

MULTICULTURALISM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

POLITICS OF CULTURAL PLURALISM

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Abstract

The aim of the thesis work is to investigate liberal multiculturalism, argue for its plausibility in theory and practice. The scope of liberal multiculturalism is bounded by seven liberal impositions that are initiated to maintain a peaceful and diverse civil society. The paper assumes that these impositions are compatible with the liberal framework and multicultural aspirations of the countries.

The thesis confirms that there are certain dynamics of the civil society, human nature and attitude that must be considered when multicultural policies are to be created and introduced. In order to assess the applicability of the multiculturalism policies, the paper unfolds the most significant concern about diverse countries: multiculturalism erodes welfare state. Theoretical discussion and brief welfare review are rejecting this statement.

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Prologue

Feminism and multiculturalism have much in common, much more than I have ever thought. When people hear the word feminism, they immediately recall the cliché connected to feminists: you want equal treatment but you want men to hold the door for you. It seems controversial however it contains the solution itself. Difference-blind attitude creates androcentrism, while too much highlight on particularity violates non-discrimination, and leads to regression in the evolution of gender roles.

This parallel idea of feminism and multiculturalism gave me the missing link to my thesis, because I am woman and I am a native citizen in the country where I live. From feminist side, I belong to the disadvantageous group, but from multiculturalist side, I am part of the “hegemonic” culture. It does not mean that a man cannot form adequate opinion about feminism or a native person about migration, but their perception lacks a tiny, but crucial element: (self) identification with the ‘disadvantaged group’. My concern about my ability to write relevant paper about ethnicity and minority rights is a little released because of this feminist puzzle that helps me to widen my perspective.

Introduction

The aim of this thesis work is to give an overview of the liberal multiculturalism in Western Europe, investigate its limits, critiques and future possibilities.

The main question that the paper answers: What type of legitimate integrational impositions on newcomers a modern liberal democratic state can have in order to maintain a peaceful civil society while it fulfills its liberal duties and these impositions are compatible with the ethnic plurality of the given country?

The primary focus is on the immigration created ethnic plurality in the European Union, however the discussion is extended to the indigenous groups, national minorities, racial groups and ethnoreligious groups since they ethnically contribute to the plurality of the multicultural state.

Since the 1980s, dramatic inflow of various ethnic minorities generated dilemmas across Europe which challenged political decision makers and the current practices of liberal democratic politics. There are numerous problems that require solution in the present: religious extremists and movements, xenophobia, offensive attitude toward minorities, intolerance, social matrix of multicultural society, marginalization, economic segregation and claims of self-determination, for some examples. Mainly these are consequences of the post-Cold War mass immigration, and arrival of very new ethnic groups who stayed permanently. The national ethnicities and indigenous groups require slightly different treatment hence their legal status, but they are covered under the same umbrella term of multiculturalism.

Citizenship theory can no longer offer plausible and satisfactory concept to describe membership in a particular community. Meaning of citizenship got re-debated then the liberal democratic countries reinterpreted the cohesion of state ("ties that bind" by Kymlicka 1998), national values, morality and national identity. It was also a crucial criterion that liberal

values (liberty, equality, toleration, justice) must be accepted universally. Multiculturalism marries liberal values with group differentiated rights and exemptions in order to ensure justice. This contradictory nature must be adopted in the policy making and accept that some theories' boundaries get rewritten in practice.

The paper firstly introduces multiculturalism as a theory, then liberal multiculturalism; the most debated issue and subject of current discussion as well. In the next chapter, multiculturalism is analyzed from the perspective of its main critiques which reveal maladies of the theory and practice and initiate changes.

The following section aims to discuss civil society as the most basic formation of persons and confer its main features, tendencies. Furthermore, attitude of people toward each other, their partiality and sense of justice in multicultural environment are thoroughly analyzed in order to understand why certain level of integration is necessary for the peaceful society. It demands the deliberating of a civil society and members that have rules which are rigid and cannot be altered by any multicultural influence.

In the final section, I turn to real cases in welfare states where liberal multiculturalism faced objections or at least suffer misinterpretation. Multiculturalism Policy Index offers a scale which measures policies' multicultural aspirations; therefore systematic retreat from multiculturalism can be rejected. Rather these policies are strengthened and compatible with the civic integration. This analysis helps to understand how different structures of minorities and different norms of civil societies demand diverse policy patterns. It is more than just simple integration task: it is a question of partiality, unity, order of nation, justice, traditions, values, inclusiveness etc.

As a conclusive suggestion, based on considered possibilities, I compare a welfare/workfare dilemma that is neither a brand new issue in contemporary philosophy and politics.

My main effort has been to merge political philosophy's theoretical concepts about liberalism with its execution in liberal democracies therefore use a proper language that translates theoretical frameworks into practical questions and problems. This field offers example when a theory works in practice that seemed to be incapable to implement, or vice versa.

The expected result of the thesis work is to identify or presume the level of integration that is required in a multicultural civil society without turning back to the old homogenizing (and according to me, unhumanizing) nation-building. I am convinced that societies, politics, markets are inherently pluralist (moreover multiculturalist) that cannot be erased by arbitrary political propaganda fuelled by fear and hostility. Multiculturalism has been universally misunderstood and stigmatized. It became a taboo. But in fact, it has evolved into a more complex, less politicized notion that works properly with civic integration within certain boundaries. If the pluralist states can adapt the new agenda of multicultural civic integration, that will eliminate offensive and prejudiced common attitude toward foreigners.

Liberal Impositions

As part of the introduction, I find it useful to list those liberal impositions that give pattern to this thesis: seemingly illiberal restrictions or requirements which preserve the preferably most liberal state form in multicultural environment.

It is a contradictory issue that must be clarified: impositions on newcomers in a liberal society. The hypothetical assumption is that it is necessary and unavoidable to impose certain requirements on foreigners in order to reduce their vulnerability, alienation and marginalization. Fulfillment of these impositions demonstrates their commitment toward the host country/ majority society therefore ensures their protection. From the host country's side these impositions are necessary and tolerable violations of their commitment to liberalism and liberal values.

The impositions are feasible requirements that anyone can fulfill regardless her/his natural endowments, capacities and abilities. Those people who are disabled or suffer other mental illness are always exemptions and belong to a distinct legal group. Furthermore, these impositions are primarily for migrants (newcomers); ethnic minorities, indigenous groups require merely different treatment. There is one crucial condition that must be satisfied in order to implement these requirements: state aid. Newcomers in a foreign environment with lack of networks and financial background cannot be expected to fulfill any of these criteria.

The first imposition is an already operating one: common language use. It is a practical requirement that does not need further verification. State must finance language education to everybody, but cannot ban the use of the mother language in private sphere. The dubious part is when a state must accept second national language and ensure the additional advantages with that language. Ability to speak the main language contributes to a two-sided integration but it does not automatically mean that the speaker will master a specific civic vocabulary. (Müller 2007, pp. 88)

The second imposition is also introduced in some countries (USA), namely the citizenship test. It expects some basic knowledge –explicitly, or implicitly- of the native history about its high culture. It might be helpful to face newcomers with specific confrontations of the way of life in that country. However it belongs to the Kymlickian liberal nationalism than to constitutional patriotism. (Müller 2007, pp. 90)

The third imposition is an intangible one: willingness to accommodate, integrate, peacefully cohabit, and interchange (Raz 1998). It serves the peace of community, and aims to benefit from multicultural structure. These nationalities carry inalienable values that enrich the meta-community if they contribute to it voluntarily. Successful partial integration carries less tangible, or quantitative elements like national past, Holocaust, colonialism etc. Understanding and relating to these legacies express their willingness to become part of the culture and society. Parallel the majority culture could also aspire to yield some crucial elements of the foreign cultures’ and create “entangled histories” which create more porous political histories. (Müller 2007, pp. 92)

The fourth condition of cohabitation is a rather misunderstood, normatively dependent concept; toleration. Group and individual liberty (practices and customs) should be within limits, which recognize the law. Toleration is a two-way imposition both on the host nation and the newcomers. Classic toleration is regarded as a “permission concept” (Frost 2007) that is based on a hierarchical society, where the inferior has permission from the superior to maintain its culture within strict boundaries. It is a faulty position in my opinion. Furthermore, toleration concept systematically ignores duties of toleration on the newcomers’ side. The third imposition connects here as the first mandatory step of toleration.

The fifth condition is acceptance of liberal values and political/constitutional essentials. Probably the most intangible impositions of all it is. Some extreme scholars suggest to acquire national virtues and sentiments, sense of belonging that are slightly saying non-sense and

unnecessary hence civic virtue cannot be coercively generated, only influenced. In a diverse society, liberalism is the only plausible framework within people can possibly achieve the greatest autonomy and self-realization. Therefore commitment toward liberal values and norms is a non-subjective intangible duty. However liberal values are deeply divisive within the majority society as well, therefore this imposition has risks and potential to misinterpretation.

The above discussed five impositions belong to the group of intangible, culture and value based requirements. These are the most debated and combatted issues. The following two are relatively less problematic.

My sixth imposition is the secular state that challenges the Islam and its non-secular state form. Primarily it is a legal challenge to harmonize group specific Muslim issues; however it has moral aspects that might require group-specific rights and exemptions.

The seventh imposition is: acceptance of constitution, laws and structure of democratic legal state. The question is what constitution is accepted, how acceptable it is, how liberal it is, and this goes to the laws too. Legal harmonization seems to be the most urgent and decisive direction because most of the current ethnic cases are solved on ad hoc, or swept under the rug as soon as possible reducing ethnic color in the case.

Undoubtedly, these impositions cannot be called liberal with whole heart. Their implementation will be more liberal in one state than in another, based on the structure of the civil societies. But I am convinced about their relevance and applicability (and some great examples prove my conviction).

Now, the paper's first section discusses multiculturalism, its liberal concerns and all attached concerns.

1. Clash of Cultures

In human history, people always made effort to explore the world, conquer territories, and spread their power with coercive tools to maintain their domination over the acquired territory. Ancient cultures left us more applicable heritage of human thinking than medieval times which was a bloody, dark period of human kind: value of human life was trivial, only virtues like martyrdom was praised, religion and politics together started wars under the glorious flag of God. The change in emphasizing reason instead of superstition, individualism instead of collectivism was outcome of the Enlightenment or a more expressive name, Age of Reason. Since the 17th century there is a continuous revolution in human thoughts, and it is not over yet. Enlightenment aimed to question *raison d'être* of mainly religious traditions and faith: human beings were defined in religious virtues that delimited individual fulfilment according to autonomous values or self-definition. Without in depth review of the Age of Reason, its triggering effect on social and cultural discourses is undoubtable, it is the 'ground zero' in terms of knowledge about human behavior and morality.

The central topic of the thesis is the migration and connected moral-ethnic issues, so broad picture about polarization of civilizations might lead us to the conflict point.

