THE PRODUCTION OF A NEW FIELD IN THE POLITICAL ARENA OF TURKEY:
THE CASE OF GEZI RESISTANCE

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Abstract

This study focuses on the question of how cooperation emerges from internally conflicting groups within an umbrella movement with a plethora of distinct movements. With its emphasis on solidarity in a single movement, social movements literature falls short of explaining this question. Even though the approaches that try to understand social movements through field theory offer to fill this gap, applying field theory alone misses how different groups within a movement cooperate. I address this theoretical question through the occupation of Gezi Park. The importance of this specific phase of the Gezi Resistance lies in its being as a new social space in the political arena of Turkey in which quite different protesters resisted together for the first time. To understand how these diversified, even historically conflicting groups cooperated and formed some sort of solidarity, I adopt the framework of regarding social movements as fields. Considering this occupation phase as a field of both contention and cooperation, I use Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, practice, and field to have a better understanding than social movement theories give. My analyses demonstrate that the solidarity among varied dissenters in Gezi Park was possible with the help of the social space in which movement-consistent practices were acted through negotiations, rather than with the help of a common interest or claim.

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INTRODUCTION

On May 31 2013, I was trying to finish my term project when I received a call from Mehmet, one of my cousins telling me that there is a call for gathering in Taksim Square. I checked the news, could not find anything about the demonstration and went back to the grind. After a while, I noticed that students around me started to chat about the demonstration and leave the library to go to Taksim square. I joined them while thinking that I can finish the project after I return home.

When we arrived to Beşiktaş, the bus driver turned to the passengers and said "The street is closed by the police, you should get off here." We started to walk towards Taksim Square. While getting closer to the square, we started breathing the tear gas, without knowing that it would become a part of our daily life in the following month. Since the clashes between the protestors and the police forces already started, we could not reach the square. However, we were lucky enough to be one of those few people, who were not involved to any political groups but still could reach the Halaskar Gazi Street that is next to Gezi Park. Not having been in such a conflict area before, I and my friends that I could manage to meet at the heart of the clash were constantly trying to figure out what was going on. While passing hours by setting ourselves back when the police attacked and proceeded towards Gezi Park when they withdrew, we tried to grasp how the crowd could be organized so fast. We all were astonished when we saw middle age women and men attempting to enter the battlefield with their musical instruments, pots and pans in their hands.

When we returned home, I already forgot about my term project, and the first thing I did was to create a Twitter account, my first. Although I participated before in demonstrations organized by different groups such as labor unions, student collectives,

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feminists and LGBTQ associations, the crowd and the atmosphere of the demonstration that I was a part of in the 31st of the May, was not similar to what I experienced before.

In the morning of July the first, the first thing to do was to check the newly opened Twitter account to check what happened while I was sleeping which was followed by a quick move towards the park. Everybody was struggling to reach to Taksim Square from various streets leading there. While walking towards Taksim from Beşiktaş, we encountered a huge crowd with flags of Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, People's Republican Party) at hand shouting the slogan of "We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal". When we first heard of it, we could just move away from them. Thanks to the smart phone of Olcay, one of my close friends, we asked Twitter what was going on and learn that CHP cancelled the party demonstration and decided to participate in the crowd at Gezi Park. While walking and checking the news, a counter-slogan reached our ears "We won't kill, we won't die, we won't become anyone's solider." With a feeling of joy and hesitation, we shouted the counter-slogan. Again while getting closer to Taksim, the tear gas started to dominate the ambiance and the counter slogan scaled up the voice. I remember thinking about the possible outcome of a clash between CHP party members and conscientious objectors. It did not happen. This encounter is an example of the negotiations among Gezi protestors that I will elaborate on this study.

When we reached the square, we were welcomed by a very ambiguous setting, where the demonstrators and police forces were looking at each other. When Türkiye Komunist Partisi (TKP, Turkish Communist Party) members reached the square with slings and stones in their hands, the temporary awkward moment ended and the clash started again. While these pauses, withdraws and pushing forwards became the daily practices of Gezi protestors during the occupation of the park, the counter slogans became much more diversified day by day. In Gezi Park, in addition to the common ones, groups were shouting also their own

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slogans and doing their own practices. Although there were negotiations due to this diversity, no one of them was silenced and each could find a place in the park.

In this thesis, I will elaborate on examples like the one that I gave above by examining the occupation phase of the Gezi Resistance between June 1 and 15 in 2013, an experiment of "another world". Being a new social space in the politics of Turkey, the importance of the occupation of Gezi Park is beyond simply being new: the significance of it was the solidarity built among diverse groups, some of which even would be seen as strange bedfellows such as Kurdish dissenters and the Secular-nationalists, or the Anti-capitalist Muslims and LGBT individuals, or feminists and sexist soccer fan groups. Moreover, the participating groups varied significantly in terms of their not only worldviews and life-styles but also resistance techniques, some of which conflicted with each other severely. In addition, there were constant negotiations over place, namely whether Taksim Square should be occupied or not in addition to Gezi Park, and how to proceed after Taksim Square was evacuated brutally by the riot police.

This study explores some of the key negotiations among protesters during the occupation through ethnographic data to reveal how this unexpected solidarity was possible, generated, and maintained. Unlikely to be seen in many social movements, the co-existence of conflicts and collaborations and constantly negotiating it enabled this solidarity. To illustrate how this co-existence was realized, I provide a conception for the occupation phase as a field of both contention and cooperation. Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, practice, and field reinforce this conception, which would fall short when only social movement theories are taken into account. I assert that the solidarity among various groups in Gezi Park was possible with the help of the new social space gained by physically occupying a place, in which movement-consistent practices were performed through negotiation, instead of with the help of a common interest or claim.

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I begin with reviewing the literature, address the limitations, and set up the appropriate theoretical framework to account for the solidarity among diverse and even historically conflicted groups. The second chapter is a background chapter that sets the stage and describes the fundamentals of the Gezi Resistance by delineating important social, economic, and historical background of Gezi Park. After that, I explain the methodology used in analyzing the occupation of Gezi Park and negotiations among its temporary residents. The final chapter presents my analyses of the ethnographic data, nourished by the theoretical framework. This is followed by a concluding discussion.

Chapter 1 – Applying Bourdieu's Concepts to Social Movements: Influences of a New Field on Protesters

Social movements can be seen as agents' collective resistance to the structure. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the structure-agency debate has been greatly influenced the literature of social movements and protests. In the 1950s and 1960s, crowd dynamics and collective behavior scholars regarded collective action as a pathological collective behavior, and protesters as emotional and irrational individuals (Blumer 1951; Smelser 1962). As a response to this approach, rational choice theory or rational action theory was introduced by an economist, Mancur Olson (1965), mainly arguing that a rational decision maker participates in a collective action if her benefits are greater than her costs. The central question for me here is who defines the rationality. In this respect, rational action theory does not provide a falsifiable explanation regarding "rationality" but rather addresses a single and static rationality definition. According to RAT, English peasants in the eighteenth century who have a "moral economy" (Thompson 1971), that does not based on maximization of individual benefits but their traditional understanding of fairness, are irrational actors. However, I do think that the traditional savvy among peasants in Thompson's moral market is more rational than unrealistic cost/benefit analysis of rational action theory in free market in respect of survival of peasants who live in a subsistence line.

