IN-BETWEENNESS:
Is Hungarian Aliyah a Migration Phenomenon?

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Abstract

Literature on Hungarian Jewry has generally agreed that Jewish Hungarians have not played a large part in the ethnic return migration to Israel,with the result that Hungarian *aliyah*has not received the attention it deserves. However, in recent years, in parallel to the Hungarian 'mass migration' to Western countries, the number of those who have decided to move to Israel has increased. The aim of this thesis is to consider why the number of *olim* has been increasing since 2007 and why these migrants have chosen Israel.To give a general overview of the Hungarian *aliyah*, I have used social historical and statistical sources and I also conducted an interview with an employee of *Szochnut*, the Central European branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel. My empirical findings are based upon ten semi-structured interviews conducted in Israel in April 2014 with Hungarian *olim*. In this thesis I will argue that the Hungarian migration to Israel is a part of larger migration patterns, therefore Hungarian *aliyah*should be studied within the larger context of emigration from Hungary and immigration to Israel. I will also argue that although the decision to make*aliyah*is closely related to identity and ideology,these in themselves are not sufficient to make the final decision, as there are many other factors that play a crucial part in the decision-making. My findings are echoing almost all of the theories about *aliyah* and as thedecision is rather complex, we can hardly fit it into one single theory of diasporic return migration to Israel.

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

In the past decades the study of *ethnicity*in general and *ethnic return migration* in particular has become a prominent field in social sciences. In the 1970s scholars in the United Statesobserved the phenomenon of *ethnic renaissance* and a heated debateevolved around its real or virtual existence (Gans 1979).Vertovec (2011) argues that in the past thirty years the anthropological study of migration focused on identity and ethnicity, while in recent years the focus shifted to the study of *transnationalism* and more attention has been paid to ethnic return migration. However, in 2009 in the introductory part of *DisaporicHomecings: Ethnic Return Migration in a Comparative Perspective*Tsuda (2009a) argued that albeit the increased attention which has been paid to the study of diasporas, little is known about ethnic return migration and the authors of the book make a successful effort to fill this gap in the literature. They provide a broad overview of preferential migration regimes and offer thorough case studies about the most prominent examples of ethnic return migrations. Schiller et. al. (1995) note that in the United States anthropologists made an accomplishment to revise the study of immigration within the concept of transnationalism, and by today the transnational approach has become the focus of migration studies.

As many scholars agree the archetype of diasporas is the Jewish diaspora (cf. Brubaker 2005) and as a result, the most prominent example of *diasporic homecomings* is the return migration of Jews to Palestine and after the establishment of the Jewish State in 1948 to Israel. However, many authors argue (DellaPergola 1998, 2011; Shuval and Leshem 1998) that the migration to Israel is not unique as there are other countries which facilitate ethnic return migrations, and the characteristics of the migration to Israel do not differ drastically from the labor migration to other countries. By the same token, Shuval and Leshem (1998) argue that the flee of the Jews to Israel from ethnopolitical persecutions is relatively similar to the migration of the refugees. According to Remennick (2009) what makes *aliyah* unique is its nation building character and

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its significance in the establishment and maintenance of the Jewish State. On the other hand, these scholars also admit that *Zionist* ideology and the attachment of Jews to their ancient homeland also contributes to *aliyah*, albeit to a lesser extent than it is perceived.

Although from the 1980s research on the Hungarian Jewry became an important field in Hungarian sociology and anthropology and a *Jewish revival phenomenon* emerged, little or almost noattention has been paid to the study of Hungarian *aliyah*. The published material on Hungarian *aliyah* is rather historical and they focus on the mass migrations of 1945-1949 and 1956-1957. Many scholars agree (Bányai 2008; Gitelman 2000; Karády 2002; Komoróczy 2012) that the ethnic return migration of the Hungarian Jewry is negligible and remains on the margin.

However, I still believe that in the light of the international trends in the social scientific investigation of diasporic homecomings, it is rewarding to study the Hungarian *aliyah*. Since 2007 there has been an increase in the number of Hungarian *olimhadashim* and Kovácset. al. (2004) find that 15 percent of the Hungarian Jewry had considered making *aliyah* to Israel and the ratio among the youngest cohort is slightly higher. Moreover, 49 percent of the total sample have some attachment to Israel, while 27 percent reported about a strong attachment and 73 percent have relatives or friends in the Jewish State. The figures show that there is a potential among the Hungarian Jewry to make *aliyah*.

In this thesis I will investigate why there has been a growth in Hungarian immigrants to Israel in recent years and I will make an effort to understand the migration patterns from Hungary to Israel in a wider context. I have two major arguments, both of witch can be described by the term *in-betweenness*. First, Hungarian *aliyah* have the characteristics of larger migration patterns as suggested by migration scholars, but it also have the characteristics of diasporic homecomings. My statistical analysis of the *aliyah* figures for the past sixty-six years suggests that the ups and downs in the number of Hungarian *olim* followed larger political and economic

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changes. I will also reveal that the migration trends to Israel either follow the emigration trends from Hungary or the immigration trends to Hungary. My statistical findings were confirmed by my interviewees as most of them either referred to the political situation in Hungary or to economic factors when talking about moving to Israel. On the other hand, they also mentioned ideological or psychic factors, as it is suggested by a previous study made with Hungarian *olim* of the 1990s (Surányi 2013), which, however, rather channel the migration than generate it. Consequently, in the debate between the general or unique characteristics of the *aliyah*,the truth is somewhere inbetween.

Secondly I argue thatthe most recent Hungarian Israeli immigrants do develop a transnational lifestyle. All of them have frequent contacts with those who were left behind in Hungary and many of them make frequent visits to Hungary or receive guests from their *natal homeland*. They are connected to the Hungarian media through the internet and follow Hungarian politics. On the other hand, they make relations with veteran Israelis and stared to follow Israeli public life at an early stage of their immigration. Although the older generations have difficulties mastering their Hebrew knowledge, they make an effort to learn the language. They start to celebrate all Israeli holidays and not all of them give up the Hungarian ones. My respondents developed a dual identification, albeit in the case of Hungary not necessarily with the country itself but with Hungarian culture. As a result, they are *in-between* Hungary and Israel.

In chapter 2, I after a brief overview of the literature on disaporic homecoming and an outline of Israeli migration patterns and Hungarian *aliyah* trends, I will present my own findings and theorybased upon the statistical analysis of three directions of migration: Israeli immigration, Hungarian emigration and the Hungarian migration to Israel.In chapter 3, I will introduce my method and the findings of the research I conducted in Israel. I will focus on three main areas: the family background and Jewish identity of my respondents, their reasons for making *aliyah* and their integration to Israeli society and the development of a transnational lifestyle.In chapter

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4 I will summarize my findings and show the limits of my research and I will also point out possible directions for further research to exploit the data I collected and to have a better understanding of the phenomena I pointed out.

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CHAPTER 2 – THEORY AND PRACTICE: HUNGARIAN ALIYAH TO ISRAEL

In this chapter after a brief overview of the literature on ethnic return migration, I will provide a historical and sociological outline of the structure of Israeli immigration and the patterns of the emigration of Hungarian Jews. As most scholars suggest, the 'homecoming' of the diaspora to their ancient homeland is a world phenomenon. They all tend to agree that the most important contributing factor for ethnic return migration is economic turmoil in the *natal* homeland, although ideology and an attachment to the ancient homeland can also influence the decision of the returnees. Based upon the literature I will also illustrate the difference between preferential migration regimes and how Israel fits into this broader picture. I will also show that although Israel indeed has a distinctive character and elements, its uniqueness in general is only a "myth". The same statements are true for the Hungarian *aliyah*. At the end of this chapter I will provide a statistical analysis of Hungarian *aliyah* figures and I will contextualize them in light of the Hungarian emigration, Israeli immigration and historical process. I will conclude that the up and downs in the number *olimhadashim* reflect a broader migration process, thus Hungarian *aliyah* follows general migration trends. However, it has its own uniqueness as well, as the majority of Hungarian Jewish migrants do not choose Israel, even when there are peaks in Hungarian *aliyah*, and a negligible number of Hungarian *olim* arrive to Israel during stagnant times.

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2.1. Diasporic Homecomings

Although there has been a significant growth in the field of studying diasporasin the past two decades (Brubaker 2005), little attention has been paid to the subfield of ethnic return migration (Tsuda 2009a).In 2009 a book has been published, titled *Diasporic Homecomings: Ethnic Return Migration in Comparative Perspective*, which aims to fill this gap.

Tsuda (2009a) argues that many people return from dispersion mainly because of ethnopolitical persecutions or economic reasons and, indeed, the longing for the ancient homeland and a sense of attachment is a contributing factor as well. He distinguishes two types of ethnic return migration: one is the return of first generation migrants to their country of origin, while the other is the ethnic return of second or later generation migrants to their ancient homeland. The most prominent case, as it is in the case of diasporas (Brubaker 2005), is the *aliyah*, i.e. the ethnic return of Jews to the State of Israel (till 1948 Palestine): but Tsuda also mentions ethnic Germans, Southern Europeans, Eastern and Central Europeans, Russians and East Asians on his list (2009a: 1-3). He finds that while from developing countries ethnic return migration is driven by economic pressures, from developed countries ethnic discrimination might have a greater effect (2009b). However, he adds that *ethnic returnees* choose their ancient homeland instead of other well developed destinations because of their *nostalgic affiliation* and *preferential immigration policies*. He argues that "[e]ven when economic disparities between sending and receiving countries are not large, the primary motives remain economic" and "preexisting social networks and institutional connections"(2009b:22) also play an important role in ethnic return migration. In case of the Russian *aliyah* in the early 1990s,based upon the literature,he explores that Russia Jews returned to Israel because of "a combination of economic crisis, political instability, and increasing Russian nationalism, anti-Semitism, and discrimination" (2009b:23).Tsudafinds that in many cases ethnic migrants find themselves in their ethnic homelands in the status of labor migrants, and diasporic homecomings are not successful in every case; on the contrary, it is often an ambivalent, if not a negative experience.

According to Skrentnyet. al. (2009),states have three major justifications for ethnic preference in the immigration laws: *first*, the assimilation of co-ethnics into the society is a quicker and smoother process; *second*, it gives protection for dispersed co-ethnics; and *third*, it expresses a historical-cultural community with all co-ethnics regardless of their locality. In their

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analysis of different preferential migration policies all over the globe, they found that the reasons behind them are different mainly by regions and not by countries.

Skrentnyet. al. (2009) find that in Asia preferential migration policies ought to help economic development. In Japan and South Korea, on the other hand, they seek for cheap labor to fill blue-collar positions, and they believe that ethnic and cultural similarities of these migrants will not cause tension in the society. These countries grant visas but not citizenships, although in South Korea they can become 'domestic residents' with certain rights similar to that of the citizens', and no 'cultural' and/or language tests are required. In contrast, in Taiwan they seek highly skilled immigrants and grant (dual) citizenship for certain skilled professionals. China offers educational and cultural program to its expats and hopes investments and remittances from them.

Skrentnyet. al. (2009) distinguish three types of preferential migration policy regimes in Europe. Germany's Basic Law of 1949, whose return migration policy is the most comparable to Israel (Joppke and Rosenhek 2009; to be discussed in section 2 of this chapter), grantes*iussanguinis* citizenship to ethnic Germans in East Europe and the (former) Soviet Union right after World War II and during the Cold War. Skrentnyet. al. observes three waves of refugees and return migrants to (West) Germany: (1) ca. 8 million *Vertriebene* (expellees) from Eastern Europe after World War II, including the repatriation of 180-200,000 Hungarian Germans between 1946 and 1949 (Valuch 2005:32); (2) about 2 million *Aussiedler* (resettlers) from Poland and Romania between 1950 and 1987; (3) and ca. 2.3 million *Aussiedler* from the FSU in the period of 1989 and 1996 (2009:57-58). These return migrants were not only granted automatic citizenship but received aids from the federal government: in 1992, however, restrictions were applied (reduction of the aids, languages and 'culture' test and people born after 1993 did not fall under the "law of return"). It has to be noted that the German return

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migration policy applied local and time restrictions and was driven by the fear of persecutions in Eastern European communist countries.

Spain and Italy offers easier naturalization for its target population and is driven by "romantic linkages" (Pan-Hispanism in the case of Spain); Italy even introduced a dual nationality law (Skrentny et. al. 2009). In contrast, Eastern European countries are driven by "moral, obligatory, protective, or remedial rationale" (Skrentny et. al. 2009:62); and the morphosis of their policy is part of the state's post-socialist redefinition; it is rather a manifestation of symbolic politics. Skrentnyet. al. (2009) observe that Hungary went the furthest with the introduction of its 'Status Law' (2001), which granted cultural and some social benefits to ethnic Hungarians and introduced a guest worker program[1]. They note that these countries do not encourage return migration, rather, the homeland comes to their co-ethnics. They also observer that these countries are recently becoming sending countries to the western EU countries, hence there is a chance for the formulation of new diasporas.

