The Image of Enemy

Russian Pro-Government Media
During the Ukrainian Crisis
in December 2013 - April 2014

by Shchelin Pavel

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Abstract

In this paper is investigated the image of enemy that was constructed in Russian pro-government media during the Ukrainian crisis in December 2013 - April 2014. The findings of the paper allow to understand the main trends of the arguments Russian propaganda used to legitimize Russian policy in the eyes of the audience. According to the paper two main arguments were used. The first one includes labeling the members of maidan movement and after its victory new Ukrainian government as "fascist-banderivtsy" in order to discredit them in Russian - speaking public opinion by appealing to the "sacred value" of the Soviet victory over Nazi-Germany in Second World War. The second argument was rhetoric that presented western democracies (EU and USA) as enemies trying to destabilize post-soviet space and cut Russian influence in Ukraine. By April 2014 this two arguments have merged.

Acknowledgements

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Table of Contents

Introduction

The analysis of the content of the image of enemy construction can provide a researcher with valuable information about the cultural patterns of behavior dominant in the particular society, since the concept of enemy serves as an important means of the maintaining the stability in the society, especially when other ideological foundations of its existence disappear.

Russia is an example of such a state that faced the challenge of the loss of nearly all ideological foundations of its existence. The collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in identity crisis in Russia, that has not been overcomed until now. It is possible to interpret the current Russian society as a community that is still trying to feel certain identity vacuum and consequently is in the search of unifying meanings. On the other hand this state of identity insecurity makes people vulnerable to various manipulations.

Throughout the presidency of Vladimir Putin there were an attempt to construct a new identity that would unite people under the personal rule of the president, providing him with a strong legitimacy basis. To accomplish this goal a strong image "enemy" was necessary to persuade people to sacrifice some of their liberties for the sake of security that should be provided by the strong presidentship. The key instruments used to create such an image were pro-governmental media.

Therefore the topic of this research paper is extremely urgent, as with every day the importance of the discourse of enemy is growing in modern Russia. Recent events in Ukraine have contributed to the intensification of the process of creating the image of foe and present a perfect opportunity to analyze the image of enemy promoted by Russian pro-governmental media.

The time period for the research is December 2013 till April 2014. It was chosen for specific reason. The Ukrainian antigovernment protest have started right in the very end of November 2013 and the first weekly program on Russian channels where these events were presented appeared in December. By the end of April it was presumed that the image of enemy will be formed, therefore April was chosen as the second time border.

The particular research question of the paper is what was the content of the image of "enemy" constructed by Russian pro-governmental media concerning the recent regime change in Ukraine.

This paper is expected to enrich the literature that concerns the problem of the role of the media in the value shaping process as well as to provide the reader with more detailed information about the image of enemy which according to the latest reports of the increased support of the president looks to be dominant in modern Russian community. Moreover, such an investigation can contribute to the understanding the recent de-democratization process in Russia.

Chapter I: Theory and Methodology

1.1 The notion of "Image"

Epistemologically this research is based on the philosophical conception of image that on its turn rests upon the assumption that "...a thing can be nothing for us expect our understanding of that thing..." (Gegel, 1970, 82). Moreover, the image recreates the reality, as "... we cannot think of something that does not have a representative symbol in our mind ... " (Sedlacek, 2013, 58) This paper has borrowed the notion of image from the writing of K.Boulding, according to which image is "...what I believe to be true, my subjective knowledge..."(Boulding, 1956, 6).

The idea of subjective reality, which coexists with the physical world, provides useful tools for the understanding of political processes. In fact, people in general and decision-makers in particular "act according to the way the world appears to us, not necessarily according to the way it is" (Boulding 1959, 120). In its turn, the information people receive about the coming events can not be objective as well, because "all knowledge that is about human society ... rests upon judgment and interpretation" (Said, 1997, 162). Thus every piece of information about the social reality contains not only objective facts but also subjective value that both the source and the carrier of the information have included into it. The problem arises how can a person evaluate the information received. The answer is that "the subjective knowledge structure of image of any individual consists not only of images of "fact" but also images of "value"" (Boulding, 1956 11) and "there are only messages filtered through a changeable value system" (Boulding, 1956, 14). The crucial role of subjective reality is also recognized by the representatives of the most positivist branch of political

science - political economy. For example, economists Robert Schiller and George Akerlof have written: "...the human mind is build to think in terms of narratives...a story that we tell to ourselves that creates a framework of our motivation ... the same is true for confidence in a nation, a company, or an institution ... " (Akerlof, Schiller, 2009, 51).

It is clear that certain group of people, united by common interests or those who were brought up in a common environment tend to interpret the information received in a common way. To a large extend, according to empirical findings it is the result of the process of primary socialization (Greenfield, Quiroz, 2013; McNamara Barry, Prenoveau, Diehl, 2013)), or socialization processes in school (Choy, Lee, Ramburuth, 2007) when a particular value system was introduced into the behavioral structure of an individual. Common value structures are important not only because they make it easier for people to understand the complexity of the world around them, but also because the very fact of having common value system is the most important means of the creation of group identity. In fact, "part of our image of the world is the belief that this image is shared by other people like ourselves who are also part of our image of the world" (Boulding, 1956, 14).

The role of shared values and beliefs in the maintenance of the internal cohesion of a large social group especially on a level of a nation is examined in the papers of the proponents of constructivist school of nationalism (Anderson, 1991; Welzel, Inglehart, 2007; Connor, 1994; Smith, 1991; Huntington, 2004; Gellner, 1983). Indeed people conceptualize themselves as a part of particular group on the ground of certain common traits shared by the members of the community and among those traits are common worldview and common way of interpreting the reality. Without such a common frame of thinking people would stop considering the group or nation they belong to as something special that differ them from the rest of the people. Accordingly the corruption of common framing by another system of meaning is a primarily challenge for the existing identity. For example, for the national

4

identity promoted by the classical nation-state it would be ideology that rejects nationality and promotes class identity as a primarily one like communism or a religion that claims to be the higher transcendental authority.

It is important to point out that the images tend to simplification of a reality and therefore they transform into symbolic images, which "are particularly important in the summation and presentation of value images" (Boulding, 1956, 108). This process occurs, as the abilities of human mind to embrace the complexity of surrounding world are limited without a proper training. Therefore when an individual finds oneself in an unknown situation or meets the issue when the difficulty or novelty of the latter results in a cognitive dissonance with the exiting belief system (Festinger, 1957) the most common reaction of a person will be "retreat into symbolic images" (Boulding, 1956, 111).

Symbolic images are especially significant in the sphere of international relations, where the politicians have to deal with the necessity to make difficult decisions under the time pressure (Rokeach, 1960;). As it has been pointed out by Holsti: "... a decision-maker acts upon his "image" of the situation rather than upon "objective" reality..." (Holsti, 1962, 244). Many researchers have showed intersubjective aspects as well as dominant images in the beliefs' structure of politicians are crucial for understanding modern international relations (Wendt, 1994; Boulding, 1959; Holsti, 1962; Sending, Neuman, Pouliot, 2011).

Another important aspect of image is the means of its transmission. There are two ways of carrying the image from one person to another - linguistic and visual. Both of them are crucial for human cognition of reality, because " ... the limits of our language are the limits of our world ... " (Wittgenstein, 1974, 56). The first one is any means of language like speech on the radio or television, article in the newspaper which can be presented in written form, whereas the second is a picture, video - row. The interrelation between these two means is following. Visual images tend to be more powerful in terms of their remembrance by a

person due to their simplicity, as people tend to prefer simple answers to problems rather then complex one. Therefore visual images summarize the linguistic images, when the linguistic images describe and justify the visual one. By that means these two ways of transmitting an image create a particular discourse. The studies of many psychologists and cognitive linguists indicate that the words in which information is presented influences directly the way a recipient embraces it (Lakoff, 1980; Lakoff, 2004; Barker, Galasinski, 2001). Consequently, for the research purposes of this paper it is important to highlight the real significance of the promoted discourse on the political preferences of decision-makers as well as ordinary citizens.

Summing up the first section the following conclusion can be made. The way people perceive the reality determines their further actions. The key unite of an individual's system of meanings is an image, which presents a subjective interpretation of a particular aspect of reality. Being transmitted through in a form of discourses through various means of communications images interact with each other creating a common worldview for a particular group with a tendency to exclude complex or controversy to the dominant one images from the general public discourse on the issue. By that means an attempt to promote an internal cohesion among group members is observed.

1.2 The Image of Enemy

Among the universe of images that describe the reality around and individual there is a particular image this paper is focused on - the image of enemy. The analysis of the content of these concepts can provide a researcher with valuable information about the cultural patterns of behavior dominant in the particular society.

