

INTEGRATING THE PATRIARCH?  
NEGOTIATING MIGRANT MASCULINITY  
IN TIMES OF CRISIS OF MULTICULTURALISM

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## **Declaration**

I hereby declare that this dissertation contains no materials previously accepted for any other degree in any other institutions and no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where the appropriate acknowledgement is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

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## **Abstract**

In this thesis, I study how Turkish migrant masculinities are represented in the Austrian context, how these representations are used politically and how migrants themselves engage with this context. To do so, I employ discourse analytical as well as ethnographic methods and analyze different sites of knowledge production around migrant masculinity.

I start with a critical discussion of existing research on Turkish migrant men in the German speaking context and problematize culturalistic notions of Turkish masculinity that can be found in this body of literature. Upon that, I develop an alternative approach to the study of racialized masculinities, bringing together critical masculinity studies, critical migration studies and feminist postcolonial theory.

Equipped with this theoretical approach, I analyze Austrian migration law and accompanying political discourses since the 1960s to show the role that shifting constructs of migrant male others play in legitimizing migration legislation. My analysis shows that racialized images of archaic Turkish migrant masculinity are currently employed to discredit multiculturalist politics and argue for strict migration policies.

Upon that, I present three chapters in which I studied how Turkish migrants engage with the dominant images. First, I focus on the contemporary discourse of homophobic Muslims and ask how a group of migrant LGBT activists in Vienna engage with this discourse and which notions of Turkish masculinity they construe in their work. The analysis not only documents the activists' strategies of engaging with stereotypes within the white gay scene in Austria, but also shows how the activists frame problems and needs of gay Turkish migrants and the diverging solutions they found. In the following chapter I present the analysis of a group of young men with Turkish migrant background, who engaged in rap music and seemed to correspond to images of problematic Turkish youth. But, based on

interviews and ethnographic data, I show the work that the young men put into crafting a ghetto persona that is more hybrid than the dominant images about Turkish youth would have it. Finally, we get to know a young Turkish migrant film maker, who used the medium of film to criticize masculinity constructs amongst Turkish migrants in Austria. As his engagement in art made him ever more critical of questions around representation, he decided to make a film about this very study, highlighting complicated questions about representation.

I end this study, by critically discussing how images of migrant Turkish male Otherness are used to establish notions about a modern normative Western masculinity. Furthermore, I discuss the limits of integration oriented research and argue for the need to decolonize research on racialized masculinities. Such research should aim to highlight intersectional structures of dominance as well as sites of friction, contradiction and resistance to these relations of power.

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# 1. Introduction

*“The researcher does not know in advance where her  
or his investigation will go.”*  
Dorothy Smith, 2005

My interest for the topic of this thesis dates back several years and it was initially a quite naïve one. Finishing sociology at Vienna university, I decided to write an MA thesis on the living situation of Turkish migrant men in Vienna, as this seemed a convenient way to combine the two fields that interested me most, namely masculinity and migration studies. After finishing my thesis, I started a PhD project in which I planned to commence studying migrant men in Austria and also searched for ways to disseminate the outcomes of my MA thesis. This turned out easier than I thought, as most applications to present conference papers went through and journals published my findings. However nice this initially felt, it was this very attention that gradually raised doubts: why were people actually so interested in the topic of Turkish migrant men? Where did the desire to learn more about the lives, thoughts and mores of these men come from? And: what is social science’s role in satisfying this desire? These doubts made me change my research focus to include that what is all too often left out in research on migrant men: the context in which migrant masculinity is produced and negotiated.

In this thesis, I critically analyze discourses about migrant masculinity in Austria and study how migrant men engage with this context. Although I reject the idea of ethnicities as objective groups, I particularly focus on constructs of *Turkish* migrant masculinity, as this is currently the most heatedly debated migrant male group in Austria. I consciously follow this highly charged discourse to unearth the imageries, longings and the violence it builds on.



This goes along with a critique of the way that social science has approached the topic of migrant masculinities. Often focusing on issues of social deviance, many studies took over the dominant notion that Turkish migrant men are foremost a social problem. Searching for the causes for problematic behavior, ‘Turkish-Muslim culture’ is often the central point of explanation, both in public and academic discourses. In the German speaking context,<sup>1</sup> some studies on migrant masculinities exist today that question this culturalizing approach. These critical studies urge us to shift the focus of attention and analyze the effects of racialized structures of dominance and the effects these structures have on migrant men.

To achieve this shift in focus, I have developed a theoretical approach that situates the social production of migrant masculinities within the reproduction of patriarchal gender relations and racism in times of neoliberal migration regimes. The framework builds on a relational understanding of masculinities (Monterescu 2007) and sees the articulation of migrant masculinities as intricately linked to the formation of the hegemonic male norm. A historical analysis of Austrian migration politics, which marks the starting point of my empirical analysis, shows how the line between unmarked male norm and problematic otherness has shifted along with changing political contexts. Current discourses on ‘Turkish-Muslim men’ are integral to the legitimization of restrictive politics of migration and integration. Informed by images of archaic village-culture and dangerous religiosity, discourses about ‘Turkish-Muslim men’ serve to draw the line between accepted and intolerable difference, or ‘good’ and ‘bad’ diversity (Lentin and Titley 2011).

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<sup>1</sup> Although differences exist, Austria shares many similarities with Germany concerning the history and presence of migration and migration discourses. I use phrases like “the German speaking context” in this text when referring to phenomena that occur widely similar in Austria and Germany. Unfortunately I could not include the Swiss context in this study.

Beyond critically analyzing these discourses of male otherness, I was interested to learn about the strategies that Turkish migrant men develop in dealing with this environment. To do so, I conducted ethnographic research with men living in Vienna who actively engaged with the dominant ideas about ‘Turkish-Muslim men’. Using different methods of activism and cultural production, these men entered into the struggles over negotiating what Turkish migrant masculinity might mean in Austria today. Following these men and their work over a period of time, I have learned about the complex, contradictory and, at times, troubling dynamics of these negotiations.

The dominant images about Turkish-Muslim masculinity affect the lives of the men and also shape their self-positioning. Their tactics ranged from appropriating and employing dominant imageries to attempts of broadening them to include non-stereotypical ways of conceptualizing Turkish-Muslim masculinity to critique and subversion of the dominant images and challenges to the legitimacy of those institutions that partake in their reproduction.

### **1.1. Research questions**

The following questions guided my research: (1) How is Turkish migrant masculinity constructed in dominant discourses? In more detail, I am interested how particular notions of gender, sexuality and racial difference inform these constructs and how they participate in drawing boundaries between self and other. (2) How are the dominant images about Turkish migrant masculinity related to social and political structures in Austria? How are they used to legitimate exclusion and avert resistance? (3) How do the dominant discourses affect the lives of men with Turkish migration background and what strategies do they find in dealing with this environment?

## 1.2. The Austrian context

Historical research has shown that diverse forms of migration have long shaped the Austrian population (e.g. Bauböck 1996). But this rich history of immigration and emigration, of forced and voluntary migration movements is lost from dominant debates which focus on particular migrant groups and sketches a distorted, limited picture of Austria's history of migration. In these debates, the so-called 'guest worker era' of the 1960s and 70s figures prominently and also shapes the ways that Turkish migrants and their children are talked about today. As described in more detail in chapter 3, the system of temporary recruitment of migrants to meet the then existing labor demand, has boosted migration from Turkey (and Ex-Yugoslavia). Many of these migrants did not return but stayed and started families or brought their spouses and children from Turkey. Statistics<sup>2</sup> show that almost 20% of the Austrian population has a migration background<sup>3</sup> today. About 18% of the migrant population has a Turkish background. Both in research and public discourse the children and grandchildren of the former 'guest workers' are commonly referred to as 'second' and 'third generation'. Although I take up this wording where necessary to retrace the dominant ways of framing migration in Austria, it seems important to note the problematic imagery at work. The wording highlights the supposedly 'strange' ancestry of particular people and marks migrants' offspring as embodying this very strange-ness. This wording not only fits to a nationalism that puts high value on an imagined shared national culture, but also corresponds to the Austrian naturalization law which is, for the most part, based on the notion of *ius sanguinis* where citizenship is acquired from parents rather than country of birth. Returning back to statistics, we see that Turkish migrant youth is the biggest migrant youth population in Austria. Also, the numbers show that children from Turkish migrant households, to a big part 'inherit' the

<sup>2</sup> E.g. of „Statistik Austria“, see: [www.statistik.at/web\\_de/statistiken/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur](http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur)

<sup>3</sup> I.e. either they themselves or their parents were born outside Austria.

marginalized social position of their parents, as their unemployment rates are comparatively high as is the share Turkish migrant youth in lower track schools.<sup>4</sup> Both this reality of social marginalization and of a dominant discourse that marks Turkish migrants and their children as problematically different, strongly shaped the context of this research.

### 1.3. Methodology

*Watch out for methodological watchdogs!*  
Pierre Bourdieu, 1992

Research methods are not a purely technical issue that could be discussed as a separate issue from a studies' overall approach. The choice and application of methods is part of the politics of research, as critical scholars have pointed out. Mehmoona Moosa-Mitha (2005) has outlined the epistemological and ontological overlaps between liberal social theory and objectivist methodology in mainstream (i.e. non-critical, non-emancipatory) research. This research is characterized by the conviction that social reality is a straightforward entity about which the researcher can produce objective knowledge. More than that, "social reality is not only knowable, but the researcher places herself in the role of a 'knower' through the process of undertaking research." (ibid: 45) The liberal researcher assumes the role of the expert who possesses privileged knowledge about the object' of research. The classical quality criteria of research methods in the social sciences (validity, objectivity, replicability, representativeness) reflect the liberal notion of society and the privileged role of the scientist.

In mainstream migration studies, this liberal approach to research is most common. Firmly situated in a positivist tradition, much of mainstream migration studies considers

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<sup>4</sup> „Migration & Integration in Österreich – Schwerpunkt Jugend“, by the Austrian Integration Funds, 2012.

historic constructs such as *state*, *border* or *national belonging* as objective categories that constitute the unchallenged context of research (Georgi and Wagner 2009). This approach to studying migration has been criticized as methodologically nationalist (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) in that it leaves the political nature of the context out of the analysis while focusing on migrants as seemingly objectively different to an imagined national society. Claiming to merely produce data and theories based on empirical facts, mainstream migration studies can thus position itself as objective and detached from sites of power and social struggles. But obviously this is not the case, as Mecheril and Castro Varela (2010: 48) exemplify in their critical discussion of one of the most prolific German migration sociologists, Hartmut Esser, who has conducted decades of quantitative research on migrants' 'acculturation processes' (in the tradition of Robert E. Park and the "Chicago School"). Esser has, amongst other things, argued that his data objectively shows the need for migrants to learn German, as those with lower German skills have lower income and formal education and worse living conditions (Esser 2009). The empiricist argumentation (*German is important for successful integration*) naturalizes structural racism as well as the exclusionary effects of mono-lingual social institutions and uses references to seemingly objective data to hide a normative claim (*migrants need to learn German*). Rather than liberal positivist methods, I thus sought a reflexive methodological approach that could grasp the very processes of making (and unmaking) particular migrant others.

A reflexive sociology, as outlined by Pierre Bourdieu (1992), not only questions the notion that methodology is simply an issue of technique, but also asks the researcher to reflect upon the foundations of knowledge production. Bourdieu argues that this is particularly relevant for studies on predefined social problems like 'troubled youth in banlieues', in which case the first task of the researcher needs to be "to take as one's object the social work of

construction of the pre-constructed object. That is where the point of genuine rupture is situated.” (ibid: 229) Such a reflexive approach aims to ‘rupture’ the entanglement between social structure and the social unconscious which veils these social structures and makes certain phenomena seem ‘naturally’ interesting, dramatic or pressing social issues. In the German speaking context, Turkish migrant masculinity has assumed the status of a social problem that seems to need academic as well as pedagogic and disciplinary attention. The methods I chose for my research, on the other hand, aim to put a spotlight on the very ‘social work’ put into creating this social problem.

However important Bourdieu’s remarks, feminist scholars have been more radical in articulating critiques and alternatives to ‘male-stream’ positivist sociology. According to this critique, dominant sociology reflects the ruling, male order in society and knowledge. It not only reproduces the dominant gendered division of labor but also of relevant and irrelevant topics and silences experiences of women (e.g. Smith 1974). This early feminist standpoint approach has received feminist critique but also generated important discussions relevant to my research project. Amongst others, it has spurred debate about the category of woman and the dangers of essentializing what is socially produced (Scott 1986). Closely connected to this is the important critique of feminists from Black and other racialized communities who argued that a simple opposition ‘male vs. female’ privileges white women’s experiences and viewpoints (Collins 1986). Today, this debate is mostly framed as ‘intersectionality’. To grasp the realities of interlocking forms of domination, I take up some of the insights generated in that field.

### **1.3.1. An intersectional methodology**

As the literature on intersectionality is too vast for a comprehensive discussion at this point, here I merely present specific aspects that were relevant for my own research project:

Different opinions exist about which and how many ‘axes of dominance’ should be considered in intersectional research. While this is an ongoing (and probably never ending) debate, three axes along race, class and gender are commonly seen to be central and affecting all members of society (Bilge 2010). This claim that *all* members of society are affected makes intersectionality open for analyses of both subordinating as well as superordinating effects, which is a relevant point when analyzing masculinities in contemporary societies (Brod 2002).

Intersectionality postulates that axes of difference are neither reducible to each other nor are they completely distinct entities (Yuval-Davis 2006: 200). This implies an understanding of ‘axes’ as never existing in a pure form but as always already enmeshed with each other. There is no way of being gendered without also being classed or raced (Walgenbach 2007). Intersectional analysis is interested in how different forms of social relations structured in dominance are mutually constituted and mutually constitute each other. On the level of conducting research, this spurs us to ‘ask other questions’:

The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms of subordination is through a method I call ‘ask the other question’. When I see something that looks racist, I ask, ‘Where is the patriarchy in this?’ When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, ‘Where is the heterosexism in this?’ When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, ‘Where are the class interests in this?’ (Matsuda 1991: 1189 cited in Davis 2008)

For my analysis, this has meant to focus on how multiple forms of discrimination feed into the production of othered masculinities and how migrant men themselves experienced these intersecting forms of dominance.

Finally, scholars (e.g. Klinger and Knapp 2007) have called for intersectional analyses to be multi-level in its methodology, bringing together experiential and structural aspects. Thus, Nira Yuval-Davis argues that “[s]ocial divisions have organizational, intersubjective, experiential and representational forms” (2006: 198) and that they should be studied in their interaction. In my analysis, I have aimed to grasp the multi-level nature of constructing migrant masculinity by analyzing research and media texts, political discourse and legal measures as well as subjective experiences and strategies of Turkish migrant men living in Vienna.

### ***1.3.2. Experience, discourse and institutions***

But ‘subjective experience’ is itself a highly debated concept. While early standpoint feminism has based much of its claims on women’s experience of marginalization, the notion of experience was troubled in the wake of postmodern and postcolonial criticism of ideas of coherent subject positions (Singer 2005: 203 ff.).

To answer the question of how to deal with experience in a non-essentializing way, I took up Joan Scott’s (1992) considerations on the issue. She calls for historicized analyses that understand experience not as pre-social. Research should focus “on processes of identity production, insisting on the discursive nature of ‘experience’ and on the politics of its construction.” (ibid: 37) Applied to my own research project, this has meant to reject the idea of studying an ‘object’ called migrant masculinity, but rather focus on the powerful discursive environment that created the position of migrant masculinity and study how those persons



who are ‘recognized’ as belonging to that subject position deal with this situation. In Scott’s words, I aimed “to understand the operations of the complex and changing discursive processes by which identities are ascribed, resisted, or embraced” (ibid: 33).

The Foucauldian framework of this approach to experience and subjectivity is hard to miss (Foucault 1998 [1976]). Rather than seeing ‘discourse’ as a mere manner of speaking about a given subject, it is understood as a site of power, struggle and the creation of those objects (subjects, truths) it speaks of. As Foucault’s writings on schools or prisons (Foucault 1977) have demonstrated, his notion of discourse leads beyond the analysis of mere texts and enables us to ask how particular regimes of truth, norms and regulations are embedded in institutions. In this spirit, I have included diverse institutions into my analysis and asked how they participate in the production migrant masculinity.

### ***1.3.3. Data collection and analysis***

To analyze the processes of constructing, negotiating and resisting particular ideas of Turkish migrant masculinity in contemporary Austria, I conducted research at diverse sites and analyzed a broad range of data. One of the corpuses I derive my analysis from is the work of my colleagues: social scientific research on (Turkish) migrant masculinity. In my view, these texts are more than a mere academic sub-field, but they actively participate in the negotiation processes I set out to analyze. This point is underscored by the fact that some of these academic texts have gained considerable popularity in public migration debates.

Within discourse analysis, it has long been established that political discourse not only ‘speaks about’ social problems but is actively involved in shaping and constructing the very problems it deals with. In line with such an understanding of policy-as-discourse (Bacchi 2000), I analyzed Austrian migration legislation and the political discourses that legitimized

these legal measures from the beginning of the so-called ‘guest-worker’ regime in the 1960s to the present. In this analysis, I focused on how particular notions of migrant masculinity informed the regulation and governance of migration in Austria. The historical analysis showed the shifting processes of constructing othered masculinities. Over the decades, both the attributes of male otherness as well as the national groups deemed particularly problematic shifted along with a shifting political and social context.

In public, political and social scientific discourse, Turkish migrant men are currently at the center of negotiations of male otherness in Austria, Germany and beyond. As I was not only interested in dominant discourses but also wanted to learn about the strategies that those who are targeted by these discourses develop, I also conducted field work in Vienna.

I ‘entered the field’ in 2007 with a rather diffuse idea of whom to contact as informants, but I was certain that I wanted to study Turkish migrant men who, in one way or the other, actively engage with public negotiations about Turkish migrant masculinity. While most sociological studies on migrant men focus on ‘regular’ men (fathers, etc.) or study men in some kind of trouble (prison inmates, drug dealers, gang members, etc.), I wanted to study Turkish migrant men who invested time and energy in entering the negotiations about Turkish migrant masculinity.

After many talks and preliminary interviews, the three ‘cases’ that I analyze in this thesis emerged: the members of a gay and lesbian migrant NGO, a group of young men engaged in hip hop and a film maker. During the research phase which lasted until 2010, I met with my informants in irregular intervals and conducted structured interviews, joined them at public and not-so-public performances and also analyzed diverse materials they produced. In the case of the NGO, I analyzed their journal and a short video they had made,

regarding the rap group, I included their songs into my analysis and I did the same with the film maker whose films I analyzed besides the interviews I conducted.

These three cases surely do not represent *the* field of activism around Turkish migrant masculinity in Austria. Even in the city of Vienna, there are several other groups that could be relevant for the questions that concern us in this study. These range from socialist Turkish and Kurdish groups, politicized intercultural theater groups, to activists at university. In this study, however, I restricted myself to a smaller number of activists for the sake of depth of analysis. Along with the differing social locations of the activists I studied, the three cases in my sample highlight different facets of current struggles over articulations of Turkish migrant masculinity. The contradictory role of sexuality in constructs of Turkish migrant masculinity comes to the fore in the case of the gay and lesbian NGO (and accompanies us throughout the thesis). The hip hoppers navigate a terrain shaped by moral panics over unemployed, criminal Turkish male youth while the case of the filmmaker shows the troubling dynamics around becoming a successful ‘migrant artist’ and documents an attempt to radically confront the production of knowledge on Turkish migrant masculinity.

A brief technical note on the question of names and pseudonyms: I do give real names of interview partners who gave me permission to do so. In other cases – which are explicitly marked as such – I use pseudonyms or, as in the case of the young rappers, I use their rap-names.

I believe that the analysis I present in my study touches upon important points of struggle around Turkish migrant masculinity which are relevant beyond the particular cases discussed. One issue seems to need special attention though: In a discursive environment that connects Turkish migration (and a supposedly monolithic ‘Turkish culture’) so strongly with a

supposedly monolithic Islam, it seems noteworthy that I did *not* include an explicitly Muslim organization into my analysis. Although Islam and Muslim faith did come up in diverse ways in all the cases I analyze, religion was not the dominant framework for the activities of my interview partners. Ethnographies such as Saba Mahmood's *Politics of Piety* (2005) have shown the tremendous potential of in-depth studies of religious Muslim groups for overcoming stereotypical notions of Islam, gender and culture and advance critical feminist research. Also within the field of masculinity studies, some research exists that has focused on Muslim men and highlighted the complex dynamics of gender and faith in the context of social relation of dominance and marginalization (Archer 2001; Gerami 2005; Ewing 2008). While this body of literature informed my own research interest and analysis, I none the less decided not to include an explicitly Muslim activist group into my sample. This was, on the one hand, a question of research economy and of not wanting to broaden the range of this study too far. But the decision was also informed by my unease of what Katharina Hierl recently called the "Islamization of integration debates" (Hierl 2012). In public, political and academic contexts there is currently a widely shared belief that Islam is of utmost relevance for issues of migration and integration, particularly when it comes to Turkish migrants. While I admit that such a focus *can* harbor interesting insights, I am critical of the dominant role that this framework has acquired in contemporary migration research. The framework privileges particular questions, analyses and proposed solutions to observed social problems while downplaying or leaving aside other issues, e.g. pertaining to political, legal or economic relations in migration societies such as Austria. While the absence of a Muslim group in my sample thus restricts the scope of my analysis, I aim to show the limits of the current religion/culture framework and establish a different perspective on the construction of masculinities in the context of migration.

For data analysis, I produced transcripts of the structured interviews (which were recorded) as well as memos of my observations and discussions during field work. Also, I transcribed the lyrics of the songs and the films I included in my analysis. I was fortunate to have been part of a small group of PhD students in Vienna who met regularly to collectively analyze our data, so I received tremendously important support with analyzing all interviews as well as several other material discussed in this thesis.<sup>5</sup> All of us were trained in social sciences and we adapted coding techniques as proposed within Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin 1990) and combined them with more fine-grained, hermeneutic methods of text analysis (Froschauer and Lueger 2003).

The research process often confronted me with challenging, surprising and complicated questions. This might be the case because ethnographic research was uncommon to me as a trained sociologist and I was not used to getting immersed so deeply into what I was studying. But obviously there are further aspects that made my endeavor a complicated one: as a member of white Austrian majority population, questions of privilege and traps of ‘speaking for’ the racialized other accompanied me throughout the research process. At several points in the research process it became clear that the issues I studied were highly charged and it would be naïve to believe that my interviews simply represented objective data. For example, several of my interview partners had previous experiences with interviews on the issues I was interested in, which obviously shaped their communication with me. This ranged from being highly suspicious because of negative experiences with newspaper-interviews to an apparent hope that my study could heighten the visibility of particular group of activists, to awkward

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<sup>5</sup> At this point, I would like to say a big thank you to the members of the interpretation group: Julia Edthofer, Assimina Gouma, Bettina Haidinger, Bettina Prokop and Petra Neuhold.

moments of supposed solidarity to outward critique of the role of social science in the reproduction of stereotypes about migrant men. In brief, I soon realized that my research did not take place in a discursive vacuum and that it would be futile to try erasing this fact throughout my analysis. Rather, I aimed to consciously take these processes into consideration, when choosing interview partners and research sites, during interviews and observations as well as when analyzing the data. I tried to be as open as possible to my informants about my research interests and preliminary findings, in order to focus their imaginations about me, my research project and possible ulterior motivations. This naturally did not annihilate frictions and insecurities during the research process and more than once, I found myself in struggles of positioning and self-positioning. Eventually I understood that these, sometimes highly uncomfortable,<sup>6</sup> moments are a direct outcome of the framework of my research project and I began seeing them as informative sites about the very processes of negotiating migrant masculinities that I was interested in. Sometimes I discussed these frictions openly with the interview partners in question in order to mitigate tensions and facilitate an open dialogue, sometimes I reflected on these experiences privately and sometimes they gave me important clues in understanding the phenomena I encountered and enriched my analysis.

Finally, this was a study conducted by a male researcher speaking (mostly) with men about masculinity, which obviously holds peculiar challenges. On the one hand, there is the danger of fraternization *as men*, which can not only lead to masculinist bonding and silencing of certain issues but also generate a false idea of a shared social location, thus blinding out the

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<sup>6</sup> Writing this, a particularly unsettling moment comes to mind, when one interview partner, after a long, and – as I thought – very open interview, asked me with a smirk: “How do you deal with the fact that people lie in interviews? Me and my friends, we all lie to interviewers.”

effects of divisions along class, racialization, sexuality, etc. (Hearn 2007). Other scholars have noted that the social situation of narrative interviews, asking for intense engagement with ones' memories, thoughts and feelings, runs counter the normative script of masculinity and may incite unsettling feelings of loss of control and vulnerability (Schwalbe and Wolkomir 2001). This dynamic did come up at times and lead to some awkward situations and discontinued research contacts. At other moments, I managed to use the resistance of my informants as a source to deepen my analysis. But loss of control was not an issue that only my informants had to struggle with. This was most explicit when the film maker I interviewed for this research told me he wanted to study my project and interview me in return. Sitting on the 'other side' of the interview situation, I learned quite a bit about the loss of control that interviewees experience and tried to use this uncomfortable knowledge for the way I conducted and analyzed my own interviews.

But research does not become reflexive by merely reflecting on one's social location and anxieties as a researcher. In critical research these considerations need be connected with a reflexivity regarding the research project and broader conditions of knowledge production. Which issues are deemed problematic and how are these problems defined? Which groups are identified as the bearers of a social problem and who is seen as bearers of knowledge and agency? In my view it is questions like these that constitute reflexive, critical research and I have tried to make this research project a space where these questions are not silenced.

#### **1.4. Chapter outline**

In the following chapter, I critically evaluate existing research on Turkish migrant men in the German speaking context and outline an alternative approach to the study of racialized masculinities. A closer look at mainstream studies on Turkish migrant men shows a troubling

culturalist tendency both in the questions these studies pose and the answers they find. Central to their argumentation is the idea of an archaic Turkish-Muslim masculinity that has been imported by migrants decades ago and passed on to next generations. Demonstrating the limits and pitfalls of this approach, I draw on a range of critical theories that constitute the theoretical framework of this study. This framework takes up critical masculinity studies and feminist theories of gender and nation to show that the production of migrant masculinities should be analyzed in its relation to the reproduction of male dominance and normative masculinity. Furthermore, I draw on feminist postcolonial approaches that highlight the gendered and sexualized nature of discourses of otherness and the contradictory imageries of racialized masculinities they promote. Finally, I discuss how research on contemporary articulations of racism in Western contexts can help to situate the analysis of constructs of Turkish migrant masculinities in the present social, political and economic context.

In chapter 3, the empirical part of this thesis starts with the attempt to historicize the study of migrant masculinities. Analyzing Austrian post-war migration policies the chapter shows that shifting constructs of ‘foreign masculinity’ were used to legitimate restrictive migration laws. The early ‘guest worker’ regime was mainly interested in questions of bodily health, strength and resilience, as migrant men were primarily seen as work objects. When migration was later reframed as a security threat to the nation and its people, new images of dangerous migrant masculinity arose. Contemporary politics of governing migration and integration construct images of archaic migrant masculinity to define unwanted populations and legitimate differentiated techniques of evaluation, inquiry and exclusion. The analysis not only uncovers troubling overlaps between political discourses and mainstream sociological studies but also shows that racialized notions of ‘foreign masculinity’ are firmly embedded in political rationalities of migration control.



Turkish-Muslim men have come under suspicion of being particularly homophobic. Chapter 4 takes a closer look at this discourse and shows how the notion of Turkish-Muslim homophobia is propagated in the Austrian context. The chapter then turns to the activists of a group that aims to improve the living situation of gay and lesbian migrants in Austria. My analysis focuses on the role that images of Turkish migrant masculinity play in their work – both the images they encounter as well as those they themselves promote. This analysis shows how complicated the terrain was that the activists had to navigate. Prejudices against gay Turkish men exist in diverse spaces and the group aimed to fight them amongst migrants, within the wider society as well as within the white gay scene. Depicting the situation of gay Turkish men, some activists themselves employed dominant notions about archaic Turkish masculinity to highlight problems and propose solutions. Finally, the analysis shows how the group entered into contemporary discourses of diversity and discusses both the merits and the problems of this strategy.

In Austria and elsewhere, male rappers with migrant background have sparked moral panics about integration failures and violent male youth. In chapter 5, I present ethnographic data of a group of young men from Turkish migrant families living in a Viennese low-income neighborhood that decided to follow the prominent examples and formed a rap group. My analysis shows the hard work that these young men put into creating a convincing ‘ghetto-masculinity’ and their struggle to reach audiences. To attain their goals they had to establish a reputation amongst peers and meticulously craft a particularly masculinist habitus. Furthermore, they sought to utilize diverse persons and institutions in their surroundings and managed to involve youth-workers, journalists and sociologists in their endeavor. This collective production of a hyper-masculine ghetto-persona is related to a context of economic crisis, diminishing welfare-institutions and the neoliberal celebration of diversity.

In chapter 6, the last empirical chapter, we encounter a young man with an unlikely biography. Being a son of Turkish ‘guest workers’, he quit school early to start an apprenticeship as bricklayer. But his life changed when he came in contact with the medium of film and he started to shoot films in which he critically observed his environment. I discuss how this practice went along with a radicalization of his critique of collective identities in general and masculinity constructs of Turkish migrants in particular. But his views did not remain the same over the years and it was his continuous engagement with film and art that has made him shift his critical gaze. Being an art student by the time I contacted him for this study, he again used his camera to critically observe how Turkish migrant masculinity is produced, only this time he did not make a film about the life of Turkish men in Vienna, but about this very study.

In the final chapter I draw conclusions from my analysis. I argue, that racialized images of migrant masculinity are not only used to legitimize strict migration policies, but that they are also part of broader struggles over white male hegemony. In that, notions about a modern normative Western masculinity are intricately entangled with the dominant images of racialized male Others, as the latter serve as counter-images to the first. I further discuss that my data shows the limits of integration oriented research and I argue for the need to *decolonize* research on racialized masculinities. Such research departs from the narrow framework of the integration paradigm to analyze the complex social positionings of racialized men, their experiences of exclusion as well as their struggles with, through and against images of male otherness. Critical research on racialized masculinities can thus highlight intersectional structures of dominance as well as sites of friction, contradiction and resistance to these relations of power.

## 2. Theoretical framework

*“We need to be suspicious when neat cultural icons  
are plastered over messier historical and political narratives.”*

Lila Abu-Lughod, 2002

The relatively small field of sociological research on migrant men is widely preoccupied with similar questions as the political and public debates about these men: What characterizes them? How different are these men to non-migrant, white men? Do they manage or fail to integrate into society? Do they pose risks – for their wives and children or the wider society? And, just like in dominant discourses, not *all* migrant men receive the same scholarly attention, as most research focusses on ‘problem groups’. Thus, the vast majority of that body of research focusses on working-class men and boys and it studies those ethnic groups which are deemed particularly ‘at risk’ in a given national setting.

In the German speaking context, this has led to an almost exclusive research focus on male Turkish migrants and their sons. In the following section, I critically discuss this body of research, its outcomes and the frameworks applied. This is more than a mere academic exercise of compiling the state of the art in a given research field as this body of literature is strongly embedded in particular discursive frameworks about Turkish-Muslim otherness and thus cannot be understood as detached from these wider debates. Several of the studies that gained popularity both within academia and in public discussions are highly problematic. Discussing these studies thus serves, on the one hand, to show the limits of much current research in the field and the need for new approaches. On the other hand, these studies are empirical material that gives us first clues about the field of power in which Turkish migrant masculinities are currently negotiated. Throughout this thesis, we will re-encounter particular

notions about Turkish migrant masculinity that we also find in these studies. It thus makes good sense to take a closer look at studies even if they are particularly problematic, as they highlight some of the discursive frameworks existing in the field of my study.

After having discussed mainstream studies on Turkish migrant men in the German context, I present studies that have taken a more critical stance on the issue and show what can be gained from these alternative approaches. These studies show the eminent need to broaden the perspective and introduce into the analysis the social context in which migrant masculinities are (socially) ‘produced’. Following up on this thought, I present a theoretical framework for my own study in the final section of this chapter.

## 2.1. The “second generation” at the center of attention

Interestingly, almost the whole research literature on Turkish migrant masculinity focusses not on migrant men themselves but on their children, i.e. what is commonly called the *second* or *third generation*. Turkish migrant men who came as so-called ‘guest workers’ in the 1960s and 1970s<sup>7</sup> seem to be less interesting or relevant as compared to their offspring. However, a closer look at the literature on migrants’ children does actually tell us quite a lot about how these *first generation* male migrants figure in the academic literature, when their role as fathers is discussed. Besides this role of fathers to their (male) children, these men do not seem to be of big interest to the sociological gaze. And thus, Margret Spohn’s (2002) study, which is one of the very few studies explicitly focusing on first generation Turkish migrant men in Germany is only partially deviating from this norm. Analyzing the men’s ‘family models’ and their relationship to their wives and children, Spohn analyzes whether the men’s

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<sup>7</sup> Germany started somewhat earlier than Austria with inviting migrants to come work for a limited time (the ‘guest-worker’ regime is discussed in more detail in the next chapter).

views and practices concerning the family have changed in the course of their migration. She argues that those men in her sample, who already in Turkey adhered to a liberal family model did not experience grave problems of accommodating to the German socio-cultural context. This was different for those of the (comparatively larger) group of men who lived according to a more conservative, religious and patriarchal family model. Spohn argues that, within this group, there are those who manage to take up the challenge which the German social context poses and change their relationship to their children and spouses towards a more egalitarian mode. Finally, the second group of conservative migrant men are reported to not come to terms with adapting to the liberal German culture. Rather, they cling to melancholic images of a Turkish past and demand respect for the structures of patriarchal dominance they know from their youth. While Spohn tries to give a differentiated view of Turkish migrant men, she narrows the focus to fit it into an integration framework that is ultimately merely interested in how well certain migrant populations adapt to a society which is imagined as integrated, modern and liberal. In that, Spohn's study is well within the established research frame we re-encounter in the studies on migrant men's sons, which constitute the vast majority of research on Turkish migrant masculinity in the German context.

### ***2.1.1. Sociology's interest in migrant generations***

With its focus on migrant children, mainstream research on second generation Turkish boys participates in a long-standing sociological tradition. Since the beginning of migration research, sociologists were interested not only in migrants themselves but also their offspring. Already the early works of Emory Bogardus (1929) and Robert Park (1950) focused on generational processes of migrant adaptation to the 'host society' and thus drew migrant's children into the sphere of scholarly interest. Within this theoretical universe, migrant

generations are a central site where integration takes place, as the ability to change radically to adapt to the new society is not expected from older migrants of the first generation. However explicitly stated or not, such views on migration, generation and integration lay at the core of much of academic work done on children of migrants since the 70s to the present date.

Discourses about youth are, in general, about more than just the members of a specific generational cohort. Through these discourses, expectations and anxieties about a societies' future are debated.<sup>8</sup> With a notorious focus on *problems*, *deficits* and *integration failures* studies on migrant's children have fuelled these debates (Geisen 2007). This is all the more true, concerning texts on young men of the second Turkish migrant generation. Although some critical studies have emerged recently (they are discussed further below), alarmist and culturalistic studies prevail and it is these studies that receive attention beyond the academic field in media and politics.

### **2.1.2. Introducing Turkish rural culture**

For a long time, the renowned German anthropologist Werner Schiffauer used to be an almost obligatory passage point for discussions on second generation Turkish male youth. In Germany and Austria his work was often-cited both within academia and in public discourses. In his studies Schiffauer argued that analyses of Turkish rural culture should be taken up when studying the life of Turkish migrants. Amongst others, his work on a case of a group of young men with Turkish migration background who were brought to court for raping a German woman in 1978 was widely discussed. In this book Schiffauer (1983) explains the Turkish concept of honor and how it regulates social relations among men as well as between

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<sup>8</sup> I thank Ayşe Çağlar, who pointed me to this in a personal conversation.

men and women in rural Turkish contexts. He argues that the incident was the outcome of a clash of cultural codes, leading the boys to interpret the woman's behavior as dishonorable and thus losing respect of her, making the group-rape an example of male bonding through the (mal)treatment of a woman. Schiffauer argues that the young men grow up under strict Turkish cultural norms, which got further amplified in the male peer-group. As this peer-group also functioned to ward-off everyday discrimination through confronting attacks, it fostered an aggressive climate amongst its members (ibid: 139).

In his analysis, two notions were brought forth which became standard arguments in studies on Turkish migrant male youth. Firstly, the image of an unbroken mediation of 'Turkish cultural norms' from parents to sons and secondly, the assumption that there is something inherently violent and deviant in these norms.

### **2.1.3. Like father, like son**

I now turn to two recent books that took up and radicalized the notion of an unbroken cultural transmission we already encountered in Schiffauer's work. It is Necla Kelek's (2006) *Die verlorenen Söhne. Plädoyer für die Befreiung des Türkisch-Muslimischen Mannes* (The lost sons. Plea for the liberation of the Turkish-Muslim man) and Ahment Toprak's (2007) *Das schwache Geschlecht – die türkischen Männer. Zwangsheirat, häusliche Gewalt, Doppelmoral der Ehre* (The weak sex – Turkish men. Forced marriage, domestic violence, double moral standards of honor). Both books were written by social scientists (Kelek being a sociologist, Toprak an educational scientist) who themselves have Turkish migrant background – a circumstance which was, especially in Kelek's case, widely discussed and taken as a sign for the credibility of her text by many (most prominently by Alice Schwarzer, *the* liberal feminist in Germany).

Necla Kelek starts her book with acknowledging to have been wrong. Like other ‘politically open’ people in Germany, she believed that Turkish migrants would undergo a process of modernization and leave their traditional morals behind. She cites her own dissertation of 2002, where she stated that interviews with Turkish youth in Germany show that they are “more or less on the way to modernity”<sup>9</sup> (Kelek 2006: 19). But, as others, she has underestimated the “cultural dimension of being Muslim (...). What we see is not the dissolution of religious identity, but, on the contrary, the flourishing of a counter-culture. Islam, being a Muslim, *more and more* becomes a cultural identity and it manifests itself especially in the lifestyles and in the value-system of the family and the *umma*, the community of the believers, a value system which is carried by the men” (ibid., italic in the original).

Kelek sees men as the primary agents of upholding the problematic values of Islam and Turkish tradition. She thus set out to identify the “basic characteristics of Turkish-Muslim masculinity” (ibid: 21) in a qualitative study she presents in the book. In this study, she interviewed two sets of young men of the second Turkish generation: prisoners of a jail in Hamburg and schoolchildren in the same city. Furthermore, she interviewed several *hodschas* (Muslim clergymen). Early in her book, Kelek presents the questions she is interested in and directly answers them. The rest of the book more or less presents evidence for her answers.

Why are so many Muslim and Turkish pupil failures at school? Why do so many Turkish boys have a violence problem? Why are disproportionately many Muslims in German jails? Is this caused by social discrimination and lacking educational opportunities? Or by Islam and the archaic tribal cultures of a growing ‘parallel-society’?  
(...)

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<sup>9</sup> In this thesis, all excerpts of German text are presented in my English translation.



Taking a closer look, we see that the commandments which are obligatory for the Muslim community, like respect, honor and shame are formulated by men. It is men who control their adherence, who execute punishments without posing questions when their wives have hurt the 'honor' of their family or when they try to break free from the role they were assigned to. And it is men, who thus get into conflict with this society and become 'perpetrators'. (ibid: 23)

In Kelek's understanding, Islam has "quit any debate and development of its own fundamentals hundreds of years ago. And the Imams, Mullahs and Hodschas have determined the interpretations which are being repeated ever since" (ibid: 170). Islam thus conserves ancient world-views and role models until the present day as well as denying the religious Muslim any right for reflection, critique or individuality. Furthermore, gender roles in Islam are hierarchical and the "word of the father is law" (ibid: 209) in Muslim families. As Islam knows no individuality and critical reason, norms and values are handed down from one generation to the next. Young boys, instead of distancing themselves from their parents in the phase of puberty and adolescence, simply take over the masculinity constructs of their fathers, and thus become what their fathers are (ibid: 95), namely violent patriarchs whose main concern is their honor and that of their family. The problems that Turkish-Muslim boys and men have, are a direct outcome of this dynamic and not of marginalization, according to Kelek.

Citing interviews with imprisoned young men, Kelek claims that, however harmful these Turkish-Muslim men might be to their surrounding, they actually are victims themselves, namely of the strict rules under which they grow up. The young men Kelek interviewed have no awareness of wrongdoing in the face of German law but only seem to care whether their father and extended family approves of their actions. Kelek presents interview passages such as the following, which was led with Mehmet, who was imprisoned for dealing drugs and was caught in a shoot-out with a rival Kurdish gang in Germany:

'Do you regret anything in your life?'

He looks at me. 'I do not understand your question', he says. 'I have always done everything that was asked of me. I have always given everything. There is no more valuable person in the world as the one, who has fought for his family even under the worst conditions. I know, for my family I am a hero. (ibid: 54)

Kelek knows that these young men do not feel guilty, as they merely follow the strict rules of their Turkish-Muslim culture. And thus she can see into Mehmet's future: "Mehmet will be released someday. Most probably he will go to his uncle and everything will start anew. It will not be the last time he is imprisoned. He is in a constant war. Against civilization." In her analysis, these young men become the local agents of the global "Clash of Civilizations" that Samuel Huntington had warned some time before (Huntington 1996).

According to the subtitle of Necla Kelek's book, it is a *plea for the liberation of the Turkish-Muslim man*. To clarify how such a liberation looks like, Kelek refers to her own encounter with Christianity, which happened at a German university in a class on sociology of religion. She compares the two religions: "While Islam is an authoritarian religion which still believes in 'superior truths' that it has formulated hundreds of years ago, which the believer has to understand and under which he has to subjugate himself, Jesus asks people 'to believe in themselves' and to not be afraid, because 'I am with you'." (ibid: 192) Kelek ends her book claiming that there is no problem with valuing cultural aspects of one's past, but that this must not stand in the way of accepting the rules of German society. Migrant Muslims thus have to do what Europeans have done in the phase of enlightenment: stop believing in predestination and start believing in themselves (ibid: 216).

Ahmet Toprak's (2007) qualitative study of young men whose parents immigrated to Germany from rural Turkey sets out to give a more differentiated analysis than Kelek's. But his plans to introduce socio-economic aspects into the analysis and to contextualize such phenomena as cultural norms (ibid: 13) are finally thwarted by the essentializing framework of his study. The central questions that motivated the scholar was to find out how second generation Turkish men think about forced and arranged marriage and, in more general terms, how the traditional gender order of Turkish society works in these families in Germany. To analyze the cultural logics behind what he defines as "forced marriage" (i.e. marriages to which both partners have not consented), Toprak consciously chose male interview partners who approved of the practice and whose parents had immigrated from rural Turkey to Germany. In the outset of his book, Toprak warns that the studies' outcomes must not be generalized to *all* young men with Turkish migration background, but only to those who come from the "same milieu" (ibid: 13) as his interviewees. However, what sounds like an important caveat ends up legitimizing generalizing readings. In the 60's and 70's, most Turkish migrants came from rural areas, thus most sons of Turkish migrants would qualify as belonging to the "same milieu" as Toprak's interview partners.

Toprak's guiding interest is in uncovering how the men's masculinity constructs are formed by traditional Turkish norms and values. He shows that virtually all of them grew up in families where traditional ideas about upbringing legitimized violent punishment. And the sons themselves adopted values about family honor and patriarchal, violent gender roles (ibid: 24). Amongst others, Toprak uncovers the double moral standards of his interview partners, who claim that they are against violence against women, but nevertheless beat their women when they do not follow their will (ibid: 35). The book, with its focus on Turkish traditions, tells the reader about the importance of intra-family "endogamous marriage" in the Turkish

countryside (ibid: 88). We also learn, that “in most Turkish families” (ibid: 96), obedience rather than autonomy is the guiding principle of child-raising and that male children have a higher value than their female counterparts. Despite having interviewed several men, the structure of Toprak’s book is a linear narrative. He presents a coherent story of “the Turkish family”, “the concept of honor”, etc. No alternative or conflicting views are presented and the interviews merge into one long story about a coherent entity: “the son of Turkish migrants”.

