

IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO:
CRITICAL VOTERS AND CLIENTELISTIC EFFORTS
ON THE ‘LEVEL PLAYING FIELD’

By

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ABSTRACT

In light of the establishment of an universal ground for comparison of the perceptions of electoral malpractice, this study employs cross-national analysis in order to understand the role of voters' critical reasoning as related to the clientelistic efforts of political elites on the electoral realm. It argues that the clientelistic efforts of political elites are inextricably linked to voters' responsiveness to the particularized offers, and are thus likely to be the object of the lack of critical nature of the latter. The reason in support of this argument is that in a clientelistic setting the relevance of the occurrences beyond the 'level playing field' is more likely to be undermined by the trade-off between the voters as clients, and the politicians as patrons that takes place in the electoral realm. Hence, the perceptions of the electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent would be less likely to go beyond the sentiments regarding the particular clientelistic trade-offs, resulting with alignments among different segments of the electorate that are likely to spur the effectiveness of the clientelistic efforts that recursively infringe upon the critical reasoning of the voters. This hypothesis, together with the alternative explanations of the alignment between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent, is tested and confirmed on a new battery of questions including 20 countries with different levels of democratization. Despite the lack of linearity that the relationship portrays, the various clustering of the countries goes in favor of the proposed pattern. Overall, the clientelistic efforts are found to be negatively related to the critical nature of the voters as indicated by the magnitude of negative association between the vote choice for the incumbent as a function of the perception of electoral malpractice, which suggests a lack of the voters' individual sense for effective connection to the general public on political matters relevant for the legitimacy of the regime as whole.

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INTRODUCTION

‘[M]ass aspirations for democracy are indeed one of the factors which help to catalyze the agenda for successful reform movements and legislative initiatives [] even against elite interests.’

(Norris, 2011:545)

The value of the vote as an effective connection to collective decision making for government formation, assumes free and fair electoral atmosphere that allows the vote to be fairly heard as articulated, and freely articulated as formed. This emphasizes the role of clean electoral process in the legitimization of the government to come. Conversely, any tilting of the free and fair atmosphere, including clientelistic practices (such as ‘direct payments or continuous access to employment, goods and services.’(Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007:2) that distort the ‘level playing field’ mainly in favor of the more affluent would permit illegitimate governance, challenging the general support for the regime. Taking into account that in the language of the democratic theory, everything that distorts the ‘free and fair’ elections is considered a violation of the electoral standards, the clientelistic linkages between the voters and politicians that systematically skew the ‘level playing field’ in favor of the incumbent (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 366) are an electoral malpractice that pressures the need for thorough investigation.

Only recently and generally inspired by the democratic backsliding (Diamond, 2008; Rose and Chin, 1999) and the electoral manipulations (Schedler, 2002) mostly in new democracies, *electoral malpractice* was established as a topic ‘in its own right’ (Birch, 2011). Meanwhile, aiming for the grounding of universal standards for the quality of the electoral

process (Norris, 2012); the Electoral integrity project¹ integrated a battery of questions as part of the World Value Survey. These questions gauge the public opinion in countries representing all the shades of electoral regimes². By unpacking the concept of ‘fairness of elections’ in its constituent elements, precisely composing the integrity of the electoral process in every successive stage of elections as a cycle, this project initially allows clarity, precision and a global ground for comparison of the perceptions of the electoral process. (Norris, 2012). Thus, in light of this new conceptual approach, namely the disaggregation of the electoral integrity and its differentiation from neighboring concepts, more specific understanding of the mechanism of electoral clientelism as connected to the electoral process and the vote, is tenable.

The main line of enquiry dealing with perception of electoral fairness shows that perception of poor quality of the electoral process, in most of the countries is followed by decrease of the voting turnout (Birch, 2010; McCann and Dominguez, 1998). However, elections perceived to be tampered by different clientelistic strategies, instead of decreasing the voting turnout, can also bring to exercise of the ‘free vote’, or voting in accordance with one’s original preference (Bratton, 2008). This means that different clientelistic efforts of the politicians as patrons can be followed by various responses from the voters as clients, depending on the types of civil relationships embedded in a certain context (2008). On top of that, the growing literature on electoral clientelism suggests that the social acceptance of clientelistic practices varies across different cultures as well that taking into account the social desirability bias, poses an additional challenge to studying the perception of electoral malpractices across different social fabrics.

¹ See: <https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/home>

² from matured democracies (such as Australia, Germany, the Netherlands), new and successfully consolidated democracies, (such as Ghana, Estonia, Uruguay) to semi democratic countries where reports signaled different levels of violations of the international standards on elections (such as Nigeria, Ukraine), in addition to the already generated perception of electoral integrity (PEI) expert index.

Acknowledging the need to establish universal pattern that would contribute to shedding a light on the clientelistic mechanism, the initial idea of this study follows the disaggregation of the clientelistic effort of political elites from the will to comply of the voters, as a potential approach to studying electoral clientelism. This approach allows a common ground for cross-country analysis of the clientelistic mechanism as related to the perception of the quality of the electoral process and the individual contribution to the electoral outcome. Since ‘it takes two to tango’, the logic of the thesis seeks to understand the variations in clientelistic efforts across different contexts, as connected to the perceptions and the preferences of the voters, as potential clients, concomitantly involved in the persistence of clientelism. In this framework the questions that seek analytical attention are:

Why are the clientelistic efforts of political elites different in different countries? How are the variations in the clientelistic efforts of political elites explained by the attitudes of the electorate as reflected in the relationship between the way voters perceive the quality of the electoral conduct and their vote choice?

Analysis dealing with the quality of the electoral process, have located the ‘legitimacy gap’ (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Norris, 1999; Tverdova and Anderson, 2003; Cho and Bratton, 2006; Moehler, 2009) showing that the winning majority, the supporters of the incumbent party, is more likely to be satisfied with the performance of the regime in general, including the quality of the electoral conduct (‘the winning effect’). Bearing in mind that the legitimization of the political system in democracy seeks for a general consensus over the rules , in order for democracy to function there should be viable chances for a turnover , and thus losers should not feel excluded from the decision making process (Cho and Bratton, 2006) . Accordingly, ‘support [of the losers] has greater impact on the stability of the [democratic]

regime, than the loyalty of the winners' '(2006: 737). It follows that the balanced evaluations of the quality of the electoral process are an indicator for democratic maturity. This line of reasoning follows the logic of the analysis that detect smaller gap in the levels of political support (i.e. legitimacy gap) between winners and losers in developed democracies as compared to emerging ones(Fuchs et. al 1995).

In like manner, the alignments between the perception of electoral integrity and the vote for the incumbent , can be understood as an allegiance of the winners to the winning party (Tverdova and Andreson, 2003; Moehler, 2009), reinforced by the 'uneven level playing field'. As the logic of this line of enquiry suggests, the 'uneven level playing field' is generally associated with taking advantage of the state resources, for party purposes in time of elections, a phenomena that goes by the name of 'the incumbency advantage'(Birch, 2011:52). Similarly, the threat that the 'incumbency advantage' poses to the quality of the democratic regimes, as specifically entrenched in the electoral (mal) practices, is widely discussed in the literature on clientelism as a non-democratic (not free, nor fair electoral race, or 'uneven 'level playing field') way for generating support, in exchange for particularized goods that allows unresponsiveness of political elites to the demands of the broader public.

Moreover, most of the literature on clientelism, and thus electoral malpractice, is focused on calculating the costs and the positive incentives associated with the feasibility of clientelistic commitment in a particular setting. Regardless of the parsimony introduced by the rational choice institutionalism, as a dominant framework in the analysis of clientelism that settles on the instrumental reasoning of the legislative elites as key actors, the same approach fails to admit the importance of the critical evaluations of the public (Norris, 2011). Likewise, and as argued by Norris(2011), the critical nature of the wider public can be a driving force of changes from

below (also see Birch , 2011: 138-144) different from the stream of actions fostered by the interests of the office-seeking political elites. Thus, the documented influence of the general democratic aspirations on the prospect of agenda-setting (Norris, 2011), implies that the performances of political elites in office, are limited by, and therefore are part of an inextricable relationship with the general public. The following paragraph links the content exposed in the previous three paragraphs as related to the perception of electoral malpractice.

Accounting for the results set forth by the line of research investigating the ambivalent evaluation of the political regime (McCann and Dominguez 1998; Tverdova and Anderson, 2003; Anderson, 2005; Cho and Bratton, 2006; Moehler, 2009) among the winning majority and the losing minority, it follows that the democratic aspirations of the public assume consensual support for the political regimes, despite the status of winner or loser. Translated in the language of the field dealing with the quality of the electoral process, it seems that democratic aspirations seek for independence between the negative perception of the electoral process and the vote choice for the challenger. The last assumes critical voters able to evaluate the electoral process independently of their vote choices.

In order to establish the direction of the relationship to be studied I turn to looking at the relationship between the perception of the electoral process and the vote choice, from the perspective of the latter. The implications are that the vote choice as a preference expression should be based on a wider formation-ground than the mere perception of the quality of the electoral conduct for the electorate in general. In a similar vein, even if the formation-ground of the political preference includes reflections on occurrences outside the electoral realm, a direct clientelistic intervention is likely to influence the preference expression in a different direction than what the original preference of the voter would suggest (on the difference between

preference formation and expression see Birch, 2011 in the following chapter). Taking in consideration the social desirability bias, a client is less likely to admit participation in clientelistic linkage that would, again, suggest a significant alignment between the vote for the incumbent and the positive assessment of the electoral process, as a potential signal for the existence of such a linkage. Indeed, in clientelistic setting voters are more likely to share their votes in accordance to the immediate tangible benefits or particularized promises provided by political elites during the electoral process. Consequently, it is likely that the determination of a significant portion of their vote choice will not go beyond the direction that the electoral trade-offs suggest.

Finally, following the logic of the previous paragraph and the natural sequence of events, the electoral process that comes before voting, the direction of the relationship adopted in this thesis looks to the perception of the electoral malpractice as a potential determinant of the vote choice for the incumbent. While a negative relationship between the perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent would suggest submissiveness rather than critical assessments of the voters, the latter is likely to be signaled in a rather positive relationship, or independence between the two. The last constellation of variables is associated with the voters' sense of effective connection to the collective decision making as a consensus over the democratic principles, and thus a general legitimization of the regime.

Referring to the previous paragraph, I argue that the independence between the perception of the electoral quality and the vote choice, assumes critical reasoning of the voters. Conversely, alignments, or a positive relationship between the perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote for the challenger, suggest dampening democratic aspirations, and thus lower bargaining power that stems from the critical citizenry. It follows that, with the loosening

the limitations on elites posed by the critical voters, the elites' efforts to deter from their democratically prescribed roles, in order to maximize individual benefit, are likely to increase. This includes intensifying of the effort to induce voters with particularized awards in exchange for their votes, as facilitated by the depressing of the critical evaluation of the population that is more likely to comply with the clientelistic commitments.

Alternative explanations of the alignment between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the challenger are likely to be the level of civil liberties and the cumulative modern experience with universal suffrage. Both of these variables, as suggested in the literature (Moehler, 2009, Birch, 2011; Norris, 2011) are likely to increase the critical nature of the voters, establishing a ground for solving the collective action problem that allows a diffusion of the voters' will to withstand (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007), and hence contribute to the increasing of the explanatory power of the perception of the electoral malpractice on the vote choice for the incumbent. Finally, I argue that a positive relationship or the independence between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent in general, indicates party-voter linkages that are not based on particularized goods.

Having settled the body of the main argument I turn to exposing of the importance to grant attention to this topic. Bearing in mind the presented cross-section of neighboring lines of scholarship, there is virtually no cross-national research that presents the role of the critical assessment of the electorate, as articulated in the relationship between their perceptions and preferences, in the pertinence of clientelistic linkages. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the filling of that gap. In addition, the perception of fairness of the electoral process was mostly studied as related to the voting turnout and therefore as a predictor of the political efficacy of the voters (van Ham, 2012), the legitimization of the governing constellation and the

support for the democratic regime. In that line of enquiry, I advance the debate by turning to the vote choice as a dependent variable, while undertaking the challenge to study the perceptions of electoral integrity as extended to the vote choice, integrating the study of electoral malpractice, a call voiced by one of the most prominent names on this relatively young field of electoral malpractice Sarah Birch (2010:1617).

Moreover, and associated with the scant knowledge on voting behavior in the new democracies (as highlighted by Roberts, 2008; Mares and Petrova, 2013) in comparison to the voting behavior literature in the established ones, this study aims to contribute to that line of enquiry as well. Last, but not least, I subscribe to the aim of the Electoral integrity project, in ‘understand[ing] how the public evaluate[s] national elections, and whether ordinary people think that contests in their country meet internationally-recognized principles and standards.’³, by including Macedonia, a case from the overlooked (by the Perception of electoral integrity battery initially introduced in the 6th wave of the World Value Survey) post-Yugoslav space.

The roadmap of this thesis goes as it follows. In Chapter I, the theoretical framework of the study is presented. The clarification of concepts and the state of the field help in the establishment of the theoretical body, on which the theoretical model and expectations build (Chapter II). Chapter III deals with the methodology. The findings and the discussion are delivered in Chapter IV. The last part of the thesis is dedicated to concluding remarks.

³<https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/projects/mass-survey>

CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CONCEPT CLARIFICATION: 'THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD AND THE ELECTORAL CLIENTELISM

1. The definition and the importance of 'the level playing field'

Elections are a mechanism for translation of the public will in seats in parliament and thus the basic democratic instrument in the hands of the voters for keeping political elites in power responsive and accountable (van Ham, 2012: 162). Consequently, the prerequisites that elections as a meaningful competition (Levitsky and Way, 2010:57) encompass are the: *freedom to participate or to be chosen (the candidates) and the freedom to choose (the voters)* (van Ham, 2012). This implies that the *mere installation* of universal suffrage is not a sufficient condition for elections to play their prescribed role.

In this line of reasoning, the concept of 'even level playing field'⁴ articulates the idea that in competitive elections 'there should be no question of any particular group or political party having a greater chance of winning the election than any other group' (Elkit and Svensson, 1997:34-35), as it is referred to the importance of the way elections are conducted, or *their quality*. Correspondingly, elections should be 'free and fair'. Unpacking the concept of 'level playing field' as an indicator of the quality level of elections, I turn to its constituent components, namely 'freedom' and 'fairness'. Hence, in this definition 'freedom' is associated with the *absence of coercion* as absence of choice, whereas 'fairness' is defined as '*people or groups [being given] unreasonable advantages*' (1997:34), where the former is associated with the freedom to choose and the latter, with the freedom to compete.

⁴ initially used for the 1994 South African elections

To conclude, elections should be free and fair in order to serve their role as an instrument for government formation, based on the public will. Given that the electoral ‘fairness’ and ‘freedom’ are interdependent, it follows that an ‘even level playing field’ goes beyond the mere installation of universal suffrage, and thus emphasizes the importance to be free to choose that seeks for a genuine choice allowed by the freedom to compete. Conversely, particularized incentives that skew the ‘level playing field’ in favor of certain candidate are labeled as *unfair* elections, and thus infringe upon the general freedom to choose as well, by lowering the political efficacy of the rest of the electorate, resulting with lower voting turnout (Birch, 2011; van Ham, 2012). , lower the trust in institutions and the support for democracy, to boot.

