GLADIATORS OF TODAY – POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND ITS STRUCTURAL PREDICTORS IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

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Submitted to Central European University Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary (2014)

ABSTRACT

Political participation is a phenomenon, which is studied by political and social scientist for a long time. Many great authors have published their studies about this topic; therefore, some broad theories are several decades old by now. Accordingly, this paper aims to confront the theories with the most contemporary data. To do so, a set of statistical methods is used to analyze the sixth round of the European Social Survey. The data from this dataset are first systemized and run through the latent class analysis to explore the presence of common patterns of political participation across European countries. The results of this analysis are then used as dependent variable for testing the hypotheses against the impact of various structural factors of political system on the political engagement of citizens. The results show, that there indeed is a variance when looking on to what extent people in different countries participate and there seem to be a difference between Western and Eastern countries. Furthermore, stable patterns in modes of participation were found across all but one examined countries. The final analysis of the size of membership in these classes (representing different modes of participation) shows that out of the examined structural variables, the level of urbanization, economic and political development have positive and statistically significant effect on the increase in membership of more active citizens.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to thank my great supervisor Levi Littvay for providing the lead and supervision without which this thesis wouldn't have been written.

My thanks go also to my new CEU family, people who I was happy to meet, who broadened my horizons and caused a lot of laughs and good times. Thank you Alisa, Betty, Ela, Marija, Marina, Shamsiya & Iva.

Great thanks also go to my comrades, veterans of the *Bloody November* and great friends with who we fought through this year together. Sometimes it was demanding, sometimes with unnecessary drama, but always with a great deal of fun as we were able to adapt quickly and to plan accordingly. Thank you Ana, Raluca, Juraj, Milos and Nemanja.

Special thanks also go to my family for their support over the years and to my closest friends who, despite the distance between us, provided me with a lot of support. Thank you Lenka, Samo & my dearest Viktoria.

The very special thanks go to Nasiba, a person with great mind and heart. Many study and coffee breaks, long talks, countless laughs and memorable trips with you created a major part of my great CEU experience. You and your stories motivated and inspired me so many times, that I believe you left a footprint, which will be with me till the rest of my life. That's why you are the captain!

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INTRODUCTION

When Milbrath in his book from 1976 looked at the political participation in United States, he came to a conclusion that the society at that day could be divided into three main groups: gladiators, spectators and apathetic. Labels he gave to these groups suggest their different roles in society. Gladiators fight in (electoral) arena, are judged (voted in and out of office) by interested spectators, while the whole fight is mostly ignored by the group of apathetic citizens. This paper will take Milbrath study as a stepping stone for mapping the political arena today, using the most recent data from European Social Survey (round 6, Year 2012). This dataset will be explored and analyzed in order to identify current trends in participation among mostly European countries and to spot potential differences between them. The aim of this paper is to explore whether the division suggested by Milbrath can still hold and be perceived as relevant even nowadays, in the era which sees dramatic increase in opportunities and possibilities of citizens' engagement in public life. Besides the mapping of the current situation and trends, this paper also tries to assess whether differences in patterns of political participation and the share of active citizens in the country can be predicted by various country level variables, such as characteristics of population, political and economical development, as well as the institutional setting of political system. The results indeed suggest that even nowadays, there is a visible difference when looking at the rates of political participation between East and West and not surprisingly, the more activities seem to be happening in the Western part of Europe. However, when looking at the latent structures present in society, the further analysis of the data indicates that overall, there is a very similar pattern of political participation, considering the presence of latent classes within societies. Most of them show an observable pattern, which suggest that citizens are politically engaged on one of three levels; activists, active voters and passive voters. In general it still holds that the group of passive voters is the most populated one and the group of the activists is the smallest; however there is still an observable variance. When trying to better understand what the factors that affect this variance are, the series of bi-variate analyses did not find any evidence that one of the examined country level variables would be able to explain the size of the most active group. On the other hand, the analyses showed that three of the selected variables (urbanization level of the country, economic development, and political development) show statistically significant positive effect on the size of the group of active voters and a negative effect on the size of the group of passive voters.

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1. Political participation and its role in democratic societies

Political participation is an umbrella concept which incorporates various types of activities in which citizens could engage in order to affect the public sphere. It is a deliberative act of an individual, aimed to influence somebody else's decision, whether it is politician, private company or other individual from one's own social network. Milbrath and Goel (1976) refer to political participation as to a way of how the macro level (political system) can be influenced from the micro level (individual). In a very similar way is this concept explained also by Torrell, Torcal and Montero (2007). These authors, referring and reflecting the previous works of Verba and Nie, define political participation as activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the action they take (Torrell, Torcal, Montero, 2007 :335). From a broader perspective, Stem and Seifert (2009) see it as a concept containing individual and collective actions, which are aimed at identifying and addressing issues of public interest (Stern, Seifert, 2009 :8).

Studying political participation is important mainly from the point of view of quality of government and democracy. As it is stated by Barnes (2006), the importance of citizen participation in politics is one of the most emphasized things in the democratic theories. (Barnes, 2006 :1). Same is the position of Torrell and his co-authors when they, once again referring to Verba and Nie, are adding that the citizen participation is at the heart of democracy, which is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely on the process of governing (Torrell, Torcal, Montero, 2007 :335). Following the same logic, Auškalniené says that: "the aspiration for a more legitimized democracy would lead nowhere without public participation by ordinary citizens: for democracy to work properly, it is essential for the citizens to express their opinion on the political system and to see that the system is responsive to this opinion" (Auškalniené, 2012 :108).

Political participation therefore exist not only for the sake of the existence itself or existence of democracy, it is also an important balancing mechanism. According to Pierobon (2010) it is important for state to withdraw from the total control over the society and to promote constructive political participation, and this development of civil society will assure and reinforce the democratic balance between the state and its subjects (Pierobon, 2010 :1). Similar argumentation is provided by Fuchs (2010) who emphasizes that citizens can, via the discussions, critique and control, play role in reducing of the power of state (Fuchs, 2010 :175).

1.1 Types and modes of participation

Scholars studying political participation often tend to provide their readers with various classifications and typologies so they can better understand division, present within this concept. In general, there are four main divisions when it comes to political participation. One of the most basic distinctions suggests that there is qualitative difference between the **constitutional** and **non-institutional** political participation. This difference lies mainly in the context, within which those activities are occurring. They can be either established within a legal framework in forms of laws or other formal rules, where conditions and consequences of an act of participation are clearly defined (Meyer, 1991 :11). An example of such activity might be participation in electoral competition, like voting in elections or casting a ballot in referenda. The other types of activities, the non-institutional ones, do not posses these characteristics. On the other hand, these activities have usually their roots in spontaneous decision of citizens to start or join various initiatives, campaigns or social and protest movements.

The other type of distinction draws the line between the types of participation based on their legal status they posses. Therefore we can talk about **legal** or **illegal** political participation.

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Although the laws and rules vary across the countries, one of the major and consistent determinants of labeling the participation as either legal or illegal lies in the use of violence or other means of limiting other people's liberties. However, the legal framework of particular country should be able to provide enough tools to make this distinction clear and as Mayer reminds us, we need to consider the fact that there is qualitative difference between civil disobedience and aggressive political violence (Meyer, 1991 :14).

In a similar fashion, another distinction between different types can be drawn considering the legitimacy of the political participation. This means that difference between **legitimate** and **illegitimate** political participation is not very different from the distinction between the legal an illegal participation. The main difference between these two is that while in the first case it is objectively measurable what is legal and what is not through judging the action in a legal framework; the other one is assessed on subjective merits and therefore is very context dependent.

One of the most commonly used distinctions when it comes to participation is the one concerning the **conventional** political participation in opposing to the **non-conventional** one. According to Meyer (1991), conventional political participation can be understood as the one which is related to institutional elements of the political process with a high degree of legitimacy. The unconventional participation on the other hand aims at direct influence on political decisions with a low degree of legitimacy and can be present within both legal and illegal framework. In practice, the examples of conventional participation include voting, campaigning, collecting signatures for petitions etc., while the unconventional ones include things like tax boycotts, traffic interruptions, wilds strikes and so on (Meyer, 1991 :14).

1.2 Differences in patterns in participation types among European countries

Naturally, not every democracy is the same. As Pierobon (2010) reminds, we can distinguish between so called advanced or progressive democracies, which in addition to honoring the basic principles of democracy display also further positive elements (Pierobon, 2010 :2). These democracies, usually put under the umbrella-term "West", consist mainly of wealthier countries. On the other hand, there are so called new or young democracies. Many of these countries used to be a part of the Soviet bloc and therefore share experience with communism or other type of authoritarian regime. These countries are believed to be usually characterized with much lower levels of citizen participation. It is often argued that this is caused by relatively recent experience with types of regimes where state controlled and enforced participation of its citizens. This could have a form of mandatory voting, enforced manifestations or engagement in ruling party or its youth organization, while at the same time, any other participation outside this framework was restricted.

Pierobon (2010), referring to Howards (2003), provides the explanation of this phenomenon. Howards according to him argues, that while after the collapse of USSR it was possible to create rapidly new liberal political and economic institutions which replaced the old communist ones, the communist legacies at the societal level have been more resistant to uproot and ordinary citizens in these countries continue sharing "striking similarities" with regards to issues as the importance of freedom for the state control and common mistrust of the organization of civil society (Pierobon, 2010 :2)

Barnes (2006) goes also in line of this logic when pointing at the facts that most of the postcommunist societies are "flat" in social structure, with most citizens differing little in income and standard of living and lacking experience in teasing out the personal implication of particular policy choices. According to him, citizens living in these countries may lack democratic politics and sometimes therefore behave apolitical (Barnes, 2006 :77). This, according to the Barnes, could lead into several possible scenarios. In the first one, people will feel the urge to escape completely from any connection with politics. In this case, as he puts it, the freedom means not being obligated to take part in these organizational activities (Barnes, 2006 :77). The second possible reaction is that people would not become passive, but instead of focusing their activities towards political space, they would rather group with like-minded friends and close social networks. (Barnes, 2006 :78).