In discussing the findings of his study, Toprak defines five central reasons for the high prevalence of violence within the gender order the men uphold: *Offences against educational goals and honor* (ibid: 162) is the first reason defined by Toprak. Under this heading Toprak counts these forms of violence within “Turkish families” that are motivated by children’s transgression of rules of decency (ibid: 163). Furthermore, Toprak discusses violence motivated and legitimized by children and women’s activities that would diminish the honor of the family (ibid: 164). Here, Toprak mentions the role of social factors once: when he concludes that the family gains more importance the less other possibilities for social recognition exist. Regarding the problem of violence it can thus be said that social hardship not only reinforces the value of the family but also the strictness of familial rules and thus the likelihood of violence motivated by transgression of these rules. But this line of reasoning is lost in the rest of his argument. According to Toprak all other sources for violent and patriarchal gender roles of the men pertain to “Turkish traditions” as well as the influence of Islam (ibid: 167).

Kelek’s and Toprak’s studies not only arrive at similar conclusions, but share another feature that is of interest for our critical discussion of their work. The two books that have become well known, lack a discussion of their theoretical framework and present themselves as

merely analyzing empirical data. The few other scientific texts that are cited along the way are almost exclusively texts on issues as honor and shame in Turkish society (e.g. Schiffauer 1987, cited by Necla Kelek), or texts about the gender order as laid out in the Koran (e.g. Kreiser and Wielandt 1992, cited by Ahmet Toprak). Thus also on the level of their analytical framework, they situate their studies in the realm of ‘strange’ (i.e. non-western) traditions and customs. Other issues worth thinking about when studying migrant men, like the dynamics of masculinity constructs or of ethnic identifications, gendered generational processes, or discussions of how social power relations manifest themselves in these dynamics, are left out of the analytical lens.

The culturalizing framework that leaves out any explicit theoretical considerations is highly productive and creates a world in which a ‘Turkish-Muslim culture’ exists that is a coherent, bounded set of rules, incorporated without friction or dispute by all its members. Equipped with this framework, the authors found what they were looking for and the young men’s statements are used to demonstrate the dramatic inertness of this culture. In this universe ‘Turkish-Muslim masculinity’ becomes an autarkic, monolithic entity that exists unrelated to the context in which it is lived and remains unchanged over the generations. To a concerned public that anxiously turns to social scientists to tell them whether the hoped for generational change has set in, these are devastating news. The young men seem to have *integration failure* hard wired into their very masculinity.

#### **2.1.4. The image of the criminal culture**

When social scientists set out to study young men with Turkish migration background, they often end up writing about criminals. The topics are so closely related in the public as well as scientists’ mind that it obviously appears to be a good idea to choose deviant men when

wanting to learn more about Turkish migrant masculinity. Werner Schiffauer's above discussed book on the rape case was already written in this 'tradition' and several works followed him. Probably the most prominent, and for a long time the only book on migration and masculinity in Germany, was Herman Tertilt's "*Turkish Power Boys*" of 1996.<sup>10</sup> In this ethnographic work, he studied a male gang whose members came from Turkish migrant families.

The gang regularly mugged middle-class German youth and stole their clothes. Tertilt analyzed this as a reaction to racism and argues: "Just as the boys themselves have experienced disregard and humiliation due to their national belonging, they obviously took the criterion of national belonging in turn as a motive to treat German youth in a degrading manner" (Tertilt 1996: 43). As Tertilt believed that the young men's fathers strongly influenced their sons' behavior, he also studied them. And he found that these fathers, embittered by their own failure to make money in Germany and return to Turkey, asked strict obedience from their sons and put high value on questions of honor. According to Tertilt, the young men shared this orientation. "In the boys' rural origin", he claimed, honor played a decisive role "both for the structure of the group as well as for the development of aspired masculine characteristics like dauntlessness, aggressiveness and readiness to exert violence" (ibid: 216). Tertilt thus takes racism and marginalization into account but this interpretation is sidelined (and ultimately dominated) by a culturalizing framework with its focus on Turkish tradition and honor. Here, the idea of trans-generational inertia even becomes so strong that Tertilt speaks of the *dörfliche Herkunftswelt* (rural origin) of a group of young men, born and raised in 1990s Frankfurt.

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<sup>10</sup> As with other German studies discussed here, again a book that was read and used in university-courses in Austria as well.

This culturalizing explanation of young Turkish men's violence was further popularized by the criminal sociologists Christian Pfeiffer and Peter Wetzels. For more than a decade, these scholars have published quantitative youth violence studies in which they argue that sons of Turkish migrants are particularly prone to violence. Thus, in 2000 they argued that male Turkish migrant youth commit more than twice as many violent acts as their "German" counterparts (i.e., youth without recent migration history). They thus developed what has become known as the "macho thesis" (Spindler 2006: 96). According to the two sociologists, the sons of Turkish migrants are "affected by a traditional concept of masculinity, which they learn in their familial and cultural socialization and which significantly increases their disposition to commit violence." (Pfeiffer and Wetzels 2000: 20). Due to the fathers' conservative values, domestic violence is common in Turkish households, the authors argue. The young men growing up in these families thus learn that violence is a normal form of enforcing their will which not only makes them prone to violence but more generally hinders their integration into society (ibid: 22).

In several studies the two criminal sociologists found what they termed "violence legitimizing norms of masculinity" (*Gewaltlegitimierende Männlichkeitsnormen*) amongst Turkish migrant youth. However, over the years their explanatory frame has shifted in line with public debates and in more recent studies, *Muslim faith* has been integrated into the analysis. In a recent study (Baier et al. 2010: 131) the scholars argue that their statistics show that Muslim faith and the associated religious traditions, foster violence legitimizing norms of masculinity. But, the authors add, it would be wrong to see Islam as a sole reason for violence, as historic and cultural aspects have to be taken into account too. This is how such a 'differentiated' analysis of the criminal sociologists looks:

It plays a critical role, that in the Muslim youth's countries of origin, at the time of their grandfathers and possibly even their fathers, often there was no rule of law or functioning police system. For the immediate ancestors of the Muslim families living in Germany, threats to property and to one's clan could often only be averted when the men armed themselves. Furthermore, the prevalent culture of honor secured group cohesion in the clan and guaranteed a powerful demeanor against enemies. (ibid.)

Today, the “dysfunctional macho-culture of many Muslims” (ibid.) creates frictions which did not exist in their “country of origin” (n.b., again we are talking about young men born in Germany). According to this ‘historical’ perspective, a violent masculinity thus lives on in the young men and makes them prone to deviant behavior.

### ***2.1.5. Of dominant and alternative approaches***

In several studies discussed above, the sons of Turkish migrant families are described as guided by traditional values such as honor and male dominance, i.e. what is understood to be ‘traditional Turkish values’. In doing so, the studies represent what Yael Navaro-Yashin described as the typical anthropological approach to Turkey, essentializing the idea of ‘a Turkish culture’ and locating it in the emblematic ‘Anatolian village’ (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 12). Turkish culture and Muslim religion, in these studies, are viewed as an amalgam where one stands for the other. Along with this comes an understanding of a direct, unbroken line that links the young men with traditional Turkey. This conviction is so strong, that time and again, the ‘Anatolian village’ is described as the young men’s place of origin thus completely distorting their actual biography.

In these descriptions, the image of the ‘Anatolian village’ becomes what McClintock, in her analysis of colonial discourses, has insightfully termed “anachronistic space” (McClintock 1995: 35). McClintock showed that in colonialist discourses a peculiar time-



space-constellation is oftentimes created in which a notion of linear temporal progress is attached to far-away places. These places could thus be viewed as the habitat of a wild, uncivilized earlier state of a European center that imagined itself to be at the forefront of a singular human modernization process (Chakrabarty 2000).

The image of the ‘Anatolian village’ invokes this colonial discursive archive and offers a convincing script for academic narratives about Turkish migrant masculinity: the anachronistic space ‘Anatolian village’ is home to an anachronistic Turkish-village-masculinity. In the course of their migration process, the men from the ‘Anatolian village’ imported this anachronistic masculinity and conserved it here over the decades. And, as the alarming outcomes of the above-discussed studies seem to prove, not only do the migrant men themselves hold a masculinity that stems from an anachronistic space, but they even transfer it to next generations. Following this script it is thus possible to argue that sons and grandsons of Turkish migrant men embody and act upon an anachronistic masculinity that is unfit for a modern society.

In recent years, some studies have been conducted in Germany that deviate from the above-discussed mainstream. While their impact on academic as well as public discourses has been considerably less strong compared to the above-discussed studies, they have highlighted important routes for critical and emancipatory research in the field.

Kathy Ewing (2008) conducted an insightful ethnographic study on the constructs of Turkish migrant masculinity in Berlin, in which she discusses the stigmatizing effects of what she termed the “Turkish rural discourse” (ibid: 54). This discourse works similar to the anachronistic-space logic I detected in mainstream studies on Turkish migrant masculinity above. But Ewing did not detect the discourse in studies but encountered it in discussions with

diverse persons she spoke to in the course of her ethnographic study. In her view, the “Turkish rural discourse” is an explanatory framework that is adopted by diverse actors to reach certain ends. Thus, media and political representatives and youth workers but also Turkish migrants and migrant organizations themselves could employ – albeit in different ways – the essentializing notion that ‘real Turkish masculinity’ is defined by ancient rural values. As Ewing shows (ibid: 94 f.), Turkish migrant fathers who migrated to Germany decades ago used it to legitimize their wish to control family members, migrant organizations could use it to claim their rightful place as representatives of this culturally specific group and sons of Turkish migrants employed the discourse to differentiate themselves from the ‘common’ Turks in Germany, who were described as backward troublemakers..

Ewings’ study showed that dominant images about archaic, unchanging Turkish migrant masculinity are not only used by dominant actors but can also be appropriated by those whose marginalization these images ultimately legitimize. But obviously, the images are most convenient for those in power. Statistics that show low educational attainment for the children of migrants and their problems in entering the labor market make it clear that racism and marginalization are a reality that not only migrants but also their inland-born descendants face.<sup>11</sup> But the dominant images about Turkish boys, as reproduced and legitimized by mainstream research, help divert attention away from these realities.

In the German speaking world, second generation research can look back at a history of serving this function. Already in the late 80ies, Frank-Olaf Radtkes argued that the majority of studies on migrants’ children’s school failure engaged in a “pedagogization of social problems” (Radtke 1988). Rather than studying the effects of marginalization, the reasons for

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<sup>11</sup> See, for example, the comparative country reports of the „TIES“ project at <http://www.tiesproject.eu>

problems were thus sought in the children and their surroundings. Back then, the first children of migrants were entering school and explanations had to be found as to why they had more problems than children of non-migrants. Today, studies like Kelek's, which report about young men who stubbornly cling to traditional values, fuel anxieties. But these studies not only deliver handy explanations but also comfortable solutions, as they assure that problems are *not* caused by discrimination and inequalities. This is a dynamic well known (and criticized, e.g. Stack 1974) from 'culture of poverty' discourses in the US, in which poor people's life-style is taken as the cause for their social situation. Only in our case, it is the young men's ethnic-religious background which is to blame for their failures. Time- and cost-intensive measures that would change the educational system or the labor market to become less discriminatory thus do not have to be implemented. The center of problems is located in the heritage and living rooms of migrants and their families. And this is where change has to occur. No politician has to fear losing votes following these studies' outcomes, as the present (institutionally racist) social structures do not have to be touched.

Critical studies have also questioned the idea that Turkish migrant men are prone to violence. In Germany Susanne Spindler (2006) conducted an interview-study with imprisoned young men from Turkish (and other) migrant families, and describes how the young men, from early childhood on, experience violence and discrimination which excludes them from state institutions like schools or the labor market. 'Gangs' are formed rather on the basis of shared experiences of marginalization than because of a shared ethnic identity (ibid: 250). Her interviews show that the male cliques are organized much in the same way as other male networks where a dominant position vis-à-vis women is cultivated and support amongst the men is granted in trade for loyalty – with the decisive difference that their networks are located at the low end of society. In this context, the body becomes one of the few resources

these men have at hand and they use it to illegally gain resources and participate *as men* in competitive struggles among men.

Explanations as proposed by the criminal sociologists Pfeiffer and Wezels leave out experiences of marginalization as well as apparent commonalities of male violence that cross ethnic boundaries. But their explanations work and are taken up in public discourses (unfortunately more so than more critical studies as Spindler's). For example, when in summer 2012 in the Austrian town of St. Pölten, a man who was known to the police for domestic violence shot his son and afterwards himself, after his wife had filed for divorce just a few days before, a newspaper journalist could employ Pfeiffer and Wezels' notion of 'violence legitimizing norms of masculinity' to explain the case. This research proved, the journalist argued, that most Turkish migrant men "see physical violence as a legitimate means to uphold traditional order".<sup>12</sup> Low divorce-rates amongst Turkish migrants, the journalist went on, are a sign of the pressure that exists in these relationships. When these break apart, it is all too likely that violence erupts. As the man who had committed the deed in St. Pölten had Turkish migration background the journalist deduced that, according to the sociologists' studies, this was typical Turkish male behavior. Thus, a 'classic' form of male partner violence (after all, women's risk to become a victim of partner violence increases drastically after separation) could be turned into an issue of (foreign) culture with the help of the sociologists' research.

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<sup>12</sup> In: „Neigen Türken eher zu Gewalt?“, Die Presse, 26.05.2012.

## **2.2. Othered masculinities in the New Europe**

The above discussion has shown shortcomings of mainstream research as well as insights that could be gained in studies that explore alternative approaches and pose other questions. In what follows, I outline the theoretical framework of this study. It aims to situate the social production of migrant masculinities within a reality of inequalities and move beyond the dominant culturalizing, methodologically nationalist research on Turkish migrant men.

### ***2.2.1. Hierarchies of masculinities***

For mainstream research on migrant men, the wider society in which these migrant men live, is of little interest. While some authors might criticize that migrants experience prejudices and discrimination, these studies view Germany or Austria as in principle modern, liberal and just societies which need no further critical inquiry. Taking up critical masculinity studies theory can shift this view and help achieve a more differentiated analysis. Quite famously, it was Raewyn Connell who introduced the notion of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1987; 2005) and created a framework to study the hierarchical organization of masculinities in patriarchal societies. With Gramsci, Connell views dominance as the outcome of an interplay of structural (juridical, political, etc.) as well as cultural (norms, values, etc.) power. In her view, male dominance is based on a combination of the power to gain wide consent to androcentric ideology and to hold the means to enforce this consent and discipline acts of noncompliance if necessary. Hegemonic masculinity is, in Connell's understanding, "the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy" (Connell 1995: 77). While legitimating patriarchal dominance over women, it also structures power struggles among men (Donaldson 1993; Howson 2006). Hegemonic masculinity establishes normative images of what it means to be a 'real man' and

sets the boundaries to this norm. It thus also legitimates marginalization, discrimination and violence against those men who (are imagined to) transgress the boundaries (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994). This relation of dominance creates different forms of non-hegemonic masculinities, which Connell terms: “complicit”,<sup>13</sup> “subordinated” and “marginalized” masculinities. While the dominance of heterosexual men over homosexual men is described as an instance of “subordination”, Connell subsumes class and race-based dominance among men in the category of marginalization (Connell 1995). In that, the approach is intersectional in outlook (without explicitly naming the concept) and studies of critical scholars like Spindler or Martina Weber (2007) have employed it to show the contradictory positioning of migrant men.

This frame of analysis also informed some Anglo-Saxon studies on migrant and racialized masculinities and lead to two recurring lines of arguments: concerning older men who migrated later in their lives, studies found out that for these men, migration often meant a weakening of their patriarchal power. Oftentimes bereft of the economic power to be the provider of the nuclear family, also their entitlement to patriarchal familial status dwindles away, while the new social context oftentimes accords new sources of power and agency to the men’s wives and children. While women would thus have incentives to adopt new lifestyles, older migrant men are reported to resist change and experience migration as a loss of masculinity (e.g. Weis et al. 2002; Crossley and Pease 2009).

While research on older men who migrated themselves thus highlights their reluctance to adapt to a new gender order, other research has documented how migrant men – and their younger offspring – employ particularly masculinist identity constructs in dealing with experiences of racism and class oppression. Thus, Michael Messner (1997) discusses

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<sup>13</sup> The term complicit masculinity describes the experience of the vast amount of men, who do not participate at the ‘front line’ of struggles over male hegemony, but who none the less profit from ‘patriarchal dividends’.

how Mexican men in the US “displace their class antagonism into the arena of gender relations”. In a similar vein, Phillipe Bourgois (2003) analyses the explicit and aggressive macho-masculinity of the Puerto Rican drug dealers he studied in New York as part of their strategy to confront structural discrimination. Studying second generation migrant male youth in Australia, Scott Poynting and colleagues (Poynting et al. 1998) argue that the young men’s strong and at times aggressive investment in ethnic identifications should be understood as a form of “protest masculinity”,<sup>14</sup> confronting experiences of exclusion and discrimination.

Different to the mainstream studies discussed further above, these studies integrate social realities and hierarchies into their analysis of migrant masculinities. Moving away from a liberal view of modern societies towards an analysis that focusses on conflict and power, we come to view migrant men as structurally involved in complex and complicated struggles.

But, however valuable this research frame is, the above studies also show the need for an even more radically relational analysis. The descriptions of older migrant men create images of ‘a masculinity’ that was stable and tranquil at the men’s place of origin and only became problematic in the new, more democratic, western context. And this might well be the men’s perception of events and the narrative they presented to the scholars. But from a critical masculinity studies’ point of view, we need to understand *all* masculinity constructs as unstable, contradictory and conflict-ridden. Not just because identities are in principle shifting, but because masculinity constructs under patriarchal conditions are established within relations of dominance, suppression and marginalization and are thus inherently in crisis (Pinar 2001; Pohl 2011).

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<sup>14</sup> A term coined by Connell in the context of working class youth.

### **2.2.2. Nation, state and normative masculinity**

However informative Connell's approach can be for studies of migrant men, we need to go further if we are interested in the reasons why particular men are positioned as non-hegemonic and why the groups that are targeted as problematic change over time.

Before starting to interview men who have been identified as 'strangers', we should take a big step back in order to grasp the socio-political context under which certain men become problematic others. In order to study the social work that is invested into creating othered masculinities, we need to think about the connections between masculinity and community and the gendered nature of politics of belonging (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992), i.e. struggles over what constitutes 'us' and where the boundaries of the imagined community are drawn. And before focusing on migrant masculinities, we should investigate the conditions under which the male norm is reproduced in the context of reproducing collective identities. Already some time ago, feminist literature on gender and nation has delivered important insights in that respect. Of particular relevance to my considerations are the early works of Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis in which they theorized how the reproduction of nations affects the lives of women. In what follows, I present some points they and other feminist theorists made and discuss how these insights inform my thoughts on masculinity and the nation.

Anthias and Yuval-Davis pointed to the manifold – and often restrictive – ways in which nationalism affects women's lives. Women would, for example, be accredited the role of biological reproducers of national or ethnic collectivities (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989: 8) and thus become responsible for producing the right amount as well as the right *kind* of children for the nation. Along with this biological function, women are often held responsible for the moral reproduction of the nation, through 'proper' child-rearing and transmission of



national culture to following generations (ibid: 9). Nationalism has an acute interest in women's sexuality, as the scholars pointed out (ibid.). The regulation and control of women's sexuality serves to draw the boundaries of ethnic and national groups. In this context, Deniz Kandiyoti argues that the intense preoccupation with women's appropriate sexual conduct "often constitutes the crucial distinction between the nation and its 'others'" (Kandiyoti 1991: 430).

This analysis was importantly developed further by Spike V. Peterson who criticized the lack of feminist attention to the fact that these nationalist ideologies and practices are not only gendered, but heterosexist. Heterosexism, in Peterson's notion "refers to the institutionalization and *normalization* of heterosexuality and the corollary exclusion of non-heterosexual identities and practices" (Peterson 1999: 39). Nationalism thus not merely shapes gender relations, but it is fundamentally involved in the reproduction of the hierarchical, binary gender organization of society. This hierarchical ordering, as Peterson argues,

is inextricable from political ordering imposed in state-making and reproduced through masculinist discourse (political theory, religious dogma) that legitimizes the state's hierarchical relations. In so far as (hegemonic) masculinity is constituted as reason, order, and control, masculine domination is reproduced through conceptual systems that privilege male entitlement – to authority, power, property, nature. Central to this ideology is male entitlement to women's sexuality, bodies, and labour. (ibid: 40)

In so far as nationalism and the modern state are institutionalized forms of male domination, they are inherently *male* institutions. To grasp how men are involved in nationalist projects we need to see both the similarities and differences to the situation of women. On the one

hand, there are similarities in that nationalist gender ideology affects *all* members of society.

Or, as Nagel (2003) puts it:

National moral economies provide specific places for women and men in the nation, identify desirable and undesirable members by creating gender, sexual, and ethnic boundaries and hierarchies within nations, establish criteria for judging good and bad performances of nationalist masculinity and femininity, and define threats to national moral and sexual integrity. (Nagel 2003: 146)

But men's involvement is a particular one, as Cynthia Enloe points out when she argues that "nationalism has typically sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope" (Enloe 1990: 45). Although women are assigned certain roles to play, men are the script writers and central figures in nationalist narratives. And these narratives are not merely the stuff that anthems and history books are made of, but affect the actual lives of men. "The culture of nationalism is constructed to emphasize and resonate with masculine cultural themes. Terms like honour, patriotism, cowardice, bravery and duty are hard to distinguish as either nationalistic or masculinist, since they seem so thoroughly tied both to the nation and to manliness" (Nagel 1998: 252). The "microculture of masculinity in everyday life" (ibid.) thus resonates with nationalist ideology. It gives men access to imagined and real power in relation to women, but it also creates marginalized masculinities that do not live up to the nationalist-masculinist ideal.

Both Benedict Anderson and George Mosse have pointed to the distinctively masculine nature of modern nationalism. For Anderson, the "nation is always conceived as a deep, comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (Anderson 1991: 7). As Mosse (1996) pointed out, the whole history of

European modernity is shaped by struggles over ‘proper’ masculinity, as part of wider political struggles. Retracing the historically shifting ideals of masculinity, Mosse argues:

The ideal of masculinity was invoked on all sides as a symbol of personal and national regeneration, but also as basic to the self-definition of modern society. (...) Modern masculinity helped determine, and was in turn influenced, by what were considered normative patterns of morality and behavior, that is to say, typical and acceptable ways of behaving and acting. (Mosse 1996: 3-4)

Ideals of normative masculinity combined notions about bodies and biology with ideas about personality and psyche. While certain characteristics (e.g. being particularly rational) have become a building bloc of normative masculinity, the ideal shifted throughout history. Norms of masculinity are (in a double sense) “man”-made, disputed and shift over time as historical research has repeatedly shown (e.g. Kimmel 1996; Martschukat and Stieglitz 2008). And these shifts are not random as struggles over normative masculinity were always also struggles over the organization of society and thus closely entangled with the existing power structures.

The masculinism of nationalist ideology is paralleled by the institutionalized patriarchy of the modern state. However dispersed and contradictory state power, in its legal, bureaucratic, political and economic dimensions works (Brown 1992), it is arranged in such ways to maintain a gendered and hierarchized split between a masculinized public and a feminized private sphere and allocate resources and power to men (Pateman 1988; Walby 1990). That is: to particular groups of men in varying degrees.

### **2.2.3.Nations' male others**

Be it Jews, vagrants, Blacks or homosexuals: that what is seen as 'abnormal masculinity' in a given social, political and historic context, is not only connected, but in actual fact a *product* of that context. 'Abnormal masculinities' are not a by-product of modern, patriarchal societies, but an integral part of their social fabric. "This ideal of masculinity, indeed modern society as a whole, needed an image against which it could define itself. Those who stood outside or were marginalized by society provided a countertype that reflected, as in a convex mirror, the reverse social norm." (Mosse 1996: 56) These counter-types, Mosse showed in his study, change as the ideals of masculinity shifted along with changing political formations in modern societies.

Patriarchal gender relations produce a multitude of marginalized masculinities along axes of sexuality, class, race, etc. Amongst them, homosexual masculinity was historically a particularly important countertype to normative masculinity. While same-sex desire might well be a universal phenomenon, the notion of homosexuality and the figure of the homosexual is not. Much rather, the invention of the homosexual is a modern, Western phenomenon that, following Foucault's famous analysis in his *History of Sexuality* (Foucault, 1998 [1976]), was established as part of a medicalizing and pathologizing discourse. Male homosexuality, from its invention in nineteenth century Europe on, was deemed antithetical to normal, healthy masculinity. Positing homosexuality as antithesis to 'real' masculinity legitimated legal disfranchisement, social marginalization, and made homosexual men a lasting target of violence and homophobic hate crimes.

Homosexual men were depicted as morally and sexually deficient as well as bodily inferior to 'real men', as would be documented in images of their supposedly limp and feminized bodies (ibid: 70). Mosse documents the rise of homosexual subcultures in Europe

of the late nineteenth century, as well as the growing panic about the ‘degeneracy’ that homosexual men embodied. From the last decades of the nineteenth century, homosexuality was thus persecuted more actively and publicly (ibid: 98). The struggle against homosexuality was supported by diverse actors, e.g. Christian purity leagues, or sexologists and other medical men, who were busy defining sexual pathologies and find cures for sexualities that deviated from the hetero-norm (ibid: 99). Mosse’s historical analysis shows the intricate links between the modern state, bourgeois society and homophobia. This will be important to keep in mind, once we encounter present strategies of othering Turkish-Muslim men on the basis of their alleged homophobia further below.

At this point, let us turn to the intersections of sexualized and racialized othering of masculinity. Anti-Semitic stereotypes about Jews are one important case where these complex dynamics of racialized masculinities could be observed. Analyzing popular, political as well as scientific Anti-Semitic discourses about Jews in the German and Austrian context of 1900 and later, Mosse analyzed the role that notions of masculinity played therein. He shows that Jewish men were constructed as lacking respectability and manly honor (Mosse 1996: 88). Medicalized discourses about Jewish men’s body, stature, brain and even skin texture, described them as prone to illness, weak and malicious. In order to make clear that Jews were everything that ‘proper’ Arian men were not, a discourse of queerness was added to the arsenal of Anti-Semitic arguments. Not only because of their failure to live up to the gendered norms of ‘proper’ masculinity, but also because of an alleged deficient sexuality, Jewish men were seen as effeminate and inherently transgressive. Here, peculiar parallels to stereotypes about homosexual men - another group of men dreaded by the Nazi-system – emerge. And, following up on Mosse’s research, these parallels were anything but coincidental, anthropologist Matti Bunzl (2004) argues. Both Jews and homosexuals came to play a prime

role in the wake of German nationalism. “Codified as an ethnically homogenous and intrinsically masculinist entity, the German nation presupposed the presence of constitutive outsides for its operative narration.” (Bunzl 2004: 16). Described with a shared set of stereotypes – “effeminacy, sexual perversion, reproductive dysfunction, physical deformation” (ibid: 15) – both groups appeared as “agents of racial and sexual insubordination (that) not only threatened the nation’s integrity, but also undermined its very constitution” (ibid.).

All narratives of national community and belonging imply norms of gender and sexuality. In so far, it is only logical that discourses of racialized othering make reference to ‘abnormal’ gender and sexuality. In the above case, these references were so strong that racist and homophobic discourses overlapped considerably. Studying racializing discourses about Turkish migrant men in recent times, I too encountered recurring references to sexuality that demarcated these men as *other*.

Seen from this perspective, male countertypes harbor crucial evidence about the makeup of patriarchal societies. Analyzing the modes of production of these countertypes can thus form part of what Eva Kreisky termed a *feministische Institutionenarcheologie* (“feminist archeology of political institutions”, Kreisky 1994: 196) that uncovers their often hidden and normalized masculinism. By studying modes of producing and negotiating particular racialized masculinities, this thesis aims to contribute to this feminist project. But, as masculinity studies lacks elaborate concepts to help grasp these dynamics, I turned to postcolonial feminist research, which has a record of studying the intricacies of gendered and sexualized racialization.

#### **2.2.4. Postcolonial approaches**

Postcolonial studies convincingly showed that imperial conquest not only established the West at the top of a global hierarchy of power and wealth, but was also a site where modernist imageries of human progress and Western superiority were created (Said 1979; Chakrabarty 2000). Feminist postcolonial scholars showed that this process of colonial and imperial conquest was a deeply gendered endeavor. In her afore mentioned research Anne McClintock analyzed several of these gendered dynamics in *Imperial Leather* (1995). In her analysis, McClintock shows how colonial exploitation and conquest was legitimized and made intelligible within a racialized, masculinist framework. This created an inventory of knowledge about otherness that is invoked and re-articulated to the present day and also informs the racialized discourses about migrant masculinity which I analyzed in my thesis.

Colonial narratives reframed imperialist disappropriation into adventures of ‘discovering’ of uncharted territory and allude to imageries of penetrating virgin female bodies. As Irvin Schick (1999: 110) argues: “the masculinized colonizer and the feminized colony were depicted in a sexual, that is, natural/biological encounter, establishing a sense of necessity, of harmony, that justified Western domination”.

Narratives of the ‘foreign land’ and its people were thoroughly contradictory and imageries of peaceful spaces populated by childlike inhabitants stood side by side with what McClintock termed “European porno-tropics” (ibid: 22). Time and again, colonized areas were described as sexualized spaces where aberration and excess reigned. Thus, local women were described, on the one hand, as passively waiting to be taken while at the other hand endowed with monstrous genitals and unsatisfiable lust, leading to contradictory “phantasies of conquest and fear of engulfment” (ibid: 27). Colonial narratives also reported about foreign men, and these narratives too were marked by contradicting imageries. On the one hand, the

whole narrative of colonialism was one of feminizing the non-European other vis-à-vis a masculinized self-image. This also documented itself in imageries of degenerated black men supposedly endowed with a merely childlike masculinity (ibid: 240). Similar imageries of emasculation could also be found in British colonial discourses about “effeminate Bengali men” who supposedly lacked virility and autonomy, as analyzed by Mrinalini Sinha (1995). But colonialist narratives also produced very different notions of othered masculinities. In line with the basic assumption that colonialized people represented an earlier stage of human development, native men were often described as vicious brutes whose masculinity was not restricted by the morals of civilization. This notion was most explicitly propagated in discourses of rape committed by colonialized men (Schick 1999: 140). The trope of rape recurred in several varieties in colonial discourse and served diverse functions. On the one hand, stories of white women being taken hostage and raped by ‘savage’ native men figured large. Matter-of-factly reports as well as popular novels of that time were full of accounts of sexual violence against white women. Critical historians have pointed to the connections between the ascendancy of these rape-stories and rising political unrest and revolt in colonized countries. Jenny Sharpe (1993) for example, showed how British government used the rape trope to delegitimize resistance to colonial rule in India, reframing it as an issue of dangerous native masculinity and legitimated the repressive measures against it as British masculinity defending the honor and safety of British women.

Schick argues that, more than just piling up dramatic stories, the constant reiteration of the rape trope inscribed itself into the whole imaginary geography of colonialism. It “thus constructed spaces of alterity both as the locus of a threat to the white man’s most precious “possession,” his woman, and as a site of non-conformity or transgression.” (Schick 1999: 147) In this interpretation, the figures in the dramas of rape stood for much more than



themselves and much more than their lives and souls were at stake: “it was Europe itself that was being raped by the barbaric “other”” (ibid: 145).

But according to the narratives, colonized men were not only harmful to white women but also to their fellow native women. Also here, the rape-trope was employed, but there were other strategies in colonial discourse too, to illustrate how badly the women were treated by their men. Accounts of harems, for example, were a prime site to report the complete dominance these men had over women (ibid: 153). Diverse practices would be taken up in colonial discourses to illustrate native women’s suffering. And, as Uma Chakravarti (1999) famously showed with the example of British’s efforts to abolish *sati* (widow immolation) in India, these discourses served to reinscribe masculinist colonial rule. According to Chakravarti, the figure of the suffering, completely dependent Hindu woman was used to argue that not only were the effeminate Hindu men unfit to rule themselves, but also that the “degeneration of Hindu civilization and the abject position of Hindu women requir(ed) the ‘protection’ and ‘intervention’ of the colonial state” (Chakravarti 1999: 35). The often-cited phrase of “white men saving brown women from brown men” by Gayatri Spivak (1988: 297) refers to this very strategy of legitimizing colonial intervention in the name of doing good.

Last but not least, scholars have called attention to another mode in which colonial discourses spoke of native men: *desire*. A current of homosocial longing for the male exotic other runs through many narratives of wilderness and conquest. This desire is often hidden and sublimated in stories of unlikely interracial friendships, wise ‘noble savages’ and hyper-virile warriors. Sara Suleri accords this, (often overlooked) homosocial dimension of colonial encounters an important role. When taking a closer look at highly popular narratives as E.M. Forster’s book written in 1920, called *A Passage to India*, we see that “the most urgent cross-

cultural invitations occur between male and male, with racial difference serving as a substitute for gender.” (Suleri 1992: 133)

As I want to show in this study, a feminist postcolonial approach can offer important insights into constructs of othered masculinities today. To grasp the complexity of othering-processes as analyzed in feminist postcolonial studies, the concept of “ethnosexual frontiers” as coined by Joanne Nagel (2003) seems particularly helpful. Nagel argues: “Ethnicity and sexuality join together to form a barrier to hold some people in and keep others out, to define who is pure and who is impure, to shape our view of ourselves and others, to fashion feelings of sexual desire and notions of sexual desirability” (Nagel 2002: 1). For my own analysis, a focus on the ethnosexual dynamics of constructing othered masculinities proved highly productive. Contemporary discourses about Turkish migrant masculinity revive and adapt many of the above discussed colonial imageries and are heavily engaged in the negotiation of present ethnosexual frontiers aimed to demarcate and justify boundaries outside as well as within the national territory. The “post” in postcolonial does not mark a distant and concluded historical phase. Much rather, this phase, which was so important for the political, economic and philosophical consolidation of European nations, established power relations and discursive archives that structure present day modes of producing others and selves in Western contexts. The specificities of this present situation are discussed in the following section.

### ***2.2.5. Racialized male others in the New Europe***

In this final part of the chapter we move closer to the actual context of my research, both regarding geographical location and time.

As has been widely discussed, racisms in Europe have shifted from predominantly biologicistic to culturalistic discourses (Balibar 1991). More recently, the ascendancy of Islam as a central figure of otherness could be observed throughout Europe (Bunzl 2005), which has often been accorded to shifting global politics from cold war to the ‘war on terror’ after the 9/11 attacks in the USA. But how does this new articulation of racism work specifically, which imageries of difference does it produce and what are the institutions it builds on? As we will see, the answers to these questions directly concern my analysis of racialized Turkish migrant masculinities in Austria.

This is so, because issues of gender and sexuality have ascended to center-stage in anti-Muslim discourses and politics in Europe and beyond. In this context, the notion “imperiled Muslim women and dangerous Muslim men” (Razack 2004) has been thoroughly established. An important site where this notion was propagated has been the numerous headscarf debates in countries across Europe (Rosenberger and Sauer 2012). In these debates which apparently focused on issues of women’s attire, much broader issues of community and difference were negotiated. In her analysis of headscarf-bans in French schools, Leora Auslander (2000) argues that these bans actually articulate political anxieties around national community in times of globalization, where Muslim migrants’ religiosity (visibly symbolized by headscarves) comes to represent a threat from within. In these debates, a dividing line between a religious other vis-à-vis a modern secular self was drawn, employing once again, the notion of Europe as the pinnacle of human advancement.

All narratives of progress need markers that symbolize the state of development a given community is thought to be. In debates on headscarves and Islam more broadly, religiosity has come to figure as the yardstick of advancement with secularism as the imagined end-point of development. As with colonialist discourses, conceptions of *time* play a crucial role in these debates. These conceptions of progress

define themselves over and against a pre-modern temporality that they produce for the purposes of their own self legitimation. Politically, the questions, what time are we in? are all of us in the same time? And specifically, who has arrived in modernity and who has not? are all raised in the midst of very serious political contestations. (Butler 2008: 1)

And these are thoroughly gendered and sexualized discourses, as Joan Scott, amongst others, pointed out. She coined the concept of *sexularism* (Scott 2009) to highlight how notions of secularism are infused with ideas about gender equality in contemporary debates about Islam. Sexularist discourses claim a direct link between secularization processes and the advancement of gender and sexual equality. Whereas Islam comes to represent a state of archaic gender inequality, the West is understood to have been evolved beyond such inequalities.

Interestingly, feminist arguments have gained importance in these discourses and some feminists have actively participated in the debates. In Germany, for example, the widely known feminist Alice Schwarzer has warned repeatedly of Islam. In her journal EMMA as well as in her book *Die Große Verschleierung* (The big Veiling), she argued that headscarves were actually the flag of Islamism and that the proliferation of covered women threatened to undermine the political victories of past feminist struggles and turn back time. In her analysis

of European debates on Islam, Sara Farris (2012) coined the term “femonationalism” for instances in which feminist arguments fuse into nationalist discourses.

Being a productive discourse, femonationalism was employed beyond veil controversies in other debates on issues as forced marriage or genital mutilation. In these debates, diverse issues tend to be lumped together as problems emanating from migrants’ culture or religion. In Austria, for example, an interior minister proposed the introduction of a law against what she termed “*Kulturdelikte*” (‘culture-crimes’ or ‘crimes of culture’), other Austrian politicians engaged in boosting EU-measures against ‘harmful traditions’ during Austria’s EU-presidency in 2006 (Sauer 2008). Such debates propagate what Uma Narayan (2000) termed the “package picture of culture” which understands cultures as distinct entities with clear boundaries and sharply differing content. This package picture homogenizes cultures by blinding out issues of internal diversity and contradiction as well as the political practice of defining the boundaries between cultures (ibid: 1084). This goes along with essentialized understandings of *traditional practices*, as Narayan points out.

The package picture of cultures mistakenly sees the centrality of particular values, traditions, or practices to any particular culture as a given and thus eclipses the historical and political processes by which particular values or practices have come to be deemed central components of a particular culture (ibid: 1085)

Narayan admits that women are often still the ones whose life is most negatively affected by what is called tradition. But she urges feminists to engage with the ongoing struggles and social changes in any community and to critically engage with practices of “selective labelling (...) whereby those with social power conveniently designate certain changes in values and practices as consonant with cultural preservation and others as cultural loss or

betrayal.” (ibid.) But the package picture of culture prevailed and all over Europe, the past decade has seen a rise in measures aimed to emancipate migrants – especially women and children – from the stranglehold of their culture. This took place in the context of a political discourse about a supposed ‘failure of multiculturalism’ and a turn to politics of integration around the turn of the century.

### ***2.2.6. The alleged failure of multiculturalism and the politics of integration***

Politicians from diverse ideological camps – and regardless whether multiculturalist politics were ever actually introduced on a state level – decried as fostering ethnic enclaves or ‘parallel societies’ where said harmful traditions would flourish. At that time, politicians and public intellectuals discovered politics of integration as a remedy for past errors. In the eyes of many, integration measures offered possibilities to support migrants as well as providing means of monitoring migrants’ integration progress, backed up by disciplinary measures (Hess and Moser 2009)

It would be wrong to view the turn to integration as merely a modernization of migration politics. The new politics of integration should much rather be understood as a most recent re-articulation of racism under neoliberal conditions, as argued by Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley in their (2011) book *The Crises of Multiculturalism*. The scholars oppose the currently widely held opinion that integration politics are objectively necessary measures to deal with migration. Rather, it is part of a governmentality which *creates* the very subjects it governs by differentiating them into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ diversity (Lentin and Titley 2011: 176). This politics propagates the notion that racism, in Western societies, is a thing of the past as we live in ‘post-racial’ societies. But far from true, this liberal argument itself should be

understood as a new articulation of racism. This new “racial neoliberalism” as the authors call it

draws on a shifting spectrum of old and new targets of racial stigmatization, mobilizing not just conventional, national insider/outsider distinctions, but increasingly the boundaries between the rational, self-managing citizen-subject and the willful, dependent, resource-heavy subject. (ibid: 178)

Racial neoliberalism produces diverse groups of others to which it attaches positive and negative qualities. While good diversity is hailed as an asset for the modern nation, those deemed to represent bad diversity become the target of political measures that range from pedagogic interventions, to disciplinary threats, to outright violence as in the case of asylum seekers or Roma in Europe today.

In many European countries, Muslim migrants are at the center of debates about the alleged problems caused by multiculturalist naiveté. The image of the suppressed Muslim woman serves as proof for the backwardness of Muslim migrant communities. Employing a logic that Liz Fekete (2006) criticized as “enlightened fundamentalism”, disciplinary integration politics are propagated to modernize these communities which are seemingly so out of time.

French veil-debates discussed above are an example of this logic. “The casting of veiled Muslim women in the role of the subjugated female pushes familiar orientalist buttons. However, it is also complicit in the image of the ‘good’ autonomous subject versus the ‘bad’ dependent one mediated in neoliberal formations” (Lentin and Titley 2011: 190).

In Germany, this economistic logic of contemporary Anti-Muslim racism became all too clear when the sales for Thilo Sarrazin’s “*Deutschland schafft sich ab*” (“Germany abolishes itself”) sky-rocketed in 2010, making it the best-selling non-fiction book in

Germany's post-war history. In his book, Sarrazin mixes biologicistic, culturalizing and economic racist arguments to warn of the dangers that Muslim populations pose for Germany

Demographically, the enormous fertility of Muslim migrants poses a threat for the cultural and civilizational balance in an ageing Europe. (...) Due to their low labor-market participation and high rates of social-benefits recipients, in all European countries Muslim migrants pose higher costs to the state than economic gain. (Sarrazin 2010: 267)

The success of Sarrazin's book should remind us that racist articulations might have shifted over past decades but it would be wrong to believe that earlier (e.g. biologicistic) racisms have simply vanished and were replaced by a new racism. Rather, they inform each other and can be resurrected to form new articulations to fit, in this case, a neoliberal ideology of the *Leistungsgesellschaft* (Friedrich 2011).

### ***2.2.7. The homophobic Other and the gay-friendly Self***

Concerning the image of problematic Muslim masculinity, another marker of backwardness was recently added to the discursive arsenal: homophobia. Against the backdrop of reports of the maltreatment of homosexuals in Iran, Iraq and other states on the 'axis of evil', also Muslim migrant communities have come to be viewed with suspicion regarding their stance towards homosexuals (Lentin and Titley 2011: 214). Some white LGBT groups have actively participated in the discourse about Muslim homophobia (Haritaworn and Petzen 2010) and, as discussed in chapter 3 this discourse was also taken up by integration politics throughout Europe. In the Netherlands, for example, two kissing men were included in a 'Welcome



video' for newly arrived immigrants, in Germany an integration test particularly designed for Muslim immigrants tested their attitudes towards homosexuality.

Considering our above discussion of homosexuality as a 'classic' counter type to normative masculinity, it is quite astonishing that 'gay-friendliness' has become an aspect of 'successful integration'. To make sense of this peculiar development, we need to reflect upon the shifting politics around homosexuality within neoliberal state politics. According to Lisa Duggan (2003), these politics are shaped by what she terms 'homonormativity'. "Homonormativity" she argues, is a "politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption" (Duggan 2003: 50). Adhering to homonormative discourses and lifestyles opened up possibilities of participation and recognition of some concerns of gay and lesbian rights movement. In a context of thorough neoliberal reconstruction of politics and the economy, homonormativity paved the way to legal amendments de-criminalizing some aspects of non-heterosexuality, inclusion into anti-discrimination legislation and heightened visibility of (a particular notion of) 'gay life and culture' on streets and in the media. But these gains are bought dearly, as Duggan's critique makes clear, by adopting a mainstreaming politics based on the exclusion or marginalization of radical groups and demands. Building on and extending Duggan's analysis, Jasbir Puar coined the term 'homonationalism' to grasp the intricate relationship of homonormativity and nationalism today. She argues that this relationship has recently shifted fundamentally, so that we now experience "a particular cultural moment of national inclusion for homosexuality, alluding to a particular kind of parallel possibility for the liberated nation and the liberated queer" (Puar 2007: 1).

