sovereignty of the Dutch

East Indies from the Dutch to an Indonesian federation led by President Sukarno".[119] The

territorial sovereignty of WNG still under Dutch rule was disputed by Indonesia claiming

territorial rights.[120]

As this issue remained unresolved, the tensions between the Netherlands and

Indonesia rose. Indonesia at several attempts tried and to no avail bring the issue to be

"resolved through resolutions by the UN General Assembly from 1954-1957".[121] An added

attempt proposed by Malaysia to establish a UN trust for WNG was quickly dismissed by

Indonesia, as this would result in the independence of WNG. These multiple attempts that

involved the self-determination of WNG was propagated by Indonesia as *uti possidetis

juris*[122] considering any move as an act of separatism. Indonesia had gained support from the

anti-colonial movement proclaiming, "WNG had been an inherent part of the Dutch East

Indies…therefore under *uti possidetis juris* it belonged to Indonesia".[123] As a stalemate

occurred, Indonesia took drastic steps and broke diplomatic relations with the Netherlands in

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[119] John Saltford, 2003: 5.
[120] See Armin von Bogdandy, *Max Planck yearbook of United Nations law*. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) and Satish Chandra and Mala Chandra, "Ch 11: United Nations Temporary Executive Authority and United Nations Security Force," In *International conflicts and peace making processs: role of the United Nations*. (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2006).
[121] Armin von Bogdandy, 2005: 100.
[122] "[UPJ is a] general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. It's obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power" for more legal depth see Cornell University Law School. "*uti possidetis juris*." LII / Legal Information Institute. http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/uti_possidetis_juris.
[123] John Saltford, 2003: 8.

1960 and began a military campaign into the territory.[124] International pressure led "the Dutch Foreign Minister Luns to submit a draft resolution to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1961, calling for a transfer of Dutch sovereignty to the Papuan people, entrusting the United Nations with the administration of the territory until the political development had progressed, and finally allowing a plebiscite to be carried out on the final status of WNG".[125] The US government was critical towards this plan, as many-worried Indonesia would quickly turn to the Soviets unless the object of self-determination for WNG was off the plate. The US expressed its dissatisfaction to the Netherlands, as they believed "that self-determination for the 'stone-age' Papuans was rather meaningless.[126] Jakarta responded with opposition to this proposal as it still meant that WNG would eventually secede and so gathered enough votes from communist and non-aligned states in the general assembly to vote against this.[127] Finally, the Dutch government dropped its pre-requisite of a Papuan right to self-determination and began negotiations towards the transferring of authority. The US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker acting as mediator under the auspices of the UN finalized the 'Bunker plan' stipulating a final agreement calling for "an interim administration of WNG by the United Nations prior to transferring sovereignty to Indonesia".[128] This agreement finalized in New York by both parties on 15 August 1962 also spelled out the termination of the mission as soon as possible after 1 May 1963.[129] All financial costs of the establishment of UNTEA were to be borne by the Netherlands and Indonesia, leavening the UN free of costs. "Before his departure from the territory on 28 September, the Netherlands Governor in a statement before the New Guinea Council

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[124] Armin von Bogdandy, 2005: 101.
[125] Ibid., 102.
[126] John Saltford, 2003: 11.
[127] Armin von Bogdandy, 2005.
[128] Ibid., 103.
[129] See for more information on the debate of the length of the mission, Satish Chandra and Mala Chandra, 2006: 245 and D. W. Bowett and G. P. Barton, *United Nations forces: a legal study*. (Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 2008): 259.

appealed to the population to give its support to the United Nations administration…[as it] would endeavor to ensure the welfare of the inhabitants".[130]

3.3. UNTEA Mandate

The final agreement would provide the UN Administrator with "full authority after 1 October 1962 to administer the territory, to maintain law and order, to protect the rights of the inhabitants and to ensure uninterrupted, normal services until 1 May 1963, when the administration of the territory was to be transferred to Indonesia".[131] The agreement included three phases for the UN in WNG: [132]

> 1) Providing military observers to supervise the cease-fire that went into effect on 18 August 1962;
> 2) Administering the territory of WNG through the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) with the help of a United Nations Security Force (UNSF), which was to maintain law and order;
> 3) Dispatching a representative of the Secretary – General to participate in the arrangements for the act of free choice and to observe this act.[133]

UNTEA was granted a broad range of powers: "to 'administer the territory' (article V); to appoint government officials and members of representative councils (articles IX and XXIII); to legislate for the territory, subject to certain qualifications (article XI); and to guarantee civil liberties and property rights (article XXII)".[134] However, the primary responsibility for UNTEA was 'to maintain internal law and order'[135] and this was in part made possible by the United Nations Security Force (UNSF) that ultimately became "the 'police arm' of UNTEA – whose responsibilities would range from ensuring the smooth implementation of UNTEA's

[130] United Nations, General Assembly, *Annual Report of the Secretary – General on the Work of the Organization 16 June 1962 – 15 June 1963*, Supplement No. 1 A/5501: 36.
[131] However, before this agreement would go into effect implementation of a cease-fire was necessary; Satish Chandra and Mala Chandra, 2006: 246.
[132] Armin von Bogdandy, 2005.
[133] Ibid., 104 – 105.
[134] See Security Council Resolution S/5169, 21 September 1962; Satish Chandra and Mala Chandra, 2006: 250; See also Jarat Chopra, *Peace Maintenance the Evolution of International Political Economy*. (London: Routledge, 1998).
[135] Jarat Chopra, 1998.

administrative mandate to supervising the buildup of a viable, local police force".[136] Netherlands' armed forces were to be repatriated as quickly as possible which would allow for the Papuan Volunteer Corps to be under the mandate of the UN Administrator as part of the UNSF "to maintain law and order and, at his discretion, use Indonesian armed forces".[137] However, "it was also agreed that the number of Indonesian troops in the territory would not exceed the strength of the Pakistan contingent of UNSF, except with the prior consent of the UNTEA administration".[138]

On an administrative level, "neither Dutch or Indonesian officials were to hold any of the top administrative positions during the seven-month transition period".[139] In this regard, many Dutch civil servants had decided to leave creating a vacuum of open positions that needed to be filled "to prevent a disruption of essential functions and services".[140] An emergency task force was created to help fill positions, but there was a shortage of adequately trained Papuans and left many of these positions to be filled by internationals and those from the Philippines.[141] UNTEA was able to maintain, "basic services and supplies for the local population" while also ensuring "the continuing functioning of the administration and judiciary of West Irian".[142] The end of the mission and subsequent handover of authority to Indonesia led to a six year rule until a 1968 referendum was held that would decide the future status of WNG.[143] Regional delegates and not the direct representation of the people of WNG decided unanimously that it would continue to be a part of Indonesia.