To conclude, ethnic return migration is a world phenomenon, albeitall scholars agree that the most prominent example is the return of Jewish people to *EretzIsrael*. Although the longing for the ancient homeland and preferential migration regimes in the homeland channel migration, the most important factor is economic pressures in the sending countries. In case of developed countries of origin, xenophobia also plays an important role. The destinations of diasporic homecomings have different grounds for their preferential migration policy: while East Asian countries are driven by putative economic benefits, European countries either look at itas a

[1] There have recently been been major changes in Hungary, which further proves Skrentnyet. al.'s arguments. The first act of the newly formed National-Christian government on May 26th, 2010 was the passing of the law on dual citizenship, which makes naturalization process of ethnic Hungarian much easier and permits Hungarian (dual) citizenship without Hungarian residency (LV. Law of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship). According to the data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office between 2011 and 2012 38,933 people obtained Hungarian citizenship, which is approximately a 273% average growth compared to average of the years 2007-2010 (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2013). Dual citizenship also enables ethnic Hungarian to vote on the national elections: on the 2014 national elections 158,654 votes were registered by the National Election Bureau, which number gives us a rough estimate for the number of dual citizens. There is an increased demand from Israelis for Hungarian citizenship, although these new citizens, in general, do not plan to return to Hungary and they do have not any identification with Hungary (see Harpaz 2013).

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"moral duty" or they have "romantic linkages". In Germany and Israel the basis for their "law of return" is the fear of prosecution, in addition, in Israel, it also has its ideological fundaments, namely Zionism and the need for co-ethic migrants.

2.2. Immigration to Israel: A Historical and Demographic Overview

> For the purposes of this Law, "Jew" means a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion. (Law of Return, Amendment No. 2 5730-1970, Section 4B)
>
> The rights of a Jew under this Law and the rights of an oleh under the Nationality Law, 5712-1952, as well as the rights of an oleh under any other enactment, are also vested in a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew, except for a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his religion. (Law of Return, Amendment No. 2 5730-1970, Section 4A)

TheLaw of Return was passed by the Knesset on July 5th, 1950,which grants the right to all *halachic* Jews to immigrate to and settle down in *Eretz Israel*. The Law of Return echoes Zionist ideology and the sentiments laid down in the Declaration of Independence (May 14th, 1948): "The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles" (Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel). Although the law was driven by Zionist ideology and the aim to give a shelter for prosecuted Jews, it also served, and still serves, practical reasons: Israel sees itself as a Jewish state and to maintain Jewish majority it has to rely on the ingathering of Jews. During the first Arab-Israeli war the Israeli Defense Forces couldonly recruit soldiers from *olimhadashim*. In 1970 the Knesset passed an amendment which expanded the scope of eligibility to the child and the grandchild of Jews and to their nuclear family. *Nota bene*, by this act Israel created a "positive Nuremberg Law", i.e. it expended the right to return under the Law of Return for those, who would be prosecuted by the Nuremberg Laws. Joppke and Rosenhek(2009) note that the amendment was passed after the Six Day War (1967) when as a result of the expansion of the State to its occupied territories (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) Israel faced demographic needs. When I was hitchhiking in a settlement

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back from one of my interviews, the South African *oleh* who picked me up expressed his strong support for the *Hebrew Roots*movement[2] as "there are not enough Jews to inhabit Samaria [West Bank], even more, according to the Bible, Jews are entitled for more territories beyond the Jordan as well". He not only supports the *aliyah* of Jews to overcome the Arab population in the occupied territories, but also the immigration and settlement of non-Jews who are closely affiliated with Judaism.Although the political debate around the Law of Return is out of the scope of this thesis, although it has to be noted that there are "liberal" challengers of the law among Palestinian and post-Zionist politicians and public figures because of its discriminant nature, while the ultra-Orthodox attack the law because of its non-halachic definition of a Jew, which results in the de-Judaization of *Eretz Israel* (Joppke and Rosenhek 2009).

However, the ethnic return migration of Jews to their ancient homeland started well before the establishment of the State of Israel. At the time of independence, 35 percent of the Jewish population was a *sabra* (Joppke and Rosenhek 2009:78). There were five major waves of *aliyah* to Palestine (from 1920 to Mandatory Palestine), beginning at the end of the 19th century, mainly from Russia, to flee from the pogroms in Europe. During the 1920s Polish migrants came, while in the 1930s a bigger wave of German refugees arrived (Komoróczy 2012).

DellaPergola (1998) examines the *aliyah* to Israel in a global context. Based on the migration statistics,he differentiates three majorwaves of Jewish migration. Before World War I Eastern European Jews migrated mainly to North America, with peaks in fiscal years 1905/6 and 1913/14. The second wave was between 1948 and 1951, when mainly the survivors of the *Shoah* made *aliyah*, while the third big wave was in the 1990s with the mass migration of the former Soviet Jewry to Israel and to western countries, mainly to Germany. He argues that these intervals of 40 to 45 years reflect major international crisis and events in global polity; the

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[2] A Christian movement which emphasizes the importance of the Torah and a need for return to Jewish roots of Christianty.

continuous up and downs in migration trends of the Jewry reflect the fluctuations in the business cycles.

DellaPergola (1998) also draws trends for the immigration to Israel, based on *aliyah* figures. Between 1948 and 1995 ca. 4 million Jews migrated globally, and more than 2.5 million of them made *aliyah*. He identifies two major peaks (Figure 1.): right after World War II (1948-1952) and after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe (1989-1992), while the lowest rate of immigration was between 1983 and 1988, after the Lebanon war in 1982, which caused anti-Israeli response, even among Jews outside Israel (DellaPergola 2011). In contrast, Ágnes Heller (2004) remembers that the anti-Israeli attitude of the Australian television made her son join the *Association of Jewish University Students*. Lustick (2011) observes three major waves in the migration to Israel (and Mandatory Palestine). Besides the *aliyah* of displaced people from Europe and Muslims countries after the establishment of Israel and the exodus of Russian Jews from the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, he points out the significance of "refugees" after the Nazi takeover in Germany in the 1930s.

The wars of Israel and the political situation in the Middle East also have an impact on *aliyah* figures. The Six Day War (1967) caused euphoria not only in Israel but in the diaspora as well, which led to a steady increase in the number of *olim* for six years from western countries, while the vast majority of the small remaining Jewish population in Poland and Romania decided to make *aliyah* as a response to anti-Semitism which followed the Six Day War (DellaPergola 2011). During this period there was a slight growth of *aliyah* from the Soviet Union as a result of a thaw in Soviet emigration policy and also in response to increased anti-Semitism. Between 1948 and 1968 more than half a million *Mizrahi* and *Sephardi* Jews arrived to Israel during the exodus of Jews from Arab countries, due to the growth of anti-Judaism, as well as atrocities after the declaration of the State of Israel and the Israeli-Arab wars (DellaPergola 1998). In the mid-1980s and in 1991 there were three rescue operations for Ethiopian Jews.

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Figure1.

The Number of 'OlimHadashim' by year, 1948-2013



Source: The Jewish Agency for Israel (received by mail)

Lustick (2011) points out that the second Palestinian intifada (2000-2005) resulted in an increase of *yeridah*, i.e. the emigration of Israelis, and low rates in the return migration of emigrant Israelis during the most violent years of 2001-2003. The effects of the second intifada can be observed in the *aliyah* figures as well, as there was a steady decrease in the number of *olimhadashim*. It dropped from 60,201 in 2000 to 21,183 in 2005. However, the decreasing trend continued until 2009. The relatively high numbers in the early 2000s are the results of the *aliyah* of French Jews due to a temporary economic recession in their natal homeland (DellaPergola 2011).

Yeridah is also a major issue in Israel. Lustick (2011) argues that although the emigration from Israel always had bad connotations and emigrants were considered to be "traitors", *yeridah* has always been present and many *olim* arrived to Israel only temporarily. However, in recent years, the low immigration rates and relatively high emigration rates led to a dramatically low migration balance, which causes demographic problems, as it threats the "Jewish character" of Jewish State. He adds that with exodus of FSU Jews many non-Jews arrived to the country:

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only two-third of them are Jews, and the conversion rates remain low (NB: in Israel only Orthodox conversion is officially accepted). As it was pointed out before, the second intifada led to a growth in emigration, and the as Harpaz (2013) points out in his article on Israeli-East Central European dual citizenship, besides economic and symbolic factors, many Israelis apply for European passports because of the fear of Iran. Lustick argues that the "demographic problem" not only raises security and political issues, but there is also an economic factor and the fear of "Third World status", as Israel "is becoming ultra-Orthodox, nationalist and Arab" (2011:46).

Shuval and Leshem (1998) question the concept of the uniqueness of Israeli migration. They argue that the notion that diaspora Jews are in exile in their natal homelands and when making *aliyah* they feel a sense of homecoming is only a social construction. They also point out that in many cases the motives for *aliyah* are not different from that of the refugees. The mass migration after the establishment of the State of Israel is not a result of the diasporic homecoming of "awakened Jews", but a flee from the countries of (former) persecutions, i.e. Holocaust survivors and Jews from Muslim countries came. They add that later anti-Semitism was a prominent reason for making *aliyah*. Shuval and Leshemtry to break with the romantic interpretation of Israel's immigration policy: they argue that the motivation for the "ingathering of exiles" is unimportant;it rather has economic, political and cultural considerations. They also challenge the myths of the "pro-migrant ideology of the society" and that immigration does not cause tensions within the society. They claim that *olim* have relatively different backgrounds according to their natal homelands and in the 1980s inter-group conflicts arose; the integration process of *olim* is different based on their country of origin and there are ethnic enclaves as well. Harpaz (2013) also points out the stratification within the society along *Ashkenazim,Mizrahim/Sephardim* and Russians. He finds that the possession of a European passport serves as a status symbol which confirms social perceptions of the society. Eventually,

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as Shuval and Leshem put it, there is an ethnic return migration to other countries as, thus Israel is not unique in this sense either.

To summarize, the uniqueness of Israel concerning migration is only a myth. By analyzing the migration trends one will find that it reflects economic and political changes in the world. *Aliyah* can only be understood in a global context, although ideological and symbolic factors can also have an impact, like it happened after the Six Day War.

2.3. Hungarian Aliyah to Israel: Historical and Sociological Perspectives

Although the "father of *Zionism*", Theodor Herzl/Herzl Tivadar, was born in Budapest, the interest of the Hungarian Jewry both in *Zionism* and in *aliyah* remained marginal. Both the *Neolog*s and the *Orthodox* opposed *Zionism* from the beginning, for various reasons, though. The former argued that there is no "Jewish nation", only "Jewish religion", and they saw it as a threat to the successful assimilation of the Hungarian Jewry. The *Orthodox*, feeling Hungarian as well, opposed *Zionism* on religious grounds: they looked at *Zionism* as a human intervention to history, and they emphasized that according to the *Talmud* the messiah will redeem the Jews from the exile (Komoróczy 2012).

However, by the end of the 19th century ca. 1,100 Hungarian Jews lived in Jerusalem, mainly *Hasidic* and strict *Orthodox* (Komoróczy 2012:308). According to Viktória Bányai (2008), the Hungarian Jews in Jerusalem were one of the biggest and economically strongest group. *Petah Tikva*[3]was founded by Hungarian Jews in 1878 (Bányai 2008, Komoróczy 2012). Still, before World War II the Hungarian Jewry was the least active in *aliyah* (Karády 2002) and the main destination for Hungarian Jews remained North America (Bányai 2008). During the 19th and the early 20th century, for economic reasons ca. 65-75,000 Hungarian Jews emigrated mainly

[3] A city in the Central District of Israel, it was the first modern Jewish agricultural settlement in Palestine.

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to the United States, most of them were *Orthodox* from the least developed parts of the country, as it was the case in the non-Jewish population (Bányai 2008).

According to Karády (2002) as a response to the white terror and the *numerusclausus* (1920) *Zionist* dissimilation had strengthened but mainly among those where the "religious culture identity" was still present. He observes that there was an internal structure within the *Zionist* movement along the leftist-socialists, the secular-bourgeoisie and the religious faction. He also finds that as a result of the Jewish Laws the number of those who made *aliyah* doubled, from 2,000-2,500 it increased to 10,000-12,000, mainly from the reattached territories(2002:116). He adds that during the 1940s 80 percent of those who emigrated from Hungary were Jewish.