On the other hand, after the prevailing research tradition of SM, i.e. crowd theories, rational action theory was vital for the social movements literature since it provided the cognitive aspect to contentious politics. Fortunately, it did not stick to this unrealistic rationality definition, but has evolved through resource mobilization theory (Oberschall 1973; Gamson 1975; Tilly 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977), which highlights the role of organizational processes and resource availability on mobilization. Recourse mobilization models also emphasize "the centrality of deliberate strategic decisions" (McAdam, Tarrow,

and Tilly 2001, 15); thus, they assume that social movements have clear goals. Emerging from this thought regarding importance of institutional processes (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), political process theories (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978; Tilly 1995; Tarrow 2011; McAdam 1982) emphasize the importance of political environment which create both opportunities and threats for social movements.

As it can be seen in the above review, the concept of agency has a huge significance in social movement writings. Actors who collectively resist the structure can be seen as emotional and deviant, or irrational, if she participates in protests even though her benefits do not meet the costs. Another point I want to emphasize is the contrariness of the streams of thought: starting from extremely emotional agents to the mechanistic and goal-oriented ones without emotions. The cultural turn, namely framing analysis (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; D. A. Snow et al. 1986; D. Snow and Benford 1988; D. A. Snow and Benford 1992), aimed to give culture, emotions, contingent elements, identity and framing processes to the existing theories. Reacting to the structuralist approaches, scholars of this thought do not regard framing as static expression of demand but rather "an active, creative, and constitutive process" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 16) of social agents.

The other alternative to the structuralist approach has been known as the concept of new social movements theory (Buechler 1995, 441). It has been interrogated what was new in the movements called new social movements (Melucci 1994). Mainly developed by Habermas, Touraine, Castells, and Melucci (Buechler 1995; Scott 1990), new social movements theory contrasts new movements with the old ones and stresses the civil society and cultural sphere rather than political sphere, autonomy and self-determination rather than maximizing influence, post-materialist values rather than conflicts on material resources, and processual-constructed nature of collective identities and grievances rather than taken for granted understandings of them (Buechler 1995; Pichardo 1997; Scott 1990). Although, new

social movements theory tries to highlight the previous contrasts, Pichardo, for instance, concludes that the central propositions of the theory do not constitute of a theory or paradigm (1997), which I agree with. I regard those movements focusing on identity politics, democratic rights, environmental issues, animal rights, and the like, as a continuity of old social movements instead of a rupture. Similarly, Scott argues that what has been labeled as new social movements were nothing but the revival of earlier movements, particularly in the United States (Scott 1990, 13).

1.1. Agents in Resistance to the Structure

In the social movement literature, the actors are defined as emotional crowds, irrational actors, imitators, or innovators; however, the question of who has the agency in social movements is left unanswered. The structuralist scholars construct an understanding of social movements with the significance of external structures such as resource availability, political opportunities, or institutionalized processes. Although they have different definitions and limits of structure, they believe in primacy of structure over agency. On the other hand, the scholars who adopt agency-based perspective, generally coming from interpretivist or hermeneutic sociology, emphasize the importance of the reflections, emotions, and framing of the individuals.

For the middle ground between structure and agency, Bourdieu defines the concepts of habitus and field. Regarding the reciprocal and constructing relation between habitus and field, Bourdieu argues that it is "a relation of conditioning [where] the field structures the habitus, which is the product of the embodiment of the immanent necessity of a field, [and] […] a relation of knowledge or cognitive construction [in which] habitus contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world […]" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 127). According to Bourdieu, habitus is a *structured structure* and *structuring structure*: First, there is a "reproduction of the structures in habitus" (Bourdieu 1977, 83), i.e. the agents internalize

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the external structures in their habitus. Second, "the practices produced by the habitus, as the strategy-generating principle enabling agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations" (Bourdieu 1977, 72), is the externalization of the internality.

However, this relation between habitus and practice, i.e. the internalized structure (habitus) of an individual always determines her practices, was criticized as being automatic. According to Vanina Leschziner and Adam Isaiah Green (2013), one of the shortcomings in the field theory originated from reliance on habitus is that "overemphasizing the automatic nature of cognition leaves us with a similarly inadequate understanding of how actors cognize their social contexts to delineate paths of action and a myopic view of the forces that drive practice in a field" (2013, 117). They suggest that a social actor in the field can deliberately or automatically engage in a practice which is habitual (dispositional) or nonhabitual. However, their framework is not explanatory for Gezi Park case. First, for the field of Gezi Park, it is difficult to say which practices were deliberately or automatically habitual, or deliberately or automatically nonhabitual, as Leschziner and Green depicted (2013, 122). I can only talk about habitual or nonhabitual practices - believing some of them were deliberate practices - for some groups whose previous protest techniques and usual practices were known. Second, they suggest that in a new field, if an actor engaged in habitual practices with an automatic cognition, this practice "now fail to resonate with changing conditions" (Leschziner and Green 2013, 124). However, I do think in such a new field which was constantly reconstructed through protesters' negotiations; regarding some practices as resonating and some others not necessitates a comparison with a former settled field which does not clearly defined in Gezi Park case, or a comparison with one's own habitus, which can be done by individual.

On the other hand, according to Giddens, "[a]gency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place." (1984, 9).

Giddens' understanding of agency is very inclusive for different types of acts in a collective action. Moreover, he states "[a]ction depends upon the capability of the individual to 'make a difference' to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events" (Giddens 1984, 14). The actors who participate in a social movement against structure, regardless of their deliberation, have this capability in Giddens' framing which I definitely adopt.

1.2. Understanding Social Movements through Fields

Bourdieu (1992) explicitly claims that specific profits or objectives, or particular types of capital are always *at stake in the field*. That is why, for him, defining a social space as a field means treating it "as a structured space of social forces and struggles" (1992, 243). I think conceptualizing field as a place of competing and struggling to obtain what is at stake in this particular field excludes *fields of social movements*, where the cooperation among agents in the field is crucial. At this point, I recognize the attempt of Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam (2012) to theorize social movements using a different approach to the concept of *field* which makes the cooperation between social groups possible in addition to the competition. I also agree with their idea of comprehending "all fields as embedded in complex webs of other fields" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 18). Moreover, their approach which "relies on social movement theory to understand the emergence of a field and its transformation" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 26) is very parallel with the aim of this study.

However, I do not adopt their analysis for several reasons. According to the authors, strategic action fields (SAFs), socially constructed "fundamental units of collective action in society" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 9), are constantly under the influence of a flux of contention between the possessors of more (*incumbents* and *governance units*) and less (*challengers*) power. In this framework, the success of strategic actions depends on the skills (cognitive, empathetic and communicative) (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 17) of the challengers. I think that they disregard the agency of different social actors. First, even

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though they criticize Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* as being so individualistic they propose a concept of *social skill*, an "individual capacity" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 17) of "institutional entrepreneurs" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 4), which is strongly linked to individuals.

Second, it reduces different social actors – coming from various backgrounds, voicing fundamentally different claims – into skillful or clumsy actors. Moreover, defending the strategic and dominant position of skilled actors among challengers can be seen as a justification of elitization in social movements which is highly contested among participants of social movements. In a nutshell, their emphasis on "strategic agency that is at the heart of our [their] perspective" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 20) gives more agency to the skillful actors in social movements, which contradicts with my inclusive understanding of agency.

Third, in spite of their emphasis on dynamic framing, they start to analyze the issue with a picture where there are constituted groups in which actors are 'already' cooperating: *incumbents* and *challengers*. In other words, they take the cooperation among incumbents and among challengers, and the competition between incumbents and challengers given. The stable depiction of incumbents who are inherently conservative and stably defend status quo (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 14) shows clearly that individual agency has no place in this frame, which would fail to analyze any kind of solidarity action that incumbents engaged in (e.g. descendants of prosecutors of the Armenian Genocide and Armenians living in Turkey resisted together in Gezi Park). As a consequence of this dichotomy of actors, their approach falls short in explaining how the individuals cooperate even if there is a former conflict between them – like in the field of Gezi Park. Finally, I think the main problem in defining the actors is to put them in two camps regardless the historical contexts of the actors. I do not think social movements can be analyzed in the absence of individual agency or in other words, in a frame where the individual's agency dissolves in the agency of structural

organizations. Overall, the question of how the actors cooperate in the field remains unanswered.

