

THE PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA TOWARDS EASTERN ENLARGEMENT; CASE STUDY UKRAINE

By
Nana Tishinets

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MA in International

Relations and European Studies

Supervisor: Professor Peter Balazs

Word count: 13,103

Budapest, Hungary
2014

ABSTRACT

Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe after Russian Federation. It used to be also a state with the strong economy during the soviet times, partially due to the overall strong soviet structure. However, today we can see a very weak and corrupted state, with the low internal cohesion as the people and government is detached, therefore, it is very difficult for the country like Ukraine to consent to any new laws and legislations inside the government. Furthermore, the weak internal cohesion affects international relations of Ukraine with two neighboring powers: EU and Russia.

Focusing on my argument and the framework of internal cohesion, the main question I address is *to what extent is the influence of the EU's EaP and of Russia's foreign policy enabled by Ukraine's internal cohesion?*

The main method exercised is the analysis of the scholarly articles, books, primary speeches and documents of the international relations between Russia, European Union and Ukraine.

The analysis of the EU and Russian foreign policy and their international relations with the six post-Soviet states in particular through the framework of Eastern Partnership and the Eurasian Economic Community, identifies a series of limitations in terms of the way they try to promote these frameworks. This research has attempted to show is that if the internal cohesion is not strong enough to bind Ukraine together as a state, the international community will have to fill this role.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my special appreciation and my gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Professor Peter Balazs, for being a wonderful mentor for me. I would like to thank you for supporting me during my research and helping me to develop an argument, though sometimes during my thesis I was bewildered due to the lack of time and stress.

I would also like to thank my research design professor, Kristin Makszin for giving me the knowledge and guidance on both my research and the methodology. And of course, I would like to thank all the CEU professors for their inspiring enthusiasm, fun classes and valuable feed-back on my work.

A special gratitude to inspiring and motivating academic writing advisor, John Harbord, thank you for your support and availability all through the year.

A special thanks to my family and friends. It is impossible to express in words how grateful I am to them for the support and sacrifices.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	4
INTRODUCTION	3
CHAPTER 1. EU AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP	5
<i>1.1 Eastern Partnership Framework</i>	5
<i>1.2 Conceptualizing Eastern Partnership.....</i>	9
<i>1.3 The top-down approach to Eastern Partnership.....</i>	12
CHAPTER 2. RUSSIA AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP	16
<i>2.1 The Foreign Policy of Russia</i>	16
<i>2.2 Russia-EU Relations; Eastern Partnership</i>	19
<i>2.3 Russian Geopolitical Break Through.....</i>	25
CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDY- UKRAINE.....	30
<i>3.1 Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership.....</i>	30
<i>3.2 Internal Cohesion of Ukraine.....</i>	35
CONCLUSION	42
BIBLIOGRAPHY	46

INTRODUCTION

As the young researcher, I encounter the democracy was one of the as the fields of foreign policy that my country had to promote in order to fulfill all requirements and join the Eastern Partnership framework. EaP is the framework for six post-Soviet states; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, where Ukraine was the primary candidate to sign the EaP. However, in the year 2013 on the Vilnius Summit, Ukraine surprised the whole world by postponing the signing of Association Agreement (comprising Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement). “The postponement of the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA signature – Ukraine’s government stopped the related preparations just one week before the summit – represents a serious setback for the EU while Russia has gained another strategic point, at least for a while.”¹ This event can be explained by the lack of internal cohesion in Ukraine, where the country cannot come to the rational consensus, whether it wants to have close ties with EU or Russia.

However, the democracy is very difficult to achieve without a strong internal cohesion of the country. The language, culture, ethnicity and economy and politics are the factors that are of the high importance for internal cohesion of the country, and as such can be utilized through a strong governance and promotion of national values to solve the internal and external problems caused by the lack of it. The research question of my thesis is: *To what extent is the influence of the EU’s EaP and of Russia’s foreign policy enabled by Ukraine’s internal cohesion?*

Framed with this context, my research is concentrated with the detailed analysis of the EU, Russia and Ukraine *triangle* that has been generated for the detailed analysis of the current instability in Ukraine’s decisions in its policy making. The analysis shows the “*triangle*” of EU’s foreign policy and the framework of the Eastern Partnership, Russia’s foreign policy and the framework of Eurasian Economic Union and the case study Ukraine.

¹Havlik, Peter. November 2013 “*Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit: A Milestone in EU-Russia Relations – not just for Ukraine.*” Policy Note/Policy Report N. 11: Pg. 32.

This thesis employs the qualitative analysis on the Ukraine's relations with the two big neighbors EU and Russia. The research will look at the span 2009 (the initiation of the Eastern Partnership framework)- November 2013 (Vilnius Summit, last summit where Ukraine postponed the EaP negotiations). For the comprehensive study this is analysis achieved through the discourse analysis. The data is collected through the analysis of the existing literature, primary sources; speeches of the high representatives and scholars, documentations, policy briefs and additional quantitative data that is obtained from the *World Bank*.

In order to illustrate the *triangle* of the relations between EU, Ukraine and Russia, this thesis is structurally divided into three chapters. The first chapter elaborates and gives analysis of the EU's foreign policy, the relations of the EU and Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership framework, through the discourse analysis based on the primary sources and the previous literature. The second chapter deals with the foreign policy analysis of Russia, Ukraine- Russian relations and the Eurasian Integration Project. The last, third chapter will focus on Ukraine, the Ukraine and the framework of EaP and the lack of internal cohesion in Ukraine, which is the main obstacle for the countries uncertainty in decision making with its Big neighbors.

CHAPTER 1. EU AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

For the detailed analysis of the relations between EU and Ukraine this chapter focuses on the existing literature and its approaches to the most significant aspect to it, the process of enlargement in particular the process of Eastern Enlargement. In this context, it will develop the analysis of the EU's main goals and objectives in the creation of the Eastern Partnership, aiming to clearly understand the interests of the EU in the post-Soviet space. The aim of this chapter is to create the picture of the EU and Ukraine relations. The Eastern Partnership Agreement, which includes six states; three Eastern European (Ukraine, Belarus, and the Republic of Moldova) and three Southern Caucasus states (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan). Furthermore, it will establish the framework and limitations of the performed analysis. The detailed analysis of the Eastern Partnership will help me to further analyze the Russian perception towards it, which will be concluded by the case study Ukraine. Therefore, the comprehensive analysis will be drawn in my research triangle, EU, Russia and Ukraine.

1.1 Eastern Partnership Framework

The proposal of the European Union to six eastern neighboring countries and the future of the Association Agreement, as it is still questionable whether all six will be satisfied with the proposal that is 'one for all' or not. One of the main questions here is whether Eastern Partnership countries will be successful in achieving their goals towards the Association Agreement considering a more

ambitious' Russia. Furthermore, I answer this question through the analyses of the engagement of the new member states of the European Union with the Eastern Partnership countries and the response of Russia to it. For instance, if all Eastern Partners successfully sign the Association Agreement, the outcome will affect not only the balance of power but also the governments in those countries that are based on the authoritarian rule or democracy.²

In this context, Walski considers that both EU and Russia are very confident and are showing its advantages in the race for the Eastern Partnership countries. Russia's main appeal is that it is rich with natural resources, so called "realpolitik" and its traditional sovereignty, whereas EU mainly makes emphasis on its strength and security that is coming from its "supranational and intergovernmental character".³

As mentioned previously, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched in the beginning of 2009, the agreement was signed between EU and each member state of the EaP: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, in hopes of overcoming the shortfalls of the Neighborhood Policy.⁴

According to Walski, Poland is the country that was more eager to bring Ukraine closer to the EU, as the Eastern Partnership framework was the Polish and Swedish initiative. The other reason is that Ukraine borders Poland and shared almost the same history of communism. During Europe's World summit in summer 2009, Sikorski pointed out: "Although EU membership for Eastern Partnership states is not yet on the agenda, we in Poland feel that the prospect of accession should be kept open.

²Walski, Krzysztof . "The European Union's Eastern Neighborhood: The Eastern Partnership as a Strategy of EU Engagement and Security." *Penn McNair Research Journal* 2: 1-15. (accessed May 19, 2014).

³ Ibid. Pg.4

⁴Council of the European, Union. 7 May 2009 "*Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit.*" EN 8435/09 (Presse 78).

The alluring prospect of joining the European Union is one of the main sources of EU influence and ‘soft power’ and continues a powerful incentive for deep reforms”.⁵

One of the common concerns of the European Union in the EaP is to narrow down the gap in the fields of economy and people between the EU and Eastern Partnership countries. The other main problem that raises concern in the EaP is the naive expectations from the initiators, mainly Poland and Sweden, when supported Polish initial ideas to except the EaP countries from the Russia’s mainly political influence. “The joint Polish and Swedish initiative is an open offer of closer cooperation, and has the aim of supporting transformation by stimulating their economic development and strengthening democracy, freedom and civil societies by enhancing legal and administrative capacities enough to approach EU standards”⁶ states Sikorski. Furthermore, Eastern Partnership is a great opportunity for the countries of EaP to go through the process of development in order to have a better perspective to access the European Union as new member states. Through the EaP countries also have a perspective to develop better relations with Russia.

The contextual background leading to the above-mentioned events is the outcome of the events occurring at the EU at the beginning of the development of the European Union. The whole process of the EU enlargement is fascinating in its origin, from only six founding members the union has managed to expand to 28 member states.⁷ All 28 are so different in their history, culture and religion yet managed to embrace the values of the European Union. The Union has managed to extend its borders farther East, thus through the creation of the new neighbors the European Union got as

⁵Sikorski, Radoslaw. The EU’s “Eastern Partnership” with Former Soviet States Holds the Key to Relations with Russia. Europe’s World, Summer 2009.<http://europesworld.org/2009/06/01/the-eus-eastern-partnership-with-former-soviet-states-holds-the-key-to-relations-with-russia/#.U2ZLzmSz4I>

⁶Sikorski, Radoslaw. The EU’s “Eastern Partnership” with Former Soviet States Holds the Key to Relations with Russia. Europe’s World, Summer 2009.<http://europesworld.org/2009/06/01/the-eus-eastern-partnership-with-former-soviet-states-holds-the-key-to-relations-with-russia/#.U2ZLzmSz4I>

⁷WTO "WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION."
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/rta_08apr14_e.htm (accessed June 1, 2014).

close as possible to the Russian Federation. However, because the process of integration of the new member states in the EU is not only time consuming but also very complicated both for the EU and the applicant state, the European Union, specifically Poland during its presidency in 2008, proposed a new Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership framework initiative to the six neighboring states.