Karády (2002) argues that after the *Shoah*, *aliyah* became an alternative even among the *universalists* as they could partake in the nation-building of a modern, democratic Jewish state and find a new "cultural community" after the persecutions. He finds that four social and historical factors helped the increase of emigration among Hungarian Jews: (1) the loss of geographical roots after the *Shoah* and the end of the "social contract", (2) the cathartic experience of the foundation of the Jewish State after the *Holocaust*, (3) the earlier Jewish *aliyah* and (4) the split-up of the Jewish families as many did not return from the death camps. He adds that 1948/49 was not only a turning point because of the establishment of Israel but also because of the communist takeover, as it threatened the bourgeois Jewish middle class.

According to Komoróczy (2012),the size of the *aliyah* can be measured in the disappearance of the rural communities even where they could reestablish religious life after the *Shoah*(Kovács et. el. (2004) finds that 87% of the Hungarian Jewry lives in Budapest).After 1949 *aliyah* became illegal, although some groups, in line with the agreement between Hungary and Israel, could leave the country until 1952, when the *aliyah* halted. The last group left the country in 1954 (Komoróczy 2012).

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The number of *olim* increased again in 1956/57 after the October 23rdrevolution. Not only were borders opened for a while and did the state make it possible to leave for Israel in early 1957, but anti-Semitism had increased during the "revolutionary days", mainly in East Hungary (Komoróczy 2012). According to the calculations of Karády (2002), in 1956/57, despite the increase of *olim*, the main destination for Jews was Western Europe, the United States and Canada. He estimates that ca. 20-30,000 Jews left Hungary during this period, but only less than the half of them chose Israel. Karády estimates that among those who arrived to Canada between 1956 and 1961 ca. 10% were Jews, which serves as a good basis for generalization for other countries. According to Bányai (2008), 20-25,000 Jews left Hungary, and two-third of them chose North America, Australia or Wesrern Europe. She also notes that there were Hungarian Jewish communities in Latin-America which served as a destination during the interwar period and also after World War II.

Komoróczy(2012) notes that the reasons for making *aliyah* after 1956 were mainly personal and after the reestablishment of the diplomatic relations with Israel study opportunities in Israel opened for young Jews. Rachel Surányi (2009) conducted interviews with Hungarian *olim*, who left for Israel in the 1990s. She distinguishes between four major groups: (1) those who left because of the fall of the regime, (2) those who were escaping from family problems, (3) those who left on religious grounds and (4) those who went to Israel to study. She finds that her respondents were rather guided by "pull factors" than "push factors", i.e. a strong attachment to Israel, the promise of a "fuller Jewish life" and *Zionist* ideology played a bigger role in their decision than economic reasons or anti-Semitism. The latter was mentioned by all respondents, though.

In case of Hungarian *olim*, *yeridah* was present from the beginnings. Komoróczy (2012) refers to three data, although official figures are not known. According to the *Hungarian Zionist Association*, in 1947 300 people returned from Palestine, while in 1950 the Hungarian Embassy

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reported about 1,200 people. Komoróczy (2012) notes that the latter was corrected by hand from 900 and later documents report only about 400 returnees. In 1951 90 people returned to Hungary on the yacht of the former Romanian king (Komoróczy 2012:1004-1005). Surányi also refers to the lack of data on *yeridah*. She reports that unofficial figures from the Jewish Agency more than 80% of Hungarian *olim* return to Hungary yearly. According to one of her informants, typically those people who return made *aliyah* due to economic reasons.

To conclude, the extent of Hungarian *aliyah* remained relatively low throughout the decades compared to other countries. Before the *Shoah*, the assimilated Hungarian Jewry was not open to *Zionism* as they regarded themselves "Hungarians with Jewish faith". After the establishment of the State of Israel there were two major waves of *aliyah*, right after World War II, parallel to the mass migration of Jews from Europe, and after 1956, when many non-Jews also left Hungary. Except for the period between 1945 and 1949 the primary destination of emigrant Jews from Hungary was not Israel.

2.4. Discussion: "The Uniqueness of Generality"

In the previous sections we have seen that many scholars argue that *aliyah* and migration patterns to Israel can only be studied in a global context, it is not an independent process, the up and downs in the *aliyah* figures reflect economic and political changes (DellaPergola 1998, 2011; Joppke and Rosenhek 2009; Lustick 2011; Shuval and Leshem 1998). The general literature on ethnic return migration also agrees that although the affiliation with the ancient homeland and preferential migration policies contribute to diasporic homecomings, economic and political factors have a great impact, being the former the most important (Skrentny et. al. 2009; Tsuda 2009a, 2009b).The literature on Hungarian *aliyah* also shows that the growths in *aliyah*figures reflects major historic events (Bányai 2008; Karády 2009; Komoróczy 2012), although Surányi (2013) reports about the "uniqueness" of Hungarian migration to Israel.

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Statistical Considerations: The Context and Trends in Hungarian Aliyah

Scholars identify two major waves of Hungarian *aliyah*, *first*, after World War II. and*second*, after the 1956 revolution when about 15,000 and ca. 8,000 people left for Israel, respectively (Bányai 2008; Karády 2009; Komoróczy 2012). DellaPergola (2011) points out that in 1990s along with exodus of the Jews from the FSU, there was a growth of *aliyah* among the Hungarian Jews as well, after the "opening of the borders" in post-socialist countries. To identify trends in the Hungarian *aliyah*, I calculated the average of *olim*, leaving Hungary between 1948 and 2013. When calculating the average, I excluded the two extreme periods to be able to identify "latent trends" which cannot be seen anyway. The average for the period since 1948 is 455, which drops to 125 after excluding the extremes.

After this alternation one can identify eight separate periods (*Figure 2.*). However, it has to be noted, as DellaPergola argues in general, that "[t]he similarities and dissimilarities offer some ground for speculation, after keeping in mind that the absolute numbers of migrants and their ratios to the total population were quite low" (2011:13). The peaks between 1948-1951, 1956-1957 and the relative peak between 1988 and 1997 do not need further considerations, it widely is discussed in the literature. However, the latter one cannot be explained only by the fall of the state-socialist regime. In the mid-1980s, as it is to be discussed in *Chapter 3*, there has been a thaw in Hungary and the "early roots" of "Jewish revival" appeared. My hypothesis is, that strengthening Jewish identity developed a much stronger attachment to Israel, as Surányi (2013) observes besides those who left for Israel due to economic and political reasons, it was a period, when people made *aliyah* based on Zionist ideology. To test this hypothesis further research needed. It is also noticeable that although there was a dramatic drop after 1956/57, the number of *olimhadashim* remained over average and relatively stable until 1966. However, it dropped in 1967 and remained low until 1988, being one of the highest in 1967 for the next period (the average of *olimhadashim* during this period was 39 a year, the figure for 1967 is

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67). It is known from the literature that the Six Day War had a euphoric impact on many Jews which resulted in a growth of *aliyah* among the western Jewry, while in the Eastern Blockbecause of the support of the Arab countries bythe Soviet Union and its satellite states to political anti-Semitism which resulted in the exodus of Polish and Romanian Jews and a growth in the emigration of the Soviet Jewry (DellaPergola 2011). Ágnes Heller (2005) also notes in her biography that the Six Day War had a great impact on her Jewish identity and it was a turning point after the *Shoah*. On July 12thHungary, among other socialist countries, ceased the diplomatic relations with Israel and although the Party became suspicious with its Jewish member it did not lead to political anti-Semitism (Komoróczy 2012).It is also has to be noted that in 1968 Hungary introduced economic reforms which led to a better public moral. Having no official Israeli representation in Hungary *aliyah* became possible only from abroad, and it was presented before western countries were a much favored destination for emigration among Hungarian Jews. The number of those who made aliyah in 1998 dropped below average again, and it remained low steadily until 2009 when a stable increase started again. The figure was the lowest in 2003, during the second intifada (cf. Lustick 2011), while it went over average in 2000, two years after an extreme right-wing and anti-Semitic party, MIÉP got into the National Assembly.

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Figure2.

The Number of Hungarian 'OlimHadashim' by year, 1948-2013



Source: The Jewish Agency for Israel (received by mail)

To analyze the recent trends and the context of the Hungarian *aliyah* I will compare the *aliyah* figures with Hungarian migration to selected countries (*Figure 3.*).Blaskó and Natalie (2014) emphasize the shortage of migration statistics and difficulties researchers have to face when conducting research on emigration. They argue that emigration is poorly documented and if so, they are still not reliable for thorough analysis. There are also significant differences between the data retrieved from the statistics provided by the country of origin and the mirror statistics of the destination countries. In 2011, according to the aggregated the mirror statistic 58,861 Hungarians emigrated to European countries, while Hungarian social security data suggests that 12,413 people left Hungary (Blaskó and Natalie 2014:39). Due to the difficulty of gaining the absolute number of migrants, to my analysis I used the official data of three countries, the countries being the most popular among Hungarian labor migrants (Hárs 2013). In case of the United Kingdom, the data used here is derived from the social security application data of the government, while in the case of Germany and Austria from their statistical offices. Germany provides a yearly break down of the number of Hungarians living there, while Austria publishes

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the number of immigrants every year. Although the numbers do not necessarily reflect the real numbers of Hungarians living in those countries, they are reliable enough to illustrate the trends. In case of Israel I used the official *aliyah* figures.

Hárs (2013) argues that the rapid increase of Hungarian labor migrants to European countries happened in 2007; before, the Hungarian figures were well behind the East and Central European average. Hárs speculates that the reason behind this growth is economic. In the sample of Blaskó and Natalie's (2014) pilot study on emigration the ratio of those who left Hungary after 2007 is 62,5% (21,5% in 2012 alone).

Figure3.

Migration trends from Hungary to Israel and selected Western European countries, 2007-2013



Source: Aggregated by the author based on the statistics provided by *The Jewish Agency for Israel* and data downloaded from *gov.uk*, *destatis.de* and *statcube.at*.

NB: Due to the arithmetic difference in the number of migrants, figures for the UK, Austria and Germany is presented on the left axis, while the figures for Israel on the right axis.

Looking at *Figure 3.*, a steady growth is noticeable in the case of every countrysince 2007, although there is a drop back in 2009 in the case of the United Kingdom and Germany and there was a slightly decrease in 2013 for Israel (8 persons) and the United Kingdom. Consequently, in the recent years the migration trends to Israel follow the migration trends to other countries, although the absolute numbers are well below that of the other countries. However, presumably

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the ratio of people with Jewish origin among the migrants to other countries than Israel is relatively high, being the most mobile among Hungarians (cf. Karády 2002).

"The Uniqueness of Generality"

No reliable statistics is available for Hungarian emigration for the period of 1948 to 2013. However, some general conclusions can be made based upon the limited data we have. According to Valuch, between 1945 and 1953 100-100,000 people left Hungary, mainly for political reasons (2005:48-50). Between 1953 and 1989 the number of emigrants were 320-340,000 out of which more than 200,000 people fled the country right after 1956, while during the 1980s outmigration became negligible (Ibid.). During the 1990s emigration from Hungary was stable with minor fluctuations (Tóth 2002).

If we compare the figures of Hungarian *aliyah* with the overall *aliyah* figures for Israel (*Figure 4.*), and with the emigration patterns from Hungary we have to conclude that it either follows the former or the latter. Conclusively, the Hungarian *aliyah* is not independent from migration process it can be only understood within the larger context of migration.

Figure4.

The Number of 'OlimHadashim' and Hungarian 'Olim' by year, 1948-2013



Source: The Jewish Agency for Israel (received by mail)

NB: Due to the arithmetic difference in the number of migrants, figures for the overall 'aliyah' is presented on the left axis, while the figures for Hungarian 'aliyah' on the right axis.

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To conclude, based upon the statistical analysis of Hungarian *aliyah*, the ethnic return migration of Hungarian Jews to Israel is not unique. The rise of the number of *olimhadashim*is either a result of political changes or economic turmoil. What distinguishes those who make *aliyah* from those who choose another destinations are not the reasons for leaving Hungary but the choice of their destination. What makes the *olim* unique is their political status in the country of their immigration and their identification with that country. However, there should be people who are leaving for Israel driven by Zionist ideology as there are people making *aliyah*, no matter how low the number is, during years of political and economic stability.