Homosexuals, who have historically been constructed as outside the norms of the community and even *destructive* to the national population (from the discourses of ‘decadence’ analyzed by Mosse, to their stigmatization as carriers of the HIV-AIDS epidemic), have become figures “tied to ideas of life and productivity” (ibid: xii), symbolizing the colorful diversity of Western states. Homonormativity neither fundamentally questions the rules of heteronormative bipolar gender order, nor the workings of neoliberal exploitation and can thus be incorporated as yet another minority into the modern diverse nation.<sup>15</sup>

As the case of the integration tests shows, the act of incorporation and ‘recognition’ of homosexuality could itself be framed as yet another sign of Western superior civility and progressiveness. Along the line of the analysis developed here, it is important to note that, while integration tests may seem to simply investigate attitudes towards homosexuality, they actually mean a particular – a homonormative – version of it which does not fundamentally challenge basic structures of the nationally organized contemporary society.

The process of inclusion of homonormativity into the national narrative paved the way for articulating a new male counter-image of the homophobic migrant other. And, as integration tests and measures directed at migrant populations document, it is especially *Muslim* migrants who embody this new counter-type. An alleged deep-seated, traditional homophobia was put on the long and shifting list of signs indicating Islam’s backwardness so that migrants’ individual friendliness towards homosexuality could become yet another item in the effort to bring out the truth about migrants’ level of modernization. As some have

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<sup>15</sup> A particularly telling example of this process could be observed around the debates on the slogan of Berlin’s annual Christopher Street Day 2006: The organizers of the parade originally proposed the slogan “Unity and Rights and Freedom” (“*Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit*”), which is also the first line of the German national anthem. After fierce critique from different groups of the political left, radical and queer scene, the organizers changed the slogan to: “Diversity and Rights and Freedom” (“*Verschiedenheit und Recht und Freiheit*”). The first version of the slogan thus shows how closely gay rights groups can identify with nationally framed politics today. Changing the slogan by inserting the word ‘diversity’ does not deviate from that logic. On the contrary: gay individuals and gay lifestyle are thus represented as modernizing the nation and updating the terms of imagining the German community.

argued, *sexuality* may thus have replaced *gender* as an important marker of modernization and civility in contemporary discourses of otherness (Haritaworn et al. 2008; Sona and Rieske 2011).

The sexual coding of self and other is not as stable and *straight forward* (in multiple sense) as the analysis of Mosse or Connell would have it. Heterosexuality is still constitutive of normative masculinity. But, as certain (e.g. homosexual rights) groups gain visibility and power, hegemonies are re-arranged to include some fractions of hitherto marginalized masculinities and new outsiders are created. While the image of the homophobic Turkish/Muslim man is a recent development, it reinstates the anything but recent strategy of sexualizing the other as part of racialization processes.

### 2.3. Conclusion

This chapter started with a critique of culturalizing sociological studies about migrant masculinities. In order to move beyond such problematic accounts, I argued we need first to consider the entanglements between masculinity and the (ideological and material) institutions of the nation-state. This ‘detour’ shows the dialogical relation between othered and normative masculinities. Othered masculinities do not exist *per se* as something objectively different to the male norm. The ways in which particular masculinities are positioned as ‘ab-normal’ shift and are a matter of historically specific circumstances. Rather than studying, *how* migrant men *are*, what distinguishes *them* from *us*, we should thus ask: what are the social and political circumstances that play into the production of othered masculinities?

### 3. From Health Check to Muslim Tests<sup>16</sup>

*“It is not cultural diversity per se that should interest anthropologists but the political meanings with which specific political contexts and relationships endow cultural difference.”*

Verena Stolcke, 1995

In line with a critique of essentialized approaches in the study of migrant masculinities, I start my own empirical inquiry with historicizing the institutional production of migrant masculinities. In what follows, Austrian migration policies and accompanying discourses are analyzed with a focus on the shifting images of foreign masculinity they produced. The analysis documents the historically changing nature of gendered and sexualized images of otherness as well as the specificities of present constructs. But the chapter aims to go beyond a mere *description* of (sexualized, orientalized, etc.) constructs of otherness. Rather, it aims to show how these images were and are intricately connected to political and economic interests and protectionist migration policies. My analysis of othering processes goes beyond the critique of racialized images, but tries to understand the interests these images serve and how they facilitate the maintenance of hegemonies and social injustices. In doing so, this analysis will show the severe problems of an analysis of migrant masculinity that uncritically adopts the present integration paradigm and thus serves hegemonic interests.

To free the analysis from the integration paradigm, this chapter connects the critical inquiry of constructs of migrant masculinity with actual practices of controlling migration. To this end, I draw on research on “migration regimes” as developed by critical migration

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<sup>16</sup> An earlier version of this chapter, titled “*From Health Check to Muslim Test: The Shifting Politics of Governing Migrant Masculinity*”, was published in 2012 in the *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 33 (3), p. 319-332.

scholars (Transit Migration 2007). Critical migration scholars employed the concept of migration regimes to overcome an understanding of the state as a unified and coherent ultimate actor in regulating migration. Rather, migration regimes are complex fields of norms, laws, procedures and discourses, developed by diverse institutional actors in their aim to shape migration processes (Hess and Karakayali 2007: 48). Migration regimes are neither static nor do they ever succeed to fully govern, determine (let alone *stop*) migration flows. They are shifting and dynamic reactions to the (shifting) practices and struggles of migrants (Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2007: 204). Such an approach enables us to contextualize the shifting ethnosexual images of male otherness within a context of historically changing migration politics.

Rather than present a fully-fledged empirical history of Austrian migration and masculinity, in what follows I read existing historical research through the lens of my own research interests. The analysis is led by the question to what extent particular images and imageries of migrant masculinity were used to legitimize migration politics and what these politics ‘do’ with migrant masculinity – how they mark and define it, make it exploitable and productive and how they make it an object of discipline and punishment.

This historicizing account of the making of migrant masculinity in Austria not only documents shifts in but also a process of differentiation of dominant images of migrant masculinity. Contemporary images are more nuanced and complex than earlier ones, and more institutions are involved in their production and negotiation, than in earlier times. As we will see in later parts of this chapter, this process is embedded in developments that many herald as a shift towards more rational, evidence based or neutral migration policies and as a sign of improvement of the way that migration is dealt with. The analysis developed here troubles this narrative of progress.

Consider the following sentences, which stem from an article published in the highly regarded Austrian newspaper *Die Presse*. In this article, author Martina Salomon criticizes earlier migration policies and argues for the need to introduce modern strategies of managing migration and integration. The article appeared shortly after a reform of Austrian migration legislation that introduced the “*Red-White-Red-Card*”, aimed to particularly attract highly-skilled migrants. Cited are the first and the two final paragraphs of the article:

The worker – male, devoid of needs, unattached and willing to someday go back to his old homeland: This is how the ideal guest worker looked like in the Seventies. But almost all stayed and brought poorly or uneducated brides and family members – and for the most part did not integrate to the present day.

...

It is advantageous to recruit young, well trained people from our culture area, i.e.: a young [female<sup>17</sup>] Polish nurse or a [female] Slovakian engineer is to be preferred over unskilled workers in whose culture area it is common to forbid the wife to have a job and who give their daughters a headscarf instead of educational chances.

Of the second category we have, for sure, too many, of the first, too few. The ‘Red-White-Red-Card’ is all fine and good – but it comes decades too late.<sup>18</sup>

Salomon’s text is revealing in several respects: it not only hints at historical shifts in migration processes as well as its socio-economic context. The text in itself is a telling illustration of a dominant way of how the past, present and future of migration is framed today: after decades of naïve multiculturalist tolerance, ‘we’ are stuck with migrant men that represent everything ‘we’ do not need. These men have come to represent bad diversity in a modern society and modern politics of managing migration are called upon to tackle this

<sup>17</sup> In the German original, these references are written in the female form.

<sup>18</sup> Martina Salomon, „Let’s finally get the right ones in“, *Die Presse*, 26.01.2009.

problem. The words ‘Turkish’ or ‘Muslim’ need not even be stated explicitly, as the author can count on the shared ethnosexual knowledge of her readers.

In what follows, I retrace political debates and legal measures that lead to these particular images of Turkish migrant masculinity over the past decades. I analyze Austrian post-war migration legislation and the political discourses that legitimize these strategies of governing migration. The analysis focuses on three phases that mark considerable shifts in the way migration was governed in Austria: the so-called ‘guest worker’ era starting in the 1960s, the securitization of migration in the 1990s and the shift to modern politics of managing migration after 2000.

### **3.1. Strong muscles and healthy teeth**

In the light of rising scarcity of labor power in Austria, measures were introduced in the 1960s that were aimed at attracting migrant workers to come for a limited period and eventually return back home and be replaced by other migrants, as long as the Austrian market would need the labor power. In theory, the guest worker regime with its idea of rotation sounded tempting: it seemed a welcome possibility to foster the growing economy while at the same time minimize the risks of future economic declines, as the ‘stock’ of migrant workers was thought to be reducible at political will (Bauböck 1996: 12).

In 1962, Austria started to actively recruit migrants, at first with little success in Italy and Spain, but the system started to take effect in the mid 1960ies when the focus was shifted and recruitment treaties were signed in 1964 with Turkey and in 1966 with Yugoslavia. Notably it was not politicians and ministers that shaped the guest worker regulations, but the *Social Partners* (a committee of representatives of capital and labor and of the two biggest political parties, the SPÖ - Social Democrats and the ÖVP – Christian Conservatives). They

set the annual contingents of migrants to be accepted, designed the recruitment procedures and decided upon the legal regulations that applied to the foreign workers (Gächter 2004: 34). Legal regulations, such as visas which had to be renewed every year or the principle of the *Inländerschutz*, which ruled that, in case of layoffs, foreign workers would have to leave before Austrian ones, the social and political position of migrants was kept insecure to facilitate their “rotation” (Bratic 2003: 40).

So, who were the people that were *invited* to come work in low paid, insecure and often dangerous jobs? Especially for the early days of the guest worker regime, the answer is clear: young, unmarried, healthy men (Bauböck 1996: 13; Mayer 2009: 35). Recruitment offices such as the one established in Istanbul’s district Beyoğlu in 1964 aimed to spur and coordinate migration flows. Austrian employers could request migrant workers according to job related skills, bodily characteristics or regional origin. They would send short telegrams to the recruitment offices reading, for example: “Please send 4 to 5 Turkish bricklayers”,<sup>19</sup> or “Due to extreme shortage of labor power and against my dislike for Turkish foreign workers, I have to ask you today, to assign me three to four Turks for my furniture factory as soon as possible”.<sup>20</sup>

In these recruitment agencies several hundred workers were tested on busy days to find out if they fulfilled the demands. Of special importance for the selection process were examinations that checked for the intellectual and bodily fitness of the applicants. Also, the criminal history of the applicants was screened to ensure that they had no previous record (Matuschek 1985: 171). In the course of this recruitment process, each worker had to come in

<sup>19</sup> “Bitte um 4 bis 5 türkische Maurer.” Telegram sent in 1964, cited in Bakondy (2010: 68).

<sup>20</sup> “Aufgrund äußersten Arbeitskräftemangels muß ich Sie heute, entgegen meiner bisherigen Abneigung gegen türkische Fremdarbeiter ersuchen, mir unbedingt und möglichst sofort drei bis fünf Türken für meine Möbelfabrik zuzuteilen“. Telegram sent in 1966, cited in Bakondy (2010: 70)



five times and pass different examinations. Workers' teeth, blood and stool was checked, as well as radiographic tests conducted (Muradoglu and Ongan 2004). The costs of these health checks had to be covered by the applicants themselves. After approval, transportation in trains or busses was organized for the new 'guests'. According to figures of the Turkish employment office, a total of 38.000 migrants, of which the vast majority were men, underwent this or a similar recruitment procedure on their way to Austria (Gächter 2004: 38).

The institutionalized violence of the official recruitment process was accompanied by an objectifying bureaucratic language. In the documents of the recruitment agencies migrants were counted in "units" (*Stück*) and referred to as "rest" or "stock" (Bakondy 2010: 77). For those who passed the examinations "delivery orders" were issued for the "Turk transports" (*Türkentransporte*) which the recruiting agencies organized. The institutional handling of migrants turned them into "labor objects" (Ha 2003: 65) to be tested, approved and imported to Austria.

Actual labor migration, to be sure, did not exclusively take place within these institutional arrangements. For pragmatic reasons, migrants as well as Austrian employers circumvent the recruitment process (e.g. Matuschek 1985: 172). Also, it would be wrong to negate the reality of female labor migration which already set in during the guest worker phase (Appelt 2003). As stated above, migration realities always exceed the boundaries of migration regimes. But the recruitment system embodied an officially legitimated strategy to govern migrant masculinity. It shaped real migration processes and shows how dominant interests were translated into migration regulations and shaped political discourses on migrants.

For the comparison with present practices of governing migration, it is important to note the particular character of the governing *gaze* of the guest worker regime, as it was

articulated in the recruitment system. The knowledge that this gaze was most interested in, was a corporeal one. It was the body – or, more concrete – the *male, resilient body* which was tested for capabilities and (exploitable as well as dangerous) potentials.

This gaze did not stop at the recruitment office, but followed migrants across borders. Time and again, the issue of (lack of) hygiene of migrants as well as the threat of migrant's illnesses spreading in the Austrian population was discussed in parliament and lead to requests for fiercer health controls (Mayer 2009: 35).<sup>21</sup> As Reneé Winter (2004) documents, the Austrian Ministry of Interior issued an order in 1968, in which it argues for particularly intense security police monitoring of labor migrants, to ensure public safety and “*Volksgesundheit*” (national/folk health). Using a Third Reich terminology of the threats of contamination, the young bodies of the migrants were described as a risk in need of monitoring and control.

While the *strong* but *strange* guest workers were seen as potential threat, questions of cultural differences, let alone gender issues, played a minor role in political debates. If culture *was* referred to, it was dealt with in a folkloristic understanding of customs as in the hygiene question. Further, these accounts were often related to the overarching focus on questions regarding labor relations, as in debates about the ‘economic backwardness’ of migrants’ countries of origin as Stephanie Mayer (2009: 42) reports in her study on political debates on migration in Austria. This folkloristic notion of cultural difference, and the prime interest in questions of labor, led to political comments that show considerable differences to present arguments: e.g. it was argued that, due to their strong belief in hierarchies and respect, Turkish workers would have fewer problems with accepting Austrian authorities than Yugoslav workers would (ibid.). Different to contemporary debates, migrants’ *culture* was not

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<sup>21</sup> E.g. parliamentary debate of 09 Nov 1966, 306/M, XI. GP.

seen as a force that fundamentally drives their actions and so the governing strategies did not focus on this force.

In the mid-70s, Austria stopped recruiting labor migrants and intensified restrictive measures against non-Austrians as part of its - *anti-internationalist* - struggle to fight the economic shock of the oil crisis. While these measures reduced the amount of foreign workers in Austria, it did not end migration, but even fortified long-term settlement of migrants who, hitherto commuted. As stricter immigration laws made re-migration to Austria less easy, many migrants stopped going back and forth between the countries, but stayed in Austria and brought spouses and children. Quite contrary to political aims, the more restrictive take on migration did not end the presence of migrants in Austria, but rather helped to create new long-term migrant populations in the country (Bauböck 1996: 14). Although the restrictive measures did not succeed in preventing migrants to settle in Austria, their lasting effect was to establish what some described as virtually two parallel legal systems and labor markets for Austrians and for migrants without Austrian citizenship (Bratic 2003: 41). This differentiation into separate spheres, as well as the notion that the migrant's status as guests was a privilege they should be thankful for, legitimized their exploitation: "For this privilege, migrants had to pay by being cheap, useful and undemanding. That this was accompanied by being dirty, simple and obedient constituted a certain expansion of the spectrum of racializing connotations besides those officially requested by the Chamber of Commerce and the Trade Unions." (ibid.) The regulations which weakened migrants' bargaining power and made them extremely dependent on employers, created a racialized or 'ethnically segmented' labor market (Bauböck 1996: 15). Without the support of unions, migrants had to accept work at harsh conditions to prevent lengthy periods of unemployment and risk losing their visa. The

racialization of the labor market has proven stable to the present day, leading to comparatively high rates of poverty and unemployment among migrants in Austria (e.g. Biffl 2007; Riesenfelder 2011).

It is important to keep this history of a highly exclusionary guest-worker policy in mind, as this history is presently often re-written in political discourse in a way that is also linked to specific images of male migrants of the first generation. As we already observed in the above excerpt of Martina Salomon's newspaper article and as will later see in more detail below, contemporary discourses on the need to introduce modern migration policies build heavily on a distorted view of the guest worker regime as a period of 'open doors', where 'everyone could come in' and lead an undisturbed life. In this narrative, which is reminiscent of the "Turkish rural discourse" Ewing (2008) described in her study, simple country men from Turkish Anatolia came in the 1960s and 70s, worked, kept to their peers and dreamt of home. The present discourse of Turkish migrant men as embodying bad diversity, employs images of these men as dumb work objects, thus using the very images which were established during the guest worker regime. In doing so, the history of their political struggles against exploitation is silenced<sup>22</sup> and their marginalized social position in Austria can be attributed to their own failure while decades of structural exclusion are left out of debates.

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<sup>22</sup> E.g. the demonstrations against the *Aliens' Employment Act* in Vienna of 1977 (Mayer 2009: 49). Even though strikes always entailed the risk of deportation, migrant workers from Yugoslavia as well as Turkey went on strikes in the 60s and 70s (ibid.). Also, Bratic (2002: 129) argues that, in a context where legal measures were taken to prevent migrants from engaging in labor and political fights in Austria (e.g. the prohibition for foreigners to organize public meetings), it should not come as a surprise that many early migrant associations were established under the header of "culture" or "sports" and focused on establishing networks amongst migrants to ease their living situation, rather than defining themselves in explicitly political terms.

Also, throughout the history of labor migration in Austria, the unions, in their role as social partner, were major actors in pushing restrictive migration policies, which they saw as a strategy to protect their Austrian clientele. For many decades, foreigners (and later: third-country nationals) were denied passive voting rights (i.e., to be nominated for election) for works councils and the chamber of labor elections, thus keeping migrants from engaging in institutionalized forms of labor struggles. Only when the European Court of Justice ruled this regulation as illegal, was this changed in 2006 (Perchinig 2010a: 150). This "insider-policy" specifically buttressed the interests of *male Austrian* ("white") workers and marginalized the position of migrants (and Austrian women, Perchinig 2005: 3).

These questions are erased from the picture of a first generation of Turkish migrant men who supposedly spent the past decades in an unchanging bubble (or rather: ‘parallel universe’ to stay in the dominant jargon). Thus withdrawn, they did not participate in societal developments and remained locked in their ‘countryside habitus’ and Turkish rural masculinity. This imagery is not only widespread in within the media, but is also used in present political discourses as a legitimization for the need to select ‘high quality’ migrants and to introduce compulsory integration measures for the ‘old stock’ of labor.

The political project of installing temporary labor migration via the system of guest worker regime did not work out as planned. In the discursive framework adhered to by Martina Salomon above, this is an outcome of naïve and lax political regulations as well as conning migrants who did not keep their ‘promise’ of leaving eventually. Critical scholars like Sandro Mezzadra (2007) might rather see this history as a sign of the relative autonomy of migration and the fact, that migration is not a faucet that can be turned off and on at political will (Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2007). From such a point of view, the fact that, *in spite of everything*, migrants stayed, created networks and engaged in diverse struggles against racism and marginalization, can be understood as highly political (and, if one wishes to use the word) self-integration practices.

### **3.2. Immigration as Penetration**

For a long time, strategies to regulate migration were deployed behind closed doors by the social partners. But several developments rapidly politicized the topic of migration in the late 1980ies and made it a public issue. One decisive factor were changes in the Austrian political party landscape: The liberal leftist *Green Alternative* party entered parliament and, under Jörg

Haider, the *Freedom Party* (FPÖ) developed a far-right populist agenda. Both parties soon set migration high on their agenda – while the Green Party adopted a liberal human rights perspective, the FPÖ used it for racist and nationalist mobilization (Bauböck and Perchinig 2006: 732).

But only with political debates concerning new dangers arising with the fall of the Iron Curtain, did migration gain the status of a social problem in need for political solutions (Zuser 1996). While immigration to Austria really did reach high numbers in the year 1990 and thereafter, this was not a direct effect of opening of the Eastern borders (Bauböck 1996: 20).<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, the imagery of ‘waves of immigrants from the East’ was to become a central trope in political and media discourse in the early 1990s and led to harsh restrictions especially in the field of asylum laws. As analysts of media and political discourses of that time have shown, the initially positive general tone about the newly ‘freed’ neighbors and guests quickly shifted shape to become a discourse of masses of immigrants and asylum seekers from Eastern Europe threatening stability and security in Austria (Zuser 1996: 15). Leading politicians like the Social Democratic Minister of Interior, Franz Löschnak, warned of the *Völkerwanderung* (“mass migration”) that was supposedly set into motion after the fall of state socialist regimes in Eastern European countries, heading towards the West (a notion, which he later extended upon in a whole book, see Löschnak 1993). Politicians and journalists warned of the ‘full boat’ (Austria) which was threatened by ‘waves’ and ‘currents’ of migrants (Rohrauer 1997). In this context, the topics of criminality and illegality gained an unprecedented role in migration debates (Zuser 1996: 34). Besides ‘criminal tourists’ and ‘illegal workers’ who threatened the belongings of Austrians as well as the welfare system, it was asylum seekers that soon became a central cause of distress. Introducing a strict division

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<sup>23</sup> According to Bauböck (1996: 20), this rise in migration happened, to a big part, due to the positive situation on the Austrian labour market at that time.

between political refugees and ‘economic’ or ‘bogus refugees’ the differentiation into categories of deserving and undeserving asylum seekers was propagated by politicians (Matouschek et al. 1995: 25). Reflecting similar discourses in other European countries, Austrian politicians could claim their willingness to help those in need, while at the same time establishing a discourse of masses of fake asylum seekers as a threat to national order and security.

While particular images of female migrants (e.g. as victims of human trafficking or in the context of scam marriages to gain Austrian citizenship) played a role in these debates, it was migrant men who were decried as a source of threat for the Austrian state and society. Discourses on *Ausländerkriminalität* (“foreigner crime”) with its gangs, (car) thieves and robberies (Zuser 1996: 46) build on images of male delinquents without necessarily speaking of them as men. And, around 1990, *Ostflüchtlinge* (“Eastern refugees”) in general, were depicted as aggressive, disorderly, lazy and loud, as Matouschek and colleagues argue in their study of political discourses on migration in Austria of that time (Matouschek et al. 1995: 27).

Images specifically reserved for men become visible when focussing on an event that caused profound political trouble and debate and has been described as the actual beginning of the new anti-immigrant discourse and politics in Austria of the 1990ies (Zuser 1996: 1). In March 1990, the minister of interior voiced his plans to move 800 male Romanian asylum seekers to the small Village of Kaisersteinbruch. This announcement triggered a wave of civic and political protest. In the course of these protests, media reported on the alcohol excesses and bar fights to be expected if these men were located in the small village (Matouschek et al. 1995: 195) and it was especially Austrian women and children who were depicted as endangered by the sexually excessive and violent men. Summing up the public and political statements, Matouschek and colleagues write: “Rumanians were characterized as foreign,

dangerous, cheating people, as potential thieves, violent offenders, rapists and ‘benefit scroungers’ (Matouschek et al. 1995: 245). Ethnosexual imageries of male otherness thus shifted from depictions of dull workers to dangerously transgressive masculinity.

The security perspective on (illegal) migration articulated itself in measures, laws and institutions of migration control and thus had a lasting effect. In 1990, the minister of interior, Löschnak, argued that border security could not be maintained anymore and thus the Austrian military was deployed on the Eastern borders of Burgenland to support police and customs units and prevent illegal border crossings (Zuser 1996: 33), furthermore visas were made compulsory for nationals of several Eastern European countries. The new Asylum Law of 1992<sup>24</sup> contained regulations that were explicitly directed against “asylum fraud” and which facilitated the turning down of asylum petitions (Stern 2010: 219). Also the amendments to Residence Law<sup>25</sup> and Aliens’ Law<sup>26</sup> that took effect in 1993, introduced new restrictions for the settlement and access to labor market (Perchinig 2010a: 148). But the implementation of the security perspective on migration not only led to legal amendments, but also affected institutional arrangements and responsibilities. In the 1990ies, the ministry of interior, which hitherto was only responsible for questions of asylum, became a central actor in shaping Austrian migration (and later: integration) policy (ibid: 147).

These developments massively and lastingly affected the way migration is politically dealt with in Austria.<sup>27</sup> In the course of this shift in racist discourses, the already established link between migration, otherness and threat has become a powerful driving force in the legitimization of migration measures in the name of law and order. As, for example, Karin Sohler (2000) shows, this perspective was gradually broadened to target different groups of

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<sup>24</sup> BGBl 1992/8.

<sup>25</sup> BGBl 1992/466

<sup>26</sup> BGBl 1992/838

<sup>27</sup> Matouschek and colleagues speak of the birth of a “modern form of Austrian xenophobia” (Matouschek et al. 1995: 24).



migrants throughout the 1990s. She argues that the discourse of organized crime helped establish a ‘police perspective’ on asylum, migration and the dangers of clandestine ‘imported crime’ (ibid: 54). Again, the images of threat that the discourse of ‘organized crime’ produced were heavily gendered. While migrant women most commonly enter this discourse in the form of victims of trafficking and prostitution (ibid: 55), men commonly appear as criminals or people smugglers (ibid: 57, see also Winter 2004). The logic of the ‘war on organized crime’ led to fierce measures of police control and punishment (Sohler 2000: 61). Especially in relation to the construct of the ‘Nigerian drug dealer’ the lasting power of the image of the criminal illegal migrant is observable. Since the mid-1990s, this image was used to legitimate new measures of surveillance, forced deportations and police violence with, at times, fatal<sup>28</sup> consequences (Görg 2002; Kravagna 2005).

In the 1990s, images of dangerous foreign men entered political discourses on migration. While earlier constructs of male ‘guest workers’ also entailed ideas of threat and calls for monitoring and surveillance, the dominant gaze did not depict these men as a significant danger to national security and well-being. The earlier ‘guest workers’ were to be tested and controlled to ensure that they fulfill their function on the labor market without threatening the privileges of Austrian workers, and to ensure that their living conditions would not worsen to a level that might cause hygienic and social problems. The foreign men of political discourses of the 1990s became inherently dangerous, as culturally backward criminals, thieves and drug dealers. While earlier migrants were treated as passive objects, these are seen as imposters, whose tricks, lies and tactics have to be exposed and punished. The establishment of the

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<sup>28</sup> In May 1999, Marcus Omofuma suffocated during his deportation, as policemen tied him up and gagged him, in July 2003, Saibane Wague died due to brutal treatment during a police control (on these and other cases of police brutality against black men and women see the 2009 Amnesty International report on racist police practices in Austria “*Österreich: Opfer oder Verdächtige. Eine Frage der Hautfarbe. Rassistische Diskriminierung im österreichischen Polizei- und Justizsystem*”).

police perspective of dangerous foreign masculinity was part of an overall securitization of migration policies in Austria. As described above, this securitization led to the militarization of Eastern borders, tightening of asylum laws and the strengthening of punitive methods against illegalized immigrants in the country.

These images of dangerous foreign masculinity can thus be understood as connected with broader shifts in the government of migration in Austria. Yet even broader connections become visible, if we go beyond the national context and turn to the EU, of which Austria became member in 1995. As in other cases before and thereafter, Austrian migration policies followed European trends and translated them into the national context. Regarding national borders and the government of movement of people, the above described processes happened in a time of great shifts on the EU-level. National borders within the EU were gradually dismantled, as the movement of persons, goods and services was liberalized. This process, European bureaucrats and politicians proclaimed, needed ‘compensatory’ measures to counteract potential risks (McGauran 2010: 108). The Europeanization of migration control, most commonly connected with the regulations *Schengen I* (of 1985) and *Schengen II* (of 1990) led to enhanced surveillance and data-exchange among member states and increased control at EUs external borders (‘Fortress Europe’). In scholarly literature, this process has been described as “securitization of migration” (e.g. Huysmans 2006; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008).

Crucially for my analysis of constructs of foreign masculinity, this process marks a qualitative shift in the way that migration is perceived politically and the role that ‘the immigrant’ plays in political imagery, as the French political scientist Didier Bigo (2002) argues. The shift towards a massive securitization of migration in Europe should thus be understood as a strategy to cope with changing geo-political relations and its perceived

consequences to territory and polity. In a time, when the former enemy, the Eastern Block, dwindled and the significance of national borders were put into question by EU-liberalization and migration, the securitization of migration was a strategy to regain political power and agency. It was (and is) a strategy to re-assert the liberal notion of the sovereign state vis-à-vis an immigrant who is seen as ‘something’ foreign, ‘something’ destructive to the homogeneity of the people (ibid: 67). The practice of intensified monitoring the borders of the state (understood as a national container) against outside influences rests upon and re-asserts the notion of the body politic as a bounded, national community of citizens, legitimately governed by the state apparatus. The securitization of migration, as Bigo (ibid: 69) writes, is “based on a central presupposition made by politicians about their own capacity of governance in relation to the state: the presupposition that it is possible to control the flow of individuals at the borders of the state”. The framing of the state as body intensifies the urgency for this control, as it creates another, threatening image, namely that of “immigration as penetration” (ibid.).

In this light, the reframing of migration as threat and the securitization of migration politics in the late 1980s and 1990s was not simply more of the same restrictive policies against migrants. In that period, political institutions and regulations adapted to fundamental political and social changes. The new policies profoundly connected migration with notions of danger and linked it to emotions of fear and loss of integrity. ‘Immigration as penetration’ catches the gendered and sexualized charged nature of these threats well (although Bigo himself, oddly enough, misses them). The security perspective situated migration in a discursive framework that is well-established in nationalist imagery. In this framework a feminized ‘motherland’ is threatened by a foreign, male force and thus in need of particularly masculinized protection. This trope of ‘rape of the nation’, which is particularly prominent in

situations of armed nationalist struggle (Massad 1995; Zarkov 2007), translates conflict into a language of loss of control, sexualized transgression, the need for vigilance and a call for masculinist self-defense. While a feminized ‘mother land’ and its vulnerable inhabitants are relegated to the role of passive victims in need of protection, the conflict itself is presented as a business between men. The security perspective applied this frame of reference on international migration in order to charge it with notions of threat and urgency. The images of waves of deceiving and thieving bogus asylum seekers, the smugglers who would help others transgress ‘our borders’, the foreign dealers who would sell drugs to ‘our children’ and the savages who would rape ‘our women’: these are ethnosexual images of dangerous male figures in nightmares of penetration. Nightmares that were summoned in political discourse to situate migration in a frame of danger and to implement harsh measures in defense.

### **3.3. Integration means emancipation!**

In 2000, an EU paper<sup>29</sup> propagated the need for a modern approach of ‘managing migration.’ This approach was taken up in Austria and shapes migration politics to date. According to the idea of managing migration, rather than merely restricting migration, new economic and population challenges require policies that actively shape it in profitable ways (McGauran, 2010: 126).

While it would be wrong to argue that present migration policies in Austria (and other EU countries) have since then been marked by openness and a pro-immigration agenda, policies have changed and a new liberal and ‘rational’ approach marks the stance on migration by politicians across the ideological landscape.

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<sup>29</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy. Commission of the European Communities, 22.11.2000, COM (2000) 757 final.

The previous quota system could not represent the needs of the Austrian labor market precisely enough. This is why the system of the “Red-White-Red-Card” has been created. This entails the consideration of factual parameters such as impacts on the labor market, economic capacity of the national economy, but also the expected capacity for integration and security-relevant aspects.

While this telling quote comes from the current (2008-2013) government program of the ruling coalition of Social Democrats and the Christian conservative People’s Party, a similar position is taken up by the liberal Green Party.<sup>30</sup> And even the right wing *Bündnis Zukunft Österreich* (“Future Alliance Austria”, BZÖ) and the far right FPÖ nowadays contextualize their anti-immigration agenda within the frame of a “need for a rational approach to managing migration”.<sup>31</sup>

Throughout the political landscape in Austria, commentators condemn earlier migration policies as undifferentiated and irrational. In chapter 2 we have seen that the discourse about a ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ is widespread in Europe (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Although multiculturalism never was a political principle in Austria, this crisis of multiculturalism is nevertheless taken up and connected with a call for a new management of migration with clear and rational rules. As in other countries, integration measures have ascended to an important facet of migration policies in Austria too (Langthaler 2010; Oberlechner and Hetfleisch 2010).

Since its introduction by the then-ruling centre right government in 2002, non-EU migrants wishing to attain settlement status in Austria have had to fulfil the so-called

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<sup>30</sup> “Instead of arbitrariness and rigid quotas, clear criteria determine, who should and may immigrate. Education, language proficiency, work experience and relatives in Austria decide, who is allowed to immigrate”, Green Party Austria, national election program 2008, p. 17.

<sup>31</sup> The BZÖ writes in their current Party program “We appreciate immigration of foreigners – along our requirements and clear criteria, where and how we need it” (p. 44). The FPÖ argues for “humane and rational alien’s policy” in their most recent election program (p.27). Not surprisingly, in the eye of the FPÖ, this policy should mainly focus on fighting crime committed by “aliens”, fighting illegal migration and conducting deportations, as well as fighting “islamistic hate preachers” as well as dangerous cultural crimes (ibid.)

*Integration Agreement* and successfully pass courses in German language as well as in “European and democratic basic values”. From early on, the disciplinary character of the pedagogic measure was made clear, when a politician of the right wing *FPÖ*, heralded the *Integration Agreement* as “serving the function of detecting integration-unwillingness” among migrants (cited. in Rohsmann 2003: 76). Severe penalties for non-accomplishment of the course, ranging from cancellation of social benefits to deportation, backed up this statement.

The introduction of the *Integration Agreement*, it is important to note, was part of a wider reform of Austrian migration laws in 2002,<sup>32</sup> which virtually put an end to the possibility of long term settlement for non-EU migrants except for the highly educated and ‘key employees’ as well as migrant spouses. The legal reform in the course of which the *Integration Agreement* was introduced, thus marks a preliminary endpoint of a development in Austrian migration legislation: since then migrants with little formal education have virtually no other way of immigration except as highly vulnerable ‘seasonal workers’ (Muttonen 2008: 183).

The trend to compulsory German language learning and to test Austrian or Western values was later widened to naturalization legislation. Again, these new integration measures were introduced as part of a new round of restrictions. The reform of the naturalization legislation in 2005,<sup>33</sup> pursued the explicit political goal to reduce the annual number of migrants attaining Austrian citizenship – a goal that was duly achieved, as the ensuing drastic decline in naturalizations showed (Cinar 2010: 14). Among other measures, this decline was accomplished by raising the minimum wage asked of applicants or widening the range of

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<sup>32</sup> Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Fremdenengesetz 1997 (FrG-Novelle 2002) und das Asylgesetz 1997 (AsylG-Novelle 2002) und das Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz geändert werden, BGBl I 126/2002.

<sup>33</sup> Staatsbürgerschaftsrechts-Novelle 2005, BGBl I 2006/37.

legal offenses that may lead to exclusion from the right to ask for citizenship (e.g. the mere suspicion of terrorism can lead to exclude a migrant from naturalization, see Stern 2010).

The latest innovation in Austrian migration law, the introduction of the “*Red-White-Red-Card*”<sup>34</sup> in 2011, consistently follows up on these recent trends. The *Card* introduced a system of allocating points to migrants for educational attainment, work experience or language proficiency in order to more precisely attract highly skilled migrants. Other changes encompassed the introduction of harsh sanctions for minor legal offences or breaches of bureaucratic deadlines and the shortening of the length of time in which migrants must pass the Integration Agreement. Furthermore, migrants now have to prove basic German language proficiency already at the time of application in their country of emigration.

To what extent do these legal changes introduced since the turn of the century thus draw new lines between an unmarked norm and what is considered foreign masculinity? This question can be answered by looking at the content of new integration measures as well as at the strategies of legitimizing new restrictions.

A closer look at the citizenship integration test, which comprises questions pertaining to Austrian history, topography and society, unravels its ethnosexual agenda. In the section “Woman in Society” of the preparation material provided by the Ministry of Interior,<sup>35</sup> applicants for Austrian citizenship are informed that women have equal rights in Austria and that any form of discrimination of women is illegal (while they do *not* learn about the persisting gender pay gap in Austria, or the fact that until 2011, all Austrian universities were headed by men, or that only 4% of Austrian fathers take parental leave, etc.). From there, the

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<sup>34</sup> As part of the package of Amendments to Foreign National Laws, FrÄG 2011.

<sup>35</sup> „Overview over democratic order and history of Austria. Script for the preparation for the exam according §10a Citizenship Law of 1985”. Edited by the Ministry of Interior, 7th Edition, Vienna 2009.

text jumps to the topic of ‘violence against women’. Here, applicants learn that several cultural practices are forbidden in Austria: Applicants not only learn that forced marriage and genital mutilation is forbidden in Austria, but also murder: “In Austria, honor killing, just like any other murder, is forbidden and punishable. It is punished by tribunal courts with up to life imprisonment” and, to make sure the message was heard, the chapter ends by stating: “Social traditions and customs thus in no way stand above the legal order and do not constitute a ‘ground for justification’ for criminal acts” (both excerpts, page 35).

In his analysis of the Austrian integration test, Perchinig (2010b) shows that the form and content of the test makes it a worthless tool as far as migrant integration is concerned, as it provides no actually useful knowledge that a migrant would need to better participate in Austrian society (e.g. information on political rights or legal regulations in relevant fields as work, housing or health services). While the test does not fulfill its *purported* function, it nonetheless plays an important role in the institutional production of strangers, as can be argued on the basis of Sara Ahmed’s (2000) insightful analyses of modern politics of migration and multiculturalism. Rejecting the common idea that strangers are those whom ‘we’ know little about, Ahmed argues that it is specific fetishizing knowledge and practices of interpellation that ‘recognize’ and constitute strangers (ibid: 23). This practice continually reasserts the one in power to test and inquire, as well as it produces the ‘strange other’. Taking up the critical perspective established by postcolonial theorists discussed above, the integration test reiterates the colonial logic of time, where the one that does the testing is envisioned as embodying the final stage of human development, while this is not the case for the tested one. In having to react to the integration-interpellation, averting accusations through acts of confession and passing, the stranger performs a public act of self-subjugation.



A package picture of dangerous foreign sexualities and the images of archaic migrant masculinity are currently important facets of the knowledge and practice constituting strangers through integration testing. And once again, the Austrian case is not unique, but follows a European trend as briefly discussed in chapter 2. In one particularly telling example of 2006, the German state of Baden-Württemberg introduced a test exclusively for immigrants from countries that the German authorities listed as “Muslim countries”. In the course of this “Muslim test” (as it was soon called, cf. Erdem 2009: 189), migrants were not only asked whether they saw the 9/11-attacks as terrorist or heroic acts, but also inquired about their notions regarding gender and sexuality, e.g. whether it would be a problem for them to work for a female boss, or how they would react if they learned that their son was gay.

How productive the images of archaic migrant masculinity are today, could also be observed in discourses legitimizing the need for a ‘modern’ migration law. To propagate the differentiated system of the *Red White Red Card*, Maria Fekter, then Minister of Interior, argued that “(w)e need the highly-skilled engineer and not an unqualified illiterate man from some mountain village”<sup>36</sup> and that we thus have “to tighten bureaucracy for the unqualified who do not know any German and loosen the bureaucracy for those who are highly skilled and whom we want to have here”.<sup>37</sup>

Questions regarding culture were, as noted earlier, virtually irrelevant when it came to the selection of ‘guest workers’. Today, the image of the “unqualified illiterate man from some mountain village” links notions of lacking human capital with ideas of suspicious cultural backwardness to signify those whom ‘we’ do not need or want. In demarcating this cultural backwardness, references to archaic gender relations played a crucial role. Such

<sup>36</sup> Cited in the newspaper *Die Presse* of 30.07.2010.

<sup>37</sup> Cited on the national radio station *Radio Ö1* on 30.07.2010.

references could be used to legitimize new obligations, such as the need to prove German skills before immigration. Employing a logic reminiscent of what Spivak (1988: 297) critically analyzed as “saving brown women from brown men” white men and women of the ruling coalition hailed the new restriction as a tool of emancipation. Thus Joseph Cap of the *SPÖ* explained,<sup>38</sup> that migrant women, and in particular “Turkish women with Muslim background” would benefit from having to learn German as the courses would be the only time that they would be free from their husbands. When the law was passed in parliament, the new Minister of Interior, Johanna Mikl-Leitner of the *Christian Conservative Party* (ÖVP), argued in a similar vein when she empathically stated: “Think of the women in the patriarchal systems! These women now have the chance to finally gain access to education.”<sup>39</sup>

As anthropologist Barbara Herzog-Punzenberger argues, questions regarding German language proficiency have become an important marker of difference and “boundary making” in Austria (2009: 56). This boundary making is gendered, as German language proficiency is not only said to raise the ‘market value’ of migrants, but also, as Plutzar (2010: 131) notes, to proffer migrant women’s emancipation by weakening the patriarchal control of migrant men over ‘their’ women.

The idea that German can help migrant women to emancipate themselves is widespread and not only put in place to legitimize compulsory language courses and integration measures, but also to inform such voluntary courses as “Mama learns German”, where basic German training is offered to migrant mothers of school children in Vienna. Thus, the course-curriculum informs about the envisaged clientele: “Many migrant women are thrown back to their role as housewife and mother, some have hardly any social contacts

<sup>38</sup> Cited in the newspaper *Der Standard* on 21.5.2011.

<sup>39</sup> Parliamentary protocol , 103/XXIV, 29.4.2011, p. 94.

beyond the family and live isolated in their flats and households.” (ibid: 4) And so, besides teaching German and providing knowledge about Austrian bureaucracy, kindergartens, and schools, the course also tackles issues of “cultures and religions”, “gender roles” as well as “traditions” (ibid: 11). Issues such as migration law, racism or anti-discrimination are obviously not deemed relevant for emancipation – again, these and other critical issues are absent from the curriculum.

Based on archaic images of Turkish-Muslim migrant men and their stubborn will to dominate ‘their’ women, the institutional racism articulated in Austrian migration laws is hidden behind a veil of human rights talk. In this context, political concepts like “emancipation” are appropriated and re-signified by state actors. Rather than standing for a collective struggle against structures of exploitation, emancipation is framed as a task that female members of certain migrant communities have to accomplish in a struggle against their male peers. Compulsory measures are framed as a kind of humanitarian development aid for an imaginary migrant community made up of women without agency and stubborn men. It was Maria Fekter herself, who might have put this strategy of reframing exclusionary politics most succinctly when she proclaimed, during a visit at a migrant women’s NGO: “Integration means emancipation!”<sup>40</sup>

### 3.4. Conclusion

A casual observer of current migration policies in Austria could interpret persistent political appeals to curtail migrant men’s power and liberate migrant women as evidence for the ascendancy of feminism to state ideology. But, complex transformations of gendered power relations notwithstanding, the above analysis suggests a rather different interpretation. The

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<sup>40</sup> Press release Nr. 7319 of the Ministry of Interior, 01.03.2011.

observable changes in constructs of migrant masculinity should thus be understood as documenting the shifting strategies of legitimizing and asserting white male hegemony in face of changing economic, political and migration realities. Images of dull male ‘work objects’ or dangerous asylum seekers articulated the economic interests and nationalist security sentiments that informed earlier (and also present) migration policies. Similarly the currently dominant constructs of archaic Turkish-Muslim masculinity must be understood as deeply embedded in modern strategies of managing migration.

Today, the widespread notion of the oppressed Muslim woman is fused into an “integration imperative” (Bojadžijev 2008: 228) with its incessant search for ‘obstacles to integration’ that need to be unravelled and conquered by pedagogic or disciplinary measures. Adopting a quasi-feminist rhetoric of emancipation, restrictive migration laws which have negative effects on migrant men as well as women can thus be introduced in the name of defending human rights (Erdem, 2009).