The agreement was aimed to build a dual-track system encouraging front-runners (Moldova and Ukraine) while improving relations with the others. Its expressed aims were to promote economic convergence with EU law, better governance and democracy, enhanced energy security, and to encourage person-to-person exchange.⁸ From the beginning it appeared the EaP would be more effective, but significant questions remained as to whether or not this was suitable policy equilibrium. EU proximity on the topic insisted on a detachment from the 'exclusive' politics of the previous era. The new mode of operation is the *partnership* model, based on shared interests, values, and 'ownership' of policy, allowing for close economic and political integration with the EU without actual membership. However, there are problems inherent in these ideals. As a result of vast economic differences, the EU naturally behaves as an economic hegemon, depending on conditionality and bilateral (as opposed to regional) cooperation, eventually forcing compliance rather than promoting actual cooperation.⁹

Moreover, there is another major limitation, mainly is the incompatible and often incoherent nature of EU foreign policy. For instance, there is a limitation in legitimacy, coordination, and resources to secure a successful policy implementation in Eastern Europe, a complication that the financial crisis has only worsened.¹⁰ Regardless of the high degree of idealist rhetoric at EU level, it remains difficult to convince individual member state to contribute funds and resources for strengthening the EaP.

⁸Marin, Anaïs. 2012 "Eastern Partnership: A New Opportunity for the Neighbours." *Journal of Borderlands Studies*: 367-368.

⁹ Ibid.,

¹⁰Bosse, Giselle. "Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership: the values/security nexus in EU–Belarus relations." *Contemporary Politics* 15.2 (2009): 215-227.

Because of the hard post-Soviet experiences, the neighboring countries are usually characterized by national governments and their constituencies as indigent, regressive recipients of Western aid as opposed to the strategic partners.¹¹ Furthermore, the low level of faith in the EaP can be the outcome of the weak information flow to the EU citizens about their eastern neighbors; countries are mainly therefor perceived as risks rather than allies. These factors are the one of the obstacles to the desired support for the EaP.¹² Last but not least, major issue is the awareness that the EU tends to use its generic policies rather than changing them to the needs of each individual country, without considering the needs and values of “partners”. This develops considerable misunderstanding between the partner countries.¹³

1.2 Conceptualizing Eastern Partnership

Defining Eastern Partnership Agreement poses a series of problems than considering unclear input of the Eastern Partnership was not sufficient.¹⁴ Poland and Sweden believed that the EaP countries are almost ready to sign the agreement, however, all six at the beginning of the initial negotiations were in difficult conditions.

European Union is in the process of building deep relations with its neighboring states in the East; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. The process of development of closer ties with the Eastern neighbors the EU is reaching through the newly established reforms of the

¹¹Boonstra, Jos, Natalia Shapovalova, and Espan Madrid. *The EU's eastern partnership: one year backwards / Jos Boonstra and Natalia Shapovalova..* Madrid: FRIDE, 2010.

¹²Christou, George. 2010 "European Union security logics to the east: the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership." *European Security*: 413-430.

¹³ Ibid.,

¹⁴ Korosteleva, Elena. 2011 "The Eastern Partnership Initiative: A New Opportunity for Neighbours?." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*: 1-21. Pg. 4

Eastern Partnership Agreement.¹⁵ Furthermore, for the EU the relationship with its biggest partner in the Eaters Region, Russia is of great importance, therefore some new strategic partnership is under negotiation.

All members of the Eastern Partnership have reached the some agreement of the EaP with the EU except Belarus. The EaP serves as the main political and legislative tool for interaction of the Eastern Neighboring Countries with the EU. "Means of participation in European programs, policies, agencies, progressive involvement in the EU's internal Market, plus financial and technical support connected to the condition of concrete political, institutional and economic reforms and strengthening of European Union defined shared values."¹⁶ All are beneficiaries of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the financial instrument which implements the decisions, which are taken at the political level into concrete action on the ground.¹⁷

Dialogue between the European Union and its Eastern Neighbors is ensured through the joint institutions that have been established under the PCA agreements, the highest of which is the Cooperation Council, and with Russia through the Permanent Partnership Council.¹⁸

The ENP brings together all EU's neighbors in the East and in the South in an effort to improve welfare, strengthen stability and security partners and the EU. In the Eastern Neighborhood Partnership every country, except Belarus, obtains an action plan, which sets out a strategic goals of reform. Each of the six countries has a document on the national country strategy outlining current bilateral priorities and jointly adopted National Identity Programme (NIP).¹⁹

¹⁵ Korosteleva, Elena. 2011 "The Eastern Partnership Initiative: A New Opportunity for Neighbours?." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*: 1-21.

¹⁶ Haglund, M., Anne and Silander, D., eds. (2007), *The European Union and the outside World: Global Themes in a European Setting*, Växjö, Växjö University Press, 254 pages. extracted from Pg.89

¹⁷ Ibid., Pg. 67

¹⁸ Mission of Ukraine to the European Union.2010 "Ukraine-EU Relations." <http://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-eu/relations> (accessed May 1, 2014).

¹⁹ Council of the European, Union. 7 May 2009 "Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit." EN 8435/09 (Presse 78).

Eastern Partnership as a specific Eastern dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy seeks to support political and socioeconomic reforms with the partner countries, facilitating their integration and convergence with the EU. Eastern Partnership is based on the principle "more for more", which means enhanced partnership with the EU for those countries that do more progress in democratic and socioeconomic reforms.²⁰ EsP proposes its partners new contract (the Association Agreement), which includes the Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreement and the facilitation of movement of persons. However, Russia decided not to join the European Eastern Partnership. Its relations with the EU can be described as the strategic partnership, which is based on the European Neighborhood Policy, but is evolving in a slightly different ways.²¹ For instance, the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia is based on the four dimensions; Common Economic Space, Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; Common space of external security; Common Space of Research, Science, Education and Culture.²²

Regional cooperation.

There are some major problems that the Eastern neighborhood countries experience, like the development of transnational corridors, management of transnational rivers and lakes, fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime.²³ All these problems are on transnational level therefore have to be solved through the cooperation of the neighboring countries.

EU is supporting regional cooperation with its Eastern Neighbors and between them, through a series of major policy initiatives; the main support goes through the Eastern Partnership Agreement.

²⁰ Ibid.,

²¹ Ibid.,

²² Suggested format for citing this paper: Van Elsuwege P. (2012), 'Towards a Modernisation of EU-Russia Legal Relations?', CEURUS EU-Russia Papers, No. 5. Pg.1

²³ "Панорама региональных программ и проектов ЕС Восточное партнерство и Россия." *Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid*. Translation: "Panorama of regional programs and projects of the EU Eastern Partnership and Russia." Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid. http://www.enpi-info.eu/files/publications/panorama%20East%20RU_low%20resolution.pdf

The Eastern Partnership provides a basis for the solution to the common problems; it promotes co-joint activities and encourages the development of relations between the partner countries themselves. The development of structural dialogue between Eastern Neighbors Partners builds a solid foundation for multilateral cooperation. For instance, the general concerns about the state of water resources in the Kura Basin brought together three countries in the South Caucasus in the framework of the EU-funded trans-boundary cooperation, aiming to improve water quality in the Kura River, which flows through Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in a unique ecosystem covering vast territory between the Black and Caspian Seas.

The enhancement of the communication between people is reached through the two major programs: “Tempus” and “Erasmus Mundus”. “Tempus is the European Union’s program, which supports the modernization of higher education in the Partner Countries of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Western Balkans and the Mediterranean region, mainly through university cooperation projects.”²⁴ “The Erasmus Mundus program aims to enhance the quality of higher education and promote dialogue and understanding between people and cultures through mobility and academic cooperation.”²⁵

1.3 The top-down approach to Eastern Partnership

ENP is seen by the European Union as a tool to promote democracy.²⁶ However, the democracy promotion strategy in the European Union are harshly criticized as being weakly coordinated²⁷, for being biased toward an EU view²⁸, and last but not least for following a ‘one size fits all’ approach²⁹.

²⁴“Tempus Programme.” . http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/index_en.php (accessed May 28, 2014).

²⁵ Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency. “Erasmus Mundus Programme.”. http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus_mundus/index_en.php (accessed May 5, 2014).

²⁶B. Ferrero-Waldner, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: the EU’s newest foreign policy instrument”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11, 2006.

The European Union most often is exercising the top-down approach in the promotion of democracy. The top-down approach is the strategy that is used through the political dialogue and official statements, various summits, negotiations and committee meetings. Some scholars discern Political Dialogue as an exercise of the ‘soft power’ on society’s way of thinking and external policy adaptation ³⁰. Furthermore, official statements carry the meaning of blaming and shaming tool.³¹ This instrument has different forms: the EU checks and comments on the Eastern Neighbor’s presidential and parliamentary elections, corruption and the rule of law, obligations that are imposed by the OSCE or the Council of Europe.

The bottom-up strategy that is mainly addressed to non-state actors and institutions that are independent from high-level politics, for instance, the actors like civil society, media and education.³² The financial support to the civil society and education is offered by ENP through TACIS/EIDHR and Tempus and many other programs. As this programs have a quite a long existence in the Eastern Neighborhood countries, this gives an opportunity for the comparison between pre-ENP and ENP era. Freedom of media and mass communication is considered as a very important subject for the promotion of democracy of EU. As freedom of media can be a very sensitive issue in the Eastern

²⁷Crawford, Gordon 2000: European Union Development Co-operation and the Promotion of Democracy, in: Burnell, Peter (Ed.): Democracy Assistance. International Co-operation for Democracy, London, 90-127.

²⁸Barbé, Esther/Johansson-Nogués, Elisabeth 2008: The EU as a modest ‘force for good’: the European Neighbourhood Policy, in: International Affairs 84: 1, 81-96.

²⁹Börzel, Tanja A./Risse Thomas 2004: One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. Democracy promotion, Paper prepared for the Workshop on Democracy Promotion organized by the Center for Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 4-5 October 2004, Stanford University.

³⁰Vachudova, Milada A. 2005: Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism, Oxford.