1.3. Social Movements as Fields

Nick Crossley is the pioneer who uses Bourdieu's theory of practice in social movement research. He starts this research in his book "Making Sense of Social Movements". In the last chapter of the book, Crossley (2002) argues that Bourdieu's framework (habitus-capital-practice-field) provides a better understanding of social movements and enables us to go beyond the dichotomies in the social movements literature such as agency-structure. Using Bourdieu's theory of practice, he offers a new synthesis for social movement theories, such as rational actor theory, resource mobilization theory. On the one hand he emphasis "different fields in which movement act" (Crossley 2003, 60) and on the other hand, he regards "movements as fields – specifically, fields of contention" (Crossley 2003, 60).

The use of Bourdieu's concepts to understand social movements does not go back too far in the literature; however, it is growing. Researchers use Bourdieu's theory to analyze traditional social movement theories (Crossley 2002; Crossley 2003; Goldberg 2003; Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008), leadership in the protets (Nepstad and Bob 2006), the ways to create environmental-habituses in the environmental social movement organizations (Haluza-DeLay 2008), and identity movements (Husu 2013).

The aim of this paper is not to revise the social movement theories. Moreover, I do not use any theory to classify or label the Gezi Resistance but rather I utilize the frameworks and concepts as they help to describe the production of the new field Gezi. In parallel with this aim, I will give the theoretical framework of Haluza-DeLay which I find explanatory for my case.

In "A Theory of Practice for Social Movements: Environmentalism and Ecological Habitus", Haluza-DeLay emphasis the importance of creating "an ecological habitus which would underpin ecological lifestyles and environmental social change" (2008, 205). However, referring Bourdieusian framework, he warns about the difficulty of changing habitus by oneself independent of the social contexts, i.e. field or social space, in which one situates herself (Haluza-DeLay 2008, 206). He regards social movements as:

> communities of practice in support of an emerging habitus that is consistent with movement framing [environmental movement in this case]. For movement purposes, a transformation of *both* fields and habitus must co-occur, until the appropriate logic of practice - e.g., "living environmentally without trying" - is routinized in the wider society (Haluza-DeLay 2008, 215).

On the one hand, Haluza-DeLay clearly argues for the theoretical potential of social movements, as communities of practice, to generate *movement-consistent habitus*; on the other hand, using the related ethnographies of Foley (1999) and Conway (2004), he shows how a social movement organization can turn a social space in which movement-consistent practices are acted with the help of "the informal or incidental learning that may occur through participation in the organization" (2008, 211).

Based on Haluza-DeLay's frame and using Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, practice, and field, I will regard the occupation phase of Gezi Resistance as a movement in which protesters can negotiate and through this, their habituses can alter. I will also regard these negotiations as collective identity processes through which habituses and field, i.e. social movements, influence each other. In other words, I see collective identity processes as a web of different reciprocal relations among diversified habituses and this new field. Indeed, what Haluza-DeLay's understanding about change from the social movement to the habituses is very similar with what David Harvey states: "The right to the city […] is a right to change ourselves by changing the city" (2008, 23), as protestors in Gezi Park claimed by constructing an alternative social space in the very center of urbanization.

Chapter 2 - Background Information of Gezi Park

"New social relationships call for a new space, and vice versa"

Lefebvre

2.1.Urbanization and Gezi Park

The last decades witnessed an increasing amount of urbanization projects in Turkey, particularly in Istanbul as "a systematic policy" (Ünsal and Kuyucu 2010, 52). These projects have been boosting the construction businesses and contributing to economic growth at the expense of urban plunder (Bali et al. 2006). This is exactly what David Harvey (2008) depicts in "Right to the City": surplus value is reinvested, i.e. capital accumulation is absorbed by urbanization. Among gentrification projects in Istanbul, "Beyoğlu Büyük Dönüşüm" (Beyoğlu Huge Transformation)[1] has a significant role for the Gezi Resistance since this project gentrified different neighborhoods around Taksim such as Tarlabaşı, Kasımpaşa, and Sütlüce-Örnektepe. The project took the form of dispossessions under the name of "urban renewal", in Harvey's words "accumulation by dispossession" (2008, 34), and transforming the green areas by allowing residential developments on them (Ünsal and Kuyucu 2010, 53–54).

Taksim Pedestrianization Project is a massive urbanization project. It includes taking all the traffic down to the underground by means of a few tunnels and relocating some of the streets in and around Taksim Square (Vardar 2012). Most importantly, the project consisted of demolishing Gezi Park and rebuilding the Ottoman-era Taksim Military Barracks on it. Moreover, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that it would not serve as a barracks but as a shopping mall, or as luxury residences (Vardar 2013). What Erdoğan does to Taksim is very similar with what Georges-Eugène Haussmann did to Paris: tearing the old slums in the city,

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[1] http://www.beyoglubuyukdonusum.com/

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"using powers of expropriation in the name of civic improvement and renovation" (Harvey 2008, 33). Apart from this, Gezi Park was also significant as it was one of the last green areas near Taksim. The aim is to create an area that appeals to profitable businesses and tourists by transforming Beyoğlu.

Urbanization in Beyoğlu "involved not only a transformation of urban infrastructures but also the construction of a new way of life and urban persona" (Harvey 2008, 26). Otel önü Iftarları (Iftars in front of hotels) was a counter movement to this was of life and persona. Emek ve Adalet Platformu (The Justice and Labor Platform), a leftist Muslim group, were protesting the contrast between the luxurious life-style of the new rich and conservative class by breaking their fasts in front of the five star hotels where expensive iftar menus were served (Emek ve Adalet Platforumu 2012). The second instance of this event was held in Gezi Park in 2011 since Gezi Park was cornered by three five-star hotels. Every space has its own relations. As Lefebvre states spaces should be analyzed concentrating on "the production of space and the social relationships inherent to it" (1991, 90). Based on Lefebvre's framework, Harvey emphasis the reciprocal and constitutive relation between space and social ties, saying "The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from that of what kind of social ties, relationship to nature, lifestyles, technologies and aesthetic values we desire." (2008, 23).

2.2. The Resistance History of Gezi Park

After the Taksim Pedestrianization Project was announced, a number of groups and NGOs were established and began to struggle with it. Taksim Dayanışması (Taksim Solidarity), a large platform with constituents of NGOs, unions, professional associations, and political parties, was established on March 2 2012 to raise consciousness as well as oppose the project via legal ways (SoL 2012).

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Herkes için Mimarlık (Architecture for All in English), a non-profit and independent organization devoted to suggest architectural solutions to social problems, organized four events during March and April 2012 (Herkes için Mimarlık 2012). Gezi Park Picnic Festivals, which attracted hundreds of people, were picnics with games, performances, workshops for children and adults, and interviews with the locals about Gezi Park. These festivals raised consciousness and showed even to people who have not been using a lot Gezi Park, that it was a beautiful park, available to be enjoyed and used, and it must be preserved. Moreover, the locals responded that it was one of the remaining green spaces in their neighborhood, they oppose any transformation of it, and no one asked their opinions about the project (Herkes için Mimarlık 2012b).