Samuel P. Huntington articulated five parts in his book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), which introduces the progress toward multipolar and multicivilizational global politics. First, after the Cold War, the world was multipolar, modernization was not connected to Western or non-Western societies. Second wave caused a power shift from West toward Asian civilizations, Islam increased its political influence meanwhile Western world reconsidered its own value. The third level brought the "civilization-based world order". Some politically, economically strong states emerged into leading position and the rest of the world joined them accordingly. Fourthly, Western world acquired power and confidence to combat differing cultures, Muslim and non-Muslim conflict

happens to be the tautest situation that is still an issue. The final, more or less current situation is the survival of the Western civilization and identity. “Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.” (Huntington 1996, pp. 20-21)

“The West and the Rest” (ibid., pp. 22) world order is itself the cause of war of civilization that is happening now, so Huntington’s 1996 prospects seem to be fruitless. This war is (mostly) weaponless, but it is represented in everyday discourses and daily politics. The cultural superiority of the West over the rest simultaneously forced its economic-political superiority that attracted millions of migrants who were seeking economic betterment. Also a grand part of the Western economies are built on foreign workforce since the times of slavery that assumes that it is not only the migrants’ fault that they ‘occupied’ the Western world. If we take a look at the map of the world, 8 main civilizations can be distinguished: Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist. (Huntington 1996, pp. 23, Map 1.3) The problem is that geographic origin of a person determines his economic position, opportunities in his life. If he was born in the developing world, he presumably will live on a certain quality of life, and the possibility of progressing is very unlikely unless he chooses migration. Even though there is a certain attempt of non-Western civilizations to resist Westernization¹, reduce their cultural, political influence while the West aims to have a word in every country’s home affairs, have influence on their culture. Globalization namely had a strong Westernization effect masquerading into integration and interconnectedness.

The inferior-superior position is not a new concept: slave-master relationship exists since people left the state of nature (according to Hobbes), but the cultural superiority brings new and necessary questions into the issue. Cultural conflicts draw new dividing line between people? Is it rather inter-cultural conflict or an intra-group tension? Does it involve rich-poor

¹ Globalization and Westernization can be overlapping concepts in this regard.

conflict? First of all, cultural superiority assumes material inequality: economic advantage on the superior side. Rich-poor confrontation therefore gets cultural color that is also true when different cultures live in the same territory, in the same country. Cultural conflict is an inter-cultural conflict that is constant within social groups. It creates the matrix of the multicultural conflict in civil society. Cultural features –race, religion – and other features like gender, sexual orientation add vertical groups, while class difference is the horizontal division.

In order to place the individual into its culture and civilization, an illustration of concentric circles gives appropriate visualization. The center is the self, then family, neighbors, local groups, fellow city dwellers, ethnic groups. There could be more circles, like historical, linguistic, gender and sexual identities. Each of them possesses an identity, a special view of life, and impacts on the individual's decisions regarding his life. In his book *The Home and the World*, Rabindranath Tagore phrases the concentric human existence as follows: "I am a Hindu first, and an Indian second. I am an upper-caste landlord first, and a Hindu second?" (Tagore 1916) So these groupings of a person's qualities are not in strict order, but individually estimated and valued order: a hierarchy or priority. Moreover, these circles are not even concentric. I might question whether they were concentric ever. The circles sometimes overlap, or have intersections, or do not meet at all: each and every individual has a unique circle of features. It does not assume necessarily inherent cultural conflict but it requires reconsideration of what we mean under the notions of culture, civilization, civil society, and identity.

The cultural conflict I suppose is happening in the Western world is one-sided and unequal. Let's assume that we accept the superior-inferior cultural position for the sake of simplicity, but what are the tools in the hands of inferior culture to maintain its existence, practice certain habits, and not to melt into the hegemonic culture? Joseph Nye distinguishes "hard power" and "soft power" tools. Superior culture possesses both: it has economic, military power to

force a sub-group to accept its ideology, and attractiveness to persuade about the same. (Nye 1990, pp. 180-181) Power and culture shows strong positive correlation because power expansion of a civilization involves the flourishing of its culture. “A universal civilization requires universal power.” (Huntington 1996, pp. 91) Exercising power means application of universal laws, rules, practices, policies within given territory that are derived from an inherited history of laws, ethos, moral obligations, and common values. Power therefore is derived from culture and vice versa: nourishing a civilization needs power (coercive -hard-power and soft power equally) otherwise external influences and attacks eliminate it.

The power-culture connection is equally applied to the superior and inferior culture, only the available tools and the scope of power differ. Inferior culture has only soft power to influence judgment, while the superior culture manifests economic/material success that testifies its superior position and maintenance.

One might rightfully ask then why do people migrate into Western countries if such an injustice can occur to them? Because there is a good chance that the “West and the Rest” terminology will be challenged.

From the 1930s we talk about The Great Divergence: 19% of the world population owns 66% of the total wealth. Their absolute advantage is attributed to geography but take a look at Germany which denies this assumption. Others attribute this advantage to national character, but North- and South-Korea are counter examples.²

What really matters in the West are its institutions and ideas: competition, scientific revolution, property rights, modern medicine, consumer society and work ethic are elements of the absolute advantage born under The Great Divergence. But the 21st century and the globalization reduced the cost of migration, lowered boundaries among cultures, people can

² Germany has been divided after the WWII, and its eastern bloc got the socialism. On the same geographic territory, two entirely distinct economies were developing parallel. North-and South-Korea has very similar national characters while the political order creates divergent societies and economies.

travel and communicate easily and quickly that means their cultural awareness is raising, they gain more *soft* and soon hard power to validate their human rights.

Those elements of absolute advantage are free and available; therefore 'Resterners' apply them very fast. Obviously the West has a responsibility in developing the Rest but it has serious self-interest to keep it under control (until the size of population makes it possible). We experience the time of Great Re-Convergence. (I summarized Niall Ferguson's TED Talk, The 6 killer apps of prosperity, from 2011 July)

This theory of re-convergence has two effects: one in the Rest where institutions create incentive to work therefore work ethic becomes pull factor to stay in the homeland. The second in the West, because economic convergence will be manifested in human rights and self-awareness: global economic redistribution will lead to cultural recognition.

It is optimist and hopefully feasible vision for the next decades.

2. Identity Politics and Multiculturalism

The second half of the 20th century triggered the rebirth of human life and values. Equality and justice became abstract but central aim of political movements which influenced the waves of economic/social politics. The suppressed, neglected groups could express their existence, demands and raise awareness of their real needs. Prudence was not strong enough objection anymore; LGBT groups, feminists, minority movements were on the table and identity politics absorbed these endeavors. Multiculturalism therefore was born from identity politics and undertook the ethnic related identity issues. In a broad sense, multiculturalism meant co-living of culturally different elements in one meta-community, but introducing the variable of culture closed out LGBT or feminist movements because they are not different in a classic cultural way. So, multiculturalism was fabricated out of identity politics for the sake of simplicity and clear distinction from other identities. This mutilation of the notion was supported by tacit contribution from both theoretical and practical side.

“Multiculturalism means- among other things- the coexistence within the same political society of a number of sizeable cultural groups wishing and in principle able to maintain their distinct identity.” (Raz 1998, pp. 197)

The notion of multiculturalism is an umbrella term to collect all moral and political claims regarding ethnic minority groups. Multiculturalist policies focus on ethnocultural groups as immigrants, national minorities, indigenous people, racial groups and ethnoreligious groups. My scope of study highlights immigrants and national minorities first, but all of them can be included under the umbrella of multiculturalism.

It is associated with the political realm: politics of recognition, of difference which aims to represent and protect marginalized groups. And it is also associated with a moral consideration about culture, value, language, and ethnicity.

The paper's aim is to argue for the liberal multiculturalism which accommodation in political and social context is a difficult, challenging task for Europe. Liberal democracies form contradictory opinions about political ideology of multiculturalism: it can be successful and offer solution for migration/integration problems or it failed already.

The point is that multiculturalism is a topic like feminism: full of stereotypes, false and incomplete information, lack of knowledge about the issue itself and lack of self-identification with its reality.

First of all, let me assess the reason why politics of difference must be applied instead of blind rules. I must state that difference blindness is inhuman and unnatural, that is why politics of difference serve human dignity the best and leaves space for identity. Dignity is an abstract, but not relative notion that is described individually, based on common sense of happiness, good life etc. Homogenization (thus difference blind rules) creates boundaries of dignity, determines good life and self-realization within homogeneous culture which seriously harms autonomy and individual self-fulfillment in my opinion although homogenizing is not inherently wrong. For some scholars, equal respect is realized if we act in a difference blind manner and focus on the similarities instead of differences. Though I support similarities and universal values but blindness melts people into one homogeneous mass that negates identity. Further that set of blind rules is simply reflection of a hegemonic culture's rules. So to sum up, majority forces minority to assimilate into an existing so-called neutral mold. This attack is cruel because liberal democracies tend to propagate that they apply at least some difference-blind principles, neutral norms. It turns out that it is bare case of "particularism masquerading as the universal." (Taylor 1992, pp. 42-44)

Classical liberalism must be reconsidered and extended in many directions; however I suppose liberal democracy is the right playing field of difference politics and the only plausible perspective for non-liberal democracies.

Balanced reciprocity satisfies principles of equality, and it carries those features that are necessary in current Western states. Reciprocity claims that everybody depends on everyone else, just as a matrix of human networks on interrelated social and economic levels. The fact that Western welfare states' economies are built on foreign work force (partially) underpins the reciprocity claim. It assumes economic/material dependence and cultural/social dependence where every group (culture) contains equal values and have right to preserve its equal position within the territory of that country. It can be extended to non-territorial autonomy that is more than recognition and I have serious doubts about its justness. Atomizing a society and its collective goals weaken the civility which the society as voluntary association has been created for. A just, liberal society absorbs different models of life, does not make a judgment but suggests an optimal solution for good life. Ultimate liberal traditions –right to life, liberty, free speech, free practice of religion- cannot be harmed but are distinguished from privileges that are important but can be restricted for the sake of common good or an absolute goal. (ibid., pp. 58-59)

Here I suggest clarifying that liberal goals of a society exist parallel with illiberal groups within the community, and illiberal actions for the sake of protection, liberty, equality, prosperity or justice. My aim is not to justify illiberal policies or excuse politician who camouflage their hostile, discriminatory politics into “group differentiated rights”. But liberal multiculturalism has to be seriously clarified and understood in order to step forward and find solution for existing difficulties.

The assumption, that there is an inherent superior-inferior relationship among groups within a society and power relations are organized accordingly, brings us to the multiculturalism as the only efficient although debated political solution. Charles Taylor caught the controversy the best so far:

“[...] all societies are becoming increasingly multicultural, while at the same time becoming more porous. Indeed, these two developments go together. Their porousness

means that they are more open to multinational migration; more of their members live the life of diaspora, whose center is elsewhere. In these circumstances, there is something awkward about replying simply, “This is how we do things here.” [...] The awkwardness arises from the fact that there are substantial numbers of people who are citizens and also belong to the culture that calls into question our philosophical boundaries. The challenge is to deal with their sense of marginalization without compromising our basic political principles.” (Taylor 1992, pp.63)

Some might think that these problems are already solved or at least suggestions for remedy are known but philosophers, theorists and politicians share variant interpretations. The dilemma is partially categorized into a “cultural pluralism” basket that belongs to the classic problem of liberalism.

