MAPPING CHANGES IN DISCOURSE: UNCOVERING A SHIFT IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR AND UKRAINIAN CRISIS

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Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

Supervisor: Alexander Astrov

Word count: 14, 953

Budapest, Hungary
2015

ABSTRACT

Through comparing the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and 2013-present Ukrainian Crisis, this thesis aims to explore whether or not a shift in Russian foreign policy occurred between the two events. While some scholars tend to see current Russian foreign policy as an escalation or continuation of the Russo-Georgian War, or as responding to NATO, others see it as experiencing a surge in nationalism. However, by analyzing speeches given by top-level Russian officials, a different pattern emerges in the discourse. While in 2008, the legitimacy of international law and order were emphasized and discussed, by 2014, extra-legal rhetoric has appeared. In addition, Russia now perceives the international order as broken. This change in discourse has serious implications for Russian foreign policy. It eliminates the previous common international framework, which will make future interactions between Russia and some other countries, such as the US, more difficult. Moreover, noted by the complexity and different patterns in the current discourse, Russian foreign policy is still in the midst of a change. The form and outcomes of this new discourse remain to be seen, but at the moment, Russian foreign policy is neither entirely clear nor unified.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express deep gratitude and appreciation to Alexander Astrov, who managed to both keep me focused and engaged with my topic. I would also like to thank my parents, who not only instilled a love of knowledge in me but also continue to support and foster that love. To my sisters: Michele, who always listened, and Nicole, whose years of hard work are finally fully appreciated.

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INTRODUCTION

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and ongoing Ukrainian Crisis have impacted the landscape of Russia's[1] foreign relations perceptibly. Headlines have left the impression that Russia's foreign policy reflected an escalation or continuation of the foreign policy during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, a reaction against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or simply a large surge in nationalism. Naturally two main questions arise: has a shift in foreign policy occurred, and if so, what are the implications? To this end, this thesis aims to examine three interrelated questions regarding Russian foreign policy. First, has a shift occurred in foreign policy as a result of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and 2013-current Ukrainian Crisis? Second, if there is a change in Russian foreign policy, is it merely a surge in nationalism that indicates an ideological or paradigmatic shift, or is there an alternative explanation? Finally, what are the consequences of the supposed change? The magnitude of a shift in Russian foreign policy could have serious ramifications for future international relations between Russia and other countries.

Scholars and journalists alike were eager to compare the Ukrainian crisis with the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and indeed, on the surface several similarities appear. Both crises in part concern Russian support for breakaway regions and took place in former Soviet republics. Some even see Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two republics that broke away from Georgia in 2008 with Russian assistance, as actual parts of Russia, which then mimics the annexation of Crimea.[2] Even before war broke out on the South Ossetia – Georgian border, Russia began having military exercises and lining up troops nearby.[3] The comparison tends to demonstrate that Russia's involvement in Ukraine is simply another step to Russia's

[1] For the sake of simplicity, the Russian Federation and Russia will be used interchangeably in this thesis.
[2] Bertil Nygren, "Russia and Georgia – From Confrontation to War: What is Next?" in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, ed. Roger Kanet (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 110.
[3] Nick Logan, "Will Crimea be a repeat of Georgia War? Probably not, but Russia's stakes are higher," *Global News*, 28 February 2014, accessed 5 May 2015, http://globalnews.ca/news/1177664/will-crimea-be-repeat-of-georgia-war-russia-stakes-higher-ukraine-euromaidan/

continued imperial or great power ambitions. For instance, in an article that appeared in *Newsweek*, the author claimed: "The Kremlin's 2008 war with Georgia,… its coercive incorporation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Russia, and the war with Ukraine all represent a working out of this logic of imperialism and war".[4] Indeed, some authors even go so far as to claim that the Russo-Georgian War was "Russia's first attempt to protect its citizens and compatriots abroad with the use of force…"[5] The events are clearly seen as an escalating series of actions reflecting Russia's growing aggression. Yet the comparison eclipses the uniqueness of the Ukrainian Crisis and its effect on Russian foreign policy. Moreover, it glosses over the important differences between the two events.

Other scholars, such as John Mearshimer, discuss the two events' relation to NATO membership. In a well-known article, Mearshimer argues:

> Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any effort to turn those countries against Russia—a message that the 2008 Russian-Georgian war also made crystal clear.[6]

In this case, Mearshimer views the Russo-Georgian War as a warning shot against continued NATO expansion. He concludes: "Yet despite this clear warning, NATO never publicly abandoned its goal of bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance".[7] Another scholar, Mette Skak, shares Mearshimer's opinion. She claims one of the biggest reasons that caused the Russo-Georgian War was the willingness of Georgia to join NATO.[8] Skak mentions how Ukraine also received "thinly veiled threats" if it decided to join NATO.[9] In another article

[4] Stephen Blank, "Putin's Ukraine War is About Founding a New Russian Empire," *Newsweek*, 6 April 2015, accessed 4 May 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/putins-ukraine-war-about-founding-new-russian-empire-319832
[5] Igor Zevelev, "The Russian World Boundaries," *Russia in Global Affairs*, 7 June 2014, accessed 4 May 2015, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Russian-World-Boundaries-16707
[6] John Mearshimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusion that Provoked Putin," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014, accessed 12 January 2015, http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/Ukraine%20Article%20in%20Foreign%20Affairs.pdf, 6.
[7] Ibid, 3.
[8] Mette Skak, "Russia's New Monroe Doctrine," in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, ed. Roger Kanet (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 138
[9] Ibid, 138.

entitled, "The 2008 War in Georgia: Lessons for the Crisis in Ukraine," the author similarly focuses primarily on NATO, and he views both events as ignoring Russia's protestations against NATO, and thus, incurring its hostility.[10] Due to NATO ignoring the warning signs present in 2008 and continuing with expansion, Russia once again acted aggressively, this time with Ukraine. For such scholars, the result of NATO expansion was both the Russo-Georgian War and the Ukrainian Crisis.

Not all scholars believe in comparing the two events. Typical differences that scholars note is that Georgia attacked first, giving Russia the justification to go to war, while in Ukraine, no such actions have been taken. Many also cite the fact that Ukraine is more important for Russia, and therefore, a different event.[11] They instead see the Ukrainian Crisis as a force that unleashed growing nationalism in the Russian Federation, even going so far as to claim that there is a "paradigmatic shift" in Russian foreign policy that did not occur during the Russo-Georgian War.[12] For instance, an article in *The Moscow Times* claims: "Putin appears to have decided to embrace ethno-nationalism and not state interests as the overarching rationale for foreign policy decisions".[13] The author broadly frames Russian foreign policy as succumbing to nationalism, eclipsing any other changes that may have occurred. Following the Ukrainian Crisis, he also claims national interests are no longer the driving force in Russian foreign policy, which would have serious consequences.

The ramifications of misinterpreting a change in foreign policy can affect the way international relations are conducted. Michael C. Hall writes on how Hobbes feared the absence of a common understanding. Problems arise as:

[10] Oleg Shakirov, "The 2008 War in Georgia: Lessons for the Crisis in Ukraine," *Center on Global Interests*, 24 April 2014, accessed 18 May 2015, http://globalinterests.org/2014/04/24/the-2008-war-in-georgia-lessons-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine/
[11] Ibid.
[12] Peter Rutland, "A Paradigm Shift in Russia's Foreign Policy," *The Moscow Times*, 18 May 2014, accessed 5 May 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/a-paradigm-shift-in-russia-s-foreign-policy/500352.html
[13] Ibid.

> Even if all were to agree on the right to self-preservation, all need not necessarily agree on what compromised threats to that preservation, how to react to them, or how to best secure themselves against them.[14]

From this example, it is clear that differences in interpretations exist even when there are agreements in international relations. Indeed, a shared idea does not mean the common execution of the idea. Such conflict in interpretations can hinder relations between other countries and Russia, escalating already brewing tensions. Hans Morgenthau wrote on a similar situation in 1974, where he argued that changes in Soviet and the United States' foreign policy allowed for unprecedented levels of cooperation. He claimed that the Soviet Union and US agreeing on a policy towards the then divided Germany indicated an opportunity for more cooperative action because divisions were no longer ideological.[15] As he stated, "relations are no longer conceived by the governments concerned as a confrontation between two incompatible philosophies… which can only end in the world-wide victory of one or the other".[16] In this instance, the lowered importance of ideology in foreign policy allowed these two countries to foster better international cooperation. If, for example, scholars claiming Russian foreign policy is now solely dictated by nationalism are correct, then it would indicate a shift opposite to the one Morgenthau described; there would be a serious ideological division that would no doubt leave little room for international cooperation. Thus, correctly interpreting foreign policy remains of the upmost importance.

To this end, it is important to analyze the discourse of Russian governmental actors, specifically, speeches coming from presidents and foreign ministers to ascertain if a shift in foreign policy has occurred. Top officials are seen as the main, albeit not sole, actors in creating foreign policy.[17] The goal is to discover an overarching pattern and any deviations

[14] Michael C. Hall, "Hobbes and international relations: a reconsideration," *International Organization* 50, No. 2 (Spring 1996): 218.
[15] Hans Morgenthau, "The New Diplomacy of Movement," *Encounter*, (August 1974): 53.
[16] Ibid, 53.
[17] In this thesis, the idea of psychological factors of leaders as a guiding factor of foreign policy is subsumed under the other notion of discourse as an object in itself (mostly discussed by Michel Foucault and Louis

from the pattern. While irregularities are not emphasized in the thesis, they did emerge during the research. However, clear patterns and indicators were still prominent and the focus. Political discourse analysis[18] is best suited for this goal because "the strength of political discourse is in constituting a framework for the general foreign policy line".[19] This is done through analyzing foreign policy rhetoric, specifically rhetoric surrounding and referring to international events. In this case, there is no need for micro-level or public discourse, which would be relevant if the motives behind the shift were the focus.