In other words, the citizens of eastern European countries tend to appreciate the freedom not to participate (Hooghe, Quintelier, 2014 :212). This however does not mean that the division between the East and the West is without deviation. Naturally, the variance is present as among one bloc of countries, as well as in another. But as Pierobon shows, these differences appeared to be rather irrelevant when we looked at the difference between post soviet and non-post soviet countries (Pierobon, 2010 :2).

This paper aims to look at and examine the claims stated above by analyzing the most recent state of this issue. This will be done by using the data about the political participation which are part of European Social Survey (Round 6), which was conducted in year 2012 and covered 29 countries. This sample will be analyzed in two ways, both from the point of view of the presence of different kinds of participation across the East-West dimension and also on the individual level, where the latent class analysis will aim to identify the different pattern of participation within countries. All of this should provide complex and relatively up-to-date information about the patterns of political participation in Europe and to see, what kind of structural and institutional factors affect these patterns.

1.3 Research questions, data and analyses

As the previous chapter tried to show, the level of political engagement or political participation is a crucial aspect forming the society of every country. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the more accurate information about the current state of this phenomenon is possible to gather, the more use it can have for both policy making and academia. In order to do this, this paper aspires to answer three main research questions, and the process of answering them will be reflected in three sub-chapters of its empirical part. The questions are formulated as follows:

RQ1 – Is there a difference in willingness of people to engage in political activities among the Western and Eastern European countries?

RQ2 – Is there a stable latent pattern of political participation present among European countries? And if, how can it be described?

RQ3 – Which structural factors (population-level, socio-economical and institutional-level factors) affect the size of the membership of latent classes of politically engaged citizens present in European countries?

To answer the questions stated above, this paper uses data about various forms of political participation which are part of 6th wave of European Social Survey (ESS) dataset. This survey was conducted in year 2012 among 29 countries. The paper works with the second released version of ESS6 dataset, which was released on May 14th 2014.¹ This dataset contain the individual level data, which means that it was created by putting together the responses selected in questionnaires among all countries included in it. For the purpose of this paper, the most relevant battery of question is the one dealing with the indication of previous political

¹ Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Great Britain, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kosovo, Lithuania, Nedherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine

participation of respondents. These questions are relevant for all three parts of empirical chapter.

In the first part, the data about the participation will be systemized and it will be looked at the patterns of political participation in particular European countries. This part is supposed to prove that even nowadays, there is still visible difference, and therefore variance to be explained, between citizens' willingness to be politically engaged.

The second part of empirical part aspires to analyze these data in a light of Milbrath's theory of different modes of participation. In this case, the *latent class analysis* is conducted on every relevant country in the dataset. This method of data analysis allows clustering of respondents based on the similarity of their answer (Oser, 2013:94). In this case, these questions aim to see whether respondents took part in specific forms of political participation in past 12 months. The aim of this is to see whether there is a stable pattern of behavior when it comes to political participation among European countries, similar to the one described in Milbrath's classical work, and to identify what are the sizes of these groups.

The third part is built on the results of previous analysis. The newly determined sizes of particular latent classes will be used as the part of the newly created dataset and treated as continuous dependent variables. The variance among them is then explained by dependent variable selected upon examining the literature about the factors increasing the electoral participation. These explanatory variables belong to three distinct groups and represent the specific structural factors. The bi-variate analysis is conducted using first the country's population level variables, then variables explaining the institutional design and finally its socio-economic development.

1.4 Country level predictors of political participation

1.4.1 Population

According to several authors the size of the population in the country could be the factor affecting the share of citizens in society, who are willing to be politically engaged. The reason behind this lies in two different, yet consistent explanations. First one, well articulated by many authors (Blaise, Massicotte and Dobrzynska, 2003; Geys, 2006; Mueller, 2003) who suggest that the lower the population of the country is, the higher should be the share of people who participate. They argue this happens when community relations are closer and more direct (Blaise, Massicotte and Dobrzynska, 2003 :4). This is often exactly the case of the population-wise small countries, where citizens might be more closely connected and be in closer proximity to the centre of power (Stockemer, Calca, 2012 :10). The other reason behind considering this variable stems from the rational choice theory and the economic-based models of decision making. This theory is built on the assumption that people are able to make a cost/benefit analysis before they make most of their decisions. This leads to a situation where the individual will have lesser incentives to go and cast his vote or engage in activities in situations, when it is almost sure that his vote or contribution will not be the decisive one. Therefore the costs arising from the participation on the public matters will be higher than possible benefits for him (see e.g. Loewen and Dawes, 2012). In such situations, it is simply reasonable, from the point of view of rational choice theory, to not vote or participate in situation where one's impact might be perceived as only very small, if any. Based on this, the hypothesis to confirm or falsify the effect of the population size on the political participation can be formulated as follows:

H1: Smaller size of population will lead to higher rates of political participation.

Another possible factor connected to country demography, geography and political participation is the **density of population**. Here, the argument pursued by Blaise, Massicotte and Drobrzynska (2003) suggest that this variable affects the mobilization potential. As they say, referring to the work of Lipset (1981), they assume that in countries with higher population densities, the people who vote are more concentrated in a few spots in the country and therefore can be easier affected by mobilization campaign. Although as in previous cases, their argument is primarily aimed at electoral participation, it could also be assumed that there is a reasonable expectation that it would apply to another forms of political participation as well. Based on this, the hypothesis to confirm or falsify the effect of the density of population on the political participation can be formulated as follows:

H2: Higher density of population will lead to higher rates of political participation

The **level of urbanization** might also play a role when it comes to determinant of political participation. As was suggested in both paragraphs above, people studying political participation (although mostly the electoral one) are often pointing out that the environment where people live can affect both their resources and willingness to participate. The rate of urbanization in the country is then one of the factors which could be assumed to have effect on the rates of electoral participation. The evidence from previous research suggests that there indeed is a difference when it comes to electoral participation. However, the evidence about the direction of this effect is not consistent as different studies came with conclusions pointing the effect of it towards both possible directions (Richardson,1973). For the purpose of this paper, however, this variable will be looked at from the perspective similar to previous two population variables and will be assumed, that people from urbanized area might much easier mobilize into some kinds of political activities. Based on this, the hypothesis to confirm or falsify the effect of the share of people living in urban areas on the political participation can be formulated as follows:

H3: Higher level of urbanization will lead to higher rates of political participation.

1.4.2 Political and electoral system

One of the broader and most common typology when it comes to description of political system of a country is a type of government. As it was said, this paper examined mostly European countries and in all of them, we can talk about democratic governments (although this sample includes Russia, which democratic status might be objected by some). Nevertheless, there is not a single concept of democratic government. Based on the institutionalized relations between the different branches of government, especially the legislative and executive, we can distinguish between countries with parliamentary systems and presidential system. Without going into detail, this distinction means, that every type of government posses such institutional setting which favor and enhance the power of the branch which name it holds. Presidential system therefore can be characterized by dominant role of the executive branch, namely president, while the parliamentary systems put more power into legislative bodies. Previous research exploring whether type of government affects the turnout (e.g. Siaroff and Meyer, 2002; Stockemer and Calca, 2012; Tavist, 2009) suggested that countries with parliamentary type of government report overall higher number when it comes to electoral participation. Stockemeker and Calcla (2012) explain this by referring to rational choice theory. According to them, the structure of political system, whether type of government or number of chambers in parliament, has impact on the perception of the election importance from the point of view of citizens. This effect of importance then takes place in the cost-benefit analysis every citizen does when it comes to decision whether to participate or not (Stockemer, Calca, 2012 :3).

Based on this, the hypothesis to confirm or falsify the effect of the type of government on the political participation can be formulated as follows:

H4: Political system based on parliamentary will lead to higher rates of political participation as opposed to the presidential one.

Similar line of argument can be used when looking at another variable representing the institutional design of country's political system, or to be more specific, the level of its centralization/decentralization. In the broadest perspective, it can be distinguished between two most frequent types of the state structure as we can see countries as either unitary states or federations. Following the same logic as when considering the electoral system and the institutional set up of the legislative body, the level of centralization can reflect how close the government of a country is to its citizens. It is reasonable to believe that federations, which are in general much more decentralized than their unitary counterparts, will provide their citizens with more connection point between the private and public life. It is because the presence of the dual state structures should expose their citizens to more level of public life. This kind of political system is offering more public offices, which are present on several levels of the country's organization. This, together with increased number of elections into these bodies, could in theory boost the share of people involved the electoral participation and this consequently into another activities affecting public life. Based on this, the hypothesis to confirm or falsify the effect of level of centralization on the political participation can be formulated as follows:

H5: Political decentralized political system will lead to higher rates of political participation as opposed to the centralized one.

Electoral or voting system is one of the main institutional settings which affect political system in a country. Free and fair elections are one of the crucial parts of every democratic political system. It allows citizens to choose their representative and give them opportunity to influence the policy choices done by the government. The way how the laws and the whole

understanding of elections and their purpose are presented in the country causes great deal in explanation of how many political parties there are present in active political life and how many of them are able to represent the interests of their constituency in parliaments or form the government. The research in this area (e.g. Duverger, 1959; Sartori, 1976) can be simplified into a claim that electoral system where seats are distributed based on the oneround majoritarian elections (system first-past-the-post or plurality system) in general leads to creation of two party system, a system which allows one party governments and therefore easier way of how to govern. On the other hand, the systems based on the proportional representation lead mostly to multi-party system, which main strength is that wider spectrum of political forces is usually represented. The last umbrella type, mixed system, can have several forms but is in general trying to put together advantages. Several authors, including Blaise and Dobrzynska (1998), argue that the electoral system effects the rates of electoral participation in a way that the countries with the proportional or mixed system are usually reporting higher rates of voters turnout as opposed to majortiarian systems. They argue that voters are more willing and included to vote when they perceive the voting system as more fair to all parties, including the small ones (Blaise, Massicotte and Dobrzynska, 2003 :8). Based on this, the hypothesis to confirm or falsify the effect of electoral on the political participation can be formulated as follows:

H6: Political system with proportional electoral system will lead to higher rates of political participation as opposed to the majoritarian one.