The dilemma’s other part is that model of ‘citizenship-as-a-right’ is challenged. Citizenship is not an extensive conception to incorporate all those rights and duties that must be highlighted in a pluralist country: citizenship is an outdated notion.³

Today’s shift to the direction of politics of recognition does not mean that politics of redistribution is by-passed; they must be combined because in case of migrants, ethnic minorities their weak social networks and socioeconomic injustices directly lock them in a low social class. Their economic and social status shows various hierarchies but the possibility of progress into higher social levels is very unlikely (without state intervention).

Classic multiculturalism theory has very limited state role and central power in order to ensure freedom of groups. But liberal neutrality or ‘benign neglect’ (Kymlicka 2000) is simply not an option; power relations between ethnic groups rule out the smaller ones and create hegemony in a neutral society.

Instead I suggest accepting a certain superior-inferior position within each diverse society and finding tools to compensate for inequalities and aspire to a just state. Socioeconomic

³ In the European Union, it is not a difficult process to get citizenship in most of the member states. But does it mean that the new citizen automatically will belong to the majority culture, religion, speak the national language etc.? It does not, obviously. Switching citizenship (or having multiple citizenships) is possible, but switching culture, mother tongue or religion is almost impossible. Citizenship rights primarily intended to struggle against the socioeconomic inequalities by the politics of redistribution. For further readings see Nancy Fraser (1998, 2000).

hierarchy contains numerous moral questions but I am afraid that trying to appropriately answer them traps us into a field that does not lead to solution.

On the other end of the theoretical scale, there are considerations that say, culture is an expensive choice therefore people easily and voluntarily can leave it in order to live in a neutral, peaceful, melted society. Melting pots exist, but are limited to cities or city districts where density of the population bans separation. Waldron (1995) had a point in the manner that cost of leaving a culture is high that must be considered by the migrant when he makes a decision. But culture is not just an “expensive taste” (Waldron 1995) but organic building element of the individual. Migrants must bear the cost of losing attachments to their homeland but the host state should not necessarily aggravate their situation.

From my liberal perspective, multiculturalism is viable if the state dares to possess decisive power in distinct situations and it does not assimilate nor marginalize.

2.1. Justification for Multiculturalism

So far multiculturalism must be contested from several aspects which underpin its applicability and relevance.

The liberal-communitarian debate points to cultural diversity and political unity problems. Democratic theorists suggest that it is a challenge to the limitations of liberal practice, namely how a more radical development of citizenship, civil society, and social movements might overcome the injustices in current democratic liberal forms. (Favell 1998, pp. 11)

Communitarians cruelly criticize the liberal's individualistic approach which puts individualism prior to the society or any community. Common values and goods are not atomized to the individuals' goods and values but show one body of values. "They instead embrace ontological holism, which views social goods as "irreducibly social" (Taylor 1992). This holist view of collective identities and cultures underlies Charles Taylor's normative case for a multicultural "politics of recognition" (1992). Diverse cultural identities and languages are irreducibly social goods, which should be presumed to be of equal worth. The recognition of the equal worth of diverse cultures requires replacing the traditional liberal regime of identical liberties and opportunities for all citizens with a scheme of special rights for minority cultural groups." (Song 2014, pp.3) Communitarian debate does not necessarily oppose liberal multiculturalism, but pose concerns about the liberal label.

Liberal-egalitarian debate states that culture is instrumentally valuable to individuals. "Will Kymlicka has developed the most influential theory of multiculturalism based on the liberal values of autonomy and equality (Kymlicka 1989, 1995, 2001)." (ibid., pp. 4) The role of culture and its preservation is a duty of the state in order to compensate minorities for their disadvantages of being in minority. The cost of leaving their culture is so high that it is not a real option. Thus, liberal label of multiculturalism aims to offer exit option.

Egalitarian theory also distinguishes inequalities originated from individual choice and unchosen circumstances (let me avoid the notion of luck, not like Anderson -1999- and Scheffler -2003).

Lastly, it is simply unarguable that the primary destination countries of migration therefore the most diverse and ethnically tense countries are those ones which caused the most striking historical injustices in forms of colonialism and slave-traffic. The postcolonial theory has two layers, in my understanding. The primary level is the legitimacy of indigenous groups' claims against oppression and cultural devastation. Their legitimacy is obvious but not ensured in form of autonomy and cultural preservation.

The second, less obvious (and less accepted) layer is destination of current migration. Most favored destinations are the former colonizing countries that conquered and possessed territories hundred times greater than their mother land and now suffer from migrant inflow from the former colonies. Without further in-depth socio-cultural, historical and psychological analysis (and hypothesis creation), let me assume, that this layer also contains justification for multiculturalism and ethnic right.

It can be submitted that no systematic, standardized justification exist because political dynamics, public conceptualizations that form it are different and continuously changing. Multiculturalism is too diverse to be captured by one single theory of pluralist liberal democracy. Liberal democracy in reality is a complex world of social policy dilemmas, legal technicalities, and census questions. An explicit connection between liberal reflection and liberal practice is missing. (William E. Conolly: The dilemma of legitimacy, 1987)

Why is that? The problem is derived from the complex description of race, ethnicity, nationality or citizenship. They are fragmented, impossible to make a core concept that covers them in similar way and make them applicable in every country.

In addition, these terms are politically colored, manipulated and framed, as tools of certain political parties to win given social groups or make promises. Media coverage and framing cause serious damage in common perception of people.

On the other hand, in the introduction I presented “illiberal” liberal impositions that must be measured and implemented carefully based on country specifics. This assumption contains not only the political features but those features of the civil society that cannot be changed, altered or damaged. These impositions are the meeting point of the non-changeable values/features and compromises from both sides. Will Kymlicka distinguish these impositions into ‘internal restrictions’ and ‘external protections’ but both of them belong to the group differentiated rights (Kymlicka 2002).

The European Union is an economic union. The political union is utopist image yet, however national borders of ethnicity will remain regardless of the form of the union. Possession of certain level of national identity, values, common language or history will always represent glue of a nation. But fixed national models or typologies are developing into different directions, involving immigration and integration politics as core elements. The question is whether they tend to harmonize and show a constant progressive policy or they stay fragmented because increasing number of migrants makes nations closed, protective and regulating. But this prediction belongs to the future.

I see immigration/integration problem as a cyclical topic of politics dependent on its power to alter public opinion about political parties or in some cases, when extraordinary events blow it to the center stage of public attention. Then parties start dynamic development of institutional responses to the salient issues, offer solution and let the decline come again. Such a cyclical process can be seen after every protest, serious conflict or integration fault. In 2014, we observe the upper part of the curve, since 2008. Arab Spring has triggered enormous size of immigration into the EU that had cause economic, social, political influence. An economic

crisis leads to competition over work opportunities between people and further conflict in cultural dimensions. Within economic context, immigration becomes a highly salient issue regardless of its framing by media or political sphere, because people of a country experience real life consequences. Now, we should decide whether mass immigration is the problem or just a symptom a system error (wit economic crisis, Arab conflict).

2.2.Liberal Multiculturalism

Writing about multiculturalism is basically a difficult job because “[...] identity politics has become something of a pejorative term, the name given to demeaning performances of political victimhood [...]”. (Miller 2014)

Without political party orientation, in the past years two major directions were applied: the reactive and proactive politics can describe multiculturalism negatively and positively. The EU aims to build a standardized norm and unified opinion about multiculturalism policies however practice and experience change national attitudes toward the issue. Multiculturalism is a hardly definable phenomenon. It is naturally created when different cultures live next to each other and have influence on each other but do not integrate. It is not a politically created process, but a social reaction. From reactive side, we take multiculturalism as crash and conflict of the cultures (as religion, habits, clothes, language) causing continuous tension in a society, so basically a rather negative connotation. From proactive side, it is value-adding process, where every culture gets more via the co-living. The authorities do not intervene into their life, or try to integrate them. The two sides coexist in my understanding.

Discussing multiculturalism shares scholars into two main teams: sceptics and optimists. Both sides are vindicated by real life experiences. The whole issue of multiculturalism is a deeply dividing and controversial field because it merges distinct theories with personal perceptions. Liberal multiculturalism is liberal in very different aspects. “Protective multiculturalism” accepts the inferior-superior zero position within civil society and instructs the state to protect the minority from oppression. “Polyglot multiculturalism” expands the choice set of autonomous agents, democracy is the framework within individuals can develop and achieve their ultimate goals. (Goodin 2006, pp. 289-290) Goodin’s categorizations can be justified

easily, because each is true and manifested in liberal multiculturalism. Individual progress can be achieved only if there is no oppression, circumstances are given, thus polyglot form needs protection, while ‘protective multiculturalism’ is pointless without ‘polyglot multiculturalism’. We must keep in mind that positivism that is also represented by Will Kymlicka, is originated from multinational countries like Canada, rather than immigrant societies as France. (Goodin 2006, pp. 290) In order to form adequate thesis, we must encounter both sides.

Let me deal with the *culture* as first stage of integration and significant context for further provisions. “The liberal value of freedom of choice has certain cultural preconditions,” and “liberals should care about the viability of societal cultures, because they contribute to people’s autonomy.” Failure to protect those cultures “will create new tragic cases of groups which are denied the sort of cultural context of choice that supports individual autonomy.”(Goodin 2006, pp. 291) That assumption proves that a merger between standard liberal values and cultural preservation must be matured otherwise oppressed groups will generate serious conflicts soon.

Is the individual autonomy builds the common culture or keeps it separated? Such diversity within a culture creates more options for choice but there is a limit where it becomes burden. Goodin compares two attitudes that are generally shared among theorists: people are living in a society that is like a kaleidoscope of values, cultures, religions, or they borrow certain habits, enjoy freedom of choice and autonomously make decision about the level of integration, and reception of foreigners. The two do not close out each other, people react differently, and their reactions cannot be institutionalized nor controlled by strict borders. All of us enjoy multilayer cultures; xenophobia is not an instinct, rather an artificially and directionally created and boosted mass reaction. On individual level, agents of a society

would never be offensive with a foreign culture unless they experience continuous negativities, conflicts and these problems outweigh advantages of co-living.

In addition I am convinced that individual level interaction with new elements of a society is mostly friendly, open minded and receiver. Conflicts are born on community level or on higher levels when external factors are also added to the balance and negativities are accumulated. However, basic features of human kind and society cannot be altered, that is discussed later in Chapter 3.

“Protective multiculturalism” emphasizes protecting the rights of minority cultures. It is a rather grudging multiculturalism. It respects the rights of cultural minorities and minority cultures, insofar as they are present. But it sees no particular reason to broaden the cultural mix, beyond that found in any given place at present. It sees nothing of value in a multiplicity of cultures, as such. It attaches value merely to the culture or cultures that happen to be presently extant in some particular place.

“Protective multiculturalism” is an argument for multiculturalism that is sometimes content to endorse monoculturalism. (Goodin 2006, pp. 294-295) It holds the trap within the theory. A superior culture and society is protective, tolerant, respecting on one hand, but on the other, it tries to make clusters for every culture. It is not celebration of diversity, only toleration of diversity.

Polyglot multiculturalism serves countless choice options, it is an individual decision how much one enjoys it and becomes part of it. The question whether it is a plausible option in political realization, and a society is able to borrow only bites from a culture without conquering the original culture.