³¹Zangl, Bernhard 2001: Bringing Courts Back In. Normdurchsetzung im GATT, in der WTO und der EG, in: Swiss Political Science Review 7: 2, 49-80.

Maier, Sylvia/Schimmelfennig, Frank 2007: Shared Values: Democracy and Human Rights, in: Weber, Katja/Smith, Michael E./Baun, Michael (Eds.): Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery?, Manchester and New York, 39-57.

Schimmelfennig, Frank 2007: European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe, in: East European Politics and Societies 21: 1, 126-141.

³²Tanja A. Borzel and Diana Panke, “Europeanization” in *European Union Politics*, 3rd edition, ed. Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez-SolorzanoBorrigan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4006-407

Partnership countries the OSCE divides its tasks into two parts: it contemplates media developments in order to prevent misbalance in the national media market and it helps states to act in accordance with their commitments to freedom of expression and free media. Furthermore, the responsibility of the OSCE includes; “efforts to ensure the safety of journalists; assist with the development of media pluralism; promote decriminalization of defamation; combat hate speech while preserving freedom of expression; provide expert opinions on media regulation and legislation; promote Internet freedom; and assist with the process of switching from analogue to digital broadcasting. The Representative also holds annual regional media conferences, bringing together journalists, representatives of civil society and government, as well as academics, to discuss current media freedom issues”.³³

The examination of these approaches is very important in order to build a clear picture how the EU is promoting Eastern Partnership. Furthermore, the example of organizations was illustrated in order to see the contribution and investment of EU to the EaP project.

Concluding, this chapter has shown that the initiative of the Eastern Partnership and its attendant framework has its ups and downs. The main problem is that it is designed for and continues to use a generic, “one-size-fits-all” approach, and this is not satisfactory for Ukraine. Since the “Orange Revolution” Ukraine has had closer relations with the European Union. Moreover, before the initiation of the framework of Eastern Partnership, Ukraine was already dedicated to making significant progress in terms of economics, democracy development, eliminating corruption and human rights protection.

If Ukraine were to endorse and implement all the recommendations that the EU has given it, it would increase its chances of moving past the EaP towards the further enhancement of its relations with

³³“OSCE.” Representative on Freedom of the Media. <http://www.osce.org/fom> (accessed June 1, 2014).

the EU. However, the country remains an essentially post-Soviet state and still feels significant pressure from its powerful neighbor, Russia, and given the low level of internal cohesion in Ukraine there is a natural conflict in its political decision to pursue closer relations with the EU or to maintain and build on the historical ties to Russia.

In order to understand why it is so important for many Ukrainians to keep close relations with the Russian Federation and for Russians to maintain close ties with Ukraine, chapter two will present an analysis of the international relations of Russia with two of its most important neighbor states, Ukraine and the EU.

CHAPTER 2. RUSSIA AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

This chapter will focus on the existing literature on the foreign policy of Russia and its goals and objectives in the international sphere. Within this context, it will analyze the conceptual and theoretical framework of the International Relations of Russia, aiming to establish the grounds for further analysis. Furthermore, in order to clearly visualize the picture of the foreign affairs of Russia with the EU's Eastern Partner countries, this chapter will give a detailed analysis of the development of Foreign Policy in Russia. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the existing literature dealing with the International Relations and Foreign Affairs of Russia with the European Union and in particular the Eastern Partners of the EU and to demonstrate the frameworks utilized and their limitations. This analysis will explain the Ukraine's hesitant attitude towards Russia, and Russia's continued efforts to convince Ukraine to join the Eurasian Economic Community.

2.1 The Foreign Policy of Russia

Russia's foreign affairs have, over the years, gained a completely different status and level of influence than the European Union. The country is considered to be a major player in foreign affairs due to its status as a world power. Most scholars characterize Russia as a state with a weak economy but strong politics, in contrast to a European Union with weak politics and a strong economy. This explains why two major forces in the international relations of the Eastern Partner countries have a different approach towards increasing their influence in political and economic matters in foreign states.

Russia is a major player in the international relations system, and indeed some have argued that it is the world power, though in the international arena it stands close to but behind powers such as the US and China.³⁴ This is partially a product of the fact that since the succession of the Soviet Union, Russia has held permanent membership on the Security Council of the United Nations.³⁵

The biggest contributions to the contemporary foreign policy of Russia are attributed to the two main leaders of Russia in the late 20th century; Yeltsin and Gorbachev. The attitude of Russia towards the contemporary world in terms of its goals and objectives in foreign affairs is transparently recorded in the newly amended Foreign Policy Doctrine of 2013.³⁶

Furthermore, the EU's foreign relations with Russia are much closer than those with the US because of the geographical and historical connection between the two polities.³⁷ Consequently, this builds a European desire to modernize Russia along the lines of its own political and economic agenda in order to build a closer connection with the state. In terms of modernization as an agenda, Europe is the most strategically important partner to Russia.³⁸ The biggest obstacle for Russia in building better ties with European Union is the reality that the EU lacks consistency and unity amongst its member states in a number of areas, particularly with respect to the issues most important to Russia. For instance, Russia has excellent relations with quite a few European states: Germany, Italy and France demonstrate through many generations close ties with Russia in many fields. However, other states

³⁴Wishnick, Elizabeth. *"Russia, China and The US in Central Asia: Prospects for Great Power Competition and Cooperation in the Shadow of the Georgian Crises."* Strategic Studies Institute: Pg. 45.

³⁵ UN. *"Security council, SC, UNSC, security, peace, sanctions, veto, resolution, president, united nations, UN, peacekeeping, peace building, conflict resolution, prevention."* UN News Center. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/> (accessed June 1, 2014).

³⁶ *"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation official site."* MFA of Russia. http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D (accessed June 1, 2014).

³⁷Barysch, Katinka, Christopher Coker, and Leszek Jesien. 2011 *"EU-Russia Relations. Time for Realistic Turnaround."* Center For European Studies.

³⁸Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007 *"The European Union and Russia: Close Neighbours, Global Players, Strategic Partners."* http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/russia_brochure07_en.pdf (accessed June 1, 2014).

of the European Union like Poland and the Baltic states have difficulties mostly due to lingering resentment generated by the Cold War and the Soviet domination of their governments in the past.

It is obvious to Russia that they have to manage relations better with Poland than with any of the EU's other countries. As a large state on the eastern border of the EU, Poland plays a very important role in the foreign affairs of the European Union, especially with the foreign affairs of the six eastern partnership countries.³⁹

The Eastern Partners are a very diverse group of nations in terms of ethnicity, language, economics, and politics. All of them perceive themselves as independent states, none of which wishes to be seen in the international arena as part of another state's zone of influence. "Zone of Influence" is a major issue in international relations, however this issue is largely an empty one as there is no country that would ever fall into the "Zone" as it has been conceptualized.⁴⁰

It is very difficult to have strong international relations with these countries through a generic policy approach, as they are very unique-not only economically but also politically. Moscow has been trying to increase its influence in these countries through the promotion of its interest in cooperation. In some cases Russia has had success, however this cooperation is one in which the states involved remain fully in control of their sovereignty. For instance, Ukraine is a perfect example of this kind of cooperation. The country under the leadership of president Yushenko was re-orienting itself towards the West, however with new leadership it has changed its views and turned back towards Russia. However, through a subsequent rebalancing of its foreign policy, Ukraine is again turning towards EU. The relations Russia has pursued with Ukraine and the other EaP states have enabled this kind of oscillation.

³⁹Shapovalova , Natalia , and Tomasz Kapuniak. "Is Poland still committed to the Eastern neighbourhood?" Policy Brief 91.

⁴⁰Kreutz, Andrej . "Russian Problem: Russia's Place in the World - An Attempt at Historical and Geopolitical Analysis". Geopolitykanetpolski portal o geopolityce. <http://en.geopolityka.net/russian-problem-russias-place-world-attempt-historical-geopolitical-analysis/> (accessed June 1, 2014).

The current leadership in Ukraine, like its predecessors, sees the importance of having good relations with Russia. Ukraine is now engaged in a sort of balancing act that is politically very deeply complex but has as its ultimate an intention to serve the core interests of the Ukrainian state.

2.2 Russia-EU Relations; Eastern Partnership

As already mentioned, the relations between the founding states of the European Union/European Community and Russia before the downfall of the Soviet Union were defined by their hostile positions on opposite sides of the Cold War⁴¹. Consequently, only at the end of 1980s did the Soviet Union and European Community (EC) begin to develop some bilateral connections. The Soviet Union at that time had no relations with organizations such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact⁴². In order to build a transparent picture of the foreign policy of Russia it is very important to note that 10 of 28 EU member states were once under effective Soviet rule.⁴³ However, the Communist regime ultimately collapsed and consequently the Soviet Union lost its domination over those territories and the constituent republics of the USSR (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 315). These circumstances lead to major changes in Russian foreign policy, which lead to some related changes in the EC's policies (Smith 2002; Gower 2007).

⁴¹Smith, Hazel. 2002. *European Union Foreign Policy: what it is and what it does*. London: Pluto Press. The EU-Russia Centre Review. 2010. *EU Human Rights Policy Towards Russia*. Issue Sixteen. http://www.eurussiacentre.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/10/EURC_review_XVI_ENG.pdf

Also see: Keukeleire, Stephan and Jennifer MacNaughtan. 2008. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

⁴²Smith, Hazel. 2002. *European Union Foreign Policy: what it is and what it does*. London: Pluto Press. The EU-Russia Centre Review. 2010. *EU Human Rights Policy Towards Russia*. Issue Sixteen. http://www.eurussiacentre.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/10/EURC_review_XVI_ENG.pdf

⁴³Keukeleire, Stephan and Jennifer MacNaughtan. 2008. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

It is very important to note that the EC was one of the first Western actors to support the whole reorientation process that was endorsed by Gorbachev (Bruyninckx ad Keukeleire 2011, 387), which was followed in 1989 by changes to the limited scope of trade and economic cooperation between the two entities and assisted the establishment of expanded relations between them. (Smith 2002, 235; Grower 2007, 119)

After gaining independence, the former Soviet States, including Russia, had to rely on the financial support of the European Union, whose main objectives were and still are the promotion of market economy and liberal democracy (Smith 2002). For instance, Russia became one of the main recipients of European financial support and development aid. According to the data that was provided by the delegation of the European Union to Russia, through the program of Technical Assistance for the CIS countries (TACIS) during 1994-2006 the post-Soviet region received 2.7 billion euros. However, after 2006 new regulations for financial assistance were implemented under the name “European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument” (ENPI).