Another crucial and political system forming characteristic of country is also the institutional setting of it legislative body. These institutions are one of the most visible embodiments of democratic and representative practices and the citizens' perception of them can greatly affect their willingness to be interested and participate in public matters. From the institutional point of view it can be, for example, looked at the types of parliament which are present in

particular countries. In general we can distinguish between two main institutional settings when it comes to legislatives bodies across the sample. Based on the **number of chamber of the national parliament** we can put countries into the group of countries with either unicameral or bicameral parliaments. The reason why this should matter is closely connected to the "fairness" argument presented in the paragraph above. In a simplified way it suggests that the fairer is political and party system perceived from the point of view of citizens, the more incentives they might have to participate in process which leads to forming of these legislative bodies. Arguments about the higher fairness, balancing effect and the better representation of the constituent's interest are usually the main factors used by proponents of this institutional setting. Brought from the pure electoral participation to the area of political participation in general, it can be argued that the higher fairness of the representational system, supposedly in this sense embodied in the bi-cameral parliaments, could lead to higher number when it comes to turnout and also other kinds of political participation. Based on this, the hypothesis to confirm or falsify the effect type of parliament on the political participation can be formulated as follows:

H7: Political system with bi-cameral parliament will lead to higher rates of political participation as opposed to the systems with unicameral parliament.

Two variables presented above were in a way dealing with the process of election and as it was showed, both electoral rules and the character of legislative bodies which are created on them can in theory have effect on the willingness of people to be in a way involved in the political process. However, there is another variable which might serve to explain part of the variance among the observed countries. This variable, which represents the frequency or number of general elections per electoral cycle, could be perceived as a proxy of possible **electoral fatigue**. The reason why this variable might be relevant when looking not only at electoral participation, but on political participation is according to literature interesting from

two different points of views. Some authors (e.g. Cox, 1997) argue that if electoral competition is happening more often, political parties have less resources and capabilities to spend on mobilization of voters. Considering this, we might therefore talk about the fatigue from the point of view of political parties or organizations. This effect can be however accompanied and enhanced by the electoral fatigue from the point of view of citizens. Authors dealing with this phenomenon (e.g. King, 1999) are suggesting that increased number of campaigns and with this connected split in media attention and factual shortening of electoral cycles, leads to the situation when voters are losing interest to participate in such processes. Reflecting this research into the field of political participation in general, it might be interesting to see whether the number of elections to which are citizens exposed will show a stable pattern in increase or decrease in other types of participation. As far as operationalization of this electoral fatigue goes, this variable will be represented by the value representing the number of national level election (parliamentary, presidential and referenda considering the matter of European Union) which happened in time period from 1990 until 2012. Based on this, the hypothesis to confirm or falsify the effect of electoral fatigue on the political participation can be formulated as follows:

H8: Lower frequency of nation-wide elections will lead to higher rates of political

participation.

1.4.3 Socio-economical development

As it was already said, political participation is one of the crucial aspects of democratic society. Vice versa, it is believed that the political participation and civic engagement are activities which are very closely present mostly in politically and economically developed countries. Putting aside the various form of forces participation which can be present in different kinds of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, the higher level of **quality of democracy** should lead to higher level of participation. Considering the framework of this

paper, it is believed that the countries with better functioning democratic system should have larger share of people who are willing to participate in public life. This might be reasonable assumption for two main reasons. First of all, it is assumed that well-functioning democratic system will not create obstacles for their citizens to participate in public life. The second one is, that the first one will actually affect the citizens into realization that they can participate and their activity might be rewarded by success. For the purpose of this study, the *Democracy Index* for Year 2012, which is annually created by the *The Economist*, will be used as a proxy for the quality of democracy in examined countries. Based on this, the hypothesis to confirm or falsify the effect of the quality of democracy on the political participation can be formulated as follows:

H9: The better functioning democracy will lead to higher rates of political participation.

As it was mentioned before, the possibilities which a developed political system offers to its citizens is not sufficient motivator for their political participation. Any form of active engagement of an individual in a public life means that he or she needs to invest some amount of its time and/or resources into it. Therefore, there is usually a consensus among the various authors that the more resources and time people posses, the more of them they can invest into some kind of political activity. Authors like Inglehart (1997) or Endersby and Krieckhaus (2008) often argue that highly developed nations are characterized by an educated citizenry and the emergence of the post-materialistic values in society. Also, both of these indicators, increased education and the decreasing emphasis on the rational and materialistic calculations, should cause the increase in the people's willingness to engage in politics and should therefore have a positive effect on electoral participation (Stockemer, Calca, 2012:10). In general, this, taken into the field of the political participation, could mean that people in countries with higher **economical development** could in theory have the higher share of politically engaged people or at least the lower share of passive citizens. To assess the

economical development of the country, the most commonly used measure is the gross domestic product per capita. This measure provides us with information about how many resources people in country approximately posses and how many of them are they therefore able to spend on these activities. To assess the economical development in the country, the data collected by International Monetary Fund for year 2012 are used. Related to participation in general, addition of these data into the model should be able to tell, whether people use their extra resources for electoral participation (voting) as the theory suggests, or if they are willing to use them also to engage in other kinds of political participation. Based on this, the hypothesis to confirm or falsify the effect of the economic development on the political participation can be formulated as follows:

H10: Higher economic development will lead to higher rates of political participation

2. Re-mapping the terrain – patterns of political participation in

contemporary Europe

Following chapter will provide the basic overview about the differences in citizen's engagement among countries from the ESS sample. As it was stated above, the sample consists of data collected among respondents from 29 countries. This part of analysis will provide the brief overview of current patterns of political participation. The aim of this chapter is to see whether in theory based, division between East and West holds even if looking at the one of the most recent data (ESS round 6 constrains data collected in year 2012) and by this to find the answer for the first research question.

2.1 Overall participation

As can be seen from the table in Appendix I, the assumed distinction between West and East is visible at the first sight. Practically every country which was labeled as western has at least one above average result when looking at particular forms of political participation (values above the mean are written in bold). The highest rates of overall participation as well as in it particular segments were present in Scandinavia (labeled here as West), where data from Sweden and Norway accompanied by Iceland showed above average results in every type of participation. The lowest value of average overall participation among western countries was reported in Portugal, which would be in the group of countries with lower than average participation even if it would be present in the category of countries labeled as East. Lower than average in the Western part of the sample are with Portugal (the lowest average value) also United Kingdom, Ireland (mainly because lower values on electoral participation) and Israel. When it comes to Eastern countries, the values are almost exclusively under the mean value of the whole sample. Two eastern countries with highest overall values, Czech Republic and Slovakia, would be at the bottom of the Western group and only Portugal would do worse than them. The lowest ranks among eastern countries as well as the whole sample are taken by Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.

2.1.1 Voting

As Letki (2003) points out, voting is not, despite its popularity as an indicator and its purely political character, the most obvious type of participation. This type of activity involves relatively little input in terms of time, money and civic skills, and therefore can be perceived as one of the least costly of political activities (Letki, 2003 :5).

Data about the willingness of respondents to vote are very similar to the data about the average overall participation. This is not surprising since voting is the most common type of participation (therefore it was mostly reflected in average overall score) across the all countries, no matter whether eastern or western. Results show that highest turnouts should be expected in Northern countries, which are together at top positions followed by continental western European countries as Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and also Cyprus and Ireland. Lowest values were observed mostly in Eastern European countries with the Czech Republic at the very bottom of the list, accompanied by Kosovo and Switzerland as the lowest ranked country from the whole Western bloc. However, when reading these results, one should have in mind the fact, that these are results of the survey asking about the participation in the last national election and the more appropriate measure of electoral participation is probably the reported turnout from the country. This could provide better data, since it would cover the share of electoral-active population among the whole population of the country as well as the opportunity to distinguish between different types of elections. However, these data were not part of the analyzed dataset and therefore beyond the scope of this paper.

2.1.2 Contacting politician

As Milbrath suggests, contacting the politician is a very specific and context dependent part of participation, as it could be assumed that people who do it are usually doing that not having in mind concerns of society, but rather their personal (Milbrath, Goel, 1976:14). However, the data show that this activity is indeed very similar to other types of political participation and shares the pattern with most of the other types. It is much more present in the West and practically all Western European countries besides the Ireland and Portugal were either above or very close to the mean value for this activity which was computed from the whole sample. Highest rate of this activity was present in Northern countries, but at this point accompanied by countries from western continental Europe as well as British Islands. Overall, the data show that the Eastern European countries will be more passive when it comes to actively accessing politics and politicians. Most of them surely confirm the suspicion that people in them will take the liberty to abstain from political activities. However, this seems to be not the case of the Eastern bloc, since one of the lowest values here is occupied by Portugal.

2.1.3 Working for a party

Working for a political party is the least frequent way how citizens in the observed countries decide to participate. The maximal value belongs to Iceland and it is 10.1%. Above the average for this activity are also three other Nordic countries, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, which share this position also with Spain, Switzerland, Cyprus and Germany. The participation rate in this group of countries varies from already mentioned 10.1% to 3.9%. While Kosovo is reporting value of 3.8%, the rest of the countries go much lower, from 3.5% in case of "Western" Ireland and Netherlands, to 1.4% for Portugal. Overall, working for a political party seems to be an activity, where the pattern dividing countries into "active west" and "passive east" seems to be weakest.

2.1.4 Working for Organization

If the pattern was weak in the previous form of participation, the one connected with working for organizations seems to hold into this pattern very strongly. Not only the there is quite obvious division between East and West, where above average value of participation in this activity is exclusively occupied by countries labeled as Western, the difference among the values is also much higher. This goes in line with assumptions of perceiving the difference between those two blocs in a sense of the active and passive one. While in the Western countries a share of respondents indicating this kind of activity varies from 39.9% for Iceland to 17.4% for Switzerland, the Eastern bloc starts with the highest share in Poland with 7.3% and ends with Bulgaria with only 1.2%.

2.1.5 Wearing a badge

Wearing a badge appears to be especially popular activity in Northern countries except Denmark. Almost a half Icelandic people declared supporting some cause by this type of activity, followed by almost a third of Norwegians and fifth of Swedish. Even Finland which usually doesn't stick with its regional partners is declaring almost 17% participation of this form, which is the same share as it is presented in Belgium. This kind of activity is however much less common among the rest of the countries and with the exception of Czech Republic with 7.1% share are all other values of Eastern countries above the 5%.