Multiculturalism practice is not black and white: their mixture is possible within limited frameworks. Goodin describes protective multiculturalism that takes internal point of view, polyglot takes the external one. In protective manner, can the person living in the culture

adopt new elements of a new culture without losing his original cultural values? From external viewpoint, can the person outside of the cultural basket borrow or bite some pieces from the culture without grabbing the whole basket?

In the center of the liberal multiculturalism, however, there is one significant player: the state and its scope of power. The state can allow group differentiated rights or collective rights that reduce internal vulnerability of members within a group or reduce tension between groups. But their direction and claims differ merely. Liberals are concerned about internal restrictions that determine basic rights of the group members in order to protect them from internal oppression. External protection has a much more promising connotation as long as it aims protection instead of limitation. Some liberal theorists also support some internal restrictions if the individual has exit right. It is rooted in the value of tolerance while absolute denial of internal restrictions is rooted in the value of autonomy. (Kymlicka 2002, pp. 342)

From my liberal perspective, certain internal limitations can be introduced carefully if they serve the individual choice. This means that group members must have access to some information about the possible choices they have in their life (via education) therefore staying within a certain group is their decision so it serves their autonomy directly. It protects primarily the children and women who are traditionally less represented and more influenced in their decisions. I assume that members do not necessarily want to leave their cultural groups but until the state is not convinced about their willingness to stay, it presupposes that they are prohibited to make a decision.⁴

⁴ Immediately I have to mention Amish and Hutterites groups where members live in absolute isolation from other groups of the civil society. In this case, children are educated in private schools and baptized at early age. It is rather an exception that presents how separation from the meta-community can preserve a rare culture meanwhile membership is obviously a non-voluntary decision. In the US these community forms are viable but show rather a tacit consent from the state rather than deliberately maintained cultures. It is rooted from toleration and not in value of autonomy.

Joel Feinberg (1992) formulated the “right to an open future” slogan for children who are simply not able to leave a community based on their rational decision, but education can widen their perspective.

My concern regarding this issue is that it is narrow-minded to concentrate only children in “illiberal” minority groups. What about children who are raised in a strongly xenophobic white family? These children are manipulated in their decisions, visions but they are not targets for internal restriction claims because traditional white families are not focused. Exit right must be available for everybody without judging that group: I cannot determine their concept of good life but I can detect when the community bans the choice/exit option.

It is another field of study how it can be carried out, what tools a state can apply in order to ‘force’ autonomous decision making, if it is possible. Such action is illiberal provision for the liberal values that I have discussed in the introduction.

Liberal consideration of multiculturalism is still the tip of the iceberg, it presents the second stage. The third stage is the reality itself, where nation-building and multiculturalism are faced and must be reconciled.

2.3. Reality of Multiculturalism

Such model as “European multicultural model” does not exist and never existed. Normative multiculturalism faces crisis in Western European countries, while it is not even born in Eastern European countries. It became a challenge to integration policies, no matter which state we observe. However European multiculturalism as core part of integration policies is something very different from the Canadian or Australian examples. (However they serve great examples and are worth analysis.)

The core reason of the crisis is that empirical reality and the public/political narratives do not meet. One conception of integration dominates in the public and political discussions: a socio-cultural definition that emphasizes essentialized thus simplified and culturalized notions of identities. Some scholars suggest that future of citizenship in Europe depends on the capacity of people to understand how civil societies work, and clarify fundamentals of equality. It is the hardest task to harmonize and standardize issues that build up integration projects. It seems to be nearly impossible to achieve, but misconceptions of core phenomena hold serious problems and mean barriers to the progress. When we come to realistic issues of discrimination, it is rightfully questionable how citizens can handle them without proper knowledge. (Kymlicka 1995, pp. 173-180)

If the European models go through a crisis because they are built on incorrect funds, how can we assess failure or success of an integration or citizenship policy? Also in one country the model might be a failure, but show successful tendencies in another.

If we compare the countries which have long tradition of integration in Europe, we find nothing clearly paraphrased, normative models. Minority policies of the past decades are not realization of multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism is strongly linked to globalization, unavoidable and useful if the country is able to handle it. It creates pluralism of cultures and religions with the result that might be a social enriches or a radical xenophobia. (Kymlicka 1995) Mostly people of a country do not refuse foreigners because they do not want the co-living or their culture (not taking into account the individual opinions, or racism). Rather they refuse political considerations and speculations regarding migrants and economic disadvantages on the labor market. In the past couple of years, the latter was more significant due to the unemployment and financial crisis. The role of state due to globalization is very limited in structuring migration. In the EU, supranational powers decide about normative policies, involving national suggestions and individual characteristics.

The problem is that globalization is a growing, complex process that cannot be reduced or controlled within a single country. Migration as a free flow of people is also a mass movement that is not restricted to one country. The EU normative solution plan is also part of a greater, global solution; it is not omnipotent or entirely correct.

One commonly applied solution is creating a societal culture into which foreigners can be integrated but it does not pose unnecessarily high expectations or promote certain lifestyle and beliefs. Linguistic requirements are practical considerations which are combined with certain institutional cohesion in order to balance diversity. This societal culture leaves space for private life, habits, beliefs, family customs but secure solidarity, and political legitimacy within a democratic state. (Kymlicka 2002, pp. 346)

Nation building therefore is building social institutions that operate in a common language under certain principles that are universally accepted and represent unity of a diverse society. Injustices are inevitable side-effects of this nation building because the main liberal principles are not neutral but reflect the majority. The question is whether group rights can compensate for these injustices.

Without in-depth analysis, let me discuss the five main ethnocultural groups that struggle for their rights and recognition in the Western world. It shows how complex the multiculturalism is in reality.

First, national minorities -Catalans, Scots, Québécois- can be divided into two groups: substate nations and indigenous groups. The former group has no state where they are the majority while the latter's territory has been incorporated into a larger state. The contrast is blurred between the two groups. Their primary demand is greater autonomy and traditional nation building within their original territory. Their claims have the most legitimate foundation among the minority groups and their cultural preservation requires state help.

Second, there are immigrant groups who decided to leave their homeland for economic betterment or because of political reasons. There are two subgroups: those who have right to become citizen and those who do not. 200 years of experience proved that these legal groups did not pose any threat to the state but integrated into the majority society and gained citizenship. I challenge this assumption because the past decade gives a different vision. Growing number of members within a sub-group tend to have more willingness to preserve certain cultural heritage and enjoy similar respect, dignity in public sphere. The increasing number of these groups creates kaleidoscopic society that needs systematic exploration of existing social institutions, rules, symbols, habits in order to be able to absorb these groups.

Third, isolationist ethnoreligious groups who voluntarily live in a separate territory under their individual rules. They seek absolute exemption from most of those duties that are levied on citizens. Their situation is so deeply divisive and historically determined that I do not wish to discuss it into the details.

Fourth group is the metics: irregular migrants, and temporary migrants. They suffer from xenophobia and social hostility the most because their social status is connected to poverty and vulnerability. Their situation requires legal steps primarily.

The final fifth group is African-Americans. Their history is full of marginalization, oppression, segregation from the majority society even though they are citizens of their country and do not represent distinct, “threatening” ethnocultural group.⁵ (Kymlicka 2002, pp. 348-361)

Such complexity simply cannot be handled within a difference blind, neutral liberal state. That would be inhuman rather than non-discriminatory. Diversity in my understanding is not contradictory with stability but neglect (even if that is benign) causes tension on economic and social level equally. Hence politics of redistribution and recognition should not be in a hierarchy but should struggle together against economic inequality that is embedded in disadvantageous social situation of minorities. Liberal multiculturalism has the potential to combine these two and build civic solidarity, au contraire to many scholars who state the opposite.

⁵ In times of slave traffic, black people were forced to live in separate communities from their co-nationals in order to reduce the possibility of cultural awareness or cultural preservation. These people forget their mother language and traditions within a short period because they could not use it. Their Anglo-conformity integration was fast and effective.

2.4. Critique of Liberal Multiculturalism

The thesis work's central aim is to find a degree in liberal multiculturalism which is liberal but offer plausible solution for the real threats and traps of a diverse society.

Personally I share a rather optimistic view of the future prospects which brings me close to the Kymlickian thinking but the current part completes my understanding of the issue. Criticism highlights the weaknesses and opportunities and offer alternatives that expand the field of multiculturalism.

“Will Kymlicka (1999:113) has recently claimed that ‘multiculturalists have won the day’ in making their case for a difference-conscious notion of justice and concomitant laws and policies in the liberal state.” (Joppke 2004, pp. 237)

However I am far not convinced about the absolute applicability of liberal multiculturalism as Kymlicka introduces. From one perspective, critical opinions highlighted theoretical errors and missing puzzles of the liberal multiculturalism. On the other hand, theory of justice cannot be transformed in order to fit into the theory of multicultural civil society that I discuss in the following chapter.

Let me collect the most striking imperfections of liberal multiculturalism. Brian Barry's *Culture and Equality* (2001) is the most famous and notorious reply to the optimists (mainly to Kymlicka) of the multiculturalism. He writes that group differentiation is matter of prudence but not justice. He states that multiculturalism is retreat from liberty and equality because it aims to create social agendas.

I accept his theory of universal morality that ensures a minimum thus necessary condition of decent human life. The liberal imposition of accepting liberal values I proposed in the introduction is derived from Barry's proposal. But he understands these objectives in only semantic form, limited to narrow sense. Moral universalism should represent basic values that

suggest direction of human life in broad sense and determine basic features, values without prescribe it.

Giovanni Sartori (Pluralismo, multiculturalismo e estranei, 2000) points out the obvious and debated issue of recognition. He expects that a pluralist state can be neutral, and offer reciprocal recognition for the minority groups. But that is not the fault of multiculturalism that certain one-sidedness superiority inherently exists in every country that is historically rooted and cannot be erased. Reciprocity is a plausible intention in case of indigenous groups and substate nations who can historically form claims and are represented in a significant number.

Jacob Levy (2000) perceives that politics of difference is still the best way to deal with diverse societies but that is strongly dependent on the social, political, cultural variables of a given country. The current politics are negative politics exclusively, just as the liberalism of fear and multiculturalism of fear. Levy steps further and see how patriotism or neutrality is not solution for discrimination or violence. But he settles for avoiding the evil, not seeking the good. Preventing cruelty is enough instead of struggling for absolute justice and equality. His propagates value pluralism that contains virtues, political ideals and moral systems. Sometimes moral diversity within is greater than moral gaps between. (Levy 2000, pp. 102) His opinion about culture is a building element the multiculturalism: every cultural element is an exit barrier for the member. The more distinct a culture is, the more exit cost is. Minority cultural preservation is a prisoners' dilemma. (ibid., pp. 115) Not all cultures represent equal value in this regard: indigenous groups do need cultural preservation and certain autonomy while immigrant groups do have a homeland where they are in majority and their culture will flourish regardless of the level of recognition in the host country. In theory of classic multiculturalism, this assumption is faulty but from practical consideration, it is impossible to

recognize all cultures equally based on their human rights. “We can at best tolerate other cultures, but their equal recognition is impossible.” (Joppke 2004, pp. 242)

2.5. Essentialist Critique of Multiculturalism

“Essentialism in the strict philosophical sense is best understood as an approach that imputes essential properties to an object of study, where its essential properties are those that it must have to be an object of the kind that it is and which make it the particular kind of object that it is.” (Mason edited by Laden and Owen 2007, pp. 222)

It has bad connotation when it comes to culture, identity. The greatest trap of multiculturalism is that it strengthens cultural barriers, defines them within these schematic boundaries for the sake of simplicity and cannot handle blurred boundaries of cultures when individual may belong to several virtues, in terms of way of life. (ibid., pp. 224) In short, it essentializes identities, practices of minority groups. “Multiculturalism then appears not as a cultural liberator but as a cultural straitjacket, forcing those described as members of a minority cultural group into a regime of authenticity [...]” (Phillips 2007, pp.14)

I have an intention to highlight how Phillips mismatches intra-groups essentialism and inter-group essentialism. The former is not a new phenomenon; it is as old as the Bible. There are leaders within every group who want to impose restriction on its members of purity and authenticity in order to maintain their cultural value and uniqueness. That is not the problem of multiculturalism but a traditional feature of groups. The latter is simply bizarre. Let me compare to feminism: feminism overvalues female potentials and therefore makes women separated and alienated from men? Obviously it does not; it only requires basic admission that women and men are different but equal. There are certain physical, psychological features that cannot be denied or altered. It is andro-centrism if we expect women to assimilate to men.