The importance of the concept of "enemy" and in politics is not a new topic in political science. Many researches examined the crucial role of these two concepts in identity formation as well as state-building processes (Schmitt, 1927; Smith, 1991). For Carl Schmitt the notion of enemy was even the key point in the definition of the sphere of political as such (Schmitt, 1927). The role of the image of enemy for a totalitarian regime was studied in-depth by many researchers (Arendt, 1973; Goldmann, 2011; Lifton, 1962). However, the basic roles, which this image performs, are present not only in a totalitarian country but also in modern democracies.

Role of an image of enemy is essential for an armed conflict, since it provides peoples with an incentive to exercise violence against other human beings (White, 2004; Atran, 2010) or to racism and discrimination. By influencing the way in which public represents this concept media shapes to a large extent the behavioral patterns dominant in the particular society in regard of particular aspect of social reality.

Any governmental authority has an incentive to appeal to this powerful image in order to mobilize the society and to unite people around them to oppose "evil". This is the most general incentive of any authority to promote the image of enemy - to spread the idea that the country is in danger and the only way to save it is to remain loyal to the existing authority, as otherwise possible public unrests may undermine the stability in the state and pave the way for its disintegration or foreign aggression against the country. Therefore any criticism against

the authority is an act of betrayal against homeland. This is typical also for western societies, where "...during times of crisis, national security and society become primarily concerns while civil rights and liberties become expendable..." (Peek, 2004, 29).

Besides, the image of enemy plays a crucial role in international relations. This aspect was investigated in several papers (Eicher, Pratto, Wilhem, 2013; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998). The way in which state leaders formulate the position of the country in the world shapes the agenda, which the representatives of the state will defend in international organizations, and will reflect the risks the government is likely to tolerate. In fact, the image of enemy plays crucial role in the maintenance of a conflict, which, as it has been proven, "... may strengthen the pre-existing ties or contribute to the establishment of unifying bonds where none before existed ... " (North, Koch, Zinnes, 355).

Finally, the way in which image of enemy is formulated reflects the desired future of the speaker, as the enemy is also something that prevents or hinders the achievement of this future. Therefore, by the analyzes of the image of enemy, as "something that is not desired" it is possible to find out what is in fact desired by the community.

The concept of enemy serves as an important means of the maintaining the stability in the society, especially when other ideological foundations of its existence disappear. Since the image of enemy has a powerful unifying potential it can be the useful means of holding people together "against someone" rather than "in favor of something". By that means it is possible for a leader or a group to unite big community in order to achieve some higher goal, like the construction of a new nation. K.Bolding has written: "...there is hardly a nation that has not been cradled in violence and nourished by further violence..." (Boulding, 1959, 123). This phenomenon is generally correct for any community. Nearly all nations have a kind of a founding story - a great challenge the people have overcome together. For example, the key role of founding myth of the War of Independence is well known for the researchers

8

concerned with American identity (Huntington, 2004). In some interpretations nation can be even considered as " ... a body of people who are conscious of having "gone through somehing" together ... " (Boulding, 1959, 123).

And, as it was already mentioned, image of enemy is a key instrument of mobilizing people to commit violent acts against other human beings, because "...a threat to the group's integrity, especially when posed by a group with a different worldview, strikes at the very basis of its members' psychological survival..."(Frank, Melville, 1988, 203)

There are several common traits which most images of enemy share with each other. The first one is a tendency to depict an enemy as a dehumanized abstract phenomenon without any particular personal differences among the members of the enemy group. Indeed, "...presenting the enemy-Other as an indistinguishable mass, is an essential strategy in the process of enemy-fabrication..." (Steuer, Wills, 2009, 12). Such a strategy allows to reduce the number of personal ties between the members of the group and the representatives of the "enemy group", and increases the readiness of the former to commit violence against them.

Secondly, the enemy group should challenge something, which is extremely valuable for the community. It can be ideology or religion. By that means the material issues of the conflict can be linked to the sphere of values and beliefs where it is much easier to an authority manipulate public opinion in order to achieve the result desirable for it. It is due to that phenomenon of a claimed attack on a no-materialistic value, that allows to create a linkage between two groups of enemy - "external" and "internal". The latter are proclaimed to help the former to undermine the stability inside the community by questioning the truths and values that are considered to be sacred.

Finally, there is a tendency to make the borders of the enemy group as vague as possible to spread the possible of the maximum inclusion into that group of different categories, which somehow challenge the existing authority. Therefore, the labels used for the

marking of proposed enemies are very general. For example, it could be "terrorists", "national traitors", "Muslims", "imperialists" etc.

Summing the second section up following conclusion can be made. An image of enemy is a powerful instrument of consolidation of the community, which on the one hand increases the community's capacity to meet the challenges of the surrounding world and reflects the image of desired future, but on the other hand increases the potential of the ruling group to manipulate the other people.

1.3 Role of Mass Media in the Image of Enemy Construction

From the earliest days of mass media it was partly a tool of an authority to indoctrinate people with the certain worldview and values. Indeed, even nowadays media remain one the main sources of images for a public opinion as well as an important way of the construction of the image of enemy. The role this image has does not confine to domestic policy but is also crucial for international relations, especially in times of armed stand of great powers when " ... the arms race is not driven by weapons alone ... it is also drive by psychological phenomenon, the image of enemy ... " (Frank, Melville, 1988, 211).

The reason behind the fact that media is a powerful means of image construction, is the fact, that media helps to interpret the reality in the framework of the existing perceptions, underpinned with the authority of "experts". Psychologically people tend to resist information that does not correlated with their worldview and "...certain perceptions are actively excluded from consciousness if they do not feet the chosen world image..." (Rappoport, 1960, 258). Since the modernity can be considered as a "risk society" (Beck, 1992) the role experts is not only confined to the prevention of various threats, which refer to their professional duties, but also to create a framework of thinking, which in its essence is a kind of a simplification of a complex reality for ordinary citizen. This phenomenon is true not only for technical branches of knowledge like chemistry or physics, but also to the social life. The complexity of modern politics especially in cases of conflicts and crisis as well as the large amount of various data received from different sources create a demand for explanation, which is meet by the experts. Consequently a number of opportunities for manipulation with public opinion as well hances to guide the decision-maker's understanding of a problem in a certain direction increase dramatically, and the construction of the image of enemy is not an exception.

11

There are a lot studies devoted for the cases when the image of public enemy was deliberately constructed by mass media. The most recent example analyzed thoroughly is mass media depiction of Islam after the 9/11 terrorist acts (Steuter, Wills, 2009; Paine, 2005; Peek, 2004). It is not the goal of the paper to analyze 9/11 representation but several conclusions made by the researchers are useful for the further analysis.

The first, and the most important conclusion is the fact that media representation did have an effect on the image of enemy construction. For example in the study of Canadian media Steuter and Wills discovered that: "...in their largely uncritical reproduction of metaphors that linguistically frame the enemy in particular ways, the Canadian media participated in mediating constructions of Islam and Muslim ... mobilizing familiar metaphors in representation that fabricate an enemy - other ... " (Steuter, Wills, 2009, 8). Therefore the study of the patterns of media representation of an enemy is relevant for the study the images of enemy dominant in the society.

The second conclusion refers to the connection between the government and the media. Even in modern democratic societies where media are tend to be considered independent from the government there is a tendency that in times of crisis or war even in democracies media tend to favor the official worldview and that " ... contemporary media are indisputably an instrument of war helping governments win domestic and international public opinion ... " (Paine, 2005, 83). It is self-evident that in authoritarian countries the linkage of pro-governmental media with the authority is much more direct. For the research purposes of this paper it is important to note, that by the analysis of pro-governmental media it becomes possible to investigate the image of enemy the authority wants the citizens to believe in.

Finally, the main attributes of the image of enemy - dehumanization,, vagueness and the fact that challenge the core values of the society are all present the discourse constructed

by the media. For a political scientist it means, that the study of the image of enemy present in public media is an opportunity to study the general patterns of this phenomenon.

To sum up this section a following conclusion can be drawn. Media, especially pro-governmental, is a key mediator between the authority and society, by the means of which, the latter transmit the enemy discourse that is suitable for it. Therefore pro-governmental media is in fact a representative sample for the study of enemy image, which by the authority desires to be indoctrinated into the public opinion.

1.4 Research Hypothesis

Concepts of "Sacred Value" and "Cultural Trauma"

After conducting the initial analysis of chosen data the general research hypothesis was formulated. As it is often happening in qualitative research it was impossible to formulate the proper hypothesis to answer the research question before conducting the pre-analysis. Since the general research question of the paper sounds: "What was the promoted image of the enemy in Russian pro-governmental media during their coverage of Ukranian crisis in December 2013 - April 2014" the hypothesis is following:

"The key role in the enemy construction was played by the certain elements of the myth of the World War II which was used both a "sacred value" of Russian community and the "cultural trauma" of the Western society".

Both notions used in the hypothesis are developed theoretical concepts and will be described in the following paragraphs.

Sacred Value

The idea of sacred value is borrowed from the social anthropology and psychology (Baron, Spranca, 1997; Atran, 2010), whereas the origins of this concept can be traced to Durkheim who defined sacred as something which connected to transcendental and non-utilitarian (Durkheim, 1912, 1995).