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[136] D. W. Bowett and G. P. Barton, 2008: 247.
[137] Satish Chandra and Mala Chandra, 2006: 247.
[138] Ibid., 250.
[139] Ibid., 249.
[140] Ibid., 249.
[141] D. W. Bowett and G. P. Barton, 2008.
[142] Carsten Stahn, 2008: 250.
[143] D. W. Bowett and G. P. Barton, 2008.

3.4. Enabling context of old policing rationalities

The principle of maintaining the internal order and increasing states' wealth goes back to the idea of 'peace as law and order' where the European equilibrium is concerned with the growth of a state's internal forces based on maintaining international peace and security. In order to achieve this, the 'European standard' is thought of as the best way for the 'proper' administration to attract wealth. Tania Li, references James C. Scott who argues that although "people can never be entirely blank, the act of resettling farmers from their lands, communities, kin, and traditions can radically disorient them and make them more vulnerable to official command".[144] Although the Papuans did not relocate, their administrative structure was left unoccupied after the Dutch had left – also the mandate specifically did not allow Dutch nationals top administrative positions – entailing UNTEA with the role similarly described by Scott to "construct new landscapes on a blank slate so that everything can be designed and implemented without reference to what went before".[145] This also goes hand in hand with the widely held belief at the time that there was a "need to bring back the people of the interior into the process of national development as they are considered for the most part, to be still living in the Stone Age".[146]

The practices that took hold in this mission reflect older rationalities of 'police' that have been transferred to the administering of governance. Administration is connected with the centralization of authority and as more power is being delegated in the center "the weaker it [the peripheral] becomes and the greater the need for bureaucracy, as a rule of organization generally, to ensure effective control of the area".[147] Authority becomes institutionalized over the peripheral "by maintaining order through a military, upholding law through courts,

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[144] Tania Li, 2005: 391.
[145] Ibid., 391.
[146] United Nations, General Assembly, *Eighteenth Session, 1219th Plenary Meeting at 3 p.m.,* (27 September 1963): 9.
[147] Jarat Chopra, 1998: 38.

managing an economy through finance structures, and implementing its will through executive mechanisms".[148] Much rooted in the colonization and decolonization periods of concern "with the centralized control of territory, one in the name of a foreign sovereign and the other on behalf of the local population…[became] …not a dispute about authority meaning control by the few over the many, only about whether the few were democratically representative or autocratically not".[149] This allowed for those particular few to be entrusted "with the administration of League of Nations mandates or UN trust territories in their transition to independence" thus leaving an uncontested gap of how territories would be administered.[150] As the UN began to assume the functions of local administration, a "particularly twentieth century development, it became the first time administrative tasks would be carried out not in the name of a single sovereign or emperor, but by a number of nations not in the name of any one".[151] However, the UN "could not be immune from this fact of authority, not only because they were composed of states based on this logic, but because of the nature of authority they tried to institute or underwrite".[152] The UN sought to be more 'collective' than its predecessor, the League of Nations, but although critical of its colonial policies, the experience of colonial administration was sought in order to be truly effective in international administration especially since "the decolonizing powers… tended not to adequately train for government service the peoples they administered".[153] Thus, such rationales as 'progress', change for the 'betterment' or 'primitive to civilized', seen in the rationale of European colonizers, are transferred onto the administration of territories by international organizations that are meant to represent the interests of the international

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[148] Ibid., 38.
[149] Ibid., 38.
[150] Ibid., 38.
[151] Ibid., 38.
[152] Ibid., 38.
[153] Ibid., 42.

community as a whole.[154]

3.5. Enacting policing practices: Electricity and Water

The administration of the state in maintaining its basic infrastructure becomes key in this mission. UNTEA carefully recorded and monitored supplies as well as inspected to ensure consumers were paying for the appropriate usage of electricity and water supplies.[155] The management and collection of revenues represent old policing rationalities that are concerned with the maintenance of order and creation of splendor. Such practices entail the control and regulation of the very minute detail of individuals' lives including performing tasks on behalf of the household. Unlike neoliberal practices that use techniques to govern at a distance such as reforming the behavior of populations to be 'entrepreneurial' or 'efficient', this old policing rationale seeks to regulate and oversee "domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners; and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations".[156] It was the case that the transfer of authority caused many consumers to leave or move from their houses.[157] This authorized the Central Consumers' Administration (CCA) to act with discontinuing the electricity and water supplies in empty houses while at the same time ensuring "that water and electricity supplies are made to houses only where there is actually an occupant responsible for the payment of invoices".[158] It is here that we see UNTEA acting on behalf of the household, closely monitoring and making sure those who use these utilities

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[154] Ibid.
[155] United Nations Archive. S-0703 Subject Files of the Temporary Administrator of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA) 1959-1963. Box S-0703-0005. Folder S-0703-0005 No. 8-1 Audit 1962-1963. "*Central Consumers' Administration (CCA) – Hollandia*". 9 February 1963.
[156] Mark Neocleous, 1998: 431.
[157] United Nations Archive. S-0703 Subject Files of the Temporary Administrator of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA) 1959-1963. Box S-0703-0005. Folder S-0703-0005 No. 8-1 Audit 1962-1963. "*Central Consumers' Administration (CCA) – Hollandia*". 9 February 1963.
[158] Ibid.

are to pay for their usage. These actions demonstrate how important payments for utilities were and the need to correct the actions of those who did not exemplify this 'proper' behavior.