Migrants do differ in certain ways that must be accepted, and it is illiberal and cruel to expect them to assimilate entirely.

I agree with Phillips that foreign cultures might seem to be more exotic and distinct that can play a straitjacket role if these cultural barriers are overemphasized. (Phillips 2007, pp. 14) But Nancy Fraser is immensely wrong when she calls it “moral pressure” to belong to a drastically simplified group identity and culture. (Fraser 2001, pp. 24) On the contrary, in foreign environment, cultural group is the hook to their previous identity that is elementary component of their current life and identity.

Culture is a property and owning a property goes hand in hand with responsibility, cost and benefits. How much an individual is attached to its culture (property) is an individual decision with some universal dynamics. But coercive political pampering of culture is incorrect: ethnical, cultural prejudices, categorizations are shortcuts in information seeking and connection making. “[O]ne of the biggest problems [is] the selective way culture is employed to explain behavior in non-Western societies or individuals from racialised minority groups, and the implied contrast with rational, autonomous (Western) individuals, whose actions are presumed to reflect moral judgments.” (Phillips 2007, pp. 9)

2.6. Liberal Critique of Multiculturalism

“However subtly (that is, mediated by ‘justice’ considerations) the linkage between empirical and normative multiculturalism may be drawn, one could argue exactly the opposite, that a centrifugal society requires centripetal state policies to keep it together. Historically the liberal, difference-blind state with its universal citizenship, which is now found fault with, had exactly emerged as a peacemaker to a hyper-diverse society torn by religious wars in seventeenth century Europe. No convincing explanation has as yet been offered why this solution, which Barry calls the ‘strategy of privatization’, no longer works.” (Joppke 2004, pp. 239-240)

Probably my explanation is not convincing enough but in my opinion, “hyper-diverse” societies of the 17th century consisted of people who possessed radically different virtues than people of nowadays. First, secularization eliminated religiously praised virtues from the central stage of human life; instead it placed individual based values and universal liberal values. Autonomous people demand attention and differentiation in order to live a just and happy life that is now aspired. Change in human mind requires change in form of state position and scope of authority. It is rather naïve to compare the 17th century’s society to the 21st century’s society.

Then, in those communities where secularization is not realized (Islam minorities) are in a difficult and tense situation in liberal democracies. Liberal values must enjoy the highest importance (even if it is an abstract definition) that can be limit to multicultural accommodation of certain groups.

These universal principles of a state always show elements of particularism: they are rooted in traditions, religious or non-religious habits. Neutral state is simply not possible in practice. The situation must be atomized into details in case of migrants and indigenous groups: migrants go to the host country, pay “cultural cost” to their economic/political betterment. While indigenous groups have legitimate claims to preserve their culture that suffers from oppression and historical harms. When immigrant groups enter a country, their culture automatically gets under a tolerance process: permission concept means the majority gives

permission to manifest that culture within national territories. Respect concept is a progressed form that criticizes the permission concept. Acceptance of a given culture is based on moral consideration when state studies objection whether that is good enough to be a rejection. It creates rational tolerance: there is a limit of toleration but that is drawn by moral, rational considerations (Frost edited by Laden and Owen 2007).

It is resulted from the obvious assumption that we cannot recognize every culture equally and “[t]o attribute “equal value” to all cultures . . . destroys the very notion of value. If everything is of value, nothing is of value: the value loses its content” (Joppke 2004 cites Sartori 2000, pp. 242).

Tolerance cannot be unilateral activity: first, immigrant groups have to protest tolerance just like host countries. Burdens of tolerance must be country specific. Scholars tend to place toleration above recognition, because it can be bilateral/multilateral. In my opinion, toleration originates from the permission conception as well. Tolerance from the host country shows strong forms of remedy to minorities for their inherent inferior position in the new countries. It might be an interesting feature to compare how Hegel (1973) describes the relationship of master and slave (majority and minority group). “For Hegel, recognition was the stake of a struggle between initially equal conflict parties and, in an inherently unstable and deficient way, it was eventually forced by the winner (‘master’) upon the loser (‘servant’) of this ‘struggle for recognition’. Accordingly, in the classic scenario the servant is forced to recognize the master [...]. In the multicultural scenario the relationship is the reverse: the winner is asked to recognize the loser, in what amounts to an act of reparation and restitution.” (Joppke 2004, pp. 243)

Based on this assumption, ethnic minority struggle seems to be foredoomed to failure. But again, let me highlight that minorities are indigenous groups, ethnic stateless minorities, religious minorities, metics etc. Immigrant inferiority does not command that indigenous

people have similar disadvantageous position. But multiculturalism is an umbrella term that involves all these considerations.

Cultural and socio-economic inequality does have interconnectedness, as private and public sphere is not that clearly separable in real world. Culture should not take away the entire attention but it does have impact on our conception of good life.

3. Diverse Civil Society

„Most countries today are culturally diverse. According to recent estimates, the world's 184 independent states contain over 600 living language groups, and 5,000 ethnic groups. In very few countries can citizens be said to share the same language, or belong to the same ethnonational group.” (Kymlicka 1995, pp.1)

Will Kymlicka starts his book, *Multicultural Citizenship*, with this strong statement that explains the relevance of his work, and hopefully the relevance of the current thesis. The world has one idiosyncrasy: inherently heteronomous.

Heterogeneity of the world population must overwrite the general conception of civil society and culture within a country's border: these notions show essentialist features for the sake of simplicity however this simplicity generates fatal misunderstandings and underestimations that must be corrected.

Aim of the section is to study the other side of multiculturalism where it is actually exist: society. The chapter reconsiders civil society as an institution and finds flaws of the current understanding. Multiculturalism is realized within these civil societies and its bounds of success are highly determined by the bounds of civil society. While the previous section tried to stick to theoretical, policy considerations now let me reveal the human side of these policies.

Civil society has natural features: refusal toward foreigners is one of them. My presumption is that the tense in heterogeneous societies partially originates from a natural refusal of people toward strangers, aliens, and not exclusively from xenophobia, or inalterable hostility.⁶

Liberal multiculturalism has several elements that probably work in theory but not in practice.

My aim is to introduce the variable of human attitude that create country specific application

⁶ One might be sceptic about my initiative to distinguish the origin of disapproval of strangers but in my opinion, it does have significant role in practical sense. Xenophobia is a deeply embedded moral disfunction that is manifested in irrational hostile activities. Natural refusal or rather distrust in strangers contains fear that might come from bad experience as well. The former is unnatural, the latter is more plausible and alterable.

of multicultural policies or set back its fulfillment. Basically, liberal impositions are necessary because fearlessness and security (and autonomy and equality) are based on a compromise. I have to admit that Chandran Kukathas has right when he queries whether equality and diversity are compatible. (Kukathas 2003) It can be compatible but civil society's dynamics must be analyzed.

In order to prove my assumption, the chapter clarifies the notion of civil society and culture then the crucial issue of partiality toward co-nationals and relevant political concepts as patriotism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism. These all serve the theory of justice and help to understand the complexity of civil society and people's attitude.

The greatest fear of mine is that people are not aware of the power of prejudice, discrimination, hatred or partiality. Their attitude is rather negatory and they have only abstract visions of justice, duties and rights.

Why is it so substantial to understand justice and why people want a just life? When we try to set an ultimate goal of human life, happiness, peace, self-fulfillment and self-realization are equally mentioned in first place. In my understanding, these phenomena are both rooted in justice, in a just world. If a person finds his life fair, rightful or just, his potential to be happy is high. Peace is an abstract concept, which basically suppose that nations do not war, having no political and economic conflicts, people equally enjoy wealth and so on. Peace is a utopian and nearly impossible goal of life, just as absolute happiness or total equality. Justice is a slightly more realistic phenomenon that involves all those aspirations that a person might have in his/her life.

Human life is more than sum of physical needs to self-preservation and safety- see Maslow's hierarchy of needs (1943, A Theory of Human Motivation). Psychological needs (food, water, sex, excretion) and safety (security of body, of family, of employment, of resources) are followed by love/belonging (family, relationships), esteem (self-esteem, respect of/by others,

achievements) and self-actualization (morality, creativity, lack of prejudice). Their proportion in one's life shows a pyramid structure, where psychological needs are the bottom of the pyramid. Thus the sum of belonging, esteem and self-actualization roughly equals the sum of physical needs. It justifies the idea that a person can achieve his life goal within a group of other people, because personal ties, recognition and respect determine his personality partially.

Completeness assumption claims that membership in a group accounts completely for a person's identity: entering the public sphere means reconciliation of already acquired norms, beliefs, practices with other groups' norms and minimize the possibility of conflict. There is another assumption, namely independence assumption that claims one's cultural identity is formed independently of the social structure which he is part of. It seems to be unnatural and faulty on many levels: orthodoxy is not the natural state of cultures. Human beings continuously benefit the available resources and opportunities in neighboring culture(s), deliberately decide based on the context in which they live. (Weinstock 2007, pp. 258-263)

Herder puts forward the notion of authenticity: each person has his own measure that inwardly generates his original way of existence, and value. It is fundamentally correct but the human mind is dialogical: it expresses and fulfills itself through continuous dialogues, struggles, debates. "We need relationships to fulfill, but not to define, ourselves." (Taylor 1992, pp. 30-33) People are embedded in the matrix of relationships that enables them to acquire human dignity which became the modern notion of honor; it indicates equal recognition in democratic culture, because everybody shares in dignity. Politics of equal recognition (politics of equal dignity) is now the only plausible demand of minority groups. (Taylor 1992, pp. 27)

Members of disadvantageous groups suffer several injustices about their dignity, because they are different in a certain way: their co-citizens act hostile in the private sphere and the public

sphere has not yet applied necessary frameworks to protect them without violating liberal principles.