In 1994 the European Union offered Russia the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which in many ways strengthened the evolution of bilateral relations. However, the fact that EU offered Russia only the PCA and not an Association Agreement made it obvious to Russia that the EU had no intention of letting Russia become a candidate for EU membership⁴⁴. Through some time it became obvious for the European Union that the basic economic and trade cooperation agreements it was relying on could not fulfill the requirements that it expected to be met. (Smith 2002) In light of this, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was implemented, in hopes that it could secure a much broader and deeper relationship. The agreement aims to achieve progress in bilateral agreements through its economic, legal, instrumental and administrative framework, with

⁴⁴Gower, Jackie. 2007. “The European Union’s Policy on Russia: Rhetoric or Reality.” In *Russia and Europe in the Twenty-First Century. An Uneasy Partnership*, edited by Jackie Gower and Graham

collective goals in all fields of cooperation.⁴⁵ The main weakness of this agreement was that it relied on the EU's status as a strong mentoring power over Russia that it had established in the 1990's.⁴⁶ However, the agreement paid little attention to the politics of Russia, and later the agreement became deficient as an EU instrument and stopped having effective influence on Russia.

More broadly, Russian strategic culture has evolved remarkably little over the last twenty years. The Putin regime, together with the Russian elite, have for the last twenty years seen the international environment in very Hobbesian terms, a "tough, hostile environment, where the strong prosper and the weak get crushed". This is a world defined principally by the relations between the traditional great powers, where geopolitical influence is absolutely vital, and where hard power is still dominant. Furthermore, the elite perception of Russia's place in the world is centered on an abiding sense of historical entitlement. In the past we have always spoken of the divine rights of kings, nowadays Russia still operates on a sense of the divine rights of power. The Kremlin regards Russia as very much a strong and independent pole in an emerging multi-polar world order. It is in this sense a privileged actor in the international system. This idea that Russia is, was, and always will be a great power, and by its very nature is a global great power predominates, and gives Russia a certain strength in its international relations. Today Moscow sees Russia as a prime beneficiary of what it calls "a global shift in power to the East", with the implication that the western powers are weakening in influence. It seems to feel that Russia, although it is faced with clear challenges for its domestic and foreign policies, stands to gain more than it loses from these circumstances. It can cast itself as the geopolitical balancer between East and West, specifically between the USA and China. Some scholars call Russia "the bridge between civilizations". It is clear that regardless of some minor changes in Russian foreign policy, the mood of the country is generally one of "strategic optimism".

⁴⁵Keukeleire, Stephan, and Jennifer MacNaughtan. *The foreign policy of the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

⁴⁶Medvedev, Sergei. 2008. "Limits of Integration: Identities and Institutions in EU-Russia Relations." *Aleksanteri Papers* 2. <http://www.hse.ru/data/033/940/1224/m1.pdf>

Moscow is clearly holding three main objectives in its foreign policy. The regime wants external acceptance and acquiescence to the legitimacy of the so-called Putin regime and to Russia's specific power for development. Secondly, the Kremlin is trying to reinforce its status as one of the three global powers alongside the USA and China. This is not simply a matter of ego, but one of justifying Russia's values of strategic independence and flexibility. Finally, the third major objective is to be recognized as an indispensable player in regional and global affairs. According to Bobo Lo, we don't have a world order; instead what we have is a "world disorder", with a lack of clarity, growing geopolitical uncertainty and highly unpredictable tensions amongst power groups.⁴⁷ Regardless of its aspirations, a Russia lacking in economic and political reforms is ill-equipped to deal with the demands of the modern age. Russia's status as a great power and prime force in the international sphere can no longer be taken for granted. If it is to maintain its influence it needs to reinvent itself as an international actor. Russia's ability to interfere in foreign states without repercussion has diminished substantially, as the very different international reactions to the war in Afghanistan and the more recent initiatives in Georgia indicate. Therefore, some changes in its international affairs are absolutely necessary. Russia is currently facing five challenges:

First, it needs to demonstrate its willingness to make a real contribution, in terms of a tangible effect on global governance.

Second, it needs to recalibrate, redefine and reestablish its influence in the post-Soviet space. It is no longer able to intervene in an *ad hoc* fashion without creating diplomatic turmoil.

Third, it needs to develop a new paradigm for engagement with Asia if it is to benefit from the economic vitality there or gain political influence in its newly empowered states.

⁴⁷ YouTube. "Russian Foreign Policy: The New and the Old with Dr. Bobo Lo." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRBjNavDdxg> (accessed May 24, 2014).

Fourth, a reconfiguration of relations with the West in terms of clearly defining its views on democracy, economic liberalization, and open society is badly needed if it is to be seen as a legitimate actor in international relations there.

Fifth, Russia needs to modernize itself, not because of western expectations, but for its own benefit. A more competitive Russia would have the tools for promoting its interest in both the West and elsewhere. Without making substantial reforms in terms of productivity, business environment, and accountability Russia will be constrained in its capacity to hold influence over other states.

These are, in sum, the challenges that the Kremlin is facing in its foreign policy. At the same time, they are also complex and difficult challenges for domestic policy in Russia, and none of them will be easy to resolve.

Russia is a member of a vast number of regional and international organizations. In many ways it portrays itself as the perfect international citizen. However, it has very little respect for multilateralism. Multilateralism is a very inclusive concept, in which all parties big and small are participants in the decision-making process. The record has shown that Russia does not believe in the notion of multilateralism.⁴⁸

Furthermore, for Russia the post-Soviet space is of great importance. Another very important question that has been raised by many scholars and political analysts is whether Putin is an imperialist, or whether Russia's main objective is to enter the post-imperial phase of its relations with the post-Soviet republics. Bobo Lo has a very strong opinion on this issue; he does not believe that Moscow has the ambition to recreate post-Soviet empire, not necessarily because it is Russia is unwilling, but because there is a lack of Russia's capacity to do so.⁴⁹ However, Russia remains committed to assuring a dominant influence and position across Eurasia. This can be hardly regarded

⁴⁸Lo, Bobo. *Russia and the new world disorder*. Washington: Chatham House, 2014.

⁴⁹YouTube. "Russian Foreign Policy: The New and the Old with Dr. Bobo Lo." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRBjNavDdxg> (accessed May 24, 2014).

as either imperialism in the classical sense or as post imperialism. It is rather a more postmodern vision of empire, as it is flexible and multivalent in its conception of influence and power. While Russia's fundamental goals and interests in its "Near Abroad" have not changed since the Soviet times, it has become much more flexible in its willingness to adapt to the idiosyncrasies and needs of the various states it deals with there.⁵⁰ Furthermore, Moscow's approach is much more differentiated than it once was in terms of the emphasis and attention it pays to the various states. It is clear that the post-Soviet republics do not weigh equally in the interests of Russia. Ukraine, given its size, demography and historic closeness to Russia weighs high on the list, as does Kazakhstan for its economic importance and the substantial Russian ethnic presence there. Countries like Tajikistan, Armenia, and Kirgizstan attract far less attention from the Kremlin. Hillary Clinton acquired certain infamy when she described the Eurasian Union as a kind of "re-Sovietizing venture". However, she might have missed a key point as the Eurasian Union, although it has a certain economic rationale, is a fundamentally a geopolitical project. Its main purpose is to reestablish Russia as a leading strategic actor in post-Soviet Eurasia. It is also of great importance not only in terms of the Eurasian region, but for projecting Russia as one of the main poles in the new global multipolar order. For instance, the Kremlin has essentially ascribed to a calculation in which the USA dominates the West, China dominates East Asia and Russia has to dominate the post-Soviet space in order to be a part of the center of the global power. Leon Aron, a director of Russian studies, spoke about the idea of Russia being a super power in terms of it having a certain control over the post-Soviet countries through the Eurasian Union.

On the question of Russia is trying to convince EaP countries to become a Russian partners instead of partners of the EU's, the former foreign minister of Russia Ivanov replied that the main logic Russia relies on is not political but economic. Russia has never attempted to change the political

⁵⁰Lo, Bobo. *Russia and the new world disorder*. Washington: Chatham House, 2014.

perspective of any country in the EaP.⁵¹ Moreover, Russia is not in the position to decide on this matter, but can only give some recommendations, as the country has no economic, military or political capacity to facilitate significant change in any foreign political regime.⁵² Ivanov assumes that the best way to promote Russia's interest is to consider and concentrate on issues like the common market economy between the EU, the US, Russia and the world. According to Ivanov, the intentions of the European Union are very obvious, and the Association Agreement is a clear effort to separate the EaP countries from Russia. At the same time, it is obvious that the EaP agreement is not a ticket to the European Union

2.3 Russian Geopolitical Break Through

In his book *"The grand chessboard"*, well-known American geopolitical scholar, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that one of the main objectives of the USA with respect to Eurasia is the prevention of the emergence of a major geopolitical build-up.⁵³ For instance, looking at three countries common resources, Russia, Belarus and Kirgizstan, Russia can be perceived as the real power on the Eurasian space. New diplomatic and political developments can easily re-center world power.

⁵¹ YouTube. "Russian Foreign Policy: The New and the Old with Dr. Bobo Lo." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRBjNavDdxg> (accessed May 24, 2014).

⁵² YouTube. "Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century - Igor Ivanov, Foreign Minister of Russia '98-'04." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1iFI6WV6NJs> (accessed May 24, 2014).

⁵³ Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives*. New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1997.

Russian scholar Nikita Lamashin stated that shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, The Pentagon stated that the main goal for the USA and its allies is to prevent the rebirth of the Soviet Union, or any other union that will carry the same power as the Soviet Union. This explains why any process of integration that will lead to the aggregation of resources and an increased sphere of Russian influence would cause some concerns for US foreign policy.