2. Integrity and malpractice in the ‘level playing field’

In the previous section I discussed the importance of the ‘level playing field’ and concluded that in order for elections to serve the role of democratic instrument and earn the label of ‘even level playing field’, they ought to be ‘free and fair’. In this section I narrow the discussion to the classification of practices that contribute to distortion of the ‘level playing field’ or the quality of the electoral process, by dampening the electoral integrity, and am thus referred to as ‘electoral malpractices’. While doing so I present several approaches on the quality of the electoral process from the existing literature that deal with the topic. At the end, I locate the theoretical framework I adopt, while turning to the scope to be referred to as elections, namely the all-encompassing ‘electoral cycle’ (Norris, 2012).

Most of the existing studies on quality of the electoral process are based on expert's surveys or on monitoring reports⁵. As argued by Norris (2012)⁶, the validity of these studies is susceptible to some type of bias that is generated by the different definitions of the underlying concepts of electoral quality that experts or observers follow⁷. On this point, Birch (2011) proposes a framework for evaluation of electoral malpractices defining it as 'the fail[ure of elections] to embody the popular will' (2011:1), and thus 'the manipulation of electoral processes and outcomes so as to substitute personal or partisan benefit for the public interest' (2011:14). Similarly, she proposes four approaches to defining the concept⁸ one of which the 'best practice' that adopts the international law, an approach that, as she argues, builds on the democratic normative benchmark adopted in her study. The democratic theoretical framework of Birch's (2011) study defines elections as an inclusive mechanism of effective aggregation of policy-driven voting behavior (2011:17-19). Hence, everything that is not included in this definition, for instance clientelism as distribution of particularized awards to induce voting in a particular way or abstaining (2011:94), is considered an electoral malpractice.

It seems that Birch adopts a framework that portraying democratic values and principles as electoral standards deals with broader concerns than the globally indorsed norms do, argues Norris (2013) depicting the need of universal conceptualization of electoral malpractice (and thus electoral integrity), a definition that the international conventions offer. In other words, and as Norris criticism follows, using the principles of liberal democracy in defining electoral

⁵ see Kelley and Kolev (Duke university, 2010): Data on international Elections Monitoring –DIEM and the Quality of elections data; Hyde and Marinov (Yale, 2012): NELDA, The National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy); Birch(2008): Electoral malpractice index).

⁶ See : <https://sites.google.com/site/pippanorris3/teaching/dpi416-home-page/dpi416-power-point-slides>

⁷ For instance, driven by different background agenda (satisfying the donor, type of the observers' training etc.) the domestic observer's reports disagree with the reports from the international actors whose reports (for various reasons, including strategic ameliorating of negative criticism as a prevention from fueling an already fragile political atmosphere, or perceiving electoral irregularities from a western point of view) are concomitantly rather at odds as well (EU, OSCE/ODIHR, IFES, IIDEA etc). (Norris, 2012).

⁸ Legal, perceptual, 'best practice' and normative (Birch, 2011:11)

malpractice is rather ambiguous, as she proceeds, since there is no single definition of democracy, historically, nor cross-nationally (2013:569). On the cross-contextual account, Norris argues that clientelism is a practice that in some countries is considered a legitimate form of political participation, and hence an antonym of electoral malpractice. On this account, Norris builds on Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) that, as interpreted by Norris, point that in some countries delivering public goods in specific constituencies is not only legitimate but expected from the representatives, as well.

On the above presented point, I agree that the shades of malpractice differ on the basis of their legitimacy the common practice shapes that make the concerns about clientelism, analysis of micro or meso level and thus too complex for a tool aiming for universal patterns to capture. In the same vein the understanding of the concept of clientelism seems to leave an open space for several of evaluations and interpretations, a point to be elaborated in the next chapter. Taking in consideration that the analysis focused on the quality of the electoral process aim to shade a light on the causes of the distortion of the 'level playing field' as malfeasances, the implications are that regardless of the legitimacy of the clientelistic practices, clientelism is considered an electoral malpractice, since it contributes to tilting of the 'level playing field', in favor of the more affluent, rather than the most competent as perceived by the general public.

In the above argued line of reasoning it is the political will to induce voters to trade their votes for particularized awards that lands universal ground for comparison, a point taken forward further in this thesis. Indeed, 'global norms of electoral integrity are not necessarily deeply rooted in idealized and abstract democratic theories, nor can be reduced to these principles' (Norris, 2013: 596), a logic that allows disaggregation between the integrity of the electoral

process, the sentiments about the electoral outcome and the clientelistic efforts of political elites as a set of separate variables, whose relationship is yet to be studied.

In the above regard, I adopt the theoretical framework of Norris that conceptualizes electoral integrity as anchored in global norms (for instance, the Universal declaration of human rights, the International covenant on civil and political rights, the OSCE election observation handbook(6th edition), the UN General Assembly resolution 64/155 etc) and stretches it to the whole electoral cycle, accounting for: the electoral laws, procedures, boundaries, voter registration, party/candidate registration, campaign finance, campaign media, campaign financing, the voting process, the vote count, the results and the electoral management bodies⁹. The reason to do so is because of the benefit of the conceptual clarity it allows, while providing me the opportunity to advance the analysis on studying electoral clientelism, as normatively anchored in the democratic theoretical approach of Birch (2011), yet a different concept than *electoral integrity*.

3. Electoral clientelism as the enemy of the ‘level playing field’

As illustrated in the literature dealing with the distortion of ‘the level playing field’ as an electoral malpractice, in the 90s the incumbency of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in *Mexico*, was secured by ‘a vast system of electoral clientelism’, likely to pertain, regardless of the top-down electoral reforms responsible for increasing the costs of its’ maintenance (Birch, 2011: 147-9). In addition, the state concentrated resources and the large rural population, despite

⁹ ‘[t]he unidimensional indices of integrity may fail to capture the full complexity of why elections fail and variety of malpractices[of different level of severity] can be identified ‘(Norris, 2013:572) with unpacking of the concept of electoral integrity to the complexity of issues it represents, that allows precision.

the reported display of relatively high standards of electoral integrity¹⁰, make *Ghana* a fertile ground for vote-buying (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007 as interpreted by Ichino and Schundeln, 2012). It seems that the propensity of voters to defect from clientelistic commitments and articulate their true preferences, as shown in the case of *Nigeria* (Bratton, 2008) depends on the civil liberties, more precisely on the types of relationships allowed by the latter. In a similar vein, the aggregation of the voters' interests is associated to the propensity to solve the collective action problem, the existence of electoral clientelism, as in the case of *Ukraine*, tends to block (Birch, 1997). But what is generally wrong with clientelism?

Clientelism, does not allow equal access to goods, meaning that voters that are part of the patron-client relationship use their vote as an expropriated good in order to sustain the relationship with their patrons from whom they earn protection and help. This gives the instrumental and personalized character to clientelistic voting. In particular, 'if votes are casted purely in terms of the benefits received, then this leaves governing parties free to disregard popular opinion in all policy decisions which do not relate to the direct allocation of resources in exchange for votes' (Hopkin, 2006:13)¹¹.

The reason I find vote-buying and clientelism in general, intrinsically wrong is because the point of democracy is that everyone's perceptions of the common good should be represented and not the more affluent people's perception of their own good. So, democracy is based on absolute political equality differentiated from all the other inequalities including those from the economic sphere. The more affluent people being represented hold the potential to push

¹⁰Retrieved from <https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/projects/mass-survey>

¹¹something that however is practiced in a local level through pork-barrel politics, making it hard to differentiate electoral promises from vote-buying (that intrinsic to the logic of politicians aiming to win/stay in office is considered part of the democratic practices) (for the philosophical debate on promises vs. vote-buying see: Lippert-Rasmussen Kasper, 2011; Stokes, 2007)

democracy backwards to some of the regimes of the authoritarian family. Accordingly, in circumstances where the vote as an equally distributed political resource, is alienated from the voter through economic resources, his choice is no more a reliable representation of his perception of the common good, and therefore it ‘carry[ies] little information about the voter’s interests’(Stokes 2007:90)

Given the reason why the political resources (the vote) should not be blended together with the economic resources in times of elections, as a normative assessment followed in this study I line up with Hopkins’ general evaluation:

‘[M]ass party clientelism on a large scale is ultimately both inegalitarian (because it does not respond to universalistic criteria) and economically unsustainable (because it feeds a continuing demand for redistribution). The case against clientelism as a form of linkage in party democracy therefore remains strong and clientelism is generally an unwelcome phenomenon from the point of view of mainstream normative democratic theory’ (2006:17).

Definitely, where few take part in decision making (like in a clientelistic setting) there is little democracy (Verba and Nie, 1972:1).

Elaborating on electoral clientelism as a type of electoral malpractice (Birch, 2011:13) and in terms of costs and incentives Birch (2011:94) argues that it is more likely for clientelism to be practiced in places where the positive incentives for this kind of politician-voter linkage, overweight the negative incentives. Moreover, the costs to do so are central for the materialization of such a will (2011:2), where the focus turns to the institutional setting (electoral system, political system etc (see Birch, 2008) and the critical citizenry (dissatisfaction with the legitimacy of the regime, see Norris, 2011). When incentives and costs are in favor of practicing

clientelism (high incentives, low costs), the vote choices are likely to be manipulated in the process of preference formation¹² and preference expression¹³(2011:33).

Concerned with the party-voter relationship that revolves around the particularized goods, I am interested in the tilting of the *preference expression* that includes the conscious will of the citizenry to respond to the political will to practice electoral clientelism. Before, dealing with operationalization of such an ambivalent concept like clientelism, the paragraphs below are rendered to clarification of the concept, and thus the nature of clientelism in different contexts.

4. The ambivalent concept of clientelism

In political science clientelism is usually associated with corruption. On clarifying this confusion, McCourt (2000) groups clientelism, patronage(as investigated in Africa by van de Walle 2007) and kinship in what he labels as ‘moneyless forms of corruption’, where corruption is referred as ‘the violation of norms based on a distinction between what is public and what is private’ (Hutchcroft, 1997) that involves public office and resources, and thus accents the position of the incumbent as generally related to clientelistic practices(a phenomena referred to as ‘the incumbency advantage’ in the field examining the quality of the electoral process). Without going deeper in the discussion on the conceptualization of clientelism (for the discussion on conceptualizing clientelism see Hilgers, 2011; for an attentive overview of the operationalization of clientelism see Hicken, 2011), in the following paragraph I present the definition adopted in this study.

¹² media and political campaign

¹³ via particularized goods: carrots or positive incentives(vote-buying) and sticks or negative incentives(coercion, threatening the voter to behave in a certain way)

Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) define clientelism as a *transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods and services*'(2007: 2). This definition accords with the relational tone of the rational choice approach that goes beyond (institutional) structures in understanding the linkages between the electorate and the elected. Acknowledging that Kitschelt and Wilkinson's (2007) approach allows going beyond institutions in analyzing the linkages between voters and politicians, and with an eye on the electoral integrity literature, in this study I follow their conceptualization of clientelism as related to clientelistic efforts.

STATE OF THE FIELD: MERGING THE LITERATURE ON ELECTORAL INTEGRITY, ELECTORAL CLIENTELISM AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

The adopted definition on clientelism in the previous section explains that dampening the clientelistic inclination seeks for overcoming of the voters' collective action problem. Acknowledging that in patronage politics 'the voters problem is how to magnify the value of her vote and ensure delivery, the candidate's problem, is how to magnify the purchasing power of the benefits at his disposal, and how to monitor compliance' (Chandra, 2007:2), the aim of the patron is to prevent the emergence of collective dissatisfaction as a result of oppression and compliance. Hence, the collective action problem emerges when citizens are atomized, and unable to organize against the clientelistic linkages that reverse the accountability. Thus, instead of voters keeping the politicians accountable, the politicians keep the voters accountable. (Stokes, 2005).

Concerning the perverse accountability (Stokes, 2005), it is acknowledged that if the patron does not deliver, the 'reciprocity [may] change to rivalry' (Lemarchand, 1981:10, as interpreted by Auyero, 2008). Namely, studying the increase of both clientelism and protest in Argentina, since 1990, Auyero argues that contestation and clientelism are likely to be in a recursive relationship, instead of excluding each other as the main line of research on the field suggests. He argues that the social ties that are established through clientelistic linkages in *Latin America*, may serve for contestation recruitment, once the brokers included in the relationships breakaway (2008:16). The plausible implication of this analysis is that in some of the countries in Latin America, the voters are likely to be critical about the electoral process, regardless of the pertaining clientelistic linkages. This means that the decreasing of the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent is less likely to be

a direct sign of diminishing of the clientelistic efforts, but rather an indirect accumulation of discontent.

Between ‘old type of clientelism’ and ‘new type of clientelism’, Hopkin (2006)¹⁴ argues that the former is a type of clientelism that encompasses a sense of obligation regardless of the incentives delivered by the patron and it is thus a more culturally embedded practice in comparison to the latter where reciprocating comes in a more narrow way without the sense of obligation encountered by the old type of clientelism. Likewise, one would expect to see, voters being more myopic in countries where the new type of clientelism is present (mostly countries where clientelistic practices are perceived as a socially undesirable practices). The lack of obligation in the type of clientelism, suggested to exist in countries with higher level of democracy, as opposed to the feeling of obligation stemming from the ‘old type of clientelism,’ prevalent in some of the new democracies, does not cancel out the alignment between the perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the challenger as a signal for clientelistic party allegiances(see Tverdova and Anderson, 2003).

Extending the instrumentalist approach represented by Kitschelt and Wilkinson(2007) Greene(2012) in an ample and substantial study building on a survey, ethnographical and experimental data from *Mexico* argues that it is not only the instrumentalist logic of clientelism

¹⁴ He suggested that the latter, unlike the former that mostly focused on institutional transformation, deals with shift in attitudes. The connection between clientelism and voting behavior is brought forth by Hopkin (2006) who discerns clientelism from other linkages of political exchange the democratic theory deals with. In his study he brings evidence that show that the western democracies are less clientelistic than the developing world (2006:8). Likewise, Hopkin defines issue voting as ‘the most distant pattern of electoral exchange from ‘pure’ clientelism’ (2006:12). Issue voting, as a type of voting promoted by the democratic theory, in the literature of voting behavior is analyzed with the building of proximity models dealing with the examination of the distance between the voters and party’s issue position . In terms of issue voting , Hopkin stresses the ‘lacking of ideological identification’ that do not allow building of ‘any kind of emotional ties to the patron party or candidate’’(2006:12). Now, that we defined the contrast of clientelistic voting, we can clarify what encounters for clientelistic voting, according to Hopkin and as described by the populist theories of democracy, more precisely. In the theoretical framework of Hopkin , clientelism is based on selective scope of benefits, rather than club or collective, where collective are the ideal that the democratic theory is inclined towards. Hopkin, also differentiates between ‘old’ and ‘new’ clientelism, where the former nurtures closer and longer relationship, and the latter emphasizing the instrumental logic, represents ad-hoc, shorter and more distant relationships.

that generates obligation and loyalty, acknowledged in the world of politics as reciprocating. Hence, he brings evidence that loyalty and reciprocity can exist even in the absence of selective benefits (necessary for the existence of clientelism), that implies that ruling clientelism out cannot be explained simply by the decline of instrumental gain of some of the agents involved in the linkage, but rather seeks shift in the *civic culture* that is responsible for generating the clientelistic obligation. In the same vein, the transition to accountability (Fox, 1994), from clientelism seeks for transformation of the object of the obligation from the patron, to the others.