Besides serving nationalist sentiments, the culturalizing images of archaic migrant masculinity help to veil the political economy of contemporary migration politics. The patriarchal ‘illiterate from some mountain village’, so we are told, is not among those ‘we need’ and thus restrictive measures are in order to safeguard the national economy. Although Liz Fekete (2006: 3) is right to analyze measures such as language requirements and integration tests as strategies of political exclusion legitimized by ideas of the dangerous Muslim other, this is only part of the story. In line with the notion of migration regimes outlined in the beginning of this chapter, ‘exclusion’ in migration policies never means simply halting actual migration processes. The real effect of point systems, compulsory language courses and integration tests is not to so much to stop migration altogether, but to hinder a great number of migrants from attaining citizenship rights and to limit their political power

(e.g. by excluding them from naturalization, pushing them into disenfranchised migration channels such “seasonal workers” or forcing them into entirely illegalized migration).

Dominant discourses about problematic archaic migrant masculinity thus fit the interests of a restrictive migration regime, designed to meet states’ economic interests and minimize political power of migrants. As discussed in chapter 2, the strategy of invoking women’s rights to legitimize the exploitation of racialized people is not new, nor specific to the context of migration law. From the gendered and sexualized imagery that accompanied colonial conquest to the notion that the ‘war on terror’ would liberate women in Afghanistan, promoting women’s rights has served to legitimate violence. In our case, it does not serve to legitimize global imperialist conquest but political disfranchisement and economic exploitation within the national borders.

The politics of governing migrant masculinity shifted from checking the body for strength and resilience towards a differentiated system of selection that goes “under the skin” to bring out deep seated truths. The migrant, who until then was deemed to silently endure inspection, is now made to talk – to tell about his human capital, his potentialities, his norms and values (and, as we learned from Foucault (e.g. 1998 [1976]): what could go “deeper” than questions regarding sex?). These technologies of inquiry are not mere chicanery, but serve the growing thirst for knowledge about the migrant other. A modern technology of differentiated migration and integration management needs differentiated knowledge of those it manages (Atac and Kraler 2006). As we will see in the following chapters, the ethnosexual images of Turkish migrant masculinity employed to legitimize migration policies are widely spread. They reappear in diverse guises in different social fields and constitute a reality that Turkish migrant men living in Austria have to deal with in one way or the other.

## 4. Queering the homophobic Other?

*“As an immediate measure to prevent rapes by Muslim-Turkish men, a flock of sheep should be placed in the city park”*  
Michael Winter (FPÖ), 2007<sup>41</sup>

In the previous chapter, we retraced the recent history of constructs of male otherness and observed the ascendancy of the image of archaic Turkish migrant masculinity in Austria. The remaining chapters of this thesis focus on several aspects of (and negotiations around) this pervasive imagery. While we have already seen that references to women’s and migrant women’s emancipation has become an integral part of dominant constructs of Turkish Muslim migrant masculinity, this chapter focusses on a more recent trend. Somewhat later than elsewhere, the image of Muslim male migrants as being particularly homophobic (a discourse prominent throughout the West as discussed in chapter 2) has reached Austria in recent years. In this chapter, I first analyze who employs this discourse and what it is that these actors convey. Upon that, I shift the gaze and ask how activists from a Viennese migrant gay and lesbian group confront this discourse and what images of Turkish migrant masculinity they created.

### 4.1. Love deserves respect!

In the Viennese public sphere, one seldom encounters multilingual advertisements except for tourist signs in English, French, Italian or Japanese. In early summer 2008 this changed temporarily. A poster series was launched that showed a kissing couple in a Viennese metro

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<sup>41</sup> Michael Winter “Lieber Sodomie als Vergewaltigung” (“Rather Sodomy than Rape”), *tangente* 1/2007

station and read “Love Deserves Respect!” in German, Turkish and Serbo-Croatian. Three different versions of this poster existed, in each version the composition of the couple differed: on one poster (the version which was least often seen) a kissing heterosexual couple was shown, in the second version, the couple consisted of two kissing women, and in the third version, of two men.



This campaign, which was originally produced in Germany, was adapted for the Viennese context by Courage, a Vienna based center for psycho-social counseling for gays and lesbians. The campaign was co-financed by the Viennese city government and Viennese youth centers participated in it as one of the central sites where the campaign would take place (with workshops and discussion rounds on homophobia and homosexuality). The kick-off event for this campaign took place during my ethnographic research for this study and I

attended it to gain insights into the motivations behind the campaign. The event turned out to be primarily a succession of speeches of local politicians from all of the major Viennese political parties (except for the right-wing *FPÖ* which was not invited). The event was chaired by Christine Marek, a politician of the Vienna branch of the Christian conservative *ÖVP*.

I refer to this campaign, as it is revealing for our critical inquiry into contemporary shifts in the sexualized imagery of Turkish Muslim masculinity in Austria. The multilingualism of the campaign is informative in that respect. In the previous chapter we learned that German language proficiency has attained high symbolic value and is politically propagated as a precondition for successful integration. According to this discourse, German proficiency not only opens doors for socio-economic success but also helps migrants to emancipate themselves from archaic tradition. According to this narrative, proficiency in German thus figures as yet another step on the migrants' development from barbarianism to civilization.

In such a discursive context, the multilingualism of the anti-homophobia campaign takes on a peculiar meaning: it is directed towards those who *still* need to be talked to in their 'mother tongues'. According to the press release accompanying the campaign, it is "specifically directed towards youth, but also towards migrant communities, to confront the still existing hostility against homosexuals". The temporality in this statement is important: particular migrant communities are singled out as a specific problem group and the peculiarity of *their* homophobia is asserted to a lagging behind in a general societal development towards 'gay-friendliness'. Thus the use of the migrants' (and migrant youths') mother tongues. Thus, far from being a sign of departure from a German-only policy, the campaign reinforces the German-as-key-to-integration notion, and locates migrant homophobia foremost in the un-



integrated territories of migrant communities. As Haritaworn and Petzen (2010) who critically discussed the campaign when it was originally launched in Germany, noted, the campaign not only locates migrant homophobia ethnically but also spatially by choosing particular urban neighborhoods for the campaign and thus reinforcing them as sexualized ‘problem neighborhoods’.

While civil servants test migrants’ gay-friendliness at national borders, sociologists map the borders within the nation. In Germany, a study<sup>42</sup> on “homonegativity” (i.e. homophobic sentiments) aroused much attention in 2008 for supposedly documenting direct links between Muslim migrants’ religiosity and their level of homonegativity (for a critique of the theoretical and empirical approach of the study see Sona and Rieske 2011). In Austria, the alleged homophobia of Turkish migrant boys was also shown in a study conducted in 2010.<sup>43</sup> This was done in the context of a study on political and social values of Viennese youth which the Institute of Youth Culture Studies conducted. Amongst other items, questions regarding the respondents’ approval of fascism and Adolf Hitler were included in the questionnaire. Also, respondents were asked, whether they approve of the sentence “homosexuality is not a natural way of life”. As the information brochure accompanying the study<sup>44</sup> reports, the studies’ make-up would ensure particularly well founded outcomes regarding migrant youths’ sentiments, as the sample of 400 (non-migrant) interviewees was accompanied by a “control group” of 103 “Youth with Turkish/Arabic migration

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<sup>42</sup> The study titled *„Einstellungen zur Homosexualität. Ausprägungen und psychologische Korrelate bei Jugendlichen ohne und mit Migrationshintergrund“* („Opinions towards homosexuality. Specificities and social psychological correlations amongst children with and without migration background”) was conducted by social psychologist Bernd Simon on behalf of the German LGBT rights group LSVD and was financed by the German ministry for family and youth.

<sup>43</sup> The study *“Wiener Jugend zwischen Engagement und Resignation”* („Viennese Youth between engagement and resignation.”) was conducted by the Austrian Institute for Youth Culture Research.

<sup>44</sup> Press release of the Institute for Youth Culture Research, Volume 28 of 4.11.2010.

background”. Based on the methodologically nationalist notion of a control group vis-à-vis a ‘normal’ Austrian sample the study reported of the troubling high rates of homophobia amongst “Turkish/Arabic” youth. While 50% of respondents in the normal sample fully reject the notion of homosexuality being unnatural, this was only the case for 17.5 % of the control group.

In their concluding remarks, the authors of the study relate their findings to the perils of a future “immigration of intolerance”<sup>45</sup> and turn that into call for action, in which a peculiar (white?) ‘we’ is asked to face the challenge vigorously. According to the authors the study shows that

in Austria, we still have a problem with sexist and anti-Semitic values and attitudes that should not be neglected and which seems to intensify due to immigration. For the future, it depends on whether we are able to lead an open debate on this problem and possible solutions, or if we decide, as so often before, to bemoan the problem in Sunday sermons (“*Sonntagsreden*”) and not take any further measures. (ibid: 6)

The homophobic “Turk/Arab” is a new agent in the old story of travels through “anachronistic space” (McClintock, 1995: 40). Migrant homophobia thus attains the status of a hazardous good imported from a backward country/culture. Was it hitherto ‘their women’ that had to be saved from Muslim men, ‘our people’ enter the stage in the migrant homophobia discourse. In this nationalist discourse, white homosexuals become part of the group of imperiled victims to violent migrant masculinity and its backward sexuality. This leads us back to the beginning of this chapter and the kick-off event for the Viennese version of the “Love deserves respect” campaign. Because of the peculiar framing of the sexually dangerous other, it was possible for the Christian conservative politician Christine Marek to head the kick-off meeting of the

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<sup>45</sup> “Turkish/Arabic” respondents also scored higher in their rates of approval of Adolf Hitler.

poster campaign, even though she is a representative of a political force that has hindered equal social and reproductive rights of homosexuals in Austria for decades. Framing the problem of homophobia as a problem of certain individuals and/or certain cultures makes it possible to describe European societies as inherently *gay-friendly* and leave out the institutional heteronormativity in Austria and its state religion, Christianity (Haritaworn et al. 2008).

Sexualized images of male otherness are never straight forward. They change, shift and intermingle to create at times awkward imageries, as the statement about sheep to prevent rapes by Muslim men indicates, which was uttered by an FPÖ politician and cited at the beginning of this chapter. During my fieldwork I learned how widely these imageries are shared, when one evening after a public discussion on *Islam and the Veil*, an already slightly drunk, high-ranking white male immigration officer explained to me, “These Turkish guys, they are all oversexed and underfucked!”. Turkish-Muslim masculinity appears as intrinsically marked by conflict and contradiction and thus dangerous to various vulnerable groups around it. As Puar importantly notes, in an intriguing way, Muslim masculinity is thus represented as fundamentally contradictory and *queer* in nature, “simultaneously pathologically excessive yet repressive, perverse yet homophobic, virile yet emasculated, monstrous yet flaccid” (Puar, 2007: xxv).

Analyzing dominant discourses about Turkish-Muslim homophobia render crucial knowledge about the intricate workings of contemporary ethnosexual imageries about othered masculinities. But my analysis aims to go beyond a critique of discourses and study how people engage with this context and shape it. In this chapter, I present data gathered in interviews and ethnographic research with LGBT migrant activists and ask, how they position

themselves within this dominant discourse and what notions of Turkish migrant masculinity they develop. As Hadley Renkin showed in his research in the Hungarian context, such an ethnographic approach “enables us to recognize, rather than deny, the agency of LGBT people to shape the cultural worlds in which they live, and to see them as active participants in such contexts as well” (Renkin 2009: 27). In what follows, I ask how the activists articulate their interests and engage in emancipatory struggles in such a context. Which strategies they developed, which narratives they take up, question or subvert? How do images of “Turkish migrant masculinity” figure therein? Which roles do familiar images of self and other play and which other notions are reclaimed into the debate? Over a period of more than a year, I conducted interviews with several activists, participated at events they organized and analyzed media material they produced to find answers to the above questions.

## **4.2. Activism in the field of migration and homosexuality**

I started my fieldwork by trying to get in contact with activists of an LGBT migrant group called *Vienna Mix* which I had seen covered in left wing media a few years earlier. As it turned out, this group had dissolved some time ago and no similar group existed at that time. I thus decided to interview some of the people who were active at Vienna Mix and learn about their motivations, strategies and thoughts on constructs of migrant masculinity. As it turned out, several of the people who were active in Vienna Mix got together during my field work phase and established a new group, called *MiGaY*. For my research project, this was a lucky coincidence as I could thus observe the activities and strategies of the group in ‘real time’. As the interviews themselves took place in the transitory phase of starting a new group after having ‘failed’ with a previous group, I also want to start this analysis with a brief depiction of this transition.

The group Vienna Mix was initiated at the end of 2003 by Ewa and an activist from Istanbul shortly after his arrival to Vienna. Several of my interview partners recounted that, even though they had lived in Austria for many years or were born there, it was that man who pointed them to the fact that Vienna lacked a migrant gay and lesbian rights group. While that man himself soon left Austria, the group went about setting up what was to become Vienna Mix.

In its roughly two years of existence Vienna Mix became, on the one hand, a meeting place and counseling institution for gay and lesbian<sup>46</sup> migrants. On the other hand, the activists engaged in awareness-raising work that was directed towards a wider public as well as focused on two particular groups: the white gay and lesbian scene and migrant communities in Austria. In one interviewee's words, the aim was, "on the one hand, within migrant communities saying: hello, we're gay! And within the gay and lesbian community say: hello, we're migrants!" (Peter<sup>47</sup>).

Ewa, who was born in Poland and came to Austria as a young girl with her parents, was soon to become the chairwoman of Vienna Mix and a driving force within the activist group. Having been responsible for issues of finance and fundraising, Ewa experienced in a very concrete way the problems of a group that situated itself beyond established frameworks. In our discussions she recounted how hard it was to raise public money due to a funding structure that offered resources for, on the one hand, migrant groups and, on the other hand, gay and lesbian groups. When applying for money, Vienna Mix was continually told that anyway, there are already enough (migrant or gay and lesbian groups) groups. To make a case

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<sup>46</sup> Although open to transsexual and other queer identifying people, the interviews gave me the impression that it was mainly gays and lesbians who actually contacted Vienna Mix.

<sup>47</sup> Name changed.

for their right to exist, Vienna Mix thus had to engage similar arguments that Kimberle Crenshaw (1989) famously made when she argued for intersectional politics. The activists had to continuously prove their point that experiences of gay and lesbian migrants are not simply a version of being a migrant or being gay and was thus not covered by the existing groups. These struggles for funding in between the established structures were also struggles against an established binary logic according to which, migrants are expected to be heterosexual, while gays and lesbians are imagined as white.

The political activism of Vienna Mix (and later MiGaY) was also a struggle over spaces – be it the question of how to emancipate migrants from a secluded space of the familial home and enable them to enter a gay public sphere, or the issue of creating a community to which gay and lesbian migrants would actually belong. As Ewa pointed out, their activism was, to a large extent, a reaction to an apparent lack of spaces of their own. Even though Austrian LGBT communities had built up an infrastructure over the past decades, these spaces catered to the needs and interests of certain people and excluded others. In Ewa’s words, the Austrian (white) gay community “has shut itself in, in their organizations and everything. And they have no contact persons whatsoever for people who might have different problems”. And the activists learned in the early days of Vienna Mix that it was not so easy to re-inscribe otherwise white queer spaces.

Thus, one of the early activities of Vienna Mix was to initiate open house evenings for lesbian, gay and transsexual migrants at the *Rosa Lila Villa*. The *Villa* is located in central Vienna and has been home to autonomous gay and lesbian projects since it was squatted in the early 1980s. The ‘Lesbian and Gay House’ (as written on a big sign over the entrance) today houses a queer club, gay and lesbian counseling offices and shared flats for gays and

lesbians. Not only because of its distinctive outlook (the façade painted in bright pink (“rosa”) and purple (“lila”), often accompanied by banners containing leftist political slogans) but also because of its popularity as a time-honored center of political gay and lesbian rights activism in Austria, the *Villa* constitutes an important and prominent queer space in the Viennese landscape. But the open house meetings of Vienna Mix did not work out as planned, as only a small group of interested women and men showed up time and again. From this, the activists drew the conclusions, as Ewa explained, that “for many people, it is simply hard to come to meetings” in a house that looks so obviously queer as the *Villa*. Another activist, Yavuz, became an important informant for me during my field work. Being the son of Turkish migrant parents, he came to Vienna when he was still a child. As we will see in more detail below, he positions himself somewhat different to other activists as, for example Ewa or Peter. Different to Ewa, he is religious and also actively engages with bringing together Muslim faith and homosexuality. Compared to Peter, who came from a Turkish migrant family too but not only had a typically Austrian name but also light skin (and said of himself that he looked “like a regular Austrian”), Yavuz has had graver experiences of racism and exclusion due to the fact that people would recognize him as ‘a Turk’. And these experiences also inform his take on activism. Concerning the said problems with the *open house* meetings, Yavuz referred to his own biography to make sense of the fact that only a few people showed up then:

A gay Turk who anyway has to struggle with problems will not voluntarily come to the *Villa*. It was the same with me, it took me months to even dare enter the place. For a long time I only went up and down in front of the entrance until I finally said to myself: *okay now I dare to go in*. It was in the evening when it was dark so that no one could see me. (Yavuz)

The group thus changed the location of their meetings to a smaller, less visible space (the bar *Marea Alta*) and meetings became more crowded.

This episode could certainly be read as an indicator of migrants' grave issues with their homosexuality, but it might tell even more about the nature of mainstream queer spaces and their (implicit) white coding. The *Villa* and its important role for gay rights struggles in Austria, might thus primarily be a space for a white struggle. For others, it did not represent an open space in the same way, even though the activists of the *Villa* repeatedly engaged in anti-racist campaigning and certainly did not explicitly propagate it as a white space. This experience shows, that such a white coding is not easily undone or re-inscribed and that organizing open house evenings was not enough to change the color of such a space.

After these initial meetings, Vienna Mix gradually became more popular and active in organizing meetings and doing counseling work for gay and lesbian migrants as well as networking with other groups or participating in public events on issues of homosexuality and migration. Besides this, media requests had to be answered and a continuously growing influx of counseling requests via the web had to be responded to. From the conversations with the activists it became clear that most of this work was done by Ewa, who was eventually overburdened and resigned from the job as chairwoman. As none of the other activists would take over this central position, Vienna Mix soon after disintegrated.

In the ensuing years, several of the original members of Vienna Mix had diverse ideas how to re-launch a migrant LGBT group, but none materialized. Until finally in 2008, Yavuz came up with the idea of a new group that should be (in Yavuz's words) "less political" than its precursor Vienna Mix. Together with Ewa and several others, the new group, which was named "MiGaY – Association for the Integration and Promotion of Homosexual Migrants"



(MiGaY – *Verein zur Integration und Förderung von homosexuellen MigrantInnen*) was launched and exists to the present day. In comparison to Vienna Mix, its goal is to engage more in creating a community to which gay, lesbian and transsexual migrants could belong. MiGaY publishes a magazine besides running a homepage and doing various projects with other (mostly queer) groups and most recently planned to establish a 24 hour help-line. The magazine, simply called “MiGaY”, not only aims to increase visibility within the established LGBTIQ scenes in Austria, but also wants to be a medium through which to better get in contact with lesbian and gay migrants as compared to the strategies taken by Vienna Mix.

With this magazine we want to really reach the migrants, get into the houses and to the migrants who sit at home and are not part of the scene or don't dare to get out. (Yavuz)

MiGaY thus set out to reach those ‘hard to reach’. One way of framing this task, as Yavuz’s quote above shows, was to allude to particular understandings of the gay and lesbian community and of being out vs. the migrant home as a space of being locked up. This logic was a popular frame that activists used to describe their work, especially when talking about the situation of migrant *men*.

### **4.3. The challenges of visibility**

In their awareness raising work, the activists faced the challenges of an Austrian context that Hakan Gürses (2004) once described as ‘oscillating between silence and noise’. The phrase aptly catches the Austrian discursive environment where migration issues are generally silenced. At the same time, this silence is recurrently interrupted by scandalizing reports on ‘social problems’ around migration, thus creating a framework that makes it hard to enter in

constructive discourse. The activists, now of MiGaY, faced this complicated environment and had to find strategies of dealing with it. Thus while they aimed to raise awareness for the problematic situation of queer migrants<sup>48</sup> they did so with relative caution and were critical of the sensationalist media reports of honor killings or forced marriages amongst Turkish-Muslim migrants, etc. At the same time, MiGaY did not want to sugarcoat difficult issues and especially aimed at spurring debates within migrant communities where the topic was hitherto little discussed, according to the activists. “It is about time for the migrant scene to start talking about homosexuality”, Yavuz argued. And the activists set out for making MiGaY a platform to stimulate and shape such a new discourse, making migrants see “Oops, there are also gay and lesbian migrants in our community, what do we do now? How will we deal with this? Once it is public, people will start talking about it.” (Yavuz).

Maneuvering within an environment that is all too eager for scandalous news on migrants (especially when related to gender and sexuality), the activists tried not to provide even more fodder for media reports that could be detrimental to their work. On the one hand for the quite obvious reason, this was because such scandalizing (and often paternalistic) reports feed into existing stereotypes about the dangerous migrant other. But for the activists there was also a more concrete reason why it was important to avoid a scandalizing approach, as Yavuz explained:

The more we dramatize, the more we will suppress the gay migrant who sits at home and has problems with his homosexuality. He will think: *oh god, they are getting killed, they are being thrown out or sent back to Turkey!* This guy will become even more depressed and will become more eager to hide his homosexuality and be afraid of coming out. (Yavuz)

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<sup>48</sup> In the interviews and talks with the activists, the actual group was referred to in changing terms, from *queer*, to *homo-bi-trans*, to “les-bi-gay”. Most recently, the magazine says it is for LSBTIQ-migrants.

The figure of the “gay migrant who sits at home” came up time and again in our discussions and I will say more about it later in this analysis. The figure stands for uninformed, insecure and non-out migrants who are wrought with self-doubt about their homosexuality. As in this quote, the “gay migrant who sits at home” would often serve to illustrate the peculiar needs of the target group of Vienna Mix and explain why they developed specific approaches in their work that distinguished them from other LGBT groups.

#### 4.4. MiGaY magazine - setting the scope

On its roughly 30 pages, the first issue of MiGaY-magazine published, among others, there is an interview with a lesbian German-Turkish DJ, a critical text on the situation of migrant male sexworkers in Vienna, a text written mostly in Serbo-Croatian on LGBT-people from former Yugoslavia living in Vienna, and pictures from LGBT-parties.

To capture the self-positioning of MiGaY, the first pages of the magazine are particularly informative. In the editorial text (signed by “the MiGaY-Team”), the need for the magazine is argued for. LGBT-migrants (“*LesBiSchwule und Transgender Migrant\_innen*”<sup>49</sup>) the text states, are amongst those groups that add to Austria’s diversity. And they “become ever more visible within ‘the scene’, while they still have to fight for recognition within their community (“*Herkunftscommunity*”) and within society in general.” (MiGay Volume 1, p.2) MiGaY thus positions itself as voicing the interests, needs and problems of people whose self-consciousness is getting stronger, but who find themselves struggling with their marginal position in different communities and contexts. While no further information is provided in

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<sup>49</sup> The underscore “\_” is common in queer/ queer activist contexts. It is placed between the male and the female ending of nouns and thus (A) makes visible the female form where it is traditionally left out and (B) creates a symbolic space in between masculine and feminine form to denote those subject positions that situate themselves outside the binary gender logic.

the editorial concerning the mainstream heterosexual and the white homosexual scene, the third group that populates the terrain in which the magazine positions itself, takes shape as the article goes on to describe the orientation of the magazine. It addresses “people who are happy in a same-sex relationship” as well as “those who had to enter a heterosexual marriage against their will” (ibid.). It also wants to reach those “who believe that that they are only gay because they live in this country” (we will get back to this idea further below) “and those who are very afraid to live out their sexual orientation” (ibid.). All these topics came back in one way or the other in my discussions with the activists. The brief accounts in the editorial give hints to the kinds of experiences which are discussed in the magazine and the range of lifestyles the editors expect of their readership – from uninformed gay migrants, to those in need of hiding their sexuality to others who have managed to live a happy and out life.

#### **4.5. Finding allies, resisting cooptation**

In their efforts to find allies and enter into co-operations, Ewa recounts that their approaches towards anti-racist groups in Vienna were met with acceptance but little enthusiasm. Also their encounters with migrant groups were shaped by ‘tolerance’ but little more. Whereas Peter interpreted the reluctance of migrant groups as an outcome of their particularly conservative values, Ewa related this to their own precarious situation, which left them without extra resources to engage in their particular struggle.

All activists I spoke to agreed that cooperation was most fruitful and productive with the established gay and lesbian groups. The reason for this, in the activists’ eyes, was simple. In their daily work, these groups were confronted with questions by gay and lesbian migrants that they could not answer sufficiently due to their lack of expertise. The activists of Vienna

Mix and MiGaY were thus welcome partners to deal with these issues. But also these cooperations, as it turned out, were not uncomplicated.

Ewa argued that it was a central concern for Vienna Mix, to establish a ‘fixed space’ and to establish their organization on a “structural level”. While it was clear for the activists that this could only be attained in cooperation with already existing migrant and LGBT organizations, this very cooperation was – and is to date – a delicate endeavor. All too often, collaborations turned out to be more cooptation than cooperation. Being a ‘young’ and less established group, fighting for issues considered to be ‘specific aspects’ of broader struggles, the activists found themselves becoming turned into ‘additions’ to the established organizations.

The problem is that everybody wants to cooperate with us and wants to do something with us. But often I get the feeling that everybody wishes that we should subordinate ourselves. (Yavuz)

Oftentimes, other groups who were eager to work together, at the same time questioned why a particular group for gay and lesbian migrants was even needed. The activists where time and again invited to leave their group be and join other groups. They resisted this assimilationist idea and claimed that theirs was not a mere ‘sub-topic’ of any larger ‘real’ issue and that LGBT migrants would need their own institutions to turn to. In this context, also symbolic issues such as having their own section at the 2010 Christopher Street Day in Vienna were viewed as important steps to ‘emancipate’ themselves from established groups.

## 4.6. Struggling with straight and queer racism

During my research it soon became clear that, in order to analyze and assess the activists' strategies of entering dominant debates about migrant masculinity, it was crucial to take a closer look at how they confront structures of racism and discrimination. The activists were acutely aware of the dominant orientalizing discourses about migrant others and personal experiences as well as theoretical engagement with the issue were important motives to get politically involved. They developed diverse strategies of naming and confronting discriminatory discourses and practices.

### 4.6.1. Criticizing the narrative of gay-friendly Austria

While the activists time and again voiced criticism of the criminalization of homosexuality in countries that enforce Sharia law (a point we will come back to further below), they also confronted the discourse of *gay-friendly Austria* described above.

One strategy employed by the activists was to recall the recent history and the still existing forms of legal discrimination of homosexuality in Austria. By doing so, the activists shifted the terms of the debate away from a culturalizing discourse that equates Islam with homophobia and disconnects heteronormative ideology from struggles over diverging interests, normative orders and its social, economic and legal institutionalization. By shifting the focus towards questions of rights and laws, the culturalizing logic could be put into question. Laws are an outcome of power struggles, neither timeless nor unchangeable. And the legal perspective made clear that the narrative of Austrian *gay friendliness* is an act of a 'sexularist' re-writing of history. Thus, as activists of MiGaY pointed out, in Austria until the 1970s, homosexual acts of adults were punished with jail and also thereafter, the age of consent remained higher for homosexual than for heterosexual relations. Also other forms of

criminalization, e.g. the ban on male prostitution, were abolished only later and even the new partnership law for same sex couples, introduced in 2010, does not grant full equality. This historicizing approach calls into question the notion that gay-friendliness is an inherent feature of Western society.

Another strategy to unhinge the orientalist logic of homophobic Islam was to point out the homophobia that lies at the core of all (mono-theistic) religions. Thus, when several texts in the 03/2011 issue of MiGaY-magazine focused on the stance that Evangelical, Jewish and Muslim dogmas take towards homosexuality, they concluded unanimously that all religions, in their conservative and orthodox interpretations, promote homophobia in one way or the other, whereas in each religion, there exist liberal approaches more open towards homosexuality. In personal conversations this critical perspective towards religion was also applied to Catholicism. Besides noting the general anti-homosexuality ideology of the Catholic Church (e.g. as voiced by the pope), Ewa used her own migration background to deepen the criticism. Herself having a Polish migrant background, Ewa would cite figures from Polish opinion polls to make her case that Poland is both a thoroughly Catholic *and* a homophobic country. Thus, not only is the narrative of a ‘gay-friendly Austria’ questioned by noting the connections between Catholic faith, being the dominant Austrian church, and homophobia. Also, an activists’ own migrant background was put to use to complicate the equation of Turkish Islam with homophobia.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Using Poland as an example here certainly harbors the danger of establishing an argument at the cost of reinforcing other stereotypes about Eastern Europeans. This point was not discussed further however.

#### 4.6.2. *Good enough for the bed, not good enough to stay?*

Gay communities are political spaces and power dynamics around ethnicity and national belonging fold into questions of masculinity and sexuality (Lambevski 1999). As recent research on gay communities in other national contexts documents (e.g. Roy 2012 in Quebec or Ritchie 2010 in Israel) also my study shows that racist stereotypes about migrant men exist in the Austrian context. These stereotypes range from sexualized imageries of hyper-potent black men to paternalist notions of needing to ‘free’ migrant gay men from their supposedly archaic, homophobic traditions, especially when it comes to Muslim migrants.

In their anti-racist activism MiGaY produced crucial knowledge about the specificities of racism within the Austrian gay (and lesbian<sup>51</sup>) scene and how imageries of migrant masculinity figure in this context. One article published in issue 2/10 of MiGaY is informative about these dynamics. Racism within the Austrian gay and lesbian scene was the main topic of that issue<sup>52</sup> and the leading article (authored by Muhamed) that starts with recounting a one-night stand that stopped short when the (Austrian) host heard him talking in a foreign language on his cell phone. The man thus asked him to put on his clothes and leave, but not before he checked the authors’ bags to ensure he had not stolen anything.

That this is not a mere ‘personal story’ but a reflection of the fact that racism (in the words of the author: *Fremdenfeindlichkeit*, i.e. xenophobia) is widespread, is then argued with regards to surveys documenting high rates of approval amongst gays and lesbians for the

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<sup>51</sup> Although all their activism was directed at diverse non-heteronormative communities, their engagement with racism seemed to focus more on migrant *men*.

<sup>52</sup> Also it was tackled in a highly visible drawing by “Sepp of Vienna” on the front cover and the backside of the journal. It showed, on the front page, a slightly hairy, muscular man pinching the nipples of a darker, more hairy man sitting in his red underwear on a chair in front of him, both looking directly at the spectator with a relaxed smile on their face. Above the two, the word “*Ausländer*” (“Foreigner/s”) was written in bold letters. The second picture on the backside of the issue showed a similar image, except that the sitting man (the dark-skinned “foreigner”) was now gone, leaving the other (lighter skinned “Austrian”) guy standing alone in front of an empty chair, now looking serious and somewhat sad. Above him, the word “*raus?*” was written. Upon unfolding magazine completely, the two pages together read “Foreigners out?”, citing a common Austrian racist slogan.



notoriously xenophobic *FPÖ*. Too many Gays and lesbians would either explicitly approve of the right wing positions, or play them down. Pointing out that the *FPÖ* repeatedly acted against homosexual-rights campaigns, the author wonders about this paradoxical behavior.

From this political line of argument, the article goes back to the racist images and discourses that exist within the white ‘scene’. On a daily basis, lesbian, transsexual and gay migrants face such common stereotypes as migrants stealing ‘our’ jobs, of not properly speaking German or of living a ‘parasitic’ life on welfare. Male migrants are furthermore confronted with the stereotype of their supposedly strong homophobia, but they are also approached in a contradictory manner: while their ‘exotic looks’ are seen as sexually attractive, their foreignness makes them seem dangerous and abusive. The thus marked migrants are confronted with a paradoxical message, that Muhamed poignantly put as, “Being good enough for the bed, but not good enough to stay in the country” (ibid: 8).

The text shows that migrant men face peculiar ethnosexual imageries within the gay scene in Austria. These imageries combine sexualized images of desirable Otherness and notions of threatening masculinity that are both racist and classist. A particularly widespread stereotype was that of migrant men being *Stricher* (a derogatory term for male prostitutes or hustlers). Except for Peter, whose light skin and perfect German enabled him to ‘pass’ as Austrian, all men with Turkish migrant background whom I talked to during my fieldwork told me about experiences of being identified as merely ‘doing it for the money’. As I learned in my conversations with Yavuz, we need to contextualize the hustler-stereotype in other experiences of exclusion in order to understand its workings:

As a migrant, as a foreigner, you really have a hard time in Austria. And, if you are gay on top of that, then you have an even harder life. Firstly, you have to integrate as migrant into the majority society. Where, as a Turk, you have to fight to be accepted, and to say: I am a Turk, I belong to you, I live here, work here, my

German is good, I pay my taxes honestly. But, never the less, you are never 100 percent integrated. I live in Austria since I am 22 and speak perfect German, I worked continuously for 13 Years now, but if I go out in the first district and I hear: you look so Turkish, you must not enter, then I think: *okay, I won't enter*. And then I go out in the gay and lesbian scene and it sometimes happens that again I am not admitted to enter, because I am a Turk, because Turk equals hustler. And this makes life very hard. This is where you start asking yourself: where do I actually belong? You are not accepted as a Turk, not accepted as a gay person. So you have a problem with the hetero-majority society, and you have a problem with the gay-lesbian minority in which you live. And sometimes, well it is really hard, life is not easy, as a gay foreigner. And in the gay-lesbian community, one somehow is always the prostitute because of the black hair and so. It's actually a sad thing. (Yavuz)

Being identified as a hustler is part of a row of experiences of exclusion that reinforce each other. Concerning the wider (hetero-) society, Yavuz has learned that he is not treated as equal even though he lives up to the alleged hallmarks of successful integration. He knows that 'integration', under current political conditions, is actually a 'fight' against migrants that has left him standing in front of closed doors.<sup>53</sup>

Turning to gay/lesbian spaces, he again experiences exclusion. As a person who has come to self-identify as gay, Yavuz is supposed to be welcome in this scene and could expect this to be his community. But again, he is denied entrance and marked as different. This time it is not the dominant integration imperative that shuts doors, but specific stereotypes about Turkish men that circulate within the gay community and that quickly identify men that do not look properly Austrian as *Stricher*.

Beyond the concrete experiences of denied entrance and maltreatment, the hustler-stereotype has exclusionary effects on more subtle and profound levels as Yavuz reported, reflecting about his own past experiences. The recurring confrontations with the hustler-

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<sup>53</sup> And not by chance, Yavuz gives the example of Vienna's posh first district here. The integration-racism that Yavuz describes has a class component. It is not directed in the same way against globally mobile CEOs, who would probably have no problem entering those doors closed to Yavuz. But in the logic of the dominant integration discourse, Yavuz embodies the position of the guest worker, unwelcome amongst wealthy whites.

stereotype eventually made Yavuz question his own homosexuality (a topic we briefly came across in the editorial of the first issue of MiGaY-magazine). In this circumstance, a peculiar narrative that is present within some migrant families could be taken up to make sense of the situation. According to this narrative, homosexual desires are thought to be a mere outcome of life in Austria, of being uprooted, living in the wrong country and its strange (Western) values. The activists encountered this narrative time and again in their counseling work. In their analysis, it is primarily a strategy of migrant parents who struggle to deal with their child's homosexuality and seek an answer to why *this* happened to *them*. Yavuz remembered that he himself took up this narrative in a phase of deep frustration because of repeated exclusionary experiences which lead him to question whether he actually only became gay because he lived in Vienna. The narrative would thus travel from one migrant generation to the next in an effort to make sense of a situation, where insecurity, discrimination and lack of a supportive community converge.

The confrontation with the hustler-stereotype works to dis-identify migrant gay men from white homosexual communities and draws boundaries between *real* (Austrian) and *fake* (migrant) homosexuals by mixing classist and racist logics. As opposed to real gays, hustlers are not only deemed to need money but also to do it for the sake of money. Thus classist notions (*hustlers are lower-class*) mix with a denial of being for real (*hustlers are not really gay*).

The stereotype translates dominant imageries about migrant masculinity into the particular context of homosexual communities and serves the function of drawing boundaries of belonging. And the stereotype works, as Yavuz adds in a later passage, shifting between

personal narrative and generalized statement as an expert. Many gay migrants, Yavuz argues, would eventually stay out of the homosexual scene in Austria, thinking:

Okay, I'll leave that be, I'll stay in my own scene and won't go in there. Because, with the normal majority society, I anyway have to fight and integrate all the time. And I do not need that all over again in the gay-lesbian community. This is simply too much and he will seclude himself. (Yavuz)

Yavuz and the other activists turned the frustration of multiple exclusions into critical energy to change this situation. And it is not by chance that *creating a community of one's own* was to become an important goal of Vienna Mix and later MiGaY. As both the 'hetero majority society' as well as the 'gay and lesbian scene' denied them easy access, they had to create their own base from which to work at changing others, as well as to have a supportive space to counteract individualization, share experiences and find solutions.

The activists deployed different strategies to confront the hustler-stereotype in their magazine. In issue 01/09 they published a text that both informed about actual living situations of migrant sex workers and aimed to playfully subvert stereotypes:

For a long time now, a rumor circulates within the „scene“, that all “hustlers” are foreigners. Their sexuality often stands for disease and criminality. The ascriptions work well: black hair, darker skin, “tarted up” and buyable. Often it is assumed that Turks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Bosnians or Rumanians in gay bars only pursue one goal: “to offer oneself for money”. (MiGaY issue 01/09, p. 8)

Criticizing maltreatment of migrant men due to the hustler stereotype, the article commences with an account of the apparent division of labor within male sex work: *Austrian* (i.e., white, non racialized) male sex workers increasingly refer to themselves as “callboys” or “escorts” (using the English term) to distinguish themselves from migrant “*Stricher*”. The article thus

points to the racialized organization of male sex work with white men occupying the top position regarding payment and status, while, below, further differentiations exist amongst migrant sex workers, for example depending on German language knowledge (less German proficiency means less ‘value’ and bargaining power). The text goes on to depict migrant sex workers as active agents with diverse biographies. They are shown to cleverly play on the dominant exoticism within the white gay scene to raise ‘their price’. The stories of three migrant male sex workers are introduced to mark the diversity of lived experiences. Yavor<sup>54</sup> is described as hard working young man from Bulgaria who mainly does the job in order to help finance the medical treatment of his sick mother back in Bulgaria. He is cited as stating that “it is just a job” for him, to have sex with unknown men. To distract himself Yavor often thinks of his Bulgarian girlfriend while having sex with paying customers.

The brothers Semih and Selim could hardly be more unlike Yavor. The article describes the two “sons of Turkish guest workers” as smart hedonists. Being homosexual and dedicated members of Vienna’s gay community, they never the less enact stereotypical, heterosexual “macho-Turks” when doing sex work, as this is what many Austrian Johns are looking for. The brothers enjoy both the sex and the money they make with it, thus “financing their life with their lust”, as the article puts it. The text ends by pointing out that migrant sex workers are neither naïve nor dangerous and that male sex work is a diverse field, shaped by lust as well as discrimination. This diversity, the text concludes, should be appreciated and taken as a motivation to rethink one’s prejudices.

In both articles discussed in this section, the activists use personalized accounts to locate racism within the supposedly apolitical arena of going out and hooking up. They reveal what

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<sup>54</sup> Whose name has been changed by the, unnamed, author of the article.

some (Mercer 1994; Hall 1996) have described as a defining feature of *all* racisms: the simultaneous longing and disgust for the sexualized Other that makes the homosexual migrant a contradictory figure. But through diverse interventions, the articles turn this relation on its feet to make clear that it is the racist imagery – and the white gays acting upon this imagery – who are the actual source of contradiction. In the second article this is underscored by presenting migrant men as living under most diverse conditions, seeking and skillfully finding ways to achieve their goals. The text reframes the perspective from ‘fake homosexuals’ to seeing a strategy of survival in a reality of global inequality and poverty. The agentic perspective is taken further in the description of Semih and Selim. Enjoying their life as sex workers, using stereotypes for their own advantage, the brothers represent anything but victims. In depicting their tactics, the text also exposes the eroticizing, heteronormative imaginations about Turkish men that the two play with. While male migrant sex workers are thus shown as strategic, knowledgeable persons, it is the majority society consumers who hold false views about the migrant other.

Compared to this text, Muhamed’s text discussed above seems more explicitly political, which is underscored by its ending where the reader is informed about a new campaign called “Qwir gegen Rechts”<sup>55</sup> which aims to confront the “shift to the right amongst lesbian and gay voters” and to foster awareness within the “lesbian-bisexual-gay community” about migrants, immigration law and hostility against foreigners. Both articles make clear that MiGaY activists are not merely hoping for acceptance or trying to change themselves to become part of Austrian queer communities. Rather, these texts are written with a conviction that homosexual migrants *are* part of the community, and have a right to be treated as equals.

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<sup>55</sup> “Qwir gegen Rechts” is a wordplay that can be read either as “queer against right-wingers” or “us against right-wingers”. It is a co-operation of MiGaY, the big LGBT-organization HOSI-Vienna, the psycho-therapist counselling center Courage, as well as a delegation from the Social Democratic and the Green party.

### **4.6.3. Diverging explanations for racism in gay contexts**

The activists found different explanations for why racism and stereotypes about migrant men exist in gay communities in Austria. Yavuz argued on the level of personal sentiments, when he criticized the unwillingness of many white gay men to actually get to know homosexual migrant men. In such a view, the problem is one of lack of real knowledge which leads to distorted views and prejudices. This explanation is useful in that it clearly identifies problems and generates solutions: present real stories, foster dialogue and interaction. But structures of power are easily left out of this critique that locates both problems and solutions in the individuals involved.

The problematic consequences of approaches towards explaining discrimination in an individualizing manner became apparent in another activists' rationalization of the negative stereotypes against migrant men within gay circles. In Peter's view, problems with migrant men only arise when they appear not alone, but in groups. Thus if "fifteen Rumanians" or "four or five Turks or Blacks" show up together, they will arouse suspicion and problems will start, Peter who used to be a member of Vienna Mix, explained to me. In this explanation, the cause of discrimination is effectively shifted away from the racist imagination (*foreigners in groups are dangerous*) towards the racialized subjects and their supposedly suspicious behavior.

Ewa demonstrated how different the issue can be explained, if aspects of power are taken into the analysis. In her view, part of the white gay community that was not racist before, developed resentments when gay and lesbian migrant activists started to organize politically. She observed that white gay men would say things like: "yes, we find it nice if

they dance at *Homo Oriental*<sup>56</sup> and sometimes we'll also dance with them there, but please don't get political!". "For many people", Ewa went on to analyze, "it is a threat if something constitutes itself. Take the Turkish guys – they are somehow exotic and nice, but other than that? That they should also have problems? *My god, we anyway have so many problems, we don't also want to deal with that!*". When exotic others ally (be it at the bar or as activists), the fear of the other, which is always already part of the orientalizing gaze, surfaces and takes over.

As the activists' accounts show that the peculiar ways that discriminatory discourses and practices play out within homosexual circles have a particular logic and should be analyzed in relation to the societal position and the politics of homosexual communities today. Thus, as Eva's accounts make clear, the sexualized exotic imagery or the hustler-stereotype are not spontaneous articulations of self-evident sentiments. That they are entangled with normalizing political processes is made apparent by Yavuz who argued that "the gay-lesbian scene is so eager to integrate into the mainstream society and say: *we are here! You have to accept us!*" that hard questions about differences and hierarchies *within* the community are silenced. The activists thus experienced the effects of both homonormativity and homonationalism. While the prior leads to particular notions of *real* homosexuality and marginalizes others, the latter advocates racializing logics to define the border that separates real from other. From these accounts it becomes clear that confronting racist prejudices circulating within white gay and lesbian spaces against migrant gay men not only asks for a critique of concrete articulations of racism within the broader society as well as gay spaces, but also, to criticize a gay mainstreaming politics that builds on notions of a clearly bounded community and thus stabilizes discourses of otherness.

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<sup>56</sup> A popular monthly queer dance event in Vienna that mainly plays pop-music from Ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey and 'oriental' world regions.