The basic idea of sacred value is that " ... people think that some of their values are protected from the trade-offs with other values ... " (Baron, Leshner, 183). So when it comes for political conflict the party that is presented to violate or "attack" these values would be perceived as an enemy by the group whose sacred values is considered to be touched even if there is no pragmatic reason to hate the group. Therefore when adversaries in violent political

14

conflicts conceptualize the issues under dispute as sacred values it becomes difficult to settle down the conflict. For example, as it has been proven empirically " ... when an attempt is made to trade a sacred value with a material good, it evokes feelings of anger ... " (Sachdeva, Medin, 2009, 1).

The most important feature of the sacred value as a potential element of enemy construction is the fact that it allows the party that appeals to it to avoid any pragmatic discussion about the conflict with its own population. When the enemy is perceived as someone who not only has disagreements about pragmatic reasons but as someone who defames the very underpins of the society any group inside the community who argues for a calm dialog with such an enemy can be labeled as a traitor and internal enemy. Therefore presenting rivals as someone attacking the "sacred values" of the community is a powerful means for an authority in the process of manipulation with public opinion inside the country.

Cultural Trauma

The concept of "cultural trauma" was developed by Jeffrey Alexander. The basic definition is following " ... cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that lowers indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways ... " (Alexander, 2004, 1). For the research purposes of these paper there are several important consequences that "cultural trauma" has for the image of enemy construction.

Firstly, "cultural trauma" may work in a way similar to the "sacred value" but for a different audience. In particular, when a group is portrayed as a collectivity that violates the memory of "cultural trauma" event its public opinion support can decrease even if the other

goals group argues for sympathize this public opinion. In fact, it may result in a cognitive dissonance of the public.

Secondly, an enemy that disgraces the memory of a "cultural trauma" can not be argued only in pragmatic way. A value question arises irrevocably, which in its turn complicates the process of potential negotiations.

Finally, one more general trait of the cultural trauma can be used in image of enemy construction. As it was pointed out by Jeffrey Alexander " ... mediated mass communication allows traumas to be expressively dramatized and permits some of the competing interpretations to gain enormous persuasive power over others ... " (Alexander, 2004, 18). So the image of cultural trauma can be used by an authority in the same way as the image of sacred value to gain additional support from public opinion in the country for certain political actions.

World War II as "Cultural Trauma" and "Sacred Value"

The creation of the political and historical myth of the World War II as a means of regime propaganda in modern Russia was marked by the several researchers (Kasamara, Sorokina, 2012; Liñán, 2010). The core of the myth is the performing the victory in the Great Patriotic War is the greatest and the most sacred achievement in Russian history that legitimatize the claims of modern Russia for a status of great power and makes all other countries in-debt for Russia. Any attempted to challenge such an interpretation leads to labeling of the group or person as "traitor"; "fascist" who does not respect the memory of 27 millions of Soviet people died in the war.

In case of the recent events in Ukraine there is a big group of protesters, most from the Western part of the country that do claim their respect to the banderivtsy movement and negative attitude to Soviet Union. The initial hypothesis is that Russian pro-governmental

media use this group as a representatives of the whole protest to use the "sacred value" of the Soviet victory in World War II in order to create a negative attitude to Ukrainian protest among general Russian public.

However for the Western community the World War II is important but not "sacred". At the same time there was a clear need in Russian pro-governmental media to justify Russian position in the Ukrainian crisis for the public opinion of the Western countries as well. Therefore, another historical event was emphasized. The banderivtsy movement commited violent acts against Poles and Jews during the war. One of the interpretations of these facts can be following - " banderivtsy are also responsible for Holocaust tragedy" with the Holocaust tragedy being a cultural trauma of Western community. Therefore the second part of the initial hypothesis is following - Russian pro-governmental media use the historical fact of the banderovczi's involvement in Holocaust tragedy to create a negative attitude to Ukrainian protest among general public opinion in Western countries with portraying the supporters of that historical movement among modern Ukrainian protest, in particular the group called Pravii Sector a representatives of the whole protect with the emphasis on Holocaust as a "cultural trauma" for the Western Countries.

17

1.5 Methodology

The basic methodology of the research is the qualitative discourse thematic analysis. Discourse is understood as discourse a coherent body of concepts and ideas that shape the process of argumentation, by transmitting common values and shared beliefs (Fisher, Gottweis, 2012). According to that approach "... political thought and behaviour ... cannot be understood without references to the distinctive vocabularies used by agents in given context ... " (Richter, 1995, 124). Consequently, the main causal assumption of discourse analyses is the belief that the way in which people communicate about and terms in which they discuss the particular question shapes the decisions they are likely to make. By understanding the mechanisms of discourse practices researches can understand logic behind the decision taken.

Therefore this method was chosen in order to uncover the references to the image of enemy that are present only explicitly in the text. The fact that in order to promote the desirable discourse newspapers use very often indirect notions and unclear references complicates the analysis based only the computer program. Therefore the particular method a discourse analysis that will be selected for this paper is a manual analysis of the data - the materials of news programs instead of methods that use computerized analysis.

Another important methodological assumption concerns the way the saying will be analyzed. In this paper it will be presumed that "... the meaning of every utterance, spoken or written, must be understood as an action performed in order to achieve the agent's intentions ... " (Richter, 1995, 131). There are several reasons why such an approach to the content was chosen. Firstly, since the object of analysis is pro-governmental media that covered an event crucial for the regime stability, all metaphors and interpretations used by **dictors** during the image of enemy construction can be considered as intentional act to achieve certain goals.

18

Consequently, in the process of analysis it will be one the research tasks to find out the goals of particular interpretations. Secondly, in such a framework of a communication act it is possible to concentrate efforts on finding links between the audience and the narratives used by the media. As it was already described one of the assumptions of the research hypothesis is the difference in stories told to internal and external audiences. Finally, since the object of the study is media it is especially important to understand saying as a kind of performance in front of an audience. However, because it is pro-governmental media and the topic covered is urgent political matters that are considered to important by the community the range of goals of the communicational acts can be limited.

To answer my research question and to check my research hypothesis I will use discourse analysis of the two main sources data.

Firstly, it will be the materials from weekly 1 hour long news programs on two the most widespread TV-channels of Russian Federation - "Channel One Russia", and the "Second Channel" (the "Channel Rossiya 2"). The period from which the programs will be selected in the late November to the beginning of March. Both channels are pro-governmental and they are also the most widespread Russian TV-channels that shape to a great extent the opinions of people in Russia, especially outside Moscow and Sankt-Petersburg where there is a problem with independent sources of information. Thus, it will allow to investigate the mechanism of enemy construction used in case of dealing with Russian public - in particular the usage of the Soviet victory in World War II as a "sacred value".

Secondly, it will be the materials concerning the research question from Russia Today channel. The materials will be chosen from each week's Sunday news reports. This data will be analyzed primarily to discover the justification of the image of enemy, as it was constructed in Russia, for the Western audience and to check the hypothesis about Holocaust as a cultural trauma used to discreditation of Ukrainian protest in the eyes of western public.

19

There are several themes the research is focused on. The first one concerns the depiction of the participants of anti-governmental protests and after 19 of February the supporters of new regime. The second theme is the presentation of the external actors that were involved in the Ukrainian crisis, except Russia. The third theme is the general narrative of the crisis. The fourth theme is the image of Russian policy during the conflict. The final theme will present the summary of the five theme's analysis and describe the evolution of the image of enemy in Ukrainian crisis constructed by Russian pro-governmental media.

To sum up, methodologically this research is designed to trace the main themes in the discourse of enemy, which was transmitted by the media, to uncover the goals and tools of the image of enemy construction process in Russian pro-governmental media, as an agents of state propaganda.

Note about the references

In this paper two types of references will be used for two different groups of data. The first group is references to the books and articles of other researchers, and for that group all full references will be placed in the end of the paper. The second groups consists of the links to the data from news programs and the short references will be placed the footnotes to make the text easier for a reader. Links to all data used as well as full references will be placed in the Appendix I.

Chapter II - Research

2.1 Evolution of the "Image of Protesters"

The first theme where the image of enemy can be presented explicitly is the depiction of the protest against the government of Victor Janukovich. Two principal stages in the evolution of the image of the protesters can be selected. The first stage is from the beginning of the protests in the late November to the 26th of January. Consequently the second stage is from 26th January until the present. The conceptual division in the depiction of the protesters was found in all three sources of data with some difference in the exact metaphors used between two channels for the internal audience ("Channel One Russia" and the channel "Rossia 2") and Russia Today.

The first stage

There are several elements that characterize the first stage. Firstly it is relevantly moderate depiction of the majority of the participants of the mass protests. They were described as "naive protesters"[1]; "protesters"[2]; "dreamers"[3]. The basic idea that was intended to be introduced by media is that the most protesters who argue for European Integration do not understand the exact negative consequences that the association with EU will bring to Ukrainian economy. Their sympathy for EU was explained as a "personal desire to emigrate"[4].