Analysis on African countries show relatively different picture on critical voters and clientelistic effort, from that one in Latin America. In a pilot survey of Ghanaian voters (conducted in eight weeks between June and August, 2003) Lindberg and Morrison (2005) bring evidence that the voting behavior in Ghana resembles the voting behavior in established democracies. They come to this conclusion by depicting the percentage of swing voters (20%) (the undecided) whose number, as argued, is sufficient to keep the level of competition. Linberg and Morrison show that the party affiliation of the voters in Ghana is not stable. This implies that various factors are likely to influence the perception of electoral malpractice in *Ghana*, that points that alignment between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the challenger, is possible to be a signal of critical citizenry, and thus pertain a negative relationship with the clientelistic efforts of political elites.

Furthermore, in a more recent study on Ghana, Lindberg (2010) argues that electoral clientelism can undermine itself. Namely, the informal institution of ‘family head’ that is the role of the members of parliament in Ghana, ‘provides everyday tools of shame’ whereas ‘sanction in the formal sense is possible at the ballot box every four years’(2010:136). He argues that the culturally embedded sense of obligation of the patron to deliver can become an effective tool for

democratic type of accountability if civic education and access to information increase with a simultaneous decrease of the poverty rate that makes clientelism a less costly mean for generating support. The implications are that clientelism is likely to be an effective generator of obligation where the institutional matrix lacks strength to do so. However, the positive outcome that clientelistic practices serve in a certain societies in generating particularized obligation necessary for keeping political elites responsive is likely to evaporate in a long run as it simultaneously undermines the accumulation of the individual sense of effective connection with the public good that is the core of the democratic system.

Even though politicians in some cultures are expected to deliver particularized goods, this does not influence the logic and direction of the relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent. Namely, if the voter is satisfied with the trade off, he would be more likely to vote for the incumbent party. However, if there is dissatisfaction with the trade-off it might be so that the voter would give a negative evaluation of the electoral process and still vote for the incumbent, out of feeling of obligation. Since, as argued by Lindberg, the role of MPs in Ghana as family heads is restraining concerning the defection from clientelistic delivery, I would not expect to see many dissatisfied clients whose patron is the incumbent. On the other hand, I would expect to see most of the dissatisfied clients whose patron is not the incumbent party, voting accordingly. This follows the logic of the main line of reasoning in this thesis, being that in more clientelistic countries it is more likely that there will be a negative relationship between the perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the challenger, signaling circulation of clientelistic goods, reinforced by the acceptance of particularized goods, on the ‘uneven level playing field’.

Surprisingly, in a similar study on the voting behavior and vote buying in an African country (*on Nigeria*), using 2007 pre-election Afrobarometer survey data, with questions on the previous 2003 elections, and the upcoming 2007 general elections, Bratton (2008) shows (logistic coefficients) that different combinations of vote-buying and violence coming from opposing parties at the same time, are likely to result with the voters defecting, instead of compiling. The implications are that voters in Nigeria understand the wrongness of vote –buying, as argued by Bratton (2008). Finally, it is likely that the ‘free vote’ that this civil cross-pressures suggest to be the case in Nigeria, would dampen the alignment between perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote for the challenger, however not eliminating the implications of the use of single non-democratic strategy for generating support, that would accord with the anticipated direction between the perception of the quality of the electoral process and the vote choice. In other words, if voters are satisfied with the trade –off (or fearful from the violence) they are more likely to vote for the incumbent. However, if they experience mixed strategies (vote-buying on one side and violence on the other), they would be more likely to give a negative evaluation of the electoral process and vote in accordance to their own preferences.

Finally, discussing about critical citizens and submissive subjects in Africa, Moehler (2009) shows that losers are more likely to defend the legitimacy of the institutions against the manipulations of the political officials. Statistically assessing round 1 Afrobarometer data on 8 African countries, Moehler brings evidence that the winning status is positively associated with the perception of high electoral fairness, as opposed to the losers’ status that is related to perception of low integrity of the electoral process. In general, she concludes that the connection between the winner/loser status and legitimacy passes through the perceived fairness of the electoral conduct. However, as Moehler argues, even if persuaded about the legitimacy of

elections, losers will still tend to doubt the legitimacy of the institutions, while winners may grant too much support to the current government, however not to the democratic institutions in general.

Using cautious language in regard to causality, Moehler suggests that it is likely that individuals perceiving electoral malpractice would switch their allegiance to the opposition. Still, she builds her analysis taking the party support as a determinant of the perception of the quality of the electoral conduct, with a doubt about the direction that, as she elaborates, seeks the use of panel data and qualitative assessment. Nevertheless, the results show that government performance and economic conditions matter more than party affiliation in the determination of the vote choice. This implies that if one is to study the relationship between the perception of the quality of the electoral process and the vote choice, the effect of the party affiliation variable is likely to be in line with the effects of alternative variables suggested in the voting behavior literature, as potential explanatory variables of the perception of the quality of the electoral process and the vote choice. Anyhow, meaningful interpretation of the mechanism between the critical voters and the clientelistic efforts seeks for narrowing the scope of analysis, and thus eliminating potential variables that may inflate the regression predictors, an issue taken further in the next paragraph.

1. Alternative determinants of the vote choice

The literature dealing with the perception of the fairness of the electoral process proposes using the party identification variable as one of the control variables, since according to the ‘sour grape’ hypothesis, one should expect to see the ‘losers’ of the electoral process to give more

negative evaluation of the electoral conduct. However, analyzing data panel covering the period from 1997 to 2001 using logistic models Birch(2010) on the Module I of the Comparative study of electoral systems data , finds no statistical significance of the party support variable, indicating that the winners/losers perception is absent in some contexts.

Still, van Ham (2012:70), accents the importance of the ‘sour grape’ phenomena, and the need to balance the data as well, with the use of balanced sample of voters supporting different political parties when assessing the perception of the electoral integrity. This implies potential threat of endogeneity when studying the relationship between the perception of the electoral conduct and the vote choice. Seemingly, and as Bartels (2002) argues, based on time-series analysis on NES data and dealing with the attitudinal differences between the democrats and the republicans in the US, that partisanship ‘is a pervasive dynamic force shaping citizens’ perceptions of [] the political world’(Bartels, 2002:138) . In addition, Lau and Redlawsk (2001:5) argue that the partisan bias is a mechanism for cognitive saving that leads to giving opinion for political matters ‘by default’ rather than as an outcome for reason in each specific instance.

As opposed to the above presented views, Duch and Stevenson (2013) argue that last minute information can influence the opinion of the voter, and thus change his vote intention on the basis of his sentiments about the momentary perceived state of the economy(that is in question in the particular study) that influences the voting act. They operationalize their thesis by comparing aggregate level measures of economic welfare to perceptions of economic welfare. They see that the perception of economic welfare, rather than the ‘true’ economic state of the country, corresponds to the vote choice intention, in line with the theory on economic voting, namely that voters are likely to punish politicians that have unsatisfactory performance on economic

issues. Hence endogeneity makes no difference in model estimation. Even though, Duch and Stevenson (2013) argue about voting as a punishment of bad economic performance (backward looking), in regard to the partisan bias, it seems that various different variables can contribute to last minute change of mind, equally to the party support, especially in the context of new democracies where the party labels are yet to be established.

As argued in the last paragraph of the previous section, in some countries (like the African countries, see Moehler, 2009) some determinants of the vote choice, like government performance and economic conditions, are likely to be stronger determinants of the vote choice than party affiliation. Thereafter, introduction of the party support variable to the model would suggest that the model should as well equally account for additional potential determinants¹⁵ of the vote choice, an investigation that is beyond the scope of this study primarily interested in the change of the clientelistic efforts as followed by changes in the magnitude of the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent.

2. Critical voters

Arguing on the importance of the critical citizenry and the feasibility of bottom-up reforms, Norris (2011), using binary logistic regression on the second and third wave of WVS, Human development index and IDEA Handbook of electoral system design data, brings evidence that electoral reforms can be predicted by democratic aspirations and institutional confidence. It

¹⁵ For example, the documented influence of the social group (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944), incentives (Downs, 1957, political party's performance (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1981, candidates position on a certain issue (Kim, 2009, distance from the voter's stance (Blais et al. 2004 etc.

follows that the public aspirations are likely to predict institutional changes as associated with ‘bottom-up reforms’ (see: Birch, 2011).

Following this line of reasoning, Tverdova et Anderson (2003), in Large-N analysis using International social survey data, using analysis of variance and logistic regression have shown evidence in favor of the political allegiance between voters and politicians. Namely, and according to the study, even though the perception of corruption lowers the trust in the political system in general, there are notable differences between different segments of the electorate in the perception of corruption and the trust in civil servants, as predicted by party support, suggesting a potential political allegiance, threatening the critical nucleus of the citizenry.

The above presented studies (Norris 2011; Birch, 2011; Tverdova and Anderson, 2003), were mostly dealing with new and established democracies from the European context. Recalling the similar study conducted on eight African countries (Moehler, 2009) from the previous chapter, the allegiance that Tverdova and Anderson (2003) suggest to be the case in mostly European and western type of democracies, Moehler (2009) relates to the submissiveness against the critical reasoning of the voters. Thus, as the logic of Moehler’s analysis puts it, it seems that the supporters of the democratic regime are too submissive and the opponents of it are too critical for the regime to be legitimate. The line of this section shows that it is likely to be so, not simply in African countries, but on a cross-national level. Finally, building on this literature I would expect to see decreasing of the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent that would indicate a critical citizenry, and thus a lower level of electoral clientelism.

Presenting the literature on critical voters and clientelistic efforts, as related to the mechanism set forward in the initial idea, in the next chapter I land attention to the research question and the structuring of the hypotheses, as potential answers.

CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL MODEL AND EXPECTATIONS

To remind, the sub-field of electoral integrity and malpractice has emerged during the last decade with the accumulation of the knowledge from several different fields of study (such as public sector management, political behavior, comparative institutions etc.), ‘generating an important and innovative research agenda with the potential to upend many taken for granted assumptions [by the] traditional micro-level study of voting behavior and the macro-level study of electoral systems.’(Norris, 2013: 570). In addition,

‘Similar analysis [concerned with the relating of the perception of the quality of the electoral process to the voting turnout] could profitably be extended to a range of aspects of political behavior, including vote choice []. Undertaking such a task would provide a much-needed. integration of the study of electoral manipulation and malpractice with the traditional concerns of behavioralists. [In general] this is a field where much work remains to be done’ (Birch, 2010:1616-1617).

Since there is yet not such existing sub-field that would land a firm ground for this idea to be settled, I hereafter, present the most relevant studies from several different tangential sub-fields that are likely to contribute to the investigation of the initial idea. First of all, I turn to presenting of the research question guiding the line of enquiry:

RQ: How do the critical attitudes of the voters as reflected in the relationship between the way they perceive the quality of the electoral conduct and their vote choice, explain the variation in the clientelistic efforts of political elites?

To begin, previous studies that used individual level data focused on assessing the perception of the quality of the electoral process with the voting participation. (Bratton, 1998; Birch, 2010) showed that a positive perception of the electoral conduct is connected to higher turnout. Similarly, negative perception will not lead to voting for the opposition but will lower

the turnout (McCann et al, 1998). Moreover, on this point, analyzing the perception of corruption and the voting behavior in eight *post-communist East European democracies* using module II from the familiar CSES dataset, Kostadinova(2009) brings evidence,(logit coefficients) on the relationship between the perception of corruption in these countries as a determinant of the voting turnout, as opposed to abstention. She finds that there is an indirect effect (path model via political efficacy variable) of perception of corruption on the odds to vote rather than abstain. To conclude, it seems that the different social milieu in Mexico(McCann et al,1998) does not comply with the conventional logic of perception of corruption, as an electoral malpractice and voting turnout, that the sample of few eastern European countries that Kostadinova's analysis (2009) shows. Finally, the different research approaches adopted in these studies, namely, case study time series and cross-national snapshot accordingly, are likely to spur the differences in the results, as well. In order to acknowledge the plausibility of this assumption, in the following paragraph I turn to a study that applies a large-N framework on the topic concerned.

Turning to a broader scope, analyzing data from Module I of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, on 31 cases from multiple relevant surveys conducted between 1996 and 2002, using multilevel modeling Birch (2010) shows that the increase in positive evaluation of the quality of the electoral conduct has a positive effect on the increase of the reported turnout. Additionally she shows that the satisfaction with democracy influences the voting turnout in a same direction. The general satisfaction of democracy implies higher level of democratization. Since the relationship I tend to examine is a combination of two individual level variables, namely the perception of the quality of the electoral process and the vote choice intention. It follows that the influence of satisfaction of democracy on the reported voting turnout, as associated with further support for democracy(McAllister and White, 2011), may as well be

related to the relationship to be analyzed, in a manner that would allow disentangling between the perception of the electoral integrity and the vote choice for the incumbent. Similar logic is presented by Fuchs et al. (1995), who with the use of statistical assessment show that in more democratic countries the ‘legitimacy gap’ between supporters of the non-incumbent parties and supporters of the incumbent parties is smaller.

To advance the understanding of this debate and thus push the concept of *democracy* lower on the ladder of abstraction, I build on a study that was presented in the previous chapter. In an analysis on vote-buying in Nigeria, based on a pre-election Afrobarometer survey with questions on elections covering the time points of 2003 and 2007, Bratton(2008) finds that a specific arrangements between the politicians and the voters stem different outcomes, indicting the need to include a variable on civil liberties when studying clientelism as related to the critical voters. In addition and as Lindbergh (2010), the familiar (see previous chapter) case study of Ghana, argues that the information procurement and civic education are likely to transform the sense of clientelistic obligation in some African societies in an effective tool for democratic accountability. This implies that the level of civil liberties is likely to be an explanation of the alignment between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the challenger. To put it in other words, lower level of civil liberties should suggests less critical voters and thus higher clientelistic efforts. Hence, I hypothesize:

H1: The magnitude of the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent will decrease with the increase of the country’s level of civil liberties.

As Birch (2007), analyzing the electoral clientelism in Ukraine (assessing the profile of the candidates in the 1994 elections, with regression model on electoral support) suggests, ‘the

wide spread existence of electoral clientelism will tend to block the organized integration of civil society into electoral politics by intervening at the grass-roots to co-opt voters and limit their access to structures which would allow them to articulate and aggregate their interests.’(2007:57). this implies that the level of civil liberties is likely to be in a negative relationship with the clientelistic efforts.