Furthermore, it is very clear why the Western media responded to the idea of Eurasian Union very negatively. In a deep financial crisis without a clear end in sight, the emergence of complex developments in a new and volatile geopolitical arena does not hold any great promise of benefit for the European Union.⁵⁴ The emergence of a strong competitor in the region may lead to questioning of the role of the European Union. According to Viktor Efimov⁵⁵, “Russia has a very good teacher on the lessons of the creation of the Eurasian Union, we can consider all the mistakes that European Union have overcome recently or may be still struggling to overcome, the perfect example of unsuccessful aspect of the formation of the Union is the creation of the single monetary union with the “Euro” currency”. Moreover, he assumes that Russia, in the creation of the Eurasian Union, should look back at the history of its own country, as there was once a successful union with a single currency and single official language which had as its goal the formation of a fundamentally novel civilization. Efimov’s argument holds a great deal of merit; for instance, a look at the history of Russia at the times of Ivan the Terrible shows that Russia has managed to successfully resolve many of the conceptual issues that Europe is facing now a days. In my view the Eurasian Union is a conceptual masterpiece of strong governance but requires a strong desire on the part of Russia’s

⁵⁴ The strong economical crisis that the European Union had was in 2008, during that time it was not clear when the EU will manage to overcome the crises. However in 2014, the European Union had managed to sooth some economical problems and the Union is getting through this difficult phase.

⁵⁵ Viktor Efimov is a director of the Saint-Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering and an author of a vas number of political articles in Russia. The extract was taken from the interview that Efimov gave to the “Secret Materials” TV show in Russia, that was published on the 4th of March 2013.

neighboring states to actually create a powerful union. The Union under Ivan the Terrible essentially implied the endorsement and use of the Russian language across various linguistic areas, a single unified monetary system, and a certain unity of culture in terms of shared values and expectations. It took some time for Russia to adopt all those principles during the Ivan the Terrible times.⁵⁶

Vladimir Putin's article "A New Eurasian Integration Project- a Future That Starts From Now" argues that the creation of the Eurasian Union started twenty years ago, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created.⁵⁷ According to Putin, the CIS was the perfect solution at that time model for integrating the governments of the post-Soviet republics, which at that point in time still were quite willing to cooperate, not only because of their strong feelings of Soviet nostalgia but also on the basis of their own economic interests. The CIS model helped to preserve industrial, commercial and other ties between the countries. Without the CIS it would have been very difficult to sustain these ties in the chaos of the post-Soviet 1990s. The creation of the CIS raised criticism from a number of scholars from across different countries, the main argument being that it lacked functionality and that the CIS union was essentially very weak, however, the main objective was successfully achieved, namely the creation of a coalition of states which managed to maintain the ties between themselves in the years following the breakdown of the Soviet Union.

The success of the CIS initiative gave Russia a certain confidence to further its efforts at the integration of the post-Soviet states, as evidence by the multilateral agreement between Russia and Belarus, the Organization of the Collective Security treaty, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Customs Union and finally the Common Economic Space.

⁵⁶Rostovskiy, Aleksandr. "Eurasian Union - the Anglo-Saxons in a cold sweat -2." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNy9yQ0tcM> (accessed May 26, 2014). Available only in Russian

⁵⁷Putin, Vladimir. "A new integration project for Eurasia - a future that is born today." Izvestia. <http://izvestia.ru/news/502761> (accessed May 26, 2014). Available in Russian only.

“In fact we are talking about turning integration into an intuitive, attractive (for citizens and businesses), sustainable and long-term project, which is independent of fluctuations in the current political space and any other conditions.”⁵⁸ Controls on the free movement of goods across the Russian, Belarusian and Kazakh borders have been lifted since June 1st, 2011, thereby fulfilling all the requirements for the formation of a full-fledged single customs territory, with clear implications for the implementations of a cross-border initiative to enhance the business environment.

“The purpose of formation of the EAEC is for the Contracting Parties to effectively promote the process of formation of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space, and to implement other objectives and tasks outlined in the above-mentioned agreements on the Customs Union, the Agreement on Deepening Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Spheres, and the Agreement on the Customs Union and Single Economic Space, in stages as scheduled under the above documents.”⁵⁹

The current members of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan⁶⁰.

The EAEC is build on the same basic economic principles as the European Union, namely liberalization and the development of an integrated market economy. In this way the Eurasian Union constitutes Russia's first step towards Europe. However, some perceive it as much more than an economical community and see the establishment of a propaganda mechanism for the eventual creation of a new form of the Soviet Union, which creates an obvious threat for the EU and the US. Clearly, one of the main goals of Russia in its desire to push the EAEC forward is to increase its influence on the other countries involved. A closer look at the actual foreign policy doctrine of Russia described above reveals Moscow's vision of the Eurasian concept, in which the primary

⁵⁸ Putin, Vladimir (Oct 3, 2011) stated in one of his speeches

⁵⁹ "AGREEMENT ON FOUNDATION OF EURASIAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EAEC)." . <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/eaecfta.pdf> (accessed May 26, 2014).

Russian objectives are to increase the state's power and influence. Ukraine remains the biggest prize in Russia's efforts at reconstituting itself to increase its influence abroad.

Conclusion, thorough the conducted research it is obvious that Ukraine and Russia have a very close ties, despite so many discourses that both countries have had through the history after the brake up of the Soviet Union. The Russian position in international arena with Ukraine is also quite obvious, for country Ukraine is a very important neighbor that has shared history, language and economy. However, Russia is aware of the strong competitor (EU) in terms of the better economic cooperation with Ukraine, and therefore practices its influential power over Ukraine.

CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDY- UKRAINE

The Eastern Partnership Agreement, as already have been mentioned, between the EU and the Ukraine was launched in May 2009, by the “Prague Joint Declaration”. It is of a high importance to note that Ukraine was and still is the main and the most successful candidate for the EaP. However as Stegnyy points out in one of his works that the meager progress in EaP is the outcome of the weak cooperation of both Ukraine and the EU.⁶¹ For instance, not much progress has been done in the fields of liberal market economy or political sphere by the EU, the same can be stated from the Ukraine’s side, as there is a high level of unwillingness of Ukrainian politicians to fulfill the requirements of this project, which leads to the increasing dissatisfaction towards EU’s approach. Considering the illustrated earlier in chapter 1 and chapter 2 the approaches that EU and Russia are using to allure Ukraine, I would like to analyze the position of Ukraine in this so-called tactical battle between the EU and Russia. Social cohesion and local governance are very important political principles that have unfortunately created many obstacles for Ukrainian politics, and could be the main source of uncertainty in its decision to join the EaP or the EAEC.⁶²

3.1 Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership

⁶¹ Stegnyy, Oleksandr. "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: 'Lost in Translation'?" In *Eastern Partnership*, . Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2014.

⁶² Ibid

The deepening of the European Union's involvement in the post-Soviet realm is well illustrated by the replacement of the ENP with the Eastern Partnership in 2009. The EaP for Ukraine brought both good and bad news. Unfortunately, as a result of the new policy initiative, Ukraine's status was automatically downgraded from EU candidate for full membership to a partner country with no clear prospect of joining the Union. One of the principal political objectives of Ukraine was to join the European Union; in fact, the country was about to apply for the membership of the EU, but the reduction in status of the Ukraine to an EaP partner alongside countries like Belarus and Armenia with far dimmer prospects of membership took this option off of the table. Moreover, the generic policy approach of the EaP towards its various member states was met with dissatisfaction in Ukraine. The "one-size-fits-all" approach automatically placed Ukraine in the same category as the other states in terms of relations with the EU, as the initiative essentially presented an equal (but distant) prospect of EU membership to all of the states involved in the partnership.⁶³ At the same time, the launch of the EaP also brought a positive change for the Ukraine in that it was from that point relabeled a 'neighbor' of the EU rather than simply a 'partner'.

The Ukraine remains a prime candidate for improved relations with and possibly membership in the EU amongst the EaP given the close ties that had been established before the program's launch. The EU and Ukraine before the launch of the EaP were actively discussing and negotiating various issues, specifically the issues of the 'Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreement', being as it is the main component of the 'Association Agreement', but the 'Visa facilitation Agreement' was also a matter of great importance. Ukraine and the European Council signed the 'Visa Facilitation Agreement' on the 22nd of November 2010, which established a visa free regime for short stays in the EU. Furthermore, Ukraine consented to the EU's involvement in its domestic reforms, which lead to the implementation of the Association Agenda in 2010. It is a so-called 'Blue Print for domestic reforms

⁶³Solonenko, Iryna. "Debating Eastern Partnership: A comparison of perspectives and expectations Report on Ukraine." *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*. http://www.feswar.org.pl/fes2009/pdf_doc/Ukraine.pdf

(EMP Action Plan second generation)'. Furthermore, since the launch of EaP there has been an increase in the number of institutions running dialogue between the two polities at a number of different levels, including civil society and people-to people contacts.

One of the main reasons why Ukraine is not willing to contribute more to the EaP is that the agreement has seen little change since its initial implementation.

Stegniy cites the lack of horizontal executive coordination, continued Ukrainian skepticism towards free markets, economic openness, and Western democracy, as well as asymmetric (i.e. one-sided) economic and political relations with the EU for the ongoing weakness of real reform in the country⁶⁴. However, Stegniyy points out that there has been "no real reform to underpin Ukraine's internal preparation for closer integration", despite the many agreements and documents which have been generated since the beginning of EU-Ukraine relations, which started soon after the country gained independence from the Soviet Union.⁶⁵

After much time and effort a dedicated internal body was created for dealing with the EU, however, the country still experiences coordination problems at the executive level that are yet to be overcome. This is worsened by the fact that since the EU's refusal of the Ukrainian action plan for integration in favor of its own Eastern Neighborhood Policy in 2004, communication with elite policy makers in Ukraine has been uneasy. In the same year, exports to the EU began to decline, while trade with the other CIS states doubled that year and continued to increase considerably, leading many to conclude that "one of the main ideas of the ENP, attaining a share in the EU internal market in exchange for the country's EU-nization, did not seem to work for Ukraine".⁶⁶

The EU has never been able to define clearly the boundaries of Europe, but a clear border persists between the former Soviet Republics (other than the Baltics) and the former satellite states; Stegniyy

⁶⁴ Stegniyy, Oleksandr. "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: 'Lost in Translation'?" In *Eastern Partnership*, . Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2014.

