CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2014
| Author | Shkaeva, Natalia |
|---|---|
| Title | THE RESOURCE CURSE MAGNITUDE IN FEDERAL STATES: A STUDY OF RUSSIA AND NIGERIA |
| Summary | This study analyzes the political factors that mediate the resource curse magnitude at the national level in two federal states, Nigeria and Russia. The study asks: what are the political determinants of the resource curse in federal states? As this research project suggests, fiscal decentralization in respect to oil revenues in a federal state can be considered as an institutional mechanism that could diminish the resource curse effects at the national level. However, the level of fiscal decentralization depends on the formal rules of federalism. The comparative analysis of Nigeria and Russia reveals that in the case of unclear constitutional guarantees for regional governments in respect to fiscal autonomy and legislative voids in respect to taxation, the federal center captures oil rents through its legislative prerogatives at the federal level. The argument this study makes and empirically tests is that fuzzy constitutional guarantees increase the power imbalance between regional and federal political actors in favor of the latter, exposing the federation to fiscal centralization over time and, thus, the resource curse at the federal level. The study concludes that countries with fuzzy constitutional rules undergo fiscal centralization as a result of oil dependency, which in turns leads to the emergence of rentier state effects at the national level. |
| Supervisor | Kovacs, Borbala |
| Department | Political Science MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2014/shkaeva_natalia.pdf |
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