On this point, and analyzing the impact of institutions on parties’ electoral linkage strategies, Kitschelt and Kselman (2011) use regression estimators on the Democratic accountability and linkages ¹⁶ data set, to tackle the significance of the impact concerned. In doing so, they take the effort of political parties to make programmatic appeals, as a dependent variable, and type of electoral systems, strategic configuration of the ballot structure, country’s wealth, cumulative democratic experience , freedom and fairness of elections, ethnic divisions and ethnic political parties that mobilize ethnic identities , as independent variables and controls accordingly. They bring evidence that indicate the negative impact of the cumulative experience of voters and politicians with democracy on party’s clientelistic efforts on a national level.

Finally, as suggested by Magaloni (2007), the rule of law, as part of the civil liberties toolkit, seems to play a crucial role in the strategic game of fraud exercised in time of elections by politicians. Correspondingly, elections are less likely to be rigged when ‘self-interested rulers willingly restrain themselves and make their behavior predictable in order to obtain a sustained , voluntary cooperation of well-organized group commanding valuable resources,[the way rule of law emerges]’(Maravall and Przerowski, 2003:3, as interpreted by Magaloni, 2007:47). It follows that:

¹⁶See: <https://web.duke.edu/democracy/>

H1.1: *The country's level of civil liberties will be negatively correlated with the country's level of electoral clientelism.*

Norris (2013), differentiates between first-order (e.g. voters' intimidation with violence) and second-order malpractices (such as clientelistic politics, media, suspicious campaign accounts), explaining that the second-order malpractices, do not necessarily infringe upon civil liberties. In a similar vein, a sufficient condition for the occurrence of uneven 'level playing field' is 'a highly politicized state in which bureaucrats are also party cadres, state properties (business, media outlets) are also party properties and resources from various state agencies are systematically deployed for partisan use.' (Levitsky and Way, 2010:64). The latter implies that if one accounts for the negative incentives (threatening the client with unemployment) of clientelistic politics, they are likely to limit the civil liberties. Even so, it must be notified that, abuses that skew the playing field, such as 'gaining de facto control of the private media via informal proxy or patronage' (2010:63), often do not impair civil liberties, pointing to the latter, as a necessary, yet not a sufficient condition for the negative relationship between the vote choice for the incumbent and the perception of electoral malpractice to decrease.

The electorate learns the rules of the game through successive elections, and it is thus more likely to give evaluations on the electoral conduct separately from the vote choice intention. This assumption is in line with Rustow's dynamic model of democratization (1970) that explains the internationalization of the democratic values or 'habitation', as a result of the repetition of the democratic commitment (1970). More recently, Linberg (2009) suggested a similar notion of dynamic internalization, learning of the electoral standards, as mode of transition to democracy (see also Anderson, 2005). From this line of reasoning, it follows that

with internalization of the democratic values, the scope of the voter is likely to outreach the electoral process. Hence, the perception of the electoral process would lose its explanatory power over the vote choice , implying to intensifying of the critical citizenry, as the experience with modern universal suffrage increases, (as confirmed in the Kitschelt and Kselman 's large-N analysis (2011). It follows

H2: The magnitude of the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent will decrease with the increase of the country's modern experience with universal suffrage.

Controlling for the potential influences of level of civil liberties, as an indicator for democratization, and the extent of modern experience with universal suffrage, my main hypothesis is the following:

H3: The magnitude of the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent will increase with the increase of the clientelistic efforts.

Indeed, 'clientelistic linkages [] are more likely to be consumed, as politicians often have to show their commitments before elections' (Kitschelt and Kselman, 2011:15). It follows that the alignments between the perception of the quality of the electoral process and the vote choice for separate segments of the electorate, is likely to signal a less critical citizenry, associated with higher clientelistic efforts of political elites .

Having presented the main research question and the hypotheses in this chapter II, in the following Chapter III, I turn to presenting of the methodological procedure.

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

1. CASE SELECTION

Following the sample selection of the Electoral Integrity Project¹⁷ of the initially incorporated in the 6th wave of the familiar WVS dataset, the scope of countries this study focuses on is a sample of democracies covering various points on the ladder of democratization. Post-cold war regimes from Africa(such as Ghana and Nigeria), post communist Europe(such as Ukraine and Macedonia), Asia(such as Taiwan and Malaysia), Latin America(such as Peru, Mexico and Columbia), regimes that are merely democratic façade(such as Egypt) and established democracies (such as Australia, Germany and the Netherlands), are included in the study.

Since none of the countries of the post-Yugoslav space¹⁸ was part of the battery and observers and domestic electoral reports dealing with the electoral atmosphere in these countries have reported variety of flaws in the electoral conduct in several comebacks, for the purposes of this thesis the electoral integrity battery was included in a survey conducted in Macedonia. The additional challenge to study Macedonia, as a case overlooked in the literature of voting behavior in new democracies, was the escalating political atmosphere amid which the data was collected(field work took place in the period between 22nd of march and 6th of April, 2014). Namely, the regular presidential elections took place on April the 13th, and only couple of weeks later on April the 27th, the third successive early parliamentary elections was set¹⁹.

¹⁷<https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/home>

¹⁹for further information see: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/116950?download=true> and <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/117636?download=true>

Finally, from the total number of approximately 30 countries (Algeria, Australia, Azerbaijan, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Ghana , Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Taiwan, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen and Zimbabwe) , this study draws analysis on 19 cases from the WVS Electoral integrity battery, together with the additional case of Macedonia. The selection of 19 cases, from all of the 33 cases from the survey, is due to unavailable scores for those certain countries on the concomitant variables essential for the analytical framework of this study.

2. DATA

As suggested by one of the most prominent scholars on this relatively young field,' the development of a good cross-national measure of electoral particularism would considerably improve our ability to measure this important aspect of electoral misconduct '(Birch, 2011:164). To highlight, in a recent qualitative study, based on focus groups in the context of Russia, Wilson (2012) sheds light on the importance to understand the variations of permissiveness of the concept of fairness of elections across-nations. Namely, the generated knowledge from the focus groups shows that Russians have a rather permissive perception of electoral fairness. More specifically, when asked about the fairness of elections, Russians tend to associate the question with their approval of the electoral result, and thus, of their sentiments about the popularity of the regime, in general. Similarly, McAllister and White (2011) have found that when Russians are asked about the fairness of the electoral process, they generally relate to their sentiment about the electoral outcome Thus it seems that the concept of electoral fairness ought to be clarified, so it

would not be left to the free interpretation of the respondents, unlikely to allow universal ground for comparison (Norris, 2012).

Following the need for disaggregation of the concept on its constituent elements, while stretching it to the elections as an electoral process (or breaking it into nine items), inclusive of all the necessary stages responsible for the quality of the conduct, Norris et al. (Electoral Integrity Project) have developed the concept of electoral integrity. The spelling of *fairness of elections*, on the meaningful components of *fairness*, allows overcoming of the limitations generated by the abstract nature of *fairness* in previous studies (Norris, 2012). Incorporating aspects of the whole electoral cycle and articulating the intricate international and domestic laws on elections and human rights in an everyday language, the Perception of electoral integrity battery (PEI) contributed to making the logic of the electoral process' quality more inclusive for the public to evaluate.²⁰ This approach allows me to advance the debate on the perception of electoral integrity to examining the vote choice, with a cautious eye on the ambiguity that simply *fairness of elections* is likely to generate. Thus, a clear differentiation of the electoral process from the electoral outcome, unlike in previous studies, where *fairness* (for example see Sarah Birch, 2010)

²⁰ This novel battery is an indicator for electoral integrity constructed in a way that it reflects the widely recognized international principles and standards on elections and human rights (such as the prohibition of voters' intimidation, the requirements for fair vote tabulation and the establishment of an even playground allowing for the opposition candidates a fair chance to run for office). At the same time, the way that the questions are structured permits a comprehensive communication of these standards that yields for answers more likely to be valid. The approach of the evaluation of the electoral process as a whole cycle, including the pre-electoral period, the campaign period and the polling day together with its' aftermath, prevents the analysis from overweighting the polling day while neglecting the other segments of the electoral process that suppose proper conduct of elections. Obviously, some of the electoral irregularities as manipulations intentionally designed to distort the popular will take place on the polling day and may be rather explicit, such as: ballot-box stuffing, vote rigging, double voting, family voting, intimidation, vote-buying etc. (Kelley, 2010:163). However, much more subtle overture, for example, of the legal framework such as gerrymandering (manipulation of the district boundaries in political advantage in a certain political party), overly-restrictive voter registration requirements or adjustments of the electoral threshold, may threaten the candidate/party fair competition far before the polling day.

was more open to the free interpretation of the public included in the sample, permits divorcing of this concept from other neighbor concepts, such as clientelism and civil rights , or vote choice resulting with the opportunity to study their relationships, without the threat of endogeneity , that breathes down the neck of the social science's quantitative tradition .

Finally, for measuring the relationship between the perception of the electoral integrity and the vote choice I use data from the 6th wave of the familiar World Values Survey (WVS), except for the case of Macedonia, for which an independent survey has been conducted (see details in Appendix II).

Dependent variable

The vote choice in all of the separate cases is recoded to vote choice for the incumbent as oppose to vote choice for the challenger .Bearing in mind the vastly elaborated ‘incumbency advantage’²¹, this way of recoding is suitable for the analysis. The incumbent is associated with the ruling party/coalition at the time when the survey was conducted (the party that won the last elections before the field-work and/or had the majority of ministers in the cabinet²²) and the challenger to all the other relevant parties that took part of the electoral race (see details in Appendix II).

²¹ ‘the bulk of evidence of case studies suggest that incumbent elites and their agents commit the majority of electoral malpractice’ (Birch, 2011: 52)

²² for those countries where the fieldwork was conducted in between the two elections , the incumbent was indicated as the candidate/political party that was on power before the elections

Main independent variable

The Electoral integrity battery²³, is used in order to analyse the public attitudes on the quality of the electoral process the questions included in the 6th wave of the WVS, that serve to structure my main independent variable were indicated in the following questions:

“In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country’s elections?

(Pre-electoral period)

IV1.1 (V228B) Opposition candidates are prevented from running

IV1.2(V228G) Rich people buy elections

IV1.3(V228F). Election officials are fair

(Campaign period)

IV1.4 (V228C)TV news favors the governing party

IV1.5(V228E). Journalists provide fair coverage of elections

IV1.6(V228I). Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections

(Polling day and its aftermath)

IV1.7 (V228H) Voters are threatened with violence at the polls

IV1.8(V228D)Voters are bribed

IV1.9(V228A) Votes are counted fairly

The scale of the variables where higher score indicated higher value of electoral integrity was reversed (for more details see Appendix I). Hence, perception of electoral integrity in the following text is referred to as Perception of electoral malpractice, where higher value on the scale is associated with higher level of electoral malpractice.

²³ <https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/projects/mass-survey>

Controls

Age, level of education and sex, seems to be on the crossing point as explanatory variables of the vote choice when controlling for the effect of the perception of the quality of the electoral process (Bratton 2008; Birch, 2005). Aiming to explain as much as possible of the variation of the relationship in question, I anchor my decision on control variables that allow the most similar ground. [See appendix II for operationalization]. The literature has suggested that older, higher educated men, are more likely to report higher level of electoral integrity (for example see: Birch, 2011, 2010, 2008).

Independent variables

I correlate the magnitude of the relationships between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the challenger of the twenty cases with the levels of democratization. Most of the indices on level of democracy available include more aspects of the vague concept of democracy than the other variables as part of this analysis, would allow me to introduce. Therefore I focus on the civil liberties dimension of democracy, as it follows from the literature presented in the previous chapter. Namely, the basic logic is that the subtle nature of the clientelistic practices, being rooted in the civil society, is likely to originally infringe upon the civil liberties. The Freedom House 2013 index on democratization, allows me to disaggregate the civil liberties from the political rights. In addition, the political rights category being based on an assessment of the three subcategories, namely: the electoral process, political pluralism and participation is endogenous to the electoral integrity battery, and thus needs to be separated from the level of democratization measurement.

In addition, the period that this index covers, overlaps with the period the WVS data was generated, allowing comparability between the electoral integrity& vote choice relationship and the level of democratization. The civil liberties index is structured from expert evaluation on: *freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights*. Expert evaluations are used in the literature for measuring complex issues, such as clientelism and level of democratization (for details see Appendix II)

Since I am interested to include the aspect of electoral clientelism that is driven by the political elites, namely the clientelistic effort in a certain country, the most appropriate indicator that measures exactly this dimension of electoral clientelism, is part of the familiar Duke university dataset on “Political Accountability in Democratic Party Competition and Economic Governance”²⁴(for details see Appendix II).

To gauge the modern experience with universal suffrage I use the data on universal suffrage by Paxton, Bollen, Lee and Kim (2003). The authors develop annual quantitative measures for suffrage from the year of 1950 to 2000, for most of the countries in the world, based on multiple qualitative resources (Paxton et al, 2003). (For details see Appendix II).

3. METHODS

For analyzing the impact of the perception of the electoral malpractice on the vote for the challenger, and given the dichotomous nature of my dependent variable and the continuous of the main independent variable, in this study I use binary logistic regression models. Logistic

²⁴<https://web.duke.edu/democracy/>

regression is widely used in the voting behavior literature where the impact of continuous in combination with categorical variables, or discrete variables, such as the vote choice or voting turnout, is tested.

Correlations are used for testing the relationship between the magnitude of the above elaborated relationship, as an indicator of how critical voters are, and the level of electoral clientelism, modern experience with universal suffrage, and level of civil liberties, separately.

CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

RQ: How do the critical attitudes of the voters as reflected in the relationship between the way they perceive the quality of the electoral conduct and their vote choice, explain the variation in the clientelistic efforts of political elites?

In order to get a sense of the data in Figure I I present the frequencies of the vote choice intention among all of the cases together with the year the fieldwork was conducted.²⁵

Analyzing the Figure1, in majority of the cases the vote choice for the challengers reported is higher than the vote choice for the incumbent party at the time²⁶. According to these frequencies drawn from each country's sample, we can assume that in most of the countries examined there was dissatisfaction with the performances of the incumbent party, reported at the time when the survey was conducted. In continuance, and in line with the basic logic of this study, in the next Figure 2, I present the reported perceptions of the quality of the electoral process for those intending to vote for the challenger, in comparison to the voters favoring the incumbent.

In order to give a clear presentation of the perception of the quality of the electoral process separated by voting intentions, I firstly compute a single variable from the 9 variables composing the Electoral integrity battery. To do so, the negative scales of some of the variables (such as 'opposition candidates are prevented from running', 'rich people buy elections', 'TV news favor the governing party', 'voter are threatened with violence at the polls' and 'voters are

²⁵ The missing data is omitted since I am solely interested in detecting the vote choice for those that reported it as such.

²⁶ The following countries compose the universe of cases Australia, Chile, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Ghana, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Ukraine)

bribed’), were reversed. The Electoral integrity is measured on a 1 to 4 scale, where the increase of the values indicates perception of lower quality of the electoral process. Hence, the perception of electoral integrity variable, hereafter, is referred to as, Perception of electoral malpractice, or PEM. After reversing the scales, I computed the means of perception of electoral malpractice for the voters that intended to give their vote for the incumbent, as opposed to those that reported vote choice for the challenger, for each of the 20 cases separately.