⁶⁵ Ibid., Stegniyy, Oleksandr. "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: 'Lost in Translation'?" Pg. 47

⁶⁶ Ibid., Stegniyy, Oleksandr. "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: 'Lost in Translation'?" Pg. 54

examines some of the facets of this boundary. The “legal-institutional boundary” is essentially the gap between the EU reforms adopted so far within its member states and the legislative and regulatory areas in which Ukraine still lags behind. The “transactional boundary” lies in the fact that while Ukrainians see considerable economic gains in cooperating with the EU, there has been little development so far to convince the EU that it has real economic prospects in Ukraine, despite Ukrainian convictions that it has much to offer in terms of resources, skilled labor, and markets for products and services. The “geopolitical boundary” essentially involves Russia’s historical and present control over the country and the implications thereof for relations with a polity that does not share it.

Stegniy arrives at the conclusion that “the prospects of Ukrainian-EU relations depend on the extent of Ukraine’s progress in promoting its own interests, as well as adoption and adaptation of EU rules and norms for practical purposes”.⁶⁷ Ukraine has made substantial reforms since communism and has improved its relations with the EU, but has done little to convince the Union that it has a strong economic incentive to foster ties to the country out of its own self-interest. However, there are tremendous ramifications for Ukraine’s pursuit of increased ties to the EU, specifically in terms of its relations with Russia. By coordinating relations and legislation and furthering the process of implementing EU *l’acquis communautaire* reforms and EU standards by way of the Association Agreement, as well as continuing its general political re-orientation away from the CIS/Russia and towards the West, which is at this point hardly to be taken for granted. While Ukraine may begin to open up its domestic market and become a greater trade partner for the EU, until that point it is likely to remain an underdeveloped peripheral state. The lack of specific attention paid to Ukraine and its idiosyncrasies, even given the advent of the EaP, only speaks to the “Russia First” policy that the EU continues to ascribe to.

⁶⁷Stegniy, Oleksandr. "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: 'Lost in Translation'?" Pg. 67

The conditions and dynamics of the cooperative agreements that have been achieved between the EU and Ukraine over the past several years (that is, since the launch of the EaP) are substantially different than those of the preceding relationship. The substantial change in the EU's priorities can explain this. Despite the substantial change in domestic political mentality following immediately after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the EU felt little alteration to its pursuits there. During that time, after 2004, the EU's main objective was 'Russia-first' policy. The European Union was offering all of its policy tools to Russia first with Ukraine as an afterthought. However, when Russia turned down the offer of partnership, Ukraine became the top-priority country in the EaP, albeit with an unclear perspective towards actual membership. Since that time the EU started to interfere and help Ukraine doing its homework, from 2004 till 2010 the European Commission launched three reports on the domestic development of the country. However, through the time, the so-called 'progress reports' became more comprehensive although less critical.⁶⁸ The Eastern Partnership has, in its initial conception, strengthened the relationship between EU and Ukraine, however, not much has been achieved in real terms since the launch of the program, and its effects have been limited to planning and negotiations.

The decrease of Ukraine's interest in the Eastern Partnership can largely be explained in terms of the lack of internal cohesion in the country. In the following sub-chapter I will analyze the difficulties associated with building internal cohesion in Ukraine through an analysis of Ukraine as a state, as any state is only strong given a strong level of internal cohesion, regardless of the external forces acting upon it.

⁶⁸For a comprehensive comparison of the EU's policy towards Ukraine before the ENP was launched and afterwards see Solonenko, Iryna (2007): „The EU's „Transformative Power“ beyond Enlargement: the Case of Ukraine's Democratisation“. European Research Working Paper Series (21). The University of Birmingham European Research Institute, http://www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/working_papers/WP21Solonenko.pdf, 2014.

3.2 Internal Cohesion of Ukraine

Ever since Ukraine has declared its independence from the Soviet Union and began its path as an independent state, the country found itself struggling in the search of identity. I am going to apply the internal cohesion framework to my analysis of the diversities in Ukraine. This analysis of Ukraine's internal cohesion will examine language differences, ethnic divisions and the difference in regional economies. By language differences I am specifically focused on the Ukrainian-Russian divide, ethnic division focuses on a similar dichotomy between Ukrainian and Russian, and by regional economics, I focus on the different economic structures underlying eastern and western Ukraine.

Language Difference

It is very important to note that Ukraine and Russia shared a common history, which goes back to the KyivanRus'. The KyivanRus' belonged to the medieval East Slavic state, which was centered around the city Kiev, the modern day capital of Ukraine.⁶⁹ According to Soviet historians, the Eastern Slavs belonged to the "Old Rus' " in terms of their nationality or ethnicity, a historic polity in which they shared the same values and spoke the same language.⁷⁰ However, according to Plokhy, the Ukrainian language is considered to lie within a subgroup or to be a sort of dialect of the Russian language. The Russian and Ukrainian languages are very similar, especially Old Russian and Ukrainian.⁷¹ Despite the similarities between the two tongues, they cannot be considered one language, particularly when considering their different positions within Ukraine.

⁶⁹Plokhy, Serhii. "The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus." *Slavic Review*. 749. (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁷⁰TarasKuzio, "Historiography and National Identity among the Eastern Slavs: Towards a New Framework," *National Identities* 3, no. 2 (2001): 109–32.

⁷¹Plokhy, Serhii. "The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.", op. cit., p. 3.

According to the research that was concluded in March 2012 by the Sociological group “Rating”, 50% of people (within Ukraine) judged Ukrainian to be their native language, while 29 percent held it to be Russian. These statistics imply that there is not only a large group of people declaring a different mother tongue than Ukrainian within the Ukrainian state, but that among them there is a substantial sub-group that does not claim Ukrainian or Russian as their mother tongue. The survey shows a predictable difference between western and eastern Ukraine. 96 percent of the West, 75 percent of the center and 58 percent of people in the northern part of Ukraine hold Ukrainian to be their native language. However the eastern, southern and Donbas parts of Ukraine (36%, 56%, 67% respectively) consider Russian to be their native and everyday language.⁷² The research of the Sociological Group showed that support for Ukrainian as the state language was strongest amongst older people, whereas the young generation generally supports Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism.⁷³

In support of the idea of a linguo-political division within Ukraine, the survey showed that (72%) of the respondents that are in support of Russian becoming a state language in Ukraine also support the entry of Ukraine into Russia’s Customs Union.⁷⁴ However, (72%) of the people that are against bilingualism also support the EaP.

Therefore, I can conclude that the language factor in Ukraine is critical to political divides within the country and plays a critical role in Ukrainian policy-making.⁷⁵ The next section explores how the difference in “native” language affects ethnic status within the country.

Ethnic Groups

According to geography, Ukraine is the second biggest country in Europe after Russia. Ukraine borders on three non-EU states; Russia, Belarus and Moldova, and four EU member states; Poland,

⁷²Sociological group "Rating", 2012., op. cit.

⁷³ Ibid., Pg. 2

⁷⁴ Ibid., Pg. 3

⁷⁵O’Loughlin, John . "The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space or Bogus Effect?1." . http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/pec/johnno/pub/ukraine_region_all.pdf (accessed May 31, 2014).

Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.⁷⁶ Ukraine is ultimately a very diverse country. The Mundi index on the demographics profile of Ukraine shows the data for the year 2001: Ukrainians comprise 77.8% of its populace, Russians 17.3%, and Belarusians 0.6%. Moldovans, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Rumanians, Polish and Jewish are all under 0.5%.⁷⁷ However, the last census of Ukraine's ethnic groups was taken in 2001, which creates a gap and an obstacle in my analysis. Inasmuch as this is the most recent census data available, I will rely on what was collected in 2001.

According to O'Loughlin, three main socio-ethnic groups evolved over time in Ukraine; Russophone. Russians (about 20% of the people living in Ukraine), Ukrainophone Ukrainians (about 45% of Ukrainians that speak and consider Ukrainian as their mother language) and Russophone Ukrainians (about 30% of Ukrainians that support and speak the Russian language).⁷⁸ This has created a weak sense of national identity among the Russophone Ukrainians, an ethnic group that mostly supports mainstream Ukrainian political views, while preserving the Russian language and culture.⁷⁹

"The conventional approach to describing ethno-cultural relations in a particular nation-state is in terms of the majority/minority dichotomy, that is, a representation of a society as consisting of the core nation and a minority or number of minorities alongside it."⁸⁰ In, Ukraine, ethno-cultural diversity is treated as a matter of a "powerful majority versus the powerless minority".⁸¹ However, this is a more complex issue than the Russian-Ukrainian ethnic divide would imply; there is a linguistic element to it that transcends ethnicity in its conventional sense.

⁷⁶ Kryzhanivsky, Stepan. "Ukraine." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine> (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁷⁷ "Ukraine Demographics Profile 2013." Ukraine Demographics Profile 2013. http://www.indexmundi.com/ukraine/demographics_profile.html (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁷⁸ O'Loughlin, John. "The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space or Bogus Effect?". http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/pec/john/pub/ukraine_region_all.pdf (accessed May 31, 2014).

⁷⁹ Ryabchuk, Mykola. "A Future Ukraine: One Nation, Two Languages, Three Cultures?." *Ukrainian Weekly* 67: 42.

⁸⁰ Hrytsenko, Oleksandr. "Imagining the Community: Perspectives on Ukraine's Ethno-cultural Diversity." *Nationalities Papers*: 197-222.

⁸¹ Ibid., Pg. 198.

Hrystenko casts the Ukraine's approach to ethno-cultural diversity as an updated version of the Soviet approach, which was constructed on the ideas of "institutionalized personal nationality" or "ascribed ethnicity".⁸² In a similar study of ethnic groups, Hesli (1998) concluded that as a result of the division of the state into West and East, the political views would continue to be divided in Ukraine.⁸³ In the East class identification is more dominant than the ethnical identification in the West. It is readily observed that class identification is strongly connected to the political orientation in the East. Ryabchuk concludes that the outcome of an ethnic-based identity in Ukraine is an orientation towards democracy, whereas the outcome of a class-based orientation is autocracy.⁸⁴ Identity formation in Ukraine is going through a serious interregional and socio-cultural division. Twenty years of independence has not been sufficient to unite the two principle regions of Ukraine. The problem of socio-cultural differences in Ukraine has brought some substantial differences in the way the West and the East perceive themselves.⁸⁵ For instance, electoral surveying divided the country into an "Orange" west/center and a "white blue" east/south, which has led to not only a political struggle in the Ukraine but also socio-economic one.⁸⁶

Having said that, I would like to draw your attention to the last main important factor in the framework of internal cohesion, which is Ukraine's economy. I chose economy as yet another factor for Ukrainian internal cohesion because Ukraine, as stated before, is the second largest state in

⁸² Ibid., Pg. 198.