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CHAPTER 3 –THE RECENT HUNGARIAN ALIYAH

In this chapter I will discuss and analyze my empirical results gathered on field and I will also establish a dialogue with the existing literature. First, I will introduce my methodology and the socio-demographic characteristics of my respondents. Second, after a brief historical overview of the identity strategies of the Hungarian Jewry, I will discuss the family background and the development of the identity of my respondents and I will position these "identity stories" in the existing literature. What I found in these family and life narratives, that my respondents can be easily fit into the categories set up by scholars who did research on identity strategies of Hungarian Jews. Then, I will also discuss the respondents' reasons for leaving Hungary and choosing Israel. I will argue that most of my respondents do not differ from the "average migrant" from Hungary in formulating their arguments about leaving, therefore the real focus should be on the decision for Israel, which makes this group unique. The common element in the stories presented here that my respondents arrived to a turning point in their life, let it be a turning point in their private life or in the course of history, which helped their decision. In this chapter I will also reflect on the existing literature on *aliyah* and ethnic return migration and I will conclude that the recent Hungarian *aliyah* cannot be explained with one single theory; rather, all theories have their own contribution to help to understand these processes. Finally, I will introduce my theory on "in-betweenness" which is a transnational phenomenon. Again, echoing the findings of the existing literature on the transnational lifestyle of *olim*, I will show its relevance to Hungarian *olim*. I will also report about the Israeli experience of my respondents and also about the struggle between staying in Israel and returning to Hungary which seems to be a major issue among Hungarian *olim*.

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3.1. Participants and Method

The interviews presented in this paper were conducted in Israel in early April, 2014. I conducted ten semi-structured interviews in Hungarian with Hungarian *olim* who made *aliyah* in the past four years, i.e. between 2010 and 2013, except for one interviewee who came to Israel first in 1990, and after spending six years in Hungary, returned in 2010. I recruited my interviewees through social media and with snowball sampling. All of my interviewees proved to be incredibly helpful. The interviews in average lasted for an hour: the shortest interview was 35 minutes long, while the longest was a bit longer than two and a half hour, and in most cases the conversation continued after I had switched off my recorder. The interviews took place in accordance with the interviewee's preference at their home, workplace/university or in a café or restaurant. Only one interview was conducted with a couple.

Five interviewees made *aliyah* together with their families, with their significant other and minor children, three families live in a kibbutz, one respondent lives in a farm on an Israeli settlement in the West Bank and the others live in larger cities. Two respondents live in the Red Sea resort, Eilat, where there is a larger Hungarian 'community' due to the constant need of workforce there and the State of Israel also maintains an Absortion Centre in Eilat. My youngest respondent was 21, while the oldest 65, the mean age of the interviewees is 35.6,seven respondents were women (see *Table 1.*).Three of those who are married live in mixed-marriages and in the two other marriages even though the wives are also of Jewish origin, only the husband was eligible for *aliyah*under the Israeli Law of Return; only half of the respondents are halachically Jews. All respondents made *aliyah* from Budapest or from the agglomeration, and except for one respondent have a university degree or studying at the university at the present.All informants' names were changed into aliases.

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Table 1.
Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Name of Interviewee	Gender	Age	Residence	Family status	Year of aliyah
Chedvah	Female	28	Tel Aviv	Single	2010
Gavriela[ה]	Female	30	Haifa	Single	2013
Hagar	Female	21	Settlement in the West Bank	Single	2012
Malka	Female	42	Kibbutz in North Israel	Married with two children	2013
Miryam	Female	40	Eilat	Married with three minor and three adult children	2013
Nina[ה]	Female	43	Kibbutz in North Israel	Married (non-Jewish husband) with three children	2013
Shimon[ה]	Male	56	Eilat	Divorced(non-Jewish wife)	2013
Soferet[ה]	Female	23	Ariel	Single	2011
Yehuda[ג]and Bina[ה]	Couple	38/	Kibbutz in North Israel	Three children	2011
Carmeli[ה]	Male	65	Ashkelon	Married (non-Jewish wife) with three adult children	1990 (2010)

ה: halachically Jewish; ג: has no Jewish origin

At the beginning of the interviews, I asked my informants to tell about themselves and their families; only in three cases did I have to ask the rather provocative question of "How did you get to know that you are Jewish?" (cf. Erős et. al. 1985) to gather information about their Jewish background.I also inquired about how they decided to make an *aliyah* and how the whole procedure was going on. The other questions were open-ended questions related to these topics or follow-up questions based upon the respondent's answers. All of my informants were extremely open towards me and only in one case did I find it hard to talk about the Holocaust memory of the family, surprisingly in the case of an interviewee I recruited through family

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connections. In a few cases it was hard not to ask a suggesting question or turn the interview into a conversation.

3.2. "My Parents Lived Their Own Socialist Life": Family Background and Jewish Identity

3.2.1. "Typical Generational Story": Family Background and Learning About Jewish Origins

In her book about the *baalteshuva*phenomenon in Hungary Kata Vincze (2009) claims that no contemporary Jewish issue can be studied without looking at the historical antecedents. She found in her interviews that the experience of the earlier decades often serves as a direct reason and a basis for the return to Judaism. She reports that the historical antecedents served in her interviews as a leitmotif.

Jewish identity in Hungary is still a sensitive question and after the *Shoah*many families chose the *strategy of silencing* or denial. However, the identity strategy of Hungarian Jews cannot be understood without a brief historical overview of the Hungarian Jewry. Karády (1992) argues that after 1848/49 in Hungary[4] there was a "confessional interpretation" of the Jewry, i.e. the Hungarian state regarded Jews not as an ethnic group or nationality but as a religious group and they were referred to as "Hungarians with Moses' faith". During the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Jews gradually received civil rights, first as individuals, than in 1895 as a group, when the "Israelite religion" was officially recognized. During this period the first "social contract" between the Hungarian state and the Jews was born: in return for civil rights Jews chose assimilation and "cultural magyarization" (Mars 2003).

After the lost Great War (1914-1918), the experience of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (1919) and the shock of theTrianonTreaty (1920) when Hungary lost a significant part of its

[4]During the lost war of independence in 1848/49 Jews fought against the Habsburgs on the side of the Hungarians, being the only minority who committed itself for the freedom of the Hungarian Kingdom.

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territory and population, the period of "official anti-Semitism" and "exclusion" came (Mars 2003). Mars argues that Jews were not regarded as a religious group (*izraeliták*) any more, but simply as Jews (*zsidók*) (2003:39). Kovács (2002) also observes that while during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the targets of anti-Semitism, more like anti-Judaism,were the "caftan Jews" who refused to assimilate, after World War I (political) anti-Semitism turned towards the assimilated, *magyarized* Jews, who "disguised themselves". PéterPopper ([2011]) also notes this elementary change in the attitude towards Jews: from being Jewish Hungarians during DualismJews became Hungarian Jews during the 1920s. In 1920 Hungary introduced its first*quasi* Jewish law[5], the *numerusclausus*, which maximized the ratio of Jewish students at universities in 6%.In 1939 Hungary introduced its Nuremberg Law, the Second Jewish Law, in which Jews were defined as a race and also passed a law on Jewish military forced labor, which resulted in the death of ca. 60,000 Hungarian Jews. In 1944 more than 400,000 Jews were deported from Hungary. According to Karády (1992) the *Shoah* was an "elementary historical fracture" in the history of Hungarian Jews as the Hungarian state and its collaborators denounced the "social contract" and Hungarian Jews felt betrayed, their Hungarian identity and the feeling of belonging to Hungary was severely questioned. It was not only the deportations which shocked the Hungarian Jewry but "everyday fascism", the absence of rescue activity, the lack of solidarity and the passivity of the Non-Jewish population of Hungary:

> In Hungary the Jewry became the victim of national fascism on the first place, regardless of the defining conditions provided by the expenditure of German rule to the country. (Karády 1992:27)

All scholars agree that the Shoah was a major turning point in the identity history of Hungarian Jews (Erős 1993; Karády 1992, 2002; Kovács 2002; Kovács and Vajda 2002; Mars 2003), and as Karády (1992) puts it, assimilation proved to be a "blind alley". He argues that "national awareness" and Hungarian national symbols were filled with negative meaning and

[5]There is still no consensus in Hungarian historiography if the *numerusclausus* can be regarded as the first Jewish law. However, many scholars and myself look at it as a manifest anti-Jewish act (cf. Kovács M. 2012).

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generated mistrust in the Jewish population. As Ágnes Heller(2004) remembers in her autobiography, she could not sing the Hungarian national anthem first in her life in the Spring of 1945, although she did like both the poem and the melody before. It was only in 1956 when she could sing it again; it was the euphoria of the October 23rdrevolution which liberated her from the Holocaust trauma.Karády (1992) also notes that the "National Front" nature of 1956 had a good effect on the Hungarian identity of many Hungarian Jews.

According to Karády (1992) there were three different models to exceed the "blind alley of assimilation": (1) conservative-nostalgic, (2) revolutionary-universalist and (3) segregating dissimilant. He argues that the universalist ideology, let it be social democratic or communist, was an alternative to the bourgeoisie-nationalist assimilation many Jews followed before the Holocaust. He also notes that those who chose the dissimilant strategy became Zionists and left the country for Palestine. Although there was a minority who chose the conservative-nostalgic model, most families became universalist and took up a universalist-communist identity. Vincze quotes from an interview with Chief Rabbi József Schweitzer who declared that although it is true that many Jews followed the universalist model, "[i]t is not true that religious life was frozen, there was always ritual slaughtering, matzo baking, Jewish high school" (2009:39).

As a result, the "years of silence" came during state-socialism.Jewishness was not only suppressed by the atheist, anti-clerical socialist state but also by the choice of individuals. A "new social contract" was born between the state and assimilant Jews, mostly those who chose Communism as a new identity. Erős summarizes this "new social contract" as follows: "[i]f you don't speak about the problems, they don't exist, and, what is more important, if you close your eyes, they cannot see you" (1993:144). He also notes that as a result of silencing and denial "tradition had been more or less eliminated and the generational continuity of the family history broken" (1993:143). Karády (1992) finds that during state-socialism there was a "dual or

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multiple private publicity", i.e. there were taboos (the Shoah, relatives living in Israel), there were certain informal "rules" of with whom and in which way they did talk about Jews and Jewishness and a linguistic code-system was developed. Karády argues that the strategy of silencing and 'tabooisation' served two purposes: it denied being different from the majority society and also protected the generation born after 1945 to reproduce the feeling of being different.

Scholars who conducted research on the post-Holocaust generations report that many did not learn about their Jewish roots until their late adolescence or early adulthood and it was a real trauma when they had to face the truth, and in many cases it was not even the family who revealed the secret (Erős et. al. 1985; Erős 1993; Kovács 2002; Kovács and Vajda 2002; Mars 2003).

I identified three groups among my respondents based upon the circumstances they learnt about their Jewish origins. Bina, Gavriela, Nina and Carmelicame to know about their Jewish origins during their adolescence and within shocking circumstances. Malka's husband was also already ten when his parents told him that he was Jewish when the family moved to Sweden and Orli started to attend a German school. His parents thought that "it is better to be aware of it".

As Bina puts it, her story is a "[t]ypical generational story". Her grandparents chose communism after World War 2 and they started the road of full assimilation, denial and secreting. They had Christmas as the "holiday of love and presents", Easter as the days of the "Bunny" and hiking, although they did not celebrate namedays. Binareports that her parents did not want to keep their Jewish origins as a secret but it was not an issue in the family. She was a teenager when her grandmother started to talk about the war and that was the time when she learnt about her origins. She had a Jewish friend in high school who took her to a synagogue and then Bina took her mother as well. Children taking their parent to the synagogue is a known

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phenomenon in the literature (Vincze 2009) and was a returning story among my interviews as it happened to Nina and Gavriela as well. As Nina sees it:

> Our generation has a very good effect on the previous one. Because we are reluctant… That's it and no more. I am reluctant to fear, I am reluctant to be secretive, I am reluctant to do so as if I were not [a Jew] […] I want to be accepted as I am. And a very strong identity developed in our generation, which is very positive to my mind, and it has an effect on the older generation as I see it.

Nina is from a mixed family, her father is not Jewish, but on her mother side everyone is. Her family was a typical silencing family as well but she thinks that her "grandmother had very serious reasons for that" after what the family went through. She was around 14 when shelearnt that she was Jewish. She was searching her way and she tried everything to make a decision,which is how she found herself in a synagogue, where she felt like she "arrived at home". She told this experience to her father who told her that she was Jewish. As result, step by step her family started to talk and after Nina's mother's death, her aunt started to talk more and more. Nina also reports that as she found it out later, it turned out that most of her friends and later Maecenaseswere also Jew, many of them now live in Israel. Malka also noted that in her childhood community everyone had Jewish roots without even knowing it about each other. This is also a returning motif in the literature (Erős et. al. 1985; Erős 1993; Gur 1992; Kovács 2002). Naomi Gur (1992) finds that the reason behind it is that these children had the same family background and went through the same socialization process. They shared common values (such as the respect of knowledge, tolerance) and also had the same style of metacommunication.

Gavriela has a Jewish mother and Christian father and they celebrated the Christian holidays. She was thirteen when she went on a vacation with one of her friends' family and in a conversation it turned out that her friend was Jewish. As Gavriela was aware of its bad connotation, she noted "Oh, poor you!" and her friends' mother told her that she was Jewish as well. She reports that her grandmother celebrated Yom Kippur and that her grandfather returned

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from a concentration camp, which caused himill-health for the rest of his life; however, her grandparents have never talked about the Holocaust. She also notes that she recognized at around the age of 10 that she was different from the others.