2.1.6 Signing a petition

As can be seen from the data, signing of the petition appears to follow the general trend as well. Above the average is this time only the Western countries, one again leading with Nordic countries. Looking at this type of participation, even countries which in other categories appear more passive are apparently catching up and got into this part of list. Only two exceptions are Israel and again very passive Portugal. Closely below the mean are also Central European countries, Slovakia and Czech Republic. Bottom of the list is occupied by already mentioned Portugal accompanied by countries of Balkan: Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Kosovo.

2.1.7 Attending public demonstration

Attendance of public demonstration is an activity deeply covered mainly by the theoreticians of social and protest movements. Milbrath's classification puts it into the category of active and unconventional participation (Milbrath, Goel. 1967:18). Among the sample of countries used for this paper, this way of participation was most common in Spain, where slightly more than a quarter of respondents indicated that they took part in some of them during recent year. The list of other countries where this activity was rather common consisted again from northern countries, Iceland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden, accompanied by Israel, Ireland, Portugal and as only eastern representative, Kosovo. In the group of countries with smaller share of protesters, are besides the Eastern European Countries also Switzerland, Denmark, Great Britain, Finland and Belgium.

2.1.8 Boycotting a product

Boycotting a product or so called consumer activism again reflects the distribution and shares of overall participation. Practically all western countries, and again led by the Northern countries, report values higher than average. However, within this category a somewhat middle ground can be observable, as there is visible division between the countries which score highest on this type participation, and the one which are at the bottom of the list (again mostly countries from Balkan, accompanied by Portugal). This middle category consists of mixture of Eastern and Western countries, and from several sub-regions.

2.2 Summary and discussion

Articles above presented basic overview about how citizens of different countries participate in particular activities (chart for this part are part of the Appendix I). As it was tried to demonstrate, with some minor exception, the countries labeled as Western are still reporting higher rates of participation across practically all the types of political participation present in ESS dataset. However, the further look into data show that the initial suspicion about the divide on the dimension of West-East might be insufficient. It is because in virtually all categories, the countries with the most active citizens were the Nordic ones, very often leaving the continental Western European countries behind them. Following the similar logic from the other side, the Balkan countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Kosovo showed overall lower scores than for example post-communist countries of Central Europe as Slovakia, Czech Republic, or Estonia from Baltic. Besides that, there were also several countries which deviate from their own bloc. Namely it was Portugal, a country very passive practically among all the measured types of participation. On the other hand, Cyprus, which was initially classified as a country of East, got itself several time in between countries with higher rate of participation. However, it must be also reminded that these results come only from one round of an ESS questionnaire. This on the one hand therefore captures the "almost" present situation about the various form of participation in the selected countries, however without looking at it from a long-term perspective it might be inaccurate. Some particular effect which took place around the time a survey was done (e.g. presence of Constitutional Assemblies or mass protest caused by financial crisis or corruption scandals) could significantly skew these results.

Because of this, it might be for the later purposes and research useful to distinguish at least also between North and South, or reflecting the possible specifics of Balkan and Baltic countries (if data about these countries be available).

3. Latent class analysis of political participation across the countries

This part of the paper will present the result of latent class analysis of the same data in order to answer the second research question. This statistical method is in its logic similar to a factor or cluster analysis. These two types of analyses are sometimes present in literature as a tool for analyzing of the clustering of political participation. However, this paper aims to rather use the latent class analysis as it was especially developed to work with categorical data and it is therefore better fitting for analysis of ESS questions oriented to political participation. The aim of this analysis is to identify the underlying participation patterns on the individual level. In other words, the results of this analysis should show how respondents from different countries cluster based on the individual involvement in particular activities and hopefully be able to identify the distinguished modes of participation. The chapter will be structured as follows. First of all, it will provide the justification for several arbitrary decisions which are connected with research design. Secondly, it put the results of the latent class analysis for every particular country in a broader context. Finally, the results of latent class analysis, namely the sizes of the particular classes will later serve as dependent variable for further analysis.

3.1 Modes of participation

The concept of modes of participation is the product of Milbrath (1976). Based on his study, which used the data from United States, he found out that the American society of those days consisted of three main groups of people when looking at the level of their engagement (Milbrath, Goel, 1976 :11). First, there was a group of so called *apathetic*, who were people practically voluntarily self- excluded from the any kind of political process. According to author, this attitude was present among third of US population. Second group, or as Milbrath named them *spectators*, consisted of people only minimally involved in politics. The last and smallest group, which formed about 5-7 percent of the population, was then filled with so-

called *gladiators*. These people formed the most active of all groups. While the names of the groups might seem strange for the describing phenomenon of political participation, Milbrath drew them as an analogy to the roles of different people at a Roman contest. As he puts it: A small band of gladiator battle to please the spectators, who in turn cheer, clap, and finally vote to decide who has won the battle (election). The *apathetic* don't even watch the show (Milbrath, Goel, 1976 :11).

Since the Milbrath's study covered only one country and, as was already presented in previous chapter, there is a variation among them when it comes to willingness of people to participate in various forms of activities, it is expected that there will be also variance on the individual level among these countries. For the sake of better understanding of results, Milbrath's references to Roman Empire will, unfortunately, not be used. Rather more specific descriptions of particular modes will be developed based on the results of analysis. It is need to be mentioned that these categories are results of arbitrary decision and could be discussed. For this purpose, the Appendix III offers a reader with opportunity to see data based on which these categories were created and named, so readers can come with better explanation if they disagree with the ones presented.

3.2 Determining the number of latent classes

As in factor analysis, the number of classes which will be searched for needs to be determined by researcher. In order to not be very general while still be able to cover broader modes of participation, an initial latent class analysis was conducted on all countries from the dataset. During this phase, an analysis was run on every country looking for 2-5 latent class solutions. All analyses were done by using the 10000 random starts to increase the accuracy of the results. To find out what number of classes fits most, several measures of model fit were considered. First of all, the most conservative Pearson chi-squared was used, but the results of this test showed very inconsistent results. Despite the models being statistically significant, the number of classes they suggested lacked the substantive significance in many cases as they sometimes stratified the sample of respondent into tiny and not very meaningful classes. Therefore, it was decided to look at different model criteria often used when the latent class analysis is conducted. These models fit measures, called Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) should give the researcher the better sense of what number of classes is present in the data. Using these measures, the results become much more consistent through most of examined countries. However, it must me mentioned that AIC and BIC measures suggested different number of classes. The AIC parameter suggested that overall about 4 classes can be indentified across the selected countries. On the other hand, the BIC criterion showed that the number of latent classes present in the data is rather 3. Therefore, a decision had to be made on how many classes will be explored and interpreted. The final decision was to use the three class model as suggested by BIC values, mostly because the classes here appeared to show enough variance, while at the same time were quite consistent when it came to their possible characterization.

3.3 Character of latent classes and the size of their membership

When results of preliminary analysis indicated that the three class solution could be the best way of assessing of the modes of participation, it was expected that differences within them will more or less mirror the division between the ones sketched by Milbrath. This in a way indeed happened to be the right expectation; nevertheless there are still some differences which make the taxonomy of classes different from the Milbrath's. The analysis of the ESS sample didn't exactly showed the very clear divisive lines between two active groups (*gladiators* and *spectators*) and one totally passive one (*apathetic*) as suggested in the work of the mentioned author. Rather, the analyzed data suggest the presence of three classes, while all three of them do participate in public life and the main difference lies what kind of activities they engage in and how likely or often they do so. In a next section, the short

description of each out of three particular groups will be presented and also reflected in a light of the Milbrath's taxonomy. It should be reminded here one more time that the labeling of the particular group is an arbitrary decision made by the author of this paper. Despite the effort to be as consistent as possible, there are cases which might be subject of objection. For this reason, Appendix II offers the overview of class sizes and Appendix III contains the statistically quantified characteristics of particular class for every country relevant for this paper, which makes them therefore open for re-interpretation,

3.3.1 Activists - LC 1

Activists are overall the smallest out of all three groups. The average share of this group in society is about 5%, showing not a great variance among majority of cases, except several outliers as Russia (slightly less that 1%) to (19% in Czech Republic). In general is this group characterized by the very high reported values of electoral participation, as well as high values connected with other form of political participation indicated in the data. The number of additional activities varies across the countries, but the general pattern is still quite stable. This group can be indeed perceived in a similar way than Milbrath's gladiator as they do actively engage in political activities.

3.3.2 Active voters – LC 2

An *active voter is* a term which will be used in this paper to refer to the member of the second latent class. In most cases is this class some kind of middle ground between the first class and the third one, when looking on both numbers of activities in which its member participate, as well as the share of the whole population they represent. The size of the membership in this group varies, as the mean value across the whole dataset is 18.31% and is ranging from 4.11% in Poland, to 38.72% in Iceland and a clear East – West division is present, with Nordic countries having the highest share people falling into this category. This group can be in general terms characterized as a group of active voters. This group can be characterized by

understanding their position within the other two. Group of active voters usually report much higher numbers on electoral participation than the group of the passive voters and in addition to this are on a non-regular basis willing to engage (or are very close to engage) in one of the other activities, usually in form of signing a petition. In Milbrath's optic, these people could be perceived as spectators as they clearly are willing to participate in electoral process. In other words, the group of *active voters* might be not as active as the group of *activists*, but data show that they are still willing to signal to them what are they preferences and are willing to judge and challenge their performance.

3.3.3 Passive voters – LC 3

In all cases except Norway, the group of the *passive voters* is the largest latent class present in the society. On average, this group form about three quarters of European societies (76.53%), with the lowest value of 55.603% in Norway the highest share 90.981% is present in Poland. Similarly to the class of active voters, even here a clear division between Eastern and Western countries is clearly present with Nordic countries reporting the smallest membership in this group and the countries of Eastern Europe on the other hand report the highest numbers. The general description of this class is quite straightforward. People who belong here do not do anything besides voting, and even when it comes to this activity, their participation cannot be taken for granted as they report lower willingness to cast their votes. Existence of this group suggests that there might be alternative way of looking at the modes of political participation, especially in contemporary and comparative context. In Milbrath's taxonomy, the most passive group, apathetic, does not bother to participate at all. Nevertheless, the results presented in this paper show, that even the most passive group report to be engaged in public matters at least by casting their vote from time to time. This was confirmed also by looking at the results of additional latent class analysis ran with up to 5 class models. Even there, no signs of such anti-system behavior were present among the countries in the dataset.