A theory of justice offers guideline in situations when people should/would behave or decide fairly and the decision is not a simple duty but a morally challenging exercise. The theory gives basic lines of sight that should enter the realm of politics, set new agendas, policies and political judgments. Basic understanding of justice is almost monolithic element of human thinking. David Miller cites Jerry Cohen that „basic principles of justice are invariant”. (Cohen 2008 in Miller 2013, pp. 43)

According to the opposite view, contextualism assumes that justice has context specific principles. The latter might be problematic in application although it partially is right. Further, monism and pluralism create new contrasts whether justice consist of one or more principles. Universalism is not necessarily monism and contextualism is not pluralistic in every case. Miller distinguishes one more aspect: objectivism versus relativism. Contextualism is not straightly connected to relativism; it can be objective or universal as well. Therefore they hold the middle ground. (Miller 2013, pp. 41-45) There are no similar societies, because citizens of a nation possess very different state of mind, and perception about justice. What people believe and what serves justice the best, are not identical in most of the cases. Categories of justices exist, but only blurred lines present boundaries among them.

John Cottingham in his work, *Partiality, Favourism and Morality* (1986), describes that all of our decisions are originated from the self; family, neighbors, fellow citizens are *our* family, our neighbors etc. These “property” bonds are divided into two separate groups: family ties are based on blood (non-voluntary), while co-citizens, co-members of the same group possess “artificial” bonds (voluntary). Familial bonds give incontrovertible and rational reason to be partial toward family members on the level of private life and individual decisions. Cottingham brings the example of fire case, when my decision to favor and rescue my child is

based on “the fact that she is *my* daughter: there is a non-eliminably particular, self-referential element in my rationale for selecting this child rather than some other.” (Cottingham 1986, pp. 359) Family bonds are indisputable; it is natural, inalienable human behavior to favor the blood ties. However let me bring examples: if person X works in the public sphere, and he is responsible for interviewing new applicants for certain positions, is it an acceptable behavior of partiality when he favors his nephew and applies him? Obviously it is not, despite the fact of familial relationship. What happens in that case when the responsible person hires his co-national and discriminates the other applicants based on their country of birth, skin complexion etc.? The two examples differ in very little details but result totally different situations. Both are unacceptable partiality but the former could have legal consequences, the latter enjoys tacit consent of the superior society.

Cottingham draws up a list of various forms of partialism: familialism, kinshipism, clanism, patriotism, racism, sexism, planetism. (Cottingham 1986, pp. 359-360) All of them hold the policy of giving preferential treatment to members of their group, but their grounds are doubtfully justified. It does not mean that there are no differentiations within these groups, but they rather highlight their similarities than their differences which is a good strategy to meet the challenges of international and intranational partiality within multicultural societies.

3.1 Multicultural Justice

“This is how we do things here”⁷ is a weak explanation of justice in a given society: the problem is that the majority sets these rules and stick to them in order to universally describe just actions and reduce the risk of change, or foreign influence.

The special relationship among people and groups brings up the problematic piece of distributive justice. One salient task to understand how these members of a society that is multiculturalist, define themselves, how they feel in that community and group, what place that group occupies within the majority society/community, and what kind of bonds exist among them.

First of all, the definition of multiculturalist can be understood in many senses. Unfortunately the “West and the Rest” ideology sets a white, able-bodied, heterosexual man as center, everything else is different hence is in minority. It sounds extreme but true anyway. Based on this assumption, a society is multicultural if there are people who are homosexual, women, deaf, disabled, born in a foreign country, have different mother language than the majority etc. Multiculturalism is reduced to the issue of ethnical minorities incorrectly meanwhile it covers a wide spectrum of difference related issues.

In countries like Canada and the UK, where multiculturalism has traditions and minority communities have hierarchical order based on their population, bonds between ethnical groups constitute a matrix. Philosophy puts rational agent in center of theory; in this case, personal ties toward minority group and majority identify the agent’s idea of justice and equality. These small (or not so small) groups can be ethnic, religious, language, cultural groups; the point is that these represent a special identity which the members feel their own. John Rawls in his work, *Theory of Justice*, names the majority society as ‘a cooperative

⁷ Charles Taylor used this expression in his paper, *Multiculturalism and „The Politics of Recognition”*, in a slightly different context. (Taylor 1992, pp. 63)

venture for mutual advantage', but also a social union where people take into account other's success and flourishing, that is complimentary to their own success. 'The collective activity of justice is the preeminent form of human flourishing.' (Rawls 1971, pp. 529) I must agree with Rawls.

At the same time, it is a romantic utopia with an unknown invariant element: the justice. People want equality and good life, independent of how they describe good life and satisfaction. In order to live in a safe and satisfying country, they have a good reason to find a moderately acceptable ground of justice. People are not completely altruistic neither totally egoist hence their own betterment plays an important role but they see their ultimate satisfaction within a community. Multiculturalism distorts this quasi simple picture: group membership has great influence so people derive their own sense of justice from the specific culture of the given group, and we assume that these principles will not converge across groups. The question is whether people can live in harmony while values and conceptions differ so much. And if they can achieve 'peace' within their community, do they want to spread out to the entire nation (the 'outsiders')? (Miller 2013, pp. 73-75)

By looking at the broad society, people realize that they must share utilities and how unequal the distribution is. Rights and duties is not a zero-sum game: some gain a lot more and others lose more. Each people own finite resource to help others, and this help is strictly restrained to the immediate environment. Economic factors worsen the situation, strengthen hostility toward 'outsiders' because resources of the state and individuals lessen. Partiality toward co-nationals mostly translated as patriotism, that express something positive or even glorious behavior. Undoubtedly, it is some passionate, intensive and colorful action while cosmopolitanism is a rather peaceful, "lonely business". (Nussbaum 1994)

Martha Nussbaum (1994, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism) cites Stoic teaching about justice that argues for cosmopolitan attitude. One highlight is that the place where we were born is

just an accident. So “we should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors.” (Plutarch, *On the Fortunes of Alexander*) This is inspiring but far from reality: the scope of our duties and rights is very limited. Stoic values however are explicitly plausible: “respect for human dignity and the opportunity for each person to pursue happiness. If we really do believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights, we are morally required to think about what that conception requires us to do with and for the rest of the world.” (Nussbaum 1994, III.3.)

C.S. Lewis said that “humility is not thinking less of yourself, but thinking of yourself less.” Certainly in order to take global citizenship, people first must take responsibility toward each other. Gordon Brown has a conversation on TED.com (July 2009): *Global ethic vs. National Interest*. His opinion is, regardless of his political persuasion and party politics, a modern utopia embedded in present conditions and resources. The massive change of technology is a key that allows us to think and act altruistically toward citizens of the world but a healthy sense of patriotism is welcome. The goal is a strong global society where people feel safe so live in peace. Brown mentions global ethic as a new world religion or credo because it enables individual completeness through the lenses of global flourishing. According to him, the 20th century’s pacts and peace-treaties pursued national sovereignty so the state can be self-determinant and own absolute power within country borders. A new target of the 21st century must destroy these self-determining and alienating borders because justice does not know borders like air or climate change.

Sympathy creates invisible bonds that might overwrite regular bonds of geographic and racial groups. The faith in humanity that Brown talks about is not a question of faith in general sense but a mandatory faith in moral sense. New technology and rapid information make suffer and pain visible to the world, just as unequal richness. These problems require alliances that oversee borders and continents, but existing institutions cannot fulfill these requirements

entirely. Unfortunately trust in supranational institutions' power is weak, needs reinforcement. They can provide external recognition that triggers internal recognition on the behalf of the state. Brown's persuasion is that indivisibility of the world's prosperity is undeniable, but it sounds bittersweet from the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

Both Nussbaum and Brown propagate cosmopolitan thinking and positive open-mindedness regardless of how human beings behave in reality. These are normative directions that can have impact on behavior on a long term, but these are more internationally normative propositions that lack exact remedy on country and community level.

3.2 Partiality in Civil Society

The following part aims to discuss co-national partiality within a civil society in the light of multiculturalism.

First of all, is it an illegitimate attitude to be impartial? Above there are examples of two cases, when partiality gets various value. If I say patriotism, as a subtype of partiality, it expresses a more valuable attitude toward our fellow citizens, co-nationals. I assume its target, form and content determine how partiality is described. Being impartial is impossible because human psyche is biased; we possess an embedded self and cannot erase basic bonds toward each other. Further, difference-blindness is inhuman and discriminatory as much as a homogeneous society is also untrue and impossible. (Taylor 1992) Society's goal should not be homogenization, nor equal treatment, but just treatment that takes into account the individuals' differences. "The problem of inequality have to be dealt with in civil society, which is a realm of inequality. But it is not easy to say how this can be done." (Walzer 2002, pp.41)

Secondly, who are our co-nationals and co-citizens? In a brief sentence, every co-national is our co-citizen, but not every co-citizen is our co-national. In multicultural societies citizens consist of several nationalities based on country of origin. But the role of a state and civil society is complex.

Miller cites Walzer's idea: it is required to have "capacity of the political community to determine a pattern of distribution, in other words on its power to create and enforce a scheme of distributive justice without outside interference." (Miller 2013, pp. 143)

Walzer "attaches great weight to the idea that principles of distributive justice depend upon the goods being distributed having shared social meanings. Shared social meanings, however, require more than just existence of a power that can create and enforce a distributive pattern. They presuppose a community with a common language in which the meanings can be expressed, interaction over time between the members of the community and so forth." (Miller 2013, pp. 143)

It brings the immediate problem of linguistic heterogeneity and that is why states put highlight on language knowledge of the given country. It enables communication among groups and the state itself. Political representation is a second, crucial tool of expression that creates a threshold above which groups enjoy advantages, but below people rely on each other and strengthen partiality. However I want to highlight the issue of accent: Angela Merkel once declared (and immediately repealed) that Turkish people in Germany must speak German with no accent in order to fully assimilate into the society. May I ask how many official dialects with different accents are spoken among native Germans? Many. Common language use might have practical function but not any further cultural-social connotation.

3.3 Duties of the Civil Society

In liberal sense, civil society is a voluntary association (family is the only non-voluntary association) that includes all groups non-coercively. Individuals are free to move among groups motivated by interest, benefits, power etc. Civil society is the free space that contains groups and enables self-realization extended to the political arena as well. From egalitarian theory's perspective the most disturbing element of this society is the unchosen membership in race, gender, religious groups. People can freely move among groups or have multi-membership in several groups, but one cannot have two genders or religions at the same time. Civil society's inclusiveness is challenged in these cases, when the person cannot or does not want to belong to another group: to protect them and ensure them equal rights are not easy that needs association and state help.