3.6. Enacting policing practices: Education and Work

Another core aspect that shows this old policing rationale is the administration of education that considered the "problems connected with the adjustment of the educational system in WNG to Indonesian practices and with the replacement of Dutch teachers and the Dutch language in the schools by Indonesian teachers and the Indonesian language".[159] This direct involvement of directing education policies is wide reaching. In this regard, an advisory council on education was established to help assist "in the preparation of plans for education in WNG…. under the chairmanship of the Director of the Department of Cultural Affairs and comprising representatives of the Mission of the Republic of Indonesia during the UNTEA Period and representatives of religious mission organizations".[160] Tania Li argues that we must "look beyond 'the state' to the range of parties that attempt to govern".[161] It is in this make up of the Council that we see education governance being delegated by various members of the community including that of missionaries.[162] This Council was tasked with an exclusively consultative capacity, not causing any immediate decision for UNTEA, but remained "informed of decisions taken by UNTEA concerning education and likely to be pertinent to the council's deliberations".[163]

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[159] United Nations Archive. S-0701 Subject Files of the Deputy Administrator of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA) 1962-1963. Box S-0701-0003. Folder S-0701-0003- No. B-5 Cultural Affairs 1963-1963. *"Establishment of an Advisory Council on Education"*. 11 January 1963.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Tania Li, 2005: 384.
[162] United Nations Archive. S-0701 Subject Files of the Deputy Administrator of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA) 1962-1963. Box S-0701-0003. Folder S-0701-0003- No. B-5 Cultural Affairs 1963-1963. *"Establishment of an Advisory Council on Education"*. 11 January 1963.
[163] Ibid.

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Education was also used to adequately train the population to enter the workforce. The role of this practice for the old concept of police in Smith's lectures is compared to a pin factory where it is needed to "reduce crimes by helping sustain a state of prosperity".[164] This factory employs with a rationale that would keep the poor working rather than having them result to the idle work of crime and disorder.[165] In a document labeled 'training' listed a boarding house with the capacity of approximately 225 young indigenous students and with an adjacent school.[166] These indigenous students who finished primary school were trained to be given skills that would enable them for the following positions: postal assistant, wireless and radio operator, radio technician, telephone tech, meteorological technician, diesel tech, powerhouse operator, mate costal operator, ships engineer coastal trade, sailor and engineer room aid.[167] These tasks nonetheless reflected the list of staff shortage positions that occurred due to the departure of the Dutch. This was regarded as one of the main problems at the time as positions concerning "diesel, electrical, radio and telephone engineers and technicians, air traffic control (ATC) officers, and supervisors for the main power stations" were needed.[168] It is in these practices that employment was being directed for the most suitable interest of society that we again see traces of this old police rationality – the maintenance of order and the increase of the states' wealth. A very huge difference in practices when contrasted to the neoliberal techniques such as the training workers to become 'entrepreneurial', 'self-sufficient' and 'independent' that we will see more of in the UNTAC mission. Skills needed

[164] Mark Neocleous, 1998: 430.
[165] Ibid.
[166] United Nations Archive. S-0701 Subject Files of the Deputy Administrator of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA) 1962-1963. Box S-0701-0003. Folder S-0701-003- Np. B-9 Communication, Transport and Power 1962-1963. *"Training Section"*.
[167] Ibid.
[168] United Nations Archive. S-0701 Subject Files of the Deputy Administrator of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA) 1962-1963. Box S-0701-0003. Folder S-0701-003- No. B-9 Communication, Transport and Power 1962-1963. *"Department of Communications, Transport and Power Organization and Current Situation Report"*. 19 October 1962.

for these employment positions were essential for the maintenance of internal law and stability. This required UNTEA to ensure that these natives were being trained with skills that would be called upon in order to ensure that 'basic services are being maintained'.[169] These skills of expertise are built around the "mercantilist assumption that a surplus on the balance of trade is the main source of wealth".[170] It is these vocations that are targeted to generate wealth for the state and not for private gain.

3.7. Enacting policing practices: Road Safety

Regarding traffic and road safety, motor vehicle inspection is emphasized comprising of two main tasks: "to make inspections prescribed by law to ensure the safety of the road (autobuses, trucks, taxis) and to supervise all government owned motor vehicles (keeping record of each vehicle, inspections of maintenance and major repairs, submitting of proposal for each budget, ordering of new vehicles and giving of technical advice)".[171] The supervision of every vehicle including its maintenance is under UNTEA administration demonstrating practices of the old policing rationality contrary to the neoliberal practices seen in the UNTAC mission where the education of traffic and road regulations is promoted so that the population can govern itself. The welfare and 'happiness' of the state is seen in this supervision of transportation in Hollandia[172] as well as in regards to "scheduling services (including special busses for labor and school children) and hiring out for special occasions".[173] The welfare of the people is taken into consideration in terms of making sure

[169] Ibid.

[170] Mark Neocleous, 1998: 443.

[171] United Nations Archive. S-0701 Subject Files of the Deputy Administrator of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA) 1962-1963. Box S-0701-0003. Folder S-0701-003- No. B-9 Communication, Transport and Power 1962-1963. *"Department of Communications, Transport and Power Organization and Current Situation Report".* 19 October 1962.

[172] Former city name in West New Guinea.