⁸³ Hesli, Vicki. "Political party development in divided societies: the case of Ukraine." *Electoral Studies* 17: 235-256.

⁸⁴ Ryabchuk, Mykola . "A Future Ukraine: One Nation, Two Languages, Three Cultures?." *Ukrainian Weekly* 67: 42.

⁸⁵ Federal State Institution of Science Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. "Russia and Ukraine: issues of social and economic development in the context of the mutual relations.." . http://inecon.org/docs/Vardomsky_paper_Russia_Ukraine.pdf (accessed May 16, 2014). This source is available only in Russian.

⁸⁶ Ibid., Pg. 7.

Europe after Russia, and is a large economic area. At the same time, it has been divided by a number of scholars into eastern and western spheres.⁸⁷

Economical partitioning

Until 2008 Ukraine showed very good results on its economical growth, Freedom House ranked Ukraine as the fast-growing economy. From year 2000 till 2007 the economy grew at an average 7.5%.⁸⁸ The fast and radical market reforms were one of the reasons to the successful growth of Ukraine's economy in the post-Soviet space.⁸⁹ In order to clearly see the picture of economic partitioning I would like to analyze the economy of the western Ukraine and the economy of the eastern Ukraine one at a time.

Economic Relations between Russia and Ukraine

Russia and Ukraine through a common historical heritage are closely related to one another in the political, economical and social areas.⁹⁰ However, their interests in the cooperation with one another are very different. For Russia the most important is the geo-political side of this cooperation, for instance the main goal for Russian is the recognition of it by Ukraine and other geopolitical players, as the privileged and main economical actor in that region.⁹¹ However, Ukraine has different interests in the economical relations with Russia. The main objectives for Ukraine in the economic area cooperation are the access to Russian market and the insurance in the fixed supply of fuel and gas.⁹²

⁸⁷ Vakhtang, Surguladze. "Underpinnings of economical events in Ukraine." <http://www.riss.ru/analitika/2481-ob-ekonomicheskoy-podopljoke-sobytij-na-ukraine> (accessed May 31, 2014).

⁸⁸ Aslund, Anders. *How Ukraine became a market economy and democracy*. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009. Pg. xiii

⁸⁹ Ibid., Pg. xiv

⁹⁰ Federal State Institution of Science Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. "Russia and Ukraine: issues of social and economic development in the context of the mutual relations.." . http://inecon.org/docs/Vardomsky_paper_Russia_Ukraine.pdf (accessed May 16, 2014). This source is available only in Russian.

⁹¹ Ibid., Pg. 7.

⁹² Ibid.,Pg.7.

Vladimir Putin, in one of the conferences that were organized before the Vilnius Summit in 2013, stated that if Ukraine will sign the Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreement with the EU, Russia would have to change its regulations on natural gas, economic exports and the labor migration.⁹³ Ukraine is very dependent on Russian energy supplies and deficiency of structural reforms made the Ukraine's economy vulnerable to the outer shocks. According to the data that is provided by the *The World Fact book*, "Ukraine depends on imports to meet about three-fourths of its annual oil and natural gas requirements and 100% of its nuclear fuel needs."⁹⁴ In January 2009, Ukraine signed a ten-year transit contract with Russia on the gas supply, however the gas prices reached the "world" level.⁹⁵ Although, the prices went up, this agreement was signed in order to prevent the incidents like the one in 2009.⁹⁶ However, Ukraine is independent in its electricity production as the country has its own nuclear power plant and hydroelectricity plant, for instance it supplies its electricity to Russia and other Eastern European states.⁹⁷ Russia is the main export and import partner of Ukraine (25.6% and 32.4% respectively) in 2012.⁹⁸ As Ukraine and Russia are interconnected in their economy, a lot of Russian offices and big corporations are based in the Eastern part of Ukraine, this creates a big flow of labor migration in and out of the country.⁹⁹ According to the International Organization for Migration, the vast majority of Russian labor migrants live and work in the eastern part of Ukraine, thus creating Russian communities and giving rise to Russian schools and media.

⁹³ You can see the full speech in original language Russian in: Expert, Money. "Putin and the European Union to Ukraine blackmail street demonstrations riots." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZhsdpGMCDw> (accessed May 31, 2014).

⁹⁴ Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html> (accessed May 31, 2014).

⁹⁵ Ibid., <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>

⁹⁶ In 2009 Russia after a two weeks of disputes cut off the gas supply to Ukraine therefore to the whole EU. (see cia.gov library publications)

⁹⁷ See World Bank website for further information.

⁹⁸ Ibid., <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>

⁹⁹ International organization for Migration. "Migration in Ukraine, facts and figures." <http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/countries/docs/Ukraine/Migration-in-Ukraine-Facts-and-Figures.pdf> (accessed May 31, 2014).

European Union is the second largest trade partner with Ukraine; WTO trade profile of Ukraineshows that 30.9% of imports and 24.9% of exports in 2012.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, Ukraine is the first non-EU member state that joined the GSE platform.

“Gas Infrastructure Europe is a representative organization towards the European Institutions (European Commission, European Parliament, Council of the European Union) as well as the European bodies of regulators (ERGEG, CEER) and other stakeholders”.¹⁰¹ Nicole Otterberg, GSE president, stated: “Transparency on storage levels is a key indicator to measure security of gas supply in Europe. GSE is proud to expand the level of transparency by winning Naftogaz of Ukraine as a new contributor to AGSI+”.¹⁰²

According to the data provided by the Eurostat during the years of 2000-2007 the trade in goods between 27 member states and Ukraine tripled in value: “exports rose from 5.5 billion euro to 22.4 bn, while imports increased from 4.8 bn to 12.4 bn. As a result, the surplus between member states and the Ukraine increased from 0.6 bn in 2000 to 10.0 bn in 2007, the share in the total external trade in goods between member states and Ukraine has more than doubled between 2000 and 2007. In 2007, Ukraine accounted for 2% of EU’s exports and 1% of EU imports, and was the EU 16th

¹⁰⁰ "Trade Profiles." Trade Profiles.
<http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=UA>
(accessed May 31, 2014).

¹⁰¹ GIE. "Gas Infrastructure Europe." <http://www.gie.eu/index.php/about-us/who-we-are> (accessed May 18, 2014).

¹⁰² Inogate.org. "As it is stated in Press-release of Neftogaz of Ukraine, it joins AGSI+ transparency platform of Gas Infrastructure Europe." http://www.inogate.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=478%3A%20naftogaz-of-ukraine-joins-agsi-transparency-platform-of-gas-infrastructure-europe&catid=38%3A%20regional-news-events&Itemid=68&lang=en (accessed May 15, 2014).

most important trading partner.”¹⁰³ Furthermore, among EU member states Germany, Poland and Italy in 2007 were the main trading partners.

Since 2007 the trading between the EU and Ukraine has not changes, moreover, EU is in the process of making the closer economic integration with the Ukraine through the Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreement.

CONCLUSION

As was established in the introduction, the main aim of this research was to understand *to what extent the influence of the EU's EaP and of Russia's foreign policy are enabled by Ukraine's internal cohesion*. In order to

¹⁰³ "Eurostat newsrelease." *An EU27 surplus in trade in goods with Ukraine of 10 bn euro in 2007* STAT/08/125.

answer this question, the research was based on the analysis of the existing literature, through the study of the primary sources, including documents, video recordings of conferences and the World Bank and Eurostat statistical data.

Considering the findings in the last chapter of the thesis, the analysis shows that there is a low level of internal cohesion inside Ukraine, and that this is the main obstacle to decision-making there. The weak internal cohesion created a fertile ground for the so-called tactical battle between the EU and Russia. Social cohesion and local governance are very important political principles that have unfortunately created many obstacles for Ukrainian politics, and have become the main source of uncertainty in its decision to join the EaP or the EAEC.

It is thus visible from the analysis that the tension inside the country is increasing as the EU and Russia continue to offer better deals and perspectives for future improvements in relations. Ukraine is unfortunately the state with the weakest internal cohesion among other the various Eastern Partners. For example, Georgia and Armenia are states with very strong internal cohesion, inasmuch the people in these states share the same language, culture, past tradition and history; however, this is not the case in Ukraine. The Ukraine that we see on the map is a very big territory that used to be part of the Soviet Union. However, the maintenance of this territorial entity was largely facilitated by the broader Soviet structure. However, Ukraine has struggled in overcoming its split with the Soviet Union, and today we see that there is still a lack of cohesion, and Ukrainian politicians are hard-pressed to agree on anything. A key reason behind this is that there is no shared heritage, no true common language, no deep cultural affiliations, and a general lack of internal cohesion.

The main challenges that I have experienced while conducting this research has been insufficient data, for instance, the demographic data on ethnicity and language in Ukraine was collected mostly during the 2000-2007 period. Furthermore, there has been little research done so far in the field of internal coherence in Ukraine.

In conclusion, what this research has attempted to show is that if the internal cohesion is not strong enough to bind Ukraine together as a state, the international community will have to fill this role. This is very much the intention of the EU and the USA or both together through NATO. They would very much prefer to see Ukraine to be a united, cohesive state, and ideally one with strong ties to the West. The recent political events there and their implications for the international relations in Ukraine show that Russia is contesting the very statehood of Ukraine, perhaps not directly but through some of its actions, namely its contesting of the legitimacy of the government in Ukraine, questioning the legitimacy of the upcoming presidential elections, and infringing on Ukraine's territorial integrity through the Crimea occupation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aslund, Anders. How Ukraine became a market economy and democracy. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009. Pg. xiii
- "AGREEMENT ON FOUNDATION OF EURASIAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EAEC)."
<http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/caecfta.pdf> (accessed May 26, 2014).
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1997.
- Bosse, Giselle. "Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership: the values/security nexus in EU–Belarus relations." *Contemporary Politics* 15.2 (2009): 215-227.
- Boonstra, Jos, Natalia Shapovalova, and Espan Madrid. *The EU's eastern partnership: one year backwards / Jos Boonstra and Natalia Shapovalova*. Madrid: FRIDE, 2010.
- B. Ferrero-Waldner, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: the EU's newest foreign policy instrument", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11, 2006.
- Barbé, Esther/Johansson-Nogués, Elisabeth 2008: The EU as a modest 'force for good': the European Neighbourhood Policy, in: *International Affairs* 84: 1, 81-96.
- Börzel, Tanja A./Risse Thomas 2004: One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. Democracy promotion, Paper prepared for the Workshop on Democracy Promotion organized by the Center for Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 4-5 October 2004, Stanford University
- Barysch, Katinka, Christopher Coker, and Leszek Jesien. 2011 "EU-Russia Relations. Time for Realistic Turnaround." Center For European Studies.