#### **4.7. Working with migrants**

Engaging with white gay and lesbian scenes to make them more inclusive was one facet of the activists work to ease the living situation of non-heterosexual migrants. Another important aspect was directed at migrants themselves. In my discussions with the activists, I was interested in what they thought are the most relevant topics for their work with migrants on issues of homosexuality. In these discussions, I focused on the central topic of this thesis, namely constructs of Turkish migrant masculinity (thus leaving out issues on other migrant groups as well as women in general). Interestingly, this had the effect of narrowing our discussions on the issue of young gay men from Turkish migrant families, while other constellations, e.g. grown up gay men who might have migrated some decades ago did not come up and seemed to play no role. My ensuing analysis reflects this particular focus of our discussions.

The activists originally also wanted to work with Turkish migrant organizations to reach them at the level of the community. But this did not work out so well, as co-operation with migrant organizations did not go beyond the stage of exclamations of interest from both sides. Activists pondered the reasons for this and besides the fact that some organizations simply had a problem with the topic of homosexuality, one guess was that the precarious situation of many organizations made them focus on ‘more pressing’ (in their view) issues as poverty or unemployment within their community.

While working with community organizations thus did not figure prominently, the activists focused on working with gay migrants and their families. These two themes structured the activists’ ideas about important issues, problems and possible solutions.

### **4.7.1. Conservative families**

When the topic of Turkish families came up in our discussions, they were generally described as conservative. While this was sometimes explicitly stated, most of the time it was presupposed that ‘Turkish migrant’ normally equals ‘conservative.’ As Peter put it:

If you come from an Anatolian mountain-farmer village, where things are more or less the same as it was back in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and you are all of a sudden catapulted to 1970s Vienna, well, then you obviously have missed some things in the development of your values. (Peter)

Also Ewa explained to me that most Turkish migrants originally were farmers who grew up in a world where homosexuality was a taboo. As migrants in the 1970s had to rely on themselves for aid and mutual support, it would not be a surprise, Ewa further noted, that they formed enclaves that fostered restricted world views. Once again, the emblematic *Anatolian village* was thus summoned to frame migration processes as time travel. Again the Anatolian village represents a place both distant and backward, thus the migratory process itself becomes an act of traveling fast forward in human development. And, as the newly arrived migrants were left to themselves, they “somehow remained in the same state as back in Turkey and even believe that Turkey is still the same” as 40 years ago, Yavuz explained. This logic was employed by the activists to explain (and, in a way, excuse) conservatism and resentments against homosexuality of Turkish migrant parents and Turkish migrant communities as a whole. And it was also employed to argue the need for interventions. Migrants from Turkey, Yavuz argued should recognize that times have changed and that even Turkey is not as it used to be. He saw this as part of his work when communicating with members of Turkish communities or parents of the persons that came to them for help. But migrant organizations themselves would have to engage in this process in his view:

Turkish clubs and associations should think hard how they can raise consciousness within their own community. But very little is done in this respect today. Much more would have to be done, but the question is: who are the people that have a say in these associations? (Yavuz)

The institutional critique of migrant associations as spaces where conservative forces have their say was not elaborated further, even though I tried to stick to the issue. Yavuz only briefly referred to the IGGiÖ, the *Muslim Community in Austria*, which officially represents the Austrian Muslim population as his “special friends”, but made clear he did not want to go deeper into that subject.<sup>57</sup> Further critical thoughts on the role of politics in actively promoting such cultural-religious associations with ‘religious dialogues’, ‘intercultural round tables’ etc. were thus curtailed.

In our conversations, Yavuz usually took on the role of the expert about Turkish communities, Turkish parents and the situation that their gay sons would encounter. In his explanations of how ‘real’ Turkish families work, descriptions of rigid norms and values blended with stories of complex negotiations within families.

When Yavuz reverted to a rigid and almost essentializing mode of describing the problematic situation of homosexual men in Turkish migrant families, these families were depicted as virtually exclusively male spaces. The Turkish father would be the one authority that guarded compliance to traditions and had the final say in all matters of decision. The problems of homosexual men/sons with their family would thus mainly be problems they had with their father and his expectations. Acknowledging the intricate dynamics of gender and power, Yavuz explained that, to a great extent, the problems of gay men in Turkish migrant families would arise from their *privileged* role as men. Being expected to represent the family

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<sup>57</sup> I did not push the subject further, but my feeling was that Yavuz was cautious not to let his criticism of this highly visible institution become a matter of public debate.

and to safeguard its (symbolic) inheritance, the men would face peculiar pressures to conform to heterosexual rules. Most men, Yavuz explained, would bow to this pressure, marry a woman and live out their homosexuality in secrecy, if at all.

Outing oneself as homosexual in a conservative Turkish migrant family could have several problematic effects Yavuz explained to me in one of our conversations. In order not to bring shame on the family, these families would often *lock up* their homosexual son at home, keeping him not only away from the ever monitoring eyes of the migrant community, but also from getting in contact with the local gay scene. Another strategy, according to Yavuz, would be to send sons ‘home’ to Turkey in order to ‘bring them back on the right track’, or to try to organize a (heterosexual) wedding for the son, to settle the issue. In all of these cases, the family thus acts as a disciplinary institution that tries to keep the son from his homosexuality.

For Yavuz, the main reasons why such measures were taken in Turkish migrant families lay in their insecurity, lack of knowledge and their worries over what others in their community would think about a homosexual son. And it was this context, Yavuz argued, which lead to the above discussed narrative of migration to the West as causing homosexuality. In their search for an outer reason, migrant parents who have a problem with their son’s homosexuality, would use the fact of their migration to solve the popular question “*What went wrong with our son?*” Employing an occidentalist logic reminiscent of anti-colonialist discourses of imported Western decadence (Mercer 1996), a Turkish homeland is created, where homosexuality does not exist and this would not have happened to their son. In this narrative, Turkey stands for heterosexuality and moral integrity, while Austria/the West represent immorality and abnormality.

While MiGaY confronted this discourse in its writings as well as in counseling work, it was not ridiculed but rather taken as proof that these Turkish parents lacked crucial knowledge and were in need of help. Employing the Turkish rural discourse thus offered the activists a pedagogic rather than confrontational approach to working with parents: Rather than having to blame parents for homophobic attitudes, the activists saw them as in need of information and consciousness-raising.

#### ***4.7.2. Of locked up men and complicated outings***

Politics of visibility and, most central, questions around coming out about one's sexual orientation, have been at the heart of LGBT activism in past decades. While liberal proponents of gay and lesbian rights activism promote coming out as a necessary step to a fulfilled life, radical thinkers/activists have scrutinized the discourse of "closet vs. out" for its binary and potentially essentializing effects (Butler 1991; Sedgwick 1991).

Also the activists of Vienna Mix and MiGaY negotiated these questions, as supporting migrant gays and lesbians in their coming-out process was an important aspect of their work. The way they framed the issue of coming out, intersections with particular understandings of ethnicity and difference became apparent. The figure of "the gay Turk who sits at home", which we have encountered earlier, is a case in point here. Yavuz often returned to this figure to show the effect that growing up as a gay man in such families that lacked information about homosexuality, were insecure and held conservative values, can have. According to Yavuz the "gay Turk who sits at home" was amongst those most hard to reach and most in need of the kind of work that MiGaY engaged in. Time and again, he returned to this figure, depicting 'him' as frightened, uninformed about homosexuality and restrained by his family. But more so than merely *sitting* at home, some of the men from this group would also be

“locked up at home”, hidden by their family and some awaiting a wedding they did not consent to, i.e. a forced marriage. This figure was contrasted by images of migrant men who are *not* in need of the activists’ help:

The migrant who already goes to *Mango*<sup>58</sup> to drink his coffee there does not need a lot of support any more, he already has put a lot behind himself. (Yavuz)

This framing employs a particular *ethnosexual geography* of problematic and emancipatory spaces. It builds on the clear distinction between a small, isolated, sad and potentially violent world of the locked up gay migrant man vis-à-vis public, lively, consumerist spaces of the gay scene that takes place in bars and clubs around the city. The move from a locked up, solitary home towards the gay scene is framed as both spatial and temporal progress. Interestingly, the framing is reminiscent of the homonationalism that white LGBT groups have been criticized for as discussed earlier (Puar 2007). Helping ‘gay Muslims’ overcoming their homophobic culture and entering a homonormative lifestyle is a crucial part of this contemporary activism, as Ritchie (2010) documented. When MiGaY considered the question of how to approach gay men from conservative families, they could take up this discursive framework but also used own biographical experiences that fit that framing. But, rather than developing drastic interventionist measures to ‘free Turkish gays from their families’ they favored strategies of negotiation which left room for maneuvering to all parties involved. As Yavuz pointed out, this distinguished them from white gay groups, whose course of action he criticized as intrusive, as they would

enter the Turkish family and say: *Hey, your kid is 18, he can now do what he wants!* And that won’t work. If the father says no, then the son cannot do so and

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<sup>58</sup> A popular gay bar in Vienna.

there will be no more discussion about it. As a Turk, I can't say that I will move out today because I am 18 now and attained full age, so now I can do what I want. Sure you can do that, but then you will lose the whole family. (Yavuz)

Setting the story in the context of the 'typical' conservative, closed family, Yavuz can show the negative consequences of interventions by white outsiders. With his intrusive, legalistic and individualistic approach, the white gay activist in this example will necessarily clash with the familial world of collectivism and authority, as embodied by the rule of the father. As Yavuz explained, the gay man in question would be ostracized and shut out of familial networks. In the story that Yavuz presented, the family would have no other way of dealing with such a radical, individualistic strategy as represented by the white gay rights activist. Evoking an undifferentiated image of *the patriarchal Turkish father* thus enables Yavuz to critique the undifferentiated and intrusive tactics of white gay-rights groups when dealing with Turkish migrant families. In contrast, the activists of MiGaY would not only have real-life knowledge about the situation in migrant families, but also proceed more cautiously.

One example of this more cautious work with families was to not raise the topic of homosexuality directly but discuss the issue of forced marriage instead. As parents generally opposed forced marriage, this created a common ground from where the activists could then navigate to the topic of homosexuality, and bring to the fore the troubling parallels between forced marriage and pushing one's homosexual child into a heterosexual partnership. Also in their work with gay migrants<sup>59</sup> the activists had developed a differentiated approach. Often they promoted a gradual rather than a one-time, all-embracing coming out process.

This is why this coming out process is important. To strengthen the self-confidence, so the migrant can say: no I will not marry, because I am gay. I do not

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<sup>59</sup> Due to my research focus, I concentrate on their work with gay *men* and also focused on that issue in our discussions.

have to tell it to my family, but I do not have to marry for the sake of my family. I will find other ways to avoid it. (Yavuz)

Importantly, the above expressed strategy was not to propose to simply *shut up* about ones' sexuality. Rather, the activists would work towards strengthening what Peter at a different point called the "inner coming out", in order to help that person get over doubts and thoughts of having to please family members and live up to their expectations. The 'inner coming out' thus served as a way of fortifying one's position, from where to develop strategies that would neither lead to a full disclosure of one's homosexuality while at the same time not having to revert to harmful tactics in an attempt to hide it (e.g. marrying in order to keep up appearances).

As in other instances, Ewa was keen to take peoples' reasons for their choices seriously, even if that meant that they would lead a "double life", playing the heterosexual amongst relatives and friends while leading a clandestine gay life. Ewa did not approve of this strategy and knew troubling stories from persons who lead such a double life. But the central problem, Ewa insisted, was not the mere fact that some people lead such a life but rather that some *had to* do so as they could not afford to choose to establish a comfortable and coherent lifestyle.

The above described strategies aimed at preventing coming-out processes to lead to split-ups with family and friends. Such split-ups would entail emotional social and economic costs which, according to the activists' experiences, was potentially more severe for migrant gays (and lesbians) as a split with family and friends could mean a loss of all supportive networks. Never the less, such split-ups were part of reality the activists dealt with, and it was discussed in an ambivalent manner in the interviews. Dramatic stories of loss and alienation existed side



by side with stories of negotiation and bargaining. Depending on the context in which such stories were located, their framing differed.

Dramatic splits with one's family, as briefly indicated in the critique of white gay activists' interventions, did sometimes happen, I was informed. Yavuz, speaking about men coming out to their Turkish migrant parents, told me about "extreme cases" he knew of

where the guy would tell his parents: *I don't give a shit about it all, about family, culture, tradition. I pack my things and move to another country!* In this case, your only choice is to really detach yourself from the family. (Yavuz)

The 'package' of *Family, culture and tradition*, in this example seems impossible to negotiate or accommodate to or change. But from his own biographical experience and from people around him, Yavuz knew that things did not always develop in such straightforward ways but that negotiations and compromises often prevailed. Thus, as Yavuz would tell me, often the sons who left or were kicked out would return after two or three years and contact with parents would be re-established. And finally, Yavuz's tone changed drastically, when he came to speak about his own coming out. In his view, his family is not a *typical* Turkish family, as his parents are not religious and only a few of their relatives also live in Austria (thus there are few people whose judgments would put the family under pressure). So when Yavuz told his parents: "I am what I am, either you live with it, or I leave" his parents were shocked but eventually decided to accept it and not kick him out, if for nothing else, so as to know that he was safe and would not end up as a drug addict on the street, Yavuz recounts. For several years now, their deal is to avoid the topic wherever possible and even the fact that his boyfriend virtually lives with him and joins the family on vacations is silently accepted. Again, it is a particularly pedagogic reading of the Turkish-rural discourse that Yavuz employs when he argues:

As a gay migrant, you have to understand your father and mother. I cannot expect from my mother, my father, that they understand homosexuality completely and could respect it fully. Because they come from a completely different generation, from a little village and from a conservative family, where they have never before dealt with the topic. (Yavuz)

Yavuz' own story thus documents the possibilities for negotiation and relative flexibility of the actors involved. Although the issue is not *resolved*, the family members have accommodated to the realities in ways that all involved can – for the time being – live with.

#### **4.8. Educating migrant gay men**

Not only did migrant parents appear to the activists as lacking crucial knowledge about homosexuality, but also the young men themselves. Educating these men about homosexuality was thus another important aspect of their work. But differences existed between the ways that the activists perceived this lack of knowledge and the needed solutions. This is how Peter framed the issue in one conversation:

With Turks, it all starts with the need for educating everyone about everything. You have to educate those who aren't gay that those who are, are not monsters. And you must tell those who are gay that they actually *are* gay. (Peter)

In Peter's view, ignorance is everywhere and thus everybody is in need of education. What they need to learn is clear, as, in this view, being gay is a clearly defined identity which simply needs to be acquired by the Turkish men in question. As these men are not seen as having any particular knowledge or relevant reasons for their actions, they are cast in the role of the ones that need to learn and adapt, rather than create own ways of living non-heteronormative lives.

Also the approach of ‘meeting the men where they are’ could have ambiguous consequences, as I learned in my conversations with Peter. Asked if they propagated alternative, pro-feminist gay masculinities that questioned normative masculinity constructs in their counseling work, Peter declined, arguing that this would have been too many steps at once. It was, he noted, anyway important for counseling work to deliver the message that, as a gay man, you are still a real man. And, he went on explaining, working with Turkish men this was all the more relevant, as virile macho-masculinity was so important for them. Working with Turkish gays, Peter argued, you would only be successful when you could make it clear to them that they could stay men “with all that is connected to being a man for the Turkish community”. As with other statements discussed here, it would surely be wrong to quickly take these arguments as representative for the work of the activists *as a whole*, because opinions and approaches differed amongst them. The statements rather represent a particular view on what the activists had to deal with and what routes they took to tackle issues. In this case expectations about images of ‘proper Turkish masculinity’ as held by migrant parents and gay men themselves, led to the avoidance of an explicitly pro-feminist approach that questioned hegemonic ideals of masculinity.

That perceptions and conclusions differed amongst the activists was apparent when discussing the issue of self-definition as gay – or the lack thereof. To Peter it was a big problem that, in his perception, for many Turkish men in Vienna, having sex with other men would not necessarily imply to understand themselves as *homosexuals*. Especially if they kept having sex in the penetrating position, these men would accommodate this practice with a self-perception as heterosexual. It seems these men took up sexual practices which were described as one amongst several forms of homosexualities in Turkey by ethnographer Huseyin Tapinc (1992). Practiced in this form, the homosexual encounter takes place between

a masculine ‘heterosexual’ men and a feminized homosexual man. “(T)he key aspect of this model” Tapinc writes “is the clear distinction between the masculine ‘active’ inserter and the feminine, ‘passive’ insertee, who regard their sexual/gender identity as heterosexual and homosexual, respectively.” (ibid: 41) To Peter, this practice was a sign of these men’s lack of a proper understanding of homosexuality and thus another sign for their need of education so that they would properly connect their sexual *acts* to their sexual *identity*, thus, in a certain sense, naturalizing a normative ‘true’ gay habitus, which unknowledgeable Turkish men have to be taught.

The issue also came up with Ewa, but she drew quite different conclusions, recounting an earlier project that Vienna Mix did together with an HIV-activism group. This project focused on male sex-workers and in the course of the project, the activists of Vienna Mix found out that many of the male migrant sex workers did not call themselves *gay*. Whereas Peter took this as a sign of their need of education on homosexuality, Ewa argued that this was a prime example of the “power of self-definition”. Ewa did not approve of these men splitting their activities from their self-identifications, but she connected this with a social context in which prostitution is for certain migrant boys and men one amongst the few ways to earn relatively good money. Ewa thus saw the refusal of these men to self-identify as *gay*, as an act of self-determination in an otherwise marginalized context. This point of view departs from Peter’s paternalist approach and connects the (discursive) practices of the men with a critical analysis of their social situation. The question of what it was, that migrant gay persons lacked and what they needed was thus not a settled one. And it became clear from the discussions, that it was also not only knowledge which would have to be transmitted, but also habits and tastes.

The typical migrant who sits at home and has little idea of gay life, thinks that being gay means merely having sex with men. We have to dismantle this and to say: there is much more than having sex with men! There are movies and books on gay people, and even in your country, there are gay and lesbian people. (Yavuz)

Again, the issue of *spaces* becomes important here and the question becomes, as Yavuz explains, “how do I get him to *Why Not* or to *Mango*, without him being discriminated against?” Making the ‘typical’ homosexual migrant leave the secure/limiting space of home and enter the spaces of homosexual life is a complicated task in at least two respects. Firstly, it is not any homosexual spaces that the informed homosexual migrant man should (want to) enter, but places of fun, going out, consumption and cruising. While the clubs and bars are thus understood as appropriate spaces of acquiring and living a homosexual lifestyle, Yavuz himself issues a caveat at another point, that “gay and lesbian life is not only partying”. The question of *which* spaces a homosexual migrant has to enter and which lifestyle he should participate in, in order to be considered gay in the right way, is not so easily answered. A second issue that complicates the project of making the men leave their home is hinted at in Yavuz's statement and was discussed above: the problem that migrant men are not simply *avoiding* gay spaces, but that there are dynamics within these spaces that might *hinder* migrant men from entering them.

In this respect, it is again Ewa whose thoughts complicate the issue of liberation, as there can be *good* reasons not to come out under specific conditions. She argues, that many migrant gays “tend to assimilative behavior” and connects this to the question of socio-political conditions, as the statement on the whole makes clear:

There are many who tend to assimilative behavior because they want to be as little as possible pushed into this minority corner. And if they have to say: *Now I*

*am also gay*, mh (*sighs*). It needs self-confidence, to take this step and also, to self-confidently demand their own spaces (Ewa)

The problem of definition thus shifts. It is not simply the Turkish guy who lacks knowledge on how to properly come out. Ewa reminds us that coming out never takes place in a social vacuum, and that minoritization has different effects, depending on one's social location. The central question then is not mainly (or solely) a lack of knowledge, but also which concrete experiences of marginalization people have made and the strategies they develop to deal with them. Not coming out, in a context such as the Austrian one, thus becomes understandable and can be connected with the lack of a network or community, strong enough to ward off negative experiences, or at least to help overcome them.

It thus comes as no surprise that all activists I talked to argued that one of the most important goals was to create a community where non-heterosexual migrants would recognize that they are neither alone nor abnormal or sick. And, as Ewa proudly reported, their bigger gatherings were visited by around 100 people. Ewa highlighted the activating potential of this community: People would see that others *are* doing something about their situation and thus would get inspired. Thus, after seeing others, "the second step is: getting out of this passivity. I am not dependent on a double life, I can lead it if I want, but I know there is something else, there is a room where I will be caught when I fall."

#### 4.9. Finally: the *hot topic* of Islam and homosexuality

In personal discussions as well as in public statements and texts, the activists explicitly refused the notion that Islam and homosexuality are incommensurable. Even though the activists were critical of conservatism within some Muslim communities they experienced the racializing effects of the dominant discourse that equated Islam with homophobia. The frustration was particularly plain when this discourse was reproduced by Austrian gay and lesbian groups. Interestingly, the *mode* in which the discourse was reproduced in white gay media was often not contempt, but paternalism:

In Austrian gay and lesbian media, you will only find negative stories about migrants. Oh, the poor gay Iranians that are being hanged; oh, the poor ones who are pushed into forced marriages; and the hustlers and, and, and. And I cannot remember if there were ever any positive stories about migrants. (Yavuz)

Curiously, the situation changed somewhat after MiGaY started publishing their magazine, as Yavuz reported critically. There were groups that criticized MiGaY in a paternalistic manner (e.g. by noting a lack of professionalism in their magazine) but would nevertheless suddenly start writing on Turkish migration issues more often afterwards. Referring to the above discussed problems of cooperating with established gay and lesbian groups on an equal footing, Yavuz reported that there were much fewer negative experiences with cooperating with LGBT-groups from Germany. “This shows, once more” Yavuz stated “how conservative a country Austria is and how many prejudices there are against migrants”.

In 2011, MiGaY magazine dealt with the issue of homosexuality and religion and also published one text on Islam. Right on the first page, a photo of a street parade was placed, showing hand written signs on a truck stating “Gay Muslim and Proud” and “Queer Muslims R us!”. Obviously, these images should work against the representation of

homosexual Muslims as victims but show them as capable of voicing claims. The text starts out by reporting on the complicated situation of young Muslim homosexuals in their struggles to be recognized both by their families as well as by the members of the gay and lesbian scene. The text informs readers that there are countries with big Muslim populations which do not criminalize homosexuality and that conservative interpretations of Islam which condemn homosexuality exist as well as liberal interpretations that do not believe that Islam forbids homosexuality. More so, homoeroticism is reported to be an important part of Muslim life. European travelers of the 18<sup>th</sup> century are referred to as having reported on homosexuality in the Middle East. The text thus engages in normalizing and historicizing the connection between homosexuality and Islam, also referring to sources documenting a long history of lesbian sexuality in Muslim countries. The text ends by building a bridge to the reader of the present time when reporting that several Muslim countries have become popular vacation destinies for white gay tourists.

While the activists shared this differentiated view in conversations with me, Yavuz also presented another explanation why Islam cannot *per se* oppose homosexuality:

If God really said homosexuality is forbidden, you all belong to hell, then I ask myself, why did he create me this way? This would be a contradiction, then I would lose my faith in God and Islam. (Yavuz)

This objection to the popular incompatibility thesis takes an explicitly religious standpoint to argue from within Muslim faith for the necessary reconcilability of Islam and homosexuality. The argument that Yavuz promotes has a logical structure: if there are homosexual Muslims and God is infallible, then homosexuality and Islam must not be incommensurable. This line of argument derives its logic not only from an empathic turn to religion and the idea of God, but also from a particular, essentialized notion of ‘the homosexual’. Rather than adopting



more fluid notions of sexuality as processual, fragmented or shifting, the homosexual, here, is a coherent, stable sexual persona. The argument thus offers a ground for claims to recognition but comes with the cost of an identity-politics notion of a true homosexual ‘core’ of a person. In the context of Islam and homosexuality though, the notion of the homosexual person serves the function of proving and asserting compatibility. Yavuz further develops his argument with reference to the Koran, stating that “God loves everyone the way he is. And nowhere in Koran it is written explicitly, that homosexuality is forbidden.” Although Yavuz is well aware that certain passages of Koran are time and again used to argue against the legitimacy of homosexuality in Islam, Yavuz gives a scriptural argument and posits himself as a knowledgeable and true believer. He thus answers to those who might challenge the above argument as ungrounded and, in anticipation of the critique, delegitimizes Muslims or *Hodchas* (Muslim clergymen) who advocate the incommensurability thesis.

The activists thus position themselves against both the liberal Eurocentric and the conservative religious argument that Muslim faith is *per se* in contradiction to homosexuality. While they dismissed this argument, they *did* engage in criticism of the maltreatment of homosexuals and the criminalization of homosexuality in countries applying Sharia law. Thus, to raise consciousness, MiGaY-activists would print T-shirts for the 2010 Vienna Gay Pride, that read “DEATH PENALTY” in bold letters and, below that, printed the flag and name of a country where homosexuality is punished by death sentence. This issue was also raised in a documentary that MiGaY produced. At one point in that documentary, a world map indicating different national legal regulations towards homosexuality was shown, moving from “marriage allowed for homosexuals” to “death penalty”.<sup>60</sup> The video indicates that Sharia law was responsible for this legal situation in all but two of the listed countries.

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<sup>60</sup> Listing Mauritania, Northern Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

This connection is further developed by a brief statement of Muhamed, explaining that most countries with death penalty for homosexuality adhere to Sharia law and thus killing people “who haven’t committed any crime”. This, Muhamed argues, “is one of the greatest atrocities and also embarrassments in the world”. And, he later specifies, it is the EU and the “so called civilized world that is proud of its developed human rights” that should be embarrassed for not intervening politically.

According to Muhamed, European states would argue that a countries’ homosexual rights legislation was “part of their cultural and legal system” and that Western states would refrain from intervening “because of political correctness”. The activists thus split Islam as a religion from Sharia as a legal system built on a particular (conservative, heteronormative) reading of Islam. Focusing on the highly visible issue of death penalty, Sharia law is criticized. This reframes the critique in two ways, on the one hand, it makes the scope of MiGaYs critique transnational by publicly deploring the maltreatment of homosexuals in other parts of the world. Secondly, it is used as a ground of critique of the here and now, and the questioning of Europe’s self-proclaimed role as the epicenter of human rights. But, rather than deepening this important critique by noting Europe’s geopolitical and economic interests to not intervene, a dominant discourse of *political correctness* is taken up. They thus get close to a highly problematic albeit prominent discourse according to which ‘Europe’ has become too cowardly to confront the Muslim world. A closer look reveals that this discourse itself is highly gendered and alludes to particular understandings of masculinity and power. The Recent works of Henrik Broder, a popular German writer and critic, can be taken as an example to spell out the gender script of that discourse. In his best-selling book “Hooray we Capitulate!” (“Hurra, wir kapitulieren!”) of 2006, he argued that Europe today engages in “appeasement politics” vis-à-vis Muslim countries, which describes itself as modest and

politically correct, but actually is only manifestation of Europe's cowardice in face of a powerful opponent. In a later article that appeared in an Austrian newspaper, Broder (2008) criticizes that whole countries in Europe have undergone a 'gender switch' and became feminized (amongst others, Broder criticizes that men in Europe dutifully sit down when urinating and chit chat like women, but lost interest in values such as working hard to feed the family). The dangerous consequence of this development according to Broder: European countries act "like battered wives who always take the blame for their husband's behaviour and swear never to 'provoke' him again, instead of fighting back." (Broder 2008: 6).

Taking up this political correctness framing, MiGaY thus - unintentionally – enters a discourse that perceives the main problem in the feminization of Europe and asks for a re-masculinization in order to stand up against a threatening global opponent.

#### **4.10. Anti-discrimination and diversity politics**

The fact that contemporary political trends offer certain opportunities for LGBT groups was already critically discussed in the very beginning of this chapter. The chapter thus closes the circle by ending with the observation that MiGaY too, seized these opportunities.

As we saw above, MiGaY was, at times, critical of the European Union and questioned its role in the fight against homophobia and the criminalization of homosexuality. But MiGaY also propagated a different and very positive image of the EU when it came to the issue of anti-discrimination. This positive, almost laudatory perspective was particularly strong in an issue of MiGaY magazine (01/2009) that came out shortly before the 2009 elections of the EU-parliament.

In an article written by Ewa, she complained that many migrants in Austria neither knew nor cared about the upcoming EU elections as they falsely thought it had nothing to do

with their lives. This was wrong, the text states and goes on to argue that the EU was responsible for such positive developments as the introduction of anti-discrimination laws throughout Europe or the positive effects it had on some accession states such as Bulgaria, which thus legalized homosexuality and introduced anti-discrimination laws to protect homosexual persons.

“Especially within the human rights sphere, the EU can definitely be seen as a motor for reforms” (issue 1/2009, page 5), the author concludes. The text ends with a call for readers to go and participate in EU-elections and carry out their legal right to vote, as it “is well-known we do not have that many rights” (ibid.). In the same issue of MiGay magazine, an interview with Ulrike Lunacek of the *Green* Party affirms the notion of EU as a motor to establish human rights throughout Europe. Thus, LGBT persons in Turkey, Macedonia or Croatia would surely profit from the EU-accession of their countries, the politician proclaims, and argues that:

Already during the accession process these countries must implement anti-discrimination laws and they get under political pressure to accept parades or, generally, visibility. Even if they do not really want to. (MiGay issue 01/2009, p. 22).

In these texts we thus learn about the positive role of the EU in promoting human rights agendas and also encounter a migrant population who, seemingly for no apparent reason, does not understand how important this political institution is for them. Taking the Austrian case as an example, it is true that EU-laws actually did force legislators to implement at least basic anti-discrimination laws. But what we do not hear about in these texts are such issues as the role of the EU in propagating neo-liberal economic austerity measures that lead to the cutting down of welfare provisions in many EU-countries and further threaten the social position of

the poor, who are often migrants. Also, the role of the EU in implementing harsh migration and asylum laws and the effects this has on the lives of migrants is not discussed. It is thus a very selective perspective on *the EU* as a political force promoting equality and sexual freedom to its member states (Renkin 2009: 25) which is propagated in these texts and many reasons why migrants might not see it as an institution promoting their interests are left unsaid.

At their events, in public statements and throughout their magazine, it became clear that MiGaY also seized the opportunities of contemporary diversity discourses and politics. As elsewhere in Europe, this is a growing political field in Austria, promoting the (social, economic, cultural) profits of a ‘colorful’ society that recognizes religious, ethno-national, sexual, etc. minority groups. To analyze how MiGaY could use the diversity logic for its own interests, and the problematic consequences this strategy held in store, I will focus on one interview in issue 01/2009 of their magazine where these dynamics became particularly obvious.

It is an interview that Yavuz conducted with the Viennese Councilor for Migrant Integration and Women’s Issues Renate Frauenberger. The title: “Diversity is very important” depicts the interview quite well and the first question Yavuz poses sets the tone: He asks Frauenberger if she thinks that the diversity of the Viennese population is one of the reasons that Vienna recently got elected as the “most livable city in the world” in a study comparing cities around the world. Councilor Frauenberger willingly takes up this angle and replies: “I think it is very important. I know that many people come to this city because life is relatively conflict-free, which is also very much due to the diversity of city life.” (MiGaY issue 01/2009, p: 6).

That the diversity discourse works so well as a medium for communication between the activist and the city Councilor is not self-evident but it is also far from surprising, taking into account recent developments in city politics around the globe. Increasingly, cities compete globally over scarce resources and investments (Brenner and Theodore 2002) and in this context, ‘city branding’ has become an important strategy to attract interest and ‘diversity’ has gained currency in marking out cities as *unique*, *livable*, *pulsating*, etc.

It is thus no coincidence that the study referred to in the opening of the interview, is an annually conducted comparison conducted by the Swiss consulting company Mercer which promotes its study as a tool to help governments and managers decide where to send their employees.<sup>61</sup> Every year, Mercer analyzes which city best provides the amenities high-ranking bureaucrats and expatriates need and enjoy (airports, infrastructure, art, etc.) and in 2009, Vienna ended the 8-year top ranking of Zurich as the ‘most livable city in the world’, in Mercer’s terms. By entering into the dominant diversity discourse, the interview, which actually focuses on the situation of LGBT migrants in Vienna, thus takes up a specific, neoliberal, framing on what constitutes a ‘livable city’ and whose sentiments count (and whose do not) in determining a cities’ ‘livability-ranking’.

In this context, it is telling to see which are the phenomena that Frauenberger interprets as signs of the acclaimed diversity of a city: Frauenberger sees diversity in different aspects of city life, “from the art and culture scene to the food markets”. The modern and diverse city promotes art and exoticism in that they bring ‘color’ and ‘life’ to the urban landscape. Theorists and activists like Ljubomir Bratic (2008) have critically put this development in relation to processes of privatization and securitization of urban space (e.g., since summer 2010, begging has been prohibited in Vienna). While these developments thus

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<sup>61</sup> <http://latam.mercer.com/press-releases/1345300>

aim at keeping poor and unwanted populations away from public spaces, sporadic, well organized and municipally funded art projects constitute a safe way of temporarily disturb the otherwise cleansed city.

Migrant street markets with their colorful and ‘interesting’ goods and clientele fit well into this logic of urban diversity politics. And, as the interview goes on to show, LGBT communities can be included into this logic today. They too can be fit into the ‘good’ diversity scheme of modern city marketing. MiGaY takes up this offer by situating *migrant* LGBT people as part of the modern and liberal city Vienna. And this strategy works, as the interview shows. Sandra Frauenberger argues for the continued need for anti-discriminatory politics and praises MiGaY for their commitment in pointing to the complicated situation of LGBT migrants and helping to improving their living situation.

But the interview also documents the perils of such a diversity politics. While LGBT migrants are included into the circle of good diversity as subjects who deserve recognition and “tolerance” (Frauenberger’s wording), not all migrants fall into this category. And in drawing the line between those who constitute good diversity and those who have to be taught to appreciate diversity, the image of the archaic, potentially homophobic migrant once again enters the discursive stage.

Frauenberger: We say Yes to immigration, Yes to diversity – knowing that immigration must be managed in a good, transparent and comprehensible manner, including appropriate integration and accompanying measures, which support people in this process. As we say Yes to immigration, we expect migrants to say Yes to Vienna. A Yes to Vienna means Yes to human rights, Yes to children’s rights, an explicit No to discrimination, Yes to diversity, Yes to women’s rights: There are societal values and parameters that need these Yeses. (MiGaY issue 01/2009, p: 7)

This statement intriguingly reminds of the political integration imperative we already encountered in the previous chapter. Importantly, the integration imperative often co-opts the very claims that migrants fought for and turns them around into tasks that migrants have to fulfill in order to attain access to rights (Bojadžijev 2002). The above statement could thus very well be interpreted as a modernized form of this politics, a ‘diversity imperative’ that turns diversity into something that migrants have to prove to cherish, in order to be welcome.<sup>62</sup>

The diversity discourse opens up possibilities for a critique of mono-cultural understandings of the white nation and claims for recognition of non-heterosexual lifestyles. But the diversity discourse comes with a price, as Frauenberger demonstrated. It splits migrants into those embodying good diversity and those who are deemed to be diverse in the wrong way and thus have to be tested, educated or sorted out. History repeats itself. And neither in the interview, nor elsewhere (to my knowledge) did MiGaY confront this racist facet of contemporary diversity politics.

## 4.11. Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter, we encountered the notion of a sexually repressed archaic masculinity as propagated in public discourse and supported by sociological studies. According to this understanding, the sexual repression of Turkish-Muslim men articulates itself (amongst other phenomena) in homophobic tendencies. Turkish-Muslim immigration

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<sup>62</sup> This trend is obviously solidifying: At the time of writing these pages, the Viennese city-government, a coalition of the SPÖ and the Green party, has started a broadly popularized process of composing a “Vienna Charta” that should set common rules for city life. All citizens were invited to propose and discuss topics to be included in the Charta online.



and the generational transmission of repressed masculinity from migrant fathers to their sons can thus be framed as an imported problem that ‘we have to save our society from’.

This takes place within a context in which social, political and economic developments have led to a reconfiguration of normative masculinity and the boundaries of the national community. Particular (i.e. homonormative) varieties of homosexuality are thus invited to partake in national projects and some gay rights groups have accepted that offer. As queer of color theorists have importantly argued (Puar 2007; Haritaworn et al. 2010) taking up the Muslim homophobia discourse and the notion of repressed masculinity it builds on, is a particularly productive way for gay rights groups to show their allegiance to the national community.

For migrants, gay rights activism is thus a complicated environment where allies are hard to find and multiple power structures prevail. The activists I talked to found diverse strategies to maneuver this terrain, taking up some parts of dominant discourses about migrant masculinity and homosexuality while refuting others and highlighting facets hitherto silenced.

Thus they highlighted the orientalism at work in the dominant discourse that blames Islam for being inherently homophobic vis-à-vis a supposed gay-friendly Austria/Europe. They did so by shifting the perspective to homophobic tendencies in *all* religious dogmas and by noting the past and continuing legal and social discrimination of homosexuality in Austria thus thwarting the easy dualism of liberal Austria vs. conservative “rest”. In their work, the activists unhinged the “sexularist” (Scott 2009) national narrative that uses gay rights as yet another marker of progress and superiority (Dudink 2011).

But my findings differ from research such as Jason Ritchie’s (2010) ethnography of Israeli gay rights groups and queer Palestinian activists. According to Ritchie’s research, there are stark oppositions between these two camps. While paternalism and cultural racism is

wide-spread amongst Israeli gay rights groups, the Palestinian groups Ritchie discusses in his research are profoundly critical. Not only have the queer Palestinian activists “refused to emulate Western and Israeli activists’ politics of visibility” but also engaged in activism that “articulates a vision of a society transformed by a fundamental restructuring of power” (Ritchie 2010: 570) rather than following a purely normalizing politics of gay rights. My own research showed less clear dividing lines between a ‘Western style’ gay rights approach and how the activists I interviewed framed problems and solutions. While they did formulate critique of the crude interventionism of white groups, activists of ViennaMix and MiGaY seemed not so much crafting completely alternative migrant queer activism, but rather aimed to integrate established gay rights approaches (including a specifically ‘Western’ notion of coming out) with strategies that are not only anti-racist but also take migrants’ living situation and cultural discourses around sexuality into account. Both in their writings and in conversations with me, diverse discourses - on homosexuality, Turkish migrants, integration, diversity, exclusion – were intermingled, showing the complexity of their task.

While highlighting and confronting other forms of discrimination and racism within straight contexts in Austrian society seemed to play a minor role in the activists’ work this was different for racism within homosexual contexts, an issue that MiGaY has time and again publicly criticized. This was a particularly complicated task, as it not only involved a critique of the very communities the activists are part of and want to belong to, but it also asked of a group which itself struggles for recognition in wider society, to reflect upon hierarchies within. In this context, anti-racist activism within gay and lesbian contexts is easily seen as detrimental to the bigger cause of societal inclusion (and thus shares fate with many marginalized groups in emancipatory movements).

But MiGaY continued to raise the issue and in doing so produced crucial knowledge about the specific dynamics of racism within gay communities. And as we saw, it is particular imageries of masculinity that informed these racializing dynamics.<sup>63</sup> Thus, migrant men were denied the status of *real* homosexuals and suspected to have ulterior motivations (earning money, stealing, etc.) to enter gay scenes. At the same time, racialized men could find themselves desired for certain supposed characteristics, thus Turkish men would be glorified for their supposedly macho masculinity, or Black men for their assumed superior virility. Being inherently tied to a racist imagery, this desire is always precarious and can quickly switch to the negative when the othered man does not behave in the narrowly defined way expected of him. Problems thus start if these men stop being mere objects of desire but ‘constitute themselves’, become organized and voice own interests. Analyzing how the activists framed issues they found important and developed strategies to tackle them, we encountered further notions of Turkish migrant masculinity. The figure of the ‘gay Turk that sits at home’ was employed to describe both problems (the secluded migrant home, lack of knowledge, fear, etc.) and solutions (participating in a welcoming community, entering a gay public, adopting a certain lifestyle, etc.). Concerning parents of gay men, the popular Turkish rural discourse and imageries of archaic, patriarchal masculinity were employed to explain peculiarities of being gay in a migrant Turkish family.

Although seldom explicitly noted by the activists, I would argue that class-issues play an important role in their work and come up at diverse points. For example the stereotypes about migrant men within gay context are highly classed in that both fear and longing for the exotic other mingles with imageries of brute lower-class masculinity. Issues of affluence or lack thereof also played a role in the counselling work of the activists, as they

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<sup>63</sup> Again, I want to note that the activists also worked on issues around lesbian migrant women. But due to the focus of this thesis, I did not concentrate on this facet of their work.

were acutely aware that for many of their clients, familial support was also an economic necessity. Yet, their own agenda partially rested on ideals of a homonormative lifestyle in which sexuality is also expressed through consumption of particular goods and where the figure of the LGBT migrant is depicted as a new and positive “symptom of modernity” (Bunzl 2004) and good diversity. The question of class thus once again reflected the complex and at times contradictory nature of their activist endeavor that navigated between diverse arenas of discourse and practice.

## 5. The collective construction of ghetto masculinity

*“Adolescents of the underclass do not like Strache<sup>64</sup> because he is relatively young and hangs out in discos, but because he promises to do something against migrant machos who terrorize discos and parks.”*

Hans Rauscher, 2011<sup>65</sup>

When I started my research for this thesis a *moral panic*<sup>66</sup> broke out in the media over the hip hop band Sua Kaan. The Vienna based group consisted of three young men whose parents had migrated to Austria from Turkey and former Yugoslavia. In their songs and low-budget videos, the three men rapped about the tough life in the streets of Vienna’s bad neighborhoods and their willingness to take up a fight with whomever confronted them. Violence – both that which the rappers experienced as well as that which they would inflict on anybody who threatened them - was a recurring theme in Sua Kaan’s rap songs. It was the song *Balkanaken*<sup>67</sup> that particularly aroused the public’s attention. The song, which got tens of thousands of clicks on YouTube, consisted mainly of warnings to the audience, that they would be robbed or even shot when they would dare to come near Sua Kaan or their tough “Kanakanen”-friends. Lines such as “*most of my friends have pump guns and they come straight from Balkan*” or the recurring words “*click clack head-shot*” (which kids in Viennese parks

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<sup>64</sup> H. C. Strache, head of the right wing party FPÖ.

<sup>65</sup> Hans Rauscher in *Der Standard*, 21.11.2011

<sup>66</sup> The concept of moral panic was introduced to a wider public by Stanley Cohen (1972) who used it to describe events in which a group of people become publicly defined as a threat to the values and the security of a society. In their study *Policing the Crisis* Stuart Hall and colleagues (1978) further developed the notion of moral panics as an ideological tool to create public consent for law and order policies against poor populations. To gain this consent, the authors argued, political leaders fuelled public debates on rising crime rates amongst black men in Britain. In an Australian study, Scott Poynting and colleagues used the term several decades later (2004) to describe the political and discursive context in which young men from migrant Lebanese families became publicly viewed as dangerous and in need of surveillance.

<sup>67</sup> Which is a combination of the words *Balkan* and the racist slur *Kanakanen*, a popular insult for people that are seen as having southern European looks.

would shout out for months to come) was too much. Newspapers asked what was going on in Vienna's migrant quarters, members of Sua Kaan were interviewed and invited to talk shows and faced with charges of promoting violence. Most poignantly, FPÖ-member Christian Hein warned in press releases of the "aggressive video" made by "foreign youth". According to Hein, the video clearly showed the bedraggled state that the city was in and the contempt these men felt for Austrians. These developments, he urged, had to be counteracted and measures should be taken against the violent rappers.

In chapter 2, I have critically discussed research on Turkish 'second generation' males and the notion of a deviant, violent masculinity transmitted from fathers to sons. In this chapter, we meet a group of young men from Turkish migrant families living under precarious economic conditions that might seem to fit those images. The group we get to know in this chapter spent much of their time rapping and tried to become as famous as Sua Kaan, however unlikely that was. In what follows, I analyze their music, their notions about masculinity as well as their life in a 'bad' Viennese neighborhood. In the analysis, I not only retrace the work that the young men invested into creating a virile 'ghetto persona' but also present the institutional actors that participated in this endeavor.

For this analysis, I take up the concept of "controlling images", as introduced by Patricia Hill Collins (2004), which aims to uncover the role of representation in reproducing racialized inequalities. In her analysis of discourses about Black women and men in the USA, Hill Collins shows that gendered, sexualized and racialized images, on the one hand, serve to legitimize discrimination but she also points to other dynamics. As reflected in the adjective *controlling*, these images do not remain outside those they represent but restrict the lives of those they represent.