From Figure 2, we can see that the frequencies indicate the differences in the PEM between the supporters of the parties standing on the opposition block of the electoral race. This is in line with what the literature refers to as ‘the legitimacy gap’, or the perception of electoral malpractice is less likely to be predictor for the vote choice for the incumbent. However, no precise conclusions are to be drawn before the statistical assessment.

In order to statistically assess the PEM& vote choice relationship, I run logistic models on all twenty cases separately, for reasons presented in the methodology chapter. The software used is the familiar SPSS. The model tested is:

$$\text{Logit}(VI) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{PEM}) + \beta_2(\text{male}) + \beta_3(\text{age}) + \beta_4(\text{education}) + e$$

Where, VI is vote for the incumbent and PEM is perception of electoral malpractice. The results from the analysis are presented in the Table 1.

I firstly turn to discussing the application of logistic regression as a statistical tool, so that the accuracy of the inferences could be assessed. The logit transformation of the nonlinear (binary) dependent variable with the independent variables allows estimation of linear function between them (Pampel, 2000:18). The caveat of interpreting the log odds, the coefficients from the output of a logistic regression, is rather neutralized with the parsimony of summarizing the

relationship between the variables in a single coefficient. A simpler way to deal with the interpretability of a logistic regression is presenting the odds ratios from the output, the coefficients presented in Table 1(the exponentiated betas) (Pampel, 2000). The logistic coefficients show the change of the odds of having a certain characteristic, in comparison to not having the same characteristic, to a unit change in a certain independent variable, while keeping the rest of the independent variables constant. Taking the vote choice as a function of perception of electoral malpractice, the odds ratios in the table express the change in the portion of the vote for the incumbent with a unit change in the perception of electoral malpractice, while controlling for the remaining set of independent variables. Moreover, the odds ratio being higher than 1 indicates increasing in the chances to vote for the incumbent, in comparison to an odds ratio being lower than 1 that indicates a negative relationship. Finally, an odds ratio of 1 is associated with independence between the independent variable in question and the dependent variable.

Bearing in mind that the results from a non fitting model are less likely to produce a result fitting the sample data representative of the population, I land careful attention to analyzing the model fit of the 20 cases presented above. There are a few statistical diagnostics indicating the model fit of a logistic regression in SPSS. Reporting the significance in logistic regression is not as candid as in linear regression. The p-value provides little information on the relationship tested. Large samples, which are the case of my analysis, can produce significant p-values, for effects that are small (Pamper, 2000: 30-31). Since, the pseudo R-squared (estimation on the linearization of the non-linear regression, the log) in the case of a logistic regression hardly have the exact same meaning of R-squared in linear regression indicating the portion of the variation accounted for in the model and the Wald test is susceptible to rounding errors that

are likely to result with the incorrect test of the null hypothesis, I focus on analyzing the results of the -2log likelihood test that follows a chi square distribution .

The -2log likelihood values of the fitted models being presented in Table 1, in Table 2, I turn to the significance of the difference between the null model (the model containing only the constant) and the fitted model. If the difference is significant, this would indicate the significant effect of the predictors in essentially creating a slightly different model (the observed data and the estimated model are likely to be different).²⁷

The majority the models in Table 2, indicate that the variation of the vote choice explained by the independent variables is unlikely to be due to a chance ($p < .01$). Thus, the null hypothesis indicating that the relationship between these variables does not fit the data, and hence the population, is rejected. The alternative way to interpret the model fit is by looking in the pseudo R-squared. The pseudo R-squared approximate the value of the variation covered for by the model based on the likelihood test. Since the logic of the Cox and Snell's R-squared statistic provides difficulties in interpretation, the Nagelkerke modification that provides values in the range between 0 and 1, is associated with a more reliable values. In the following Table 3, I present the Nagelkerke R-squared values associated with the variation covered by the original model.

In Table 3 we can see that the perception of electoral malpractice explains conveniently high portion of the variation in the vote choice across different contexts. The variation accounted for by the model is notable in: Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Estonia, Poland and Ukraine. Macedonia, Malaysia and Taiwan are the cases where the perception of electoral malpractice

²⁷ <http://www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/mike.cox/III/spss10.pdf>

covers for above 20 percent of the variation in the vote choice that is an intermittent finding the political science scholarship deems notable.

Having dealt with testing of the model fits and particularly, the portion of the variation explained by the models, I turn to interpretation of the coefficients presented in Table 1. The interpretation of these coefficients permits an assessment on the acceptance or the rejection of the first hypothesis. Precisely, I am interested to evaluate the predictive power of the perception of the quality of the electoral process, on the vote choice for the incumbent. Before going further I would like to explain the way the estimates are to be simplified. Pampel (2000:36) suggests subtracting 1 from the exponent and multiplying it by 100 in order to get the estimate of an event occurring. This is the approach followed in the analysis.

From Table 1, we saw that the slopes of the independent variable associated with insignificance ($p > .05$) indicating independence between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent. However, even in these cases the relationship goes in the assumed direction. Namely, the perception of high electoral malpractice implies lower chances to vote for the incumbent. The odds ratio being smaller than 1 indicates negative relationship, meaning that the odds to vote for the incumbent decrease for each unit increase in the perception of electoral malpractice, as opposed to voting for the challenger. The countries discussed are the following: Australia (OR=.77), Colombia (OR=.58), Pakistan (OR=.87), Peru (OR=.90), the Philippines (OR=.77) and Uruguay (OR=.52), where there is no significant relationship between the perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent.

As for the rest of the countries, the analysis of the sample resulted with evidence (passing the conventional level of $p < .05$) that emphasize the role of perception of the electoral malpractice in determining the vote choice for the incumbent. For instance, with 99.9 % ($p < .001$)

of certainty we can say that the odds for voting for the incumbent, as oppose to voting for the challenger, in Poland, Taiwan, Ukraine, Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Ghana , Macedonia and Malaysia get lower with a unit increase in the perception of electoral malpractice of the population. In addition, with 99% ($p < .01$) percent of certainty the same can be stated for Mexico and the Netherlands. Nigeria meets the certainty of 95 % ($p < .05$), accounting for the social controls.

The value of the variation covered by the model (see Table 3) is worth to be mentioned for: Chile (13 %), Egypt (15 %), Estonia (16 %), Poland (11%) and Ukraine (17 %). A special note should be accorded to Malaysia (26%), Taiwan (20%) and Macedonia (30%) having the highest variation in the vote choice covered for by the model. In logistic regression, it is the magnitude of the relationship that deserves more attention, rather than the denoted significance of the slope. In order to render more understanding to this relationship along the cases in Figure 3 I present it visually.

From Figure 3 we can see the odds to vote for the incumbent as opposed to voting for the challenger with a unit change in the perception of electoral malpractice. The relationship is negative because the odds to vote for the incumbent increase for a factor higher than 60 for the population in Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Macedonia, Malaysia, Poland, Taiwan and Ukraine, perceiving lower electoral malpractice. The countries where the magnitude of the relationship is widest are Macedonia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Ukraine. For instance, the odds to vote for the incumbent in Malaysia, rather than for the challenger, are 93 times higher for a voter that perceives lower electoral malpractice. In Taiwan the odds to vote for the incumbent, as oppose to voting for the challenger, increase by a factor of 90 for a unit decrease on the perception of electoral malpractice variable. In the case of Ukraine the vote for the incumbent

decreases 88 times, in comparison to the vote for the challenger, with a unit increase in the perception of electoral malpractice, controlling for the other variables. The same is for Macedonia, where the odds to vote for the incumbent, rather than for the challenger are 84 times higher for those that perceive lower electoral malpractice. The magnitude of this relationship is not negligible in Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia and Poland as well (see Figure 3).

The quality of the electoral conduct, being the channel which should not lead the voters astray in granting the elites with a power to govern, seems to have a statistically significant ($p < .05$) predictive power in explaining the voters' preferences in most of the cases. Going back to the theoretical premise, it seems that the voters are considerably biased in giving their evaluations of the electoral process. In doing so, the evidence from the sample shows that voters give their sentiments about the electoral outcome instead of an assessment of the implementation of the process as such, when asked for their evaluation of the electoral process. This raises a concern about the disaggregation between the state apparatus and the political parties in the perception of those (the voters) responsible to monitor the performances of the institutions that create the electoral atmosphere.

To test the Hypothesis 1: *The magnitude of the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent will decrease with the increase of the country's level of civil liberties*, I use the 2013 Freedom House index on democracy. Precisely, I use the Civil liberties scores, delivered by expert's assessments on: freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights. In this dataset, the numerical ratings range from 1 to 7, where 1 is 'most free' and 7 is 'least free'

In Figure 4, ‘odds’ are the odds to vote for the incumbent, as oppose to voting for the challenger, with a unit decrease in the perception of electoral malpractice. ‘CL’ is a notation for level of civil liberties. The relationships are assigned with a negative sign because the relationship between the vote choice for the incumbent and PEM, as expected by the first hypothesis, is negative in all of the cases. According to the first hypothesis, we would expect to see the magnitude of this relationship to decrease (get closer to 0), as moving from the highest level of civil liberties (1), towards the lowest level of civil liberties(7). In other words, the theoretical expectations would suggest clustering of the cases in the first quadrant (up left) and in the fourth one (down right). This means that moving from the countries with higher level of civil liberties towards the countries with lower level of civil liberties, the critical nature of the voters is expected to decrease.

The correlation between the odds and the level of civil liberties ($r=.12$), does not pass the conventional threshold. It seems that the direction of the correlation between the level of civil liberties and this relationship does not comply to the one theoretically expected. So, instead of seeing the odds to vote for the incumbent, as opposed to the challenger, decreasing as moving towards the lower levels of civil liberty, we see the opposite. *Namely, as the level of civil liberties decreases the magnitude of the negative relationship between the perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent decreases ($R\text{-squared}=.015$).*

In addition, and as we can see from Figure 4, the relationship between the odds and the level of civil liberties is far from linear. This suggests that the pattern portraying the move from dependence of the vote choice on PEM towards independence is likely to take a different shape rather than the straight forth linear one. To put it more simply, the path to critical voters does not linearly go through the establishment of civil liberties. However, the possibility of a different

pattern explaining this relationship along different contexts is not ruled out. Nevertheless, the observed evidence lead to the rejection of Hypothesis 1: *The magnitude of the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent will decrease with the increase of the country's level of civil liberties.* (See Figure 5)

The time of introduction of the universal suffrage, as we know it today, may be an alternative explanation (see Figure 6), for the rise of the critical voters. By this I mean that it is possible that people that were exposed to the full universal suffrage longer are more likely to report vote choice intentions independently from their evaluations of the electoral process.

I expect to see the relationship between the vote choice and PEM to get weaker as the actual experience with the universal suffrage in a certain country increases. The correlation between the magnitude of the relationship and the experience of universal suffrage above the score of 90, intensifies but still does not meet any statistical significance ($r=.38$). This correlation is considered rather moderate in the social sciences.

The experience with universal suffrage contributes to the increasing of the R-squared for about 13 percent, from what the R-squared was for the relationship between the level of democratization and PEM& the vote choice. It seems that the universal suffrage covers for higher portion in the variation of the magnitude of the vote choice & PEM relationship that means that it is likely that the experience with universal suffrage contributes to the disentanglement of the perception of the quality of the electoral process and the vote choice. This means that voters become more critical as their experience with modern universal suffrage raises.

When we go back, to Figure 5 and analyse the possible patterns, bearing in mind the experience with universal suffrage, we can see that all of the countries in the first cluster have

more than 50 years of experience with universal suffrage as described by the democratic theory (Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Uruguay and Ghana). The countries that have the amount of modern experience with universal suffrage, as we know it today, and are not part of these cluster are: Poland, Pakistan, Malaysia, Egypt and Colombia.

Poland (62+) is part of the second cluster, together with Chile (30 years) and Estonia (20 years). Moving towards lower levels of civil liberties, the ‘experience with universal suffrage’ variable becomes quite meaningless in the explanation of this possible pattern. For instance, Malaysia is one of the countries with the highest experience with universal suffrage, and yet it is the case where the perception of electoral malpractice has high predictive power for the vote choice. On the other hand, it seems that the 30 years of experience with universal suffrage, regardless of the status of a ‘semi-democracy’ (score=3 on civil liberties) contribute to disaggregation between the vote choice intention and the perception of the electoral process in Peru.

However, the 13 percent increase in R-squared suggests that the modern experience with universal suffrage can explain a moderate portion of the variation in the magnitude of the relationship between the vote choices. This goes in favor of the theory explaining that the meaning of the democratic electoral process can be adopted by repetition of successive elections. Hence Hypothesis 2 does not need to be rejected: H2. *The intensity of the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent will decrease with the increase of the country’s modern experience with universal suffrage.*

From Figure 7 we can see that the relationship between clientelism and PEM& vote choice is not linear. The correlation between the ‘odds’ and electoral clientelism ($r=-.09$) is lower than the one between the magnitude of the relationship and democracy. However, the direction

of this relationship goes in the way expected by the third hypothesis. In other words, the predictive power of PEM slightly increases as moving from less towards more clientelistic countries. This means that H3: *The magnitude of the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent will increase with the increase of the clientelistic efforts*, needs not be rejected.

Turning to the relationship between the odds, the level of democratization, the modern experience and the political will for electoral clientelism, I turn to Table 4.

Analyzing Table 4, we can see that as the political will to practice electoral malpractice increases (positive scale), the civil liberties significantly decrease (.73**). This means that H1.1: *The country's level of civil liberties will be negatively correlated with the country's level of electoral clientelism*. needs not to be rejected.

Overall, from Table 4 we can see that the relationship between the vote choice and the perception of the quality of the electoral process is most likely to be explained by the modern experience of universal suffrage that expectedly, negatively correlates with the clientelistic efforts. The political will for electoral clientelism, obtains negative relationship with the alignment between the vote choice for the incumbent and the perception of the electoral malpractice. Even though the relationship between the political effort for electoral clientelism and the civil liberties moves in strong negative trend, the level of civil liberties does not follow the theoretically expected relationship with the magnitude of the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent.

Clustering the countries

From Figure 8 we can see that the cases with the lowest magnitude between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent (the cases with statistically insignificant slopes) are Peru, Pakistan, the Philippines, Australia, Columbia and Uruguay. Even though Ghana, Mexico and Nigeria are in between both of the groupings, they show significant model. It is possible that in Ghana and Nigeria, the education variable that shows significance, influences the inflation of the PEM slope. In the following sections, I turn to depiction of a pattern in the results, by comparison of means between clusters.

The average score of civil liberties of all the cases where the perception of electoral malpractice showed independence from the vote choice (Australia, Columbia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines and Uruguay) is 2.8. On the other hand, the average civil liberties score of the 6 cases where PEM showed the strongest predictive power in the explanation of the vote choice (Malaysia, Taiwan, Ukraine, Macedonia, Estonia and Egypt), even though higher (less civil liberties) it does not differ much from the average of the former cases ($M=3$). This means that the increase of civil liberties goes in favor of differentiation between the evaluation of the political atmosphere (media coverage, electoral administration, electoral malpractices in the polling station etc.) and the political preferences, pointing to increase of the critical nucleus in the citizenry.