Carmeliwas 12 when one of his friend's mothertold his mother that Carmeli made some anti-Semitic statements. That was the reason for which Carmeli's mother revealed the "family secret" and after that Carmeli made her mother talk about their Holocaust trauma. The father was a forced work laborer during the *Shoah*, while the mother was liberated in Bergen-Belsen. Carmelisais that since his father was a member of MSZMP, "religion was not an issue" at home and thus he did not inherit any traditions. However, he also adds that when his father became old and ill he started to say Hebrew prayers. His family was a typical "Cadre family", they celebrated Christmas and namedays. Carmeli also notes that he received an exemplary upbringing as he was taught not to look at the "color" but at the personality.

The second group constitutes Shimon, Chedva, Soferet and Hagar who knew about their Jewish origins since their early childhood. Shimon has always known that he was a Jew on her mother's side, the family did not hide it, but he also added that "I think it took me a time till it subsided, till I cognized it". For his parents it was natural, but was not an everyday issue: "My parents lived their own socialist life."His story is unique in a sense that although he is from a typical "Cadre family" his mother did not follow the strategy of silencing. He also addsthat his grandfather's family did not break with the traditions and remembers that his aunt used to say *Kiddush* before the meals, although she did not know the meaning she murmured, for which Shimon's mother ridiculed her sister. It is also popped out during the interview that his mother was collecting antique Hebrew prayer books which became his hobby as well.

Chevda is Jewish from her father's side and she was really young when her parents divorced and her father moved back to her Jewish grandparents. Chevda spent her weekends with her father in her grandparents house where she noticed David Stars on books and family relics. She

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was around 4 when on a winter evening she was with her grandmother in the kitchen and Chevda drew a David Star on the steamy window. Her grandmother wiped it off automatically and added the she should not draw such sings. That was when her father felt it was high time he told Chedva that they were Jewish. He explained Chedva why they should not talk about it in public and he also talked about the Holocaust, although the *Shoah* was a taboo for her grandparents. However they did not keep any Jewish tradition, her grandparents kept a record of Jews both in public life and in their environment. They did celebrate Christmas, which has alwaysbeen grotesque as Chedva puts it, and namedays.

Soferet is halachically Jewish but her father is Christian. When her parents divorced they moved to Budapest from Szolnok and Jewish traditions became more important for her mother, know she attends the Óbuda Synagogue, where the rabbi is a member of the LubavichHasidic movement. It was never a secret in her family, but at the beginnings it was not present in their everyday life, although they celebrated Chanukka. She remembers a story that when she was a little girl and they arrived home from a Chanukka celebration she and her sister were shouting aloud in the staircase that "I am a Jew, I am a Jew." and they were gagged by their mother. After the divorce they did not celebrate Christmas and they had mezuzah on doorposts at home.

Hagar is Jewish on her father's side, although her father is also from a mixed family. Her father's second wife is Jewish, whose family celebrated Chanukka and kept other traditions but "not on a serious way". Because of her stepmother her Jewish roots were not kept as a secret and her father was also a teacher in the Lauder Javne Jewish Community School. Her grandmother's family was religious before the war and she studied Hebrew, but after the Holocaust her great grandmother declared that "there is no God". She also lost her brother in the late 1940s, who made *aliyah* and was killed by Arab terrorists. After the *Shoah* Hagar's grandmother was baptized as a Catholic and later, under the influence of a Calvinist friend and

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after several tragedies in her life she converted to Calvinism. Now she is visiting a Methodist church weekly.

Malkaand Miryam made *aliyah* on their husband's right; however, both of them have Jewish roots. Vinczediscovers the technique of "kosherization" in life narratives when the Jewish origins are not evident or vague and they cannot be proved by official documents. She argues that "many want to become a Jew even if the conditions under the religious law are not fulfilled" (2009:123) and in these cases the interviewees are emphasizing the maternal lineage and they are either giving thorough details or they are adumbrating. She also notes that these respondents tend to recite the findings of the literature. Kovács and Vajda (2002) also report about the "Jewification of the life story" in the case of those parents who are not Jewish but decided to enroll their children to a Jewish school.

Malka reports that she is Jewish on her grandmother's lineage but they have no official documents and she also notes that she had Jewish friends since elementary school without even knowing each others origins. Her parents always took a notice that surprisingly both Malka and her sister have "a *kind* [italics by me] of a circle of friends".Miryam also refers to her maternal grandmother whosefamily converted to Christianity but there is no real memory of Jewishness in her family. They came to know their Jewish origins after her grandparents death when they reorganized the family documents and the found the papers of their flat. The flat was assigned to them by the state when people had to prove their Aryan origins and although her grandfather could document his Aryan origin, her grandmother did not as

> it was evident that there was someone in the family with Jewish origins but so long ago that they proved to be politically correct, hence they got the flat.

To conclude, all my respondents are typical in a sense that they grew up in a"revolutionary-universalist" and/or assimilated family, only in one case did the mother return to Judaism. Many did not come to know their Jewish origins until their adolescence and their families adopted the "strategy of silencing". Although the stories presented here do not differ elementarilyfrom the

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previous findings on the field, I found it important to share my respondent's stories as it is important to see on what fundaments could their identity build on and from where did they arrive to the decision of making *aliyah*.

3.2.2. "I am a Beginner Jew": The Development of Jewish Identity

In 1975 Glazer and Muynihan published a book, titled *Ethnicity: Theory and Practice*. Their aim was to incorporate social scientific essays on a new, rising phenomenon: "ethnicity", which back that time came into the focus of "certain political and social developments". In the introductory part of their book they claim that assimilation is a utopia and "ethnicity" is or will be a characteristics of modern states. They also argue that there is a desire to belong to minorities, or as the new phenomenon suggests, ethnic groups which "frequently involves a distinctive advantage or disadvantage" and remaining a member of these ethnic groups is "frequently a highly affective way either *to defend the advantage or to overcome the disadvantage* [italics by me]" (1975:15).

In 1979 Gans also contributed to the scientific debate on ethnicity with his article, *Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures*. Although Gansadmits that there is a growing desire among third and four generation migrants to take up the identity of their grand and great-grandparents he denies that there is an ethnic revival an that acculturation and assimilation halted. On the contrary, he argues that *it* still takes place and what we witness is only a "symbolic ethnicity". He notes that the "straight-line of assimilation" effected secular cultures more than sacred ones and "has particularly eroded the secular cultures which Jews and Catholics brought from Europe" (1979:2); however, in the case of Jews sacred and secular elements are more intertwined. He argues that ethnicity today became more visible and ethnics are much more committed to maintain an ethnic identity than take an active role in their ethnic cultures and organizations. He finds that ethnic identity "can no longer be taken for granted", hence "they must make it more explicit than it was in the past" (1979:8). He describes "symbolic

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ethnicity" as practices which does not claim bigger sacrifices, such as celebrating certain holidays, in case of the Jews giving a bigger importance to traditional religious holidays like Chanuka, and a greater longing not only towards the culture but towards the ancient homeland. He also notes that "symbolic ethnicity" is also manifested in consumer goods and can take political forms.

What we call a "Jewish revival" today in Hungary started in the 1980s. First, there was a change in the attitude in (social) sciences, literature and in the film industry (Mars 2003; Vincze 2009). Research on Jewish identity started (cf. Erős et. al. 1985), more and more Jewish cultural, secular and religious institutions were founded and Zionism gained a new impetus (Gitelman 2000; Mars 2003; Vincze 2009). According to Kata Vincze the founders of the "revival institutions" were the members of the second and third generation of *Holocaust* survivors who sought a positive Jewish identity. Both Kovács (1992 and 2002) and Vincze (2009) interprets the "Jewish revival phenomenon" as a part of the "ethnic renaissance of third generation migrants" and Vincze also sees a parallelism with the "new age phenomenon".Erős (1993) and Kovács (1992) agrees that Jewishness became an "interactional identity" with a "reactive content", i.e. one has to manifest themselves in actual situations, mainly as a reaction to anti-Semitism. As Erős (1993) puts it "being Jewish" became "a 'borderline' problem", while Kovács argues that

> [T]oday it is more frequent that those who see their Jewish identity only as a response to the provocations by the outside world, find themselves in such situations when they have to feel Jewish. (1992:109)

Gitelman (2000) distinguishes between five dominant forms of contemporary Jewish identification in East Central Europe. *First*, there are people who follow the traditional forms, both the old religious ones and the secular ones inherited from the state-socialist period. *Second*, there is an activist and creative form practiced by those who want to express their Jewishness in an active way and want to fill up Jewishness with new forms and content. *Third*, there is a form of "symbolic ethnicity" which means occasional attendance to cultural and religious

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events and to *Holocaust* memorial meetings, and he also adds that these people tend to have more Jewish friends (cf. Gans 1979). *Fourth*, there are those who regard themselves Hungarians of Jewish origins, but being Hungarian plays a more important role in their identity than their Jewish roots. However, they show a bigger interest in Jewish issues than Hungarians lacking Jewish origins. *Fifth*, there is a defensive form of Jewish identification which is defined by boundaries and have a reactive content mainly towards anti-Semitism (cf. Erős 1993, Kovács 1992).Gitelman concludes that

> Jewish identity in Eastern Europe has become a matter of choice, as has communal reconstruction. On both the individual and communal levels some have chosen to ignore the new opportunities. Others have sought merely to memorialize a Jewish past, while still others have been trying to revive and fill with meaning their personal and collective Jewishness. (2000:35)

As I will conclude during the analysis of the interviews conducted, none of my respondents can be fit into one single category. Some practice more forms at the same time, or tend to follow different forms at certain periods of their life. As Mars argues "personal identity changes over time particularly associated with rites of passages or with major events" (2003:41). Most of my respondents' parents' identity based onthe two latter forms suggested by Gitelmanat the same time, i.e. they consider themselves Hungarian with Jewish origins but also have a defensive attitude. And, indeed, to a lesser extent, they still follow the state-socialist secular forms.

Four of my respondents partially belong to the first category, i.e. they follow traditional forms. Hagar and Soferet follow the old, traditional religious forms, while Shimon and Carmeli follow the state-socialist, secular forms. It have to be noted that while Hagar and Soferet are the youngest respondents, 21 and 23 respectively. It is echoing Kovács'sfindigns (2002), who found that four-fifth of"*those who have reverted to tradition*"belong to the younger age groups. Shimon and Carmeliare the oldest ones, 56 and 65, their socialization took place during state-socialism.

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In Hagar's narrative the Jewish grandmother plays a crucial role. As I already recited it in*Section 3.2.1.*, Hagar's grandmother grew up in a religious family which broke with Judaism after the *Shoah* and was baptized as a Calvinist. She married an atheist, anti-clerical cadre, who banned Hagar's grandmother from attending religious services. Later, after tragedies in her life under the influence of a Calvinist friend she was baptized as a Calvinist, and now she visits a Methodist church. Hagar opened towards religion two years ago and she started to talk about religion with her grandmother. First she was interested in Christianity, but than gradually she turned towards Judaism. She started her conversion in the *Neolog*congregation in Hungary, now, in Israel she continues her conversion according to the Orthodoxy. If she leaves the farm she wears skirt and she plans to cover her head after marriage.

> Recently I keep almost everything, there are only a few things I am not familiar with yet. But now I am really close to live a full Jewish life. […] It is all together, you get it in a package, it's not up to my decision, so ifI want to be a Jew, I can be a full Jew in this way.

Soferet grew up in a family with traditions. They celebrated *Chanuka* and after her mothers divorce her mother returned to the traditions, she started to visit a synagogue led by a *Hasidic* rabbi, they had *mezuzah* on the doorposts and started to keep the *Kashrut* to a certain extent.In HungarySoferet also attended the Chabad Free University in Budapest. Now, in Israel Soferet is a full kosher and although she does not want to cover her head after marriage there was a time when she wanted to and she does not agree with those movements which urge women to sit together with men in synagogues. When she participated in *Taglit*she already developed religious awareness as she reports that it shocked her that many participants were religious Christiansand they did give a voice to that. Now, in Israel she keeps the Shabbat and her boyfriend is from a *Mizrahi* modern orthodox family. As it is seen from Soferet's interview, her Jewish identity is based on religious grounds which started to develop already in Hungary, but she returned to the traditions on an everyday basis in Israel.

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> I found myself in Judaism, I knew that I wanted a Jewish husband and to establish a Jewish family […] I am here in Israel and I can only be really Jewish here […] Back home I cannot imagine myself as a Jewish family and as a keeper of the Jewish traditions.