[1] *Voskresnoe Vremya*. 1.12.13
[2] *Vesti Nedeli*. 1.12.13
[3] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 8.12.13
[4] *Voskresnoe Vremya*. 1.12.13

At the same time pro-governmental media have highlighted that there is a certain group among the protesters who are dangerous. This group was from the very beginning described as either "orange eurointergrators"[5] or "radical nationalists"[6].

Both narratives have the closest connection to the tradition of enemy in modern Russian society.

The first narrative relates to the wave of "colored revolution" that happened in the middle of 2000s and was generally anticipated by Russian public opinion as an attempt of the United States to intervene in the traditional sphere of influence of the Russian Federation - the territories of the former Soviet Union. Therefore the link between modern protesters and those from 2004 is a clear attempt to connect modern antigovernment protests with hidden influence of the USA. This narrative is also related to the inter-Russian discourse of "the agents of the foreign influence", which was enforced by pro-government media after the first wave of mass protest in Russia in 2011. Even a special law about foreign agents was introduced on the 20 July of 2012[7], which made it difficult to all NGOs to work in the country. To strengthen the role of the "foreign agents" as the crucial organizational force of the current Ukrainian protest Russian pro-government media gave voice to the Ukrainian politicians who opposed the maidan. For example, Oleg Tzarev - the member of the parliament from the Party of the Regions. He said following: "...in Ukraine there are a lot of funds sponsored from outside of the country that have formed the public opinion ..." and "...there are evidences that on the territory of our state with the support of the US government a project "Texcom" is operating, which final goal of the provoking civil war in Ukraine .. " [8]. Consequently, the goal of the narrative is to present some of the protesters of maidan as a threat, since they are tools in the hands of foreign powers to abuse the naive expectations of

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[5] *Voskresnoe Vremya*. 1.12.13
[6] *Vesti Nedeli*. 1.12.13
[7] Федеральный закон Российской Федерации от 20 июля 2012 г. N 121-ФЗ
[8] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 8.12.13

some Ukrainians to provoke instability in the country. The audience for such kind of propaganda is firstly Russian citizens, who are persuaded by that means that it is not really people of Ukraine who challenge the authority but rather some "external agents" who manipulate ordinary. The latent message is not to allow such a situation in Russia. The second group this narrative targeted is Ukrainian citizens from eastern parts of the country (Donetsk, Lugansk) - to introduce into their public opinion that the most active protesters do not lot oppose the government because they love Ukraine but just because they are paid for it.

The second narrative of the "radical nationalists" is presented even more explicitly in the media during the first stage. From the very beginning the most active group of maidan that fight directly with the police was labeled as "nationalist", despite the fact that only a small part of active protesters consists of the members of radical organizations. The leaders of the most radical members of the protest, such as Oleg Tyagnibok - the leader of the third biggest opposition party - "Svoboda", which mostly popular in the western regions of the country, were latently presented as the leaders of the protest in general. In particularly the following citations have been used: "...radical Tyagnibok who is sure that nazists defended Ukraine against Jews and Russian ..."[9] and the citation from the Visental center where according to the Rossya 2 "...people remember how Tyagnibok called for a fight with "moscow-jewish" mafia ... "[10]. Moreover already in the program on the Channel One Russia on December, 8 for the first time an explicit link between " banderivtsy " and "nazis" were introduced. Particularly it was the opinion of one Serbian historian: "...new wave of the active actions of banderivtsy in the Western Ukraine reminds him the chorvat nazis, who became active on the eve of the disintegration of the country [Ugoslavia -P.S.] 20 years ago"[11]. Right after these words the scences of street fighting in Kiev were shown. Even the opinion of some foreign politicians

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[9] *Vesti Nedeli*. 1.12.13
[10] *Vesti Nedeli.* 8.12.13
[11] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 8.12.13

was used to strengthen the negative image of Svoboda party. For example the opinion of the US congressman Jeffris: "...covered by the claims of the protection of traditional Ukranian culture Svoboda's program reflects radical ideology, that is full of antisemitism, xenophobia and Nazi ideology ... "[12].

Several factors have to be pointed out concerning this narrative. Firstly, in fact all protesters who combated the police were presented as nationalists. Secondly, initially the process of labeling was conducted via the opinion of external experts either from Serbia or from Jewish organizations to provide more legitimacy for the claims of the connection between far-right protesters in Ukraine and Nazi ideology as for Russian and Ukrainian audience as well as for the West. Actually it is possible to state that the narrative of an enemy based on the sacred value of the victory over Nazism as well as cultural trauma of the Nazi crimes has started to be formulated soon after the beginning of the protest.

Thirdly, this narrative that presents the part of the protesters as banderivtsy created and image of the choice proposed for the Ukrainian society by Russian media. Either people could support the protest against the government and support by that means banderivtsy and radical nationalist or they stick to the existing authority or at least calm down to prevent the possible "coup". The idea of the protesters aiming to the seizing the power illegally was introduced through voices of those Ukranian politicians who supported Janukovich in the very same program: "... the goal of opposition is a coup d'etat ... "[13]. By that means the following idea was promoted, that in Ukraine there are groups of radicals who seek to seize the power by violent means, and these radicals are the heirs of traditional enemies of all soviet people - banderivtsy. Despite the fact, that during the first months of the protest this idea was not really intensively introduced it is important to note that the ground for the creation of this construct was made already in December 2013.

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[12] *Vesti Nedeli* 15.12.13
[13] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 8.12.13

24

The depiction of the protesters in the third channel - Russia Today differed from those on the governmental channels for internal audience. They were described as "proponents of european intergation", "peacefull protesters"[14]; "manifestatotrs"[15]; "protesters"[16]. In fact those people were not portrayed as an enemy at all and the nationalist discourse that was clear on the other two channels was not introduced during the first period on Russia Today.

Summing up the image of the protesters during the first stage of the crisis several conclusions can be made. To begin with, the majority of the members of the public protests was not portrayed as an enemy, as it would be difficult to explain why such a big part of a country that was considered to be the friend of Russian people has turned into their enemy. Therefore only part of the protest was depicted as a threat. This part consists of two groups, with one being agents paid by foreign powers, and another - radical nationalist from the western regions of the country. Thus two possible ways for the development of the image of enemy in regard to the protesters were created and the state propaganda received different way to react in the future depending on the development of the situation in Ukraine. Moreover, the two groups mentioned above were presented initially not as possible enemies for Russia, but rather as a threat to Ukrainians themselves especially from eastern regions of the country. Finally, from the perspective of the research hypothesis of that paper the usage of the Russian interpretation of the victory in the second world war was in fact used already from the very beginning of the protests, but during the first menthes it was an option besides another narrative of the agents of the West.

The Second Stage

(From January, 26 - until now)

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[14] *Russia Today*, 1.12.13
[15] *Russia Today*, 8.12.13
[16] *Russia Today*, 5.01.14

The development of the Ukranian crisis has determined the change in the presentation of the protesters. As soon as it has become clear that no compromise on the terms of the Janukovich government is possible, and strict laws of January, 16 only inspired people to resist the authority the narrative of the "black revolution"[17] was introduced with all recourses available for Russian pro-government media. In fact it is possible to mark the exact program where the new propaganda narrative was systemized - the news program on the Possya 2 from the January, 26.

The key elements of this new narrative concerning the protesters are the following. Firstly, there is no differentiation among people of maidan and all of them are described as coherent body. Secondly, from the perspective of Russian media this body consisted of: "rebels", "the heirs of Bandera", "radical nationalists", "aggressive mob[18]", who seek "to seize the power using violent means"[19]. For the part of the audience that is not familiar with Bandera movement the next part of the program explained explicitly the Russian vision of the role of Bandera movement during the Second World war, which from the point of view of Russian pro-government media confined to collaboration with Nazi Germany in the mass killings of peaceful soviet citizens. This movement is also named "Ukrainian bandit underground". The link between this part of Ukrainian past and the protests in present is presented very explicitly: "Among current Ukrainian rebels most part represents radical nationalist from Galitchina...during the Great Patriotic War the whole division of Ukrainian volunteers from that area, which was call exactly "SS-Galitchina" fight for the Third Reich. Today young men from that region are also against Russia. From Galitchina are the key members of such radical-nationalists organizations like "Trizub", "Patriot" and "Brotherhood". All of them are the members of so-called Pravii Sector [Right Sector-P.s.],

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[17] *Vesti nedeli*, 26.01.14
[18] *Voskresnoe vremya* 19.01.14
[19] *Vesti nedeli*, 26.01.14

that took responsibility for fire and bloody fighting with the police in Kiev"[20]. To reinforce the link between the modern protesters and the banderivtsy movement the opinion of some Jewish politicians is cited. For example the opinion of the member of Knesset Naomi Blumental: "...When one sees what is happening in Ukraine it is hard to believe. One can not forgive antisemitism, never..."[21]

The significance of the program from January, 26 is hard to over evaluate. Here the image of all protesters as enemies of all people to whom the memory of Russian "sacred victory" is precious is presented as explicitly as possible was firstly presented as the main and even the only Russian enemy discourse. This narrative of " banderivtsy ", "fascists" and "nazis" instead of protesters will be reinforced in all coming programs and will become the dominant discourse in the representation of the supporters of new Ukranian government after the flee of Janukovich.