In this thesis, there are three general classifications of speeches. While a few other officials, such as foreign ministers, have made speeches discussed in this thesis, the majority come from the Russian Federation's president, Vladimir Putin. Throughout the chapters, the speeches are used without specific acknowledgement in order to convey the overarching narrative, but during the research process, there was a great focus on the differences between speeches. The classification of speeches follows.

1. *Domestic speeches:* This category of speeches is specifically targeted inwardly toward citizens by the nature of the event. National Unity Day, Victory Day, and New Year's Day celebrations are examples of domestic speeches as they are national holidays. These holidays were chosen in particular as Victory Day is considered the most important holiday in Russia and as an international holiday in Russia.[20] National Unity Day typically has nationalistic rhetoric, while New Year's Day speeches are very general, without much acknowledgement of any international situations. Together, these holidays show a domestic, nationalistic, and international perspective all in domestic rhetoric. The President's annual address can also be seen as a domestic speech. Even though the officials are in no doubt of the fact foreigners can and some will read these speeches, the target audience is not primarily the international community. In this paper, they provide both a baseline for discourse as well as show the most important viewpoints of the Russian government on the international

Althusser). Thus, even though the discourse comes from high ranking political officials, the individualism of the leaders is treated as secondary to the discourse in itself.

[18] The term 'political discourse' is defined according to Henrik Larsen, who sees it as an independent factor in understanding foreign policy in addition to actions. It provides the underlying set of meanings in foreign policy.

[19] Henrik Larsen, *Discourse Analysis and Foreign Policy: France, Britain and Europe*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1997), 22.

[20] Shaun Walker, "Western leaders' snub casts shadow over Russia's lavish Victory Day celebrations," *The Guardian*, 15 April 2015, accessed 18 May 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/15/moscow-defiant-victory-day-parade-european-kim-jong-un-9-may-russia-ukraine

community. The reason being is that if the government takes time to incorporate international activity during a domestic speech, it must be of importance.

2. *International speeches:* These are speeches that target the international community. This includes speeches given at press conferences, where foreign media is often present, engages, and reports on the proceedings to their home audiences, and speeches issued at international conferences, such as the Munich Security Conferences.[21] These speeches give the Russian government liberty to speak more freely about how it views the international community as, in this setting, it is more appropriate.
3. *Country-specific speeches:* There are only a few country-specific speeches included in this paper, mainly to see the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. These speeches are neither domestic nor not entirely international, as they tend to be between only two countries. Examples include the speech at the Year of Ukraine in Russia in 2003.

The framework of this paper was built off of preliminary research conducted by reading primarily domestic speeches from 9 May 2003 - 9 May 2015. First, I read two international speeches, the 2007 Munich Speech and the 2014 Annexation of Crimea Speech, and I noticed that there was a difference in rhetoric, from legal-based to another form, which in this paper will be referred to as *extra-legal.* Altogether, 72 speeches were read from all three categories, the most coming from domestic speeches.[22] A few speeches were read in the original Russian to account for the validity of the English translations. Additionally, occasional phrases were read in the original Russian if the statements were of particular significance or phrased oddly in English. From this, the independent and dependent variable emerged. The events are independent variables, while the effect on rhetoric concerning the international order is the dependent variable.

1. ***Events:*** Two events are the main focus of this thesis: the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and the 2013-present Ukrainian crisis. These events were chosen because they were seen internationally as moments were Russia reasserted itself on the world stage and are typically compared due to this commonality, as previously mentioned.

[21] Putin himself has admitted to the differences in rhetoric depending on the target audience. Regarding his 2007 Munich speech, he stated, "in Munich I was speaking at an international conference. That implies a certain style, candid and controversial". (The Kremlin, Press Statement and Answers to Journalists' Questions Following a Meeting of the Russia-NATO Council, 4 April 2008, accessed 19 April 2015, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/04/04/1949_type82915_163150.shtml)

[22] A complete list of the speeches in their appropriate categories can be found in Appendix 1.

2. ***View of international order:*** Based on the events, I wanted to see if the view of the international order changed. This was measured by the common phrases used when discussing international order, institutions, laws, and actions made on the international level, such as the recognition of Kosovo. From this, two types of rhetoric emerged, legal and extra-legal rhetoric.
    a. *Legal rhetoric:* It often includes references to international legislation, particularly the United Nations' Charter. Other legal rhetoric includes the idea of precedent and references to the international order under the auspice of the UN or Security Council.
    b. *Extra-legal:* Simply, it is what legal rhetoric is not. Rhetoric outside of legal rhetoric and mentions to the standard international order constitutes extra-legal rhetoric.

The remainder of the thesis will focus on the official discourse surrounding the events, looking specifically at rhetorical shifts from legal to extra-legal in an attempt to show that a change in Russian foreign policy has occurred and the consequences of this shift.

CHAPTER 1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCOURSE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Beyond the question of a potential change in Russian foreign policy lies the overarching theme of the relationship between discourse and foreign policy. Specifically, if a change in discourse can reflect a shift in a state's foreign policy. First, however, it is important to solidify the definitions of discourse, rhetoric, and foreign policy. After the terms are defined, exploring the relationship between discourse and foreign policy will reveal how a change in foreign policy rhetoric indicates a change in foreign policy.

1.1 Discourse and Foreign Policy Discourse: Defining the Terms

Foucault's *The Archaeology of Knowledge* primarily provides the understanding of discourse used through the thesis. His discussion of a 'system of formation' is particularly relevant to the definition of discourse. A 'system of formation' is:

> a complex group of relations that functions as a rule: it lays down what must be related, in a particular discursive practice, for such and such an enunciation to be made, for such and such a concept to be used, for such and such a strategy to be organized.[23]

A discursive formation then appears via the pattern of rules used in discourse. Changes in the pattern occur when a new object, idea, strategy, or similar meets the already existing discourse; discourse itself remains the same, but it includes new rules that follow the inclusion of the new addition.[24] Through the formation process, regularities can appear, and thus, an overarching pattern, which Foucault determines is somewhat similar to ideology, theory, and other abstractions.[25] It is important to note that there is not an origin to a discursive formation; rather, it expands and covers several temporal planes at once.[26] Naturally, a discursive formation requires time to surface distinctly.[27] Instead, discourses,

[23] Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 73.
[24] Ibid, 74.
[25] 'Discursive formation' is used to avoid the heavy connotations associated with those words (Ibid, 38).
[26] Ibid, 74.
[27] Ibid, 74.

understood as "a particular historical instance of discursive formation," can appear in less time.[28]

Exposing an irregularity does not indicate the end of a discursive formation or the appearance of a new one. Discourse is not merely an expression of a fully formed or given idea, but it is "a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined".[29] In short, a subject, or the speaker/writer of the discourse, is not consciously speaking to an ultimate goal or expressing an overarching manifest. Discontinuities within a discourse are part of forming the discourse, and they should not be ignored or swept away if they do not match a pattern. Rather, discontinuities indicate the transient nature of discourse. The emergence of a new pattern of rules does not necessarily eclipse the previous pattern of rules. It merely indicates the emergence of a new object, strategy, et cetera.

At this point, rhetoric and discourse have been used interchangeably, and there is a reason for this. Rhetoric is generally defined as the art of discourse or persuasion. Yet, as Lloyd Bitzer argues, discourse becomes rhetorical when a situation occurs that requires a certain response.[30] In other words, rhetorical discourse does not simply appear; it comes from necessity. For instance, there may be a philosophical or scientific lecture given, but the purpose is not to necessarily persuade or create action, nor is it required; such lectures are not rhetorical discourse.[31] Persuasion is a particularly important aspect of rhetoric. For this reason, rhetoric cannot be taken as a candid or entirely honest response. Thus, "rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action".[32] Bitzer views discourse as a type of forum, an area where discussion and conflicting thoughts appear

[28] Larsen, *Discourse Analysis,* 16.
[29] Foucault, "Archaeology," 55.
[30] Bizter, "Rhetorical," 3.
[31] Ibid, 3.
[32] Ibid, 4.

and interact. Furthermore, Bitzer claims that rhetorical discourse is often invited or even required[33], meaning, the situation calls for a certain response, typically in the form of speeches from officials.[34] Speeches in this thesis are classified as rhetorical discourse; they were either invited or required. Rhetoric refers to a specific type of discourse explored in this thesis, and the terms are therefore used interchangeably.

In regards to foreign policy discourse, I turn to Jamie Gaskarth, who wrote on British discourse and foreign policy. He builds off of Foucault's original analysis of discourses,[35] adding foreign policy discourse. Gaskarth states that several elements, such as style and theme, form a certain discourse. It is important to discover "the rules of formation that are implied within these discourses as they may have political effects".[36] Or in other words, by understanding which rules a government follows, it becomes clearer how they perceive events, policies, other countries, and generally international relations. Moreover, discourse has the ability to produce a political effect. Gaskarth believes foreign policy is not merely a given set of elements or actions, but rather, it is a field that is constructed by policy makers. In other words, foreign policy makers produce the environment in which they operate.[37] Thus, foreign policy discourse is a set of rules that govern and illustrate a state's actions and identity; the discourse is flexible, changing with internal and external conditions.