In her 2004 book *Black sexual politics* Hill Collins dedicates a whole chapter to the analysis of controlling images of black men in contemporary USA, which harbors relevant insights for my own analysis. In line with the postcolonial analyses discussed earlier, Hill Collins retraces the long history of present images of Black men as wild, uncivilized, virile beasts. These images are informed both by fear as well as admiration and a wish to ‘tame’ Black men through training and obedience (Collins 2004: 153). Hill Collins identifies diverse fields where discourses about black masculinity are played out and popularized. Professional basketball is one such field, where particular controlling images of Black masculinity are at work. These are most salient in success stories about Black players as they often follow a particular script that is gendered, racialized, and classed. According to this script, the Black players only made it to the top due to diligent training and obedience towards their trainer. As such, these stories serve to represent Black men as bodily skillful but in need of guidance. The basic message this sends to Black youth is: “submit to white male authority in order to learn how to become a man” (ibid: 154). Hill Collins argues, that this script is promoted widely and travels to diverse social fields. Amongst others, it is reproduced in youth work, where it is used to teach young boys that they too could make it out of poverty if only they abide by the rules of white male order. In masking structures of inequality and making the young men themselves responsible for their (lack of) success, the script thus works to pacify and keep a marginalized population from protesting against their living situation.

Basketball is one field in which controlling images of ‘decent’ Black masculinity are produced. Hip hop, on the other hand, serves to produce opposing images. While Hill Collins is conscious of the emancipatory possibilities of hip hop, she evaluates today’s mainstream music rather as arenas for controlling images of tough, aggressive and criminal Black masculinity. The ubiquitous imageries of *gangsters* and *pimps* encapsulate the “perception of

Black men as inherently violent and/ or hyper-heterosexual and links this perception to poor and/ or working-class African American men” (ibid: 158). Cool Black masculinity, according to this imagery, is virile, misogynist and ego-centric. Such gangsters do not strive for collective action to change a system of oppression, but to trick the system in order to reap personal profits (ibid: 159). Again, the controlling image thus serves good functions in reproducing inequality in that it not only fosters the notion of the deviant Black male subject, but also works to discourage those Black men who identify with the image from engaging in social struggle.

Obviously, the concrete form and content of images of Black masculinity as analyzed by Hill Collins are deeply embedded in the specific context of the USA. But *controlling images* is a concept that works beyond a given context. It describes the workings of classed, racialized and sexualized images and their entanglement with the reproduction of material structures of inequality. These images draw on an established set of stereotypes, but adapt them to fit present day discourses and moral panics. Controlling images secure public support for unequal treatment of particular populations and aim to avert resistance from these populations by promoting restricted, de-politicized images to identify with. The following analysis takes up this analytical framework and asks how a group of young men from Turkish migrant families deals with the controlling images they are faced with, how they use these images to accomplish goals and how these images are part of the very structures that perpetuate the young men’s marginalized position.



## 5.1. Chain Gang: Performing the controlling image?

Over several months, I studied the group of young men from Turkish migrant working-class families who had started a rap group. I analyzed how rap was a way for them to articulate experiences and create peculiar public personas. As I was to find out, this happened neither spontaneously nor in a social vacuum – diverse interests, agents and institutions participated in the creation of these ‘ghetto youth’.

### 5.1.1. The group

I met the young men through a youth center. As rappers, they called themselves *Lazkopat* and *King 54* and I will use these, rather than their real names, throughout the chapter. The two friends started the group Chain Gang in late 2006 and formed the “inner circle” of Chain Gang, but the total number of participants fluctuated over the years. In what follows, I present an analysis of the songs that Chain Gang produced in 2008, as well as observations I made and discussions we had when I met the young rappers over a period of several months at different locations and events in their neighborhood.

In 2008 Chain Gang produced several tracks that could be downloaded for free from their website and listened to on YouTube. In these songs, there was plenty of material for moral panics but at that time their songs only reached a rather small circle and the general public took no notice of them. With several hundred clicks per song, Chain Gang was far from famous, but from the looks of postings on their sites and from the crowd that came to their concerts, Chain Gang had established a small, loyal fan-base amongst friends, other youth living in the district and beyond. Chain Gang thus does not represent an ‘outstanding case’. Rather it is one of the many little-known all-male, second or third migrant generation

rap groups that exist in cities all over Austria and beyond, who make music with virtually no resources and even less musical training.

And like many other groups, Chain Gang adopted a particular ‘migrant gangster rap’ style that was adapted from the North-American original by rappers in Germany such as Bushido. Chain Gang’s tracks consist of electronic beats and samples drawn from hip hop, soul and oftentimes ‘oriental’ (sitar, etc.) music, to which Lazkopat, King 54 and Akrap-G (who entered the group shortly before I met them) added spoken word raps. The tracks analyzed here are mostly performed in German, but at times the rappers switch languages and rap parts in Turkish.

Lazkopat and King 54 grew up close to the youth center where I met them, in one of Vienna’s infamous ‘bad’ neighborhoods where income is low and unemployment rates are comparatively high, as is the proportion of inhabitants with a migration history. As we learned earlier, the Vienna city government is engaged in diversity politics and this neighborhood, with its huge street market, Turkish restaurants and relatively cheap rent, is amongst the districts that should attract young, open-minded middle class residents. But, despite the mushrooming of bars, shared office spaces and roof-top apartments, the neighborhood was not fully gentrified so far and the sheer quantity of betting offices gave a hint at the economically desperate situation of many people living there. Also for Chain Gang members, economic hardships were well-known issues. In several instances, the young men, all of whom quit school at the age of 15 to start an apprenticeship, told me about their anxieties about finding a proper job in the future. For Lazkopat, who was somewhat the ‘master mind’ and driving force behind Chain Gang, the situation was particularly tense, as he could not even find a company that would accept him as an apprentice.

I met up with members of Chain Gang and their friends over a period of several months to talk about them and their music. Although I sometimes joined them when hanging out at “their” places around the neighborhood, we usually met at the youth center, where the young men spent a lot of time and where I became a quite regular guest in that period. But more than simply being a place to hang out, the youth center and its employees played an important role for the young men and turned out to be active agents in co-constructing their performance as ‘ghetto rappers’. I thus included the youth center and its social workers in the analysis.

### **5.1.2. The youth center, a masculine space**

For members of Chain Gang, there were good reasons to spend a big part of their leisure time in the youth center. Not only could they hang out with friends without having to pay for consumption, but it also offered free internet and even an audio-recording room outfitted with decent equipment. Chain Gang could use this room for free to record their songs, as long as they stuck to the youth workers’ conditions, i.e. did not produce racist, nationalistic or sexist songs (a recurring point of contestation, as we will later see).

The youth center, which was funded by the Viennese city government and where eight social workers worked in shifts, was almost exclusively frequented by youth with migrant background and many of them apparently had Turkish parents, as Turkish was heard steadily. While the premises would be crowded with boys most of the time, the youth club suffered from a severe absence of *girls*. Talking with youth workers about this issue, I was told that, even though some girls would show up when they arranged dance contests in the

hall in their basement, girls would scarcely show up otherwise. Hakan<sup>68</sup>, one youth worker, explained to me that especially the girls from the neighborhood would avoid the premises, as there would always be a brother or some cousin hanging out here, who believed he had to “look after” them. To avoid this form of control, Hakan believed, girls would go elsewhere to spend their time. Anna, another youth worker put it this way: “The girls either come because of the boys, to meet them here, or they stay away because of the boys. The problem is, they don’t come of their own accord”. The youth center was, as I could observe in the weeks to come, a thoroughly masculine place. It was a place where young men hung out, and one that catered to the interests of these boys. But, to be sure, this masculinity was not fixed and stable. Rather, the center was a place where masculinities were negotiated, constructed and performed – amongst the youth themselves, as well as with the youth workers, and eventually with me.

Many of the interactions between the young men and the youth workers took on the form of a (sometimes more, sometimes less) friendly dispute in which diverse topics and behaviors were debated. By involving the boys in conversations about such issues as nationalism, religion, violence or sexuality, the youth workers challenged the young men to voice their thoughts and critically reflect their opinions. And the boys, obviously acquainted with this pedagogic strategy, played along. Thus, youth worker Anna would, for example, approach one of the boys and ask him what he thought about nationalism, Islam, “typical Turks”, etc. and the boy in question would reply more or less reluctantly. While it quickly became clear that the young men knew the ‘right answers’ that would please the youth workers (and thus make them stop their interrogation), they would challenge the pedagogues time and again. Chances were plentiful and the boys were resourceful in creating trouble. For

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<sup>68</sup> All names of youth workers have been changed.

example when King 54 sat at one of the youth center's PCs and called me over to show me some YouTube videos of kids beating each other up, after that showing me images of kissing women, shouting out: "*Ugh, I hate lesbians!*", a male youth worker overhearing him quickly shouted that he should turn that off. Another time, Akrap-G came to the center to show off his huge belt-buckle in the shape of the Turkish flag. Soon, Anna approached him, shouting "*No nationalism in here!*" After getting into a lengthy discussion, Akrap-G took off the belt, but signaled to the onlookers that he was not defeated by smiling widely.

In their interactions with the youth workers, negotiations of masculinity seemed to be ever present, be it when a (male) youth worker would make the boys apologize for their "disrespectful behavior" when they spat at another boy or when another (male) youth worker would end quarrels amongst the boys by yelling loudly through the room. In earlier times, the center organized "boys' evenings", where they would do things like cook a dinner (and wash the dishes afterwards) together with male youth workers to "broaden their view of masculinity" as I was informed. In all of these cases, male youth workers would *as men* address the boys and work with them on their male behavior. Through resolute interventions against aggressive behavior and by acting as alternative male role-models with whom to explore non-traditional masculinities, the youth workers aimed at changing the young men's view of what it is to be a "real man". While the young men critically welcomed these interventions and respected the male youth workers' opinions, Anna, the only female youth worker at the center, did not have the same authority. Her interventions would more often be made fun of, belittled or ignored by the young men. "I think that the boys see the male colleagues as equal opponents, but not me", she once told me. Apparently, the repeated pedagogic interventions by her male colleagues have – unintentionally – fostered the male bond between the boys and the male youth workers. While the latter thus attained a position

where the young men accepted them as proper opponents with whom it made sense to get into contests and disputes over what it means to be a man, they relegated Anna outside the male circle. But, Anna argued, this very exclusion opened up other possibilities for her. As she had a “lighter” relationship with the boys, she could more easily engage them in games or creative activities – i.e. *feminized* activities. The young men accepted this division of labor, and when they eventually wanted to produce a music video, they turned to Anna to help them.

In the beginning the youth center backed up the young men in their engagement with rap music, as it seemed not only to interest them but also get them involved in a collective project. But the enthusiasm of the youth workers eventually waned, as the rap project did not turn out quite as they had wished. “We wanted them to sing about their life, about how hard it is to find a job, but now, all they sing about is: I am a better rapper than you are!” Anna once told me, but adding with a shrug “well, at least it keeps them busy, which is also something”. Her colleague Hakan had more thorough reservations: Once when he showed me around the neighborhood, telling me about youth unemployment and the hard future that many of the youth living here faced, he added: “So here we social workers are, arranging one hip hop contest after the other, but cannot help them find jobs”.

### **5.1.3. *Negotiating relationships***

Although we eventually established a quite friendly relationship, my encounters with the members of Chain Gang and their friends was not free from complications and throughout the months our relationship changed time and again. To be sure, these shifting movements could be quite unsettling and confusing to me at that time. But in retrospect, they give relevant insights into the complex field the young men navigated and the strategies they developed to position themselves vis-à-vis others.

In my first encounters with the young men, several things happened simultaneously. Not everybody welcomed my presence at first. One young man, who I later found out to be King 54 would put on an explicitly ‘bad boy’ posture whenever we met in the youth center and would not talk to me until much later. On my second day at the youth center, Akrap-G would suddenly and quite theatrically shoot kisses at me and laugh at my baffled reaction. Both incidents, I would interpret as tests of my masculinity. The first, rather bluntly, testing how I would hold up against a demonstration of virility. The latter, more subtle, testing how I would react towards a public challenge to my sexuality. Both challenges obviously build on, and reproduce, a particular notion of masculinity – a tough, virile, heterosexual one.

Those young men in the group around Chain Gang, who were more positive about my endeavor to find out more about them and their music were giving me joking hints like “We’re up to no good, we only cause trouble around here” that were apparently supposed to help me understand which kind of kids I am dealing with and which position they occupied in the youth center. Especially Lazkopat, who was most energetic about the band project, showed quite some interest in my research. Apparently, he saw the potential of my project to increase their visibility and popularity and he would say encouraging sentences like: “You write a book about us? Yes, write a book about us, live with us!” As I later learned (and as is discussed further below), the young men had quite a record of ‘being studied’ and skillfully used these opportunities for publicity.

#### 5.1.4.A permanent male battle

Besides gaining popularity and success, the central motivation for the members of Chain Gang to start rapping was to tell the world about their life. In an interview, King 54 put it this way:

We had fights on the streets, everywhere there were junkies and people beating each other up. At one point we said let's do something on street life. And we wrote tracks about the streets, about our experiences. (King 54)

The young men once told me, that they chose the name Chain Gang to show that, even though they have a rough life, they stick together like chained. Typical to rap music, most Chain Gang songs tell stories about the everyday life, struggles and thoughts of the narrator. Besides describing their hard life, the rappers oftentimes directly and harshly addressed the listeners in their songs. While the *I* of the rapper is described as serious, tough, strong, ever ready for a battle to defend his crew or territory, the *You* is all that *I* is not: timid, cheating, lazy, unpopular. Oftentimes *You* is described as competitor and intruder. The thus challenged *I* positions himself as ready to fight back, be it with words, fists or guns. In their songs, Chain Gang members often assert their determination not to “give up” until they have “reached our goal”.

One point needs consideration here, as it is so obvious it might slip from attention: all the opponents, the imaginary *You*'s that Chain Gang struggle with in their songs are *men*. This becomes clear when the *You* is addressed with terms as “*Junge*” (boy, lad) or the Turkish equivalent “*Lan*” but also when he is feminized (e.g. by fantasies of sexualized violence, as we will see below) and denied the status of man. Obviously, these feminizing insults are



directed to a male counterpart because, feminization, after all, only works as an insult for men. In their songs, the Chain Gang members tell of lives shaped by continuous disputes and contestations with other men. While the Chain Gang crew thus led a risky life, they make it clear to everyone who wants to listen, that they are ready to fight back and stand their ground when challenged.

Spending time with the young rappers, I learned that acquiring this tough masculinity took more than simply singing harsh lyrics. The first insight came from observations that I initially could not make head or tail of. Roughly three weeks after I started frequenting the youth center, something strange happened. By then, I had established what I thought was a good relationship with the young men. But this time – it was a day on which they planned to record a track at the recording-room of the youth center – the mood was suddenly bad. When trying to chat casually with the boys, their replies were quite snotty and dismissive. I wondered why the young men, with whom I had good talks just days ago, reacted that differently all of a sudden. It only started to make sense after spending more time there when I recognized the pattern. Whenever they were about to record a track, they would change their ways and become rougher. They would shout offensive remarks and give harsh replies when talked to and even their posture changed accordingly. Thus, their walk would typically become more swaggering and bowlegged and they added such gestures as beating doors or walls they passed for no apparent reason. When I once discussed these observations with Anna she rolled her eyes in recognition: “Yes, it’s awful! Whenever they do their rap-thing, they become like this before and after their recording sessions.” Seen from the perspective of a youth worker, this transformation was obviously evaluated as a step into the wrong direction. To me, it showed that becoming a ‘gangster rapper’ involves incorporating a certain habitus.

### 5.1.5. *The gang and the right to the ghetto*

In the songs, references to the Chain Gang crew and other friends are important and recurring. The group of male friends is hailed as a place of solidarity and collective struggle. It is a resource of power to its members, but it is often also the target of attacks by rivaling groups. Importantly, the group or gang often comes into play in connection with *space*. Thus, certain neighborhoods would be “our neighborhood” or simply “Chain Gang country”. In such a territory, Chain Gang would define the rules to which others were supposed to abide. And as the rappers make clear, anyone daring to oppose this order would receive their punishment.

It is our goal, to fuck up everyone  
who doesn't play by our rules.  
Streetfighter is back!  
("This is our neighborhood")<sup>69</sup>

Unser Ziel ist, jeden zu ficken, der sich an  
unsere Regeln nicht hält. Straßenkämpfer is  
back!  
("Das ist unser Viertel")

With lines like these, the rappers claim in an aggressive tone what should rightfully be theirs as male members of society: a sphere where they dominate, give orders and are not disputed. In their case this space was not well-off or prestigious but quite the opposite, as Chain Gang's frequent invocations to the “ghetto” make clear. And they were not the only ones to use that language. During the time of my fieldwork, the most prominent case of a politician to use this sort of ghetto talk when referring to the district was Hannes Missethon Secretary General of the Christian conservative ÖVP. In a widely discussed newspaper interview,<sup>70</sup> he argued that the lazy handling of migration issues of the Viennese Social Democratic Party SPÖ has made a ‘migrant ghetto’ out of the very neighborhood that Chain Gang-members lived. To make his

<sup>69</sup> Throughout the chapter, I quote excerpts from Chain Gang songs. I present both the German original and my English translation. The title of the song in question is given in brackets at the end of the quote.

<sup>70</sup> “Faymann hat die Ausländerghettos gebaut”, Der Standard, 17.07.2008.

point, the head of the ÖVP added that in this neighborhood it felt like “one has gone to bed in Vienna and woke up in Istanbul”.

In their lyrics, Chain Gang used the ghetto metaphor to radicalize the political and media discourse about their district. While, from a sociological point of view (Wacquant 2008), there are no actual ghettos in Vienna, the terminology allowed Chain Gang to talk about deprivation, violence and frustration in a hyper-masculine way. But the ghetto terminology also endowed them with the aura of toughness, as anyone who survives in such a rough area and even manages to rule parts of it, must be super rough themselves. Engaging in what recalls Connell’s notion of protest masculinity, the young men employed the ghetto discourse as a way to express male entitlement to space. As the *right to the city* is denied to them, at least they claim a *right to the ghetto*.

Time and again, I would join the members of Chain Gang on their tours through the neighborhood and to their favorite places. One such place was a small, hidden park, where the boys hung out in a corner that they introduced to me as “our corner”. This statement was backed up by a wealth of graffiti’s reading their crew’s name as well as their individual rapper’s names. Here, they would sit, talk, smoke, kill time and have their ongoing games of jokes and brawls. When entering the park, younger kids would shout their names and sometimes chant “Chain Gang!” with a respectful tone. In a certain manner, the young men did ‘own’ a part of their neighborhood and thus live up to their rapper persona. But compared to the world that Chain Gang created in their songs, lived reality was far less glamorous and far less violent.

### 5.1.6. Rap and the question of violence

For Chain Gang-members Rap and violence were connected in multifold ways. Not only was the wish to sing about experiences of violence a motivation for them to start rapping, but also, rapping posed a way for them to be less violent in real life.

In earlier days, we solved every problem with violence, but now we do it with words, with texts. For example, if somebody wants to fight with us, we write a song, without their names. But they hear it and understand that it is about them and they stop because the lyrics are too hard. (Lazkopat)

As far as their earlier tracks were concerned, they were rife with allusions to violence, as in this sequence:

Enter my country, if you dare, and  
I will tear you up. Lazkopat and  
King are out on the street. This is  
my track, if you don't like it, you  
can piss off, because tearing me  
up is impossible.  
("This is our neighborhood")

Wenn ihr euch traut, kommt in mein Land  
und ich zerfetz euch. Lazkopat und King  
sind jetzt auf der Straße. Das ist mein  
Track, wenn er euch nicht gefällt, könnt ihr  
euch verpissen weil mich zerfetzen geht  
nicht.  
("Das ist unser Viertel")

While lines like these speak about keeping others out of Chain Gang's sphere of rule, I would argue that more than struggles over city-space are at stake here. 'Tearing up' others is a recurring theme in Chain Gang-songs. And, while the rappers accredit themselves the power to rip other men into pieces, their own bodies are steeled and unbreakable.

Stress and violence fuck up my  
head, I feel so aggressive, as if I  
had an ironclad skin. You run away  
from me, because I have a  
bazooka. Down with the gun, fists  
up, one on one"  
("My violence has boundaries")

Stress und Gewalt ficken meinen Kopf, ich  
bin so aggressiv, als hätte ich eine  
Panzerhaut. Du laufst vor mir weg weil ich  
habe eine Panzerfaust. Knarre Weg, Fäuste  
hoch, one on one.  
("Meine Gewalt hat Grenzen")

In his seminal study *Male Fantasies*, Theweleit (2000 [1977]) demonstrated how male anxieties of intrusion and dissolution lead to a fixation of keeping one's own boundaries intact and to fantasies of destroying others. In the violent fantasy above, ironclad skin makes the rapper unbreakable and impenetrable, while a bazooka extends his potency to kill. A similar logic is at work when Chain Gang uses images of sexualized violence in their music to announce what they would do to their enemies. When the rappers sing about penetrating their opponents anally or orally it is a demonstration of their power to undermine these men's bodily integrity. Forcing the other into the *receiving*, and (according to the heteronormative logic) feminized position, the opponent is deprived of his masculinity, whilst the rapper gains an aura of hyper-masculinity.

Be it the surveillance of 'their' neighborhood's boundaries, or forceful penetration of opponent's bodies, in these imagined struggles, a precarious masculinity is depicted as threatened by intrusion but ultimately defended and safeguarded by virile resistance. Whenever I noted the intense violent imageries in their songs, the young men repeatedly assured me, that this was "only for entertainment" and that their listeners would understand that this was not directed against concrete, real people. The young men understood well, that there was little attention to be gained within the world of gangster rap, if violence posturing was not exaggerated considerably. And they also knew that listeners did not simply take their texts at face value.

### **5.1.7. *The (missing) women of Chain Gang's world***

Interestingly, women play no role in Chain Gang's songs. They are neither depicted as amorous partners,<sup>71</sup> nor as targets of violence, nor do they figure in any other way in the songs I analyzed. The universe that Chain Gang creates is a truly male one.

When we touched upon the topic in our conversations, diverse arguments for the absence of women in their songs came up. On the one hand, the rappers critically observed a rise in misogyny within rap. In their music, they did not want to partake in the proliferation of sexism, which has accompanied hip hop's rise into the pop cultural mainstream. But they also saw the rampant sexism in much of contemporary hip hop music as a sign of a more general moral decline. In their view, the presence of sex in hip hop mirrors the fact that contemporary youth widely indulges in sex and drugs. But instead of finding other, non-derogatory, ways of relating to women in their music, they avoided the topic altogether.

This was also the case because the young men felt that the masculine world of rap would not suit women. Rap music, in Lazkopat's words "is somehow a gangster-thing. And, after all, only men are gangsters." Employing an ethos of protection, it would have been wrong and disrespectful to women to drag them into the rough and manly sphere of gangster rap. Including women into their rap-world could also mean that they would have to 'diss' them in the same way as they did with other opponents. "We don't insult women. If we would insult women, that would be like insulting our sisters or our wives." As women, in this view, were over-determined by their relation to other men ('sister of ...', 'mother of ...', etc.) they were not proper opponents to get into a fight (however artificial) with.

From my observations when meeting them, it seemed that this notion also applied to their everyday life. When I encountered them hanging out at the youth center, at 'their park'

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<sup>71</sup> One exception was a love song I heard them perform at a concert. This song was not put online and is not included in this analysis.

or other places, I would virtually never see any girls participating. Once King 54 explained to me why they never hung out with girls: love relationships with girls would eventually end and these girls would then have knowledge about their group, which they could use to discredit them. With boys who left the group this would not pose such a problem, as they could beat them up in this case, which was not possible with women, as they did not beat them on principle. I doubt that this narrative is a comprehensive explanation of their (lack of) relationships to girls. What it does show though, is how well the gangster framework (being a clandestine group, need to be cautious with ‘outsiders’) can be used to make sense of their life in the male clique.

The ethos of protecting women from ‘manly spheres’ that motivated Chain Gang not to sing of women in their songs resonated in other discussions we had once when the topic of *honor* came up in talking about stereotypes about Turkish men. Although critical of the dominant discourses portraying Turkish men as violent patriarchs, the young men did hold the assumption that a particular sensitivity for honor might be a shared feature of ‘Turkish men’, which was also true for them, they declared. To illustrate what that means in real life, Lazkopat told me that he would intervene when his sister “did something” that was off limits. “If she is religious, she shouldn’t do it, only after marriage”. But, he was quick to add, he would never use force, as the woman in question would anyway have to want to do the right thing on her own account. It was true Lazkopat went on, that some Turkish families would use force and even weapons to settle such issues. “This” Lazkopat explained to me “is extreme. It is a very old tradition, which maybe existed in the villages”.

I encountered one more facet of Chain Gang’s position towards women when browsing their *myspace* page and saw they were ‘friends’ with the highly controversial artist Lady Bitch

Ray. At that time, the female rap-artist aroused a lot of media attention with her “Vagina-Style” rap and pop-feminist titles like “No dick is harder than my life”. The fact, that Lady Bitch Ray (who was also a PhD candidate in German Studies) was a daughter of Turkish migrants added drama to the story. Even though she breached most of what Chain Gang saw proper female-like behavior, they spoke of Lady Bitch Ray with appreciation. “We thought it is great that a woman rapped. That a girl just comes along, writes her own texts and is successful with it”, Lazkopat explained. With her tough masculine performance and by gaining a most valuable good, namely popularity, Lady Bitch Ray became a respectable rap artist in Chain Gang’s eyes.

#### ***5.1.8. Rap as a medium for social critique?***

In its beginning, rap and hip hop culture were a highly politicized medium that Black men and (to a lesser degree) women in the US used to voice critiques of discrimination. Also in the German speaking context, rap was taken up early on by migrant youth to confront experienced injustices (Loh and Güngör 2002). But both in the USA as in Europe, the rising popularity of hip hop lead to a gradual diminishing of critical contents. Does Chain Gang use rap to point to social questions and criticize injustice? Not primarily, as their stories of experienced hardships and bravely faced challenges tend to individualize the social and leave structures of discrimination out of sight.

Nonetheless, some social questions do come up in their songs. At one point (in “Don’t ask why”) the hypocrisy of a world in which a few people are rich while others starve, is challenged. Also at several points the reality of poverty and joblessness is referred to. In “My life”, Lazkopat sings of the daily stress he has with his parents because he quit school



and does not live up to their expectations. Also, in their depictions of the ghetto life there are several references to a social context in which drug abuse and alcoholism are common.

Analyzing the songs for tactics that the rappers find in coping with these problems, we find hardly rebellious and rather adaptive strategies. Thus, regarding the global injustice of starving populations, listeners are told to “don’t ask why” and, at another point, are informed that one needs a whole lot of money to survive in this world. Trying to ‘make it’ within the existing system seems the only path. And, while widespread drug use is described as a sign of ‘hard times’, drug addiction is ultimately depicted as a self-inflicted fault and a sign of moral deficiency - “junkies” are described as oppressive and violent, while others are criticized for being bad role models because of their drug and alcohol use.

#### **5.1.8.1. Confronting racism and discrimination**

Different to other issues of inequality, racism is more explicitly talked about in one song (“Lazkopat feat. Akrap-G, The King 54”). In this song, an opposing *You* is warned that he should stop saying “*Ausländer*” or “*Kanak*”, i.e. racist taunts, or The King 54 will get violent. A bit later in the song, he goes a step further and states: “If you call me Tschusch [another racist insult], I’ll go to court, because I’ll kill you.” Not discussed as a structural or institutional issue (e.g. discrimination at school or in the job world), it is broken down to an individual insult that is answered with force. Racism is thus addressed, but it is translated into the language of Chain Gang rap songs. Thus, once again, the rapper is shown to face any challenger and ready to punish him for his wrongdoings – anti-racism in a particularly masculine mode. Reflecting their structural position in Austrian society, they developed a male persona that cannot accept to be insulted or humiliated and thus put in a less powerful position.

In everyday life, amongst each other and friends, the young rappers would casually call themselves “*Kanak*” and thus take up hip hop’s strategy of appropriating the “N-word.” From what I could observe, this practice was only employed amongst boys, never with girls when they happened to be around. Alluding to a shared experience of marginalization, the self-conscious use of labels such as *gangster* or *Kanak* created an air of camaraderie and solidarity amongst the boys who would thus signify that they did not silently accept derogative naming but take matters into their own hands.

In our discussions, the issue of racism came up often and it was clear that the young men had an acute knowledge of the dominant stereotypes about Islam and Turkish migrants in Austria. They explained to me, that their band-slogan “Here, the truth is spoken” is also directed against these lies and stereotypes. In their music, these lies should be opposed and rectified and they also planned to produce a song half-jokingly called “*Islam statt daham*”, (“Islam instead of at home”) thus flipping the infamous FPÖ slogan “*Daham statt Islam*” (“At home instead of Islam”). The track was meant to reverse the terms of the dominant discourse: “All the time it is the FPÖ that talks about Islam and the like. Thus we now want to make a rap song which talks about the FPÖ,” King 54 told me. Unfortunately that song was never realized and the criticism the young men had about the dominant stereotypes did not make it into their musical oeuvre. As later discussed, all of the young men self-identified as Muslim, but did not strictly follow religious rules. Islam seemed to be most relevant as a cultural marker to articulate collectivity and belonging to a community. Also their repeated experiences with anti-Muslim racism added to their identification with Islam and Muslims in Austria.

These negative experiences led to strong criticism, most often focusing on the treatment of Islam and Muslims in Austria. To illustrate the injustice, King 54 drew a

(romanticized) comparison between Turkey, where Christians would not be harmed, whereas here in Austria, Muslims endured continuous harassment. Lazkopat criticized that girls and women wearing headscarves faced attacks on streets and that dominant images about these women portrayed them as notoriously subordinated by their violent husbands.

The young men skillfully took up recent events to make their claims, as when FPÖ's Susanne Winter claimed in a newspaper interview, that rates of pedophilia are particularly high amongst Muslim migrants. In a conversation on this incident, Lazkopat alluded to the case of Josef Fritzl, who incarcerated his daughter for over 20 years and had children with her and asked me: "So, was Fritzl a Turk, or an Austrian?" to show how 'culture' is employed differently in dominant discourses about male violence, depending on their (lack of) migration background.

One site of discrimination that became apparent to me in the course of my research was not addressed by Chain Gang members: that within the rap and hip hop scene itself. Having become sensitized to the existence of a multitude of migrant rap groups such as Chain Gang existing in Vienna (let alone the rest of Austria), I became conscious of the virtual absence of these groups in the media. Sporadically there were reports on rap as a method in youth work or articles were published on migrant rappers or crews, but even these reports would scarcely talk about the actual music but rather focus on issues of violence or (lack of) integration. But in regular music media like the very popular youth radio station FM4 the music that such groups produced would not be played.

A documentary about Viennese rappers entitled "More than 1.000 words" which came out during the time of my fieldwork confirmed my impression that rap groups like Chain Gang, but also more prominent ones like Sua Kaan, are marginalized within the

‘scene’. While one black rapper was amongst those artists the documentary featured, all other rappers were white. Not only were Austrian migrant rappers and the whole branch of rap music that dealt with migrant experiences excluded, but they were even explicitly decried at one point. Thus, when one of the white rappers in the documentary described his approach to rap music and what makes it special, he explained “you know when I rap, I use metaphors. I don’t just stand there and say: oh yes, my Turkish neighbor is being treated badly.” The documentary thus not only presented a white hip hop scene but also (unwillingly) informed about stereotypical images of Turkish migrant rappers that legitimized this exclusion. Naming maltreatment and racism (topics that used to be important in rap) was turned into a sign of banality, from which the rappers distanced themselves.

The audience at the release party of the documentary confirmed my impression as none of the more popular migrant rappers could be spotted in the crowd, which was a get-together of the Austrian rap-scene. It seemed that dominant dividing lines are reproduced within the Austrian rap-scene itself and young rappers like the members of Chain Gang are not perceived as part of this scene. But Chain Gang-members themselves have also accommodated to this divide and did not view themselves as part of the scene. And when I once asked what they thought of white/Austrian rappers, they answered they did not know any by name.

### ***5.1.9. Mixed self-positionings***

Although the young men casually spoke Turkish with each other, switching back and forth to German, they kept their songs mostly in German, as “the market is too small for Turkish only rappers in Austria” (Lazkopat). But they also included Turkish parts “to show people that we are Turkish and that we know Turkish. Also, there are always people who recently arrived

from Turkey, who do not know German”, King 54 explained. To them ‘being Turkish’ played a decisive, however symbolic role. They would talk about life and politics in Turkey and I often found them watching online documentaries on Turkey's history. When asked, they would call themselves “Turkish Austrian” or “Muslim Austrian”. Actual life in Turkey they only knew from summer vacations. These were obviously ‘times of exception’ for them, which some liked for the “freedom” it gave them to be away from their usual context, while King 54 only reluctantly went there, as he “knew nobody” there and would be considered as “German” there.

While Turkey was somehow ever present as point of reference, the young men had no doubts about its actual role in their lives and not one of them planned to move there in later life. Lazkopat once told me the very obvious reasons for this decision: “Life is better here. Take the insurance system, child benefits, sick-pay or unemployment benefits. In Turkey, it’s not like that”. Still, at times, their views on Turkey would take on glorifying, nationalistic traits, praising Turkey’s modern society, productivity or political role in the region. A Kurdish youth worker told me that the issue of Kurds in Turkey was one that regularly sparked heated discussions. From these discussions, he got the impression that, “I am probably the first Kurd these kids talk with, after having heard all these negative stories at home.” In his view, the issue remained a complicated one, but he was positive about the progress they had made. And statements like these seem to prove him right, as Lazkopat later made clear:

Often, people would get together and say: you are Christian, he is Muslim, we have to do something to get him out of here. This is how street fights start. The same with Kurds and Turks. And through our music and our texts, we want to prevent this. (Lazkopat)

All Chain Gang members identified as Muslim, although this seemed to play a more important role to King 54 and Lazkopat. The question of what ‘being Muslim’ meant to them, did not really seem to make a lot of sense to them. They only gave tentative answers referring to eating and drinking practices and their efforts to pray regularly. Both went regularly to a nearby Muslim center that housed a Mosque, book store, a shop, etc. and that offered discussion groups for youth, where issues of Islam and beyond would be debated. In our discussions, the young men mostly referred to Islam and faith in the context of morals, peacefulness and generally helping people to know what is right. E.g., when we discussed what needed to be done to reduce street violence, Lazkopat referred to Muslim faith as a solution:

Lazkopat: If they were religious, this violence and killings would never happen. Because, if they believed in god, they would be afraid to be sent to hell not paradise.

PAUL: So the solution would be, to be more religious?

Lazkopat: Yes, and go more often to the mosque and actually listen to what is said.

Except for sporadic references, Islam was not mentioned intensely in Chain Gang’s songs. As we will see at the end of this chapter, this changed considerably a few years later.

### 5.1.10. *Trained by failure, guided by faith*

In most Chain Gang songs, their rough street life is presented in an almost glorifying way.

However in one song (called “My Life”), Lazkopat crosses this positive view self-critically:

There are so many things that I’ve done wrong, now I regret everything. I should have studied and became good so I would not have stress with my parents. Look at me, I have stress every day, I have no job in this shitty bloc.  
 (“My Life”)

Ich habe so vieles falsch getan, jetzt habe ich alles bereut. Sollte studieren und etwas Gutes werden, damit ich mit den Eltern nicht Stress habe. Schau mich an, ich habe jeden Tag Stress, ich habe keinen Job, in diesem Scheiß Block.  
 („Mein Leben“)

The testimonial makes clear that the rapper does not see himself as a shining example of how to live life right. Quite the opposite, the audience is told not to do the same mistakes and “end up” like him. While Chain Gang members thus do not present themselves to the audience as models to follow, they never the less claim a particular knowledge and authority. To claim this particular speaker position, faults and failures are not hindrances but a *conditio sine qua non*, as it gave Chain Gang members firsthand experience of the hardships they sing about. Never the less, failure alone would obviously not suffice to claim an authoritative speaker position and here, rap comes into play. When life was miserable, Lazkopat recounts, he found rap. And he goes on to say:

With rap I want to put my life into text for you. And show you what goes on in my block.  
 (“My life”)

Mit Rap möchte ich mein Leben für euch texten. Und zeigen was in meinem Block so läuft.  
 („Mein Leben“)

Rapping is a way to turn experiences into a story to be told. As many writers and artists have observed, hip hop culture and rap offers the emancipatory potential of giving voice to those whose experiences and thoughts are excluded from mainstream discourses. It can be a way to access these discourses for those who are not, or merely in negative ways, represented publicly. The continuous bragging about one's successes in street life and mastery of rap, which is so typical for the genre and is found all over Chain Gang's songs, makes sense in this context. It functions as a marker to signal listeners that these are rappers worth listening to and to take advice from. Thus, we as listeners are continuously reminded that, even though they might have made some bad choices and life is hard for them, Chain Gang members have managed to climb the ladder of respect in their neighborhood and became popular rappers and proper men. Even though life is hard and austere, Chain Gang members follow their moral code. In their songs, this is not only asserted in their critique of drug-addicts, cheaters and opportunists, but is at times also backed up by a reference to religious faith.

I follow the path that my religion  
leads. This is my life, my life, my  
honor.  
("My Life")

Ich folge dem Weg den meine Religion führt.  
Das ist mein Leben, mein Leben, mein Stolz.  
 („Mein Leben“)

Because they are trained by failure, skillful, successful and upright Chain Gang members can claim a speaker position that legitimized them to speak to their fellow youth.



### 5.1.11. *The co-construction of the decent gangster*

Using this speaking position, the members of Chain Gang would at times use their songs to give advice how to lead a proper and successful life.

One should have a goal, that one wants to attain. One should study hard and not give up. When you make it you'll be rewarded plentifully. Engineer, Master, Doctor. [...] Only with education does one have a perfect life and for this perfect life you have to study hard. Don't fuck school, never forget. Because without school your life is completely wrong.  
("My Life")

Man sollte ein Ziel haben, das man erreichen will. Man sollte viel studieren und nicht aufgeben. Wenn du es schaffst, wirst du viel belohnt. Ingenieur, Magister oder Doktor [...] Nur durch Schule hat man ein perfektes Leben und für dieses perfekte Leben muss man viel studieren. Gib keinen Fick auf die Schule, vergiss nie. Weil ohne Schule ist dein Leben voll daneben.  
 („Mein Leben“)

At times, Chain Gang's music takes on a tone reminiscent of a social worker. In this case the audience – which is obviously expected to contain a considerable number of potential school drop-outs – is told to stay in school and attain formal training in order to gain well-paid jobs later on. Far from propagating a 'no future' message, the lyrics engage with the 'at-risk' youth to tell them to do the right thing, i.e. 'follow the script' in Hill Collins words. The fact that some might not get equal chances to follow a career path is left aside. As I discuss in the following section, the youth center was actively involved in trying to make Chain Gang into a rap group that would send positive signals to their audience

#### **5.1.11.1.      *Violence is no solution!***

One instance where the co-constructed nature of this positive rap persona would come to the fore, was when Chain Gang decided they wanted to produce a music video to enhance their visibility. For this, the young men wanted to write a new song that would render a good story to be told in a music video. It was to be shot with the help of Anna, who had access to a digital camera and was experienced, as she regularly did video projects with youth. The endeavor led to many discussions between Anna and the boys about the content of the song as well as the music video.

The young men initially wanted to shoot a fast video with street fights and thrilling chases. But, as Anna made clear that she would not participate in producing a video that promoted violence, the young men had to change their plans. After a short while they decided upon a project that would speak out *against* violence and wrote the song “*Gewalt ist keine Lösung*” (Violence is no solution). The video to the song was supposed to start out with two young men having a fight on the street. Lazkopat and King 54 who happened to pass by would intervene in order to stop the violence, when a police car showed up on the scene, mistaking the two rappers for the actual aggressors, upon which a wild chase would start. Eventually, Lazkopat and King 54 would manage to shake off the policemen.

Lazkopat and King 54 explained to me, that the message of the song was to show the negative effects of violence to the youth who would listen to the song. For several weeks, the video was a prominent topic amongst them, and especially the scenes with the policemen were discussed eagerly. As direct (male) agents of ‘the system’, they were obviously highly valued opponents. And the prospect of depicting themselves not only as wrongly accused by the police, but also, ultimately, superior to this all powerful enemy filled the young men with exited satisfaction. Only Akrap-G once told me in a private conversation that he did not like

the idea, as “rap and violence belong together. Rap without violence doesn’t really work, I think.” Being a new member with rather little to say in the group, his doubts about adapting so blatantly to the youth workers’ anti-violence agenda remained unheard. But Akrap-G had a sense of humor about it, and smilingly told me in the above mentioned conversation: “Well, at least the track is against violence, which means it actually is somehow related to violence”.

#### **5.1.11.2.      *The lyrics***

In the video, sequences in which the story was told would be interrupted by takes that showed the three boys rapping. As I had the chance to join the group when they filmed these sequences, I present and discuss the songs’ lyrics briefly, before turning to the film shooting itself, as this was a prime site to observe the collective construction of Chain Gang-masculinity.

The song “Violence is no solution” started out with the sound of distant police sirens, after which the rap set in. On the next page, the lyrics are presented.

There's much to see on these streets  
but it is senseless.  
Everyone must understand that.  
Many will drown, because of all the  
violence.

I rap against violence.  
Vienna is sunken deep.  
Youth is sunken in drugs, nothing  
moves on, it is like a soaked ground.

The time has come.  
We must change something.  
The youth must get out of that heap,  
let us lift you from the depths.  
You don't have to live on the street,  
what you do, doesn't make sense.

The time has come, I want to change  
something. People should finally  
change, criminality shows daily on  
the street.

Violence is no solution

We are here to change something.  
With our texts, we want to avoid so  
many things. What you do is not real  
rap, what you do is just rubbish.  
We want to be a role model for the  
youth.

Suck this track in deeply.  
This is no joke, no.  
I rap to the beat from line to line.

The time has come, I want to change  
something. People should finally  
change, criminality shows daily on  
the street.

Violence is no solution.  
(„Violence is no solution“)

Auf diesen Straßen ist vieles zu sehen  
Es ergibt keinen Sinn  
jeder muss das verstehen.  
Wegen der Gewalt werden viele untergehen

Ich rappe gegen Gewalt.  
Wien ist tief versunken.  
Die Jugend ist tief in Drogen eingesunken, es  
geht nichts weiter, es ist wie ein  
durchgetränkter Boden.

Jetzt ist die Zeit gekommen.  
Wir müssen etwas ändern.  
Die Jugend muss raus aus dem Haufen, lasst  
euch einfach aus der Tiefe rausheben.  
Ihr müsst nicht auf der Straße leben.  
Das was ihr machts ergibt keinen Sinn.

Es ist so weit, ich will was ändern. Die  
Menschen sollen sich endlich verändern, die  
Kriminalität ist täglich auf den Straßen zu  
sehen.

Gewalt ist keine Lösung

Wir sind hier um was zu verändern.  
Mit unsren Texten wollen wir vieles  
verhindern. Was ihr macht ist kein Rap – Das  
was du machst, ist ein Dreck.  
Wir wollen ein Vorbild für die Jugendlichen  
sein.

Zieht euch diesen Track tief rein.  
Das ist kein Spaß, nein.  
Ich rappe auf den Beat von Line zu Line.

Es ist so weit, ich will was ändern. Die  
Menschen sollen sich endlich verändern  
Die Kriminalität ist täglich auf den Straßen zu  
sehen.

Gewalt ist keine Lösung.  
(„Gewalt ist keine Lösung“)

The lyrics contain several tropes known from other songs: besides routine side swipes against other rappers, the song criticizes a morally declined society with drug use, criminality and violence as dramatic signs of social anomy. More explicitly than in other songs, the rappers position themselves as guiding the audience out of the darkness of their miserable life. More than other songs, “Violence is no solution” thus establishes a pedagogic relationship between the artists and the audience. However much they position themselves as knowing and seeing the dramatic situation on the street, their manner of interpellating the audience creates a distance between them and articulates a message of paternalism rather than solidarity.