Although Shimon in a sense keeps the traditional state-socialist seculars forms, he also has a "symbolic ethnicity". When I asked him about his family backgrounds he noted, that he is Jewish "[o]n my maternal lineage, I am the *echte* [italics by me], the last non second generation". Shimon always had periods in his life when his Jewishness became more important to him, when his "national awareness" became stronger in the form of cultural and minority awareness but it became really important when he spent a year in Egypt in 2001 as peacekeeper and he made regular visits to Israel.He describes himself as a "Hungarian Jew who is looking for his roots" but he is not sure whether he is looking for the Biblical roots or the *Ashkenazi* roots and also wonders to what extent European Jews are Jews except for the ancient roots.For him, Jewishness is an ethnic identity but he regards it as a personal issue. Like her mother, he married a Christian and it was not important to him to pass on Jewishness to his daughter, as it is "her choice". Shimon does not observe any religious traditions, although he collects old Hebrew prayer books, a hobby he inherited from his mother. Back in Hungary, he attended the "March of Life" and visited Jewish restaurants. He also notes that he had non-religious Jewish friends but their Jewishness was only revealed later.

Carmeli also falls into Gitelman's first category. He has a Christian wife and does not observe any religious traditions, they celebrate Christmas even in Israel: "My wife is Christian, it is evident that we set up a Christmas tree". He also reports that his wife is more familiar with Jewish history and Carmeli describes himself as someone who is tolerant with all religions, religious and ethnic affiliations does not matter for him. He also has a strong left-wing identity, a nostalgia towards the Kádár-era and he remembers that "there was no anti-Semitism in socialism". Carmeli has a very strong Hungarian identity, he describes himself as Hungarian on

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the first place (Gitelman's fourth category). As it popped out during the interview he hasa really strong, latent minority identity:

> I am Hungarian on the firs place, then Jewish. Or Hungarian, then Gypsy. Or Hungarian, then Schwab. Or something like that.

However, his minority identity is present on the cognitive level as well in the form of tolerance towards other religions and minorities and he also positioned himself against *Jobbik* throughout the whole interview.

Most of my interviewees live their Jewish identity in the forms of "symbolic ethnicity". Their socio-demographic status is the same as explained by AndrásKovács (2002) in the case of that group "in which *tradition is present as symbol*". Kovács finds that people born after 1966 constitute two-third of this group, they live in Budapest, their parents had college or university degrees and they tend to be office workers or individual entrepreneurs. Although in Kovács's sample those who grew up in families "not characterized by Jewish atmosphere" constituted only 20% of those who fell into this category and 30% less so; my respondents were either characterized by an almost complete lack of traditions or they fell into the "less so" category.

Although Malka and her husband did not inherit any traditions from their family they started to be interested in Jewish culture and Judaism. Malkanotes that "if you have some bondage to something, you will be interested in that". She started to study Hebrew when she was 13, they had regular visits to Israel and they did the paperwork for *aliyah* 6 years ago, but they only started to be involved in Judaism when the family moved to Nice, France in 2008. However, they started to study Hebrew again 10 years ago and attended some Jewish communities but back than they did not develop any strong bondage with neither Judaism, nor with the Jewish community. They started to go to the synagogue in France where they befriended a French-Israeli family and after their return to Hungary they started to visit the Leo Frankel Synagogue and they did light candle on Friday evenings. As Malka observes:

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> It was important to go to the synagogue sometimes, although we went by car, as back home you have to be in the community, you need some ligament, but here it is given, you are among Jews.

They did not, and still not, maintain a Kosher household, although they do not eat pork and they keep separately meet from dairy products in the fridge. They had *mezuzah* on the doorposts back home, and Malka wears a *Magen David* medallion.

Nina also wears a medallion but hers is a *Chai* medallion. They had *Chanukia* and *Menorah* at home and she reads tales for her daughters from Jewish tale books. However, since her husband is not Jewish, there is a duality in their family. It is important for both Nina and her husband to pass on both traditions, although Jewishness plays a more important role in the family.

> For the kids, that they are Jews is like that they are speaking in Hungarian and that they are Hungarians. That's how it should be in a democracy, which is functioning right.

They celebrated Christmas even in Israel, but they celebrate all Jewish high holidays as well, and recently, still back in Hungary, they had *Kabbalat Shabbats* sometimes and *Chanuka*. For Nina *KolNidre* (*Yom Kippur*) has always been an important holiday. They also visited the Leo Frankel Synagogue where she told the rabbi that "I am a beginner Jew" for which the rabbi replied with laughter that "All of us are". When I asked her if she celebrates namedays she replied that she always told her environment that "at least in this thing let me be a regular Jew". For her it is important to live her Jewishness as a positive thing, although she did not find her community in 1990s, until *Sirály* was opened. She is very critical of the "traditional" Jewish organizations, mainly *MAZSIHISZ*, because they are a "closed community" and it is very hard to identify with them. She has a very strong attachment to Israel, when she told me about their planned *yeridah* she said the follows:

> Last year on August 15th [the day of their aliyah], I *arrived home*. Now I am *returning*[italics by me] to Hungary. But not for good. From many respects I am here [in Israel] at home.

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Miryam has a *Magen David* medallion in her neck and in her case, she and her husband found their way back to Jewishness through their children. Their second son studied Hebrew and was involved in a youth Jewish organization, the *Shabbat EstiLáz*, he was the first in the family who moved to Israel. They were very proud when he was enrolled in the army. However, back in Hungary they did not have "symbolic ethnicity", although she attended pro-Israeli protest. Now, in Israel they celebrated *Chanuka* instead of Christmas but they do not keep kosher and she did not report about other holidays. She reports about their previous Israeli trips as follows:

> There is this experience when you arrive somewhere and than: 'Sakes, now I am at home!' And we had this experience as well.

I conducted the interview Chedva andGavriela on Friday night at Chedva's home. I arrived just before *Shabbat* started, a couple of minutes before the women have to light the candles. Both Chedva and Gavriel lit a candle and murmured the *Shabbat* candle blessing. OnChedva's bookshelves among a few other books one can find Jewish religious books, books on Judaism and the Hungarian Jewry and books written by Jewish authors. To illustrate the ambivalence towards tradition and the *mitzvah*, I have to note that while I was conducting the interview with Gavriela, Chedva went to smoke a cigarette, which is a forbidden activity on *Shabbat*.

Until Chedva did not participate in the *Taglit* program she had no connections with Jewish communities, mainly because she had concerns as she is not Jewish halachically. However, the *Taglit* proved to be a turning point in her life, it served as an entry to the Jewish community and also to Jewishness:

> Back than, when I was 23, I got a feedback from the Jewish community that I can take part in it. […] It was a cathartic experience that eventually I can be with my"co-Jews" and we can talk about it freely, and I can live this experience, and to arrive here, even as a tourist […] It was a totally different experience to enter the country, even as a tourist, and I felt from the beginning that I have something to do with this place.

After the *Taglit* she entered the Jewish scene of Budapest. She became a member of a Jewish voluntary organization, *Kidma*, which was an organization which aimed to help young Jews to find their way back to Jewishness. They wanted to mediate Jewish traditions, although religion

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was not important for them. She also notes that her friendships with other Jews have a different quality than with non-Jews since they have a "common basis". In Israel she did the official conversion as she wanted to be halachically Jewish and she also wants her children to be halachically Jewish and be fully recognized by the State of Israel as Jews. About religion she adds: "now it's flexible, although I light the Shabbat candle and keep kosher. These are the two things I keep seriously".

For Gavriela,*Taglit* served as a turning point as well. At first, she did not want to participate but it turned out to be a positive experience, she felt that "Here everyone is a Jew, here you don't have to hide it". After the *Taglit* she participated in various programs organized by *Szochnut* and she went to Israel as a volunteer with the *TikkunOlam* program. She gradually became the part of the "Jewish bubble of Pest", first *Sirály*, than religious communities. Her grandmother celebrated *Yom Kippur* "even after the Holocaust", therefore she celebrates it as well. She started to light the *Shabbat* candles back in Hungary and she had *mezuzah* at home. She also reports about anti-Semitism which had a deep impact on her during university.

Chedva and Gavriela besides their "symbolic ethnicity" also took up some activist forms, so did Yehuda who has no Jewish roots at all. For him the existence of Israel and Judaism is a question of liberty:

> That's what liberty means. That you can be a Jew, your children can be Jews. Having a healthy identity, and not being 'a Ghetto Jew'.

Yehuda is from a Calvinist peasant family where the Old Testament was important, although the family was not religious, but the "Calvinist ethic" was present in the thinking and the traditions of the family. Her mother is from an atheist working family, hence Yehuda was not baptized, but in his teens he started to attend religious classes for the sake of culture. Although he did not want to be baptized, for his mother's request he did it. At the age of 17 he went on a one-month school trip to Israel which was a crucial experience in his life, the contradictions of the country impressed him. After his trip to Israel he joined a Jewish organization where he

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became a leader and an important figure in Hungarian Jewish public life, although he explained his concerns about the "Jewish revival". In Hungary, he and Bina attended a synagogue, the rabbi is their friend. He started the conversion, although he did not finish it and they celebrate the Jewish holidays, they completely broke with Christian holidays, and keep Jewish tradition to have an affiliation with the Jewish community: "I am Kosher, my wife is terefah. For me it was more natural to be a Jew than for Bina [who is halachically Jew]".

It is not only Yehuda who lacks Jewish roots and takes Judaism more seriously. Chedva also reported that her non-Jewish mother is more open to Jewish culture than her Jewish father, Carmeli said the same about his wife. In one of Kovács and Vajda's (2002) interviews the non-Jewish wife finds it more important to make their son know about his Jewish origin and to have a positive Jewish identity. During a research I conducted with my two Russian classmates we also found that the non-Jewish member of the community we visited takes Judaism more seriously than the Jewish members and he is the most active member of the community. As for them Judaism is a matter of choice and not a heritage, and they did not inherit any traumas it is easier to get involved and develop a positive attitude towards Jewishness and Judaism. As Yehuda pointed it out, it is a question of liberty and as FerencErős argues "the question of Jewish identity is a question of democracy – as all questions of minority identity pertain democracy, all over the world" (1993:145).

To conclude, as ethnic groups in the "western world", from the 1980s in Hungary Jews gradually started turn back to Jewishness and Judaism, mostly through the forms of "symbolic ethnicity". Although only one of my respondents is from a family with traditions almost all (eight out of ten) of my respondents returned back to the (secularized) traditions to a certain extent, two became observant Jews. Those who did not return to the traditions, developed an "ethnic identity" or have an unconscious "minority identity" with cognitive forms.

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3.3. Reasons for MakingAliyah

As it was revealed in *Chapter 2*, the two main factors for diasporic homecomings are economic reasons and ethnic discrimination in the sending countries, albeit ideology and preferential migration policy do have an impact on the returnees decision. However, the latter two rather channel migration flow than generate it (DellaPergola 1998, 2011; Shuval and Leshem 1998; Tsuda 2009b). On the other hand, Surányi's (2013) findings suggest that in her respondents' decision *Zionism* and the promise of a "fuller Jewish life" played a more crucial role than economic or political reasons.My statistical analysis of the migration trends in the Hungarian-Israeli contextto the contrary notwithstanding, *it*indicates that Hungarian *aliyah* in general is influenced by economic and political changes and confirms Tsuda's (2009b) argument about the rather "channeling effect" of ideology.

According to the employee of *Szochnut*[6], who is in charge of Hungarian *aliyah*, in the recent years there was an identifiable growth in the number of inquiries and those who decide to immigrate to Israel. She finds that the increased demand for outmigration among Hungarian Jews is due to economic and political reasons. A significant number of those who decide to make *aliyah* considered other countries as well, mainly Denmark and the UK, but eventually they chose Israel for pragmatic reasons, i.e. they become Israeli citizens upon arrival and for six month they receive an "absorption package" from the state. However, there are people who make *aliyah* based on ideological grounds but, as she observes, the majority of them return to Hungary. Although she cannot cite statistical figures, she estimates that ca. 40% of the Hungarian *olim* are from the younger generations, who just graduated from high school or university, around 30% are families, and the remaining 30% is composed of middle aged individuals or couples. She also notes that there is an increased demand among the elderly due to the growing anti-Semitism and quite a few of them have a fear of a "second Holocaust". She

[6] I conducted the interview with her in Budapest in the *Szochnut* Office at the Israeli Cultural Institute (IKI) on April 4th, 2014.

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observes that *Taglitper se* does not have an impact on *aliyah* among younger generations, rather the post-*Taglit* programs, like *Masa*, but those who participate in the latter program are essentially more committed.