The further development of this discourse is the creation of the image of "Pravii Sector" as the most important political enemy. According to this new narrative Pravii Sector is the group of radical nazis, who are not controlled either by the leaders of opposition or by the western countries who supported the protest for the very beginning. For example they are referred to as "non negotiable nationalists". Some provocative for Russian audience expression of their leader Dmitro Jarosh are quoted to strengthen the danger from that group. For example: "...banderovchina is not a past it is the present and the future..."[22]. Moreover some interpretations of Russian journalists also contribute to the provocation of genuine fears and despise for this movements among Russian audience. For instance, the majority of Russian people claim to be orthodox and therefore such a depiction of "rebels stronghold": "...the portraits of Stepan Bandera...as icons - every person who enters the building is made to

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[20] *Vesti nedeli*, 26.01.14
[21] *Vesti nedeli*, 26.01.14
[22] *Vesti nedeli*, 02.02.14

27

take off the hat in front of it ... the old motto: Ukraine is above all, death to the enemies..."[23],
"...the portrait of the real leader of the changes that occur in the country now - the leader of
Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera... "[24], creates a negative image of the movement, since
they put the "Nazist" as a hero and God. To show that the protest is inspired mostly by "
banderivtsy " from the western parts of the Ukraine there was a lot of news reports from these
regions and several opinions of the local people that fitted in the promoted narrative were
presented. The example of opinions: "...we will dig out the weapon of our grandfathers and
grandgrandfathers"[25], "we are proud of our grandfathers- banderivtsy and our glorious past,
and our children will be banderivtsy "[26]. At the same time right before these opinions the
views of pro-russian activists in the eastern part of the country were presented to intensify the
contrast between two parts of the country the Russian media wants people to believe in. In
this views young people repeated the new narrative: "...we are united in combat against brown
plague [fascism-P.S]; the liberation of Europe from fascism also started from the East..."[27];
"...faschist for people from the Eastern Ukraine are those neo- banderivtsy who have occupied
maidan in Kiev..."[28].

    At the same time the way the Russia Today has interpreted the events in Kiev and
maidan was different. In January-February the channel still pretended to be objective and it
did not reproduced the discourse of two pro-government federal channels in an open way.
Until the very victory of the revolution people on the maidan were mostly described as
"protesters", and it was explained that Pravii Sector was only the most radical relevantly small
part, of it[29]. However, the main discourse was also implemented via the different technology.

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[23] *Vesti nedeli*, 02.02.14
[24] *Voskresnoe Vremya*, 02.02.14
[25] *Vesti nedeli*, 02.02.14
[26] *Vesti nedeli*, 02.02.14
[27] *Vesti nedeli*, 02.02.14
[28] *Vesti nedeli*, 09.02.14
[29] *Russia Today*, 19.01.14

In were mostly the international experts who referred to the issue of banderivtsy. For example, the channel interviewed the professor of St. Thomas University Mikhail Molchanov, who said: "...in the protests take part nationalists, neo-nazis and members of Pravii Sector movement..."[30]. This discourse was reinforced after the victory of the revolution in February. Here is the example of the new topics: "Nationalists and radicals are going into power in Ukraine"[31]. Moreover the thesis of the pursued Jewish minority was also widely used. The channel cited Haarez newspaper, according to which Jewish community in Kiev asked Israeli government to protect it[32], as well as the words of one the most radical Ukrainian nationalists Musiychko, who had little to do with maidan movement, except of being the member of the Pravii sector, but who said in 2007 that "he will fight against communists, Jews and Russians until his death"[33]. Consequently, despite having a different methodology of the presentation of official discourse Russia Today also serves the purpose of transmitting it. The difference is that compared to domestic federal Channels Russia Today did not used simple propaganda tools, lied to the audience or presented interpretations without factual support. But the facts the channel selected to present and the importance attached to different issues indicates that the goal of Russia Today was to distort the positive image of the protesters on the maidan dominant among Western audience, by linking it to the negative image of radical nationalism and antisemitism via emphasizing the role of some relevantly small radical groups that were in fact the members of the protest movement. Moreover, from March this discoursed was retransmitted more intense mostly by referring to the opinion of Russian governmental officials or pro-Russian politicians and people from the eastern part of Ukraine[34].

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[30] *Russia Today*, 26.01.2014
[31] *Russia Today*, 23.02.2014
[32] *Russia Today*, 23.02.2014
[33] *Russia Today*, 23.02.2014
[34] Russia Today, 02.03.2014

Summing up, in the middle of January on the channel "Rossia-2" new narrative of the protesters as an archi-enemy was finalized, which was immediately retransmitted by Channel One Russia, and from the end of February by Russia Today as well. The presentation of the people who opposed the government has transformed in Russian propaganda into the nazi-banderivtsy rebels against the legitimate government. Thus, at least the depiction of the people on maidan supported the initial research hypothesis of the paper. Firstly, the "sacred value" of the Second world war is used to reinforce negative emotions among the Russian population, as well as pro-Russian part of the Eastern Ukraine, who watch Russian channels, towards the anti-governmental protest and after the victory of this protest towards new power in Kiev. Secondly, three channels emphasized the anti-Semitism of the very small group of the protesters to link them in the eyes of the western audience with Nazi ideology, and the "cultural trauma" of Holocaust, decreasing their popular support among the population of the Western countries.

2.2 The evolution of the Image of the "Role of the West"

The second theme where the image of enemy was presented is the depiction of the role of the Western countries (European Union and the United States) in the Ukrainian crisis. This image was found to be more consistent in Russian media, however three periods can also be highlighted. In the timeframe of the crisis the division is principally the same - the first period continued until the second half - end of January, the first period was from January until the victory of the maidan in Kiev (end of February) and the third period goes on from the beginning of March until the end of the observation period.

The first stage

December-end of January

The first stage has certain particular features. To begin with, during this this stage it was some Western countries, not the protesters on the maidan in Kiev who were depicted as the main enemy of the peace and stability in Ukraine. Moreover, the argumentation used to prove this viewpoint was focused on the economic matters and comparison of the benefits and drawbacks of the European and Eurasian projects of integration for Ukraine. Finally, the rhetoric used in broadcasts on the television correlated sometimes with one used during the Cold War period.

The first part of the argument was the idea that the association with European Union will inevitably result in consequences for Ukrainian economy. The following collocations and arguments were widely used to express this idea: "serfdom treaty"[35], "nobody hided that the signing of the treaty will mean ... the end of Ukrainian economy"[36]. This idea was summed up

[35] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 1.12.13
[36] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 1.12.13

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by Russian political expert Vitalii Nikonov: "...it was exactly the plan [of the EU-P.S.] to give nothing to Ukraine and to use it later as the market for cheap labor force..."[37]. Combined with already covered in the analysis of the first themes ideas of "naive Ukranians" and "foreign agents, inspired by Western NGOs" the first part proposed narrative was following. EU is using the hopes of Ukranian population for better live and some small paid group of protesters to make Janukovich to sign the treaty with EU in order to abuse the country.

To strengthen the argument broad support that European and American politicians provided protests in Kiev from their very begging was interpreted in such a way, that the protests were organized by the Western countries. This interpretation of the physical presence of the official representatives of Poland, Sweden Lithuania and especially USA on the maidan was from the very beginning found in the broadcasts of all three channels[38]. According to this framework it was due to the influence of western politicians that the protests intensified dramatically, as "...European politicians supports the revolutionary mood of Ukrainian opposition..." and prevents the people "...from hearing the viewpoint of Ukrainian government..."[39].

The second part of the negative image of the West during the first stage of Ukrainian crisis went beyond economic argument. The role of the European and American politicians was interpreted in a broader geopolitical context of confrontation between Russia and the West. At that point the lexis used was very close to one used during the Cold War. For example: "...next geopolitical project of the West is planned to be implemented at the expense of Ukrainian citizens..."[40] ; the citation of the opinion of E.Kusturiza: "...all talks about democracy are for a long time only the way of modernized ways of the annexation of new

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[37] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 1.12.13
[38] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 8.12.13; *Vesti nedeli* 1.12.2013; *Russia Today* 08.12.2013
[39] *Russia Today* 08.12.2013
[40] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 1.12.13

territories..."[41]; "...new coalition of Poland, Sweden, Lithuania does everything to harm Russia..."[42]; "...protest in Kiev was not only Ukrainian from the very beginning... every day western emissars can be found on the square ..." [43]; "...political expert Mark Sleboda thinks that the American politicians go in Ukraine with only one goal - to set a disagreement between Kiev and Moscow..."[44].