1.2 Foreign Policy Discourse and its Connection to Foreign Policy

In order to affirm that indeed a shift in foreign policy appears via a change in discourse, the connection between the two must be explored in-depth. To begin with, there is typically a relationship between discourse and political thought in general. Daniel Garst writes on how analyzing discourse can show changes in thinking and perceptions. He

[33] For example, ceremonial or traditional events require rhetoric as well as a response to an important event, such as a war.
[34] Bizter, "Rhetorical," 8.
[35] Foucault originally only analyzed three fields as examples: medicine, grammar, and economics.
[36] Jaime Gaskarth, "Discourses and Ethics: The Social Construction of British Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, (2006): 327.
[37] Ibid, 326.

specifically analyzes the speeches in Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War* in order to illustrate how there is more to Thucydides' work than a realist and material interpretation. Garst suggests, "Thucydides is concerned with the language through which this self-interest is articulated, the norms and conventions associated with it, and whether or not they decay over time".[38] In short, self-interest and actions are important, but the way they are discussed also matters. One prominent example Garst provides is the Melian Dialogue, wherein Garst argues that Athenian rhetoric has shifted as its attitude and perceptions changed. Rather than before the war, when Athens stressed "energy, innovation, and generosity," it now places greater importance on "weary realism and abdication to base necessity".[39] Garst concludes that this shift indicates that Athens has sowed the seeds of its own destruction, as it has destroyed its "rhetorical culture" and ability to justify its actions intelligibly. Therefore, changes in rhetoric reflect a shift in thinking.

In addition to indicating a shift, rhetoric also provides a forum in which concepts can be explored. As Gaskarth concludes, "in describing or performing an activity linguistically, we are producing its meaning and so creating, reinforcing, or changing policy understanding and practice".[40] According to Gaskarth, a country's rhetoric allows it to explore and create new meanings; it is a flexible place for countries to mold a new identity and test policies and conceptions. In short, discourse is the playground for identity shaping and building, but whose identity? If we understand foreign policy as the medium through which foreign policy makers and states interact on the international level, then the natural assumption is that from discourse, a state's identity is formed.

This is not the whole picture, however. Erik Ringmar proposes there is an alternative to the traditional understandings of the relationship between the State and Self. Hobbes, according to Ringmar, considers the State as protecting a person from chaos, or seeing the

[38] Daniel Garst, "Thucydides and Neorealism," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, (1989): 6.
[39] Ibid, 15.
[40] Gaskarth, "Discourses," 327.

"Leviathan as a superman who… brought peace to the individual men of which he was composed".[41] Therefore, the State gains its identity from the role it plays for the Self. Hume, on the other hand, believed the idea of the Self was impossible, as the Self is ever-changing and does not have a coherent identity over time, which also reflects the identity of the State.[42] Ringmar argues that neither provides a satisfactory answer as the Self and State cannot be shown categorically or as solely abstract, similarly to a piece of music.[43] Instead, he argues, these concepts are understood in relation to other subjects, concluding, "What we are as subjects… is neither more nor less than the total collection of stories that we tell and that are told about us".[44]

By producing a story, by adhering to, or by recognizing a story, both State and Self find their identities. He argues there will always be a gap between the "actual" and "potential," and in this void, narratives are created that detail either the current identity or alternatives; for individuals, he calls it an "identity crisis", and for the state, it is a "formative moment".[45] Thus, stories are told both by individuals and by states. The clash between narratives results in an identity change or crisis. Indeed on the importance of a unified narrative, Richard Lebow writes regarding Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War*: "Common action required common understanding; language was the vehicle of this understanding and the very foundation of political stability and civilization".[46] A unified and accepted narrative about Self and State identity is essential for the realization of political goals, or the production of power.

[41] Erik Ringmar, "On the Ontological Status of the State," *European Journal of International Relations*, 2, no. 4 (1996): 446.
[42] Ibid, 448.
[43] Ibid, 450.
[44] Ibid, 452.
[45] Ibid, 456.
[46] Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides the Constructivist," *American Political Science Review* 95, No. 3 (September 2001): 555.

With disharmony in the narratives, there is not only a loss of identity but loss of power. Garst, for instance, describes how Athens eventually only fought for self-interest without a rhetorical culture:

> Not only is ambition of this sort unlimited, it is incoherent and irrational; for without a comprehensible world there can be no way of reasoning about it or acting within it. One cannot be self-interested without a language of the self; one cannot have power without community.[47]

Without the Self, without the narrative of the Self, there cannot be community, and there cannot be power in order to follow through on ambitions. Lebow similarly expresses the view that without meaningful words, "conventions that depend on them lost their force, communication becomes difficult, and civilization declines".[48] As words become meaningless, the ability to exercise power and a very community can break apart. As Henrik Larsen asserts, referencing Foucault: "language is also linked to power in society and discourse is central in constituting identity and social beliefs… Discourse is not just an entity derived from social power but itself an expression of social power".[49] It is through the narrative that the State and individuals find their identity, and thus gain the ability to act.

What, however, is exactly the purpose of the narrative and identity, and what does it mean for a state's power? Fortunately, Ringmar provides an answer to this exact question:

> Our narratives will support, or undermine, a certain perspective on the world and hence also a certain distribution of power. But stories will also have political significance since they determine which actions we undertake.[50]

In essence, identity through the narrative also indicates the state's perception of its power. This means that rather than actions or events dictating discourse, or even discourse merely being a shadow of more materialistic occurrences, Ringmar contests that discourse itself creates an identity, which illustrates how the state functions. Indeed, he soon asserts:

[47] Garst, "Thucydides," 16.
[48] Lebow, "Thucydides," 558.
[49] Larsen, *Discourse Analysis*, 14.
[50] Ringmar, "On the Ontological Status," 454.

> The narratives we construct about our state will specify who we are and what role we play in the world; how our 'national interests' are to be defined, or which foreign policy to pursue.[51]

Overall, the harmony of identity is essential for a state to have the ability to act. Discourse both illustrates these patterns and is a space for the discussion of identity.

What then is the specific relationship between foreign policy and discourse? Rhetorical discourse is understood as a set of rules that a state both follows and creates. Discourse in part comes from competing narratives, thus accounting for any discontinuities that may exist. Competing narratives indicate a competing understanding of identity, both of the Self and State, as part of self-identity comes from state identity and vice-versa. As rhetoric both aims to persuade an audience and provides a platform for exploration, it cannot be accepted as concrete or absolute. Narratives indicate the state's perception of its own power, even national interests. From this perception and the success of the narrative, as in the absence of a major discontinuity or competing rhetoric, a state is able to act. In relations with other states, the interplay of narratives and exercise of power exists in the form of foreign policy. Thus, foreign policy discourse is both the identity of a state, specifically its perception of power and its place in the international order, and a space where identity is formed and explored. Changes in foreign policy discourse indicate shifts in the state narrative and identity, and thus, mimic changes in foreign policy.

[51] Ringmar, "On the Ontological Status," 455.

CHAPTER 2: THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR AND RHETORIC: THE DESIRE FOR AND BELIEF IN INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND LAW

For many scholars and observers alike, the Russo-Georgian War appeared to be Russia's way of reasserting itself after a rather lengthy absence from the world arena following the collapse of the USSR.[52] Did such a significant event have an effect on Russia's perception of the international order, and if so, what effect? This chapter will explore the official rhetoric shortly before the Russo-Georgian War, during, and afterward in order to unearth any patterns or irregularities in the discourse.

2.1 2007-2008 Rhetoric: Russia's Perception of the International Order before the Russo-Georgian War

Before discussing the Russo-Georgian War, it is important to first understand how Russia saw the international order beforehand. In particular, what was its view of NATO and the UN, two organizations representing the international community? What were the main threats to the international order, and were there ways to combat these perceived threats? To begin with, a ready example comes from Putin's 2007 Victory Day speech. He states:

> These new threats, just as under the Third Reich, show the same contempt for human life and the same aspiration to establish an exclusive dictate over the world. It is my conviction that only common responsibility and equal partnership can counter these challenges and enable us to join forces in resisting any attempts to unleash new armed conflicts and undermine global security.[53]

Two key phrases already become apparent: 'an exclusive dictate over the world' and 'common responsibility and equal partnership'. As national holiday rhetoric referring directly to the international order is not entirely typical,[54] these two phrases were chosen in particular.

[52]Charles King, "The Five-Day War," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2008, accessed 8 May 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2008-11-01/five-day-war.
[53] The Kremlin, Speech at the Military Parade Celebrating the 62nd Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, 9 May 2007, accessed 19 April 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24238.
[54] Typically, national holidays are a chance for countries to produce a sense of national "collective belonging," which focuses more on national cohesion than international affairs. See Jon E. Fox, "Consuming the nation: Holidays, sports, and the production of collective belonging" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29, no. 2 (August 2006), accessed May 6, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870500465207

They indicate two important trends present before the Russo-Georgian War about how the Russian government perceived the international order. It is important to note that Russia saw the Third Reich as a threat primarily because it aimed to become a world dictatorship, and that there is a clear desire for an international order capable of countering this dictatorial threat *only through* cooperation and equality. Thus already in this short speech, two key features of 2007 Russian foreign policy discourse appear: a fear of global dictatorship and a desire for more inclusivity.

2.1.1 The 2007 Munich Conference: Openly Displaying Russia's Understanding of the International Order

At the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2007, Putin delivered what is now a famous address where he clearly illustrated Russia's view of the international order. To many, it symbolized Russia's new assertiveness on the global stage after the collapse of the Soviet Union.[55] Yet, there is more to this speech; it provides insight into how Putin understood the international order, Russia's place in it, and dangerous issues that, if not taken seriously, could develop into an eventual crisis, leaving the international order in ruins. In this way, it is more than Russia's debut but a serious warning and an illustration of what Russia perceives as overlooked and unaddressed issues. Indeed, Putin wastes no time in providing a definition of international security as comprising "much more than issues relating to military and political stability. It involves the stability of the global economy, overcoming poverty, economic security and developing a dialogue between nations".[56] Most issues then on the international level are seen through the prism of security.