Associational commitment is born if people use their freedom to maintain civility. Individual, egoism must be overwritten otherwise no state power exist that can stick together the groups. So to say, civility comes from within, not from external sources of power. Liberalism aims to create plurality, so liberal state is "the chief playing field" of civil society. (Walzer 2002, pp. 35-37)

Values of civil society determine the notion of good life within the given community. Individual choice is always altered by the dominant form of good life, and it continuously changes. Conflicts between groups hence values are necessary building elements of civil society. The point is not to avoid it but to make it just. Conflict among minority-majority groups is unequal therefore expresses the hegemonic willingness, values, interests. "Civil society is a school indeed- for competitive coexistence and toleration, which is to say, for civility. Of course, it is also, simultaneously, a school for hostility and sometimes for zeal." (ibid., pp.38)

There are three abstract principles of justice: equality, need, and merit (Miller 2013, pp. 78), that are weighted in different proportion in collectivist groups. Equality and need get the greatest focus, while merit is just behind. What does influence this order? Culture affects how principles of justice should be applied. That can destroy the desire to act on principles of justice of the majority culture. So it is a denial from the minority, that closes itself out from the bigger culture, therefore the majority excludes the minority as a reaction. It is a vicious circle that needs mutual agreement in order to step forward. Social justice can be achieved if group members practice justice toward insiders and outsiders equally, even if separate groups seem to be equal and properly working. There is a case from the 90' of Hungary when Roma communities still existed under the power and leadership of the ruler ("vajda"). Their jurisdiction, redistribution of basic resources and wealth, elementary economic decisions was supervised by the 'vajda'. Their community had strict traditional norms and rules, not necessarily identical with the Hungarian rules and values. Although the system worked properly, and the Hungarian police respected their territory for the sake of tranquility, it obviously was not a proper and just form of minority group. These communities must integrate themselves into the majority community and apply the same duties, laws as the majority.

The problem is that these groups are adjudged to be a threat to the ongoing practice of justice and undermine the existing democratic institutions, and indirectly the hegemonic culture of the civil society. It is not a surprise that alien culture threatens people who live in their familiar environment so they take self-defense and intensify partiality toward co-nationals.

In quantitative sense, the more group exist in a society, the stronger the civility is. But in practice, quality opposes quantity. Parallel networks of people might weaken the civil society, and migrants, ethnic minorities tend to create their own, separated networks.

Miller sadly shares Alesina and Ferrara's findings: "people are more likely to trust others in an unequal city than in a racially fragmented one." If the minority's fragile identity gets attention and gains positive attachments, people tend to trust that group. Minorities must battle with deeply embedded historical experiences, common consciousness and discrimination. Trust is the most troublesome factor and very fragile. "There are [...] several macro-level studies that find an inverse correlation between ethnic diversity and levels of expenditure on redistributive social programmes [...]" (Miller 2013, pp. 88)

If political realm aims to protect group members as individuals and as a community, risks and liabilities might occur. Class difference and power relations exist not only in the overall society but within a group: there are weak and strong links. Great danger of civil society is exclusion: the weak, marginalized gets ignored, do not possess sufficient communication channels and protection. It happens often in more homogeneous societies, although multicultural states where gender, race, religion, nationality and social divisions create obstacles are the absolute endangered cases. The welfare state's resources are benefitted by people who can reach those advantages, who use social net, and are represented respectfully. Civil society does have protective role, particularly in case of disperse immigrants who do not have centralized representation. "Identity politics in modern pluralist societies- [...] - is most importantly and most problematically the politics of weak groups, whose members are poor and (relatively) powerless. So it would seem- [...] – that the best way to respect them is to address their collective (as well as their individual) weakness. But this indirect approach avoids the question the question whether they have a right to recognition and respect as members and whether it is necessary, or possible, to enforce this right directly." (Walzer 2002, pp. 41)

So far it is obvious that civil society has to take responsibility, not only for its co-nationals but all members of its society. Classic liberalism assumes that there is no additional

responsibility, but private life and private issues. Let me state that liberalism and multiculturalism in classical sense are in serious contradiction, as the next chapter will introduce. However theory and practice rarely overlaps, liberalism needs to be revised in order to find solution. Liberal egalitarian and social democratic arguments, with different methods, agree that society must take responsibility.

In financial terms, resource allocation for disadvantageous groups is a rather simple process, including non-profit organizations, grants, tax exemptions, philanthropic gifts etc. In moral terms, it is quite a complicated duty.

Every minority group shows similar vertical socio-economic features to the majority society: there is a small number of strong members who makes decisions and set rules, and there is many weak members and the new entrants.

Let's suppose that allocated financial resources reach the chosen group (let me skip the criteria based on what the groups is chosen), now the leaders, powerful members of that group decide about the distribution. There is no assurance that money reaches potential targets and helps them to become strong members of their group. At that point, in my opinion, state needs room in order to act and regulate. It is intervention, beyond all doubt, but "[t]he principle at stake here probably has a twofold, social and political, character: first, associational policies and practices that radically curtail the life chances of members ought to be resisted by the (liberal egalitarian) state; and, second, policies and practices that limit the rights or deny the responsibilities of citizenship should be similarly resisted. The harder question is posed by the first of these: what constitutes "radical" curtailment? On, more fundamentally, what range of life chances is inquired by the idea of individual autonomy?" (Walzer 2002, pp. 45)

We can summarize that multiculturalism is not a building element of social justice, it always has a feeling of remedy. Without judging any groups-minority or majority- I try to justify

these human reactions. Thomas Hurka makes an effort to justify nationalist attitude and observe its roots. In defense of nationalism, he detects two arguments: cultural perfectionist and metaethical particularist argument. The first has already been anatomized because personally I am convinced about its validity. The culture, we born into gives us properties, and means that constitute one's personality to a high degree. Our 'embedded self' in a culture justifies our national partiality toward our "mother nation". There is one problematic puzzle: which mother nation it is. There are millions of people who cannot be grouped into one national community; rather it is their personal decision and emotionally biased want where they belong to.

Secondly, I share Hurka's second argument which proves that impartiality does not exist: "[...] impartialist morality, [...] is inconsistent with the true nature of moral codes and principles. These codes and principles, [...] always arise within particular cultures; they are addressed to the members of a culture as having the particular cultural identities they have and as occupying particular roles within that culture. Morality is always our morality, in these circumstances here. This means that the standpoint presupposed by impartial morality- [...] – is not available. Morality must be impartial because the impartialist alternative is conceptually incoherent." (Hurka edited by McKim and McMahan 1997, pp. 143)

Finally, in certain philosophical sense, multiculturalism and nationalism can line up on the same side and combat individualism and materialism which are harmful for collective responsibility, cultural membership and equality. But the two identical concepts are in sharp opposition in practice: they respect different cultural communities. The nationalist links community to a certain geographical position while multiculturalists are less concerned about the position, but the way of life and values that are attached to that certain culture. (Levy 2000, pp. 106)

4. Multicultural Welfare State

The final section of the thesis work aims to interleave principles of liberal multiculturalism, and implications of culture, identity within the welfare state. Civil societies are welfare societies when we study their economic consistence, and just like civil society is influenced by ethnic pluralism, the welfare state is affected as well. The standardized and simplified notion gives the impression that welfare state is an evident causation of a certain level of well-being. Or it is a human right to live in a state where social services protect people from deprivation, and maintain them on an optimum level at least. The growing demographic pressure and complex ethnic relations however put serious strain on the national governments in well-developed, developed and developing countries equally.

Besides the obvious that the welfare state is built on economic dynamics, it has moral foundations too. According to this foundation, welfare is based on social unity, trust, loyalty, solidarity, mutual interest etc. Ethnic diversity, according to critiques, is eroding unity of the welfare state, thus the community.

Here we arrived to the core criticism of multiculturalism that is supported on empirical level. Theoretical considerations can be combatted, challenged but such a strong assumption – diversity erodes the welfare state- needs discussion and further empirical observation, but the latter is not goal of the present thesis. My aim is to prove that liberal multiculturalism policies and aspirations do not destroy the meta-communities of nation states, but strengthen them, so they do not harm the welfare state. Multiculturalism has two effects that can be criticized: moral consequences and economic/welfare consequences. My moral discussion is explained in the previous chapters, but welfare consideration is not separated from it entirely.

This intention to argue for some kind of multicultural integration is achievable if we accept that liberal multiculturalism has limitations, migrants must take liberal impositions and certain

degree of integration is necessary. General mistake is that scholars do not name those multicultural policies that they blame for destroying the community.

Which are these multicultural policies? And what makes a policy multicultural?

Answering these basic questions we probably will see that policies of multicultural countries show integrative tendency in many cases, they balance between multicultural recognition and civic integration in order to strengthen their meta-community while preserving their precious minorities. And this is not only the case in dual-ethnic countries but in poli-ethnic ones as well.

Previously I suggested that redistribution and recognition has to co-exist in the liberal state. From the perspective of welfare state, it is called 'recognition/redistribution trade-off' hypothesis. (Banting, Kymlicka 2006, pp. 4) I do not see that there is a necessary trade-off among the two. However my hypothesis is not underpinned by sufficient number of studies, researches therefore I can only rely on my understanding of the problem.

It is important to separate two subgroups of ethnic minorities: immigrants and non-immigrant minorities. Philosophical theory does not inevitably make a distinction between the two. Non-immigrant minority groups enjoy particular advantages, treatment, exemptions in the past couple of years that is visible and absolutely accepted. Their claims are justified based on the historical harms, oppression they suffered previously. Their coercive integration was done decades ago, now forms of remedy are urged from the majority.

Immigrants are a very different case. Their independence, cultural preservation, distinction is questioned and problematic. But difference does not equal vicious. The economic crisis caused some retreat from multiculturalism policies, integrative policies were newly introduced. Yet, couples of years ago, immigrant groups were not targets of minority politics. The turning point is that members of the immigrant groups are growing so fast that their representation in a country is significant, their distinct cultures are visible and striking.

My suggestion is that degree of integration is required for the sake of tranquility and unity, is valid for these immigrant groups and proven by policy trends that slightly prioritize integration as well. But legally, these claims cannot be separated. Historic minorities enjoy comfortable and properly differentiated rights that reflect multiculturalism practice. Then why do immigrant groups face resistance?

Recognition/redistribution trade-off therefore is more threatening in case of immigrant groups according to arguments. Immigrants are not integrated at all (not like indigenous people) therefore multiculturalism further emphasizes the difference among people, that lowers support for welfare redistribution. Social heterogeneity constraints redistribution. (Wilensky 1975 in Banting 2005)

However crisis of the welfare state exist since the oil crisis: it is easy to blame “strangers” of a society for economic malfunctions. It has no evidence that citizens of welfare states before multicultural policies had trust and solidarity toward each other and these policies destroyed that idyllic picture. Au contraire, ignoring subgroups create misunderstanding, suspicion, alienation and marginalization. The state must encourage immigrants to participate, open to the majority, spread information and co-operate. One of the liberal impositions I suggested requires such open-mindedness.⁸

There is one other argument that suggests that people tend to misdiagnose the problems that minorities face. Cultural ‘misrecognition’ becomes the center of the problem, instead of realizing that culture is just a part of the socio-economic and socio-cultural situation. There are many origins of inequality (race, culture, social) that must be encountered, so multiculturalism should not be ideologically committed to the cultural difference. Unfortunately, cultural and economic inequalities fall to the same place and trap the minority into a vicious social position. Multiculturalism has the potential ability become essentialist,

⁸ I am aware of how abstract this requirement is. Although I am convinced that attitudes, behaviors are qualitatively measureable and demonstrable.

that might cause such a misdiagnosis effect, but it depends on the environment how it turns to this open debate. (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, pp. 10-20)

The problem is that no one has tested empirically that multicultural policies have real effect on the social redistribution, so there is no systematic evidence that these policies erode interpersonal trust, solidarity therefore indirectly the welfare state's ideology and operation. However the extend of change does matter (Swank 2002, Huber and Stephens 2001) which underpins my theory that some integration is necessary that can be realized in form of liberal impositions.