### **5.1.11.3.      *The video-shooting***

I joined the group when they filmed the non-story shots, where the rappers would be shown in different urban contexts, singing the above lines right into the camera. On that day of the shooting, we were a rather big group. Not only was Chain Gang accompanied by a slightly older and somewhat business-like looking young man, who introduced himself as “Chain Gang’s manager” to me, but also a TV-reporter joined us. The reporter worked for “*Heimat, fremde Heimat*” (“Home, strange/foreign home”), a program on public television that focused on migration realities in Austria. Recently, the long-established program had tried to shake off its culturalistic outlook and open up to newer topics and younger audiences. The reporter had heard of Chain Gang via Anna and wanted to produce a feature on them, showing how a group of young men were managing to get themselves out of a miserable life through rap music.

Together with a friend who helped carrying the equipment, the group set out to shoot the scenes. The first site was a side-street near the youth center. Lazkopat and King 54 were to

walk slowly towards the camera rapping. While Anna filmed them, the friend operated a CD-player for playback, the manager nervously observed the two rappers and the journalist filmed the whole group. Watching the whole scene with all its differently positioned spectators (me included), I became acutely aware of the complex relations of observation it engendered.

However D.I.Y. the video would eventually look, almost nothing was spontaneous about it and the impression that Chain Gang wanted to convey had to be crafted through painstaking repetitions and alterations. The biggest problem, at least in the eyes of ‘the manager’, was King 54’s lack of cool poses. After each take, and with increasing tension, he would approach King 54 and tell him to look tougher and angrier. King 54 (not the experimental type) unwillingly obeyed the orders, but the manager was still not satisfied, hissing at me: “Damn, he cares more about his good looks than about looking evil!”. But eventually, after many rehearsals and discussions about facial expressions or the right way to positioning their fingers, the situation improved. King 54 got visibly tougher each take and the manager grew satisfied.

After the scene at the side road was finished, some takes were made in front of a huge billboard onto which the young men climbed. It showed a car, which was the reason why the men favored it. However, it was ‘merely’ a Renault, which elicited some contempt by Akrap-G, who shouted out that they should go look for a Mercedes billboard.

Finally, they wanted to shoot a scene in a surrounding that looked particularly *ghetto*. But, putting their heads together, the young men could not come up with a site they thought fitting. After some discussions, Anna said she knew a really good place which we could go to by car. The young men were relieved and so we traveled through the district to a small run-down bridge. Anna’s taste proved right and the whole crew immediately liked the bridge, which was not only covered in graffiti, but also set in a superbly ghetto-style scenery, made

up of railway tracks, an empty parking lot and a 70s high-rise building. At this spot, which none of the young men had ever seen before, we shot the remaining takes, with Anna skillfully arranging the young men in different positions.

#### **5.1.11.4.      *Cash for culture***

Shortly after the video shoot for “Violence is no solution”, another incident took place which shows the collective construction of Chain Gang. One day Anna approached me in the youth center, telling me that they needed help with writing a text. Anna and the Chain Gang boys sat around a table, staring at a blank form. Anna explained to me that the city of Vienna had recently launched a new program to fund youth culture. She handed me the postcard-style promotion material, which read “Cash4Culture” in colorful graffiti-style letters. Young people could ask for funding that would help them perform ‘their’ culture, it said. The boys were excited about the possibility of getting funding for their own audio recording equipment so that they would not have to rely on the youth center’s recording room any more.

“You must be good with words, help us write the application” Anna told me. As one part of the application, the young applicants had to write a one-page motivation letter. The boys themselves kept saying that they did not know “how to say this in good words”. Anna’s efforts, to make them formulate sentences through posing questions as “So what could you do if you had your own recording studio?” had little success, as the young men would only reluctantly answer. Eventually Anna gave up on this and started writing first sentences herself, sometimes asking me what I thought. Gradually, we both got into the flow of formulating ‘youth style’ sentences, while the boys got quiet and eventually left one after the other, apparently happy to be freed from the task. Anna and I were outdoing ourselves in formulating first person sentences that praised the idea of funding Chain Gang to set up their

own recording studio. It would enhance ‘our’ autonomy and give space for ‘our’ creativity, ‘we’ would create songs about ‘our’ life and tell youth how they could get through rough times in non-violent, positive ways. As part of Vienna’s lived diversity, ‘our’ music would promote respect and understanding amongst ethnicities.

In retrospect, the incident is a telling example of the field of forces that Chain Gang navigated. In this field, ‘performing your culture’ is one opportunity that marginalized youth is offered by authorities. The terms that define this ‘culture’ and the conditions under which it is worthy of public support, are heavily institutionalized. Recuperating the style of what has earlier been part of a critical youth culture, programs like “Cash4Culture” are a low-cost way for the increasingly underfinanced municipality to do something for underprivileged urban youth. Instead of tackling social issues, the program juxtaposes youth culture and quick money and thus leaps on the currently widely propagated notion that doing your thing will get you fame and riches (in line with the plentitude of talent shows on TV aired all over the world). What Patricia Hill Collins has argued for the US-context is also true for our case: Encouraging marginalized youth’s dreams for a quick way out (and up), such programs – more or less consciously – work to divert young people’s frustrations about their living situation and thus pacify them. Instead of burning cars or demanding proper education, youth will engage in gangster poses and tell their listeners that they should go to school, in order to make the best of what they can hope for (while their female companions will rehearse sassy dance moves, and the wider public is satisfied to see that ‘at risk youth’ is kept busy). In the light of this, Hakan’s earlier critique of a youth work that organizes rap parties and dance contests while it is increasingly unable to help their young clientele find work, seems highly fitting.



Considering the thoroughly crafted nature of this funding program, it also seemed highly fitting that, in the end, it was a youth worker and a sociologist who slipped into the imaginary personas of young migrant men and tried to write down what civil servants at the receiving end of the application might have in mind when they imagined a youth culture worth funding. When Anna and I were done writing, Lazkopat read it through quickly and signed approval of what we wrote. But in the end, our efforts were in vain as the application was eventually turned down. The rappers were naturally displeased by these news, but, as they were only partially involved in the application and seemingly never really believed that they would get the money, they took it rather easy.

#### **5.1.12. *Being studied – using opportunities***

The terrain that the young men had to navigate in their attempts to create proper ghetto personas was not only populated by social workers and municipal funding agencies, but also the media and scientists, i.e. actors who seemed interested in the young men's story and wanted to tell the world about it. For Chain Gang, any form of publicity could broaden their popularity. Even talking to me and showing me around 'their neighborhood' was part of their strategy to use the resources they had to claim discursive space. Their main resource was obviously *their life, their story*: young boys of Turkish migrant background who grew up under harsh conditions but never the less try to 'make it'. During my field work, I found out that this was a story that many were currently interested in. Besides the TV-journalist, another team of sociologists (from the department of criminal sociology) eventually showed up and chose 'my group' for a study on the life of youth in underprivileged neighborhoods.

The young men learned that their story had a certain 'value', and, as I could observe, they became quite skilled in deploying it. Thus, when I overheard an interview between the

journalist and one Chain Gang-member, I was astonished about the *déjà vu* effect. Not only did the journalist ask similar questions as I had done some weeks earlier but also the answers – regarding rap music as a way for them to overcome a violent lifestyle – were astonishingly similar. To the young men, it was obviously not so unusual to be interviewed about their life and their struggles by media people or sociologists. Again, Akrap-G found a joking way to spell that out, when he came up to me in one of my first visits to the youth center and bombarded me with statements as: “Hello, what’s your name? How are you? Are you a professor? My name is Akrap-G, I am 15 years old. Turkey is a beautiful country.” In his cynical way, Akrap-G not only made clear that he was used to being questioned, but also that he was not going to simply endure this procedure but remained in charge.

The youth workers at the center had mixed feelings about the intense interest in the boys. One pedagogue found it a good thing, because “the boys need a lot of attention and these sociologists give it to them”. But this opinion was hardly shared by his colleagues. Although I was repeatedly assured that they supported my project, there was critique about the intense presence of social scientists lately. As a consequence, “there are sometimes more grown-ups than kids around here” as one social worker put it, which would be bad as “both us and the kids behave differently then. The kids are exited and we cannot do real work with them in these phases”. As there were ever more people who wanted access to ‘problem youth’ via the youth center, they decided they would more often turn down requests in the future. The problematic position that these requests, and their orientalizing motivations, put youth workers in, was highlighted when one explained: “I sometimes feel like a tourist guide: here, look at these wild beasts!”. Certainly, the young men too realized the exoticizing dynamic in most of these encounters and drew their conclusions from it. To Akrap-G it was clear why so many sociologists want to know about their story: “Because they are jealous. Because we can

do things that they cannot do.” What looks like well-intended interest in deviant migrant masculinity from the sociologists’ point of view, is perceived as longing for a less normalized life from the viewpoint of those studied. In quite a clairvoyant manner, Akrap-G thus unraveled how controlling images about young men of Turkish migrant background from working-class background are articulated. Notions of dangerous underclass-masculinity fuse with ideas about male otherness and make the young men the object of a curiosity that is driven by both dread and longing. We also saw the power of controlling images to bring together diverse actors and endow them with particular roles that serve to reproduce these images. Journalists and sociologists aim to generate critical knowledge about the young men’s lives and thus feed the ongoing discourse about curiously dangerous others; youth workers grant access to the boys in order to arouse attention for their clientele (and their work) but become gate keepers to a mystified ‘parallel world’; the young men were both objects of interest and actors in their struggle to use the brief moments of public attention for their own interests.

Did the young men achieve their goals, did they subvert power structures according to their interests or were they caught in a web of stereotyping and self-marginalization? I doubt that these questions can be answered in a straight-forward way. For the young men, finding themselves in a multiply marginalized location, the public interest in them constitutes ambivalent opportunities. Seizing these opportunities, the young men attempted to create a career where otherwise youth unemployment or underpaid, insecure jobs await them. Engaging in hip hop gave them a platform to articulate opinions and establish a speaker position from where to answer to diverse discourses that exist *about them*. But the attention they receive was highly infused with the dominant controlling images. The energy they invest

into being heard is thus likely to work against them in that they reify dominant beliefs about young working-class men with Turkish migration background as problem cases.

## 5.2. Conclusion

For the young men engaging in rap serves diverse functions, amongst other it gives them the opportunity to formulate tough, honest and ethical personas. These personas have no parents, foremen or policemen telling them what to do, but on the contrary, they claim a stage to tell about their experiences, thoughts and opinions. Oftentimes, the songs would create imageries of a merciless world, where nothing is for free but has to be fought for, danger lingers everywhere and the solidarity of a male clique is essential. In this mode, the young men also name and confront injustices in their music – as a challenge they are ready to face. With their recurring references to virility, toughness and their proclaimed ability to feminize others, the songs affirm them as *real men*.

In several songs Chain Gang members articulate a desire to participate *as real men* in *male struggles*. As such the artists of Chain Gang discursively engage in the “serious games” that Bourdieu (1998) has insightfully described as central to the reproduction of male domination. In these serious games, men struggle for positions of male hegemony - over other men and over definitions of normative forms of masculinity used to legitimize male dominance over women. By calling these struggles games, Bourdieu highlights such aspects as the important role of particular (and oftentimes unsaid) rules that participants have to follow in order to play along. Importantly, these games cannot be played by just anybody, as the rules define who is eligible to play. More than simply allocating ranks and gains, the serious male games thus define the population of accepted, proper men. While these male games exclude women from equal participation altogether, they also have the power to define

– by exclusion – those men and masculinities deemed *not man enough*.<sup>72</sup> The game thus constitutes a mutual *recognition* of men by men. Those who enter into a serious male struggle are thus not simply enemies but intimately tied together. As Meuser (2006: 124) points out, the participants of such serious games meet as “partner-enemies” recognizing the other as worthy of fighting with. In their songs Chain Gang create a world full of serious male games and claim their rightful place in these games as brave, virile participants.

With its gangsters, ghettos and gunfights, the world that Chain Gang’s music creates is an alternative, self-defined ‘playground’ for young men who sense that they will not be asked to enter the legitimate serious games in economy, politics, science or art where men struggle over resources and power. Claiming a right to ‘their’ ghetto is a very direct strategy to create a space of dominance for young men who are regularly told in public discourses that they do not belong here. With graphic displays of the violence they are prepared to execute and a sentence like “Osama Bin Laden loads my gun” (in “My violence has boundaries”), the young men maximize their chances of being heard by other men in the neighborhood as well as any politicians who need material for a next round of moral panics. They know about the images that exist of ‘boys like them’ and engage with them in diverse ways. They confront some of them by uncovering their discriminatory subtext, they embrace others as actually true and make fun of yet other images. When youth workers confronted them and some of their opinions, it thus often seemed almost like a game, with the young men obviously knowing quite well what the pedagogues ‘knew’ about them. This game, as we could observe, was yet another *male game* the young men engaged in.

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<sup>72</sup> Plenty of examples can be found for this power to define male out-groups, e.g. when Austro-German fraternities excluded Jewish men from participation in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century or the (official as well as unofficial) exclusion of homosexual men from military services around the globe (Schiedel and Wollner 2009; Mosse 1996; Pinar 2001).

The young men created a rap world devoid of women and employed ideals of manly protection and proper feminine conduct as explanation. In turn, the notion of a tough gangster life offered them a framework to make sense of the absence of women in their real, everyday lives. While they were thus in a phase where women did not play a role as partners, talking about their sisters was a way to voice their views on intimate gender relations. A framework of honor and religious belief put them into a position of monitoring women's sexual conduct. In this context, essentialized notions of Turkish masculinity were at the same time taken up and put into question: while valuing honor was described as a feature of 'Turkish masculinity', outright dominance or violence against women was located in a tradition from which they critically distanced themselves. Once again, we encountered the Turkish-rural discourse as the young men negotiated a position vis-à-vis women that was in control but should also mark them as liberal .

As we have seen, the young men find themselves surrounded by diverse actors and institutions who wish to craft them according to their interests. Thus, for the criminal sociologists, they are an interesting case to study processes of urban exclusion and strategies to deal with them. For the empathic journalist, they are an example of at-risk youth, who have found hip hop as a way out of a miserable life. Social work hopes that hip hop keeps the young men busy with a meaningful task and that through their songs, the young men tell about youth problems at school and the labor market as well as send positive messages to their peers. To the city that wants to foster cultural diversity, funding hip hop is a way to promote what is seen as positive cultural production of migrant youth.

All these agents are interested in the young men's *real life story*. In that, the rappers share a fate with writers such as Necla Kelek, whose migration background too is seen as proof that what she said is based on *experience*, i.e. *true*. And the young men aim to make the

best of this ascribed role of ‘expert by experience’ and use it to substantiate their claims. But the outcome, as we have seen, is a highly collective production, in which the boundaries between ‘center’ and ‘periphery’ are blurred, as anthropologist Ayşe Çağlar, writing on the situation in Germany, pointed out already in the late 1990ies. With youth work and cultural programs encouraging migrant Turkish youth to engage in hip hop as a “creative expressive art form of the ‘margins’” (Caglar 1998: 250) the state is actively involved in producing a particular image of these very margins. In our case we could observe how the young men’s wish to tell their story of a hard life and the will to succeed could be turned into a pedagogic lecture to ‘at risk’ youth. With their focus on propagating role-models, these songs reproduced the paternalism of a detached youth work that individualizes social problems rather than structurally empowers those who are marginalized.

As Hill Collins noted with reference to black male rappers, Çağlar also notes that the promotion of hip hop is a double-edged opportunity for migrant youth: while the invitation to perform ‘their’ marginalized cultural expressions empowers them to gain voice, it disempowers them by relegating them to a clearly defined and circumscribed sector of cultural production (Caglar 1998: 252). Taking up the offer of *performing one’s own story* comes with the price of being fixed in that role, both by those who acclaim the outcome as valuable authentic expressions and by those who see it as a document of dangerous masculinity.

### 5.3. Epilogue: Sayha and Amil and the Iman

PhDs that take years to finish have the great advantage that interesting things might happen “in the field” in the meantime. As far as the young men discussed in this chapter are concerned, they eventually ended the Chain Gang project and started a new group – this time only Lazkopat and King 54. In this new formation, called Sayha and Anil, they produced several new songs that share many features with those discussed above. But one song, called “Come to the Iman” (*Komm zum Iman*), stood out – both concerning the track itself, and the comparably huge attention it received on the web.<sup>73</sup>

The video was made in collaboration with *Dikmen productions*, a small Viennese hip hop label, and is of particular good quality, concerning camera, cuts, etc. Again, the video is made up of different parts, where some show the two rappers singing directly into the camera, while other parts of the video are set in and around a big Viennese mosque, showing men in an empty hall deeply immersed in religious practice, praying on their knees, intensely reading the Koran, washing hands and feet, etc. Amongst these solemn and serious men, we also see the rappers (who wear suits in the other scenes) dressed in simple traditional gowns, as deeply absorbed in prayer as their fellow men in the mosque.

Different to earlier songs, the rappers sing most of this song in Turkish. And also the message is more explicitly religious than it was earlier the case. In *Come to the faith* (*iman* meaning faith in Arabic), the rappers sing about the merits of a religious life and invite the audience to lead a more faithful life according to the rulings of Islam. Moral decline is once again decried in the song:

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<sup>73</sup> While other Sayha and Anil-songs received, like Chain Gang songs before, just a few hundred clicks on youtube, “Come to the Iman” was watched almost 27,000 times when these lines were written (in August 2012).



Today's youth colors their hair and  
shapes their eyebrows.  
In these hearts there is no faith  
Trust your heart, not your intellect.  
Alcohol addiction everywhere  
Let's save the youth  
("Come to the faith")

Şimdiki gençler boyatırlar saçları, ay tipim  
bozuldu, aldırırlar kaşları. Dünyada kalmamış  
kalplerde iman, aklına değil kalbine inan.  
Alkole batmış herkes, gençliği kurtarın.  
(„Komm zum Iman“)

But the proposed solutions have changed:

Command your will, acquire the  
essence of the Koran, get rid of your  
sins. Listen to the Koran, do not take  
what belongs to someone else.  
Follow Mohammed's  
recommendations, this is how you  
will find god.  
("Come to the faith")

Nefsine hakim ol, kurtul günahından, ilmine  
sahip ol, kurtul günahından. Kuranı dinle,  
yeme kulun hakkını. Sünneti izle, bul sen de  
hakkını.  
(„Komm zum Iman“)

Instead of staying in school and aiming for a decent job that pays enough, the rappers now promote allegiance to faith. According to the song, a faithful life would lead the listeners out of a desperate and sinful life and into a community characterized by love, mutual respect and truthfulness. The basic message of a fallen youth that needs saving is thus still recognizable, although the tone has changed and the solution is seen with a higher authority than the youth worker (the song ends with the call "*Oh god, educate us*"). As did sociologists, politicians and journalists in recent years, so did the young men: along with the shift in dominant controlling images, the young men shifted the perspective and put Islam at the center of attention. And, as in the other cases, it had the effect of strongly increasing their visibility. One thing stayed the same though: also in *Come to the faith*, women are absent. The community of sinners is a community of men.

## 6. Of badly ageing films and struggles to disidentify

*“For me, the question, ‘Who should speak?’  
is less crucial than ‘Who will listen?’”*

Gayatri C. Spivak, 1990

In this chapter, we encounter Muzaffer Hasaltay or “Du von Jetzt” as he later called himself as an artist, a filmmaker living in Vienna, whose experiences have changed him from being an outright critic of Turkish migrant men to a critic of the modes of producing knowledge about Turkish migrant masculinity. Having known Muzaffer from an earlier study for my MA thesis as an interesting young artist who, back then, had eagerly shared his views about Turkish masculinity with me, I was interested to learn how his life and his ideas have changed over the years.

That he has changed considerably became clear at once when I contacted him to inquire if he would be willing to participate in my PhD research. Different to several years before, when Muzaffer quickly accepted to be interviewed and openly told me about his work, his life and his opinions, he was considerably more hesitant now and eventually only accepted under a condition that I found surprising, exciting and highly unsettling at the same time: Yes, I could study him, the ‘artist with Turkish migration background’, but only if he could do a film project on me, the white sociologist, turning him into an object of research. What followed, were several long interviews, in which I would ask Muzaffer questions and vice versa. These dialogues were captured on my audio recorder as well as on his camera, making these encounters truly peculiar. Long before I was finished with this thesis, Muzaffer had already exhibited video installations based on these encounters. In what follows, I retrace the trajectories of critique articulated in Muzaffer’s works and in his views from our first encounter to his video project on my thesis.

## 6.1. The bricklayer as filmmaker

When I searched for interview partners for my MA-project on identity constructs of young men of the so called second generation in 2004,<sup>74</sup> a friend introduced me to Muzaffer. My friend told me that Muzaffer had once participated in a video-project she conducted with youngsters and that Muzaffer might be an interesting interview partner as he stuck to making short films on his own. We thus met for a long, biographical interview, in which we talked about his life, growing up in Vienna and also discussed his motivations for making films.

Of the videos Muzaffer had back then produced (he was 24 when we first met), *The Dream* was most sophisticated. He had managed to round up several friends to serve as actors and help him shoot the video. The short film takes place in a Turkish café in Vienna, full of chatting men. One of them falls asleep and upon waking up, finds himself in the same café with the difference that the place is now filled with men and women alike. After a short moment of bafflement the young man obviously starts to enjoy the new situation. However he quickly finds out that this was merely a dream, as he wakes up a second time (now for real) sitting in the café, again filled with men as before. *The Dream* documented Muzaffer's increasingly critical stance towards what he called "the Turkish society" in Austria and Turkish migrant men in particular. While this critique was still quite implicit in *The Dream*, it got more poignant over the years and he was straight forward about it when we met for the first interview. To understand his increasing criticism it is important to see the role that making movies played in Muzaffer's biography.

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<sup>74</sup> In 2007, some parts of my MA-thesis to which I also refer here have been published in the article "His-Stories of Belonging. Migrant Boys reconstructing Home", in: *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 28 (3): 317-330. The citations on the pages 189 and 190 stem from interview material gathered for the MA-thesis.

Although he was born in Vienna, Muzaffer's parents sent him to his grandparents in Turkey due to economic problems they experienced in that time. He attended elementary school in a town near Istanbul where his grandparents lived. At the age of ten Muzaffer returned to Vienna and experienced this return as the beginning of a grim period of his life. While he was good at school in Turkey, he faced grave problems in Vienna and learned to be satisfied with merely passing exams and lost interest in school as well as any special future job. Thus, his decision to start an apprenticeship for bricklayers was made without much ambition. In this period most of his friends were sons of Turkish migrants like him and these friends played an important role in his life.

But Muzaffer's life changed considerably when a group of activist artists approached him and his friends and asked them to shoot a short film on his everyday life. Muzaffer enjoyed the possibilities the medium of film presented to him and, even after he had finished his bricklayer-apprenticeship, continued making short films. Not only did he become ever more serious in his techniques, but he became ever more critical concerning the life he captured in his films. At the age of 20, Muzaffer quit his job, moved out from his parents' place and stopped seeing most of his former friends. He literally distanced himself from his earlier life, becoming more of an observer than a participant. In our first interview, he described this process as follows:

I have seen and learned a lot. A lot has changed in my life. I'm not a Turk any more ... and not a bricklayer either. I don't live with my parents any more. And I'd also say that I am not religious any more. (Muzaffer)

## 6.2. A story of emancipation and critique

Muzaffer criticized Turkish migrants who, in his view, did not live for their own interests but according to the picture that “other Turks” have of them, ever worried to lose prestige. When we first met, Muzaffer had virtually no close friends. He was particularly critical of his friendships with other “Turks”, which used to be important to him before but which he then saw as restrictive:

Now I am very critical. Now I can be critical. In earlier days, I was the same as they are. But I have read and learned a lot. And then you think about what is right. I could never have such thoughts as long as I was among them. (Muzaffer)

Muzaffer, who told me he has “learned to be alone”, depicted himself as a self-determined individual as opposed to the “typical Turk” whom he described to me as lacking their own opinions. He adopted what could be called a radical individualism, criticizing any form of collectivity, calling himself an “earthling”.

His criticism of the “Turkish society in Austria” was particularly directed against Turkish migrant men. In Muzaffer’s view, Turkish culture (and here, he did not distinguish between the situation in Turkey and amongst Turkish migrants in Austria) was implicitly built upon the subordination of women under men. For example, in marriage, Turkish women would have to do all the familial work while the men seek the company of other men in Turkish cafes as he depicted in *The Dream*. In general, Turkish men would have more freedoms as compared to their female counterparts for which they would also propagate religious dogmas that aimed to control women and their sexuality. The Turkish value system with its focus on male honor would “manipulate” Turkish women in such a way that they would not recognize how unjust the system is that they live in. In Muzaffer’s view, this whole

system was built on the bigger physical strength of men which allowed them to subjugate women. In more equal societies like the Austrian, the particular culture had successfully “tamed” men so that they could not use their bodily advantages to subjugate women as Turkish men could.

All this, Muzaffer told me in a long and intense interview. Back then his films were not yet known to a wider public but making these films was, in Muzaffer’s view, an integral part of what he experienced as an ‘emancipation’ from Turkish migrant circles.

When I met Muzaffer again for my PhD research, he was still critical of the dominant masculinity constructs he observed amongst Turkish migrants and their sons in Vienna. In many ways, his accounts about the archaic notions of masculinity that even young men from Turkish migrant families would follow, were reminiscent of the ‘Turkish rural discourse’ and seemed to mirror essentializing notions of sociologists such as Christian Pfeiffer, discussed in chapter 2. But different to these notions, and different to his own earlier accounts, Muzaffer now held a more relational view and saw these constructs of masculinity not as the outcome of an all-embracing Turkish culture and religion, but of a social relation of racist interpellation and identification.

They have been called Kanak and Tschusch so often, that the Turks now also talk like that amongst them. They have accepted and embraced it. (Muzaffer)

Muzaffer, who says that “German is a pretty racist language” with its will to categorize everything and everybody, has become critical of the effects that the controlling images about Turkish masculinity have on those men and boys who have to face these images on a daily basis. In his view, migrants have accepted the notion that they do not belong to this society

and simply *are Turks*. In this context it naturally becomes important to define what *being Turkish* means. This search for a ‘true core’ of Turkishness has led many to turn to old traditions. And, Muzaffer argued, having been handed down from one generation to the next, these ideas about real Turkishness turned into a norm that younger generations take over and identify with.

Following this analysis, those men who do identify with rigid notion of real Turkishness would thus adopt masculinity constructs that seem archaic and which propagate the valorization of close ties and group cohesion. In Muzaffer’s view, these notions about masculinity and the ideas of community they imply are not only unfit for present living conditions and have detrimental effects on women, but also rob men themselves of the opportunity to actively negotiate their identity. The differences to an analysis as proposed by sociologists such as Pfeiffer are obvious. While Pfeiffer and colleagues create the image of an unchanging Turkish masculinity transmitted from past to present day, Muzaffer’s analysis works the opposite way. Here, the subjectivizing force of the racist interpellation is taken into account. The men would thus recognize themselves in the dominant discourses that speak of ‘foreigners’ or ‘Turks’. And it is this moment of recognition that motivates the men to follow an allegedly timeless archaic masculinity. In Muzaffer’s view, this dialectic of the racist interpellation creates “identification” – a process he was, understandably, highly critical of.

I think to identify oneself is a dangerous thing. Because, by identifying, one also has to say: ‘Okay, this is what I am. Now what follows from that?’ (Muzaffer)

Looking back, his own youth now appears to Muzaffer as a phase where this process of identification took place:

Many of them did not know what they actually did at first. (...) They have gone along, just like I did. Because this is the truth and this is what you know. And you are presented with these ideologies: you are this and this and that. Already when you are a little boy, you are being addressed like this. This influences you, it influences your personality. (Muzaffer)

For Muzaffer, this identification process is closely linked to seeking a life in groups rather than on one's own. While he too had had times when he was strongly integrated in a group of male friends, he eventually became critical of the costs that came along with it. "If you want to think for yourself, alone, you also have to be alone", Muzaffer says today and sees his distancing from the close circle of friends as an important step.

To Muzaffer, this was a process of "coming to see" – not only a world beyond the own group, but also of seeing the very world he was in, but from a new, distant perspective. When he was within his group of friends, things were easy, as one knew when to go to the Mosque (or not), when to go to the park, how to talk and what not to say.

Somehow, everything happens by itself. But if you are on your own, you can see yourself and you can even recognize your surrounding better than before. It is somehow as if swimming in water and the current pulls you somewhere. (Muzaffer)

In this group, certain notions of what it means to be a 'real man' are established and adopted by the male group-members. Looking back at *The Dream*, Muzaffer now says that the film shows how patriarchal masculinity constructs even restrict those who profit from them:

I could see it in their faces that they actually also did not want the system that existed there. That is also the reason why there is this wish, where one guy has this dream, that it would be mixed or even that there would be only women. (Muzaffer)



Every relation of dominance restricts even those who occupy a hegemonic position and this is also the case for male domination (cf. Bourdieu 1998). Also in his later work, Muzaffer uses the medium of film to grapple with this observation and ask how it affects the lives of men who are located in a marginalized position in the patriarchal order.

While Muzaffer's notions about male dominance in general and Turkish migrant men in particular thus remained critical over the years that passed between our first meeting, his willingness to share this critique with a wide public has diminished. Interestingly, this was for the most part due to the successes he had experienced in the past years.

### **6.3. A troubling career**

Talking about how things went for him since our first encounter, Muzaffer had to admit that, even though earning riches or achieving a career was certainly not his motivation for making films, things had gone well. After our first meeting, he had eventually managed to convince the employment center to pay him a one-year training course at a well-known school for film and multimedia technology. Upon that, Muzaffer worked at a newly funded private TV-station and thereafter was employed at a community TV program. Then, he went to the Vienna Film Academy for a brief period before being accepted to the Conceptual Arts Class of the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, where he was studying when we met again.

As Muzaffer explained to me, the professor who headed the Conceptual Arts Class explicitly promoted critical artistic production that engaged with political issues.<sup>75</sup> Migration and global inequalities were amongst the topics central to the classes' curriculum and it was

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<sup>75</sup> From what I learned, teaching at the Academy of Fine Arts is organized considerably differently to common universities. At the Academy, students are members of one "class", headed by (and often named after) one professor, usually an artist themselves. Although there are other (often younger, less known) lecturers who offer courses to the members of these "classes", the artist who heads the class has considerable power to decide upon the classes' curriculum and regarding which students are accepted to their class.

Muzaffers' impression that the professor, herself an artist originally from Slovenia, had aimed for international and migrant students in her class. As it turned out, this critical outlook as well as negative experiences at the Vienna Film Academy would eventually become important for his own critical thinking and artistic production.

Compared to the Academy of Fine Arts, the Vienna Film Academy is much more focused on the mainstream film-market and promotes itself as an institution that has produced renowned Austrian film-makers. In the Austrian context, it has a 'good name' and in order to be accepted, one has to pass an entry exam. Soon after Muzaffer has passed that exam and entered the school though, he knew that this was not the right place for him.

I got tired of the Film Academy because of the specific and limited view that people have there. It too is a closed society which you cannot access from the outside but when you're inside it feels very cozy. (Muzaffer)

Muzaffer, the promoter of individuality and critic of group-identity had thus once again found himself in a bounded space with a shared, closed world view. However, this group was not bound together by their common experiences of marginalization but quite the contrary.

They have an elitist background, they have good education and a lot of knowledge. They might be walking lexicons but that does not mean that they have become human. It is more a top-down thing. They can't mingle. In order to attain such a position, one has to subjugate. I have to step on someone, in order to get this high up. (Muzaffer)

The notion of being (non-)human and related concepts were important for Muzaffer's perspective on art, society and also gender relations. Here the notion of being "non-human" served as critique of the fact that the Film Academy students' views and interests were shaped

by their societal position. Muzaffer, who has a history of leaving closed circles, left again and entered the more art-world oriented Academy of Fine Arts.

For at least two reasons, the situation was different in the Conceptual Arts Class. On the one hand, the members were continually asked to reflect upon the *political* nature of their art. For Muzaffer, this led to an intensified engagement with issues concerning the politics of representation and the responsibility of artists, concerning their work. This political take on art spoke to Muzaffer and affected his later work, as will become visible in the film *Can We Speak With Each Other?*, discussed later in this chapter.

Muzaffer also cherished the “mixed” nature of the conceptual arts class. Members came from diverse countries, spoke different languages and occupied also marginalized societal positions. In this context, questions regarding marginalized peoples’ perspectives on society and its frictions became relevant. Muzaffer got in contact with works of Gayatri Spivak and other critical theorists that influenced his thinking about the connections between standpoint and perspective. Looking back, Muzaffer says “for a long time, I was not conscious of what I actually do”. While the wish that something should change also motivated films like *The Dream* he did not then see it as a political film. Today, Muzaffer says that “everything is political, because everything moves something, changes something”. There is no such thing as an innocent speaking position.

The political nature of Muzaffer’s films is most visible in his critique of fixity, identification and inertia as opposed to hybridity and self-consciousness. His films deal with this problem in different ways, but it also shaped Muzaffer’s thoughts on making art in general. Thus, although he does see his works as political, he dismisses the thought of producing “truths” his audience should simply take over. Otherwise, he would run the risk of producing something that itself is inert and dead: “What I do (...) must not be fossilized –

like something I retrieve from 1.000 years ago and that leads a ghost-life.” Rather, he wants to create something that inspires the audience to think themselves, to “wake up” and “see”.

Importantly, his films should not *classify*, echoing Michel Foucault’s famous dictum “(d)o not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same” (Foucault 1972: 17) Muzaffer draws his political stance from own biographical experiences as a ‘guest-workers’ child’ whose engagement in art catapulted him out of the path that, from a sociological point of view, would be expected: “yesterday, one could say, I was working class, today I am another class”. Art, at least his own art, should create a room that enables such shifts rather than fixating imageries and subject positions.

I am not doing art for others. I’m not doing it so that others can see it and be happy. It is topics that concern me. (Muzaffer)

Personal experiences inform Muzaffer’s work and he uses the possibilities of film to translate these experiences into relevant narratives. Ironically, it was this approach of connecting personal and public narratives, that has generated considerable attention for his work, but also pushed him into the slot of ‘migrant film-maker’. His film *The Friend* for example, would be acclaimed for uncovering ‘hidden truths from within the Turkish society’. To Muzaffer, this identification was a throw-back and he has thus come to see his own work with suspicion.

#### **6.4. The Friend – a film that “ages badly”**

In 2007 Muzaffer produced a 10-minute movie called *The Friend* (“Der Freund”) which gained prominence and was screened at diverse off-mainstream events. I first saw the film about a year after it came out at an exhibition at the Academy of Fine Arts where *The Friend* was shown amongst other art works. At that evening, the place was alive with (mostly white)

artists who were obviously using the opportunity to meet and network. This was not the case for Muzaffer, whom I found standing outside the exhibition hall, looking disgruntled. Upon my asking if there is a problem, Muzaffer stated: “My film ages badly,” and added, in reply to my puzzled look, “people see what they want to see.”

Many people, Muzaffer told me in our later meetings, would merely see his work as a unique insight into the interesting world of Turkish migrants. What they would thus fail to see were the more profound issues that Muzaffer wanted to raise in the short film, around male friendship, closeness and its eventual end.

In what follows, I give a summary of the plot of *The Friend*, which deals with a day in the life of two young men and the tragic end of their friendship. Upon that, I present my own analysis of the film (and in particular the representation of masculinities therein), as well as Muzaffer’s views on the film and the issues that informed the plot.

#### **6.4.1. The plot**

The film starts with a dedication: “...ONA” is written in white letters on a black screen, accompanied by the German translation, saying “... to him”.

The first take shows the hallway of an older Viennese house. A young man (called Osi, as we will later learn) exits the apartment at the far end of the hallway. Osi obviously leaves an ongoing quarrel he just had with his father who now calls after him<sup>76</sup>: “...Now we should hassle with you? As long as I live here, you are my seed, ...”. Osi exits the apartment with an unnerved and angry look. He is tall and has a muscular posture, has short hair, wears jeans a T-shirt and gold chains, and carries a sport bag. In the next scene, we see Osi on the street, calling Murat on his mobile phone. Speaking Turkish, he calls Murat “*brother*” and asks what he is up to at the moment. He tells Murat that he needs a smoke and asks if Murat could get him some weed.

The scene switches to Murat on the other end of the line. He is a tall, thin man with longer hair and a neat short-trimmed beard. Murat wears a tight and

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<sup>76</sup> The dialogues are direct citations from the English subtitles of the movie.

colourful T-shirt showing a picture of Bruce Lee. The scene is set in Vienna's U6, a metro that goes along a broad street called the "belt".<sup>77</sup> Riding on the train, Murat talks to Osi on his mobile phone and tells him that it will take a while as he has to go cut a friends' hair first but that he will contact him later. During this phone call, in which Murat switches between Turkish and German, the camera also shows a big man with a bald-shaved head, sitting next to where Murat stands. The white man looks angry at Murat and when he finishes his call, shouts at him: *"Go home if you can't speak German! You fucking Tschusch."* To which Murat turns around – alert but calm – and asks what he means by that. The guy goes on: *"Go home with your Bruce Lee shirt, you guest-workers' child. Learn German, fuck off."* Murat replies angrily: *"What's your problem, you bloody racist?"* When Murat spits on the floor in front of the guy he gets up quickly and starts punching Murat rather clumsily without striking him. Murat, on the other hand, moves smoothly, evades the attackers' punches and manages to knock him out with a few well-placed kicks. He exits the metro without turning back and we see two young white men sitting close by, looking dumbstruck from the scene to Murat.

In the next scene, we see Osi and other well-trained bare-chested men wearing boxing-gloves and training gear in a Thai-box gym. Osi and the others are busy hitting at punching bags as well as training with each other in the boxing ring. A trainer tells Osi how to correctly attack an opponent if he wants to *"k.o. him"*. The camera then stays on Osi, who sternly rehearses upper cuts as the scene abruptly ends. We are back with Murat, who arrives at the flat of a friend sitting on a couch, busy playing a video game in a room plastered with big posters of Bruce Lee. While they start eating *Schnitzel* which Murat has brought with him, they get into a relaxed conversation about their day, all the while switching between Turkish and German.

Osi, to whom the film gets back now, has finished training and is still in an aggressive mood. We see him standing on a street, talking on the phone and looking up to the windows of a house opposite of him. He is obviously talking to his girlfriend (whom we never actually hear, nor see), saying, in Turkish: *"Why haven't you picked up your phone for two days? ... I know you're home, come down! ... What, your mother? Fuck your mother!"* Upon which she obviously hangs up. While redialling, Osi swears *"Damned bitch, fuck you!"*, which he repeats when he gets her back on the phone and goes on threatening her that he would kill her if he would *"catch"* her. He hangs up and, kicking his sport bag, shouts *"They're all the same! Bleeding cunts!"*

We are back to Murat and his friend, who now wears a cape just like customers of barbers wear, while he plays a video. Murat meanwhile skillfully cuts his

<sup>77</sup> The street, which is infamous for its street prostitution, serves as a barrier between 'better' (i.e. *white*) inner-city districts and migrant 'problem neighborhoods' (like the one where the members of Chain Gang live) outside the 'belt'.

friends' hair while chatting with him about the metro incident. It is *"those people who get you into jail"* Murat says and adds that he did not want to go there again. His friend thinks he should have beaten him up more fiercely, which Murat opposes. This would only have caused troubles and anyway, he did not want to beat him but merely fought to protect himself. Describing how the whole incident ended, Murat says: *"When I got out, the people looked at me as if I were the guilty one."*

Switching back to Osi, we see him sitting on a park bench, unsuccessfully trying to reach Murat on the phone when a friend comes by and they start talking in German. When asked how he was doing, Osi shrugs and complains about stress. The friend says that Osi seems to have changed, upon which Osi says *"I have changed my image"*, pronouncing the last word faulty. The friend laughs and says *"What? In the ass?!"* (which, in German, sounds similar to how Osi has pronounced *image*). This makes Osi so angry that he slaps the friend and tells him to *"fuck off"*. Osi goes back to the bench and again tries to reach Murat.

But he does not hear the phone as he is immersed in playing a video game with the friend whose hair he has just cut. While playing a fighting game, of which one figure makes the unmistakable yelling sounds of Bruce Lee when beating up an opponent, they share a joint and light-heartedly talk about different kicking moves and how they are executed in the game. Eventually, the friend, who is slightly plump, gets up and shows Murat how he would do a certain move. The friend swiftly demonstrates several kicks and Murat laughs approvingly. Only now, Murat notices Osi calling and takes up the phone. Obviously, Osi is upset, as Murat has to explain why he did not answer his calls earlier (because it was mistakenly set to silent mode) and finally he even has to tell Osi he should stop cursing and leave his mother out of the issue. Murat manages to calm Osi down and tells him he will meet him as soon as possible. With: *"He's crazy again, I have to go"* Murat leaves his friends' place.

In the last scene, we see Osi, once again, sitting on a park bench and waiting. When Murat arrives, they immediately start a quarrel about Osi's cursing and Murat not answering the phone. Osi starts pushing Murat while yelling how he had to wait on him all day. Murat is calmer and explains once more that it was not on purpose. But the fight escalates as Osi believes that Murat is lying:

Osi     *"I always knew you wanted to hit me."*

Murat *"Is fighting the way to keep the friendship?"*

Osi     *"What are you saying? Fuck your friendship. What kind of friendship is this? ... Come on hit me now."*

Murat *"Osi you ruin everything, we're friends!"*

Osi repeats that he always knew Murat wanted to fight him. *"I never wanted to fight with you"* is Murat's reply, while Osi already starts to seriously beat him.

Murat does not fight back but tries to block Osi's ever fiercer hits. Osi now beats Murat in the same way as he trained it in the gym before, also the angle of the camera is the same, creating a déjà-vu effect. We now see what Murat sees, so that Osi looks right at "us" while beating. After each kick, the screen now blinks white until it eventually turns black and everything falls silent for a moment. The final take shows the sky, we hear a high-pitched tone<sup>78</sup> and only faintly, Osi's voice can be made out, yelling: "*Murat, what's up, come on get up, Murat!*"

The screen goes blank and the tone continues a while until it stops. After a short pause, Sitar-music starts and the end titles are shown.

### **6.4.2. The end of a special friendship**

Muzaffer told me that he had decided spontaneously to produce the film after a close friendship ended in a fight. When Muzaffer describes this end of the friendship, we re-encounter a process that had already earlier changed his life considerably:

In the end it somehow fell apart. I have shaped myself and have found myself and was already becoming different to how I was before. It was not the same anymore. People change, I have changed, he has probably changed or maybe he has not changed. But as I have changed, I have seen that something is not right. (Muzaffer)

The peace and closeness of the relationship ended when Muzaffer, once again in his life, "moved on" while his friend seemed to remain the same. In the film, the fight is dramatized, as Muzaffer wanted to "continue the story" in a way that it might have ended. Muzaffer described this friendship as a very close and intimate one. It was "an intellectual relationship. We philosophized, did research, read texts together. It was a long relationship of seven years". This intimate, almost passionate quality of their relationship is cut out in the film. From their first dialogue, there is tension and aggression in the air. In the end, the fact that they once had

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<sup>78</sup> As known from hospital movies when an ECG-monitor signals that the heart of a patient has stopped beating.



a strong relationship can almost only be deduced from the sheer violence with which Osi reacts to the disappointment by Murat.

#### ***6.4.3. Reality, fiction and collaboration***

To Muzaffer, the fact that the film is based on real-life experiences is important as this gives the story an immediacy a purely fictional story would lack in his view. Also, he explicitly dedicated this film to his former friend and saw the work as a message to him through which to make sense how their friendship ended. Never the less, Muzaffer did not try to simply tell their story ‘as it happened’, but added some parts and changed others. On the one hand, because he did not want to make the film “too kitschy”, with “two heads sitting there and talking”, on the other hand, Muzaffer considered that others might hardly connect to the story if it was merely about him and his former friend. He thus opened the story up and included friends’ experiences. Thus, a friend told him about a fight he had, similar to that in the subway, the story about struggles to find marihuana was introduced by another friend and in Osi’s fight with the father, Muzaffer wove in experiences with his own father. Muzaffer broadened the authorship for the story he wanted to tell and what finally looked like a rather stringent and clear narrative was actually manufactured out of a mosaic of experiences. “And this is also art, to somehow re-build my story into another one,” Muzaffer argued. One reason why Muzaffer disliked the way his film was viewed was that this artistic intervention was lost to those who saw the film as a realistic document of a migrant subculture.