Very soon after defining international security, which included the caveat of requiring 'dialogue between nations,' Putin brings up unipolarity, defining it as "one centre of

[55] King, "The Five-Day War".
[56] Vladimir Putin. "Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy." The Washington Post, February 10, 2007. Accessed March 17, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555_pf.html.

authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making. It is a world in which there is one master, one sovereign".[57] This confirms Russia's stated desire for more inclusive decision-making. He then makes a brief quip afterward, stating, "Incidentally- Russia –we- are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves".[58] It is already clear that Putin views unipolarity negatively and suggests that democratic countries are perhaps those most guilty of making unipolar decisions. The problem, according to Putin, of unipolarity is that it creates conditions where "there [are] and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation".[59] Thus, even at the beginning of the speech, Putin makes several viewpoints clear. International discussion and cooperation is for the sake of security purposes, which encompasses economics, politics and other issues, but they are only relevant in the context of security. He additionally warns against unipolar decision-making as a threat against security because it rids the world of the possibility of having a common moral foundation.

From this, obvious questions arise, such as, how is morality defined? Putin ties unipolarity with illegitimacy, stating: "Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems," and continues: "We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system".[60] At this moment, he answers both his understanding of morality and how the international order should be structured. Unipolar action disturbs the international order by not allowing it to have a common moral foundation, and morality is understood as what is legal. An international law is only considered legitimate and effective if all parties follow it. He immediately then openly accuses the US as being the primary violator of international law, and claims because of this, international security, and

[57] Vladimir Putin, "Putin's Prepared Remarks".
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.

thus international order, is at risk. If this pattern continues, international law cannot be considered legitimate, leading to instability and the collapse of international security. It is at this point in time Putin states, "we must seriously think about the architecture of global security".[61] Thus, order and respect for the law still exist, but it is in need of reform and a discussion with all members represented equally.

At this moment, the UN is seen as the only legitimate global governing institution. Putin states: "The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN".[62] International military force is thus only legitimate if legally sanctified by the UN. It is evident based on Putin's previous rhetoric why this is the only viable mechanism; the UN is the international forum with the most nations participating. And indeed, after this statement, Putin stresses that the EU and NATO are not substitutes, undoubtedly partially because Russia is excluded from these organizations. He verifies this by stating, "it is necessary to make sure that international law have a universal character both in the conception and application of its norms".[63] For Putin, legitimate action for the sake of international security can only be conducted through the UN, as it will counter the huge threat of unipolarity. This threat remains, and will remain, a prominent concern for Putin.

2.1.2 After the Munich Conference: On NATO and the Recognition of Kosovo

On February 14, 2008, three days before Kosovo declared independence and six months before the Russo-Georgian War, Putin gave a press conference. He was asked a direct question about the recognition of Kosovo and, if it occurred, what the Russian reaction would be.[64] Due to its controversial nature, Russia's response to international recognition of Kosovo would give insight into Russia's view on the international order. In response, Putin first stated:

[61] Vladimir Putin, "Putin's Prepared Remarks".
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence and was recognized by many states, including the US, despite Russian protests that its declaration was against international law.

> We think that to support a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo is amoral and against the law. Territorial integrity is one of the fundamental principles of international law. The Security Council has issued Resolution 1244, which speaks of Serbia's territorial integrity, and all UN members must respect this resolution.[65]

Although using different words and phrases, the message is essentially the same as it was in his 2007 Victory Day address and Munich speech. He again stresses the ills of 'unilateral' decision-making, and how '*all* UN members,' not a few, must follow the rules. He also relies heavily on international law during his response, even directly quoting legislation, as the final deciding factor to a right or wrong action on the global stage. Putin later states: "If we act only out of political expediency and serve only the political interests of particular countries we will undermine international law and the general order".[66] He hints at exclusivity of interests and actions when he mentions 'particular countries,' but more importantly, he warns owing to unilateral decision-making, international order *could become* delegitimized. At this moment, despite the challenges, the global order is still respectable and usable.

Continuing the trend in April 2008, after both Kosovo's declaration of independence and its recognition by many countries, Putin attends a meeting of the Russia-NATO council, and in the press statement, he provides important insights into how Russia perceives international security in particular. Security still depends on the ability of UN and the Security Council to operate effectively and as the sole decision-maker. Thus, despite Kosovo's action, Putin still refers to the authority of the UN and international law. Indeed he states, in response to a question about a new global security structure, that "the key role in creating a new structure of international relations in today's world belongs to the United Nations and its Security Council".[67] When Putin is asked a question about Iran,[68] he answers by saying that his actions toward Iran will be "within the framework of the UN Security

[65]The Kremlin, Transcript of Annual Big Press Conference, 14 February 2008, accessed 19 April 2015, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/02/14/1011_type82915_160266.shtml.
[66] Ibid.
[67] The Kremlin, Press Statement.
[68] Specifically, the question addressed the issue of Iran's nuclear program and how to stop its nuclear power ambitions with the intention creating nuclear weapons.

Council" and that Russia has already acted accordingly with the UN in regards to Iran.[69] In this case, he emphasizes that in the case of international relations that jeopardize international security, a country should give way to the higher authority present in the international order, which is the UN and the Security Council. He believes this is not the international order currently, but how the 'new structure' should look. This indicates that he still is optimistic about cooperation on the international level despite challenges.

Putin, as in his 2007 Munich speech, critiques NATO in part due to the fact that Russia is not included in the discussions. In general, he views it as a unilateral organization, making decisions for an area that he sees as encompassing more actors than only NATO members. Thus, his dislike of unipolarity still remains strong, and the rest of his press conference confirms this. He says that he countered NATO initiatives with more inclusive ones, which "provide equal, democratic access to everyone in charge of [Russia's proposed missile defense system], namely the United States, Russia in Europe".[70] However, he states the proposal was not accepted, but he remains optimistic that talks will continue positively. Indeed, there is optimism that the international structure, despite its failings, will continue to operate. At one point he states:

> Treat us properly and we will respond accordingly. But today I thought that our partners were listening… But as you know, to do everything unilaterally, to try to put all the blame on one-side, that is a dead end.[71]

He gives a very simple formula: if Russia is listened to, it will also listen to others, and if not, then there can be no basis for cooperation. He argues that Russia may be seen as unaccommodating, but that is because it is not always treated correctly, although today he felt listened to. He warns that unilateralism and discussions excluding Russia will result in an end to dialogue and, in essence, the functioning of the international order. However, at this point,

[69] The Kremlin, Press Statement.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.

the international order is not broken, and the UN still retains authority, although there are obvious failings and challenges, which are growing unilateralism and exclusivity.

2.2 Rhetoric Surrounding the Conflict: Action Justified in accord with International Law and Order

On August 8, 2008, the Russo-Georgian War[72] started, considered by many Russia's desire to reestablish itself as a great power, or even a physical manifestation of Putin's 2007 Munich speech.[73] Right after the end of the war on August 14, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grigory Karasin, gave an interview about South Ossetia. In the first question, he is asked about the effect of the war on relations with the West. He responds:

> The truth, as it is well known, is born in disputes. And there is nothing alarming in that originally our Western partners had a different position and different view of the situation surrounding Georgia… As a result of such open, joint discussions, an option should be found on which we will be able to join forces with Western partners for a final settlement of the situation in the region. [74]

Russia does not go on the defensive but instead indicates that the West had a different perspective, which Russia believes will change after open discussions. He does not see it as distressing that the West does not agree with Russia's actions. What is interesting is that he claims truth comes from conflict; in this way, it seems the Russo-Georgia War is viewed as an opportunity for Russia and the West to improve their relations, to perhaps see each other clearly for the first time. This phrasing indicates that he thinks the West and Russia will be able to continue to have a good relationship, and what is more, the relationship *may even be better* than it was before. This is the very first opinion Karasin expresses, which is not directly related to the conflict itself or the parties in the conflict. It shows how one of the most important aspects of the conflict was Russia's leverage to now engage the West in a

[72] On August 8, 2008, the Russo-Georgian War began and lasted for five days. South Ossetia and Abkhazia also were heavily involved in the war.
[73] Skak, "Russia's New," 138.
[74] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Interv'yu stats-sekretarya – zamestitelya Ministra innostrannykh del Rossii G. B. Karasina po Yuzhnoi Osetii, opublikovannoe v ezhenedelnike "Rossiya". (Interview with State Secretary - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Grigory Karasin on South Ossetia, published in the weekly "Russia"). 14 August 2008. Accessed 7 May 2015. http://mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/A59A69A0C7C68415C32574A500375421.

discussion on a more even ground. This reflects Putin's earlier wishes for more inclusive discussion and decision-making.

Later on, Karasin is directly asked a question about the effectiveness of the UN, and what he thinks the UN will decide concerning Russia's actions in Georgia. Specifically, the interviewer asked how the UN relates to the world order. From this, it is possible to see if Russia's view of the UN changed due to the war, and if so, how it changed. Furthermore, he also shows how Russia now views the UN in regards to global order. Karasin first responds by stating, "I hope that very soon we will be able to convince our colleagues in the UN Security Council that our proposals are well-founded and motivated by the logic of developing events".[75] Thus, Karasin expresses the idea that cooperation is possible, and moreover, that the opportunity *still exists* to convince the UN Security Council. This is an important subtlety in his statement, as it confirms that he believes the UN still operates, and that Russia has a voice in decisions made in the Council.