Gezi Parkı Koruma ve Güzelleştirme Derneği (Gezi Park Association, Gezi Park Protection and Beautification Association), a constituent of Taksim Dayanışması, organized a large festival at Gezi Park on April 13 2013, including a number of concerts, and performances, attracted a larger participation (Taksim Gezi Parkı Koruma ve Güzelleştirme Derneği and Taksim Dayanışması 2013). Their slogan was "Rise Up for Taksim" and they also initiated a hashtag in Twitter. Their call finishes "Come, let us have fun with the concerts, and claim our future" (Taksim Gezi Parkı Koruma ve Güzelleştirme Derneği and Taksim Dayanışması 2013).

2.3. The Early Days of the Gezi Resistance[2]

May 27 can be argued as the beginning date of the Gezi Resistance. The night, after the protest against the demolishing of Emek (Movie Theater) (Atlan 2013), a historic theatre to be replaced by a shopping mall which was yet another urbanization project around Taksim, bulldozers entered the park and uprooted a few trees. They were prevented by a handful of

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[2] The information used in this subsection were gathered from Bianet's timeline of the Gezi Resistance, including all of the notable events and moments of it (Kural 2014).

activists, mostly from the aforementioned organizations. They began to camp there with their tents to guard the park during the night. The next morning, on May 28, more people joined the wait. However, around noon, the police attacked the protesters with pepper spray. The brutality of this intervention yielded more people to the park. An MP, Sırrı Sürreya Önder from Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples' Democratic Party), managed to stop the demolishing by standing in front of a bulldozer. The camp and the guarding of the park continued throughout the day and night.

On May 29, the dissenters planted some trees in the park for the uprooted ones and they organized a concert and a movie session in the evening. On May 30, the campers of Gezi Park, nevertheless, woke up to a terrible morning: the police attacked with tear gas in the very early morning while people were still sleeping and burned the tents of the campers. This image as well as the pepper spray assault on May 28 created an angry backlash by the people who thought of them as unacceptable, increasing the participation even more.

May 30 continued with the first forum of the Gezi Resistance in which forums became one of the landmarks of the movement. Again, concerts were organized for the evening and participation to the resistance kept on rising.

May 31, known as the longest day of the resistance, started with the clashes between the police and protesters in the very early morning and continued until afternoon of June 1. The police was forced to withdraw from the Taksim area by protesters who then occupied Gezi Park. Taksim Square was included in the "saved district" by building barricades on the roads leading to Taksim Square. A new phase of the Gezi Resistance began.

Chapter 3 - Methodology and Position in the Field

I attended to the Gezi Resistance, starting from May 30 and onwards. Although I did not camp in Gezi Park, I was present in and around the park and the square whole day. However, I did not think that I would conduct a research on the Gezi Resistance at the time. I was too in it and simply experiencing the movement, trying not to miss any moment of it, not as a researcher but as an enthusiastic dissident. I neither took notes nor recorded anything. I was a little bit familiar with the social movement literature and occasionally, I was trying to fit what I know from that to my experiences. Moreover, I was definitely a participant of Gezi Resistance. Overall, I can tell that I was in a position between a participant observer and an observing participant, usually tilting towards the latter.

Being impressed by my experiences, I wrote a non-negligible number of my final papers about the Gezi Resistance, dissecting of its gender, neoliberalism, politics, visual culture, and social network related issues. Thinking through these papers and reflecting on my experiences as well as being theoretically nourished by the coursework, these efforts enriched my overall understanding of the Gezi Resistance. Nevertheless, it is a very complex and still ongoing phenomenon, making it notoriously difficult to understand it thoroughly.

To collect my data, I returned to the field for three weeks on April 15 2014, ten and a half months later than the beginning of the Gezi Resistance. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 different groups; each lasted approximately seventy-five minutes and some of them were held in the buildings of the groups' associations. Due to time and space constraints, I only give place 11 of them here. I selected my interviewees by looking whether they camped and lived in Gezi Park for almost whole duration of the occupation phase. Moreover, I recruited my interviewees only from the groups and organizations, rather than individuals who has neither a membership to any organization nor affliation with a group. By doing so, I do not mean that the role of unorganized individuals on Gezi Resistance was

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negligible. Nevertheless, I used this selection criterion since my theoretical puzzle instructed so: how solidarity emerged in Gezi Park, which is a field with a plethora of distinct movements and claims.

Although I did not have access to many people in the beginning, my contacts snowballed as I talked to more people. The list of the groups that I interviewed and mentioned here can be found in the appendix. Moreover, I very briefly described the important details of them to orient the readers better to the case.

After each interview, I took my field notes. However, due to having time constraints in the field and an abundance of different groups to interview, I could do the transcription only after my fieldwork. After transcribing the key parts of the interviews and coding them with MS Word's comment tool, legitimacy, as I talk in the next chapter, emerged as a common theme in most negotiations and debates happened during the occupation.

During my fieldwork, I also attended a number of demonstrations, movie sessions, forums, and the like. Visiting the first squat of Istanbul, Yeldeğirmeni Squat, joining to a meeting of Müştereklerimiz (Our Commons), a group very active during the occupation phase in the organization of the daily life in Gezi Park, and participating in International Workers' Day of 2014 where I was a participant observer for the first time in a May Day, observing the resistance practices and interactions between groups were the notable events of my fieldwork. In addition to the interviews, these experiences helped me significantly to get a better understanding of Gezi Resistance as a field.

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Chapter 4 - The Key Internal Negotiations about Legitimacy in Gezi Park

The Gezi Resistance was interpreted as a miracle with its extremely diverse constituents, and yet, its ability to act in concert. The participants as well as columnists have been frequently used "Gezi Spirit", which has been usually connoted with a common set of values that united these people from very diverse backgrounds and worldviews. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Gezi Park was a conflict-free area. There were significant debates on some issues related the collective living in the park. After analyzing the data, the concept of "legitimacy" came to the fore. My respondents used the word "legitimate" with its two different meanings: "allowed by law" and "reasonable and acceptable"[3] to describe practices of other protesters. First, I was surprised when it came out among my codes in the data; then I make sense of it. Throughout this chapter, I particularly analyze the legiticimacy debates about the distinction between Gezi Park and Taksim Square, and the different resisting techniques. Focusing on these two, I highlight some of the key internal conflicts in Gezi Park, contributing the processes of collective identity with the negotiations surrounding these debates.

4.1. The Space: The differentiation between Gezi Park and Taksim Square

As its name obviously implies, the Gezi Resistance started with Gezi Park. However, on June 1, after the police was forced to leave Gezi Park by the protesters, they began to draw the boundaries of their new space by the setting up a plethora of barricades in the six entrance points as they are indicated by numbers in Figure 1. The figure shows this "saved district", as some protesters call it, covering a large area, notably including Gezi Park as the heart of the resistance, and Taksim Square. However, there were some debates around the space, namely settling down to Taksim Square and resisting outside of the park.

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[3] Cambridge Dictionary: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/legitimate?q=legitimate

Figure 1. The map of the "saved district" in Taksim (*maps.google.com*)

4.1.1. *Where to Settle Down: Gezi Park and Taksim Square*

International Workers' Day in 1977 is known as Bloody May 1 in Turkey. Suddenly gunshots were heard and someone opened fire to the workers gathered in Taksim Square for May Day celebrations while riot police and armored riot control vehicles began to come towards the crowd to disperse it. Eventually, 34 people lost their lives and 136 people were injured where the case still waits to be enlightened (Atay 2013). Taksim Square, which is highly significant for the collective memory of the left of Turkey, has been banned to May Day demonstrations with a few exceptions for the past 60 years (Çelik 2013). By means of workers movements' constant struggle for years, the AKP government was forced to open Taksim Square to the May Day demonstrations between 2010 and 2012. There was no incidence in all these three years as in all previous exceptional May Day's which were allowed to be celebrated in Taksim Square, except 1977 ("1 Mayıs Kuşatması Başladı" 2014).

