CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2015
| Author | Chukwuocha, Joseph Chukwuma |
|---|---|
| Title | IN DEFENSE OF THE NEUTRALITY OF THE POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE |
| Summary | I argue in defense of Rawls’ anti-perfectionist theory of political neutrality, which I contend offers a more plausible account of legitimacy than the perfectionist alternative. Given the contestable nature of the good life, and the fact that citizens of liberal states possess autonomy to pursue different plans of life, Rawls claims that it is impossible to reach an agreement on a single conception of the good life except through the oppressive use of state power; but unjustified coercion is illegitimate in a liberal state. Hence, legitimacy requires state neutrality. Critics object the Rawlsian arguments for political neutrality. I discuss two of such objections; firstly, the asymmetry objection, claiming that Rawls treats reasonable disagreements about the good life and justice arbitrarily unequal. Secondly, the perfectionist valuable autonomy objection contending that valuable autonomous life depends on certain necessary conditions that justify state actions on the good life. I argue that the asymmetry objection does not undermine political neutrality, because the importance of fundamental matters of the constitution in public life may generate the need for a higher order agreement about the political life that is not available for matters about the good life. I also contend that the value autonomy criticism turns against perfectionism, because in making autonomy conditional on the good, perfectionists encourage unjustified coercive state actions that undermines the plausibility of liberal perfectionism. |
| Supervisor | Andres Moles |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2015/chukwuocha_joseph.pdf |
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