Turning to the modern experience with universal suffrage variable, the average of the same group of countries with strongest PEM & vote choice relationship is around 28 years. On the other hand, the same score of the other group of countries is above 51 years, pointing to a conclusion that the repetition of elections contributes to critical reasoning. Looking in the group

of these countries, we see that the label of democratically better performing countries does not fit the all of the cases. For example Columbia, Pakistan, Peru and the Philippines, having civil liberties scores form 3-5, are partly free, semi-democracies. So, it seems that the disaggregation between the perception of the electoral process and the vote choice cannot really be ascribed to the level of civil liberties.

Other countries that have similar civil liberties score, such as Macedonia (3), Egypt (5) and Mexico (3), as the four above mentioned, have significant relationship between the vote choice and PEM. The question that comes next, is, *what makes these countries (Columbia, Pakistan, Peru and the Philippines) different from the rest? Their scorings on civil liberties show that it is not democracy that contributes to the critical reasoning of the voters.*

Even though the overall evaluation of the electoral process is highly negative in the above discussed countries, for example, like in Nigeria (see Figure 2) it seems that voters in Nigeria link their voting preference with the electoral apparatus, counter to what the democratic theory would suggest. In addition, the case of Columbia and Nigeria, are quite similar on the perception of electoral malpractice overall, the civil liberties and the electoral clientelism variable. The only thing that differentiates them from the variables concerned, is the experience with modern universal suffrage, the first has more than 50 years experience with universal suffrage, and the second much less(31 years). This would suggest, as discussed in this chapter, that the repetition of the electoral process, matters for the increase of the critical reasoning of the voters.

With regard to the third variable of electoral clientelism, the top group (Columbia, Peru, Pakistan, Philippines, Uruguay and Australia) average on electoral clientelism is 3. The bottom group (Malaysia, Taiwan, Ukraine, Macedonia, Estonia and Egypt) average is 3.3. The difference of .3 suggests that the increase of the clientelistic effort of political elites is likely to

be explained by the entanglement between the evaluation of the electoral process and the vote choice. Bearing in mind that the scale ranges from 1-4, a difference of .3 means much more than a difference of .2 (the difference between these groups on the civil liberties scale) on a scale ranging from 1-7. This suggests that the variations in electoral clientelism can be explained by the increasing of the critical reasoning of the voters.

Turning to the correlation between civil liberties and the electoral clientelism we can see (table 4) that they substantially and statistically correlate in the theoretically expected direction, namely the increase in the effort of electoral clientelism does go in hand with the decrease of civil liberties. Yet, the civil liberties variable as an indicator for democracy does not go in the theoretically expected direction with the relationship between PEM and the vote choice for the incumbent. However, when we see the differences between the top group and the bottom group of countries we can see that the civil liberties variable is lower for .2 in the bottom group, in line with the theoretical expectations. This suggests that the linearity of the relationship is tilted between the top and bottom groups of electoral clientelism, on the civil liberties variable.

Pursuing this path of reasoning, for instance in Germany and the Netherlands have the highest scores on civil liberties, the lowest on electoral clientelism, they both have long modern experience with universal suffrage and yet the evidence show that there is an alignment between the perception of electoral process and the vote choice there. In the case of Australia, on the other hand, the civil right and experience with modern universal suffrage is similar to Germany and the Netherlands. The level of electoral clientelism in Australia is higher, and yet citizens seem to assess the electoral process as a democratic mechanism, rather than entangling it with their sentiments about the electoral outcome (in correspondence with the expression of their political preferences). This suggests the existence of another intervening variable that has a

stronger contribution to the disentanglement between the vote choice& PEM in addition to the effort for electoral clientelism. The possible explanation, as explained by the literature on clientelism, is likely to be that regardless of the political efforts to practice electoral clientelism in certain countries, the costs to do so are higher (Birch, 2011). This would imply that the Australian electorate is more critical, as related to the institutional matrix being sensitive to manipulations. This is possible to explain the rather impartial assessment of the electoral process of Australian voters, and the more biased one in Germany and Netherlands. As we can see, going back to Figure 2, that the evaluation of the electoral process in Australia is in general more negative, than that one in Germany and the Netherlands. Yet, the political perceptions of the voters in Germany and the Netherlands are less critical.

When analyzing Australia in comparison to Uruguay (both of the countries show electorate's perceptions stipulated by the democratic theory), we can see that they are the most similar cases with the same level of civil liberties, electoral clientelism, experience with modern universal suffrage and relationship between the PEM and the vote choice for the incumbent. Looking at Figure 8, we can see that Uruguay differentiates from Chile on the modern experience with universal suffrage variable that is likely to contribute to the different outcome namely associating the electoral process with the voting intention in Chile, as oppose to Uruguay. Looking in the Latin American countries, we can see significant effect of the electoral clientelism variable between Ecuador and Chile, that are same on the other variables, meaning that it is possible for this variable to explain the differences in the Latin American space , in addition to the modern experience with universal suffrage one. Turning to Ecuador, Columbia and Mexico, Columbia has the lowest level of civil liberties and yet the electorate in Columbia seems to be critical. The possible explanation in this case seems to be the longevity of the

modern experience with universal suffrage that appears to be a significant variable, once again. However it may be so that the critical reasoning in the particular context of Latin American countries, does not diminish the level of clientelism, but is in a coexistence with it, as associated with Auyero's suggestions on the recursive relationship between contestation and clientelism in Latin America (2008).

Likewise, comparing Pakistan and Egypt, we can see that Pakistan has slightly more modern experience with universal suffrage, and slightly less with electoral clientelism. Turning to the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan, the Philippines have the highest level of electoral clientelism from all of the cases I examine and still it seems that the electorate in the Philippines has the perceptions assumed by the democratic theory in contrast to the voters in the other two, where the electorate seems to associate the political preferences with the electoral process the most in comparison to all of the countries examined. The only explanation of the above presented constellation is that it is likely that the impact of the effort engaged in electoral clientelism on the voters' perceptions has a curvilinear shape. This means that it is possible that above a certain threshold it seems rather autistic not to report obvious electoral malpractices, resulting with dampening the negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent.

Looking at the high level of civil liberties in Ghana, in comparison with Nigeria, it, again, seems that the level of civil liberties as an indicator for democratization, cannot explain much of this 'myopic behavior' of the electorate (of the overlap between the vote choice and the democratic apparatus). Diligently scrutinizing the differences between these countries on the variables included in the study, it seems that slightly less effort of electoral clientelism and much lower level of civil liberties is associated with a slight decrease of the magnitude in the

relationship between the vote choice for the incumbent and PEM, in Nigeria, suggesting that the civil liberties variable might as well have a curvilinear relationship with the entanglement between the electoral apparatus and the vote choice.

Looking at the results from the post communistic countries as Estonia, Macedonia, Ukraine and Poland we can map the post-communist effect there, suggested by the literature on personalized politics as the outcome of the communist political culture facilitated by the fragile institutions (Ledeneva, 2004; Tucker, 2007). There is a clear pattern in this group of countries. Macedonia and Ukraine in comparison to Estonia and Poland (1) have lower score of civil liberties (3). The modern experience with universal suffrage seems to have an impact in this constellation. Namely, Macedonia and Ukraine, being same on the civil liberties variable, slightly differentiate on the modern experience with universal suffrage variable that makes the magnitude of entanglement between the vote choice for the incumbent and the PEM in Macedonia lower, even though the level of electoral clientelism there is somewhat higher. The different mechanism of interaction between the experience with universal suffrage and clientelistic effort variables is likely to contribute to a lower magnitude of the relationship between the vote choices in Macedonia than in Ukraine. Bearing in mind that the case of Macedonia is based on a representative, but yet different sampling procedure and source, the counterintuitive smaller magnitude of this relationship, is likely to be explained taking this note into consideration. The comparison between Estonia and Poland suggests the same trend. It seems that the clientelistic effort gets lower in these countries and goes in line with the increase of the civil liberties, as the experience with universal suffrage rises.

Lastly, I present the final approach that lands more serious attention to the main underlying explanation of the relationship between PEM and the vote choice for the incumbent,

the clientelistic efforts. Clusters are constructed of groups on the clientelism variable. Accounting for the number of cases (20), I take the 5 best performing countries on the electoral clientelism variable (lowest score on electoral clientelism) and the 5 least performing cases on the electoral clientelism variable (highest score on electoral clientelism). This leaves an equal number of countries in the middle, resulting with a proportional assessment of the cases.

According to the above explained logic, the most clientelistic countries are: the Philippines, Egypt, Macedonia, Ecuador and Taiwan. Landing careful attention, one can see that the mode that this sample indicates is the score 3, for the majority of the cases (Macedonia, Ecuador and the Philippines), with Egypt having the score of 5 and Taiwan of 2. Assuming that Egypt and Taiwan are outliers, all of the other cases that have a 3 score on civil liberties, have modern experience with universal suffrage of less than 50 years as well. Following the line of the theoretical expectations, the magnitude of the relationship between the vote choice for the incumbent and PEM decreases together with the electoral clientelism in the case of Ecuador. However as the level of clientelism raise in the Philippines the magnitude of the relationship between the vote choice& PEM, decreases to insignificance, regardless of the same level of civil liberties of 3.

When we expand our scope, accounting for Peru, that has a civil liberties score of 3 as well, it seems that we can map a pattern of the magnitude of the relationship between the vote choice and PEM decreasing, with the decrease of electoral clientelism, keeping the civil liberties on the level of 3, partly free (semi-democracies) and the amount of modern experience with universal suffrage below 50 years. The Philippines being an outlier from this trend with the highest level of electoral clientelism, points to the likelihood of the nonlinearity between the magnitude of the relationship between the vote choice& PEM and electoral clientelism. In other

words, it seems that we can refer the voters as critical, in most and least clientelistic countries with modern experience of universal suffrage of less than 50 years.

Including the fifth case ranked with 3 in the civil liberties index, Ukraine, we see that Macedonia and Ukraine are the most similar cases from the bottom 5 cases where the electoral instrument is associated with the electoral choice. The last case with civil liberties of 3, Mexico, goes in the same direction. Accounting for the Philippines, it seems that in semi-democratic societies(score 3 on civil liberties) , with less than 50 years of modern experience with universal suffrage, the increase of the clientelistic efforts is associated with the decrease of the critical voters.

From the Figure 9, we can detect a pattern among the countries discussed in the previous paragraph. Since the assumption was that after a certain threshold the relationship between the vote choice and PEM and the electoral clientelism becomes curvilinear, the Philippines is likely to be beyond that certain threshold , where the electoral clientelism is highest and the magnitude of the relationship between the vote choice& PEM starts increasing again. Excluding the Philippines from the analysis based on this assumption, while testing for linearity, the correlation between the relationship and the electoral clientelism is .75 that is considered an exceptionally strong relationship. However, since the number of cases is very small (5 cases), the correlation score does not meet the conventional level of $p=.05$.

Finally, I turn to the 5 countries labeled as least clientelistic: Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, Uruguay and Poland. We can see that all of this countries are considered the most democratic (score for civil liberties=1). The other similar characteristic of these cases is the amount of modern experience with universal suffrage. Namely, they all have above 60 years of modern experience with universal suffrage. However, Pakistan has modern experience with

universal suffrage of above 60 years as well, and yet has a score of 5 on civil liberties, indicating the lowest level of civil liberties from the whole universe of 20 cases. This would suggest that modern experience with universal suffrage above 60 years is necessary, yet not sufficient condition for the disaggregation between of the vote choice& PEM relationship, that is associated with the decrease of the clientelistic efforts of political elites. A need for careful examination of the variation of the magnitude of the vote choice& PEM relationship as related to the level of electoral clientelism, lands a space to the following Figure:

In Figure 10, we can see that the magnitude of the vote choice for the incumbent & PEM relationship decreases with the decrease of the level of electoral clientelism in the least clientelistic democracies as well. The pattern in these cases seems to have the same non-linearity as in the case of semi-democratic countries.

To summarize, in this chapter, I generated the data results in building a theory around the findings. In that respect, I firstly separated the cases between cases with the lowest magnitude of the PEM& vote choice for the incumbent relationship and cases with the highest. I did this in order to ponder the weight of the variables of electoral clientelism, civil liberties and modern experience with universal suffrage on the magnitude of the relationship examined. Secondly, I separated the cases in most similar clusters, according to geographical and socio-historical characteristics. Lastly, I grouped them into most extreme cases on the clientelism variable, and cases with the lowest level of clientelism, in order to delve into their attributes through the lens of electoral clientelism as the most viable explanation reflecting in PEM& vote choice relationship, as an indicator for the level of criticism among voters.

Furthermore, by separating the cases in the above explained logic, I gave a separate scrutiny to each of the mean of each of the variables in the groups, respectively. The difference

of the means of civil liberties between the groups has shown that the level of civil liberties increases by .2 in the group where the magnitude of the relationship is the lowest. Although this goes as theoretically expected, the .2 difference suggests that it is likely for the scale of democracy not to account for the disaggregation between the vote choice and the perception of the electoral process, resulting with it having a lower explanatory power. Turning to the ‘modern experience with universal suffrage’ variable, I noticed that the decrease of the PEM& vote choice relationship is associated with higher modern experience with universal suffrage. Bearing in mind that the average modern experience with universal suffrage in the first group was 28 years and in the second 51 years (almost 50% EUS in countries where the electorate differentiates the voting preference from the evaluation of the electoral process), it seems that the EUS variable (modern experience with universal suffrage) is likely to explain more than the civil liberties one.

Comparing the EUS variable of the ‘lowest magnitude of the relationship’ group, with their level of civil liberties, we saw that the level of democratic development loses its explanatory power, since the countries in this group vary from 3 to 5 (score on civil liberties). Consequently, the modern experience with universal suffrage variable emerges as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the disaggregation between the vote intention and the evaluations of elections as a democratic instrument. Finally, turning to the electoral clientelism variable, the difference between the means of the extreme cases on the vote choice& PEM variable (.3) shows slightly similar score as the difference on the civil liberties variable. However, since the electoral clientelism scale ranges from 1 to 4 (in comparison to 1-7 of the civil liberties scale), this slightly higher score on electoral clientelism, and lands higher likelihood to the electoral clientelism to relate with the level of criticism, stronger than the civil liberties variable. In addition, the

significant correlation between the civil liberties and the clientelism variable($r=.7$) indicates that a crumple entwining between the civil liberties variable and the electoral clientelism one , fills the space between the extreme groups on the ‘magnitude of the relationship’ variable.