In 2013, the square was closed to the demonstrations again. However, this time, the governor's office announced that the reason of the ban was that the square was still a dangerous construction site due to the Taksim Pedestrian Project, a huge urbanization project covering almost the whole of the square ("Vali Mutlu: 1 Mayıs'ın Taksim'de Yapılmasına Kesinlikle Müsaade Etmeyeceğiz" 2013). It has been debated a lot that whether the holes due to construction around Taksim region might lead to serious injuries or not, and whether the available area was enough to carry the participants or not. In the mainstream media, the debates took the form of technical issues (Çelik 2013). However, I interpret the main motivation of this ban as an intervention to the collective memory of the left: to force them stripping away the state-oppression related connotations of Taksim Square, to which the left in Turkey has a significant attachment. Indeed, after just a month, while it was still a construction site, it was seen that Taksim Square had enough space and nobody fell down the

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holes during the Gezi Resistance, arguably with its participants more crowded than the May Day. This was even ridiculed by the protesters during the Gezi Resistance.

The map in Figure 2 exhibits the distribution of the groups that I interviewed over the park as well as the richness of the facilities in it. During the occupation phase of the Gezi Resistance, Gezi Park was very busy with workshops, demonstrations, performances, mini concerts, forums, and the like. Meanwhile, the relationship between the left and the square became visible. For instance, some of the leftist organizations set tables in Taksim Square, in addition to their tents in Gezi Park, and sold their magazines in the square. Ayşe, from Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi (SDP, Socialist Democracy Party) which were among these groups, said: "We have a weekly newspaper called Gelecek (The Future) and we distributed that. We had a table in the square for this reason. Moreover, there was the table of the Dev-Lis[4], just above the stairs leading to the park. We had some friends sleeping there, too."[5] Mete, from Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP, Peace and Democracy Party), evaluated this situation: "the organizations outside [Gezi Park] […] tried to explain themselves. However, I find their approach wrong. Instead of organizing forums to make themselves known, they chose narrow approaches such as selling newspapers and magazines. They lost this opportunity; they picked an incorrect way to organize people."

Setting a table, selling magazines, and distributing pamphlets are habitual practices of the left in Turkey. Many people interpreted their continuation to these practices as well as carrying them to Taksim Square as that they either could not or did not want to adapt to the emerging movement. Indeed, these views are parallel with the framework of Vanina Leschziner and Adam Isaiah Green, which regards those habitual practices in an unsettled field "old guard" if they are acted with deliberate cognition; and non-resonating if they are automatically acted (2013, 122–124). However, I do think in such a new field which was

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[4] Dev-Lis is SDP's organization for high school students.
[5] Field diary notes from the interview with Ayşe, Sedat and Deniz from SDP dated 23.04.2014.

constantly reconstructed through protesters' negotiations; regarding some practices as resonating and some others not necessitates a comparison with a former settled field which does not clearly defined in this case, or a comparison with one's own field, which can be done by any group, including old left.

Figure 2. A hand drawn map of Gezi Park (PostVirtual 2013).

Ali, from Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Gençlik Kolları (CHP Youth, Republican People's Party Youth), assessed those practices of old left as "it would be better if it did not turn out that way" and articulated: "the leftist organizations occupied Taksim Square, they set their tents out of the Gezi […] they stood apart themselves, implying that "we are different" and it was unpleasant." Hüseyin, from Sosyalist Yeniden Kuruluş Partisi (SYKP, Socialist Party of Refoundation) that is known as being close to the Kurdish movement, maintained that they, as SYKP, did not have an aim to occupy the square but "some groups were expecting a revolution from the movement. These groups were thinking that Gezi Park is not enough and they should also occupy the square, their square, which was already forbidden to them for years."

As the state continued to ban the square to International Workers' Day demonstrations and commemoration of the victims of 1977, the left in Turkey became more attached to Taksim Square (Atay 2013). With the Gezi Resistance, finally, they got their square for which they fought with the police to enter in each International Workers' Day. The left who set up tables and tents in the square in addition to the park tried to differentiate themselves to communicate their thoughts to the audience that they realized they were able to organize. I think making themselves visible when they found a free space is understandable considering the history of left in Turkey in which they lived through 1980 coup d'état and marginalized by the state on all occasions. Moreover, it was important for them to be closer to the police to defend both the square and the park. Since police did not firstly attack from the back of the park (points 5 and 6 in Figure 1), a possible attack was expected to come from the square.

The distinction of the square and the park was actually a case where many contested issues of the old left became visible. For instance, while Umut, from Gezi Park Association,

was identifying what is legitimate or not based on this spatial dichotomy, he also distinguished the ones who were taking the park serious or not:

> During the meeting on June 2, we said that our presence is legitimate in the park; away from there, we do not have any legitimacy. […] We opposed every suggestion to diffuse to the square but maybe, we should have let them and we should have no relationship between the tents in the square and the park. […] By telling that in case they were out of the park, they would have no legitimacy, we invited the politics [i.e. political concerns and demands of the left] into the park with our own hands. It was the square that they valued, and has the priority for them; not the park. The park was not valuable for them neither before nor after the resistance; it was always the square. Maybe, we should have let them to defend and live their square. […] The presence of the ones who did not care about the park in it also led to some problems experienced afterwards.

Umut's words show an example how claims were diversified. Even though the resistance started with common reactions to demolition of the park and police brutality, different interests from various movements became visible with the occupation phase. In the group interview of Gezi Park Association, all respondents including Umut indicated their sincere gladness about that a resistance regarding Gezi Park turned to the movement of the all people in Turkey, except right-wing and pro-government people. However, for Umut, people were welcomed if they did not came with different claims than the park. In such a movement or field (Crossley 2003), there were diversified demands of varied movements or fields which contradicted, coincided, shortly influenced each other. Those were different negotiation processes than the ones among individuals in a single movement or field; hence, I think they necessitate different frameworks to analyze.

4.1.2. *June 11: Inside and Outside*

June 11, the day when the physical resistance just outside the park and in the square lasted a whole day, was another instance in which the square and the park distinction became visible. Until June 11, there was no attack by the police to either the square or the park. Between June 1 and 10, the whole of the occupied area was surrounded by the barricades

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built by the dissenters, and the protesters experienced an alternative life in which for the first time in their lives, they were the owners of the place they live, and they felt they belong there. However, in the early morning of June 11, they woke up with the brutal police intervention (Vardar, Kural, and Tahaoğlu 2013). To remove all the banners and flags hung by the protesters on the AKM building and on Republic Monument[6] ("Vali Mutlu: AKM ve Anıt İçin Oradayız" 2013), the police swept all the barricades defending Taksim Square and tried to take the control over it. SDP members, the first group started to resist against the police attack, used Molotov cocktails, fireworks, improvised slingshots made out of the tables. This kind of resistance was discussed a lot among the participants and abused by the government to marginalize the left-wing groups. I will come back to this way of resisting and interpretations of it by the dissenter groups in the next sub-section, under the title of "Molotov cocktails".

While the fight was lasting the whole day in June 11, the square and the park distinction was realized as follows: Some groups stayed in the park and watched the resistance at the very edge of it while other groups were physically resisting the police violence in and around Taksim Square. Hüseyin from SYKP told me about this division: "There were also many people telling that their concern is the park. SDP and some groups were contending that they are not going to give the square; otherwise, the police can also enter the park. We were also aware of this danger […] Hence, we also joined the clashes and reinforced the resistance […] there was already a strong opinion to defend the park and these people were watching it from the edge of the park."