3.4 Deviant cases

As it was mentioned in the previous paragraph, a three class of solution was based on the merits of the BIC criterion and the results of latent class analysis looking for these classes showed consistent results when considering the class structure. Out of the 29 countries which were included in the last edition of 6^{th} round of European Social Survey dataset, 26 continued to be used in the final analysis. That means that 3 countries were dropped out of the final dataset, a situation caused by two main reasons.

First of all, Finland was dropped off the dataset since even the repeated latent class analysis conducted on this country reported results very different from the rest of the countries. In this case, otherwise stable division in the structure of participation modes (activists, active voters, passive voters) didn't hold. As opposed to other countries, the largest group (usually filled with passive voters) was created by people with high values of electoral participation and also non-marginal values of other kinds of participation. When it comes to other two groups, another visible deviation from usual pattern was present. Data showed that there is no clear distinction between activist and active voters as observable in cases of other countries. In Finnish case, the other two classes were similar when it comes to their size (16.57% and 12.79%) and also number of activities they members engage in. The main difference between them is the list of activities which respondents belonging there reporting to do. While both are scoring high on electoral participation, the first group (16.57%) also report their willingness to contact politician and working for organizations, the other one (12.79%) don't engage in those, but rather are willing to sign petitions and to boycott products.

The other two countries which didn't make it into the final analysis are Albania and Kosovo. The reason for this is much more pragmatic and is connected with availability of the co untry level data for them. Several datasets from which the data were taken in order to run the analysis often lacked the data for one or both mentioned countries. Therefore, for both reasons of convenience and transparency, it was decided to drop both of these cases. Making this decision, the results of the analysis should be more relevant and easier to re-examined, as risks of the possible inaccuracies caused by using the values computed by different organizations (and with different methodology), can be lowered.

4. Analysis of country level variables and their relationship for latent class memberships

4.1 Bi –variate analyses – hypotheses tests

This chapter aims to provide the verification or falsification of hypotheses connected with variables which are supposed, based on theories, to have effect on the character of political participation in the country. Political participation is here understood as a dependent variable and it is operationalized as the share of population belonging into one of the three participation modes introduced in previous chapter: *activists* (LC 1), *active voters* (LC 2) and *passive voters* (LC 3). Following sub-chapter will provide results of series of bi-variate analysis done on this data. Every paragraph will be devoted to one particular independent variable and its effect on the size of particular latent classes. Since the list of explanatory variables contains both continuous and categorical variables, the appropriate statistical test was used in order to get meaningful and interpretable results. All of the variables were checked for assumption of normal distribution. Descriptive statistics, mainly the one for skewness and kurtosis can be found in Appendix IV. There were no major violations of neither of this assumption when it came to variables which were supposed to be treated as continuous, as in any case the value of skewness didn't pass the threshold of 2 or -2, and kurtosis 7 or -7. The effect of independent variables of continuous nature (size of population,

GDP per capita etc.), was therefore put into the linear regression model. On the other hand, in order to see whether there is a significant effect of variables of categorical nature (level of centralization, type of parliament etc.); a two-sample t-test was conducted. Each bi-variate analysis will be presented in a form of table and brief description containing the evaluation of the appropriate hypothesis. Results of all analyses will be then summed up and discussed at the end of the chapter.

	Activists	Active Voters	Passive Voters
Population size	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)
<u>R</u> ²	0	0	0

4.1.1 Population size

N=26; p<0.001 ***, p<0.01 **, p<0.05 *, p<0.1.

As authors mentioned in the theoretical part of this paper suggested, the size of the population should play role when it comes to electoral participation. They argued that thanks to closer ties between people and stronger sense of community. This, altogether with an increased importance of one individual vote, meaning that one vote in population-wise small country present a higher share of the total number of votes than in big countries, should lead to higher incentive to participate in elections. However, when confronting this assumption with the data used in this dataset, the effect of the population size proved not to be significant towards neither one of the three participation classes. Therefore, in this case, the hypothesis H1 has to be rejected.

4.1.2 Population density						
	Activists	Active Voters	Passive Voters			
Density	0	0	0			
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)			
<u>R²</u>	0	0	0			

N=26; p<0.001 ***, p<0.01 **, p<0.05 *, p<0.1 .

Density of the population was another variable which should have based on the theory some effect of on the increase or decrease of electoral participation. In this case, author argued that citizens from the countries with higher density will be more concentrated and therefore any mobilization activity will have higher chance to success. However, when taking into account modes of participation which were results of latent class analysis, the significant relationship for neither of the membership in one of the classes wasn't confirmed. Therefore, in a similar way than when looking at the size of the population, the hypothesis H2 has to be rejected.

4.1.3 Urbanization

Activists	Active Voters	Passive Voters	
-0.01	0.57 ***	-0.57 **	
(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.15)	
0	0.41	0.34	
	Activists -0.01 (0.07) 0	Activists Active Voters -0.01 0.57 *** (0.07) (0.13) 0 0.41	Activists Active Voters Passive Voters -0.01 0.57 *** -0.57 ** (0.07) (0.13) (0.15) 0 0.41 0.34

N=26; p<0.001 ***, p<0.01 **, p<0.05 *, p<0.1.

Out of the variables which are characteristic for the population of the country, only the share of population living in the urban areas appeared to be significant factor influencing the political participation. Based on the theory, people living in cities should be easier to mobilize as the cost of mobilization in these areas (altogether with the higher density of populations) is lower and the mobilization efforts should be therefore more effective. Results of the linear regression conducted on one latent class at the time indeed showed that this variable can predict the size of the two out of three groups. While this predictor wasn't successful to explain the size of the activists group, provides consistent results when it comes to predicting the effect on membership of the class of active voters and passive voters. In both cases, the coefficients are approximately the same in their size, but vary in the direction of the effect. Results show that one percent increase in the percentage of population living in the cities increase the size of the latent class filled with active voters by 0.57% and this variable is able to explain 41% of variance. At the same time, the one percentage point increase on this variable makes the share of the group of passive voters smaller by 0.57% and this variable is able to explain 34% of the variance. Stated above suggest that the H3 is can be confirmed as the data suggest that the increase in the share of population living in the urban areas is positively affecting the share of population which are more politically active and lowers the share of the share of most passive group in population. There is unfortunately no evidence of what is the effect of country's urbanization on the size most active group of citizens.

	Parliamentary	Presidential	Difference	p-value
LC 1	5.64	3.25	2.39	0.13
LC 2	18.23	17.25	0.98	0.88
LC 3	76.13	79.75	-3.62	0.61
Ν	22	4		

4.1.4 Type of government

As was already stated, one of the most general divisions among democracies is based on the type of government present in the country. Out of two main types, the parliamentary system of government was in theory supposed to report higher values of electoral participation. Following the main premise of this paper, it was naturally expected that system emphasizing the position of legislative body within it will provide more incentives for citizens to vote and participate also in other activities and therefore report higher share of active citizens. The testing of the data however showed that this expectation wasn't fulfilled at all, when looking at the relationship of this variable with the classes of active and passive voters, since the mean differences didn't reach the significant level even remotely. Results for the class of activists on the other hand, despite failing to reach statistical significance as well, reported much lower p-value which possibly could reach 90% confidence threshold given the larger sample of countries. However, the present data don't leave other chance than reject the hypothesis H4.

	Federation	Unitary state	Difference	p-value
LC 1	4.13	5.78	-1.65	0.28
LC 2	19.89	17.28	2.59	0.527
LC 3	76.00	77.00	-1.00	0.82
N	8	18		

4.1.5 Level of centralization

Level of the centralization of the country is another variable which could in theory make difference in citizens' willingness to engage in public life. Federative organization of the country should in theory provide its citizens with opportunity to participate on several levels. Moreover, bringing the decision making process closer to them, their incentives to engage should be even bigger. Out of the sample of 26 countries included in the dataset, 8 countries were organized as federations and 18 of them as unitary states. The two sample t-test didn't show the significant difference between the two groups of countries. Indeed, the federations reported slightly higher mean value when it comes to active voters and slightly lower mean value of passive voters' group size, however neither of them was significant. The same situation is present with the size of activists' class, where no significant difference is reported. The hypothesis H5 therefore needs to be rejected.

4.1.0 LIC	.1.0 Electoral system						
	Proportional	Other	Difference	p-value			
LC 1	5.48	4.40	-1.08	0.55			
LC 2	17.90	18.80	0.90	0.55			
LC 3	76.67	76.80	0.13	0.98			
Ν	21	5					

4.1.6 Electoral system

Electoral system is variable very closely connected to formation of parliaments and the whole political system. As it was stated above, there are three general types of electoral systems,

proportional, majoritarian and mixed. Theory states that proportional electoral system should be the system which is best at reflecting of the preferences of voters. Absence of majoritarian principles present in other types of electoral system, the proportional electoral system should therefore offer the most incentive for people to participate in election. In other words, this system grants voters the highest chance that their vote will influence the final structure of parliament and consequently government. Results of two sample t-test however showed no significant result when it comes to sizes of class membership in neither of three classes. Therefore, the hypothesis H6 has to be rejected.

4.1.7	Type of	parliament	
	1 JPC 01	purnument	

	Bi-cameral	Unicameral	Difference	p-value
LC 1	6.28	4.08	2.20	0.14
LC 2	17.78	18.41	-0.63	0.88
LC 3	75.93	77.58	-1.65	0.72
N	14	12		

Type of parliament into higher citizens' involvement in electoral participation is the type of the parliament, to be more specific, the number of chambers it is created from. In theory, the bi-cameral parliament should be perceived as ones, which offer more possibilities and institutional tools to provide fair representation of citizens' interest. Therefore, it should be in their best interest to utilize this opportunity in form of higher electoral and other political participation. The results of the two sample t-test however showed that considering the sizes of particular classes, there are no significant differences between countries with bi-cameral and unicameral parliaments. Extremely high p-values for differences in means of the groups of both active and passive voters, suggest no prediction ability for this variable and the same situation is present for difference in class of activists. Therefore, the hypothesis H7 has to be rejected.