[173] United Nations Archive. S-0701 Subject Files of the Deputy Administrator of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA) 1962-1963. Box S-0701-0003. Folder S-0701-003- No. B-9 Communication, Transport and Power 1962-1963. *"Department of Communications, Transport and Power Organization and Current Situation Report".*

there are enough inspectors who are nonetheless "experienced motor mechanics who have held senior positions as workshop managers in large garages" to be in charge of inspecting vehicles.[174] Overseeing the basic health and public safety of society is the concern of the police as with almost everything where human life is organized communally.[175]

3.8. Enacting policing practices: Food Supplies

Another aspect that the administration became involved with is the maintenance of an adequate number of food supplies in the territory.[176] Dealing with the procurement and distribution of food supplies involved a great deal of day-to-day administrative work.[177] This entailed a great handling of "financial transactions on a substantial scale that was brought under close supervision of the Director of Finance".[178] It is here that UNTEA named, the Director of Finance to also be the Director of the Department of Economic Affairs as it had "became necessary to designate a senior officer who could devote all his time to questions relating to agricultural programming for the territory".[179] It is here that we see what Foucault mentions in his example of the French grain trade.[180] The management of food supplies is policed to "calculate the amount of grain being produced in any given province and then to enforce regulations on the amount of grain produced to guard against famine and scarcity".[181] This rationale marks the old police rationale as having both the interest of society and the state as one. Without a degree of regulation, the prosperity of the state would be thought of as in jeopardy.

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[174] Ibid.
[175] Mark Neocleous, 1998.
[176] United Nations Archive. S-0701 Subject Files of the Deputy Administrator of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA) 1962-1963. Box S-0701-0001. Folder S-0701-0001 No. B-1 Economic Affairs – General 1962-1963. *Department of Economic Affairs – Administrative Re-arrangements*. 9 January 1963.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Andrew Johnson, 2010.
[181] Ibid., 12.

3.9. Conclusion

The range of activities expressed here represents "a core aspect of policing in its broad ambition – the desire to regulate all manner of what appear to us quite heterogeneous things and activities".[182] UNTEA had managed to become the intermediary in the creation of a stable order that would be handed to the Papuans and ultimately the Indonesians. Like Foucault's description of the police during the *Ancient Regime*,[183] we observe a wide range of activities that UNTEA sought to direct while also taking care of the 'well-being' and 'happiness' of the people. Such tactics "of education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation, encouragement in fields such as public schooling, health, and rural development"[184] employ a governance of control in the form of expertise that is meant to 'uplift' and 'improve' the population The following chapter will describe the UNTAC mission and how we see a change of practices in regards to 'policing that most reflect the rise of neoliberalism'. It is in this period where it is no longer acceptable to directly manage the supplies of food, for it is the 'system of natural liberty' that is to be favored.[185]

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[182] Jan Bachmann, 2014: 121.
[183] Andrew Johnson, 2010.
[184] Tania Li, 2005: 386.
[185] Mark Neocleous, 1999: 443.

4. UNTAC

4.1. Introduction

Entering the post cold period, we see a change in traditional forms of peacekeeping, which is widely highlighted in literature as an aspect of the change in the bipolar international structure.[186] We also see the reappearance of administrative missions along with an increase in its number, which has also been attributed to the change of the bipolar structure. However, it will be shown that UNTAC displays continuity of its predecessor mission, UNTEA, in that it contains similar elements of the 'old policing rationale', but in this case, with a difference in its tactics and practices that coincide with the "rise and institutionalization of liberalism as a way of life".[187] The rationale of the old concept of police is still very much present, but acts through the various liberal practices within the administrative governance of UNTAC. It is in this chapter where these rationales and practices will be highlighted amongst the dominant discourse of liberal governance. The idea and practice of 'policing' according to the old concept would no longer be regulated by "weighing and measuring, inspecting buildings, administering the minute details of an individual's life, but instead by … monitoring and securing freedom by promoting and carrying out such activities that would activate self-responsibility, self-determinism and freedom".[188] The welfare and state centric practices that dominated the 'old policing' system is no longer seen as positive and categorized as the wrong type of government. So as we saw in UNTEA the push of laborers towards a vocation meant to prosper the state is now seen as an obstruction to the free flow of labor. However as "Foucault notes, with the transitional governmentality of the *e´conomistes*, we are still in the realm of *raison d'Etat*".[189] This could

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[186] See Roland Paris, 2004; Simon Chesterman, 2005; Stephen Campbell, 2011
[187] Barry J. Ryan, 2011: 1.
[188] Ibid., 5.
[189] Hans-Martin Jaeger, "Governmentality's (missing) international dimension and the promiscuity of

be seen in the refocused efforts made by UNTAC towards molding the work force to the values of 'productivity' and 'individuality'. Consequently, these workers are set to think of their labor as their own individual worth, whereas the rationale behind these liberal tactics is to create a more efficient and orderly government that can prosper.

4.2. UNTAC Historical Background

The end of the cold war saw a spark in the number of UN peacekeeping missions that not only did not look like the 'traditional' missions of the past, but were also of an all encompassing and intrusive nature. UNTAC marked the largest mission of its kind at the time and was also the first administrative mission in the post cold war period since its predecessor UNTEA. UNTAC helped managed to bring a peace process to Cambodia in a country that had seen over 22 years of fighting. This conflict first involving an invasion by Vietnam began to wane as the Soviet influence on Vietnam started to retreat and a general need to return back to international normalcy. As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) praised Vietnam's retreat, however there still remained another struggle within Cambodia. The four main factions inside Cambodia – the 'State of Cambodia' (SOC) in Phnom Penh, led by prime minister Hun Sen; the Khmer Rouge (KR), led by Khieu Samphan (with Pol Pot in the background); the *Front Uni National pur une Camodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif* (FUNCINPEC)[190], a royalist party led by Prince Sihanouk's son, Prince Ranariddh; and the Khmer People's National Liberal Front (KPNLF), a republican non-Communist group[191]– could not agree on any settlement that involved a decrease of their influence. After countless negotiations a political settlement was finally made in Paris of October 1991 entailing provisions in the 'Paris Peace Accords'.

German neoliberalism," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 16. (2013): 33.

[190] The translation in English is as follows: 'National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia'.

[191] Robert B. Oakley, *Policing the new world disorder peace operations and public security*. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998): 70.