Karasin continues: "The UN Security Council resolution, the main organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, should also include a clear, overall background of the August events in the conflict zone".[76] Thus, Karasin views the UN as the final decision-maker, and he hopes that the UN will work to get the appropriate background information in order to come to a resolution. Clearly, as in his previous response, and similar to the previous speeches, a resolution in the UN *must* take note of all the information. His phrasing implies that this can only be accomplished if all sides are listened to, meaning, a discussion that includes Russia and not just Western countries. He verifies this by right afterward stating, "I must admit that our diplomatic efforts and contacts with representatives from western countries over the past days, and our reasoned position on current events

[75] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Interv'yu stats-sekretarya
[76] Ibid.

eventually led to us being heard".[77] It is therefore obvious that Karasin thinks that the UN was operating during the Russo-Georgian War and afterward specifically because Russia was heard by the West.

As to his view of the world order, Karasin ends the interview in line with what Putin had discussed at length in his Munich speech. He states:

> With regard to the role of the UN as a whole, Russia has always considered and continues to consider it one of the key platforms for discussion of the most pressing issues of world order. However, recent events have confirmed the pressing need to reform both the organization and its Security Council.[78]

Thus, the UN is essential to the world order, and despite this war, Russia's attitude toward it has not changed. However, as Putin also stated before, there are issues with the UN that need to be addressed, and as he said, these are 'pressing' issues, meaning that time is of the essence in order for the UN to continue to maintain its role as a global mediator and forum.

Later in the month on August 26, Medvedev released an official statement explaining why Russia will recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. At this point, a little time had passed after the war. Medvedev's statement fills in one of the gaps left by Karasin's statement, which is whether or not Russia still respects international law, especially after the recognition of Kosovo. In this regard, Medvedev makes two significant statements. First, at the very beginning of his speech, he says, "The Georgian leadership, in violation of the UN Charter and their obligations under international agreements and contrary to the voice of reason, unleashed an armed conflict victimizing innocent civilians".[79] It is easy to tell from this that Medvedev continues to consider the current international order important, legitimate, and synonymous with reason as he uses international law to chastise Georgian actions. Meaning, because Georgia violated international law, Georgia is wrong.

[77] Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interv'yu stats-sekretarya.
[78] Ibid.
[79] The Kremlin, Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, 26 August 2008, Accessed 7 May 2015, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml

Furthermore, Medvedev touched on the topic of Kosovo, which thus makes his opinion on the matter and its effect on international law and order clear.

> We repeatedly called for returning to the negotiating table and did not deviate from this position of ours even after the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo's independence… Regrettably, [our proposals to Georgia] were ignored also by NATO and even at the United Nations.[80]

In this statement, Medvedev does not aggressively criticize NATO and the UN, but he does express his dissatisfaction with the institutions. He does so by first mentioning Kosovo, and how *even though* the recognition of Kosovo occurred, what the Russian government perceived as a violation of international law, he continued to work within the established system; he still wanted a discussion with other countries. He also then expresses his frustration that Russian proposals were ignored at all institutions, but his wording is not severe or aggressive. Like Karasin, and Putin's Munich speech, it seems as though Medvedev wants to bring light to these issues so they can be addressed before they increase in severity.

Medvedev closes his speech by justifying why the Russian government has decided to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. He explains:

> Considering the freely expressed will of the Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples and being guided by the provisions of the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law Governing Friendly Relations Between States, the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other fundamental international instruments, I signed Decrees on the recognition by the Russian Federation of South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence.[81]

Thus, Medvedev explains Russia's actions *through the framework of international law*, citing legislation and rules in both the UN and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. He also emphasizes that this action was through the free will of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz citizens, and because of this democratic process, it must be respected. Even during another interview five days later, Medvedev very closely mimics sentiments that were present in Putin's Munich speech in a statement that requires little interpretation, "Russia

[80] The Kremlin, Statement by President.
[81] Ibid.

recognises the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law," and continues to argue against a unipolar world.[82] Therefore, at this point during the war and shortly afterward, Russian foreign policy demonstrates that international law and the general international order is still in effect. Despite the recognition of Kosovo and the Russo-Georgian War, very little has changed in this respect.

2.3 After August 2008: The Continued Legitimacy of the International Order

It may seem logical that after a period of time wherein Russia could reflect more fully on the Russo-Georgian War and recognition of Kosovo, its opinion and attitude may have changed towards the international order and the legitimacy of international law. However, this is not the case. Even a year later, and two years after Putin's Munich speech, the Russian government continued to have similar rhetoric regarding the events and international order. In November 2009, Medvedev gave the annual presidential address. He stated:

> We have the universal mechanism of the United Nations to help us develop a collective approach. In recent years and perhaps for the very first time since the end of the so-called Cold War, the United Nations has once again started to gain momentum. And we will actively encourage it to strengthen its position.[83]

This reflects the similar statement by Karasin, as in perhaps the Russo-Georgia War was an opportunity for better and more open discussion between the West and Russia so that the situation may even improve. Medvedev thinks this scenario will only occur through the UN. Moreover, the UN is strengthening, despite the war and Kosovo controversy.

That is not to say, however, that Medvedev suggests the system is perfect. Again, like Putin and Karasin, Medvedev remarks about NATO: "We need a new, efficient platform. If we had such an effective institution that would have been able to halt an aggressor, then

[82] The Kremlin, Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels Channel One, Rossia, NTV, 31 August 2008, accessed 7 May 2015, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml

[83] The Kremlin, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 12 November 2009, accessed 25 April 2015, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/11/12/1321_type70029type82912_222702.shtml

Georgia would not have had the nerve to start a war against South Ossetia".[84] Thus, there seems to be a slight contradiction is his rhetoric. Medvedev, as aforementioned, thinks the UN is improving and the forum of the future, but there is apparently a trace of uncertainty in international conflict resolution due to NATO. At this point, it appears he still supports such conflicts should be handled at the international level and in line with the current way of thinking, but NATO should not be a part of the decision-making, perhaps being replaced by a new institution.

It is perhaps appropriate to end this chapter as it began, with a quote from the 2009 Victory Day speech, now delivered by Medvedev. He states:

> [The price we paid in WWII] is why we so dearly want a peaceful future for our planet, why we value calm and stable human life and the important principles of international security. We have strengthened these principles and will continue to do so in collaboration with other states and the international community, and create a general guarantee for lasting peace in the world.[85]

Despite the changes in 2008 due to the Russo-Georgian War, Medvedev's statement, although different in style, reflects the same sentiment present in Putin's 2007 Victory Day speech. By speaking of the 'planet', Medvedev is already indicating he is referring to international issues, confirming this by emphasizing the importance of international security. Thus, like Putin, Medvedev remarks on the international order during an important national holiday. More importantly, however, Medvedev echoes Putin's call for greater cooperation with the international community in order to combat potential, violent threats.[86] Therefore even after the Russo-Georgian War, Russian foreign policy still clearly indicates that it places importance on the international community, shared security, and cooperative discussion and action.

[84] The Kremlin, Presidential Address.
[85]The Kremlin, Speech at Reception in Honour of 64th Anniversary of Victory in Great Patriotic War, 9 May 2009, Accessed 25 April 2015, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2009/05/09/1613_type127286_216102.shtml
[86] Unlike Putin, however, Medvedev does not state openly that the threat is a world dictate, but by context clues, such as the need for international cooperation and a community, it is clear he perceives the threat as similar. The difference can perhaps be accredited to personal rhetoric styles.

Overall, despite such important events as the Russo-Georgian War and the recognition of Kosovo, rhetoric from 2007-2009 changed little in terms of how Russia conceptualized international order. For the Russian government, international order and stability depended on security and could only be ensured through the UN and the legitimacy and recognition of international law. In addition, a serious flaw Russia sees in the international order is the dominance of some countries, particularly the US. Continually breaking the rules could lead to the collapse of the system. To combat this, Russia continually proposes that more countries have a say in world affairs, particularly Russia. In the rhetoric, this is described as a unipolar versus multipolar world, and the continued existence of the unipolar world could lead to the collapse of the international system. At this point, however, Russia remains optimistic about the validity of the international order and law, and indeed, seems to even view the Russo-Georgian War as a chance for better cooperation with the West due to more inclusive discussions.

CHAPTER 3: THE 2013- PRESENT UKRAINIAN CRISIS AND THE APPEARANCE OF EXTRA-LEGAL RHETORIC

Following 2009 little seemed to change regarding official foreign policy rhetoric. As early as February 2013, Putin continued to view the international order as working and pressed operating within the framework of existing international laws. However, when the crisis in Ukraine broke out in November 2013, a shift in rhetoric appears. The most notable signs of this shift appeared in Putin's 2014 address to the Duma in which he asked them to recognize Crimea as a part of Russia. At this moment, an evident change occurs that was not seen before, during, or after the Georgian crisis. Putin introduces *extra-legal* rhetoric into his foreign policy discourse. Since 2007, Putin had been stressing the importance of keeping with the international order and law. This chapter will explore how by 2014, it is clear his thinking had changed, signified by the appearance of extra-legal rhetoric and the increased rhetoric surrounding the collapse of the international order.

3.1 Before November 2013: The Continued Legitimacy of International Law and Order

On February 11, 2013, Putin met with the Russian Foreign Ministry Staff nine months before the Ukrainian crisis began and six years after Putin's infamous Munich Speech. At this meeting, Putin celebrated Diplomats' Day and overviewed the main purpose of the Foreign Ministry staff. His speech aligns neatly with the patterns discussed and uncovered in the previous chapter, and thus indicates that before the November 2013, the Russian government viewed the international order as in tact, albeit still with serious problems. He continues to believe in the primacy of international law and the UN when he states, "We must strive for strict compliance with the principle of supremacy of international law and make the United Nations the central pillar in the international system not just in word but also in deed".[87]

[87] The Kremlin, Meeting with Russian Foreign Ministry Staff, 11 February 2013, Accessed 15 April 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17490

Thus, it is evident that Putin still views the international order as a work in progress but an attainable goal nonetheless. In addition, the UN in still considered to be the highest form of legitimacy.