	Activists	Active Voters	Passive Voters	
Electoral Fatigue	-0.36	-0.95	1.31	
	(0.30)	(0.79)	(0.84)	
<u>R²</u>	0.02	0.02	0.05	

4.1.8 Electoral fatigue

N=26; p<0.001 ***, p<0.01 **, p<0.05 *, p<0.1.

As stated in chapter devoted to theory, the predicted effect of electoral fatigues should have decrease the willingness of people to participate in elections. Authors supported this argument by pointing out on two main reasons behind this, the limited resources of people and groups who want to organize and mobilize people to participate, and the erosion in attention which is given to such activities. Therefore, a logical question about the effect of the numbers of elections on the willingness of people to not only vote, but also engage in other forms of political participation arise. The results of bi-variate regression taking into account the number of elections which country experienced in time period from 1990 to 2012 however did not show any significant relationship in any of three different classes. The hypothesis H8 therefore can be rejected.

The definition of the definiti	much			
	Activists	Active Voters	Passive Voters	
Dem Index	0 99	5 04***	-6.08***	
Deminidex	(1.58)	(1.22)	(1.19)	
<u>R²</u>	0.07	0.39	0.50	

N=26; p<0.001 ***, p<0.01 **, p<0.05 *, p<0.1 .

419 Democracy index

The question whether higher electoral participation enhances the quality or the better quality of democracy stimulates the citizen's willingness to participate on is a question still present in contemporary literature. The assumption with which this paper works is that people from countries with well performing democracies should be motivated to engage not only in elections, but also other kinds of political participation. The results of linear regression using the *Democracy index* created by *The Economist* suggest that this indeed might be true. As in previous cases, this variable is still unable explain the size of the membership of the smallest and most active group of citizens. However, the data provide quite clear sign that the quality of democracy in the country has an effect on the size membership of groups of active and passive voters. Linear regression shows that while the one point increase in democracy index leads to increase in size of active voters by 5.04, while at the same time reduces the size of the passive voters groups by 6.08%. Although there might be need for better and more accurate quantification of this effect; it is not possible to do with current index as it is itself created as an average of several different variables. The values of R² for these analyses also show that this variable itself is able to account for 39% of variance when it comes to group of active voters and 50% for the passive ones. In both cases, the results are significant and therefore the hypothesis H9 can be confirmed.

4.1.10 GDP/cap

	Activists	Active Voters	Passive Voters	
GDP/CAP	1.47	10.5***	-12.11***	
	(1.02)	(1.78)	(1.69)	
<u>R</u> ²	0.04	0.58	0.67	

N=26; p<0.001 ***, p<0.01 **, p<0.05 *, p<0.1 .

Looking at the gross domestic product per capita and considering it as a proxy for economical development of the country should serve as a base for testing the last hypothesis of this paper. Theories assumed that the more resources will people have at their disposal, the less likely would be they to opt-out from political engagement. In other words, people from economically more developed countries posses in theory more resources to be politically active. The result of linear regression provides evidence that this assumption seems to be the right one. As can be seen from the table above, not even this variable is able to explain the

size of the most active part of population. On the other hand however, there are statistically significant and consistent results when it comes to effect on size of the group of active and passive voters. Results clearly indicate that higher gross domestic product per capita leads to increase in size of the population of active voters, while at the same time it is reducing the size of the group of passive ones. Therefore the hypothesis H10 can be confirmed.

4.2 Summary

As can be seen from the results presented in this chapter, most of the hypotheses about the effects of institutional setting and country characteristics didn't meet the criteria so they can be labeled as significant. Only three of them showed that they have a standalone significant effect on class membership of the two out of three classes, namely the class of active voters and class of passive voters. Out of the population level variables, nor population size or its density appeared to have significant impact on willingness of people to participate. In other words, they didn't increase nor decrease the membership of one of the three groups representing different modes of participation. The only variable out of this set which reports to have effect is the urbanization – a proportion of population living in the urban areas. Results showed that the higher is the share of this population, the higher is the share of people belonging into group of active voters, while at the same time the number of people labeled as passive voters drops. This goes with assumption that people living in cities are easier to approach and mobilize than those living in rural areas.

Another set of hypotheses tested the effects of institutional settings on the belonging in one of the classes. Unfortunately, non out of the five in selected variables dealing with political and electoral system (type of government, level of centralization of the country, electoral system, type of parliament and number of nation-wide elections people are called to engage in) did not show up as having explanatory power since the differences of means between countries with different institutional settings were not significant. The exact opposite situation however appeared when looking at variables representing the socio-economic development of the country. The proxy for political development, the *Democracy index*, appeared to be significant predictor of size when it came to groups of both active and passive voters. Similarly to the urbanization rate, the higher value on this variable, meaning the presence of more developed democratic system, suggested statistically significant increase in size of the group of active voters. At the same time, the same increase reduces the size of the population of passive voters. On the other hand, neither this variable was able to explain the size of the population belonging to the group of activists. It should be reminded that the use of selected index as a proxy for quality of democracy can be challenged as it itself is created by putting together several variables. The main reason for its selection was that the creator of this index involved every country included in the analysis and therefore was believed that the values of it are directly comparable.

Similar situation as with democracy index appeared when attempted to access the effect of economical development on the political participation. The value of GDP per capita, measured in American dollars, showed to be a sound predictor for the size of the membership in both class of active and passive voters. In order with the theoretical expectations, the results showed that the higher GDP per capita had both statistically significant positive effect on increasing the size of the active voters group and the negative effect on the size of the class of passive voters. Theory that the more resources people in a country have, the more they can "invest" in various activities seems therefore be confirmed and sound even beyond the scope of electoral participation. As in previous cases, no significant result was found when looking at predicable power of this variable on the size of group of activists.

4.3 Limitations of results and ideas for further research on the topic

Despite written above, it must be noted that the results of all conducted analyses come hand to hand with limitations and therefore they need to be read and understood accordingly. First and foremost, it must be understood that data on the political participation, upon which this analysis was conducted, consisted only from the one round of ESS dataset. This means that some of the data might theoretically be affected by specific events which occurred in particular countries in the time period of 2011-2012. This problem being recognized, it was decided to work with the whole set of countries used in ESS dataset. That way, the possible error caused by this country specific events could be randomized and not ever further emphasized by possible inclusion of bias induced by researcher-driven selection of examined societies. Also it must be remembered, that the final bi-variate analyses was not conducted on the whole dataset of the countries. Out of original 29, the numbers of cases in the latter analyses dropped to 26 as 3 countries were dropped for specific reason. We are talking about Finland, where the latent class analysis failed to report the pattern present in all other countries and therefore the sizes of the classes (modes of participation) were not usable in further analyses. The other two cases, Albania and Kosovo, were there dropped from the dataset and the analyses as it appeared quite problematic to find some of the relevant country level variables, comparable with ones presented for other countries. Because of this, it might be argued that the number of cases is not sufficient to serve as a basis for inferential statistics. However, this problem was also recognized and tried to deal with by using the maximum of usable cases given by dataset. This way, the process of this data analysis can be later repeated either on larger dataset of countries, for example by using another major dataset with similar battery of question. Alternatively, the further research might take into account more data points, meaning use more rounds of ESS or other dataset to see, whether the patterns described here are stable across the time, as they seems to be quite stable across the countries (at least when it comes to examined time period).

CONCLUSION

This paper aspired to contribute to the literature about political participation and the structural factors which stimulate it. In order to do this, the European Social Survey dataset was used and analyzed to answer stated research questions by re-mapping the types and patterns of political participation present in contemporary Europe. In contrast to previous literature, which in many cases understood the political participation as a synonym to the electoral participation (voting), this paper used the broader definition of this concept. Therefore, not only voting, but also other activities such as contacting of politicians, working for political parties or organizations, signing petitions, wearing badges, attending public demonstrations and boycotting products, were taken into account.

First analysis showed that when it comes to the overall rate of participation or participation in particular activities, there is indeed still a visible division on the East-West dimension present. This is observable when looking at the systematized descriptive statistics of the variables indicating political participation, where countries with above-the-average rates in both overall participation and participation in particular activities are usually present in Western countries. More than that, the data also suggest that for the future research, it might be worth to break this general division into more specific regions, as several of them (especially visible in Nordic countries) seem to report even more similar pattern of political participation among themselves.

The second part of the empirical part was focused on finding the presence of the stable latent class structure among citizens of European countries. This part of the paper aspired to confirm or update the argument and theory formed by Milbrath, in which he divided the US society into three main groups, the active group of *gladiators*, less active group of *spectators* and the anti-system or ignorant group of *apathetic*. The result of latent class analysis indeed showed

stable results. Altogether 26 countries, which is an absolute majority of the whole sample, indicated quite stable division between the three main latent classes when it comes to their willingness to engage in public life in some way. As predicted by the theory, size of the membership in the class of the most active citizens is the smallest, usually followed by the group of active voters in the middle and the vast majority of population across the most of the countries can be described as passive voters. In contrast to expectations based on the Milbrath's results, when looking at the three class model, no country reported the presence of totally ignorant or apathetic group.

The last part of the empirical chapter was later focused on the exploration of relationship between country specific structural factors and the sizes of present latent classes. A series of bi-variate analyses were conducted and their results showed that some structural factors might predict the size of two out of three classes; the class of active voters and the class of passive voters. Out of the ten examined variables, three (economic development, quality of democracy and the rate of urbanization) showed significant and consistent result when predicting size of the class membership in them and therefore succeeded to confirm hypotheses related to them. Besides this result, another three variables, namely type of government, level of centralization and electoral fatigue, showed results pointing in a way which was predicted by the theory, although all of them failed to be statistically significant and hypothesis related to them were therefore rejected. Other examined variables (population size, population density, electoral system and type of the parliament) failed to provide both consistent and statistically significant result and hypotheses concerned with them were rejected as well.