The Paris Peace Accords entailed a number of agreed upon elements including: "a cease-fire; the basic withdrawal of foreign forces; the cessation of outside military assistance; the voluntary repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; the creation of a transitional administration; the holding of internationally supervised elections leading to the formation of a new government; guarantees of Cambodia's neutrality, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and international support for the country's rehabilitation and reconstruction".[192] However, power sharing amongst the factions still remained a critical and highly debated issue. The UN's role in managing this transition "offered a means of uniting the factions on the principle that transitional oversight would be performed impartially and not be in the hands of any Khmer entity".[193] An agreement was finally made "to form a quadripartite body – the Supreme National Council (SNC) – that would embody Cambodian sovereignty and represent the country during the transition. The SNC would have 12 members, six from SOC and two apiece from the other three factions, with Sihanouk as chairman and its 13th member".[194]

4.3. UNTAC Mission

The Paris Accords authorized the establishment of UNTAC for a period not to exceed 18 months and conferred upon UNTAC 'all powers necessary to ensure implementation' of the comprehensive settlement.[195] This mission went far beyond any other mission at the time to include tasks "institution-building and social reconstruction as integral parts of peace-building 'package' designed to secure an end to armed conflict, and a transition to genuine democracy".[196] However, before development and proper social reconstruction begins, an

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[192] Ibid., 70 – 71.
[193] Ibid., 71.
[194] Ibid., 71.
[195] Ibid., 73.
[196] Nassrine Azimi, *The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): debriefing and lessons: report and recommendations of the international conference, Singapore, August 1994.* (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995): 4.

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effort towards democracy was emphasized, as "one of the primary responsibilities of UNTAC was to establish a neutral political environment, conducive to the holding of free and fair general elections".[197] This required UNTAC to ensure impartiality by the adequate training of personnel and through relevant administrative structures.[198]

The UNTAC mandate also saw that the "police served a strictly monitoring mandate"[199] as "the Agreements clearly stipulated that responsibility for the management of local police forces remained with the Cambodian parties".[200] However, "UNTAC's 3,600-person Civil Police Component was charged with ensuring that law and order be maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms be fully protected throughout Cambodia".[201] These tasks included six components – "electoral, civil administration, human rights, repatriation, rehabilitation and civilian police".[202] The election component being the main task of UNTAC was issued, "to help create a level political playing field, UNTAC was given major responsibilities in the area of civil administration…in order to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair elections, administrative agencies, bodies and officers which could directly influence the outcome of elections will be placed under direct UN supervision of control".[203] In this regard, UNTAC had direct control of five main areas of: foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security and information.[204]

> In defense matters, UNTAC was to scrutinize the administrative structures of the military as well as military expenditures. In finance, UNTAC was to examine fiscal policies and allocation of funds, and wage policies. In foreign affairs,

[197] Ibid., 7.
[198] Ibid., 7.
[199] Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping and related stability operations*. (New York: Novinka, 2005): 65.
[200] Grant Curtis, *Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process*. (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1993): 13.
[201] Ibid., 13.
[202] Robert B. Oakley, 1998: 77.
[203] Grant Curtis, 1993: 13.
[204] Ibid., 13.

> UNTAC was to oversee the issuance of passports and visas, and foreign assistance disbursement and accountability. In information, UNTAC was to review printed and broadcast materials and to ensure fair access by all parties to means of information. In the public security domain, UNTAC's job was to access the public security procedures of police and other ministries influencing law and order and to examine laws and judicial decisions. To augment its operational oversight, a Civilian Police Component was established to supervise and control local civilian police.[205]

By obtaining this secure environment, it was thought, "electoral, civil administrative and other components would pave the way for Cambodia's political and economic reconstruction".[206]

UNTAC's support towards economic development in Cambodia was limited, as the Paris accords did not allow for the mission to benefit one particular faction over another by providing financial and technical cooperation.[207] However, support was given towards budgetary consolidation, which "involved a process of reducing the already inadequate public expenditure levels rather than increasing fiscal income or strengthening administrative capacity"[208] leaving many urban and rural social services to decline. Cambodia's rehabilitation process had committed many donors during the June 1992 Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRRC), however, many took the 'wait and see' approach until the establishment of a new government.[209] This exacerbated the already dire situation in regards to securing "financial resources to ensure the delivery of essential public services".[210]

Overall, the success of the mission in terms of the development in Cambodia stressed the "need for peace and for the creation of a neutral environment".[211] It wouldn't be until this

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[205] Robert B. Oakley, 1998: 78.
[206] Ibid., 80.
[207] Peter Utting, *Between Hope & Insecurity: The Social Consequences of the Cambodian Peace Process*. (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1994): 78.
[208] Ibid., 78.
[209] Grant Curtis, 1993.
[210] Ibid., 16.
[211] Peter Utting, 1994: 131.

'democratic peace' was achieved that the development process including long-term capital-intensive activities would take place.[212] Until then short term priorities needed in the social sector were left to NGOs and their programs towards the "production and service sectors which involve the majority of the Cambodian population: agriculture (including hydrology, fisheries, forestry), health, education and rural water supply…[assisting] …provincial, district and village level initiatives [aimed at] integrated community development and credit projects".[213] In conclusion, UNTAC did manage to reach its "primary objective of organizing and conducting free and fair elections in May 1993 … [as well as to provide] …for some 365,000 displaced Cambodians from the Thai border to be successfully repatriated, and for some 200,000 internally displaced persons to return to their villages".[214]

4.4. Governmentalization of administrative practices

Securing civil service payrolls became important to properly augment and manage so that it can be "maintained by the Cambodian administration following UNTAC's departure".[215] In this case traces of the old police rationality can be seen in regards to maintaining stability and order for the country, however, using different practices from that of UNTEA. No longer do we see an emphasis on focusing on the quantity of administrative servants or directing specific sectors to be managed to maintain law and order, but a move towards creating a 'more efficient government'.[216] Creating a more 'efficient' government in this mission required the consultations from experts who originally served on the UN/World Bank Rehabilitation team to come up with a report of recommendations.[217] These recommendations had strongly suggested a reduction of "the existing public service

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[212] Grant Curtis, 1993: 17.
[213] Peter Utting, 1994: 109.
[214] Nassrine Azimi, 1995: 5.
[215] Ibid.
[216] Ibid.
[217] Ibid.