There are several reasons why Russian pro-government media have recreated this image of Western powers as an enemy from the very beginning of the protest.

To begin with, such an interpretation corresponds with the principle of desired information - which is one of the cornerstones of state propaganda. Indeed, the worldview of significant part of Russian population was influenced by either the Soviet propaganda (old generation) or the re-created threat of "foreign agents" (a narrative that was forcefully indoctrinated after the anti-governmental protests in Russia in 2011). According to this framework antigovernmenal protests even if the protesters claim to pursue "high values" of democracy and civil rights are in fact inspired by the foreign powers to destroy the stability in the former post-soviet space. Therefore, for a lot of people it may be easier to believe the protest in Ukraine was orchestrated by Western powers, rather that to presume that people become brave enough to oppose corrupted government.

Secondly, such an interpretation is simple and can be easily retransmitted by pro-governmental channels. The protest is not genuine, as western politicians manipulate it. Consequently, even if some demands of the people on maidan may look sympathetic it is not a good idea to trust them, as the real goal is to allow the West "...to grab Ukraine from Russia..."[45]. It is important to point out that these theses was especially strong reproduced by

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[41] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 8.12.13
[42] *Vesti nedeli* 1.12.2013
[43] *Vesti nedeli* 15.12.2013
[44] *Russia Today* 15.12.2013
[45] *Vesti nedeli Vesti nedeli* 1.12.2013

Russia Today channel to persuade western community in the incorrect behavior of their countries, who only pretend to defend democratic principles but in fact just manipulate people. Moreover, this idea was widely embraced among the Ukrainian population in the eastern regions of the country, which will partly determine lately their negative attitude towards new regime in Kiev.

Finally, according to these interpretation people inside Russia who support Ukrainian protest support the geopolitical ambitions of Western powers that damage Russian strategic interests. Once again, this very simplified interpretation allowed Russian state propaganda to subdue the possible spread of sympathies towards the protests inside Russia.

Another important aspect of this segment of Russian propaganda is its relevant objectiveness. Indeed, this negative image of the "geopolitical threat of the Western countries" was constructed on the interpretations of the actions and events that really took place. American and European politicians did participate in the protest, as well as initially proposed association indeed would have caused a lot of troubles for Ukrainian economy. Moreover, according to the agreement Ukraine would have lost the opportunity to participate in other integration processes, in particularly, Eurasian integration, which would have cut the prospects of close economic connections between Russia and Ukraine. Consequently, all these facts have provided Russian pro-government media with the factual recourses to reconstruct the image of "Western threat", by putting the emphasis on these aspects of Ukrainian protest.

The last but not the least point is the fact that during December-first half of January the presentation of Western powers as the main threat was a dominant one with the protesters on maidan being the objects of the manipulation of the western politicians. To a certain extend it reflects the widespread opinion among Russian people and politicians that there can

be no self-organized anti-governmental activity of the people, without a hidden organizational force. Moreover, after 15th of December when Russia provided Janukovich government with 15 billions dollar loan the dominant view in Russian media became victorious one. The broadcasts from 22nd of December presented nearly empty maidan in Kiev. Consequently, the narrative of the victory of Vladimir Putin over the West could have been used later to strengthen his domestic popularity. At this point there was little believe that the protests will last long and therefore the narrative of the protesters as the main enemy seemed to be not so effective in the future whereas the presentation of the Western powers a threat could be used and reintroduced in the later events. The proposed triumph of Russian policy was expressed in the following words; "... NATO enlargement to the East, American anti-missile systems, the disrespect towards the sovereignty and interference in the domestic affairs - everything which was done in Europe in the last years despite Russian arguments - everything found suddenly its blocking point in Ukraine..."[46].

Summing the characteristic features of the first stage several conclusions can be made. Firstly, the dominant narrative was the depiction of Western powers as the main organizing force of the protests, the goal of which was to create a divide between Russia and Ukraine. Secondly, the Ukrainian events were put in the broader context of geopolitical struggle. Finally, by the end of December in Russian pro-government mass media was depicted a belief in Russian victory in its stand with the West in Ukrainian crisis.

The Second Stage

Middle of January 2014 - End of February 2014

The second stage can be characterized by several important traits. Firstly, the change in the depiction of the role of the western powers in the events happening in Kiev. Secondly,

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[46] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 22.12.13

the evaluation of the western influence as the main threat has switched into the emphasis on the radical Ukrainian nationalism as the main enemy. Thirdly, the relations between nationalists in Kiev and the West were depicted in such a way, as by supporting the maidan European and American politicians have released forces they are now not able to control.

The change in the depiction of the role of the Western Powers correlates with the switch in the depiction of the protesters described in the previous part. As soon as the dominant narrative transformed into the fear and mobilization against "nazi threat" the depiction of the western politician evolve into people who thought to be in control of the process but are powerless now.

The example of the used rhetoric: "...It is clear that the West would prefer to see Klichko and Jachenyuk but here other voices are louder..."[47]; "...eurocommissars on maidan - mission impossible..."[48]; "...they put their kings on the chessboard: Germany and Europe - Klichko, the USA - Jachenyuk ... but have overseen the force that have interfered in the game and will not stop and will destroy everything ..."[49]; "...Pravii Sector have already wiped the floor with the three ministers of foreign affairs from EU..."[50]; "...this crowd is not controlled neither by opposition nor by the West..."[51].

This shift into the representation had a number of important consequences. Firstly, it changes the image of the main enemy for Russian people from the Western powers into radical nationalists. Secondly, for the audience in the western countries it justifies the initial negative attitude of Russian authorities towards the protests, since in the story which was presented by Russian pro-government channels, from the beginning Russian officials warned their Western colleagues about the danger of the growth of radical nationalism in Ukraine if

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[47] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 26.01.2014
[48] *Vesti nedeli* 23.02.2014
[49] *Vesti nedeli* 23.02.2014
[50] *Vesti nedeli* 23.02.2014
[51] *Russia Today* 23.02.2014

the protests will continue. Since these warnings turned to be correct they can justify other interpretations promoted by the Russian media. Finally, such a shift opened a space for dialog between Russia and Western countries to settle down situation in Ukraine in order to prevent the growing nationalism with Russian representatives having stronger negotiation position.

Compared with the first stage the second one has a number of differences in its methodology. To begin with, whereas during the first stage the arguments were either justified rationally, as in case of the comparison of costs and benefits of different integration processes for Ukraine, or were based on the interpretations of the real facts, the rhetoric of the second stage appealed mostly to artificially created idea of "Nazi threat" which was described above. Moreover, the whole context becames more emotional with a lot of statements that are presumed to be self-evident without a need of further explanation. From the point of view of propaganda technology it is described as the principle of supposed obviousness. The ideas like banderivtsy equals fascism are not explained properly, especially for the audience who does not know who were banderivtsy during the Second World War, the origins and evolution of this movement. Moreover the further theses can be accepted only if a person believes in initial statement that the majority of the protesters are radical nationalist, which is direct distortion of the reality. To conclude - on the second stage the propaganda became simplified, appealing entirely to emotions and images.

Summing the second stage up several consequences can be drawn. Firstly, the depiction of the Western countries was brought into the correspondence with the main enemy narrative promoted by Russian media. Secondly, in this narrative the position of Western powers became morally weak, since it is presumed that partly via their efforts the ancient indebatable evil - radical nationalism received a chance of revival in Europe.

The Third Stage

<center>From the begging of March until the end of April</center>

The third stage is a further development of the previous stage.

Firstly, the western support of the new Ukrainian government is criticized since in the Russian narrative it means the support of radical nationalism. The example of the rethoric is following: "... the significant part of European ruling elite and eurobureacracy has already discredited itself by the connection with liberal-faschist group in Kiev..."[52], "...in Germany people oppose **neonacsizm** and fascism but they close their eyes on what is happening in Ukraine..."[53].

Secondly, due to their weak moral position the Western countries must respect the right of the Russian Federation to protects Russian people in Crimea and eastern parts of Ukraine against the "banderivtsy- fascists ".

Thirdly, since the USA was the country that most loudly has opposed Russian intervention in Crimea it was blamed to have double standarts[54] and to promote nazism in Europe.

Summing up, the third period does not present any conceptual novelty in the Russian enemy discourse but rather the development of the narrative formed during the second stage. The critique of the Western powers is based on the moral arguments that are presumed to be self-evident for the audience. Western politicians are blamed for the support of fascism and therefore all their arguments that criticize Russian actions are immediately presumed to be wrong. To a certain extend a mixture of two images of enemy can be found. The narrative of " banderivtsy-fascists-rusophobes" is mixed with narrative of anti-Russian geopolitical

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[52] Vesti Nedeli 16.03.2014
[53] Vesti Nedeli 06.04.2014
[54] Vesti Nedeli 16.03.2014

movements of Western democracies who try to use this fascists to their benefit. However, the proportion of these two narratives is different. The most emphasis is put on the Ukrainian internal nationalist movement, which is mostly uncontrolled by the Western countries. The later now are just trying to adjust this movement to their goals.