Scholars suggest that multicultural policies crowded out redistributive issues from the policy agenda. If we take a rigorous look at the exact multicultural policies that are implemented in the EU's member states, some surprising outcomes might reject this assumption.

Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting (2006) introduce the Multicultural Policy Index which focuses on the treatment of minorities, excludes the exclusively non-discriminatory policies. These policies are supporting accommodation of minorities while preserve their identity and respect their claims. The three main measured areas are immigrants, national minorities and indigenous groups. It excludes negative policies like the case of Denmark, but these countries are initially offensive toward multiculturalism policies. Therefore negative cases would have just lowered their index, but the overall pattern is not affected.

Highlight of the thesis was on the growing number of immigrant minorities, so let me list the components of the immigrant Multicultural Policy Index.

1. constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism
2. the explanation/celebration of multiculturalism in the school curriculum
3. the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing

4. exemptions from dress codes, Sunday-closing legislation, etc.
5. allowing dual citizenship
6. the funding of ethnic group organizations or activities
7. the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction
8. affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, pp. 49-56)

Countries are scored based on how they implemented these claims: explicitly adopted MCP equals 1.0 score, incomplete or implicit adaptation of a policy equals 0.5 score and 0 is given if the policy is not adopted. There are three categories of countries based on the collected scores: strong ($x \geq 6.0$ out of 8.0 scores), modest ($3.0 \leq x \leq 5.5$) and weak ($x < 3.0$) multicultural societies.⁹

Indigenous and national minorities have only slightly different claims but the classification of countries shows extreme differences. While indigenous groups mostly receive special treatment, immigrants still suffer serious neglect. If one country is capable of implementing MCPs for its national minority, then it is possible for the sizeable immigrant communities too. In the countries of measurement certain welfare crisis exists independent of their MCPs, the degree of implementation and number of substate minority groups. The conclusion of the measurement is that there is no evidence that countries with strong MCPs have relative decline in their levels of spending and redistribution. (ibid., pp. 65)

The argument does not stand based on the testing. Undoubtedly there is potential tension in the welfare state that partially is originated from hostility toward foreigners, and partially from real life events of the welfare crisis. Further testing is seriously needed in order to measure interrelations among multiculturalism and welfare state. There is no a master

⁹ Immigrant MCP: **Strong**: Canada, Australia, **Modest**: Sweden, UK, US, Belgium, **Weak**: France, Norway, Switzerland, Spain, Germany, Denmark (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, pp. 58)

narrative that can be applied universally, so each country's uniqueness determine how and to what extent these policies are applied.

4.1. Workfare

The subchapter is an independent subject: workfare vs. welfare. However I suggest building a link between the two sections therefore there is a chance to highlight a contemporary problem of daily multiculturalism politics. This section aims to give a rather normative idea about the crisis of welfare state. It is not specifically to the minorities but a universal solution (suggestion) which faces the undisputable problems of the system.

Workfare is an alternative system instead of welfare. It is an adequate reconsideration of the current system because that will be unsustainable within a short time due to demographic, economic factors. Ageing population, ethnic diversity and connected conflicts, nationalist voices, xenophobia insist change in the welfare system (or in the perception of people that is discussed earlier). Workfare obliges unemployed people to meet certain participation requirements on the labor market, show activity and willingness to improve their skills and potentials in order to get a job. This way they increase the possibility of returning to the job market, or at least find temporary jobs organized by the state. The program has two main goals: on one hand it is building a bridge between unemployment and employment by mandatory (temporary) jobs, on the other hand, increasing human capacity by trainings and education.

Both tools are created to get the unemployed to contribute to the welfare system, and insist their job seeking. The experience of having a job makes it easier to get back to full-time positions with real salary, regardless of how much time they spent as unemployed. It is highly recommended in the UK where there are more than 250.000 families in which non of the

members have ever had any job so the culture of working (work ethic) is simply missing. It is also necessary in those extreme cases when the citizen spent long years, decades on welfare so the job market has changed so much that it discourages the unemployed to get back to it. The third case is the migrants' situation: if the state organizes mandatory jobs as first step, migrants might rather choose it instead of the black/grey economy and get their first experiences about a country in an organized, controlled form. It then enforces their further occupation, proper use of the language and the impression of unity and protection.

The training/education tool gives opportunity to those who did not have access to proper education previously or migrants who did not have eligible degrees/certificates in the new country. It is the case that disadvantageous groups like migrants, elderly, poor people cannot follow demands of the job market (IT skills, language requirements) and it discourages them to participate in it. Organized trainings could narrow the gap among disadvantageous and advantageous groups. The system has already in work in Canada, Australia, UK or Hungary where it is called Közmunkaprogram. According to the Hungarian 1991. IV. Act, 2§ (2) asylum seekers, refugees, immigrants who are free to move and possess right of abode, have the same rights and duties as Hungarian citizens. 2§ (3) Labor migrants after six months of employment in Hungary are eligible for the same rights on the job market as the Hungarian citizens.¹⁰

¹⁰ 1991. évi IV. törvény a foglalkoztatottság elősegítéséről és a munkanélküliek ellátásáról:

2. § (1) A foglalkoztatás elősegítése és az álláskeresők támogatása során az egyenlő bánásmód követelményét meg kell tartani. E rendelkezés nem zárja ki azt, hogy a munkaerőpiacon hátrányos helyzetben levőket többletjogosultságok illessék meg.

(2) A menekültként, oltalmazottként vagy menedékesként elismert, továbbá a bevándorolt vagy letelepedett jogállású, valamint a szabad mozgás és tartózkodás jogával rendelkező személyeket az e törvény és végrehajtási szabályai által tartalmazott jogokat és kötelezettségeket illetően a magyar állampolgárral azonos jogok és kötelezettségek illetik meg és terhelik. Törvény, valamint kormányrendelet e szabálytól a külön törvény szerint a szabad mozgás és tartózkodás jogával rendelkező személy (a továbbiakban: a szabad mozgás és tartózkodás jogával rendelkező személy) tekintetében eltérő szabályokat állapíthat meg.

(3) Azt a harmadik országból származó munkavállalót, aki a harmadik országbeli állampolgárok beutazásáról és tartózkodásáról szóló törvényben meghatározott összevont kérelmezési eljárás alapján kiadott tartózkodási engedéllyel rendelkezik és Magyarországon legalább hat hónapig munkaviszonyban állt, az álláskeresőként való nyilvántartásba vétel, valamint az álláskereső ellátása tekintetében az e törvény és végrehajtási szabályai által meghatározott jogokat és kötelezettségeket illetően a magyar állampolgárral azonos jogok és kötelezettségek illetik meg.

This six month of employment can be fostered by state organized employment in the workfare. Further prosperity of the employee is much likely after the state aid.

Theoretically it is good alternative to solve the crisis of the welfare system however I must add my concerns about its possible consequences. The workfare builds system on capable people who are able to work but neglects those who are disabled, sick and unable to fulfill these requirements. It raises a barrier among non-capable and capable people that might cause alienation of the non-capable ones and make them feel useless, strain on the rest of the society. The purpose of the workfare is faulty: working people want to erase free riders of the welfare net, but neglects the fact that a significant percent of those people are unable to work/contribute due to physical, social reasons. They are branded as abusers of the welfare system unless they prove the opposite which is not possible in case of many people.

In addition, jobs organized by the state are low-paying menial ones that give little satisfaction and even tinier experience of the real work life. People in the workfare program became stigmatized, suffer from stereotypes and get trapped into their social situation. If they pass the mandatory time of the workfare, they probably get similarly low-paying jobs on the market because employers pay just a little more than the workfare and expect employees to be grateful for the jobs.

Trainings/education is a better tool however it is questionable that the given education is able to offer real knowledge and useful “equipment” on the current job market. If the state wants to increase quality, it must be financed from taxpayer’s money so it might face opposition again. Stigmatization is a valid threat as well, and it continues the already existing social alienation of disadvantaged people.

In case on the migrant workforce, I find it more applicable to introduce certain level of workfare. Their inexperience on the job market, lacking language and other skills can be partially supported by state organized trainings and jobs. Their migrant position is more vulnerable than the national poor's, in my opinion. I do not suggest a necessary ranking of national and ethnic poor groups, however it might be a tight balancing of pros and cons of workfare and in that case newcomer migrant groups can benefit more of it.

Conclusion

In a world where people often shape the difference into a judgment, diversity needs serious reconsideration. It is time to combat common senses, misinterpretations, and misunderstandings. The thesis work aim was to go back to the roots of the modern notion of “multiculturalism”, interpret it in a special way and suggest checks and balances that make it viable in the future. Introduction of group-differentiated rights on the sense of civic identity and mutual concern can be a starting point of a multicultural civic integration which is not an utopist contradiction anymore. Differentiated citizenship can exist and function properly but it immediately opposes the basic liberal thesis of citizenship. One of my main goals was to merger liberalism and multiculturalism that these notions must co-exist for maintaining those liberal values that determine every civil society. These values are hardly defined, but in a wider sense, liberalism is the only plausible framework for diversity.

In the heterogeneous environments people rally their subgroup values with civic virtue of their new home country and create merely new perception of values, culture, spirit and national pride. It is still difficult to figure out how these values are created and how to enhance them. There are dynamics, rules, perceptions that are stable, cannot be influenced, and there are many which are constantly changing- as I have insisted in the chapter about civil society. It is rare that there is no any approximation from the minority groups; rather they wish to participate in mainstream of the society and politics. However some religious habits require exemption that causes a clash between poliethnicity and inclusion. I suggested making a distinction between socio-cultural and social-economic status, and the latter might be the easier case. Double standards are applied on every day basis but we hardly see that socio-cultural exemptions (where I put religious exemptions as well) are given to Christians, Jewish people too. Meanwhile socio-economic status is a factor that classifies everybody into social groups, no matter of ethnicity. The point is that both factors are applied to the whole society,

only the double standard and stereotyped view makes it a minority problem. It proves that people are capable of sharing cultural heritage and build new cultural values, the question whether they want to.

The role of welfare state gets into focus when material inequality is at stake, discussed in the final chapter. Protection of citizens is possible through a strong welfare state, but it needs contribution and mutual support. If the state offers real protection to its members (minorities as well), they probably will feel safe and want to be real part of the society (inclusion). This unity is the engine of the welfare system.

But I do not deny the fact that minority groups are different: equality does not mean similarity but they can co-exist. Their unique socio-cultural heritage exists despite the socio-economic equality that they want to achieve via self-governance/self-representation. Here we face a deeply philosophical consideration of society as one co-operative scheme of perpetuity. (Rawls, 1971)

But it assumes certain hierarchy: minorities work for the large society in order to assimilate and cooperate, for the common good and welfare. On economic level, it probably enables them to be equal, but their cultural, social difference stays. And why would they want to eliminate it? Self-governance with well-designed conditions can be integrative and protective for both parties. Continuous refusal from central government cause hostile attitude and conflicts on local and national level. Indigenous groups brought so much progress in understanding ethnic minorities, and this proves that multiculturalism is not just a political propaganda but real life dictated consequence.

That is undisputable that certain sacrifices in institutional cooperation must be made for further ethnic peace: the co-living is two-player (at least) game. But each party makes remarkable compromises that improve human virtue the most.

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