Furthermore, Putin perceives Russia as essential for preserving the international order, stating that Russia is becoming more involved in international organizations and must "promote these principles and approaches [from international law and the UN] over the coming years".[88] Here in a different way Putin is stating a similar theme that was present in both his and Medvedev's previous speeches; the international order requires Russia's voice. Therefore, the pattern is similar to Putin's 2007 Munich Speech and the rhetoric in 2009 after the Russo-Georigan War. The international order and law, as well as the supremacy of the UN, still holds true. To improve the system, it is necessary to incorporate more voices into the decision-making process.

However, there is one additional aspect of Putin's speech that is worth noting. He makes one small mention of supporting "our compatriots abroad and for Russian citizens in difficult circumstances abroad".[89] It is mentioned offhandedly at the end of a list of other issues in the framework of security issues with which the Russian foreign ministry must address. It is not necessarily unusual for him to make references to Russian citizens abroad or compatriots abroad.[90] At this point, it is simply important to recognize it as an example of how the Russian government discussed 'compatriots abroad' before November 2013.

3.2 The Perceived End of the International Order, and the Appearance of an Extra-legal Rhetoric

[88] The Kremlin, Meeting with Russian Foreign Ministry.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Legislation specifically dealing with citizens abroad was discussed heavily in the late 1990s with the ratification of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine (See Igor Zevelev, The Russian World Boundaries. During 2002 and 2003, the year of Russian in Ukraine and Ukraine in Russia, there was also such discussions as well, and it was discussed in similar terms and phrases as mentioned above. Periodically, you can also find similar examples throughout 2003-2013, including a reference to ethnic Russians (etnicheskie russkie, as opposed to the typical 'compatriots' term used now, sotechestvenniki) in a 2004 presidential press conference in response to a question about the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. However, it is never the main focus, subsuming under the supremacy of international law or order, and it is often found only in domestic speeches.

At this point, it is clear that Russian foreign policy still held a positive view of the international order and the supremacy of the UN and international law. However, when the annexation of Crimea occurred, there was also a shift in rhetoric. The components of this shift were not entirely clear at the time, i.e. what was new in the rhetoric and what precisely had change, yet a noticeable difference occurred. The first pattern evident was that the international order had lost its credibility despite the continued reference to international law. In this case, rather than using international law as support or justification, it was more to indicate the gaps and weaknesses of the international order. Unlike before, where the international order was criticized in order to be fixed, there seems little chance at repairing the old international order. Rather, the goal is to build a new international order altogether.

In addition, a new form of rhetoric appeared that did not involve the law, the UN or other international organizations, or matching Russia's actions to the current international order. This new rhetoric is under debate among scholars currently, which this chapter will touch upon only very briefly. It is not the goal of the thesis to define what this new rhetoric is, and it is sufficient to define it as *extra-legal* rhetoric. The appearance of extra-legal rhetoric indicates a shift in Russian foreign policy; a shift from the prominence and respect for international law and order to the search for a new form of justification for international actions. In essence, at this time, it appears rhetoric is in part being used as a forum for producing and exploring concepts; indeed, it may be said that Russian foreign policy could be undergoing a "formative moment".[91]

3.2.1 The Annexation of Crimea in March 2014: The Appearance of a New Rhetoric

On March 16, 2014, Crimea held a referendum in order to choose one of two options: to remain in Ukraine or join the Russian Federation. The results of the referendum indicated

[91] Ringmar, "On the Ontological," 456.

that the majority of Crimean residents wished to join the Russian Federation.[92] Two days later, Putin addressed the State Duma in order to ask for permission to incorporate Crimea and Sevastopol into the territory of the Russian Federation. After first addressing the Duma officials and others, he immediately states that the referendum held was "in compliance with democratic procedures and international norms".[93] At the beginning of the speech it appears that legal rhetoric and 'international norms' are still the primary means of justifying Russia's actions. This would imply that the international order still exists and is legitimate, as the previous speeches have shown. He seems to support this by then going into the facts and figures of the referendum. However, Putin then states: "To understand the reason behind such a choice it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other".[94] Thus, in the beginning of the speech, two important patterns are important to note. Legal rhetoric has not entirely vanished, but 'the reason' behind Russia's actions is not based on legality or a respect for the international order. The primary reason is the history between the two places and a vague notion of *something else*. 'What Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other' is a statement quite dependent on the personal interpretations of those two places; in other words, there is no common, international standard available for outsiders to understand the situation. It logically follows then that the reason for Russia's actions on the international stage cannot be understood in the current international order.

Putin begins to talk in-depth about international law and order only after discussing at length the personal and historical connection to Crimea. However, for the sake of continuity, I will first discuss the view of the international order and then extra-legal rhetoric. Putin first starts to discuss international law in terms of the referendum held in Crimea. He argues,

[92] There is controversy surrounded by the referendum. This paper will not go into the controversy, but some people claimed it was an illegal, inaccurate referendum, especially as there were only two options.
[93] The Kremlin, Address by President of the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014, accessed 17 March 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603
[94] Ibid.

"what do we hear from our colleagues in Western Europe and North America? They say we are violating norms of international law. Firstly, it's a good thing that they at least remember that there exists such a thing as international law – better late than never".[95] It is painfully obvious that Russia believes that the West has not, and does not, follow international law. He even makes a joke about their disregard for international law, showing how international law has lost legitimacy and respectability. He also argues that the Crimean referendum is in line with the UN Charter's right to self-determination, and moreover, that Crimea follows the

> Kosovo precedent – a precedent our western colleagues created with their own hands… when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country's central authorities.[96]

From the previous statements in 2007 about Kosovo, it seems odd that Putin would claim Kosovo is a precedent, as to the Russian government, it was a clear violation of international law. Thus, by attaching Crimea to Kosovo, he also seems to be delegitimizing Russia's actions in Ukraine.

However, his intention becomes clear when soon after he discusses the international order. Perhaps the most important statement in the speech regarding Russia's perspective on international order is:

> Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right… To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organisations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall.[97]

While a long passage, it is highly significant. Here, Putin resolutely shows his new view on the international order, one that has been clearly promoted previously. Moreover, as indicated in the second chapter, what Putin and Medvedev warned against has come to pass. Unilateral

[95] The Kremlin, Address by President.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.

decision-making and exceptionalism have apparently destroyed the international order and the validity of organizations and legislation. No longer is the UN held as a legitimate institute, but now it is seen only as an instrument used for the West's bidding, bending to its will, and ineffective in governing. Putin, unlike before, is no longer warning about the dangers of these actions, but he is saying that they have finally destroyed the international order. Notably, Putin does not provide a new idea of the international order; his main goal seems to be explaining why the international order no longer is legitimate. This leaves a noticeable void in Russian foreign policy rhetoric.

The idea of international law taking a lesser role and the appearance of a new rhetoric that is somehow beyond international law surfaces and develops in the Address. Indeed, in the very few beginning paragraphs of the Address, there is only the one reference to international law, and that reference in fact dealt with justifying the process in which Crimea joined Russia, rather than as a justification as to *why* Crimea could join Russia. Instead, Putin focuses on Russia and Crimea's "shared history and pride".[98] He describes the history of Crimea and Sevastopol and their importance to Russia, ending with "Each of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valour".[99] Obviously, there is a new form of rhetoric in Russian foreign policy discourse. For instance, Putin uses the word 'dear to our hearts', a phrase that has no relation to international law and order. It is a personal as well as an emotional plea; to understand the significance of the place, one must *feel* the importance, rather than know it. This idea is furthered when he refers to Crimea and Sevastopol as symbolic, as this once again has a personal connotation because in order to understand a symbol, there must be a shared background.

[98] The Kremlin, Address by President.
[99] Ibid.

Moreover, when Putin justifies why Crimea should be a part of Russia, he explains, "In people's hearts and minds,[100] Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This firm conviction is based on truth and justice and was passed from generation to generation…"[101] Once again, it is important to note that Putin makes another emotional appeal; another appeal to people's shared background and to a *feeling* rather than a common, rational foundation. Furthermore, the justification comes from 'truth and justice' that has spanned generations. This implies that the current form of 'truth and justice' in the world and the framework of the international order *could not apply* in this case because actual 'truth and justice', or rather the 'truth and justice' now used to justify Russia's actions in Crimea, has existed long before the current international order. This indicates that the international order and law no longer is relevant in this situation.

Similarly, Putin makes an interesting statement regarding how it came about that Crimea was a part of Ukraine. At first, he states that Crimea was given away without any consideration for the population's wishes by Nikita Khrushchev, but because the Soviet Union still existed, it continued to seem like a part of Russia. When the USSR collapse, Putin says, "Russia realised that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered".[102] For Russia, the loss of Crimea was not simply robbery, which can be handled under the law, but it was plunder, which gives the connotation of an action *beyond law*, one that is personal and with moral implications. The addition of plunder gives insight into how Russia views the international order. As far as Putin is concerned, Crimea, due to a shared history and historical injustices, is a matter beyond law. However, it is not entirely clear at this point what encompasses extra-legal rhetoric.

[100] Note the original Russian: В сердце, в сознании людей (V serdtse, v soznanii lyudei). While translated perhaps for colloquial purposes as "minds," the Russian word "сознании (soznanii)" is better translated as "consciousness", which again implies more of a personal, emotional connection rather than a logical, common one.
[101] The Kremlin, Address by President.
[102] Ibid.