Summary of the analysis of the Second Theme

The analysis of the second theme has revealed several issues important for understanding of the construction of the general image of enemy. In fact, the West is one the cornerstones of the enemy narrative in modern Russia.

Firstly, the presentation of the role of the Western powers has undergone significant transformation during the Ukrainian crisis. It has transformed from the main enemy with is supposed to be responsible for the political instability in the country into the silent supporter of uncontrollable fascist forces. For the domestic Russian audience as well as for those people in the West who believe in Russian narrative of the Ukrainian crisis such an understanding of the role of the Western powers in Ukrainian crisis gives Russia morally strong position in its negotiation with Western powers on its new policy towards Ukraine, as well as justifies Russian military intervention in Crimea and its further annexation.

Secondly, the created narrative of the West has important consequences for the understanding of the development of Russian internal policy. The moral **condemnation** of the western policy towards Ukraine by its linkage to the issues that constitutes simultaneously cultural trauma and sacred value allowed the government to prevent any significant opposition towards its policy and correspondently support of the position of the western powers inside the country. The opposing that has arisen was presented in pro-government media as "national traitors" cutting their support among the silent majority of Russian

population. In fact, Russian government has won the war for the dominant discourse. The victory was provided by the linkage of the ideals and mottos traditionally associated with Western democracies and liberal opposition such as "freedom, democracy" with their support of the "fascist revolution". The fact that there was no fascist revolution in Kiev, did not have any importance since such a revolution has happened in the narrative most Russian people believe in.

Finally, the evolution of the image of West correlates with the evolution of the methodology of the state propaganda. The direction of this evolution is simplification and de-rationalization. Such a transformation is underpinned by powerful images and beliefs that are based on the narratives of the "Great Patriotic War".

Summing the second theme up, it is possible to state that the analysis confirms the general research hypothesis of the central role of the narrative of sacred value of the victory over fascist Germany combined with cultural trauma of Holocaust. However, this hypothesis needs certain additions. The depiction of the West during the Ukrainian crisis was not confined to the usage of the two narratives mentioned above. The third important component is the rhetoric of the geopolitical stand between Russia and global West with the Ukraine being an object of their rivalry. In this part of presentation the lexis used by pro-government channels seems to be similar to one used during the Cold War.

2.3 The evolution of the Image of the whole process

The third theme, which has to be analyzed, is the depiction of the processes that happened in Ukraine in general. There are several narratives that were present throughout the whole period of observation. The first narrative is "protest as chaos versus authority as an order". This narrative was growing in its strength until the final loss of the regime of Victor Janukovitch on the 22rd of February. The second narrative is the image of "the divided country" that was present in the media since December, 2013 but became dominant only since the second half January, 2014.

The first Narrative "Chaos VS Order"

The way in which the protests against Victok Janukovitch decision not to sign association agreement with European Union and later against his regime in general were depicted in Russian pro-government mass media have contributed to a great extend to the creation of the image of enemy.

To understand how the logic of confrontation was interpreted by Russian channels it is important to highlight what was mostly absent in the broadcasts. From the very beginning there was little information about the reasons of popular dissatisfaction against the government, except the disagreement of the protesters with the government's decision not to sign association agreement. The way in which the media defended this agreement was already shown in the analysis of the second theme. At the same time there was little information about the violence against the protesters from the side of security forces and even if such information appeared it put the blame for the violence on the leaders of the protest and on Western politicians who have supported the opposition.

At the same time another idea was presented very explicitly in the broadcasts. The government was depicted mostly as a power that keeps the order in the country and defends

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ordinary citizens against the threat of anarchy. Anarchy was pictured to be produced by the protesters, by emphasizing the size and the role of its most radical wing. It was highlighted several times during in various programs that the authority is ready for the dialog, but the opposition seeks instead the violent overthrown of the government and the continuation of the crisis[55]. For example, " However, the reasons why the protest movement refused to agree with the proposals of the government were explained to the audience at all.

The fact that from the end of December the "euromaidan" has transformed into the civil movement against the whole system of corruption the previous government was built on was omitted. The demands of the protests were not explain except the statement[56] that they seek to conduct a coup d'etat and the pictures of violent clashes between the police and so-called "maidan's self-defence", which was reffered to as "agressive mob[57]". The most characteristic example is the way in which two federal channels described the essence of so-called "16 January laws". Among the innovations proposed by these laws were following provisions.

To begin with, drivers of motorcades of more than 5 cars, if they cause traffic jams, face the loss of their driver's license and vehicle for up to two years. This measure was developed to prevent the activity of "automaidan" [car maidan -P.S] movement that provided the protesters with various supplies. Moreover, gathering and disseminating information about the Berkut, judges, or their respective families carries a penalty of up to 2 years in jail, even in case if the gathered information was about crimes conducted by the officials.

According to the story of Russian pro-government media the aim of these laws was to increase the security during the public gatherings as well as to prevent violence. In the framework of the general narrative "security forces versus aggressive chaotic protests" this

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[55] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 8.12.2013; Vesti nedeli 26.01.2014
[56] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 8.12.2013
[57] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 19.01.2014

interpretation seemed to be logical. But it was omitted that these laws prevented in fact any opportunity to protest against the government and that is why provoked only further rage of the members of the maidan movement.

As a result the following image has appeared. There is a big group of aggressive people who want to destabilize the country and there government who protects the state interests. In this story the possible violence against the protesters is legitimized and even desired in the eyes of the part of public opinion formed by people who believe Russian media. Here it has to be highlighted that the significant number of Ukrainians from the eastern regions of the country belongs to that group.

This logic was found in all three channels, but technically the way in which Russia Today persuaded its audience was different. Here there was more information about the position of the protesters, as well as the violent acts from the side of Ukranian security forces. But the emphasis was put once again on the refusal of the opposition leaders to agree with the propositions of the government, as well as on the victims of the clashes from the side of the police.

To sum up, the examined narrative created the negative image of the protesters. They were presented not as a "freedom fighter"; "civil resistance movement" or "patriots" but rather as an aggressive mob that wants to get into the power. The most important logical consequence of that narrative is the fact that possible violence against these people is justifiable. One of the possible interpretations of the reasons for such a narrative is the fact that by that means Russian pro-government media tried to legitimize the possible decision of V.Janukovitch to use armed forces against the people on maidan.

The second Narrative "Divided Country"

The narrative of the divided country was the most explicit theme in the broadcasts of Russian pro-government media during their coverage of Ukranian crisis. Since December

2013 the public opinion in Russia and in Eastern Ukraine has been being persuaded in the existence of the insuperable divide between western and eastern regions of the country.

The importance attached to the construction of the image of a gap between different parts of the Ukraine can be demonstrated by the names of news reports from the country: "On the Eastern Front without changes"; "Whom will you chlopchi [people-P.S.] support?"[58]; " Union-collapse"[59], "West-East"[60]; "Kharkov and Donetzk do not want to feed maidan"[61]; "The feeling of coming civil war"[62].

There are several dimensions of the divide proposed by the Russian pro-government media. First dimension is a historical one which includes emphasizing the fact that the present borders of Ukraine "were formed artificially by Lenin and Stanlin"[63]. The second proposed dimension is economical, according to which there is "hard-working Donbass [Eastern part of the Ukraine-P.S] that feeds the country"[64] and "lazy poor West". The third proposed difference is the various political preferences between western and eastern regions of Ukraine, which exist indeed. However, it was emphasized several times that most supporters of the antigovernment protests in Kiev were from western regions of the country, whereas eastern regions remained relevantly calm for a long time. Finally, the western regions of the country were presented as the nests of banderivtsy movement and whereas the East as the stronghold of the memory about the Second World War and the "fighters against the fascism"[65]. The logic of the serious disagreements between the different parts of Ukraine was found in the broadcasts of Russia Today channel as well[66].

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[58] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 8.12.2013
[59] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 15.12.2013
[60] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 22.12.2013
[61] Vesti nedeli 02.02.2014
[62] Vesti nedeli 02.02.2014
[63] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 15.12.2013
[64] *Voskresnoe Vremya* 15.12.2013; Vesti nedeli 02.02.2014
[65] *Vesti Nedeli* 02.02.2014
[66] *Russia Today* 26.01.2014

The goal of this narrative was to prepare the public opinion in Russia and Eastern Ukraine to the possible separatism in the eastern regions and especially in Crimea. In fact the legitimization of the crimean referendum as well the annexation of the peninsula by Russian troops was a separate story. However, its logic was the same as in general narrative: historical difference from the western Ukraine, memory of the Second World war and disagreement with new authorities in Kiev. It has to be highlighted, that the crucial part of the content of "difference" was made by the "fascist - banderivtsy" already described in details in the previous parts of the paper.