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manpower requirements by more than a half" with high-level support.[218] This practice can be traced to the 'old policing' concern of the prevention crime and disorder as according to Adam Smith, "the condition of dependence experienced by many servants has a detrimental affect: if too many are employed by one household and economic conditions force that household to dispense with some of its servants then they are thrown into a situation which invites the criminal acts".[219]

UNTAC was specifically concerned in the respect that payments to civil servants were to be made on time as well as allotted the appropriate wage for their labor.[220] This reflects Adam Smith's discussion on the pin factory "which shifts from being one moment in the articulation of police power contributing to the wealth-producing capacities of a politically constituted social order to being a site of autonomous social relations – the independent factory employing independent wage-laborers within a *laissez faire* economy – which help contribute to the wealth of nations".[221] This shift is important as it stresses the individual wage laborers as being in control of their 'work' in a liberal economic system that relies of the 'efficiency' and 'productivity' of the laborer. This is a drastic change from the UNTEA mission where individual performance was not evaluated as contributing to the 'wealth of the state'. However, wage labor in this context is crucial here because it demonstrates the continuity of the 'old' police mentality as "both police science and political economy retained the same fundamental concern: with labor, poverty and the condition of the working class".[222] Liberalism's feat over the change of the 'police' concept to a more narrow

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[218] Ibid.
[219] Mark Neocleous, 1998: 429.
[220] United Nations Archive. AG-007 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992-1993) 1884-1996. Box S-0794-0028. Folder S-0794-0028-01 1/22.1 – Civil Administration – Part 1 1992 – 1992. "UNTAC Control of Budgetary Disbursements".
[221] Mark Neocleous, 1998: 444-445.
[222] Ibid., 444.

understanding only did just that, but did not completely rid police science from political economy.[223]

The idea that the appropriate labor should be allotted with the appropriate wage demonstrates the need to incentivize workers that their 'strong' work ethic will be rewarded. However, UNTAC expressed its limitations for the overall responsibility of budget management and instead implemented "financial controllers to all Provinces that would oversee each of the ministries" where then UNTAC would "intervene and audit outlays where it suspects some form of misdemeanor, misappropriation or misallocation has occurred".[224] However, financial controllers who would be "monitoring the allocation of money from the treasury to separate ministries"…couldn't be completely trusted to "ensure that the right person at the end of the line is paid, and that the correct payment due to him is made".[225] Such circumstances that would prove this to be true would be attributed "to the civil servants' absenteeism, inefficiency and ineffectiveness or any other forms of deviant behavior that should disqualify a person from receiving a salary".[226] These characteristics describe a work ethic that is incompatible with the overall objectives of the administrative structure and is thus targeted for "considerable improvement [towards]… closer adherence to a proper code of conduct".[227] The work ethic of those 'who do not turn up regularly to work, or spend only a very short time in the office' have been emphasized in UNTAC's task 'to provide the right administrative framework'.[228] A push to 'direct' civil servants towards a more proper way of behavior to meet the needs of the new administrative practices is emphasized here. This requires training civil servants within a "democratic multi-party

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[223] Ibid.
[224] United Nations Archive. AG-007 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992-1993) 1884-1996. Box S-0794-0028. Folder S-0794-0028-01 1/22.1 – Civil Administration – Part 1 1992 – 1992. "UNTAC Control of Budgetary Disbursements".
[225] Ibid.
[226] Ibid.
[227] Ibid.
[228] Ibid.

system of government [and the institution of] a proper code of conduct and rules of discipline to define conditions of employment and individual behavior".[229]

As a more complex economic structure requires more "skilled workers and professionals"[230] new improvements like the addition of a system of computerization gives "UNTAC the opportunity to demonstrate that the pay process could be carried out not only more efficiently but also with a greater amount of control than was previously exercised by the Cambodian authorities".[231] It is Adam Smith's connection of poverty and labor in the *Wealth of Nations* that "the active participation of the poor in the commerce of society helps preemptively any slide into indigence and crime. The active worker thus makes a contribution – indeed a major contribution – to the state of prosperity, a state arrived at independently of any but the most limited form of government".[232] In other words, these changes make managing from afar easier with these mechanisms that record and monitor. These reforms make it less possible for individuals to act arbitrarily when carrying out administrative tasks.[233] Eventually, it is thought that these reforms will provide greater capacity for the administration, which would then lead to greater economic development. These practices and reforms that experts devise meet the specific objectives of improvement experts have themselves defined, which positions them to direct how others should live.[234] The payroll process has been specifically designed to make individuals more accountable in their actions making it easier to "root out corruption, collusion, and waste".[235] Conforming to

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[229] Ibid.
[230] Caroline Hughes, *UNTAC in Cambodia: the impact on human rights*. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Indochina Programme, 1996): 73.
[231] United Nations Archive. AG-007 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992-1993) 1884-1996. Box S-0794-0028. Folder S-0794-0028-01 1/22.1 – Civil Administration – Part 1 1992 – 1992. "UNTAC Control of Budgetary Disbursements".
[232] Mark Neocleous, 1998: 446.
[233] United Nations Archive. AG-007 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992-1993) 1884-1996. Box S-0794-0028. Folder S-0794-0028-01 1/22.1 – Civil Administration – Part 1 1992 – 1992. "UNTAC Control of Budgetary Disbursements".
[234] Tania Li, 2005: 384-388.
[235] Ibid., 384.