I assess the June 11 as a refraction point in which the "should we throw stones or not" debate flamed again and intersected with the square and the park distinction. At the beginning of the Gezi Resistance on May 31 and June 1, even the people, who did not fight in the front

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[6] The places of them can be seen in Figure 1.

rows, did not have practices such as throwing the tear gas canisters back to the police, or throwing stones to them, supported the resistance by standing behind the ones who struggle with the police. Maybe the most important reason of this was people's witnessing the brutal police interventions to the peaceful protesters in the park between May 27 and 30. The people, who were watching International Workers' Day demonstrations from the mainstream media, which labeled the protesters throwing stones to the police as provocateurs or terrorists, for the first time, saw that the police could respond violently, independent of the resistance techniques of the protesters. Nevertheless, on June 11, the debates about the use of violence continued and even boosted by the mainstream media and the government.

Fatma, from Halk Evleri (HE, People's Houses), told me: "I have a question mark whether the threshold has been reached or not: there should remain no legitimacy to label people as the ones throwing stones but the debate still goes on. There is direct attack on us and some still tell us not to throw stones". Here, Fatma used the word legitimacy to describe such a labeling as not *reasonable* and not *acceptable* (the second meaning). From the other side of the debate, I will give a related excerpt from Umut's response. Although each has different opinions on the subject in the group interview that I have done with members of Gezi Park Association, Umut articulated:

> The ones who want to throw stone throw their stones outside [Gezi Park]; we saw that we cannot prevent this because we cannot sort out the plainclothes police. It is impossible for everyone to share the belief that a green non-violence will be victorious. However, we, the ones who believe so, told that whatever happens we will not abandon the park […] we should sustain the non-violence until the end.

In his first excerpt about settling down to Taksim Square, Umut used the word legitimate in its first meaning, i.e *allowed by law*, and clearly stated that there was no legitimacy outside the park. When it is read with the above quotation, it exemplifies the intersection of the "should we throw stones or not" debate and the square-park distinction. Indeed, this

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intersection was also used by the state as a marginalizing narrative. On June 11, the governor of Istanbul *Hüseyin Avni Mutlu* stated:

> Particularly, we see the youth's, who stay in Gezi Park, listening to our warnings and waiting in Gezi Park although there were provocations to pull them into the conflict area, and their giving no credit to the ones who want to clash with the police both meaningful and valuable. ("Vali Mutlu: AKM ve Anıt için Oradayız" 2013)

Turkish state and mainstream media used the negotiations among protesters about the distinction between Taksim Square and Gezi Park as an opportunity to marginalize the protestors from leftist organizations who settled down in the square and the protestors who physically resisted.

4.2. The Resistance Techniques

There was a great diversity in Gezi Park in terms of not only identities but also resistance techniques, performances, and attitudes. However, it can be argued that respecting diversity, a key value emerged in Gezi Park, of identities was stronger than respecting diversity of different resistance techniques. There were even conflicts over practices, creating discussions and sometimes quarrels. In this subsection, I will focus on the key conflicted techniques of the Gezi Resistance and debates surrounding them.

To get a better grasp of these conflicts and debates, a brief history of the social movements in Turkey with an emphasis on the differentiation dynamics within these movements seems necessary. With the early 70s, and late 60s, the left in Turkey started to split steadily with respect to not only differentiation in the ideational aspects but also adopting different ways of claim-makings (Ersan 2014). While this splitting was continuing, the society was becoming increasingly polarized each day, mainly on a left-right axis. The fights between the leftists and right-wing groups became an everyday issue. This and many other reasons precipitated a chaotic environment, prepared the legitimacy for the Turkish army to deliver the September 12 1980 coup d'état (Belge 2000).

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In the context of the Cold War, the 1980 coup d'état was disastrous, particularly for the left. Almost all left-wing aligned organizations of all sorts were banned while members of them arrested, tortured, and executed whereas the leftist media were found "harmful to the society" and also forbidden (Belge 2000). Moreover, in general engagement with politics was punished and demonized, urging the following new generations to be apolitical[7] (Vassaf 2013).

It took until late 1980s for the left to recover although it has also been evolving in itself. As the old left, workers & socialists movement, was still alive and active, the late 80s and onward witnessed the rise of the so called new left and the identity-based political and social movements including the Kurdish movement, feminist movement, LGBT movement, environmental movements, and Islamist movements. Even some people interpret them as examples of new social movements; hence argue that New Social Movements theory is the most appropriate one among other theories from social movements' literature to make sense of these movements (Şimşek 2004). They do so to contrast the differences between these identity-oriented movements from the Marxist movements, although the former ones were nourished by the latter.

Note that these movements are not only different from the old left, but also they are different from each other in many respects. Although most of them have identity-based issues as their common ground, their claims as well as claim-making instruments and forms cover a very diverse array.

Charles Tilly observed that many movement participants follow available scripts for their performances in the uprisings (2008, xi). Studying the variations of these performances over time, he asserts that the repertoires of performances change incrementally as the experiences as well as constraints accumulate (2008, 5). Having their roots in the Marxist

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[7] This was the main surprise for the people about the Gezi Resistance. The youth was extensively labeled as apolitical since 1980 coup. The Gezi experience made people realize that the new generations are different, so their way of political engagement as well as their contentious performances.

movements, Tilly's reasoning suggests that we can see similarities between these movements' claim-making forms. However, appreciating these common points, he also asserts the learned yet improvisational feature of these (2008, 14). In addition, since the rise of the identity-oriented social movements in Turkey from late 1980s onward, a long time-period to observe all key reasons[8] of changes in repertoires Tilly suggested (2008, 14), we can argue that each of the aforementioned movements accumulated their own distinct repertoires.

The evidence of this can be found in the Gezi Resistance. When it is interpreted as an umbrella movement, consisting of all these movements and more in it, it is not surprising to see a variety of different performances and forms. What is puzzling is how this diversity of performances, particularly the ones conflicting with each other, could be managed to be hold together.

4.2.1. *Amusement and Mourning*

After the Gezi movement spread across the country, there were serious clashes in different regions and cities in Turkey while the occupants were living in the park without police attacks for 10 days (between June 1-11). During those days, entertainment, commemoration, and defending the occupied area at the barricades could coexist in Gezi Park. However, this coexistence also had internal conflicts. On the one hand, some protesters were experiencing the park as a festival area. On the other hand, other dissenters were thinking that it would be disrespectful to the memory of the lives lost during the resistance as well as to the protesters who were still fighting. Hence, they were not happy with the joyful practices. Selin from IFK talked about this conflict as follows:

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[8] He suggests three main reasons of variation in repertoires of performances, which I will not go into detail here: First, the permitted and tolerated performances depend on the form of the regime in that country where the activists innovate between the two. Second, the history of a movement shapes dynamics of these changes. Third, changes in the political opportunity structures allow people to experiment and innovate on the available scripts.

> We were commemorating at the tent of IFK: Abdullah Cömert, Mehmet Ayvalıtaş, and Ethem Sarısülük were the ones murdered by the police so far and after shouting each's name, we were replying all together "He is living here!". After that, in accordance with our principle "to live is to resist", we were dancing halay [a kind of folk dance]. However, many people were talking about that we should keep mourning instead. [...] Nevertheless, we did not agree why we should not have fun: we can cry but we can also laugh. Moreover, dancing is also a kind of rebellion. In case of a police assault, we were ready to resist. We were trying to keep the crowd's enthusiasm alive and fresh, how and why do you repress it?