Summary of the Third theme

Several important conclusions can be made after the analysis of the analysis of the evolution of the Image of the whole process.

To begin with, the negative image of the protest as a chaotic aggressive force was created. After the victory of maidan this image was used immediately to delegitimize new government in Kiev. Consequently, the image of the protest as an enemy was transmitted on the current Ukranian government.

Moreover, the image of divided country was reinforced in the targeted public opinion. The fact that this image has been being created from the very beginning of the antigovernment protests in December may indicate that the Russian government expect the victory of maidan and wanted to prepare public opinion for its further actions aimed on the annexation of Crimea and promotion of separatism in Ukraine.

Finally, the core element of propaganda remained the same - the threat of radical nationalism, which based on the sacred value of the victory in the World War II. Therefore the image of the situation in Ukraine in general supports the main research hypothesis of the article.

2.4 Summary of the Chapter II

After the completion of the analysis of three themes it is possible to describe the image of enemy created by Russian pro-government mass media in whole. The analysis has revealed two crucial narratives that constitute the image of enemy the observed media wants their audience to believe in. The importance attached to these images remained stable through the whole period of observation, however a timeline with the periods of the particular emphasis on one of them can be created as well.

The first narrative re-creates the times of Cold War with the western powers being a definite threat for Russia and Ukraine as well. Initially these powers were presented a force that sought to abuse Ukraine and turn it into the economic colony of European Union with a lot of cheap labor force. When their plans failed due the decision of Victor Janukovitch not to sign Association agreement with EU western countries have ignited the protest inside the country using the "fifth column". The second element of the narrative was the description of the Ukrainian crisis in context of geopolitical confrontation between the USA and Putin's Russia. This narrative was the dominant one until the middle of the January, when it became clear that no peaceful agreement between the government and the protest movement would be reached. Another possible explanation is the understanding of the Russian government that western powers cannot control the protest movement, which has become an independent political actor itself. Therefore the emphasis was moved on the second narrative.

The second narrative is based on the image of the radical nationalism threat. Its elements are the historical references to banderivtsy movement its connections with Nazi Germans and the labeling of the most active part of the protest as "fascists". This narrative is entirely based on the importance that Russian society attaches to the victory over fascism

46

during the Second World War. By naming later the whole protest as a "fascist movement" Russian government managed to destroy mostly its support in the Eastern regions of Ukraine, demonize the movement in the eyes of Russian population and decrease the sympathy towards "the maidan" among some part of the audience in Western countries as well. The whole image of the protests transformed into "the attempt of fascist coup d'etat", and accordingly the new Ukrainian government was depicted in official pro-government media as illegitimate.

After the support expressed by EU and the USA to the new Ukrainian government after the victory of maidan and the sanctions imposed on Russia after its actions in Crimea the two narratives have merged with each other. Consequently the image of enemy promoted by Russian pro-government media can be summarized as: radical nationalists-fascism supported by western powers.

Conclusions

This part will present the findings of the paper from the point of their coherence with the research hypothesis described in the theoretical part. Moreover, here the discovered image of the enemy promoted by Russian pro-government media will be summarized. Finally, several consequences of such a content of the discovered image of enemy, which may help to understand the possible directions of further Russian foreign and domestic policy, will be presented as well.

The research hypothesis presumed that Russian pro-governmental media referred to the "sacred value" of the Soviet victory in World War II and history of banderivtsy movement, which was presented as the ideological ancestors of modern protest, in order to create a negative attitude to Ukrainian protest among general Russian public. The involvement of the banderivtsy in the Holocaust tragedy that was conceptualized as "cultural trauma" was supposed to be used to win the sympathies of the western public. The empirical findings have proven this hypothesis partially.

The hypothesis was generally confirmed but with certain important adjustments.

To begin with, the narrative of the World War II as "sacred value" is indeed the cornerstone of the created image of enemy. Russian propaganda managed to present the majority of maidan movement, and after its victory in February new Ukrainian government as well, as supporters of "banderivtsy - fascists" ideology. However, no significant difference has been found between the proportion of the "sacred value" and "cultural trauma" elements depending on the targeted audience. Both elements were used as a coherent combination with the similar affect on domestic as well as on foreign audience as well. The difference in the approaches was concentrated in the quality of produced broadcasts with Russia Today being more objective and less emotional than "Channel One Russia" and "Rossya 2". Moreover, the intensity of broadcasts was also higher in channels that targeted the Russian audience and pro-

Russian people in Eastern Ukraine. For this type of audience the narrative of "sacred value" which is threatened by the enemy, whose evilness is self-evident, - "fascists" created a just cause for any actions that would protect the population of East Ukraine from the new "hunta regime". These actions include supporting of Russian military intervention in Crimea to direct fighting with Ukrainian army as the member of so-called "Donbass militia". From the perspective of the paper, current very considerable public support of military resistance groups by the population of the Eastern Ukraine can be considered as the result of the work of Russian propaganda that has managed to win the information war in this region and indoctrinate its version of the conflict into the minds of local people.

However, the predicted narrative of "banderivtsy - fascist" has turned out to be not the sole element of created image of enemy. The analysis revealed the recreated cold war image of "evil West". The promotion of this image was especially intense in December and January 2013 but it decreased in February, March 2014. However, by April the negative image of Western powers was again reinforced. As the result by April 2014 two images merged in Russian propaganda creating new archi-image of enemy: "fascist-banderivtsy regime in Kiev supported by Western liberal democracies".

There are several conclusions that can be made regarding the validity of the theoretical part of the paper. The theory was based on a thesis that the way people conceptualized things is not based on the events itself but on the information individuals received about it. Therefore the media can manipulate the public opinion by creating certain images. Among this images the image of enemy is one the most powerful means to unite people or legitimize the actions of authorities.

To begin with, the discovered facts support the thesis that the way people understand the reality does not necessary equals the facts occurred but rather is the consequence of the way the occurred facts were represented. Indeed the image of the Ukrainian crisis created by

49

Russian pro-government media has little to do with the actual facts happening in Ukraine, however it is the image not the reality Russian people believe in. The artificially created image of "fascist- banderivtsy " threat dominates in Russian-speaking public opinion, despite if the fact that the real percentage of the Ukrainian population who support radical right movements is low.

Moreover the research also confirms the power of the media in modern politics. By creating particular images Russian pro-government media indeed was able to mobilize Russian-speaking population by indoctrinating it with certain media myths, allowing the authority and personally Vladimir Putin to manipulate it in order to achieve Russian political course and improve domestic support. Therefore, the control over the means of discourse production can be considered as the crucial foundation of modern Russian authoritarian regime.

There are also several important consequences that follow from the content of the analyzed image of enemy for Russian domestic and foreign policy. In a certain sense this image may be considered as a new ideology of the country. Furthermore it clearly represents the result of the development of Russian political system under the Putin's regime.

Firstly, it indicates that Russian authority is not going to tolerate independent political regime in Ukraine seeing it as a threat to its security. The legitimacy of current Ukrainian government is not recognized; new leaders of the country are presented as fascists. From the perspective of the long-term peaceful settlement it is a definite negative sign. The annexation of Crimea will therefore most probably transform into the constant "frozen conflict".

Secondly, as Russian propaganda presented such a clear antagonism with European Union and the United States it is possible to presume that in the future Russian foreign policy will be conducted in the spirit of looking all possible allies against western countries.

Finally, the discovered image of enemy supports the viewpoint that the whole development of Russian political system during the last ten years was aimed to create an antiliberal political culture. Therefore, the created image can be seen as the final point of the artificial evolution of Russian public opinion. Since, the cornerstone of newly formed ideological legitimation of the governing authority is based on the antidemocratic cold-war style propaganda and emphasis on the necessity of the defense against the non existing "nazi threat", the perspective for liberalization and democratization of domestic live in Russia can be considered as unrealistic. In the worldview influenced by the discovered image of enemy any advocation of liberal values can be considered as an act of treason against the country. Indeed, the revolution in Ukraine has started with democratic demands and liberal values are conceptualized as the product of Western civilization. Consequently, from both these directions liberal ideas are the attribute of the promoted enemy and the defense of these ideas is the defense of the enemy. This will definitely make it much more difficult to promote any democratic values among the population, and without such promotion the opportunity for positive changes in the political system after the end of the Putin's regime is also undermined. Moreover, taking into consideration the recent changes in Russian domestic policy further limitations of the freedom of speech can be expected as well in order to prevent the production and promotion of counter-discourse.

The paper is considered to fulfill its research goals. The research question is answered, since the content of the image of enemy in Russian pro-government media during the Ukrainian crisis is analyzed in depth. Moreover the findings have supported the theoretical part of the paper. Further this paper has shown the role of the control over the media in modern politics. The thesis has enriched literature about current Ukrainian crisis and can serve as a starting point for further investigations.

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