The view of the international order has been subsumed under extra-legal justifications of Russia's actions in Crimea. Indeed, Putin confirms this attitude when he mentions:

> we all knew [Crimea is historically Russian land] in our hearts and minds, but we had to proceed from the existing reality and build our good-neighbourly relations with independent Ukraine on a new basis. Meanwhile, our relations with Ukraine, with the fraternal Ukrainian people have always been and will remain of foremost importance to us.[103]

Once again, Putin makes an emotional rather than legal or logical appeal, referring to 'hearts and minds'. However, he mentions after this that Russia had to contend with the international order, and operate from this standpoint. This is now the past, while the future 'will remain' tied with 'the fraternal Ukrainian people'. Thus, Putin admits that Russia followed the international order and respected the law, but that was the past. The present and the future are based on a new, extra-legal rhetoric, which includes the idea of fraternalism and knowledge only known in a person's 'heart and mind'. What this indicates is that the priority of following the international order is no longer the intention of Russian foreign policy.

Moreover, Putin accuses Ukraine of breaking international law. He states that Russia was accommodating to Ukraine because it expected Ukraine to treat Russian citizens and speakers "in a friendly, democratic and civilised state that would protect their rights in line with the norms of international law. However", he continues, "this is not how the situation developed".[104] Yet, this does not indicate necessarily that international law in general is broken. Indeed, it would seem to show that Russia still believes in the primacy of international law, and that Ukraine violated it, which is the main issue. However, rather than before when Putin appealed to international legislation and the UN, he instead admonishes international order for failing to properly punish Ukraine for this violation. When referencing the language policy that was introduced in Ukraine, which he claims was against the rights of ethnic minorities, he says the politicians "were immediately 'disciplined' by the foreign

[103] The Kremlin, Address by President.
[104] Ibid.

sponsors of these so-called politicians".[105] He continues by stating that the law has only been suspended, but the idea still remains. International order in this case was ineffective as only a few outside actors interfered with internal Ukrainian politics, and there was no solution; the law still exists in draft form.

Clearly, at this point, the international order does not have the validity and legitimacy it previously did. There are significant moments in the Address that directly indicate that international order no longer exists due to the fact that it has been violated too many times by one or a few actors. In Putin's view, if international order cannot effectively discipline the violators, international law and order is broken. However, there is also the appearance of extra-legal rhetoric, which is unusual, as typically this rhetoric was seen in domestic and country specific speeches previously. The form extra-legal rhetoric is taking is not clear at this point, although it has facets of nationalism, minority rights, ethnicism, as well as others. The confusion indicates that Russian foreign policy in some regards is working with a new pattern that is not fully developed but instead emerging and changing.

3.2.2 Lavrov's February 2015 Munich Speech: The End of the International Order

Almost a year later, Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered a speech at the 51st Munich Security Conference, and his speech indicated the Russian government views the international order as broken and illegitimate. Indeed, it almost seems as though his only goal is to explain exactly how the international order is broken and whose fault it is. Much like Putin's Address, rather than offer solutions as to how to repair it, Lavrov simply exposes new areas of the failures of international order and law. His speech is also notable because he does not include much extra-legal rhetoric but mainly focuses on discrediting the old rhetoric and order. Thus, rather than an increase in extra-legal rhetoric, there is already a noticeable decline in it, while another pattern is instead emerging.

[105] The Kremlin, Address by President.

Lavrov, unlike Putin, immediately begins to discuss the international order. He starts by outright explaining how the international order has collapsed and why. He states:

> it is impossible to agree with the arguments of some of our colleagues that there was a sudden and rapid collapse of the world order that had existed for decades…last year's developments confirmed the correctness of our warnings against profound, systemic problems in the organisation of European security and international relations in general. I would like to remind you of the speech delivered by Russian President Vladimir Putin from these stands eight years ago.[106]

Lavrov counters the traditional argument by saying that the collapse of the international order had clear warning signs, and indeed, Putin had warned against potential problems during his earlier Munich Speech. Essentially the problems with the international order and law outlined by Russian foreign policy (exceptionalism and unilateral decision-making) have led to the delegitimization of the international order. It could have been prevented, as it was tested over years. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the rhetoric did in fact warn against the flaws Russia saw in the international system, and at this point, Russian foreign policy is claiming that those preventable issues have finally led to its collapse.

Lavrov additionally outright asserts that the international order has collapsed several times, and he provides examples of times when international law was tested and failed. Most of all, he says categorically that the West has caused the collapse of the international order: "The project of building a "common European home" failed because our western partners were guided by illusions and beliefs of winners in the Cold War rather than the interests of building an open security architecture with mutual respect of interests".[107] Lavrov thus echoes the earlier warnings in Putin's Munich speech about unilateralism; Russia's interests were not taken into account, and that is part of the reason the international order is no longer valid.

[106] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov delivers a speech and answers questions during debates at the 51st Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2015, Accessed 23 March 2015, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/4E7CDDD252FDEF1F43257DE60031E493
[107] Ibid.

Lavrov also states that American exceptionalism in particular has led to the meaningless of international law and order. He explains:

> It is very hard for us to explain why many of our colleagues fail to apply to Ukraine the universal principles of settling internal conflicts which presuppose, above all, an inclusive political dialogue between the protagonists. Why do our partners in the cases of Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, Mali and South Sudan, for instance, urge the governments to talk with opposition, with rebels, in some cases even with extremists, whereas in the Ukrainian crisis, our partners act differently…[108]

This is only one example of Lavrov's accusations against American exceptionalism out of many in his speech. First, he stresses the fact that universal principles are only applied in some cases and only with the permission of a few actors. Moreover, Lavrov also includes the idea of 'inclusive dialogue,' which again refers to the problem of exclusivity. For Lavrov, the examples he lists are further proof of the general degrading of the international system caused by the continued practice of unilateral decision-making and exceptionalism.

While the majority of Lavrov's speech is directed toward explaining clearly and precisely why the international order has collapse and who is at fault, he does take a moment to offer a solution. He remarks: "The world is now facing a drastic shift connected with the change of historical eras".[109] Rather than believing that there is a stable world order, Lavrov is expressing that he still believes there is a change occurring. Again, this differs from earlier rhetoric as before, there was a system in place that had problems but was still operative. It also indicates that there is a 'formative moment' occurring, wherein new patterns and discourses are surfacing and interacting. Therefore, rather than before when Putin and Medvedev offered several suggestions to improve the international system and how, at this moment, Lavrov can only provide a general one. It is to have bilateral talks with parties involved in conflicts rather than have multilateral organizations become involved. Already, this is a change from earlier thinking and indicates that the Russian government thinks the international order is broken, and there needs to be a new system in place.

[108] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Minister.
[109] Ibid.

3.3 Victory Day Speeches in 2014 and 2015: Competing Patterns

Thus far a clear shift has been shown in Russian foreign policy rhetoric. Up to the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian government still viewed the international order and law as legitimate. After the annexation of Crimea in particular, Russia saw the international order as broken, which is particularly shown in Lavrov's 2015 Munich Speech. However, in Putin's March 2014 speech, extra-legal rhetoric appeared in the discussion of international affairs. In the two Victory Day speeches, the trend is also reflected. In 2014, there is more extra-legal rhetoric, while in 2015 much more attention is paid to the demise of the international order. The patterns appear to be simultaneously appearing and interacting, indicating Russia could be undergoing a 'formative moment'.

Interestingly, in his 2014 speech, Putin makes very little reference to the events in Ukraine and the state of the international order. The speech is much more focused on the domestic importance of the holiday. However, he does mention the sacrifices near the Dnieper,[110] in Kursk[111] and Sevastopol, as well as several other Russian cities.[112] His acknowledgements indicate that these areas, some outside of Russia, still hold certain significance to Russia due to the shared history from World War II. He also states that the holiday causes citizens to "feel especially acutely what it means to be loyal to our homeland and how important it is to defend our country's interests".[113] While this is perhaps typical domestic rhetoric, the idea of defending the country's interests is of particular significance in light of the events in Ukraine. Yet, even in May 2014, two months after the annexation of Crimea, there is not such a surge in discourse against the international order that it enters a national holiday speech. There is the same extra-legal rhetoric evident in Putin's March 2014

[110] The Dnieper is a river extending from Belarus, through Russia and Ukraine, ending in the Black Sea. His mention is thus significant as it includes an area outside of Russia.
[111] Kursk is a Russian city on the border of Ukraine.
[112] These areas also had significant and important military battles, which could also explain their presence in his speech.
[113] The Kremlin, Speech at military parade marking the 69th anniversary of Victory in the 1941–1945 Great Patriotic War, 9 May 2014, accessed 15 May 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20989

speech when he refers to the shared history of territories inside and near Russia. Thus, at this point, the collapse of the international order is not quite as significant and there is more extra-legal rhetoric present.

Instead, a little over a year after the annexation of Crimea, the perceived collapse of the international order has once again resurged. In Putin's 2015 Victory Day Speech the ideas present in his 2014 speech to the Duma and Lavrov's 2015 Address have become more apparent. This also indicates the possibility that competing patterns are at play. Moreover, Putin offers a proposed new system, similar to the one Lavrov proffered. Putin remarks a fair amount on international law and order, especially for a domestic speech. He states:

> in the last decades, the basic principles of international cooperation have come to be increasingly ignored… We saw attempts to establish a unipolar world. We see the strong-arm block thinking gaining momentum. All that undermines sustainable global development.[114]

Thus, similarly to Lavrov, Putin stresses that the international system is broken because the foundation for it is not respected or followed. Again, he mentions the problem of unipolarity, but rather than warning against it, he indicates that 'strong-arm block thinking' is winning. He instead proposes that the "creation of a system" should be based on a "regional and global non-block basis".[115] Therefore, once again Putin indicates the system is broken, as there needs to be 'the creation' of a new one and thinks it should be based on multilateralism. He further supports this notion by mentioning the contributions of several states to the World War II victory, including the US, France, Great Britain, Mongolia, India, China, and CIS countries.