- Christou, George. 2010 "European Union security logics to the east: the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership." *European Security*: 413-430.
- Crawford, Gordon 2000: European Union Development Co-operation and the Promotion of Democracy, in: Burnell, Peter (Ed.): Democracy Assistance. International Co-operation for Democracy, London, 90-127.
- Gower, Jackie. 2007. "The European Union's Policy on Russia: Rhetoric or Reality." In *Russia and Europe in the Twenty-First Century. An Uneasy Partnership*, edited by Jackie Gower and Graham
- Havlik, Peter. November 2013 "*Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit: A Milestone in EU-Russia Relations – not just for Ukraine*." Policy Note/Policy Report N. 11: Pg. 32.
- Hrytsenko, Oleksandr. "Imagining the Community: Perspectives on Ukraine's Ethno-cultural Diversity." *Nationalities Papers*: 197-222.
- Haglund, M., Anne and Silander, D., eds. (2007), *The European Union and the outside World: Global Themes in a European Setting*, Växjö, Växjö University Press, 254 pages.extracted from Pg.89
- Hesli, Vicki. "Political party development in divided societies: the case of Ukraine." *Electoral Studies* 17: 235-256.
- Kryzhanivsky, Stepan. "Ukraine." Encyclopedia Britannica Online.
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine> (accessed May 30, 2014).
- Keukeleire , Stephan and Jennifer MacNaughtan. 2008. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Kreutz, Andrej . "Russian Problem: Russia's Place in the World - An Attempt at Historical and Geopolitical Analysis". Geopolitykanetpolski portal o geopolityce.<http://en.geopolityka.net/russian-problem-russias-place-world-attempt-historical-geopolitical-analysis/> (accessed June 1, 2014).
- Korosteleva, Elena. 2011 "The Eastern Partnership Initiative: A New Opportunity for Neighbours?." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*: 1-21.

Lo, Bobo. *Russia and the new world disorder*. Washington: Chatham House, 2014.

Marin, Anaïs. 2012 "Eastern Partnership: A New Opportunity for the Neighbours." *Journal of Borderlands Studies*: 367-368.

Maier, Sylvia/Schimmelfennig, Frank 2007: Shared Values: Democracy and Human Rights, in: Weber,

Katja/Smith, Michael E./Baun, Michael (Eds.): *Governing Europe's Neighborhood: Partners or Periphery?*, Manchester and New York, 39-57.

Medvedev, Sergei. 2008. "Limits of Integration: Identities and Institutions in EU-Russia Relations." *Aleksanteri Papers* 2. <http://www.hse.ru/data/033/940/1224/m1.pdf>

O'Loughlin, John . "The Regional Factor in Contemporary Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space or Bogus Effect?1." . http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/pec/johno/pub/ukraine_region_all.pdf (accessed May 31, 2014).

Plochy, Serhii. "The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus." *Slavic Review*: 749. (accessed May 30, 2014).

Putin, Vladimir. " A new integration project for Eurasia - a future that is born today." *Izvestia*. <http://izvestia.ru/news/502761> (accessed May 26, 2014)

Ryabchuk, Mykola . "A Future Ukraine: One Nation, Two Languages, Three Cultures?." *Ukrainian Weekly* 67: 42.

Rostovskiy, Aleksandr. " Eurasian Union - the Anglo-Saxons in a cold sweat -2." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNY9yQ0tcM> (accessed May 26, 2014).

Shapovalova , Natalia , and Tomasz Kapuniak. "Is Poland still committed to the Eastern neighbourhood?." *Policy Brief* 91.

Schimmelfennig, Frank 2007: European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe, in: *East European Politics and Societies* 21: 1, 126-141.

Sikorski, Radoslaw. The EU's "Eastern Partnership" with Former Soviet States Holds the Key to Relations with Russia. *Europe's World*, Summer 2009.
<http://europesworld.org/2009/06/01/the-eus-eastern-partnership-with-former-soviet-states-holds-the-key-to-relations-with-russia/#.U2ZLzmSz4I>

Smith, Hazel. 2002. *European Union Foreign Policy: what it is and what it does*. London: Pluto Press. The EU-RussiaCentreReview. 2010. *EU Human Rights Policy Towards Russia*. Issue Sixteen.
http://www.eurussiacentre.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/10/EURC_review_XVI_ENG.pdf

Stegniy, Oleksandr. "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: 'Lost in Translation'?" In *Eastern Partnership*, . Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2014.

Solonenko, Iryna. "Debating Eastern Partnership: A comparison of perspectives and expectations Report on Ukraine." *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*.
http://www.feswar.org.pl/fes2009/pdf_doc/Ukraine.pdf

Solonenko, Iryna (2007): „The EU“s „Transformative Power“ beyond Enlargement: the Case of Ukraine“sDemocratisation“. European Research Working Paper Series (21). The University of Birmingham European Research Institute,
http://www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/working_papers/WP21Solonenko.pdf , 2014.

TarasKuzio, "Historiography and National Identity among the Eastern Slavs: Towards a New Framework," *National Identities* 3, no. 2 (2001): 109–32.

Tanja A. Borzel and Diana Panke, "Europeanization" in *European Union Politics*, 3rd edition, ed. Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez-SolorzanoBorragan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4006-407

Vakhtang, Surguladze . "Underpinnings of economical events in Ukraine."

<http://www.riss.ru/analitika/2481-ob-ekonomicheskoy-podoplyoke-sobytij-na-ukraine>

(accessed May 31, 2014).

Viktor Efimov "Secret Materials" TV show in Russia, that was published on the 4th of March 2013.

Van Elsuwege P. (2012), *'Towards a Modernisation of EU-Russia Legal Relations?'*, CEURUS EU-Russia Papers, No. 5. Pg.1

Vachudova, Milada A. 2005: Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism, Oxford.

Walski, Krzysztof . "The European Union's Eastern Neighborhood: The Eastern Partnership as a Strategy of EU Engagement and Security." *Penn McNair Research Journal* 2: 1-15. (accessed May 19, 2014).

Website of the Index Mundi "Ukraine Demographics Profile 2013." Ukraine Demographics Profile 2013. http://www.indexmundi.com/ukraine/demographics_profile.html (accessed May 30, 2014).

Website of the Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html> (accessed May 31, 2014).

Website of the Council of the European, Union. 7 May 2009 "*Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit.*" EN 8435/09 (Presse 78).

Website of the Federal State Institution of Science Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. "Russia and Ukraine: issues of social and economic development in the context of the mutual relations.."

http://inecon.org/docs/Vardomsky_paper_Russia_Ukraine.pdf (accessed May 16, 2014).

This source is available only in Russian.

Website of the Expert, Money. "Putin and the European Union to Ukraine blackmail street demonstrations riots." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZhdpqmCDw> (accessed May 31, 2014).

Website of the Eurostat newsrelease. " *An EU27 surplus in trade in goods with Ukraine of 10 bn euro in 2007* STAT/08/125.

Website of the Erasmus Mundus Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency. "Erasmus Mundus Programme." http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus_mundus/index_en.php (accessed May 5, 2014).

Website of the GIE. "Gas Infrastructure Europe." <http://www.gie.eu/index.php/about-us/who-we-are> (accessed May 18, 2014).

Website of the Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. 2010 "Ukraine-EU Relations." <http://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-eu/relations> (accessed May 1, 2014).

Website of the Migration International "Migration in Ukraine, facts and figures." <http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/countries/docs/Ukraine/Migration-in-Ukraine-Facts-and-Figures.pdf> (accessed May 31, 2014).

Website of the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007 "The European Union and Russia: Close Neighbours, Global Players, Strategic Partners." http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/russia_brochure07_en.pdf (accessed June 1, 2014).

Website of the OSCE "OSCE." Representative on Freedom of the Media. <http://www.osce.org/fom> (accessed June 1, 2014).

Website of the Inogate.org. "As it is stated in Press-release of Neftogaz of Ukraine, it joins AGSI+ transparency platform of Gas Infrastructure Europe." http://www.inogate.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=478%3Anaftog

az-of-ukraine-joins-agsi-transparency-platform-of-gas-infrastructure-europe&catid=38%3Aregional-news-events&Itemid=68&lang=en (accessed May 15, 2014).

Website of the Trade Profiles "Trade Profiles."
<http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=UA>
A (accessed May 31, 2014).

Website of the Tempus Programme "Tempus Programme."
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/index_en.php (accessed May 28, 2014).

Website of the EuropeAid "Panorama of regional programs and projects of the EU Eastern Partnership and Russia." Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid.
http://www.enpi-info.eu/files/publications/panorama%20East%20RU_low%20resolution.pdf "Панорама региональных программ проектов ЕС Восточное партнерство и Россия." *Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid*. Translation:

Website of the UN. "Security council, SC, UNSC, security, peace, sanctions, veto, resolution, president, united nations, UN, peacekeeping, peace building, conflict resolution, prevention." UN News Center.
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/> (accessed June 1, 2014).

Website of the "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation official site." MFA of Russia.
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D (accessed June 1, 2014).

Website of the WTO "WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION."
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/rt_a_08apr14_e.htm (accessed June 1, 2014).

Wishnick, Elizabeth. "Russia, China and The US in Central Asia: Prospects for Great Power Competition and Cooperation in the Shadow of the Georgian Crises." Strategic Studies Institute: Pg. 45.

YouTube. "Russian Foreign Policy: The New and the Old with Dr. Bobo Lo." YouTube.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRBjNavDdxg> (accessed May 24, 2014).

YouTube. "Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century - Igor Ivanov, Foreign Minister of Russia '98-'04." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1iFI6WV6NJs> (accessed May 24, 2014).

Zangl, Bernhard 2001: Bringing Courts Back In. Normdurchsetzungim GATT, in der WTO und der EG, in: *Swiss Political Science Review* 7: 2, 49-80.