these liberal behaviors and reforms is meant to be a choice in principle for civil servants. However, when examples of donors expressing conditions for funds – the implementation of 'controls' that "ensure that the money is clearly specified as going to those for whom it is intended and for those purchases for which it is identified" – then there is not really a choice.[236] This practice on behalf of the donors' wishes is the type of 'old policing' rationale present that is meant to coach populations towards an "orderly, modest, courteous and respectable behavior".[237]

4.5. Governance at a distance

Another sector in which practices contributing to the management of the population can be seen is the subject of the 'ways and means to improve the traffic situation in Cambodia'.[238] Here we see the securing of people in relation to a series of deaths that have occurred in traffic accidents.[239] The old concept of policing present in this empirical discussion shows the concern with the general welfare of the population. However, it is uneconomical to monitor every person in his or her own safety which is where this discussion presents us with how such governance practices would allow for these rationalities to 'govern at a difference'. However, to govern at a distance these practices have to be shaped to make them less contestable to the population. This is contrasted to the practices of the UNTEA mission where the population and vehicles were directly managed and governed in their individual actions such as mechanical maintenance. Traffic issues in this case were shaped to be "problems due to a lack of training and technical means for controlling traffic as well as to

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[236] United Nations Archive. AG-007 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992-1993) 1884-1996. Box S-0794-0028. Folder S-0794-0028-01 1/22.1 – Civil Administration – Part 1 1992 – 1992. "UNTAC Control of Budgetary Disbursements".
[237] Jan Bachmann, 2014: 121.
[238] United Nations Archive. S-0795 Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General 1991-1993. Box S-0795-0018. Folder S-0795-0018-01 2/3.19 – Civil Administration – Traffic 1992 – 1993. "*Ways and means to improve the traffic situation in Cambodia*". 28 September 1992.
[239] Ibid.

the poor quality of roads and the dramatic increase in cars and motorcycles".[240] This caused for the establishment of a working group "at the expert level to deal with the traffic situation".[241] A technical expert from Malaysia was agreed to by UNTAC to provide advice primarily partly because it was emphasized that traffic laws and problems should be looked at through 'Cambodian eyes' since 'European ideas were not workable there'.[242] The importation of Western ideas was noted as not being an effective means of governance as it contained remnants of a colonial past. It was noted that traffic rules and laws based on a non-European perspective were needed to make it more objective and locally based, but it was still acknowledged that the same standardization of that of Western frameworks were still used.[243] This awareness "that the underlying mental, political, and economic preconditions of the Western industrial economy were absent and could not be imported or created rapidly" required instead not the development of "capital, technology and resources, but rather a spirit of ordering, taking precautions, combining, calculating, entrepreneurialism, human leadership and free creativity, civic-mindedness, a sense of responsibility, work ethic, reliability, punctuality, a drive to save and produce, and a bourgeois middle class".[244] This instance portrays the act of 'rendering technical' as experts are called upon that would have "the capacity to diagnose deficiencies in others, and those who are subject to expert direction".[245]

The technical working group came up with 'solutions' that could be implemented all over the country.[246] Solutions included, "a television program on traffic that would educate

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[240] Ibid.
[241] Ibid.
[242] Ibid.
[243] Ibid.
[244] Hans-Martin Jaeger, 2013: 47.
[245] Tania Li, 2005: 384.
[246] United Nations Archive. S-0795 Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General 1991-1993. Box S-0795-0018. Folder S-0795-0018-01 2/3.19 – Civil Administration – Traffic 1992 – 1993. "*Ways and means to improve the traffic situation in Cambodia*". 28 September 1992.

people in general as well as leaflets and small posters that were to be made in a way that people can understand from the pictures as most of the Cambodians would not be able to read".[247] Educating people to take their 'road' safety as their responsibility acts to provide each person with agency to prevent their own injuries or deaths thereby saving many resources in monitoring their every move. By creating these 'technical solutions' to "educate desires and configure habits, aspiration and beliefs", individuals do not need to be monitored in great detail since these solutions arranges "things so that people, following their own self-interest, will do as they ought".[248]

4.6. Surveillance of illiberal behavior by the liberal police

Policing encompasses a wide variety of individuals, and by no means excludes those that are 'casted' out of society. The management of prison administrators in their relation to how they manage those in prison is key to the projection of being a 'liberal' state. This sort of targeting of prison administration by UNTAC is important to the sustainability of liberal governmentality practices as "the promotion of liberty by the state" encompasses a variety of interventions in fields such as "market contracts and working conditions, as well as in housing, education and other areas of social policy".[249] "If we treat liberalism as committed to the maintenance and defense of individual liberty then the active involvement of prominent liberals in the practice of imperial rule must appear incomprehensive, at least in terms of their liberal commitments".[250] This aspect of the mission taking more of a direct and sovereign role is important for the promotion of liberal governmentality techniques and practices for this stresses the 'repressive' aspect of police that limits such illiberal behaviors, thus further leaving the liberal techniques depoliticized. "Liberalism must produce freedom

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[247] Ibid.
[248] Tania Li, *The will to improve: governmentality, development, and the practice of politics*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007): 5.
[249] Williams Walters and Wendy Larner, 2004: 29.
[250] Ibid., 29.

[to govern economically], but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats' as counterweights to freedom".[251] Thus, UNTAC sought to use technical methods to collect data on all detention institutions that included requests for information regarding the following:[252]

> 1) Number of prisons including 'unofficial' detention houses; their location and eventual name (call sign)
> 2) Number of prisoners by category if at all possible (men, women, young prisoners under 18 years of age);
> 3) Number of untried prisoners;
> 4) Number of prison guards;
> 5) Number of medical care facilities for prisoners;
> 6) Number of Doctor(s)/Nurse(s);
> 7) Number of bathing facilities(shower) and toilet to which prisoners have free access;
> 8) Food supply (how many meals/day, quality and quantity in gram);
> 9) Supervising authority of prisoners (military, police, etc.) and names of main responsibilities such as directors and their deputies.[253]