As previously mentioned, these results however need to be read with caution. The fact that it uses only the most recent data and can therefore describe the current situation also comes with some difficulties. First of all, the results are based only on one rounds of the ESS dataset and therefore it is not possible to claim that these results are stable across the time and unlikely to change. In fact, they might be quite easily skewed by some country-specific event which took place around particular time in particular country. Therefore, further research using data from dataset containing larger number of countries or through longer time period could test, whether results presented here could be confirmed or falsified.

Also, the whole analysis done in the third part of the empirical chapter showed that although several of them appeared to be a good predictor of size relationships between the passive voters and active voters, selected structural factors were not able to explain size of the most active class of population. Future research could therefore focus on other, possible individual level, factors which make this particular group of citizens to be much more active than the rest of the population.

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APPENDICES

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	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bcpprd	Overall
Lithuania	56.0	7.7	3.8	2.8	3.1	5.5	1.9	2.0	10.4
Hungary	72.9	4.8	1.1	3.3	1.2	3.0	3.6	3.7	11.7
Slovenia	73.2	7.2	2.6	1.9	1.4	7.7	3.4	3.9	12.7
Bulgaria	73.8	4.6	2.8	1.2	2.5	7.3	5.5	3.7	12.7
Ukraine	76.9	7.7	3.4	2.2	5.0	3.2	2.3	0.7	12.7
Russia	68.0	7.6	3.2	5.4	4.0	6.1	4.1	3.3	12.7
Poland	69.1	7.3	2.5	7.3	4.5	10.7	2.4	6.0	13.7
Estonia	68.2	12.3	2.3	4.8	3.7	9.6	4.0	6.5	13.9
Kosovo	65.3	8.9	3.8	4.2	3.0	9.6	8.4	14.8	14.8
Slovakia	76.3	10.4	1.8	4.8	2.7	20.5	3.5	10.6	16.3
CzechRep.	64.8	12.3	1.9	6.3	7.1	18.9	6.7	13.7	16.5
Cyprus	80.3	15.4	4.6	6.6	4.6	10.7	4.8	9.5	17.1
Israel	77.7	10.4	2.4	3.8	3.5	13.4	11.0	22.1	18.0
Albania	84.6	16.4	8.1	4.8	11.4	6.4	7.7	9.9	18.7
average East	71.9	9.5	3.2	4.2	4.1	9.5	5.0	7.9	14.4
Portugal	69.1	5.6	1.4	4.0	1.6	7.3	7.4	3.2	12.5
UnitedKingdom	71.7	15.3	2.0	7.9	6.6	32.3	3.5	18.9	19.8
Ireland	74.4	18.5	3.5	11.4	6.9	22.5	10.5	11.4	19.9
Netherlands	83.7	13.5	3.5	25.2	4.1	22.1	3.0	13.7	21.1
Switzerland	66.3	14.8	6.4	17.4	5.6	34.1	4.4	28.2	22.2
Italy	80.6	15.5	5.4	12.6	10.9	23.2	17.3	12.0	22.2
France	78.9	12.0	3.2	13.1	7.4	29.0	11.0	33.4	23.5
Denmark	93.9	16.6	3.9	25.0	6.3	25.0	4.3	25.7	25.1
Spain	76.0	13.2	7.7	22.0	10.7	33.2	25.9	17.3	25.8
Germany	82.0	15.1	4.6	31.6	5.8	35.0	9.1	33.6	27.1
Finland	85.0	18.4	3.1	37.2	16.8	23.7	1.5	34.9	27.6
Belgium	85.0	18.4	3.1	37.2	16.8	23.7	1.5	34.9	27.6
Norway	86.7	21.8	7.9	32.1	29.7	35.4	9.6	24.0	30.9
Sweden	90.5	16.3	4.4	34.3	20.0	43.6	7.3	42.8	32.4
Iceland	87.0	25.9	10.1	39.9	44.0	56.2	17.8	32.8	39.2
average West	80.7	16.1	4.7	23.4	12.9	29.8	8.9	24.5	25.1
average All	76.3	12.8	3.9	13.8	8.5	19.6	6.9	16.2	19.9
difference W-E	8.8	6.6	1.5	19.2	8.8	20.3	4.0	16.6	10.7

Appendix I – Overview of political engagement across the Europe

		active	passive	
	activists	voters	voters	
Belgium	4.01%	26.65%	69.34%	Belgium
Bulgaria	3.63%	7.97%	88.41%	Bulgaria
Cyprus	6.39%	10.95%	82.66%	Cyprus
Czech				Czech Republic
Republic	19.00%	7.18%	73.82%	Denmark
Denmark	1.76%	31.78%	66.47%	Estonia Estonia
Estonia	2.27%	13.71%	84.02%	France
France	3.61%	34.10%	62.30%	Germany
Germany	10.21%	23.12%	66.67%	Hungary
Hungary	1.10%	8.72%	90.18%	
Iceland	5.21%	38.72%	56.08%	Ireland
Ireland	5.82%	21.01%	73.17%	Israel
Israel	3.16%	11.07%	85.78%	Italy activists
Italy	9.07%	12.51%	78.42%	Lithuania active voters
Lithuania	3.94%	8.16%	87.91%	Netherlands passive voters
Netherlands	2.82%	28.73%	68.46%	Norway
Norway	11.33%	33.07%	55.60%	Poland Poland
Poland	4.91%	4.11%	90.98%	Portugal
Portugal	2.09%	12.74%	85.17%	Russia
Russia	0.93%	15.82%	83.25%	Slovakia
Slovakia	5.10%	18.55%	76.36%	Slovenia
Slovenia	1.99%	8.84%	89.17%	Spain
Spain	8.69%	20.45%	70.87%	Sweden
Sweden	4.01%	29.35%	66.65%	Switzerland
Switzerland	8.17%	21.57%	70.26%	Ukraine
Ukraine	1.61%	7.67%	90.73%	United Kingdom
United				0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Kingdom	3.46%	19.54%	77.00%	

Appendix II – Size of the membership of latent classes across countries active passive

Belgium	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	69.34%	86.60%	6.50%	0.60%	8.70%	1.40%	0.50%	1.50%	2.90%
LC 2	26.65%	93.60%	26.20%	0.00%	29.30%	10.00%	53.20%	9.70%	24.30%
LC 1	4.01%	94.40%	64.20%	76.40%	63.30%	43.90%	54.70%	21.10%	29.40%
Bulgaria	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	88.41%	72.40%	1.60%	0.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.20%
LC 2	7.97%	79.60%	3.50%	0.00%	3.50%	12.20%	48.40%	38.20%	17.30%
LC 1	3.63%	87.70%	66.80%	62.80%	19.20%	29.50%	51.10%	33.90%	20.70%
~									
Cyprus	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	82.66%	78.20%	6.80%	0.40%	0.00%	0.50%	2.10%	0.70%	3.70%
LC 2	10.95%	85.20%	0.40%	0.00%	0.15%	0.09%	0.51%	0.514	0.22%
LC 1	6.39%	100.00%	84.40%	66.90%	78.10%	49.50%	52.30%	29.40%	26.90%
Czech									
Republic	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	73.82%	52.90%	3.20%	0.00%	0.00%	1.00%	3.20%	0.40%	4.20%
LC 1	19.00%	80.60%	32.60%	9.40%	18.70%	34.70%	84.80%	37.00%	49.40%
LC 2	7.18%	89.10%	25.80%	1.70%	16.80%	3.90%	14.30%	1.20%	13.90%
Denmark	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	66.47%	92.20%	3.70%	0.00%	11.10%	0.00%	9.90%	0.20%	11.90%
LC 2	31.78%	96.00%	31.80%	6.00%	42.40%	11.80%	44.00%	7.20%	43.20%
LC 1	1.76%	100.00%	76.40%	71.10%	76.20%	72.80%	78.70%	59.80%	71.80%
Estonia	ahara	voto	contrilt	welzerty	wrkorg	badga	agnetit	nhldmn	batord
		62 000/	5 500						1 500/
	84.02%	05.00%	3.30%	0.10%	0.70%	0.90%	5.00%	0.90%	1.30%
LC 2	13./1%	90.00%	32.80%	6.00%	13.30%	10.90%	33.70%	13.50%	27.80%
LC I	2.27%	80.80%	94.10%	50.60%	81.80%	48.10%	61.90%	40.10%	27.20%
France	share	vVote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	62.30%	75.40%	5.20%	0.40%	1.10%	0.90%	6.00%	1.30%	19.10%
LC 2	34.10%	82.20%	18.10%	4.10%	26.10%	11.00%	61.70%	19.80%	53.50%
LC 1	3.61%	98.50%	57.70%	35.00%	77.70%	69.60%	91.80%	78.00%	72.70%

Appendix III – Character of latent classes across the countries

Germa	ny	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
	LC 3	66.67%	76.40%	5.40%	0.40%	18.80%	0.80%	12.40%	1.00%	19.70%
	LC 2	23.12%	88.20%	15.20%	1.80%	38.20%	10.20%	71.40%	20.40%	55.90%
	LC 1	10.21%	97.90%	75.50%	38.90%	91.20%	24.10%	65.20%	25.80%	52.70%
Hunga	ry	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
	LC 3	90.18%	69.80%	1.30%	0.00%	0.70%	0.00%	0.10%	0.00%	1.30%
	LC 2	8.72%	94.90%	28.30%	6.30%	21.40%	1.40%	22.00%	27.00%	20.70%
	LC 1	1.10%	95.90%	61.60%	37.50%	37.60%	100.00%	54.90%	70.30%	38.20%
Iceland	b	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
	LC 3	56.08%	80.60%	10.10%	0.70%	23.60%	27.40%	34.30%	4.20%	14.40%
	LC 2	38.72%	93.50%	37.10%	12.90%	54.90%	59.40%	81.10%	31.60%	55.70%
	LC 1	5.21%	96.40%	100.00%	84.00%	87.10%	90.60%	81.30%	47.20%	40.50%
	_			_		_				
Ireland	1	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
	LC 3	73.17%	71.00%	9.20%	0.30%	3.40%	0.60%	3.40%	0.90%	4.20%
	LC 2	21.01%	82.90%	33.40%	0.00%	22.00%	10.10%	73.10%	31.80%	27.10%
	LC 1	5.82%	84.90%	73.30%	48.40%	66.20%	64.90%	76.40%	50.50%	42.60%
Igraal		choro	voto	contrilt	welznety	wrkorg	badga	conntit	nhldmn	hotord
151 401		Share 95 790/	74.800/	5 90%				200%	2 1.0%	12 40%
		0J./0%	74.00%	J.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%	2.90%	2.10%	62 000/
	LC 2	2 1 6 0/	90.90%	21.00%	51.200	9.00%	9.30%	62.500/	48.00%	05.00% 56.20%
	LUI	5.10%	89.00%	/3.20%	51.50%	50.70%	55.00%	03.30%	02.30%	30.20%
Italv		share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	betprd
10001	LC 3	78 42%	75 70%	7 30%	0 50%	1 60%	0.60%	9.60%	6 80%	6 10%
		12 51%	92 90%	15 10%	0.00%	33.90%	37 50%	75 90%	49 20%	37.90%
	LC 1	9.07%	100.00%	79.60%	50 70%	67 30%	52 80%	53 60%	53 70%	21.00%
		2.0770	100.0070	-77.0070	50.7070	07.5070	52.0070	55.0070	55.1070	21.0070
Lithua	nia	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
	LC 3	87.91%	50.90%	2.60%	0.10%	0.00%	0.00%	1.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	LC 2	8.16%	73.50%	21.00%	0.00%	9.80%	7.50%	25.80%	9.80%	12.30%
	LC 1	3.94%	92.80%	60.00%	84.10%	33.20%	45.30%	25.20%	12.20%	6.30%