#### **6.4.4. *It is a man's world***

*The Friend* certainly deals with many issues, but it is, I would argue, foremost a film about men. It is their struggles and troubles that we follow when watching the film and it is their drama that we are left with when it ends. Women merely appear as abstract figures or ideas in the form of Osi's girlfriend and as mothers (of the girlfriend and as a target for hurtful insults). They neither appear in person nor play a role on their own account. Eve Sedgwick (1991) has shown, that this is a common way to narrate tales of male homosociality: the presence of women is needed, in order to ward off the 'threat' that this might be a homosexual relationship. But the women are merely figures in the drama that actually takes place between the men.

In my reading, a good part of the film's narrative is told through the prism of the two main characters' masculinity constructs. In particular, representations of their masculinities are used to mark the differences between Osi and Murat (who is obviously Muzaffer's *alter ego*) and thus make the narrative a convincing one. Particular notions of sexuality, ethnicity and racism as well as class position are weaved into the representations of the characters.

And as we can observe in the film, these are issues which are not detached from the characters but inscribe themselves into their body and habitus. Thus, Osi is a tough guy whose stature tells us about his strength while his walk shows us that he will not "give in" when challenged. The gold chains he wears are a strong class marker and give a hint to the importance he accredits to other people's view of him and his orientation towards material goods. Murat has a considerably different outfit: he wears his hair long and has a finely trimmed beard, also he wears a bright T-shirt with a print of Bruce Lee on it. Murat's style reflects urban liberal aesthetics and he signals a different performance of masculinity: he has a soft side (his peaceful way of talking, the diligence with which he cuts his friends' hair, etc.)

which he is not afraid to show. But we also learn that he is a ‘real man’ when he stands his ground and faces the opponent in the subway. When needed, he has the guts and the skills to act as a man should. He uses violence not out of joy but necessity, for self-defense. Different to Osi, Murat is in control of his life.

#### **6.4.5. Osi’s father and the violence of culture**

The two main characters are surrounded by other male figures. For Osi his relationship to the father seems important, however briefly this relationship is touched upon in the film.

Osi suffers under his dominant father, whom we do not get to see but merely hear shouting after Osi. In a literal sense, this is a father that is at the same time absent and too present. Talking about the Film, Muzaffer employed the concept of “manipulation” again when describing the violence that this patriarchal father-son-relationship embodies. But, different to when he was describing the political nature of art-production before, Muzaffer used the concept to explain his view on how the violence of the father-son-relationship is part of a culture of male dominance. The film, Muzaffer explained, was very much about “this spiral of violence and also this manipulation or cultures”. Upon my inquiry as to how far he sees these notions connected, Muzaffer explained:

manipulation, as when the father says (...) ‘You are my seed. As long as I live in this house, you will do what I say and how things run here.’ That means he bends you. It is psychological violence, actually. (Muzaffer)

That Osi’s father speaks Turkish with his son fits the dominant image of the un-integrated, backward-minded patriarch of the first migrant generation. But it was not Muzaffer’s aim to convey this message.

You would surely find similar things in Austrian families. Maybe he would use different words (...) but I think it is that way in many cultures or where we have many followers of a few religions (...) it is a catastrophe, actually. (Muzaffer)

Rather than blaming supposedly specific *Turkish* patriarchal norms and family values, Muzaffer aimed at a critique of culture (and religion) as ideologies that legitimate male dominance and violence. And for Muzaffer it is important to recognize that male violence does not only take the form of direct, physical violence. While this mode might have established men's dominance over women in earlier times, male violence has, in Muzaffer's view, changed shape and modernized into more subtle forms. The fight between Osi and his father, which opens the film, is an example of this less visible, psychological form of male violence.

#### **6.4.6. Murat, the racist attack and subversion of stereotypes**

Although the subway scene also served another narrative function for the film (which will be discussed in the next section), it obviously gave the issue of racism in the young men's lives a highly visible place in *The Friend*. In Muzaffer's words "these men are, so to say, the marked ones" and the subway scene shows this process of othering as gendered, racialized and classed. The public sphere turns into a male battle arena when the white man aggressively reacts to Murat speaking Turkish. The male aggressor challenges him not only on the ground of his migrant background and as a man, but adds a classist marker when insulting Murat as a "guest-worker's child".

In his immediate physical reaction and his later reflection on the episode, the film turns the dominant image of Turkish masculinity upside down, while still 'saving' Murat's

masculinity. It is saved, because Murat does not back down cowardly but stands his ground. In that, the whole interaction has a deeply masculine quality and Murat leaves the scene *as a man* when he exits the train without looking back at the beaten enemy. But the dominant representation of the uncivilized brutal Turkish man is subverted in several respects. Firstly, the whole attack happened for no (legitimate) reason and clearly emanates from the Austrian part. Then, it is Murat who tries to calm the situation down and de-escalate it, however unsuccessfully. And finally, when he sees no other way than to exert force, Murat only hits as much as necessary, not for fun or out of the heat of the moment but in order to defend himself and strike down his opponent. When reflecting on the incident later, he does not have any feelings of retaliation, but is merely angry about the fact that it is incidents like these that could get him into jail. In this statement, the injustice of the whole situation becomes clear and fighting back attains the quality of fighting for justice. The fact that none of the passengers intervened but merely watched enhances this feeling of injustice and shows that, as a member of an othered group, he cannot count on solidarity but has to fight on his own.

The scene of the attack subverts dominant representations of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, as white (working-class) masculinity is represented as irrational, hateful and aggressive, while Murat represents a peaceful and wise male position that none the less has the ability to ward off attacks. The film itself often presents the archetype for this wise, justice seeking fighter: Bruce Lee. In his movies, Bruce Lee often played a casual working man who more or less unwillingly gets entangled in conflicts between powerful, evil (mafia, etc.) forces and oftentimes regular folks on whose side Bruce Lee thus fights for justice. Muzaffer explicitly drew on this reference and in the film, Bruce Lee seems to be with Murat all the time and wherever he goes (on his T-shirt, in the video game, hanging on the wall at his friends’ place). To Murat, Bruce Lee represents an authority figure equivalent to the role that Osi’s father

plays for Osi. But, while Osi's father forcefully keeps him from standing on his own feet and developing his personality, it is the contrary for Murat's relationship to his father figure. Bruce Lee is a teacher, not a hegemon and Murat has learned and acquired skills from him that help him lead his life. These are not only the physical skills that help him defeat enemies but also the mental skills that help him to reflect on his life and make the right decisions. The differences between the father figures underscore the differences between the masculinities that Osi and Murat represent.

#### ***6.4.7. Osi: violence and speechlessness***

The racist attack should not only show the realities of being made other that these men have to face on a daily basis, but also served to accentuate Osi's problematic personality in relation to the figure of Murat. Thus, with the subway scene, Muzaffer argued, he also

wanted to reveal the differences between the two. One is troubled and somehow unskilled. And everyone approaches him, at first the father who wants him to abide by his will, then the girlfriend who doesn't come down and didn't answer the phone for two days and then the friend who mocks him shows up (...) Actually, it's speechlessness that he suffers from. The fact that he cannot articulate himself, and finally can only beat up his best friend, whom he actually trusted but feels betrayed by. (Muzaffer)

In this reading, the racist attack is taken as truly 'everyday', and simply used as a way to accentuate the calm and thoughtful character of Murat. Osi, on the other hand, is "stuck in a circuit of violence" he does not get out of. Different to the wise fighter Murat, Osi practices kick-boxing in order to hurt people. When he starts beating – be it the sand sack or his best friend – he loses control of himself and his actions. Osi thus lacks the wisdom and self-control that Murat embodies. And even though Murat is the dead one in the end, it seems Osi was a

loser in all encounters throughout the film from the moment when he ran away from his dominant father.

Osi passes the violence he experiences from his father onto his girlfriend and, like his father, feels entitled to a male position of control and subjugation. He makes clear that he does not accept his girlfriend withdrawing from this control and that he will punish her for this when he gets the chance. This is not a relationship based on trust and emotion but on power and discipline. In this fight, Osi is represented as a misogynist patriarch ready to inflict pain onto others. Although his girlfriend opposes Osi, she is a 'fitting match', as Muzaffer explained to me, when he pointed to her living situation. Like Osi, the girlfriend lives at her parents' place. In her case, the symbolism of being trapped there is even stronger as with Osi who can, at least, run away annoyed. Both Osi and his girlfriend are represented as having strong ties with their families and in both cases, we are shown how oppressive these familial ties can be.

While Osi can easily be perceived as driven by a supposed Turkish culture of male violence, Muzaffer sees the actual problem in his speechlessness. In the film, this speechlessness takes on diverse forms. While it is straightforward when Osi refrains from talking back to his father, it is less obvious in his interactions with others, where he is ever quick to resort to insults and violence. And even his attempt to tell his friend about his quest to change himself comes out wrong and leads to misunderstanding and, again, a violent reaction. Both because of an outside that does not *let* him change, and a personality that is not *ready* to change, Osi is stuck in a circuit of violence. Unable to communicate, he beats his way through a world that he cannot understand nor control.

This dynamic culminates in the last fight, in which Osi loses control and unintentionally kills Murat. Ultimately, the whole drama was caused by the differences in

how the two young men developed – or lack thereof. While Murat has *evolved* and emancipated himself from binding ties and ‘became human’, to take up Muzaffer’s words, Osi is stuck and inert. From this position of standstill, he tries to violently bridge the gap that has emerged due to their different trajectories. And other than in Muzaffer’s real life, where this situation lead to a break-up of the friendship, the film depicts an alternative reality where Osi manages to keep Murat from becoming different and moving on by fatally injuring him.

#### **6.4.8.A Turkish film – the dominant reception of *The Friend***

*The Friend* was received with appraisal and interest in the Austrian art scene. However positive this recognition might have been for Muzaffer, he grew critical of it, as the film was widely perceived as a quasi-ethnographic document. Thus, in a societal context that upholds the liberal tradition of defining ‘the other’ as the one who is dominated by their culture, while the enlightened ‘we’ has supposedly evolved past that stage and merely consumes culture (Brown 2006), the film could be viewed as a spectacle of Turkish masculinity. Under present circumstances, Muzaffer’s film *speaks for itself* and a few markers suffice to invoke a whole narrative about the brutal world of Turkish migrant masculinity. In one conversation, Muzaffer formulated this in the following way:

When I say nothing, people think I am a Turk, because Turkish is spoken in the film and because we are these goons. (...) The film is clear about it: I am a Turk. (Muzaffer)

The ethnicizing interpretation was widely shared. Thus, at a left-wing alternative film festival his work was shown in the ‘migrant films’ section and when a famous Turkish-German



filmmaker was guest lecturer at the Academy, he addressed Muzaffer as a talented minority filmmaker.

The film, which, amongst other issues, documents his and others' struggles with being identified *as other* and the complicated struggles to overcome this identification, was thus turned into yet another sign marking their otherness. Also, his critical gaze on the violence of collectivizing *ideologies* was thus mis-read as a critique of the violent collectivism of Turkish men. Muzaffer was positioned as a trustworthy witness, allegedly sitting at the border between the cultures, showing to the 'outside' what is 'inside' Turkish masculinity.

When we discussed this point Muzaffer stated that, in principle, he would not oppose to identify "as Turk". But, given the realities of a context in which such labels are powerfully charged, he must oppose it.

If I would approach you, the Austrian, the sociologist, and talk to you - if I accept that I am a small second-generation guest worker and approach you like that (...) I have already identified myself and in this society there is this identification: guest-worker, scientist. Unfortunately it really is like that. Wherever you go you are treated like that. And I try to smash this. (Muzaffer)

The labeling is much more than merely 'depicting someone as other' as this labeling process also locates those labeled in a relation of power. On the one hand, the process of othering is always already intersectional. The label 'Turk' is at the same time a racialized and classed label that says more about the labeled one than merely the country where he (or his parents, etc.) came from. And, as became clear at several points above: it is also a gendered label. The film makes Muzaffer a Turkish *man*, supposedly giving first-hand insights into a *male* Turkish world.

The contrast “small second-generation guest-worker” versus “sociologist / scientist” is, on the one hand, a critique of the hereditary thinking so prominent in public discourses and sociological studies of migrants and their children. Confronted with this thinking – as represented in the film by the racist man in the subway – migrants’ children face a situation where racist notions that already legitimated the exclusion of their parents are transposed onto them. The migration discourse with its fixation on the importance that migrants supposedly attach to their *heritage* thus itself becomes part of the heritage that migrant children have to deal with.

What the opposition also shows, is the relational character of these labels, where each is positioned in a field of power. Alluding to the power/knowledge nexus in sociologist scholarship on Turkish migrants that I have discussed in chapter 2, Muzaffer makes clear that the “small” Turk is thus per se in a subjugated position vis-à-vis “the sociologist”.

What also becomes clear in his comments above, is that the problem is not merely one of ‘being named as’, but the subjectifying nature of such powerful discourses of dominance. The label ‘Turk’ *does* something with the one who “accepts” it. Because accepting the label goes along with taking over the world view in which these relations of dominance are seen as “natural” and legitimate. This is why Muzaffer needs to “smash” the labeling process. Because it identifies him as *the other* and pushes him to enter into the very logic of labeling and finally perceive himself and the world according to this logic.

That one is perceived accordingly “wherever you go”, Muzaffer also experienced at the Academy of Fine Arts. Not only was he more often than once approached as ‘the migrant filmmaker’. But also his abilities as an artist and his motivations for doing film were questioned in the light of his ‘peculiar’ background. Thus, at different occasions Muzaffer

told me that even at the Academy which he otherwise liked, people underrated him and that he would observe that people held the view that “a bricklayer surely goes to the Academy only because he wants to become a star”.

The division of manual vs. cognitive labor, so central to capitalism, also affects Muzaffer’s life. Due to his class position and because he is recognized as having a migrant background, he is not accredited the unmarked position of ‘the artist’ whose work simply represents creativity and mastery. Muzaffer, who resisted this dynamic within the art scene, also highlights parallel phenomena within academia, as, for example, feminists of color have remarked (Alexander and Mohanty 1997). Their work, as Jennifer Petzen critically observed “is often regarded as mere raw material, which is then turned into theory by white theorists” (Petzen 2012: 294). Muzaffer struggles against this selective inclusion (be it as *migrant artist* or as *informant* for the ethnographer) that ultimately silences minority voices. And Muzaffer, who has always used film to work through awkward experiences, radicalized his methods in his most recent film project, in order to smash the circle of identification.

#### **6.4.9. An ‘ethnic film’ all the same?**

But before turning to his newer work, I want to discuss whether the ethnic reading of *The Friend* was really so unfounded as Muzaffer saw it. Did not several aspects of the narrative suggest this very reading? I would argue that the film, and in particular the ways through which the differences between the characters are depicted, mirrors several of the dominant tropes about Turkish migrant masculinity and thus offered an ethnicizing reading.

Probably in a most general way, the difference between Murat and Osi is depicted by the latter’s absence of any real agency while Murat manages to engage even with threatening situations and otherwise seems not to be struggling with himself or his surroundings. In our

discussions Muzaffer often used figures of speech such as “I have formed myself” to describe relevant shifts in his life. Compared to the critical picture he draws of a life in ‘traditional’ Turkish communities that follows clear rules and that is lead in tightly woven groups, these figures of speech point to himself as the motivator of his actions. Referring to such “technologies of the self” (Foucault 1988) marks him as moving beyond a community that acts upon rules and expectations of others. We can recognize this distinction in the film in the chain of Osi’s problems which are at the same time stressful and related to his Turkish migration background (an aggressive father, his Turkish-speaking girlfriend, his first fight which starts because of a misunderstanding due to his “broken” German). At one point in our discussions about the film, Muzaffer affirmed such an interpretation, when he explained that Osi, in his view, is “stuck in the Turkish community”.

It seems that representing Osi as more strongly connected to ‘the Turkish community’ in Vienna was a way for Muzaffer to make sense of their separation: while Murat (as well as his computer game-playing friend, who does *not* live with his parents) *moved on*, Osi’s inertia is also represented by his more ‘ethnic’ identity. And this is a masculinist identity, with Osi being depicted as an aggressive heterosexual macho-misogynist.

In a certain way, the film also spatializes difference. The film starts with a view of the hallway that leads to the flat where Osi lives with his family. With its old style, those who know the Viennese housing situation can recognize it as a ‘guestworker’s place’. In a concrete sense, the film thus shows us where Osi comes from. And also all other spaces that Osi is shown in throughout the film are ‘migrant spaces’. Thus, when he calls his girlfriend we see “*Srbija*” and Serbian nationalist symbols sprayed on the house behind him, telling us that his girlfriend too, lives in ‘migrant neighborhood’. The other spaces that we encounter Osi in, are even more explicitly coded as male migrant spaces: the kick-box hall and public parks.

Obviously, these are also classed spaces, marking Osi as poorer working-class, who, after leaving the gym seems to have no actual place to go to than the park. For Murat, this association is less explicit. Just as he moves more freely between Turkish and German language, he is also less strongly attached to migrant urban spaces, literally placed on the border between white and migrant city parts when riding the subway.

I would thus argue that the ethnic reading of the film was more of a co-production conducted by both the audience and the film itself. It uses ‘known’ markers of Turkish migrant masculinity to render its narrative convincing. Thus, we find facets of the narrative of violent Turkish fathers and their wish to control family members. The fact that we do not *see* the father only serves to stimulate imageries about how bad he might actually be. In line with that, it seems likely that the film could be read as promoting the notion of ‘exit’ from oppressive migrant communities, so important in liberal theories of multiculturalism (Markom and Rössl 2008).

This ‘ethnic reading’ of the film is also facilitated by the representation of the key figures. Thus, Osi seems to embody many of the qualities ‘a Turk’ should have according to dominant imageries: he is as aggressive as his father, stubborn, misogynist, body-oriented and brutal. And however much the figure of Murat does not fit into this stereotypical image, even this representation could be used to reinforce the stereotype in that it could easily be integrated into the dominant logic of contemporary integration politics. In this context, the figure of Murat, which *could* be seen as proof that it is wrong to think of ‘Turkish men’ as a group, can be interpreted as the ‘positive example’ of a man who has managed to emancipate himself (at least to a certain degree) from Turkish masculinity norms. As with other examples of good diversity, the figure of Murat could thus reinforce the stereotype as the exception to

Osi as the rule. With Murat's death at the hands of Osi/'Turkish culture', the film might even sustain the idea that this population is doomed.

### 6.5. Can we speak?

In his next project, Muzaffer, who has come to view *The Friend* as a *badly ageing film*, did not make yet another film that could be read as a report from the world of Turkish masculinity but returned the gaze in order to get to the problem of knowledge production itself. His gaze fell on an institution that has proven so productive when it came to imageries about migrants and their children: sociology. And it was my research project that Muzaffer was to use to produce his most radically anti-identitarian film to date.

To my astonishment, Muzaffer had read my MA-thesis before we met for the interviews for this PhD project and he saw his film project as an intervention into the limited possibilities of an academic text. Although he appreciated my critical intentions, Muzaffer said about himself that in the MA thesis, "I shout out that I am not a Turk, not a Muslim" and that chances were, that, just like his films, my PhD thesis too would be read as a text "about Turkish men" by other sociologists, pedagogues or politicians. With his film, Muzaffer wanted to disrupt such an interpretation of fetishized and fixated identities.

Muzaffer would eventually name the short film "*Können wir miteinander sprechen?*" ("*Can We Speak With Each Other?*") and make a clear reference to Spivak's (1988) famous question about the subalterns' ability to speak (or be heard). In this work, Muzaffer asked whether a non-objectifying dialogue between us is possible. He wanted to make a film in which we "do not treat each other as objects. Because science does that too. It is a kind of ideology too". He wanted us to encounter each other "as humans" and be „on the same side so that I don't have to struggle against this sociology“.

Although I made clear that I highly valued this quest and that I saw my own work as also criticizing sociology as a site of producing orientalizing knowledge, we would repeatedly get into debates over his idea to create a space where we encounter each other purely as humans. In these debates, I would express doubt about the notion of a ‘true subject’, untainted by ideology and argue that sociological thinking is so much part of what defines me that I do not believe it possible to exclude it from our encounters. Muzafer was visibly taken aback whenever I made that point and my assertions that I was, nevertheless, very much in favor of trying to establish a non-hierarchical space of dialogue, scarcely convinced him. In a certain sense, his latest film documented what Muzafer interpreted as our failure to ‘speak with each other’ as subjects and transcend the objectifying powers that structure the encounter between ‘an Austrian/white sociologist’ and ‘a Turkish migrant man’.

### **6.5.1. Deconstructing the sociologist**

*Can We Speak ..?* starts with alternately showing a man and a woman standing in front of a white wall reading a text straight into the camera. When the man speaks, a decisive accent is audible and at several points, he has troubles pronouncing words. Eventually, the faces begin to blend into each other and at times the voice of the woman is heard while we see the man speaking and vice versa. Towards the end, Muzafer is shown speaking the last words of the text, which explains the context and motivation of the film. The film should thus “make visible the experience of being categorized by a sociologist who does not further define himself” and aim to break this objectifying setting.

How this could be done is shown impressively in the next take, where Muzafer and I are sitting in front of a computer, watching his recording of us during an interview session in a garden. To introduce even more layers, Muzafer had put a mirror next to me during our

interview sessions and positioned himself so that his face was visible next to mine while I was answering his questions. In the introductory text, this intervention is explained: The mirror was

an attempt to dissolve the subject-object distinction of such an interrogation and transform it into a conversation between equals. The encounter is characterized by the impossibility of both endeavors. The sociologist tries to conduct an interview while the filmmaker tries to have a conversation on the interview itself.

The two of us watching the interview is interrupted by me, sitting in front of the white wall and being asked by Muzaffer about my experience of being interviewed and a discussion on how film-making, like academic research, can be used to create powerful truth claims.

After that we are back to watching interview parts, in which, amongst other topics, I discuss how, in my view, sociology is heavily based on creating knowledge about societal others and my struggle to not reproduce that in my own research. Then we are shown discussing the possibility of encountering each other *as humans*, with me articulating my doubts. While this discussion unfolds, Muzaffer, who was sitting beside me watching these scenes on the computer, is slowly disappearing, so that for some time, I am sitting alone, watching the interview bits in the computer. Muzaffer eventually reappears and after some time gets up to shut down the camera. At this, the screen goes black and the word “credo” appears.

In the final take, Muzaffer faces the camera and speaks right into it. In this film, Muzaffer explains, he wanted to show that the interviewer and the interviewed are, in actual fact, not two entities existing detached from each other. But it is, Muzaffer goes on, ideologies, prejudices and categorizations that turn us into man or woman, Austrian or Turk, sociologist or artist. And the two of us, Muzaffer concludes, did not manage to transcend



these categories but remained within them and the distorted world-views they entail. In his closing remarks, Muzaffer calls on the audience to critically reflect upon the knowledge that they apply when interpreting the world and rid themselves of long-established “dead” ideologies of self and other in order to overcome separation, fear and conflict.

*Can We Speak ..?* is closer to myself than other material presented in this thesis and it is thus harder to arrive at a ‘sober’ analysis. With me it provoked diverse reactions ranging from frustration to curiosity. Amongst the highly interesting aspects of the film, I see Muzaffer’s thoughtful and witty strategies of deconstructing speaker positions. Along with the movements of the subjects in the film, who shift, fade, are reflected or vanish, also the position of the observer is destabilized. When the camera shows us watching a recording of ourselves, the clear line between observer and object of observation becomes blurred.

Frustration was what I felt when I first saw the film and learned about Muzaffer’s negative view of our encounter. Viewing myself as a critical researcher, I certainly wanted approval by an artist whom I saw as engaged in critical work too, albeit in different fields and with different methods. But it later dawned on me that this was both an expression of our diverging viewpoints and also reflected broader issues of the politics of representation.

Not being restricted by academic jargon or logic of argumentation, *Can We Speak ..?* uses diverse methods to impressively uncover what normally remains silenced in social science. The film shows that an academic text must not be seen as simply interpreted raw data, but the outcome of a complex process of negotiation and struggle. The reference to Spivak makes clear that Muzaffer situates this struggle in a context of dominance and marginalization, which prevents the speakers, in his view, to enter into a real dialogue.

With Haraway (1988), the film can be seen as a critique of positivist science, its idea of an unmarked academic ‘god’s view’ and the hidden violence such a perspective involves. Through various methods, the film works to undermine a fixed reading of identities. In this context, our dispute is reminiscent of the complicated question of how to deal politically with the very (identity) categories one fights to dismantle. This issue, so well known to many political struggles (Lorey 2008; Yuval-Davis 2006), articulated itself in a recurring debate I had with Muzaffer in which I argued for the need to acknowledge the existence of categories *in order* to combat them vis-à-vis Muzaffer’s notion that any such acknowledgment leads to the reproduction of categories and divisions. These are hard and probably unresolvable questions around the politics of representation. Muzaffer’s goal to ‘speak as humans’ can be interpreted as *one strategy* to solve the dilemma of fighting the very categories that mark and constitute one’s life, experiences and political struggles.

## 6.6. Conclusion

For Muzaffer, making films was, on the one hand, a means to find a voice and enter into negotiations of Turkish masculinity, but eventually film-making itself also turned out to be a field of power that Muzaffer had to engage with. With the three films discussed in this chapter – *The Dream*, *The Friend* and *Can We Speak With Each Other?* – different issues became relevant in Muzaffer’s life. In his first film, Muzaffer formulated an implicit critique of his observations of a masculinity construct amongst his peers which not only excluded women but also restricted men. Muzaffer’s critique of problematic masculine norms amongst Turkish migrant men developed over the years and in our second encounter, his earlier, rather culturalistic explanations gave way to a more dialectic view. In a context of exclusion and othering, it could thus make sense for Turkish migrant men as well as their sons, to find safety

in a rigid notion of ‘true Turkish masculinity’ and use it to legitimize claims for recognition and entitlement. It is possible to read *The Friend* in line with this analysis and we could thus interpret Osi’s aggressive habitus as his answer in reply to a life full of ‘stress’.

In both films, the limits of a normative male ideal are underscored by presenting alternative possibilities. While, in the first film, this alternative reality merely exists for a fleeting moment in one boy’s dream, the character of Murat represents this possibility in *The Friend*. And in both films, this alternative is presented but is ultimately lost (the dream ends, Murat is beaten to death).

With *The Friend*, a new field of struggle opened up for Muzaffer, as he observed that, once again, he is being identified and thus immobilized. As we saw before, in a context of integrationism, migrant ‘native informants’ who seem to give first-hand accounts of the troubles of ethnic minorities are highly valued. Commentators such as Necla Kelek (or Hirsî Ali) fulfill an important function of speaking out ‘truths’ that could otherwise be criticized as discriminatory. But native informants are obviously not only welcomed by politicians in search of legitimation for restrictive policies, but are also sought after in art contexts. Ironically, by making films in which Muzaffer critically engaged with processes of identification amongst his male peers, he has produced art work that could be interpreted in a way that pushed him into yet another box – the migrant film-maker.

Spurred by a politicized art education and this experience of othering within the art scene, Muzaffer shifted his attention towards the politics of representation itself. It thus makes good sense that Muzaffer, when I contacted him for this study, did not accept the role of a critical informant just as he had a few years before. My research was a welcome site for Muzaffer to study and deconstruct the sociological gaze. Instead of creating a fictitious narrative himself, Muzaffer returned the gaze at the sociologist to question his techniques of

creating sociological narratives about Turkish migrant masculinity. Instead of creating *new* or *different* images of Turkish migrant masculinity, Muzaffer thus engaged in a more radical endeavor. *Can We Speak ..?* questions the whole logic of *Turkish migrant masculinity* by putting a spotlight on and criticizing the institutions involved in circulating and reproducing these images.

However different this film is to those he made before, it is hard to overlook some basic similarities. Again we see men in a struggle to overcome the limitations of identification. Again we see one person (this time Muzaffer in person) trying to emancipate himself from restrictions which the other person seems unwilling or incapable to free himself of.

Analyzing Muzaffer's films, we encountered the complications and contradictions around representing racialized masculinities under present conditions. The existing power relations create a longing for particular images and privilege limited readings of these images. As did the other men discussed in this thesis, also Muzaffer experienced the double-edged opportunities that such a discursive environment offers to those who are willing to enter into public negotiations around male others. Muzaffer's biography and his work showed that seizing these opportunities *does* something with those who enter the speaker position. It enabled him to critically distance himself from his surrounding, but it also made him sensitive to the contradictions of occupying this position of the critical observer. Thus, Muzaffer seemed to perceive the problems around representation of racialized masculinities more explicitly than others I spoke to during my field world. And more radically than the others, he engaged into a critique of these dynamics.

## 7. Conclusion

*“It is by no means clear (...) that to study masculinities, they must have the epistemic status of things that are ‘present’ and awaiting empirical classification.”*

Steve Garlick, 2003

Late in 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly denounced the political project of multiculturalism as a failure. Only a few months later, her colleagues, the British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy followed suit and joined in the criticism. The arguments they presented against multiculturalism were roughly similar: that multiculturalism promoted tolerance for intolerable beliefs and practices; that it encouraged migrant communities to live separate lives; and – with particular reference to Muslim migrants – that it ultimately fosters violence and terrorism. This discourse of failure of multiculturalism, which has been around for a while (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) seems to have been reiterated so often that it attained a truth of its own. Thus, even in Austria, a country that never implemented anything remotely close to state multiculturalism, the narrative of a history of openness and naïve tolerance has become a standard feature in discourses on Austrian migration and integration politics.

As critical scholarship made clear, this public condemnation of multiculturalism is but a recent instance of an ongoing political project of framing migration as a security threat and Muslim communities as particularly suspicious populations (Lentin and Titley 2011). Feminist scholars have furthermore noted that this contemporary politics of exclusion is highly gendered (e.g. Farris 2012).

Expanding upon this scholarship, my own research has shown the importance of studying in more detail the role of men and masculinities in the context of racialization and exclusion. Concerning the above noted failure of multiculturalism discourse, the relevance of particular imageries of ‘foreign masculinity’ for making this discourse intelligible is readily visible. Even if it is not always explicitly stated, it is migrant men who are seen as the actual source of most perils that allegedly come from naïve multiculturalism. In that this crisis of multiculturalism discourse mainly serves to legitimate harsh migration policies, these imageries about the migrant male other have crucial functions in contemporary politics of exclusion. In the Austrian context, images of violent Turkish patriarchs could be used by some to spark moral panics about the decline of law and order in the city and thus call for a tough grip on crime. Others could use them to argue that stricter laws concerning German language skills are actually helping Turkish women to emancipate themselves from their patriarchal husbands.

### **7.1. Decolonizing research on racialized masculinities**

Bringing critical masculinity studies into dialogue with critical migration studies and feminist postcolonial studies, I aimed to advance our understanding around processes of racialized masculinities and propose alternatives to the currently dominant integration paradigm. To establish this alternative, it seems necessary to decolonize research on racialized masculinities.

I consciously employ the notion of decolonization, although I base this claim on my research on negotiations around Turkish migrant masculinities in Austria and thus *not* a straightforward post-/colonial situation. The notion of decolonizing research on migrant masculinities seems useful for several reasons though. On the one hand, because I understand

it as part of a broader project of decolonizing sociology. This requires us to ‘provincialize’ (Chakrabarty 2000) sociology by situating it within the history and present of euro centrism:

Since its institutional beginnings in the nineteenth century, sociology, self-defined as a science of the modern (Western) world, has conceptualized modernity endogenously by taking the social norms, structures, and values characterizing the so-called Western societies as a universal parameter for defining what modern societies are and the processes of their emergence as the path to be followed by other, modernizing countries. (Boatca et al. 2010: 1)

Sociology is not only based on the idea of a dichotomous division of the world in Western and non-Western societies, but has also founded its theorizing on the unquestioned existence and necessity of nation states. To date, most sociology is *national* sociology, taking as its frame of reference the supposition that societies are bound by national borders. Historical and present entanglements between and across world regions (Randeria 2009) are thus left out of the sociological gaze and results in methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002). “In migration studies” Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez notes, “this is translated into the ‘tradition-modernity paradigm’ through which ‘non-European’ migrants are projected as being in a ‘pre-modern’ state” (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2010: 31). As we have seen, this paradigm is well at work in much research on migrant masculinities. To decolonize scholarship on migrant masculinities, we need to overcome research frameworks that build on the idea of migrant masculinities as essentially different to national/normative masculinities. Such research (willingly or not) serves to reproduce the assumption of nations as cultural containers and the West as the pinnacle of modernity.

Decolonizing research on racialized masculinities furthermore calls for a critique of dominant orientalist representations of male otherness and their utilization for the reproduction of

dominance. While originally analyzed by Said (1979) in the context of colonialists' depictions of an imagined orient, the *logic* of orientalist representations of selves and others is not limited to these instances (e.g. in the Eastern European context, see Todorova 1997; Helms 2008). My analysis clearly showed the orientalist logic of contemporary representations of Turkish-Muslim masculinity in Austria in which a civilized/superior/Western Self is constructed vis-à-vis a backward/inferior Other. Some have argued, that these representations are informed by long lasting "frontier Myths" (Gingrich 1998) that were established in those European countries which have a history of contact with the Muslim world. With the 'Ottoman Sieges', commemorated in numerous memorials in Vienna and elsewhere, and occasional warnings of right-wing politicians of a 'third Turkish siege' due to migration, these orientalist myths might indeed inform images about Turkish Muslim masculinity in Austria today (Dallinger et al. 2011). But, rather than pinpointing the origins of certain myths, I was more interested in the use to which they are put.

In that respect, my research showed that already for decades, ethnosexual images of migrant masculinities have been employed to legitimate restrictive migration politics and punitive measures against migrants in Austria. Contemporary images of Turkish-Muslim men depict them as archaic and hyper-masculine patriarchs. The notion of an unchanging Turkish 'village masculinity' that has been imported by the migrants and afterwards transmitted to next generations employs colonialist notions of modernization and backwardness. Not only does the 'Anatolian village' constitute an imaginary anachronistic space, but the narrative of unchanging 'village masculinity' locates this space within the men themselves. The bearers of Turkish-Muslim masculinity are thus seen to embody anachronism and, if no measures are taken, will even pass it on to next generations.



I would argue that these insights should not only inform our thinking about how migration masculinities are marginalized today, but that they are also indicative of present shifts in the overall field of masculinity constructs. Taking a look at how hegemonic masculinity is currently analyzed within masculinity studies, we find that Connell (2005) argues that it is thoroughly shaped by an ideology of transnationalism and neoliberalism and others, e.g. Meuser (2010), add that ‘soft skills’, flexibility and a new openness to homosexuality mark the contemporary male norm. But, in the light of my research, and with Mosse’s (1996) scholarship on the role of the ‘counter-type’ for the construction of the male norm in mind, we should ask in how far these contemporary articulations of normative masculinities are connected to new forms of racialized masculinities.

Be it images of dumb work objects, mountain-illiterates, homophobes or fake homosexuals and deviant youth: the classist images of archaic Turkish-Muslim masculinity form a contemporary counter-type against which a neo-liberal, independent and both culturally and economically self-sufficient male norm is sketched.

Rather than adopting the integration framework and searching for the essence of Turkish migrant masculinity, my ethnographic research aimed at uncovering the dialectic relationship between *being identified* by dominant images of male otherness and engagement with these images. My ethnographic data has shown that all men in my study are confronted with dominant images of Turkish migrant masculinity. The discourse recognizes and constitutes them as strangers (Ahmed 2000). Thus identified, the men are excluded from the secure space of unmarked masculinity. Whether they want it or not, they *have* to engage with these images and the narrow spaces of articulation these images create. But this dissertation has shown that

none of the men simply embody the stereotypes nor do they passively tolerate them. They found different strategies to work with, through and against these images.

The young rappers we encountered in chapter 5 could seem to represent much of what is currently said about male Turkish youth. But, rather than simply enacting an ‘Anatolian village masculinity’, my research has found that their gender performance is an outcome of complex negotiations between diverse discourses and institutions and that it cannot be understood as detached from the concrete social and economic situation they occupied in Austria. The young men invested time, energy and thoughts into creating hybrid ghetto-personas that combined bad-boy postures of migrant rappers with notions of a ‘reformed’ masculinity that propagated the importance of education as well as adding references to Muslim faith to claim an authoritative speaking position. To ask ‘what is typically Turkish about their performance of masculinity?’ would mean to pose the wrong question. Much rather, we should ask what it is that these young men could *accomplish* by crafting this hybrid ghetto persona. Lacking other, more acknowledged resources, embodying a tough street-fighter masculinity enabled them to enter into ‘serious games’ of masculinity (Bourdieu 1998) and demand recognition as men. On a discursive level, they could claim a right to their ghetto, which seems particularly relevant in a context where one constantly learns that one does *not* self-evidently belong to the city and the imagined national community.

In their demands for recognition, the young men employed highly problematic notions of masculinity defined by violence and misogyny. But my research should caution us to revert to simplistic critiques. Quickly defining such masculinity constructs as a problem in need of pedagogic or disciplinary interventions runs the risk of obscuring the intersecting structures of marginalization that form the context for these constructs. This is a hierarchized

context that positions racialized men at the margins, while offering opportunities to claim limited power and attention *as men* when taking up an aggressive, hard masculinity. Our critical attention should thus be directed at this gendered, racialized and classed structure which makes it *reasonable* for racialized young men as the rappers to perform virile fighter-masculinities.

Although differently positioned, all of the men I interviewed experienced the contradictory dynamics of being longed for and rejected at the same time. While excluded from the national ‘we’ and decried as inherently problematic, the same discourses produce longing for the othered man, *his* virility, *his* lasting control over women, *his* narratives from an exoticized parallel universe believed to be governed by its own archaic rules. The men I encountered in this research navigated this terrain, accepting some offers to male entitlement while struggling against others.

While Chain Gang members encountered the contradictory positioning in the form of imageries of ghetto masculinity (that sparked fear as well as attention), we learned from the activists of Vienna Mix/MiGaY, that also within white gay contexts in Austria, imageries about migrant masculinity are filled with contradictory meanings, making Turkish migrant men at the same time desirable and an object of distrust. To Muzaffer, the filmmaker, this paradoxical positioning articulated itself in yet another guise, in that he was at the same time praised for being a migrant filmmaker while being denied the possibility of assuming the position of an unmarked artist.

Closely related to this was a dynamic around claiming privileged knowledge about ‘one’s own culture’. The members of Chain Gang learned that their story was a form of capital they could use to receive attention and might even be turned into money, if they could

perform *their culture* in the right way to be eligible for grants. But also in both other cases, this dynamic appeared. The members of Vienna Mix/MiGaY actively used personal experience and knowledge to position themselves as experts on homosexuality amongst Turkish migrants and connected this with a critique of problematic interventions by white gay organizations. That this is an inherently double-edged dynamic became clear in Muzaffer's case, for whom the role of the 'native informant' ultimately led to ethnicized interpretations of his films. The authority accredited to representatives of Turkish migrant masculinity is based on the premise that what the 'native informant' says can be used to confirm the existing stereotypes. In that, the offer of claiming privileged knowledge can ultimately reproduce fetishized knowledge about the migrant Other.

Under current circumstances, certain topics are foregrounded when discussing Turkish Muslim masculinity. *Women* are one such topic that virtually all debates about Turkish-Muslim masculinities eventually turn to. This is, on the one hand, highly understandable, as a relational view on masculinities should highlight how they are positioned vis-à-vis women. But, taking a closer look at the function of references to women in dominant discourses about Turkish migrant masculinity raises doubts. As in earlier colonialist narratives, women seem to primarily function as a signifier within a male drama. As passive victims without agency, the figure of the 'Muslim woman' then mainly serves as further proof of the need to discipline Turkish migrant men and legitimize exclusion of whole migrant populations.

In this study, I explicitly focused on migrant men and their experiences. Women appeared only very marginally in the stories that the men told me, it could thus create the impression that Turkish migrant masculinity is constituted within a men's world. While this framing is in itself interesting concerning the discursive construction of masculinity, further

research with an explicit focus on the role of women in the lives and practices of racialized Turkish migrant men seems promising.

*Islam* is another issue that has come to be seen as almost obligatory passage point when studying Turkish migrant masculinities. Readers will have recognized that I have neither discussed it at length in my theoretical framework nor particularly focused on it in the empirical analysis. While Islam and Muslim faith did sporadically come up, this was mostly the case when my informants explicitly referred to it (in discussions as well as material I analyzed). In these cases I retraced the meanings that the men attached to notions of Islam, honor or other seemingly typical traits of Turkish masculinity and asked what role they played in their strategies of negotiating constructs of masculinity.

My relative neglect of topics that are currently treated as *the* locus for understanding Turkish migrant masculinity was a conscious research decision. Although interesting debates have come from, for example, focusing explicitly on Islam and masculinities (e.g. Ouzgane 2006; Potts and Kühnemund 2008), I chose another approach. I did so because the current focus on Islam in migration studies runs the risk of limiting our focus on certain topics (e.g. concerning morals, mores, values, etc.) while leaving out other topics (e.g. experiences of social and economic exclusion and the gendered strategies of coping with these experiences). Leaving aside the currently dominant Islam-focus, I aimed to create a space where the men themselves could identify issues they deemed important. As it turned out, Islam did come up in several instances thus documenting its relative importance, but my research also showed that many other topics are relevant in the lives of these men thus questioning the current focus on Islam in the context of gender, migration and integration.

My research documented the realities of racialization, but it also showed that these realities do not remain unchallenged and we saw diverse strategies to subvert the reproduction of fetishized imageries of ‘the Turkish-Muslim man’. For Chain Gang, rap was a medium to tentatively articulate social critique and at least amongst themselves, they used it to create songs that confronted anti-Muslim racism. MiGaY-activists used their magazine to publish articles on racism and migrant male sex workers in which they combined confrontational, pedagogic and witty strategies to subvert dominant images and draw attention to the actual problem of classed and raced hierarchies within non-heterosexual communities. Muzaffer’s films combine criticism of migrant men as he perceives them with stereotypes of Turkish masculinity and present (however precarious) alternative constructs of male identity. In these films, Muzaffer not so much engaged with public images but rather with the self-perceptions of Turkish migrant men themselves. While he located the source of the problem firmly within Turkish culture in our earlier discussions, he later developed a more relational view on the subjectivizing force of racist interpellation. In this sense, his latest work logically followed up on this development, as it turned the gaze to critically study the social sciences, which, as we learned early in this thesis, is actively engaged in producing knowledge about the migrant male other. With the tools of a film-maker, he thus posed hard questions that recall anthropology’s ‘writing culture debate’ (Clifford and Marcus 1986): who has the authority to produce knowledge about the (migrant male) Other? What are the technologies of discourse that gives certain knowledges the credit of objectivity and authority? What is academia’s investment into creating narratives about the Other that fixates them as different?

The Questions bring us back to the endeavor of decolonizing research on migrant masculinities. While Muzaffer's work does not *answer* them, it is questions like these, which can push further critical research on racialized masculinities.

Current migration politics build on a differentiated system of tracking, testing and monitoring migrant populations, both at nations' borders and within the territory. This differentiated system affects migrants as well as their children. It not only *makes* migrants but also differentiates them into bearers of good and bad diversity (Lentin and Titley 2011). In this context, images about archaic Turkish migrant masculinity have become a symbol for bad diversity and are used to demarcate the line between acceptable and unacceptable difference. It is thus not enough to conduct research showing that certain migrant men are actually not as problematic as dominant discourses might have it. The problem is not that these discourses are inaccurate and better research is needed to simply rectify them – the problem is the function that these images have in current politics of constructing raced, sexed and classed Selves and Others. Critical, decolonized research on racialized masculinities needs to find ways of knowledge production that subvert this relation of dominance by asking other questions and applying other approaches than proposed by the integration paradigm. Such research should uncover how racialized masculinities are positioned in contradictory ways in intersecting realities of male dominance, exploitation and racialization. And, rather creating seemingly objective expertise about 'the migrant man', it should create spaces for critical, collaborative knowledge production that not only shows structures of dominance but also moments of friction, subversion and resistance to these structures in order to break cycle of reproducing fetishized knowledge about the male Other. I hope my thesis has made a contribution to this emancipatory endeavor.

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