The comparison within the Germany, Netherlands and Australia group showed the possibility of the existence of an intervening variable that is likely to explain the higher electoral clientelism in Australia regardless of the lowest PEM & vote choice magnitude. The viable nature of this variable suggested a further extension of the research path towards: critical electorate, sensitive institutional matrix, socio economic factors and nationalistic rhetoric of the incumbent party at the time. Yet, again, the civil liberties variable did not prove sensitive to the PEM& vote choice relationship in this cluster. Simultaneously, the Latin American, Arab, Asian, African group of countries suggested the importance of the EUS and the electoral clientelism variable, pointing to the potential curvilinear nature of the electoral clientelism and the civil liberties variable. The post communist group of countries confirmed the post-communist effect on particularization of the politics, where all the variables go in the expected direction

The last approach to building of a theoretical body was to see the cases through the lens of electoral clientelism in structuring the causal mechanism. The trajectory of differentiating most clientelistic from least clientelistic countries calved the grouping of the cases in those with score 3 on the civil liberties variable, and the rest of least clientelistic countries. Thereafter, a clear pattern transpired. For instance, all of the partly free countries (score 3), have EUS of less than 50 years and the magnitude of the vote choice& PEM relationship goes in line with the decrease of electoral clientelism there to a certain point, suggesting a curvilinear association between the electoral clientelism variable and the vote choice& PEM relationship. The examination of the most clientelistic countries points to a similar pattern. They all have EUS of

more than 60 years and a civil liberties score of 1. However, the outliers from the former group and the country (Pakistan) with more than 60 years of EUS sheds a light on the 'modern EUS' variable, controlling for civil liberties, as a necessary but not sufficient condition in the differencing between the vote choice and the perception of electoral malpractice (PEM). Keeping the level of civil liberties constant, the level of electoral clientelism is reflected in the variation in the magnitude of PEM& vote choice relationship.

The inability of the civil liberties variable, as an indicator for democracy, to grasp the critical nature of the voters, as the central agents of the democratic process in the evaluation of the democratic atmosphere, spells out the need for a better conceptualization of the indicators gauging the level of democracy. The necessary conditions of high modern experience with universal suffrage and low level of electoral clientelism, identified with disentanglement of the political preferences from the political perceptions, may amalgam the construction of such a democratic indicator. Nonetheless, the necessary conditions of high modern experience with universal suffrage and low level of electoral clientelism in the disentanglement between political perception and the political preferences, bringing a country higher on the ladder of democratization, deem further comparative qualitative assessment.

CONCLUSION

It goes without saying that there is no democracy without elections, but that elections can exist in a non-democratic political setting as well. Thus, in unpacking the concept of democratic elections, the classical democratic theory portrays voters as central actors of the democratic system with a developed sense for effective connection to the collective decision making associated with the persistence of the democratic regime. Granting value to the vote, assumes ‘even level playing’, that would allow free and fair competition between the political parties, and thus a genuine choice for voters, expected to deliver their votes with the eye on the public good. Conversely, any particularization that permits privileges for certain political candidates over others in the electoral race, would suggest undermining the notion of equality that is the base of the political right to vote. The undermining of the notion of political equality, as reinforced and reflected in the skewing of ‘the ‘level playing field’ ‘mostly in favor of the incumbent (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 366), garners support on the base of clientelistic linkages, whose exclusive nature does not echo the democratic premise of the rule of the people. For instance, the voter’s concern becomes how to increase the value of the vote by delivering in exchange for particularized goods. Thereafter the candidate is concerned with the increasing of the effectiveness of the ‘purchasing power of the benefits at his disposal’ and the monitoring of compliance. (Chandra, 2007:2) that accumulates a type of ‘perverse accountability’ where voters are kept accountable (Stokes, 2005) alongside with their vote that ‘carry[ies] little information about the voter’s interests’ (Stokes 2007:90).

The aim of this study was to shed a light on the causal mechanism behind the variations of the clientelistic efforts of political elites in different countries as related to the critical reasoning of the voters. Acknowledging that democracy assumes general consensus over the

rules of the regime, or legitimate governance, the main argument of this thesis associates the increase of the voters' critical assessment with the decrease of the magnitude of the negative relationship between the perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent. In other words: *the evaluation of the electoral process should be based on the generally accepted rules of the regime, rather than particularly preferred political options*. I thus, argued that such a critical reasoning encompasses unresponsiveness to the clientelistic efforts of political elites that are likely to be associated with the decrease of the latter, while putting the power of agenda setting in the hands of the critical electorate

In a research design that includes the 6th wave of World Values Survey (and independently gathered data) on twenty countries (where the Electoral integrity battery was employed) across the ladder of democratization, I used logistic regression for testing of the association of the perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent. For testing the association between the above described relationships, as an indicator for the critical reasoning of voters, and the clientelistic efforts of political elites I used correlations. I hence controlled for alternative explanations of the disaggregation between the perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent, including the level of civil liberties and the modern experience with universal suffrage, as suggested by the literature on electoral integrity. The evidence from the logistic models show that in most of the cases there is a strong negative relationship between the perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent ($p < .05$) regardless of the level of the democratic maturity of the countries, indicated by the level of civil liberties (H1), that is against the normative line of the classical democratic theory.

In order to explain the variations in the relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent, the odds of the logistic models (signaling the magnitude of the factor by which the chances to vote for the incumbent increase with a unit change in the perception of electoral malpractice) were correlated with the variables indicating: the clientelistic efforts, the modern experience with universal suffrage and the level of civil liberties, respectively. The results showed the expected direction among all of the variables and the odds (H2 and H3), except for the correlation of the civil liberties' variable and the odds, that showed the opposite direction to what is indicated in the expectations (H1). Even though, the only correlation coefficient that passed the conventional threshold of $p=.05$, was the correlation coefficient between the level of clientelistic efforts and civil liberties (H1.1), accounting for the number of countries analyzed in the study that is in between few cases and large-N analysis (prescribe to data unavailability), the direction suggested by the correlation coefficients yields the necessary evidence for theory building.

The surprising finding of the counter intuitive relationship between the critical voters and the level of civil liberties (more critical voters for a lower level of civil liberties) suggested that the opportunities granted by a high level of civil liberties do not necessarily mean that they are employed in building a critical electorate as assumed by the democratic theory. Moreover, the civil liberties and the clientelistic efforts being in a significantly negative relationship, as theoretically anticipated, implies that even though dampening the clientelistic efforts is associated with the increase of civil liberties and the increase of the critical voters, simultaneously, the increase of the level of civil liberties is, however, associated with the decrease of the critical voters, that suggests the increasing of the clientelistic efforts, instead of the opposite. This rather entangled relationship, reflecting the complex mechanism between the

three variables of concern, suggests that there is an additional intervening variable in the relationship between the critical voters and the civil liberties that reverses the expected (by the electoral clientelism variable) direction between them.

When countries are grouped in various clusters, the increase of civil liberties in the clusters is mainly as expected, connected to the increase of the critical evaluations of the electorate, the increase of the universal suffrage and the decrease of the clientelistic efforts, in general, that suggests a *non-linear relationship* between this set of variables. In other words, the voters in some most clientelistic countries being critical, as oppose to voters in some least clientelistic countries being rather submissive, suggests that it is likely that above a certain threshold on the electoral clientelism variable, voters from most clientelistic countries become more critical, regardless of the concurrent existence of clientelistic efforts.

For instance in the Philippines, the independence between the perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent could have been a common reporting of electoral occurrences as social practice, rather than critical reasoning (Schaffer, 2002). In Colombia, on the other hand, the general awareness about the electoral malpractices that loses its explanatory power over the vote choice for the incumbent, taking the high level of electoral clientelism, suggests coexistence of the clientelistic practices and the democratic attitudes of voters, as reflected in their critical reasoning, (see Auyero, 2008 on contestation and clientelism).

Another surprising finding, is that there is a significantly ($p < .01$) negative relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote for the incumbent in countries where the level of clientelistic efforts is the lowest, and hence the level of civil liberties is the highest, namely in the Netherlands and Germany. In comparison with Australia, that is the only

country that suits the theoretical expectations (modern universal suffrage of above 60 years, highest level of civil liberties and relatively low level of clientelism) it seems that the lack of critical reasoning of the electorate in the Netherlands and Germany could have been an instance of the political discourse of nationalistic rhetoric that escalated during the few last years²⁸ (when the survey was conducted, the period from 2010-2014). This assumption is in line with Chandra's (2007) theory of patronage politics that suggests the electoral favoritism as a potential incentive for the reinforcement of such politics through setting of political platforms that revolve around exclusion of particular ethnic groups, and are thus based on the procurement of particularized goods, a fertile ground, as argued by Chandra (2007), for the emergence of clientelistic efforts.

Nevertheless, the understanding of the mechanism between critical voters and clientelistic efforts, and thus establishment of any causality and generalization, seeks for expanding the universe the cases and time points with a possible use of panel data to measure the evaluations before and after actual elections, a caveat that this study prescribes to data unavailability. Future research may, as well, include variables such as evaluation of the economic performance and positioning on the left-right scale on ideology. Last, but not least, looking ahead, the evidence from this study, when controlling for level of civil liberties, suggest that the highest level of civil liberties (1), together with a modern experience with universal suffrage higher than 60 years are necessary, but yet not sufficient conditions for the increasing of the critical citizenry as an indicator for unresponsiveness to the clientelism efforts associated with the decrease of electoral clientelism. Finally, talking in terms of sufficient and necessary

²⁸ For instance, see the Dutch anti-Islam PVV party and anti-immigrant opinion in Germany stirred by the 'Multiculturalism utterly failed in Germany' 2010 speech of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel

conditions appeals for deeper contextual understanding, and thus a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), a point suggested for further consideration.

In a nutshell, it can be concluded that clientelistic efforts are likely to deprive the individual sense for effective connection to the collective decision making process. This occurrence, on the other hand, is likely to facilitate the voters' susceptibility to the clientelistic offers, resulting with the increase of elites' clientelistic efforts to induce with particularized goods, while pushing the cultural pendulum further away from the logic of elections as democratic instruments. Conversely, the critical voters, rather than those that align their perceptions with the vote choice in general, are more likely to be reluctant to respond to clientelistic efforts, and while contributing to decreasing of the country's level of clientelism, they seem to be responsible for the maintenance of their own kind, as well. The cautious causal language used in this study, as a snapshot study advancing the debate on electoral clientelism, electoral integrity, and democratization and voting behavior, however, sets a theoretical ground yet to be challenged.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Appendix I: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Perception of electoral malpractice (total N=21 139)				
Australia	.90	3.60	1.58	.39
Chile	.90	3.20	1.71	.48
Colombia	.90	3.60	2.38	.43
Ecuador	.90	3.50	1.96	.44
Egypt	.90	3.60	2.15	.46
Estonia	.90	3.40	1.87	.48
Germany	.90	3.30	1.34	.42
Ghana	.90	3.40	2.12	.42
Macedonia	.90	3.50	2.22	.54
Malaysia	.90	3.40	1.88	.45
Mexico	.90	3.60	2.31	.41
Netherlands	.90	3.30	1.42	.37
Nigeria	1.40	3.60	2.39	.34
Pakistan	.90	3.60	2.32	.42
Peru	.90	3.60	2.24	.39
Philippines	1.00	3.50	2.26	.35
Poland	.90	3.10	1.73	.40
Taiwan	.90	3.40	2.18	.38
Ukraine	.90	3.50	2.37	.38
Uruguay	1.20	3.90	1.99	.29

Civil liberties index	1.00	5.00	2.55	1.39
Electoral clientelism index	1.59	3.80	2.99	.65
Years of modern experience with universal suffrage	.00	65	43.10	18.88

Appendix II: Variables and sources

Variable	Value (as recoded)	Source and recoding procedures
Dependent		
Vote choice (V228)	0 (challenger) 1(incumbent) (recoding for each country separately, for details see following table)	<p>The World Value Survey. The fieldwork of the 6th wave of this survey was conducted between the years of 2010 and 2014. The minimum sample size is 1000, and samples are drawn from the entire population of 18 and older. The sampling procedure allows for data collection from a representative national sample. When probability samples are not possible to gather, quota sampling is allowed under strict principles. Held at : http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp</p> <p>The representative sample from Macedonia was obtained from the whole population of 18 years and older. The sample size numbers 1000 randomly chosen respondents. It was conducted by the Institute for democracy ‘Societas Civilis’ Skopje (IDSCS), that used face-to face interviews and a multistage sampling procedure. Held at : http://www.idscs.org.mk/index.php?lang=en</p> <p>The dependent variable is indicated with the question: <i>If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would, you vote? If "Don't know": Which party appeals to you most?</i> Each country team (including the Macedonian) was responsible for providing codes for all the relevant political parties in the certain country.</p> <p>The answers were recoded into: 1 indicating the ruling party/coalition at the time when the survey was conducted (the party that won the last elections before the field-work and/or had the majority of ministers in the cabinet²⁹) and 0 indicating all the other relevant parties that took part of the electoral race.</p>
Independent variable		
Perception of electoral malpractice (index composed)	1 (not at all often) 4 (very often)	The scales of few of the statements that expressed malpractice, rather than integrity, were reversed: ‘Opposition candidates are prevented from running’, ‘Rich people buy elections’, ‘TV news favors the governing party’, ‘Voters are threatened with violence

²⁹ for those countries where the fieldwork was conducted in between the two elections, the incumbent was indicated as the candidate/political party that was on power before the elections

from variables V228A-V228I)		at the polls', 'and Voters are bribed'. The scales are negative, meaning that as the points of the scale increase, the quality of the electoral process decreases. In order to make a single variable out of the nine questions I collapsed them into a single one. I computed the variables into an index and then divided them all with 10 so that I could use the same 4-point scale for the index while gaining in simplicity.
Controls		Recoded according to the coding in the Macedonian case
Age (V242)	1(18-29) 2(30-39) 3(40-49) 4(50-64) 5(65 +)	
Education (V248)	1(1-3) 2(4-7) 3(8-9)	<i>Highest educational level attained:</i> 1='no formal education', 2='incomplete primary education', 3='complete primary education, 4='incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type', 5='complete secondary school: : technical/vocational type'', 6='incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type', 7='complete secondary school: university-preparatory type', 8= 'some university level without degree', 9='university-level education with degree'
Sex (V240)	1 (male) 2(female)	
Independent variables		Measured against the relationship between the perception of electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent
Civil liberties	1 (most free) 7(least free)	<p>'2013 Freedom House index on democracy Full details on codebook and questionnaire held at the www.freedomhouse.org The methodology used for the survey derives from the Universal Declaration of Human rights.</p> <p>¹ Each country is assigned a numerical rating from 1 to 7 for both political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. The ratings are determined by the total number of points (up to 100) each country receives on 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions; countries receive 0 to 4 points on each question, with 0 representing the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of freedom.</p> <p>The average of the political rights and civil liberties ratings,</p>

		<p>known as the freedom rating, determines the overall status: Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0). I use the Civil liberties scores, delivered by expert's assessments on: <i>freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights</i>.</p> <p>See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet.pdf</p>
Electoral clientelism (clientelistic efforts) (b6)	1(negligible effort or none at all) 4(a major effort)	<p>held at the: https://web.duke.edu/democracy/</p> <p>Full details on codebook and questionnaire https://web.duke.edu/democracy/documents/DALP_Codebook_2014-04_01.pdf</p> <p>Duke university dataset covers 5 subject areas³⁰ concerning political accountability, among which I see the variables measured on a country level. Particularly I take variable b6: <i>In general, how much effort do politicians and parties in this country make to induce voters with preferential benefits to cast their votes for them?</i> as a measurement for clientelistic efforts. It is measured on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 presents 'negligible effort or none at all', and 4 is 'a major effort'.</p> <p>Held at http://www.lehigh.edu/~bm05/democracy/suffrage_data.html Full details for codebook and questionnaire: http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/CODEBOOK_Phase_1.pdf</p>
Years of modern experience with universal suffrage		<p>Years covered: 1950-2000 see: Paxton, Pamela, Kenneth A. Bollen, Deborah M. Lee, and Hyo Joung Kim. "A half-century of suffrage: New data and a comparative analysis." <i>Studies in Comparative International Development</i> 38, no. 1 (2003): 93-122</p> <p>The scale used measures the universal suffrage that ranges from 0=full exclusion to 100=universal franchise. A score of 0 is associated with absence of elections for the executive or/and the legislative branches, for a period longer than 8 years. The way the modern experience with universal suffrage is operationalized is the following. I take the first year assigned with a score above 90 (the implementation of universal suffrage closest to what the</p>