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Netherlands	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	68.46%	78.90%	4.90%	0.10%	11.50%	0.20%	3.80%	0.00%	1.80%
LC 2	28.73%	92.00%	23.70%	4.40%	45.50%	6.00%	52.30%	5.00%	32.70%
LC 1	2.82%	88.80%	71.60%	56.80%	79.40%	56.40%	63.40%	38.30%	46.30%
Norway	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	55.60%	89.40%	20.90%	3.10%	37.10%	33.40%	41.30%	7%	30.80%
LC 2	33.07%	77.50%	5.90%	0.20%	2.00%	4.00%	7.60%	0.00%	1.00%
LC 1	11.33%	96.70%	63.50%	45.60%	83.90%	76.40%	78.70%	42.80%	52.00%
Poland	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	90.98%	66.30%	3.10%	0.40%	2.70%	0.80%	4.50%	0.70%	2.50%
LC 1	4.91%	91.80%	84.30%	39.20%	59.90%	29.00%	51.50%	15.80%	29.00%
	4 11%	89 30%	0.00%	1 20%	27.60%	38 20%	66 80%	16 50%	37.00%
		07.5070	0.0070	1.2070	27.0070	30.2070	00.0070	10.2070	37.0070
Portugal	share	vote	contplt	wrknrty	wrkorg	hadge	sonntit	phldmn	betnrd
IC3	85 17%	65.40%	1 50%	0.00%	0.50%	0.10%	0.00%	0.60%	0.70%
	12 7/1%	83 30%	16 10%	0.00%	10 70%	3 /0%	33 00%	3/ 70%	11 20%
	2 00%	03.30%	66 10%	51.00%	73 20%	38.00%	61 30%	39.60%	20 80%
	2.0970	92.9070	00.1070	J1.9070	13.2070	38.9070	01.30%	39.00%	29.0070
Dussia	chara	vote	contrilt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	conntit	nhldmn	betprd
	811are 82 2504	64 70%	1 40%	0 10%	0.00%	0 80%	0 50%	0 50%	0.60%
	15 8204	83 00%	25.00%	12 60%	28 10%	20.60%	20.00%	18 80%	15 00%
LC 1	13.6270	04 200%	52 50%	01.80%	20.10%	20.00%	29.90%	61 60%	13.90% 21.20%
LC I	0.9370	94.2070	52.3070	91.0070	00.00%	90.30%	//./070	01.00%	21.30%
Slovelrie	choro	vota	contrilt	welznety	wrkorg	badga	agnetit	nhldmn	botord
	511a1C	72 2004	4 00%	0 10%			5 60%	0.40%	
	10.30%	72.50%	4.00%	0.10%	0.80%	0.50%	5.00%	0.40%	2.00%
LC 2	18.55%	85.40%	21.70%	0.00%	/.30%	1.40%	08.10%	9.40%	35.20%
LC I	5.10%	100.00%	58.60%	28.70%	49.00%	37.20%	12.70%	25.60%	49.90%
<u>.</u>	1		. 1.	1 .	1	1 1	.•.	1 1 1	1 / 1
Slovenia	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pblamn	betpra
LC 3	89.17%	70.40%	3.10%	0.80%	0.30%	0.10%	1.60%	1.50%	0.20%
LC 2	8.84%	87.90%	23.40%	1.90%	1.70%	6.70%	45.90%	14.30%	28.00%
LC 1	1.99%	100.00%	79.50%	75.90%	64.30%	21.20%	34.90%	19.70%	18.00%
	_			_		. .			_
Spain	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	70.87%	72.50%	6.70%	1.20%	9.80%	0.90%	12.60%	6.90%	10.60%
LC 2	20.45%	81.00%	11.90%	5.50%	31.90%	24.60%	73.90%	64.60%	28.60%
LC 1	8.69%	92.70%	62.50%	59.60%	86.10%	47.90%	85.50%	71.00%	38.40%

Sweden	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	66.65%	86.60%	6.50%	0.70%	17.90%	6.50%	22.70%	0.90%	29.50%
LC 2	29.35%	97.70%	29.40%	0.00%	61.10%	41.90%	80.40%	15.00%	66.30%
LC 1	4.01%	91.60%	65.10%	100.00%	80.70%	57.80%	79.70%	47.20%	63.60%
								-	
Switzerland	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 3	70.26%	57.50%	5.40%	0.50%	5.90%	0.90%	13.60%	0.40%	12.40%
LC 2	21.57%	78.60%	22.40%	0.40%	27.20%	10.20%	79.60%	11.50%	67.40%
LC 1	8.17%	89.60%	62.10%	62.60%	73.10%	26.60%	65.90%	14.10%	42.10%
Ukraine	share	vote	contplt	wrkprty	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmr	n bctprd
LC 3	90.73%	74.90%	4.00%	0.20%	0.40%	0.60%	0.00%	0.00%	6 0.10%
LC 2	7 67%	00 100/	21 2004	16 500/	12 000/	20.200	21 700/	15 10%	6 20%
	1.07/0	90.10%	J1.2070	10.30%	12.00%	0 28.20%) 21.70%	15.10/0	0.2070
LC 1	1.61%	90.10%	55.80%	100.00%	36.60%	98.70%	60.90%	47.00%	6 0.20%
LC 1	1.61%	90.10%	55.80%	100.00%	36.60%	98.20% 98.70%	60.90%	47.00%	6 0.00%
LC 1	1.61%	90.10%	55.80%	100.00%	36.60%	98.70%	60.90%	47.00%	6 0.20%
LC 1 United	1.61%	90.10%	55.80%	100.00%	36.60%	98.70%	60.90%	47.00%	6 0.20% 6 0.00%
LC 1 United Kingdom	1.61%	90.10% 100.00% vote	55.80% contplt	10.30%	wrkorg	badge	sgnptit	pbldmn	bctprd
LC 1 United Kingdom LC 3	1.61% share 77.00%	90.10% 100.00% vote 64.50%	55.80% contplt 5.20%	10.30% 100.00% wrkprty 0.20%	wrkorg 2.50%	badge 1.40%	sgnptit 13.00%	pbldmn 0.20%	bctprd 4.90%
LC 1 United Kingdom LC 3 LC 2	share 77.00% 19.54%	vote 64.50% 88.30%	contplt 55.20% 31.80%	10.30% 100.00% wrkprty 0.20% 1.00%	wrkorg 2.50% 13.60%	badge 1.40%	sgnptit 13.00% 80.20%	pbldmn 0.20% 9.50%	bctprd 4.90% 52.90%

Legend:

- activists
- active voters
- passive voters
- size of the class membership
- voted in previous national elections
- contacted politician in last 12 months
- worked for a political party in last 12 months
- worked for an organization in last 12 months
- wore a badge in last 12 months
- signed a petition in last 12 months
- attended a public demonstration in last 12 months
- boycotted product in last 12 months

	Mean	St. Deviation	Valid N	Skewness	Kurtosis
LC 1	5.269231e+00	3.914667e+00	26	1.92650176	5.0038435
LC 2	1.807692e+01	1.023298e+01	26	0.41798718	-0.9707861
LC3	7.669231e+01	1.100461e+01	26	-0.26014754	-0.0285797
Population	2.642532e+07	3.381753e+07	26	1.95979449	4.4627689
Density	1.329000e+02	1.112838e+02	26	1.20704800	0.8595579
Urbaniz	7.457692e+01	1.174793e+01	26	0.03405605	-0.1871593
TypeOfGov	2.000000e+00	4.000000e-01	26	0.00000000	4.5516304
Centraliz	1.307692e+00	4.706787e-01	26	0.88524644	-1.3247283
ElecSys	1.269231e+00	6.038339e-01	26	2.19064349	3.8399643
TypeOfParl	1.538462e+00	5.083911e-01	26	-0.16391579	-2.1447981
ElecFatig	1.173077e+01	2.554333e+00	26	0.01366205	-0.3238389
DemIndex	7.860385e+00	1.306637e+00	26	-0.99966791	2.8621441
Gdp/natlog	10.1929823	0.7497403	26	-0.5780046	0.2579302

Appendix IV – Descriptive stats of variables used in bi-variate analyses

Legend:

LC1	- activists
LC2	- active voters
LC3	- passive voters
Population	- population size
Density	- population density
Urbaniz	- share of people living in the cities
TypeOfGov	- (1) presidential system; (2) parliamentary system
Centraliz	- (1) unitary; (2) federation
ElecSys	- (1) majoritarian/mixed; (2) proportional
TypeOfParl	- (1) unicameral; (2) bicameral
ElecFatig	- number of national-wide election between years 1990-2012
DemIndex	- index of democracy
GDP/cap	- gross domestic product per capita (in USD)
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