With this data being provided, UNTAC would then be able to understand the extent of the situation and be able to recommend ways to improve the detention centers. This record of information also acts a management tool for UNTAC to make sure that "the conditions of detention, treatment of prisoners and process of law and justice have been properly applied" with an even further call to "institutionalize these inspections as a regular activity of the provincial offices".[254] In order to improve and impose tactics, "calculation is central, because government requires that the 'right manner' be defined, distinct 'finalities' prioritized, and tactics finely tuned to be governed …[and] only then can specific intervention be devised".[255]

[251] Hans-Martin Jaeger, 2013: 35.
[252] United Nations Archive. S-0795 Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General 1991-1993. Box S-0795-0019. Folder S-0795-0019-01 2/3.22 – Civil Administration – Public Security 1992 – 1993. "Prisons Administration". 28 August 1992.
[253] Ibid.
[254] United Nations Archive. S-0795 Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General 1991-1993. Box S-0795-0019. Folder S-0795-0019-01 2/3.22 – Civil Administration – Public Security 1992 – 1993. "Regular Inspections of Provincial Prisons". 11 September 1992.
[255] Tania Li, 2007: 6.

After analyzing these reports UNTAC prepared a draft project "setting out the principles and practices governing the treatment of prisoners and the management of penal institutions".[256] These practices "bring certainty to the present and to the future… [and] embodies that from which we have emerged, the ignorant and less enlightened ways of achieving a sense of order inferior to the present state of order".[257] Similarly, this corresponds to one principle objective of UNTAC's human rights mandate: to prevent a return to the "policies and practices of the past".[258] This of course, requires "helping to rebuild (or build) these institutions and restoring a capacity for good governance" which would determine whether human rights are being safeguarded.[259]

4.7. Conclusion

Turning to the end of the cold war and seeing the rise of neoliberal policies, the conceptual aspect of the old police concentrating on the state's internal order is still present as they are presented through practices that are shielded under objectives such as 'good governance'. Such practices focus on molding individuals to be liberal subjects that should follow the techniques of good governance in order to help their own selves and reform to the 'proper way of living'.[260] Those that do not reform to this 'proper' way are thus subjected to various techniques and practices that are unbeknownst to them all to maintain a state of prosperity and order. As the case of Cambodia, a post – conflict state that was perceived to have no socio-economic or political system, was targeted for the installation of 'peace through governance'.[261] This type of language conceals the 'old police' to be recast in

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[256] United Nations Archive. S-0795 Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General 1991-1993. Box S-0795-0019. Folder S-0795-0019-01 2/3.22 – Civil Administration – Public Security 1992 – 1993. "Regular Inspections of Provincial Prisons". 11 September 1992.

[257] Barry J. Ryan, 2011: 2.

[258] United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, *Report of the International Symposium on Human Rights in Cambodia*, E/CN.4/1993/Add.1 (14 January 1993): 16.

[259] Caroline Hughes, 1996: 73.

[260] Barry J. Ryan, 2011: 4.

[261] Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, *Liberal peace transitions between statebuilding and peacebuilding*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009): 33.

technical terms that reflect the concern for the welfare of populations.[262] This language thus allows for technical solutions taken to be the cure for all cures allowing for the introduction of liberal governmentality techniques that can manage populations' behavior from afar. Those who introduce these techniques represent a wide range of actors that are not as directly visible. These are the "missionaries, social reformers, scientists, political activists, ethnographers, and other experts who routinely diagnose deficiencies in the population or some segment of it, and who propose calculated schemes of improvement".[263] Presently, these actors look more like "nongovernmental organizations, both national and transnational, which are involved in arenas such as public health, welfare, agricultural extension, conservation, human rights, good governance, and, increasingly, peace building – all elements of the hydra headed endeavor we have come to know as 'development".[264]

[262] Tania Li, 2005: 384.
[263] Ibid., 386.
[264] Ibid., 386.

Conclusion

The concept of police has seen many changes to which it is now seen regarded for its institutional property of belonging to the state made up with uniformed officials. However, the interest of this thesis was to locate the forgotten aspect of 'police' before it had seen this change in the administrative missions of UNTEA and UNTAC. It was the task to further explore how the 'old' policing rationale took root in the post cold era where we also see a rise in neoliberal governmentality. It was the break in the policing concept that allowed for this rationale to be concealed within the techniques of liberal governance that focused more on the individual than on the whole society. However, the techniques used by UNTAC demonstrate the use of the 'old' policing rationale that we also see first encountered in UNTEA. Civil society or the population in the UNTAC case are seen as separate agents that are capable of their own freedom particularly due to the conceptual change. The use of the old police concept to conceptualize the practices within liberalism sheds a new light on how we can view the ordering of society.

As we saw in the empirical chapter describing the practices of UNTEA, much of the administration focused on the realization of the maintenance of law and order while increasing the wealth of the state. These were by means of regulating a diverse set of sectors such as employment, education, electricity and food supplies. Regulatory measures used in UNTEA are considered by the neoliberalism rationale as destructive mechanisms in the creation of prosperity for the state. The end of the cold war we see a resurgence of administrative missions where practices reflect this neoliberal rationale. However, the same rationale of the old policing concept can still be seen behind many of these practices. It is instead rethought of in the *Wealth of Nations* that the "natural effort of every individual to

better his own condition is sufficiently 'capable of carrying on the society of wealth and prosperity".[265]

What has been explored here, describes the presence of the old policing rationalities that are used to maintain peace and law and order often seen in practices and processes "dubbed 'welfare' or 'management' rather than 'police'".[266] These rationalities are not presented how they were first used in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but are carried through by practices and discourses that are meant to 'protect the welfare of society' or assist in the promotion of 'good governance'. The birth of the UN and its administrative peacekeeping missions do not leave it uncontaminated from rationalities dating back to the European Equilibrium or colonialism. They are still present and take on different forms. It is with studying administrative practices through a policing lens that we are able to see the continuities and discontinuities of such governance practices in the international context.

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[265] Mark Neocleous, 1998: 442-443.
[266] Ibid., 427.

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