		<p>democratic theory would suggest) and I subtract it from the year the field survey was conducted, for every separate country</p> <p>The scale used measures the universal suffrage that ranges from 0=full exclusion to 100=universal franchise. A score of 0 is associated with absence of elections for the executive or/and the legislative branches, for a period longer than 8 years.³¹ The way the experience with universal suffrage is operationalized is the following. I take the first year assigned with a score above 90 (the implementation of universal suffrage closest to what the democratic theory would suggest) and I subtract it from the year the survey was conducted. In doing so (for details see table below)</p>
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Dependent variable (recoding)

Country	Year when survey was conducted	Incumbent ³² party ³³ (at the time of the survey ³⁴)	Year of the peak of universal suffrage (1950-2000), or the first year assigned with a value above 90	Indicator for experience with universal suffrage (the difference between the year the survey was conducted and the year of the peak of universal suffrage)
1. Australia	2012	Australian Labor party	1950 (97.7)	65 +

³²<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

³³ Political party of the members in cabinet

³⁴ When the survey was conducted

2. Chile ³⁵³⁶	2011	Coalition for change (Independent democratic union, National Renewal), Parties of the right)	1981 (93.8)	30
3. Columbia ³⁷³⁸³⁹	2012	Social party of national unity (party of the U) (in coalition with Colombian conservative party(PC), Colombian liberal party(PL) and Radical change(CR))	1958 (96.4)	54
4. Ecuador	2013	PAIS alliance	1979 (97.2)	34
5. Egypt	2012	Freedom and justice party	1956 (99.3)	56
6. Estonia	2011	Estonian reform party and Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica	1991 (98.8)	20
7. Germany ⁴⁰	2013	⁴¹ <u>Christian Democratic Union of Germany</u> (CDU) and the <u>Christian Social Union of Bavaria</u> (CSU) and the Free Democrats	1950 (97.6-100)	63+
8. Ghana	2011	National democratic congress	1957 (95.5)	54
9. Macedonia	2014	VMRO-DPMNE (in coalition with): Socialist party of Macedonia, Democratic Union, Democratic renewal of Macedonia, Democratic party of the Turks of Macedonia, Democratic party of Serbs in Macedonia, Union of Roma in Macedonia) and DUI	1992 (90)	22
10. Malaysia	2011	Barisan national	1957 (95.5)	54
11. Mexico ⁴²	2012	The Party of national Action (PAN)	1966 (96.4)	46
12. Netherlands	2012	People's party for freedom and democracy (VVD) and the Labor	1950 (92.4)	62+

³⁵ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/chile#.U2uYeYGSyVM>

³⁶ http://www.indexmundi.com/chile/government_profile.html

³⁷ <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/colombia#.U2ucQYGSyVM>

³⁸ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/CO.html>

³⁹ <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1311770915&Country=Colombia&topic=Summary&subtopic=Political+structure>

⁴⁰ <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/BeginningReading/PRsystems.htm>

⁴¹ Field-work dates: 22-07-2013 to 13-11-2013, federal elections were held 22.09.2013 (took the incumbent party before the elections)

⁴² <http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/964/>

		Party (PvdA)		
13. Nigeria	2011	People's democratic party (PDP)	1980 (100)	31
14. Pakistan	2012	PPP (Pakistan people's party)	1950 (95.6)	62+
15. Peru	2012	Alianza Gana Perú	1980 (97.8)	32
16. Philippines	2012	Liberal party of the Philippines ⁴³	1978 (99)	34
17. Poland	2012	Civic Platform and Polish peasant's party	1950 (96.9)	62+
18. Taiwan	2012	Pan blue coalition (Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party(PFP) and the New Party (CNP)	0 (100 in 1950. after that 0 score)	0
19. Ukraine	2011	Party of the regions	1991 (99)	20
20. Uruguay	2011	The broad front coalition(Frente Amplio) ⁴⁴	1950 (100)	61

⁴³ 'Team PNoy', a coalition lead by the Liberal Party , forms only after (2013) the field survey is conducted and therefore the parties that are part of this coalition are not included as part of the incumbency , see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Team_PNoy

⁴⁴ Movement of popular participation, Uruguay assembly, Christian democratic party of Uruguay , Communist party of Uruguay, Socialist party of Uruguay, Artiguista Fall, New Space

Appendix III: Figures and tables

Figure 1. Vote choice




Figure 2. The perception of the quality of the electoral process separated by vote choice




Table 1. Logistic models: The perception of the electoral malpractice and the vote choice for the incumbent

Table 1. Model of perception of electoral malpractice (PEM) and the vote choice...										
Variables	Australia		Chile		Colombia		Ecuador		Egypt	
	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI
PEM	.77 (.19)	(.52-1.13)	.30*** (.29)	(.16-.54)	.58 (.29)	(.33-1.02)	.28*** (.19)	(.19-.41)	.23*** (.30)	(.13-.42)
Sex (male)	.96 (.14)	(.72-1.27)	1.22 (.261)	(.73-2.04)	1.30 (.26)	(.78-2.15)	1.25 (.16)	(.91-1.72)	1.99 * (.28)	(1.15-3.45)
Age	1.06 (.05)	(.95-1.19)	1.16 (.10)	(.95-1.42)	1.22 (.11)	(.99-1.5)	.93 (.06)	(.82-1.05)	1.18 (.10)	(.97-1.44)
Education	.91 (.12)	(.71-1.17)	2.07*** (.23)	(1.31-3.28)	.32*** (.21)	(.22-.45)	.79 (.12)	(.62-1.00)	.76 (.18)	(.54-1.08)
Intercept	.75 (.59)		.26 (.97)		138.481*** (.998)		46.104*** (.60)		3.78 (.98)	
Model fit...	1159.39		366.905		415.045		924.775		318.814	
N	928		333		634		846		324	

Variables	Estonia		Germany		Ghana		Macedonia		Malaysia	
	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI
PEM	.24*** (.18)	(.17-.35)	.437*** (.14)	(.33-.58)	.61*** (.15)	(.46-.82)	.16*** (.23)	(.07-.18)	.07*** (.26)	(.04-.12)
Sex (male)	.97 (.16)	(.74-1.33)	1.005 (.002)	(.81-1.25)	.84 (.13)	(.65-1.10)	.94 (.21)	(.62-1.42)	1.36 (.19)	(.94-1.96)
Age	.72*** (.06)	(.65-.81)	1.002 (.002)	(.93-1.08)	1.02 (.06)	(.90-1.15)	.99 (.08)	(.85-1.15)	.95 (.09)	(.80-1.12)
Education	1.07 (.16)	(.79-1.45)	.89 (.08)	(.76-1.05)	.74** (.10)	(.61-.91)	.69* (.17)	(.50-.96)	1.12 (.18)	(.78-1.61)
Intercept	20.22*** (.62)		2.87*** (.36)		3.62*** (.47)		582.182*** (.81)		347.365*** (.81)	
Model fit	947.249		1804.035		1378.656		534.605		700.992	
N	779		1343		1048		518		761	

Variables	Mexico		Netherlands		Nigeria		Pakistan		Peru	
	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI
PEM	.68**	(.52-.89)	.47**	(.36-.75)	.68*	(.50-.93)	.87	(.60-1.25)	.90	(.57-1.42)
	(.14)		(.22)		(.16)		(.19)		(.23)	
Sex (male)	.97	(.78-1.22)	1.28	(.97-1.70)	.87	(.70-1.08)	.95	(.70-1.30)	.83	(.58-1.20)
	(.12)		(.14)		(.11)		(.16)		(.19)	
Age	1.08	(.98-1.19)	.99	(.88-1.11)	.96	(.86-1.07)	1.00	(.87-1.16)	1.04	(.91-1.19)
	(.05)		(.06)		(.06)		(.08)		(.07)	
Education	.85	(.72-1.02)	1.34*	(1.06-1.69)	1.33**	(1.10-1.57)	.43***	(.32-.57)	.92	(.69-1.23)
	(.09)		(.12)		(.01)		(.14)		(.15)	
Intercept	1.90		.58		.96		1.75		.833	
	(.44)		(.60)		(.50)		(.63)		(.74)	
Model fit	1732.813		1120.561		1891.798		1027.698		688.432	
N	1300		873		1496		1005		553	

Variables	Philippines		Poland		Taiwan		Ukraine		Uruguay	
	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI	OR	95%CI
PEM	.77	(.53-1.13)	.27***	(.15-.46)	.10***	(.06-.16)	.12***	(.06-.27)	.52	(.23-1.16)
	(.20)		(.28)		(.29)		(.36)		(.41)	
Sex (male)	.97	(.75-1.27)	1.48	(.97-2.28)	1.10	(.79-1.54)	.65	(.34-1.09)	.91	(.58-1.42)
	(.14)		(.22)		(.17)		(.27)		(.23)	
Age	1.00	(.90-1.12)	1.20*	(1.02-1.40)	1.08	(.94-1.25)	.97	(.81-1.17)	.89	(.76-1.05)
	(.05)		(.08)		(.07)		(.10)		(.08)	
Education	.97	(.81-1.17)	1.00	(.69-1.45)	1.18	(.9-1.57)	.90	(.54-1.48)	1.75**	(1.23-2.48)
	(.09)		(.19)		(.15)		(.26)		(.18)	
Intercept	1.60		3.33		106.563 ***		105.218 ***		4.54	
	(.56)		(.78)		(.86)		(1.23)		(1.04)	
Model fit	1210.425		493.992		802.026		361.357		445.136	
N	881		380		667		384		366	

Binary logistic regression. ... Vote choice (0-1), where 1 indicates vote for the incumbent. ... -2 log likelihood. *** denotes $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$. Odds ratios (OR) are reported. Standard errors in parenthesis. Note: The perception of electoral malpractice (PEM) variables are measured on a scale of 1-4, where a higher value indicates perception of greater malpractice.

continued

Table 2. Model fit of the relationship between PEM and the vote choice for the incumbent

Model	Chi-square test	Goodness fit
Australia	4.14	low
Chile	31.28***	high
Colombia	53.87***	high
Ecuador	51.14***	high
Egypt	38.23***	high
Estonia	100.81***	high
Germany	35.52***	high
Ghana	20.58***	high
Macedonia	128.01***	high
Malaysia	143.15***	high
Mexico	17.02**	high
Netherlands	27.82***	high
Nigeria	19.96***	high
Pakistan	41.17***	high
Peru	1.90	low
Philippines	1.90	low
Poland	32.28***	high
Taiwan	110.18***	high
Ukraine	44.62***	high
Uruguay	16.523**	high

*** denotes $p < .001$, ** $p < 0.01$

Note: Smaller chi-square values indicate a better model fit

Table 3. Nagelkerke test of goodness of fit

Model	Nagelkerke R-squared	Variation covered (%)
Australia	.00	0
Chile	.13	13
Colombia	.16	16
Ecuador	.09	9
Egypt	.15	15
Estonia	.16	16
Germany	.03	3
Ghana	.03	3
Macedonia	.30	30
Malaysia	.26	26
Mexico	.02	2
Netherlands	.04	4
Nigeria	.02	2
Pakistan	.06	6
Peru	.005	0.5
Philippines	.003	0.3
Poland	.11	11
Taiwan	.20	20
Ukraine	.17	17
Uruguay	.06	6




Figure 3. The magnitude of the relationship between PEM and the vote choice for the incumbent

Note: The higher the magnitude of the relationship the less critical voter are,





Figure 4. Critical voters along the ladder of democracy

Note: The cases closest to 0 on the y-axis indicate higher level of the critical perception of the voters



- 1-Australia
- 2-Chile
- 3-Colombia
- 4-Ecuador
- 5-Egypt
- 6-Estonia
- 7-Germany
- 8-Ghana
- 9-Macedonia
- 10-Malaysia
- 11-Mexico
- 12-Netherlands
- 13-Nigeria
- 14-Pakistan
- 15-Peru
- 16-Philippines
- 17-Poland
- 18-Taiwan
- 19-Ukraine
- 20-Uruguay

Figure 5. Critical voters along the ladder of democracy (detecting a pattern)

Note: The cases closest to 0 on the y-axis indicate higher level of the critical perception of the voters





Figure 6. Critical voters and modern experience with universal suffrage

Note: The cases closest to 0 on the y-axis indicate higher level of the critical perception of the voters



- 1-Australia
- 2-Chile
- 3-Colombia
- 4-Ecuador
- 5-Egypt
- 6-Estonia
- 7-Germany
- 8-Ghana
- 9-Macedonia
- 10-Malaysia
- 11-Mexico
- 12-Netherlands
- 13-Nigeria
- 14-Pakistan
- 15-Peru
- 16-Philippines
- 17-Poland
- 18-Taiwan
- 19-Ukraine
- 20-Uruguay

Figure 7. Critical voters and clientelistic efforts

Note: The cases closest to 0 on the y-axis indicate higher level of the critical perception of the voters

Table 4. Correlation between the odds, clientelistic efforts, civil liberties and modern experience with universal suffrage

Variable	Odds	Clientelism	CL	EUS
Odds		-.09	.12	.38
Clientelism			.73**	-.41
CL				-.03

***denotes correlation significance at the level .001(2-tailed), N=20

Note : Odds(PEM, social controls vs. vote choice), CL=civil liberties. EUS=modern experience with universal suffrage. The higher the odds to vote for the incumbent with a unit increase in the perception of electoral malpractice, the higher the voter's level of critical perception. Higher value on the scale measuring clientelism indicated higher level of clientelism. Higher level on the scale measuring CL indicates lower CL. Higher level on the EUS scale indicates more years of modern experience with universal suffrage.




Figure 8. Critical voters, modern experience with universal suffrage , clientelistic efforts and civil liberties

Note: The negative sign next to the relationship between the vote choice and the perception of electoral malpractice (PEM) is omitted, because we are interested to see the change of the magnitude of the relationship along the different variables. Smaller magnitude of the relationship between PEM and vote choice indicates higher level of critical evaluation. Experience with democracy has a positive scale. Lower score on the civil liberties scale indicates higher civil liberties. Lower value on electoral clientelism indicates lower level of clientelism. Civil liberties and electoral clientelism are measured on the right axes.




Figure 9. The pattern I

**Electoral clientelism vs vote choice& PEM, controlling for semi democracies (3) ,
modern experience with universal suffrage <50 years (most clientelistic)**




Figure 10. The pattern II

**Electoral clientelism vs vote choice& PEM, level of civil liberties (1),
modern experience with universal suffrage >50 years (least clientelistic)**

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