What I found is that all but one of my respondents arrived to a turning point in their life (or in their family life) before making a decision to make *aliyah*. Although there have been some similarities among these turning points, it is rather hard to create a typology to understand larger patterns.The other factor which connects most of my intervieweesis the dissatisfaction with Hungarian politics:the success of the far-right *Jobbik* party, increasing nationalism and anti-Semitism. In case of the younger generation the "liberating" experience of *Taglit*, while in the case of the elder ones previous visits to Israel and the ambivalent experience of "Jewish revival" was also a contributing factor. Although in all but one cases economic reasons were not mentioned explicitly, in quite a few cases it is also contributed to the decision. It was also noticeable in the interviews that the respondents tend to justify their decision on psychic grounds (I would be more cautious using ideological grounds), many of them started to "*kosherize*" their biography after they had to explain their ethnic homecoming and it seems that the Israeli experience *per se* spiritualizes their *aliyah*.

Carmelihad made aliyah in 1990, although he returned to Hungary for six years in 2004. His decision is closely related to the regime change, when "economic and human anger broke loose" and he experienced a "moral, ethical and economic decline" in the country. He was motived by the exodus of FSU Jews and by György Moldova's just published book, *Who Killed the Dead Sea?*

Nina and Miryam have children who just reached school age and neither of them wanted to incur their children to the Hungarian school system. Nina referred to the recent changes in the *Hungarian National Curriculum*: she does not want her children to attend "Religious Studies"

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classes or read Albert Wass's books[7]. Nina added that growing anti-Semitism also contributed to her decision, once her name appeared on the radical extreme right website, *kuruc.info* after she gave an interview for a French documentary about European anti-Semitism.However, Nina already wanted to make *aliyah* when she turned 18, guided by spiritual reasons. She wanted to study psychology in Israel, but she had faced a strong resistance from her mother and grandmother: her grandmother did not understand why Nina wanted to be a Jew. Because of her family's resistance Nina decided to postpone the *aliyah* and she added:

> I wanted to declare my belonging to the Jewry with an Israeli citizenship and that I absorb the culture here, in the Middle Eastern reality and not in a European intellectual environment; because the SzentIstván park-like[8] Jewish society is totally different from the Jewish society here [in Israel].

Although Miryam referred to the schooling of her children on the first place, she also added that she wants her children to a have a "vision of the future" and what is going on in Hungary in the political and economic life does not serve the good of her children. She wasdisgusted by the ideology mediated by the National-Christian government and as also she noted that at the and she had only attended protests. It is also important to note that Miryam's three elder children already had made *aliyah*, although her eldest son returned to Hungary.

For Malka and her family, since 2008 Israel has been "in the drawer as plan B". In 2012 herhusband lost his job, and they already had decided that if Orli looses his job, they will not have a "new start" in Hungary as it would be hard to reproduce the existence they had built up. She added that their *aliyah* was also inspired by "the desire for adventure" and the emotional attachment to Israel. In Malka's*aliyah* story the cleavage among the generations also appeared: her in-laws asked them to tell others that they only went to Israel as volunteers. Her mother-in-

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[7]A contradictory Hungarian-born writer, who was sentenced to death in Romania for war crimes.An anti-Semitic thinker, who became the icon of the political right in recent year.
[8]A park in the 13th district of Budapest with a relatively significant Jewish population.The district is affiliated with the Liberal left wing.

law still follows the "strategy of silence", as she always points out that her name is *only* a German name.

In the previous section I already pointed out the importance of *Taglit* in the development of a positive Jewish identity among young Jewish Hungarians. According to the interviews it also helped the participants to develop a positive attitude and an attachment with Israel. Chedva, Gavriela and Hagar also participated in *Masa*, while Gavriela has been to Israel with *TikkunOlam* as well.

Both Soferet and Hagar were disappointed with the university in Hungary and decided to drop out after the first year, which proved to be their turning point. Soferet also noted that"back home the situation of the youth is alarming". Her decision to make an *aliyah* was born on a Saturday when in the synagogue there was a lecture about *aliyah*. Originally, the entire family (her mother and sister) wanted to migrate to Israel but eventually only Soferet did. In her case *Taglit* was only a confirmation as she already did the paperwork for the *aliyah* at *Szochnut* by that time. Anti-Semitism was a key element in Soferet'snarrative as she had to face it every day in high school:

> I don't have a big nose, but everyone says it is. 'Your nose is big, you're a Jew; your eyes are green, you're a Jew' […] Here I don't get that, 'you filthy Jew'; I got rockets from Gaza, but I'm not that afraid of them as psychic terror […] Here, if you see a David Star it's not anti-Semitism which comes to your mind, it's about the community. It is called Magen David [Shield of David] in Hebrew,it's about protection.

Hagar was not only disappointed with university but she had economic considerations as well. Her stepfather's business was in deficit recently, hence she could not count on his support anymore. First, she wanted to move to England to work but she could not find a satisfactory job.Eventually, she decided to participate in the *Masa* program but she did not want to make *aliyah* at that time. During *Masa* in Israel she started to date an Israeli boy and she stayed there for a year illegally, she only made *aliyah* officially after residing in Israel for a year.

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Chedva had major changes in her private life: she ended a serious relationship which lasted for five years, her Jewish grandmother has died and she finished university. She faced serious existentialist problems: she was not sure if she chose the right profession and if she made a good decision when she broke up with her boyfriend.

> I didn't want to start that Hungarian life which was ahead me. I wanted to escape from the situation I was in.

She started to look for au pair jobs in Berlin and England but she was not sure if she really wanted to work for a German family she did not know, so she started to look for Israeli families. She spent the firs six month working in Israel illegally, she made *aliyah* later, as she noted: "I stuck here".Chedva also started to date an Israeli which made her stay there, albeit they broke up later.

After *Taglit*, Gavrieal participated in many programs in Israel offered by *Szochnut* and she was considering to move to Israel for a long time. However, her decision only came after she graduated from university and she could not find a job in Hungary. Although she looked for jobs in other countries her focus was in Israel. According to her narrative she decided to make *aliyah* after she was offered a position at an Israeli company and to fill the position she had to have an Israeli citizenship.

In 2001 Shimon made frequent visits to Israel from Egypt where he was stationed as a peacekeeper. That was the time when he realized that his future was in Israel, albeit he did not make an *aliyah* till 2013. He did not want to leave Hungary until his daughter became independent and he did not end with his "issues" in Hungary. Note, that as a former police officerhe could retire at an earlier age but due to the new regulations imposed by the government it is rather hard to find a full time job, once someone is retired. Shimon also reported that "one of the last boosts to leave Hungary was given by politics" and he also adds that now "it seems to be permanent".

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Yehuda and Bina decided to leave Hungary for a shorter period of time, although they are already in Israel for three years. They had many options in their mind, mainly Thailand, but eventually they decided for Israel for emotional reasons.Yehuda also added that they did not want their children to be raised as "ghetto Jews":

> We either build the ghetto and we start to 'ghettoficate' and stay, or there is another alternative, for example Israel, or like a positive Jewish identity […] Judaism is a lot of joy, a lot of philosophy, it contains a lot of very important values.

Yehuda is disappointed with Jewish life in Hungary and he believes that Jewish revival has halted and arrived to a blind alley. He has strong connections to Israel and he thinks that one can only develop a positive Jewish identity there. They also agreed with Bina that their children could have a much better life in a kibbutz than in Budapest.They decided to move to Israel in 2011 because of their children's age, as they think that later whentheir children got older Budapest will be a better option for them. Yehuda noted that "no large cities in Israel can offer the cultural diversity that Budapest does". What I found fascinating in Bina's narrative that she finds, that for Yehuda, who is not Jewish, moving to Israel was psychically more important than for her, who has a Jewish background. The generational divide came out in their narrative as well:

> For them [Bina's parents] that we came here is a result of their conflict with their own assimilant Jewish identity. They have to face things or have to answer questions they have never wanted to face or find answers to in their life. […] They see how happy we are here, but they only emphasize the negative aspects: 'there is no culture here, the children have no impulses here'. And in the meantime they swear at Orbán.

To conclude, in the case of my informants the decision for making *aliyah* is a result of multiple reasons. At the time of their *aliyah* my respondents arrived to a turning point in their life, hence the main reason for making *aliyah* is personal. Most of my interviewees mentioned the current political situation in Hungary along with growing anti-Semitism. Quite a few of them referred to economic factors, albeit only one ofsaid explicitly that she decided to leave Hungary for economic reasons. Their personal experience with Israel, i.e. earlier visits to the

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country, the participation in birthright programs, also facilitated their decision. It has to be noted that two of my respondents stayed in Israel first illegally and they only made their *aliyha* official later. Although one family has lived in Israel for three years, they only moved to the country temporarily, they are the ones for whom psychic reasons played the most important factor. Even though in most of the cases ideology and psychic factors have an influence on *aliyah*, they are rather important in choosing the destination (or to make the final decision), they alone do not explain emigration and in many cases they become important only after *aliyah* has been made.

3.4. 'In-betweenness': Transnational Lifestyle and Integration into IsraeliSociety

Schiller et. al. (1995) argue that the new generation of migrants, unlike their predecessors do not uproot themselves, rather they integrate into the society of their destination while they do not completely exist from the society of their sending countries. These new generation of transmigrants remain connected with their *natal* homeland through personal connections, political and economic institutions. Moreover, some not only engaged with two societies but they maintain transnational relations with more than two countries.

Larissa Remennick argues that the "social incorporation of migrants […] is an uneven and bumpy road" (2013:479), and there is no general pattern for integration as every individual takes its on road. She also points out that some of these roads end in return migration. She finds that former Soviet Jews still maintain a close relationship with Russia and Ukraine through personal and economic connections. Many FSU Jews commute between Israel and their *natal* homeland and still have properties there. As during the exodus of FSU Jews in the early 1990s the destination of emigrants was not only Israel many have connections in a third country, mainly in Germany.

In his book about contemporary diaspora, Esman (2009) finds that information technologies have a significant influence on Diasporas. He argues that with the help of the internet members

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of the Diasporas can maintain an intense relationship whit those who stayed at home and they have an easy access to the media of their home countries, thus they can stay updated with events back home. Although Hungarians in Israel do not constitute a diaspora (cf. Surányi 2013), Esmans's findings are true for them as well.

My interviewees also reported about intensive, almost daily connections with their family members and friends back in Hungary, as one of my respondents noted the time she spends with writing e-mails and making Skype-calls "is way too much". Those who have Facebook claimed that it is impossible to avoid news from Hungary, they can stay updated even without looking at news portals as their friends always post the important news on their wall. Carmeli listens to Hungarian radio channels and watches Hungarian television through the internet, which also helps him to follow the Israeli news as he can translate the news from Hebrew to Hungarian with his browser.My interviewees read Hungarian novels and all of the reflected on the results on the national elections.

In average, my respondents visit Hungary twice a year and many of them receive visitor from Hungary. Bina's parents come to visit to Israel every in three months, Yehuda just had returned from Hungary two days before the interview, the children ate Frankfurter, brought from Hungary during visit. Soferet does the shopping in Hungary as the prices for clothes and electronics are really high in Israel. However, no matter how embedded Carmeli is in Hungarian society through the internet he has not been to Hungary since 2010 and he does not plan to make a visit due to political reasons:

> At the moment I'm not planning to go home, not even to visit, because the anger has broken loose. I'm rather a leftist […] so at the present moment I don't intend to go back, albeit really love my home country [Hungary].

Malka's husband is working for a company which is setting up a branch in Hungary. Orli spends most of his time in Hungary and he will be replaced to Hungary. As result, he, Malka and their smallest child will most probably move back to Hungary, while two older one will stay in Israel. Malka plans to commute between the two countries. Like my other respondents

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who had properties in Hungary, Malka and her family did not give up their house in Hungary. As she noted: "We gave two to three years for this project, anyway".

As most of my respondents arrived to Israel in the past few years it is almost impossible to draw a general conclusion about their integration, albeit I can reflect on some previous findings. The professional and social downgrading what is observed by Fogiel-Bijaoui (2013) and Remennick (2009) is also present among Hungarian *olim*. Only three of my respondents could get a job according to their profession, Bina who is a physician, Malka's husband, Orli who has a degree in engineering and Gavriela who made *aliyah* as a result of the fact that it was a requirement for her to get the position. Remennick (2009) also reports the highest rates of finding a job according to ones profession is the highest among physicians (more than 50%) and engineers (60%).Malka also managed to get a white-collar job as she has a huge cultural capital, she speaks four languages excluding Hungarian and Hebrew. All but one of my older respondents reported that they have worse living conditions than they had back in Hungary.