Although the roots of those conflicts can be found in the rise of identity-oriented movements such as feminist and LGBT movement in Turkey after 1980, such instances of conflicts are also observed in the activism forms of the anti-capitalist and anarchist movements. In the recent International Workers Day demonstrations and environmental protests against some deleterious policies, entertaining practices were seen which is different from the old-left's habitual practices. In the International Workers Day of 2010, for instance, while the leftist organizations were trying to arrange their corteges, the above-mentioned groups were sitting and waiting until the group in front of them walked for a while. When there was some distance between them, these groups, all at the same time, were running and fifing, creating some noise. I talked to many people from the leftist organizations who thought that this kind of actions were inappropriate at that time.

How did these groups who were not accepting each other's styles of actions live together in Gezi Park for two weeks? In parallel with the idea of "movements as fields – specifically, fields of contention" (Crossley 2003, 60), I regard the so-called Gezi Park experience as a new field in which there were different movements or fields with their conflicted resistance techniques. To illustrate how those diversified forms negotiated with each other in the park, I will give the excerpt from the story of Hasan, from Yeşiller ve Sol Gelecek Partisi (YSGP, Greens and the Left Party of the Future):

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> We were having an entertainment along with music and I was trying make people have fun by dancing, and etc. However, some people were reacting and one of them said "the fight in Ankara is going on and there is no victory. Why are you having fun?" I replied that the only reason of being able to stay here is to associate this with humor, joy, and laughing somehow. In turn, he told me that I can do whatever I want but he will not have fun.

The above encounter shows that although the dissenters could not reach a consensus and they even did not have a common understanding of each other's practices, they continued to share the same field. I do think this encounter without consensus, persuasion, or understanding was very influential in terms of the attitude of protesters from different movements towards each other in Turkey. Most of the groups were used to interfere others' practices such as tearing other's posters and banners, and the like. In this new social space, nevertheless, their habituses started to change through the "informal learning in collective action" (Foley 1999, 39) by the means of these negotiations. Here, I do not mean that people easily started to change and those changes were long lasting; it might even turn out the contrary. However, what I want to emphasize here is that the movement was an "operative field for alteration of habitus" (Haluza-DeLay 2008, 215).

Mustafa, one of the many gays who could disclose their sexual orientation to their families with the encouragement they got from their experience of the solidarity in this social field, from LGBT Block told me about this as follows: "along with music, we danced halay and belly dance. We were the mascot of the Gezi, we were the funniest and everybody was coming to our tent. We were very happy with that and thinking that "finally, people like us"." Reproducing their habitual practices in this new field, LGBT individuals contributed to the ongoing construction of it. I think that their presence in Gezi Park with their amusing and habitual practices was very influential in fighting against the negative perceptions that people had against them. In Bourdieu's term, this new field, which was also constructed by LGBTs practices, structured the other's habituses (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 127).

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4.2.2. Drinking and Soberness

During the night of May 31 and the first hours of June 1, when the Gezi Resistance spread across Turkey, I was resisting in the Cumhuriyet Street which is one of the main roads going to Gezi Park. While in the beginning the police frequently repulsed us, with increasing number of protesters and lasting for many hours, the resistance turned into a form in which we tried to march towards Gezi Park – advanced upon the police – and returned when they used tear gas. Towards midnight, some people from the back crowd, who were supporting the physically resisting groups by standing behind them, started to drink and chanted "Cheers Tayyip!". The number of those people increased as the time passed. The package store near to the junction point between Halaskargazi Street and Vali Konağı Street may have broken its the maximum sale record in a few hours.

"Cheers Tayyip!" was a slogan which reflects the limitation to the time windows of selling alcohol, and the increase in the prices of cigarettes and drinks. Ayşe, from SDP, expressed this situation as "Drinking in the streets and chanting "Cheers Tayyip" became a resistance technique for some people against the limitations about alcohol"[9]. However, some thoughts arose against drinking in Gezi Park because of different reasons. Before exploring those concerns, I will give some excerpts from those who drank in the park. From CHP Youth Beşiktaş, while Veli said "I was not sober at all", Ali responded "We were drinking since the first day but we could have changed the quantity of it. I am admitting this as a self-criticism". Hasan from YSGP, who is saying "I was drinking beer and wine in the evenings but I was not drinking much", claimed that most of the leftist organizations were against the alcohol consumption in the park since it softens the resistance.

Even though Hasan was right about the general stance of leftist organizations to the alcohol consumption in the park, they were not the only ones, and the reasons were quite

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[9] Field diary notes from the interview with Ayşe, Sedat and Deniz from SDP dated 23.04.2014.

different. Preventing the internal conflicts among protesters was the most common underlying reason for those against alcohol in the park. I have heard from different interviewees that the excessive alcohol consumption made people aggressive and led to some disputes. Moreover, my respondents from Istanbul Feminist Kolektif (IFK, Istanbul Feminist Collective), Gezi Park Association, and BDP emphasized that alcohol consumption increased the tear gas exposure level of protesters on May 29 and 30, when police attacked on the very morning while they were still drunk. Selin, from IFK, expressed this situation as "a stoned group, just a meter away from me, could not get up even they were exposed to the tear gas. After seeing that, I preferred not to drink. Even if I drank, I had it under my control".

The interviewees from some groups, such as SDP, *çArşı*, SYKP, BDP, explicitly indicated that nobody from their organization drank in the park. Avoiding drinking is a habitual situation for BDP, the representative party of the Kurdish movement in the parliament, and other organizations close to the Kurdish movement such as SDP. Can, from BDP, answered my question about it and said that: "in the resistance areas, we do not head towards individual pleasures". On the other hand, for the fan group of Beşiktaş football team, *çArşı*, whose members come together and drink before every game, drinking is obviously habitual. According to Mehmet from *çArşı*, for this reason, allowing members of *çArşı* to drink in the park would have yielded too much drinking. Hence, the seniors of the group, since the hierarchy in the group maintained by them due to lack of an organizational structure for a long time, did not let anyone to drink around their tent.

In the above groups, even though they could reach a consensus in themselves or they were hierarchically maintained, no one group was able to impose their own thought on the others. Mete, from BDP, verbalized it as "We do not want people to drink but we cannot do it by telling them "do not drink". This is already the perception that people associate with the ruling power: by imposing ourselves as the ruling power, we make people go away." Since

protestors were socially constituted actors they underwent some modifications of their thoughts as they interact (McAdam et al. 2001:22). For example, Sedat from SDP clearly expressed: "I did not drink and I also did not get the ones drank in those days. […] They drink, but they still do not abandon the park, this is their style of resistance. We should accept it. I do not oppose it anymore."[10]

4.2.3. Molotov cocktails

"When we throw molotov cocktails, it is not accepted but when it is fireworks, it is all right. Should we include humor to make our actions accepted?!" [11] said Deniz from SDP, which at the beginning was the only organization fighting back against the brutal police intervention in the morning of June 11. To remove all the banners and flags hung by the protesters on the AKM building and on Republic Monument, the police swept away all the barricades defending Taksim Square and tried to take the control over it. To respond this, as it can be seen in Figure 3, some people from SDP threw Molotov cocktails at the TOMAs[12].

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[10] Field diary notes from the interview with Ayşe, Sedat and Deniz from SDP dated 23.04.2014.
[11] ibid.
[12] TOMA, a heavily armored kind of water cannon, is the abbreviation of "Toplumsal Olaylara Müdahele Aracı", "Intervention Vehicle to Social Events" in English.

Figure 3. A SDP member throwing Molotov cocktails to the riot police ("Molotof Atanlar Sivil Polis Mi?" 2013)

Some people interpreted using Molotov cocktails as attacking to the police rather than defending. Additionally, since it has been historically associated with the armed struggle of some leftist groups, it has not been adopted as a technique of contention by many organizations except some left-wing groups. Sertaç, from Türkiye Gençlik Birliği (TGB, Youth Union of Turkey), commented on this:

> They use molotov cocktails. The people (*halk* in Turkish) do not use these. Throwing stones is now legitimatized, even an old lady used the slingshot. To make the masses join is the most important among all technical details however, this is not the case for SDP. What is important for them is to show that they are the forerunners.

The police, who dismissed the masses with children and elderly in them by disproportionate force during the Gezi Resistance, reacted against this few people, as can be seen in Figure 4, surprisingly weakly and calmly. Moreover, the mainstream media, which avoided broadcasting the resistance for days, was there for the first time.

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Figure 4. The riot police's weak intervention to SDP members ("Kim Bu Molotofçular?"

2013)

This situation has been interpreted very differently by many people. Although SDP

acknowledged that those were their members, it is still perceived otherwise by some people.

For instance, Veli, from CHP Youth Beşiktaş, indicated that :

> There was the play of SDP, you know. I see them as the cast of our police
> department's drama. On the one hand, it has been claimed that he was a
> plaincloth policeman. On the other hand, it has also been said that he is a
> member of SDP's administrive board (...) when people see a clash with police,
> they should at least go and stand behind them. But in this case, TOMA was
> shooting water to the air instead of the protester. We also know the secret
> agents in the leftist organizations.

Similarly, a non-negligible amount of the protesters believed that one of the dissidents

who threw Molotov cocktails was a plainclothes police officer or a secret agent put into the

organization by the state. There are two significant reasons of this. First, I think majority of

the participants conceive the Gezi Resistance dominated by a peaceful repertoire with the

help of the narratives of mainstream media, which depicted civil disobedience techniques

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rather than violent ones. Hence, they could not accept it. Second, the police dismissed the crowd considerably slower, giving an opportunity for the mainstream media to broadcast the clash. Fatma, from HE, highlights this and explains:

> The police preferred to treat them differently, that is, not forcefully. This is different from the case when many people behind them to support. I think their special treatment was due to portray the protests as the actions of the marginal leftists who attempt bring the state down [...] to get the unorganized masses out of the resistance.

What Sertaç describes above is the legitimization process of resistance techniques, and what Fatma delineates here is the way in which the state made use of the illegitimate techniques through mainstream media. In Gezi Resistance, media was an influential external field used by the state both to damage the legitimacy (in the meaning of acceptability here) in the eyes of conservative people and to control over the negotiations among protestors by marginalizing some groups with specific techniques.

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CONCLUSION

In this study, focusing on the occupation of Gezi Park in Istanbul between June 1 and 15 in 2013, I explore the production of a new field in the political arena of Turkey in which quite different, even historically conflicted groups, resisted together for the first time. To understand how these diversified groups cooperated and formed some sort of solidarity, I analyze how these groups' conflicted interests were negotiated in the park. I adopt relational sociology and explore the key conflicts in Gezi Park. Detailing the two sets of key negotiations and dissecting them, I delineated the processes of collective identity building, sustaining, framing, and reframing.

First, with its focus on solidarity in a single movement, I argue that social movements literature falls short of explaining how cooperation emerges from internally conflicting social movements within an umbrella movement with a plethora of distinct movements. Instead, I adopt the framework of regarding social movements as fields. By doing so, I treat the occupation phase of the Gezi Resistance as a field in which habituses of protesters can alter through negotiation, that in turn influences the social space, i.e. the field and collective identity process.

Through the marriage of Bourdieu's concepts habitus, practice, and field and collective action processes, I explore how cooperation emerged in this new social space. My analyses demonstrate that the solidarity among varied dissenters in Gezi Park was possible with the help of the social space in which movement-consistent practices were acted through negotiations, rather than with the help of a common interest or claim. I think it would be fruitful to apply this theoretical framework to other social movements similar to Gezi Resistance in terms of involving a diversity of participants and occupations, such as the Indignants movement in Spain and the Occupy movements all over the world.

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The analyses presented in this study also have some implications about the political fields of Turkey. Creating a new language as well as alternative solidarities and identities to the existing ones, Gezi Resistance has been influential in the political field of Turkey. Although it is still too early to draw conclusions about the future of Turkey's internal politics, as the most shouted slogan of Gezi Resistance goes: "This is just the beginning, the struggle continues!".

APPENDIX

In the list below, there are interviewed groups and brief details about them.The second column denotes the kind of the interview. For example, I did two interviews with CHP and the first one was a group interview with 6 people whereas the second one was one-on-one.

Group	Type	Description	Website
Socialist Democracy Party (Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi, SDP)	1. Group (3)	A socialist party, advocating democratic socialism and known to be close to Kurdish movement in Turkey. Unlike other leftist parties, SDP is a progressive party, acknowledging their support to LGBT movements.	www.sdp.org.tr
People's Houses (Halkevleri, HE)	1. One-on-one	An enlightenment project planned by Atatürk, HE has been revived by civil society, struggling against neoliberal policies, with an emphasis on rights.	www.halkevleri.org.tr
Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP)	1. Group (6) 2. One-on-one	Founding party of Turkey, CHP has been Kemalist, stressing laicism. Nowadays, CHP has been identified with two groups in it: social democrats and Secular-nationalists.	www.chp.org.tr
LGBT Block	1. One-on-one	LGBT Block, established during the Gezi Resistance, is a platform, unifying all LGBT communities & organizations.	www.facebook.com/LgbtBlok
Youth Union of Turkey (Türkiye Gençlik Birliği, TGB)	1. One-on-one	TGB is a very large Kemalist group with strong nationalist and anti-imperialist tones.	www.tgb.gen.tr
çArşı	1. One-on-one	A rebellious fan group of Beşiktaş that became very popular with their stubborn resistance and slogans.	www.forzabesiktas.com
Gezi Park Protection & Beautification Association (Gezi Parkı Koruma & Güzelleştirme Derneği, Gezi Park Association)	Group (6)	Established after Taksim Pedestrianization Project was announced, they organized a very important festival almost a month before the resistance in Gezi Park. They also filed a lawsuit to stop the demolishing of Gezi Park and the court accepted their claim.	tr-tr.facebook.com/taksimgeziparkidernegi
Greens & the Left Party of the Future (Yeşiller & Sol Gelecek Partisi, YSGP)	1. One-on-one 2. One-on-one	The first green party of Turkey, their political alignment highlights libertarian socialism, green politics, anti-capitalism, direct democracy, and LGBT rights.	www.yesillervesolgelecek.org
Peace & Democracy Party (Barış & Demokrasi Partisi, BDP)	1. Group (2) 2. Group (2)	BDP, now transformed into Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), was the party of Kurdish movement in Turkey. Their political alignment stresses local self-governance, emancipation of women, and social democracy.	www.hdp.org.tr
Istanbul Feminist Collective (İstanbul Feminist Kolektif, IFK)	1. One-on-one	IFK, ia an umbrella organization which includes different feminist organizations and independent feminists.	https://tr-tr.facebook.com/istanbulfeminist
Socialist Party of Refoundation (Sosyalist Yeniden Kuruluş Partisi, SYKP)	1. Group (2)	SYKP is a new Marxist-Leninist party, organized during the Gezi Resistance. They struggle for worker, women , and environmentalist movements.	www.sosyalistyenidenkurulus.org

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