Nina and her family decided to make *yerida* as they could not adopt to the lower living standards and occupational downgrading as it is the same in Miryam's husband's case, who also might return to Hungary (NB: at the time of the interview he was back in Hungary for a month). Nina summarizes the reason for her unsuccessful *aliyah*, albeit she easily adopted to the Israeli society in her everyday life:

> I had so strong attachments that I thought that I will be able to cope with the fact that as an intellectual I'm a cleaning leady in the Nursery school and Uri works in factory. I was seriously mistaken about that. I doesn't work like that.

Chedva, after three years, will also return to Hungary for a longer time. She wants to tighten the loose ends she left behind in Hungary.

Except for Carmeli, Shimon and Gavriela, who have only a basic Hebrew knowledge, has daily interactions with veteran Israelis. Among the youngest, three out of four have or had Israeli boyfriends. All but one respondent follow Israeli politics, the only one who does not is

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not interested in politics at all. Some of my interviewees have a preferred party in Israel. As Remennick (2009) also finds women adopt to the Israeli culture much more easily than men.

To conclude, all of my respondents have a transnational lifestyle, they are embedded in both in Israeli and in Hungarian society. Thanks to the information technology they have daily contacts whit their family and friends left behind in Hungary. Given short period since their *aliyah* it would only a speculation to draw a general conclusion about their integration. However, it seems that except for professional and social downgrading, they managed to get to a remarkable extent in integration, although some of my interviewees are facing difficulties with learning the Hebrew language. These are the most common factors, which lead to the decision for making aliyah.

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CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

The main aim of this thesis was to understand why there has been an increase in Hungarian *aliyah* in recent years and what the reasons are behind the fluctuation in the *aliyah* figures for Hungary. To answer my questions I used a statistical analysis of the migration trends for Israel and Hungary and I compared these patterns with the trends of Hungarian *aliyah*. My findings confirmed those theories which argue that Israeli immigration is far less unique than it is suggested by ideologists and Israeli migration scholars. The trends of Hungarian *aliyah* follow larger migration patterns and the major political and economic patterns are being reflected in the ups and downs of the number of Hungarian *olim*.

To further understand these trends, I conducted a qualitative research in Israel with Hungarian *olimhadashim,* who emigrated to Israel in recent years. In the light of my quantitative and qualitative findings, it can be concluded that Hungarian *aliyah* is a general migration phenomenon on the one hand, and it has its unique characteristics on the other hand. It follows other migration patterns, therefore the focus should not be on the reasons for leaving for Israel but on why Hungarian Jews choose Israel. By shifting our question, we will get a better understanding of why *aliyah* is still unique despite the fact that statistics suggest its generality. As it was revealed in the interviews, most of my respondents left Hungary for the same reasons as those whose destination was not Israel. What makes these people different from othersis the choice of their destination. It has to be noted as well that there is a negligible rate of *aliyah* during stagnating times,which suggests that there are people who are still guided by Zionist ideology or they have a turning point in their life and their decision is affected by the preferential migration policy of Israel and the perception of another homeland with co-ethnics besides their natal homeland.

The interviews conducted also allowed me to study the development of my respondents' Jewish identity and their experience of diasporic homecomings. My findings about my

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interviewees' family background and the development of their identity show that most of them went through the typical stages of a second or third generation Holocaust survivor. Most of them grew up in a family which followed the strategy of silencing after the *Shoah* and found out about their Jewish origins later in their life. All of them were somehow affected by the Jewish revival phenomenon of the 1990s and 2000s and developed a positive Jewish identity breaking with their parents' identity strategies. Although in most of the cases their positive Jewish identity was not the reason for their emigration,but it determined their destination. However, for some of them other destinations were not on their agenda. I also found out that my informants became transnational migrants, i.e. they are still embedded in Hungarian society, while they are steadily integrating into the Israeli everyday life. Thus, they remain *in-between* Hungary and Israel.

My research had a number of limitations. I did not manage to reach out to all strata of the Hungarian *olim*. Although many of my respondents reported that a vast majority of recent Hungarian *olim* are "economic refugees", none of them got into my sampling. As a result, I was only able to show a smaller group of Hungarians Israelis. Also, to have a better understanding of Hungarian *aliyah* a comparative study would have been needed with those Hungarian Jews who also emigrated from Hungary but chose a destination other than Israel.

Although I managed to conduct interviews with those who are planning to make *yeridah*the data collected on this phenomenon is not rich enough to draw general conclusions. As Remmenick (2009, 2013) suggests integration to a new society in not a straight line process: it has certain stages, each with different possible outcomes. Therefore, I suggest for a follow-up study in the future to see the different outcomes of their *aliyah* experience. As many of my respondents emigrated with their children, such a follow-up study would enable me to see how the life of different generations are effected by a significant change like emigration.

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I believe that the study of Hungarian *aliyah* is not only an interesting project but it also contributes to the broader scholarship of both Israeli emigration and ethnic return migration and further research on this subject will lead us to a better understanding of the Hungarian Jewry and also of the broader field of emigration.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Aliyah Figures for Israel, 1948-2013

Year	No. ofOlim	Year	No. ofOlim
1948	101,828	1981	12,599
1949	239,954	1982	13,723
1950	170,563	1983	16,906
1951	175,279	1984	19,981
1952	24,610	1985	10,642
1953	11,575	1986	9,505
1954	18,491	1987	12,965
1955	37,528	1988	13,034
1956	56,330	1989	24,050
1957	72,634	1990	199,516
1958	27,290	1991	176,100
1959	23,988	1992	77,057
1960	24,692	1993	76,805
1961	47,735	1994	79,844
1962	61,533	1995	76,361
1963	64,489	1996	70,919
1964	55,036	1997	66,221
1965	31,115	1998	56,730
1966	15,957	1999	76,766
1967	14,469	2000	60,201
1968	20,703	2001	43,473
1969	38,111	2002	33,570
1970	36,750	2003	23,273
1971	41,930	2004	20,899
1972	55,888	2005	21,183
1973	54,886	2006	19,269
1974	31,979	2007	18,131
1975	20,028	2008	13,701
1976	19,754	2009	14,574
1977	21,429	2010	16,633
1978	26,394	2011	16,892
1979	37,222	2012	16,557
1980	20,428	2013	16,968

Source: The Jewish Agency for Israel (received by mail)

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Appendix 2: Aliyah Figuresfrom Hungary, 1948-2014

Year	No. ofOlim	Year	No. ofOlim
1948	3,463	1982	18
1949	6,844	1983	36
1950	2,732	1984	35
1951	1,285	1985	33
1952	239	1986	29
1953	245	1987	63
1954	77	1988	134
1955	277	1989	187
1956	1,013	1990	300
1957	7,216	1991	231
1958	165	1992	144
1959	240	1993	212
1960	347	1994	214
1961	245	1995	272
1962	201	1996	230
1963	296	1997	157
1964	373	1998	98
1965	129	1999	115
1966	114	2000	165
1967	67	2001	103
1968	29	2002	59
1969	62	2003	37
1970	65	2004	112
1971	62	2005	94
1972	43	2006	63
1973	47	2007	49
1974	50	2008	54
1975	29	2009	100
1976	31	2010	115
1977	14	2011	144
1978	13	2012	166
1979	20	2013	158
1980	38	2014 (Jan-Apr)	52
1981	26		

Source: The Jewish Agency for Israel (received by mail)

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Appendix 3: World Jewish population by major regions, 1948-2009

Region	Number (thousands)			Percent			Percent change		
	1948	1970	2009	1948	1970	2009	1948–1970	1970–2009	1948–2009
World total	**11,500**	**12,662**	**13,309**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**10**	**5**	**16**
Israel	650	2,582	5,569	5.7	20.4	41.8	297	115	757
Diaspora, Total	10,850	10,080	7,740	94.3	79.6	58.2	−7	−23	−29
Europe, Total	**3,750**	**3,232**	**1,469**	**32.6**	**25.5**	**11.1**	**−14**	**−55**	**−61**
Europe, West	**1,035**[b]	**1,113**	**1,053**	**9.0**	**8.8**	**7.9**	**8**	**−5**	**2**
Spain, Port, Gibr	13	10	13	0.1	0.1	0.1	−23	30	0
Italy	35	32	29	0.3	0.2	0.2	−9	−9	−17
France	235	530	485	2.1	4.2	3.6	126	−8	106
Ger, Aust, Swi, Bel, Neth, Lux	146	122	208	1.3	1.0	1.6	−16	70	42
UK, Ireland, Scandinavia	436	419	318	3.8	3.3	2.4	−4	−24	−27
Europe, East	**2,715**	**2,119**	**416**	**23.6**	**16.7**	**3.2**	**−22**	**−80**	**−85**
Former USSR in Europe	2,000	1,897	320	17.4	15.0	2.4	−5	−83	−84
Czech, Slov, Hun, Pol, Rom	605	163	68	5.3	1.3	0.5	−73	−58	−89
Bul, Gre, Former Yug, Turkey	110	59	28	0.9	0.5	0.2	−46	−53	−75
Former USSR in Asia	225	262	19	2.0	2.1	0.1	16	−93	−92
Other Asia	365	100	19	3.2	0.8	0.1	−73	−81	−95
North Africa[c]	630	92	4	5.5	0.7	0.0	−87	−95	−99
South Africa	105	124	73	0.9	1.0	0.6	18	−41	−30
North America	5,215	5,686	5,650	45.3	45	42.5	9	−1	8
Latin America	520	514	391	4.5	4.1	2.9	−1	−24	−25
Oceania	40	70	115	0.3	0.5	0.9	75	64	188

a. Core definition, not including non-Jewish members of households.
b. Including 170,000 displaced persons.
c. Including Ethiopia.

Source: DellaPergola's table 1. (2011:8)

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Appendix 4: Hungarian Jewish emigrants to Israel (Palestine), 1919-1957

Year	No. ofOlim	No. ofOlim
1949-1945	4,629	5,982
1946-May 15, 1948	3,691	5,700
May 15, 1948-1949	10,307	6,844
1950-1951	ca. 3,693	4,017
1952-1955	ca. 370	838
1956-1957	9,020	8,229

Source: Karády's table 11. (2002:132)

Appendix 5: Estimated Hungarian immigration, 1945-1989

Years	No. of emigrants
1945-1953	100,000-100,000
1953-1989	220,000-230,000 (excl. 1956/57)
1956-1957	ca. 200,000

Source: Valuch2005:48-50

Appendix 6: Estimated Hungarian immigration to selected European countries, 2007-2013

Year	No. of Immigrants		
	Austria	Germany	United Kingdom
2007	4,478	3,818	13,308
2008	5,164	3,859	16,180
2009	5,768	1,393	11,535
2010	6,412	7,475	15,646
2011	9,250	13,868	18,127
2012	13,066	24,638	24,668
2013	14,935	28,216	23,622

Source: Aggregated by the author based on data downloaded from *gov.uk*, *destatis.de* and *statcube.at*.

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GLOSSARY

Aliyah: the return migration of Jews from the diaspora to the Land of Israel.

Ashkenazi: a Central and Eastern European Jew.

Baal Teshuva: "master of return", a Jew who returns to Judaism.

Chanuka: an eight-day Jewish holiday commemorating the rededication of the Temple in Jerusalem. The Christian refer to is as "the Jewish Christmas."

Chanukkia: the nine-branched Chanukah Menorah.

Halachically Jewish: Jewish, according to the Jewish religious law (Halakha). In Jewish law someone born to a Jewish mother or an adult who converted to Judaism.

Hasidic: a mystic branch of Orthodox Judaism.

Kabbalat Shabbat: the welcoming celebration of Shabbat.

Kashrut: Jewish religious dietary law.

Kosher: a food that conform to the regulations of the Kashrut.

Magen David: Star of David.

Masa: an Israeli cultural and educational scholarship program for young Jews.

MAZSIHISZ: Federation of Jewish Communities, the most significant Jewish organization in Hungary.

Menorah: a seven-branched lampstand, one of the symbols of Judaism.

Mezuzah:a piece of parchment inscribed with specified Hebrew verses from the Torah. It is affixed to the doorpost in Jewish homes.

Mizrahi: Jews from the Middle East.

Neolog: the largest Jewish current in Hungary. In the 19th century it was a Reform movement, than it gradually turned towards Conservative Judaism, today its religious standpoint is the closest to Modern Orthodoxy.

OlimHadashim: new Jewish immigrants in Israel, new olim.

Olim: people who made aliyah (Pl.).

Sabra: an Israeli born Jew.

Sephardi: Jews from the Iberian Peninsula, who were later dispersed throughout Western Europe, the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East.

Shabbat: the Jewish day of rest, which last from Friday sunset until Saturday sunset.

Shoah: the Hebrew term for the Holocaust.

Taglit: the birthright program of Israel.

Talmud: a central text of Rabbinic Judaism.

Terefah: a non-Kosher food.

TikkunOlam:a Jewish social action volunteer program in Israel.

Yeridah: the emigration of Jews from the Land of Israel.

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