In conclusion, it was shown that in 2013 the Russian government still viewed international order and law as legitimate. While the system had flaws, it was not beyond

[114] The Kremlin, Speech at military parade on Red Square in Moscow to mark the 70th anniversary of Victory in the 1941–1945 Great Patriotic War, 9 May 2015, accessed 10 May 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49438
[115] Ibid.

repair. After the 2014 annexation of Crimea, there is a distinct shift in rhetoric. Rather than justifying its actions based on international law, Russia now views the international system as broken because it has been violated so frequently by other actors, primarily the US. To Russia, exceptionalism and unilateralism, two issues Russia had warned against, eventually destroyed the legitimacy of the world order. Due to this, a new rhetoric appears to justify Russia's actions, which is seen in Putin's 2014 Victory Day Speech and Address to the Duma. Notably, in 2015, extra-legal rhetoric is not as apparent, albeit it does exist. Rather Lavrov and Putin continue to stress the demise of the international system. The competing rhetoric indicates that Russia is facing a 'formative moment' wherein a new pattern in Russian foreign policy discourse has not appeared but is developing.

CONCLUSION

By comparing the Russo-Georgian War and Ukrainian Crisis, a shift in Russian foreign policy appears through changes in discourse. Russian foreign policy discourse before, during, and after the 2008 war frequently relied on legal rhetoric, while in 2014 multiple changes emerged in the discourse, including the appearance of extra-legal rhetoric. In 2007-2009, the Russian Federation still used legal rhetoric in order to justify its actions. It did not, however, claim that the international system or law were without problems. Two main issues that were frequently repeated were perceived unilateral and exclusive decision-making and rule-breaking. This is exemplified in Russia's reaction to the recognition of Kosovo. Yet, the international order was not broken. Instead, Russia continually warned against these issues but maintained the legitimacy of the international order and the UN.

In 2013 with the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, and in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, a change begins to occur in Russian foreign policy discourse. Unlike before, the international order is now broken. Moreover, Russia introduces extra-legal rhetoric to justify its actions in Ukraine. The rules of the extra-legal rhetoric are not entirely clear; there are aspects of nationalism, ethnicism, historical claims, and others. Extra-legal rhetoric appears strongest in 2014, most likely due to the annexation of Crimea. In 2015, this rhetoric already has already begun to play a smaller role. Instead, there is an increase in the discussion of the broken international order, particularly visible in Lavrov's Munich Speech. Yet Russian foreign policy discourse appears to merely be focusing on the absence of the international order rather than filling the void left by it. The ill-defined extra-legal rhetoric cannot be said to fill this void as it is unclear as well as apparently fading from use.

Since a shift has occurred, the Russo-Georgian War and Ukrainian Crisis cannot be understood as a continuation as Russia's supposed long-standing imperialistic or aggressive tendencies, or as continually keeping NATO at bay. If Russian foreign policy did indeed

continue linearly from the Russo-Georgian War, then there would be not be the emergence of a new rhetorical pattern or the disappearance of the same legitimizing rhetoric it had used in 2008. Additionally, if the goal of both events was to ward off NATO, then a shift in rhetoric would not have occurred either.

From this, it must be concluded that the events are different and that a shift in Russian foreign policy discourse has occurred between 2007 and 2014. While some scholars focus on the appearance of the extra-legal rhetoric, mainly the nationalistic aspects, the actual picture is more complex. While there are nationalistic tendencies in the discourse, legal rhetoric has not disappeared altogether. Instead, it has changed. Rather than before when legal rhetoric justified Russia's actions, with the perceived collapse of the international order, legal rhetoric has reversed, speaking against international law and order. This change shows that current Russian foreign policy does not merely indicate a surge in nationalism, but that Russia perceives the international order itself as being broken and illegitimate.

Moreover, the change in Russian foreign policy discourse indicates a shift in Russian foreign policy. Discourse is understood in two ways. First, it is a moment in a discursive formation, meaning that it is a small part to a bigger picture. Second, patterns and rules that reflect how, in this case, a state can act and simultaneously form its identity appear in discourse. They indicate the exploration and fluctuation of competing ideas, concepts, strategies, et cetera. Irregularities thus do not mean that there is not a pattern, but that there is something new being introduced into the current discourse. However, when there are many competing narratives, then it is possible the discourse will change perceptibly because at this point, there are multiple competing discourses, which will undoubtedly form new rules and patterns. During this time, a state can undergo a type of identity crisis, or 'formative moment'. A relatively unified state narrative allows a state to realize and further its ambitions.

From the changes in discourse, there appear to be several emerging patterns in Russia's foreign policy along with certain ramifications. First, there is the loss of the legitimacy of the international order and law. As this was a discursive staple in Russian foreign policy rhetoric, its absence is noticeable. If Russia no longer respects a common international framework, undoubtedly other states will find it more difficult to interact with Russia; there is no longer that particular common base. Second, the appearance of extra-legal rhetoric indicates that several ideas, strategies, et cetera are competing and interacting in the void left by legal rhetoric. The use of nationalistic rhetoric already appears to be decreasing, while the continued emphasis on the perceived collapse in the international order is growing. This process is happening currently and rapidly, meaning, at the moment, Russian foreign policy is not entirely unified as it is not acting under a single narrative.

Therefore, it is necessary to reevaluate Russian foreign policy between 2008 and 2014. Clearly, there has been a change, and it is not simply an indication of Russia's possible imperialistic tendencies. Second, while there are nationalistic qualities in Russia's extra-legal rhetoric, it is not the only pattern emerging. Russia can possibly be best described as having a 'formative moment,' wherein it is exploring other concepts, strategies, et cetera, and it cannot be said definitively at this moment which rules Russia is using. Russian foreign policy instead is simply emphasizing the end of the international order and the fault of other countries. Yet, other extra-legal rhetoric has not disappeared altogether, indicating that Russia's foreign policy has not settled. Interacting with Russia internationally will be hindered by the loss of a common framework as well as an unclear Russian foreign policy. Yet, with time, a clearer discourse should emerge, which will require further research.

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF SPEECHES

An asterisk (*) indicates an international speech, two asterisks (**) indicate a country-specific speech, while no asterisk indicates a domestic speech.

2003

1. **January 27: Speech at the Opening of Russia Year in Ukraine - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21849
2. May 9: Speech at a Reception to Mark the 58th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/21992
3. December 31: New Year's Address - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/22272

2004

4. **January 23: Speech at the Ceremony marking the End of the Year of Russia in Ukraine and the 350th Anniversary of the Pereyaslavl Rada- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/22333
5. May 9: Victory Day Speech- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/22453
6. *November 26: Opening speech and answers to questions by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, at a joint press conference at the end of the Russia-EU summit, The Hague - http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/f2bf256d6eb8afefc3256f580041c274?OpenDocument
7. December 22: Speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a Ceremony of Presentation of Letters of Credentials - http://mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/8b0195a871ebd7cbc3256f73004f2636!OpenDocument
8. *December 23: Press Conference by President Vladimir Putin - http://mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/4fb0f1f9c0d53683c3256f740024dec4!OpenDocument
9. December 31: New Year's Address- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/48213

2005

10. **January 24: Press Conference Following Russian-Ukrainian Talks - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22795
11. **January 24: Meeting with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22794
12. **March 19: Beginning of Meeting with Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22867
13. **March 19: Press Conference on the Results of Russian-Ukrainian Talks - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22869

14. April 25: Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation- http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml
15. May 9: Victory Day Speech - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4528999.stm
16. November 4: National Unity Day Speech- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/23252
17. December 31: New Year's Address- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/23370

2006

18. May 9: Victory Day Speech - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23576
19. November 4: National Unity Day Speech - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23882
20. December 31: New Year's Address – http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/23988

2007

21. *February 10: Putin's Prepared Remarks at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555_pf.html
22. May 9: Victory Day Speech - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24238
23. November 4: National Unity Day Speech- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/24648
24. December 31: New Year's Address - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/24755

2008

25. February 14: Transcript of Annual Big Press Conference - http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/02/14/1011_type82915_160266.shtml
26. *April 4: Press Statement and Answers to Journalists' Questions Following a Meeting of the Russia-NATO Council - http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/04/04/1949_type82915_163150.shtml
27. May 9: Victory Day Speech- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/31
28. *August 14: Interv'yu stats-sekretarya – zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii G. B. Karasina po Yuzhnoi Osetii, opublikovannoe v ezhenedel'nike "Rossiya" (Interview with State Secretary - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Grigory Karasin on South Ossetia, published in the weekly "Russia") - http://mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/A59A69A0C7C68415C32574A500375421

29. August 26: Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev - http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml
30. **September 17: Statements following Signing of the Treaties on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/1436
31. November 4: National Unity Day Speech- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/1966
32. December 31: New Year's Address- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/6033

2009

33. **April 30: Speech at Ceremony for Signing Bilateral Documents between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/3921
34. May 9: Victory Day Speech- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/4016
35. *July 24: Opening Remarks at Meeting with Permanent Members of Security Council- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/4876
36. **August 8: Excerpts from Conversation with Residents of South Ossetia- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/5148
37. November 12: Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/5979
38. December 31: New Year's Address- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/6557

2010

39. April 1: Speech at Meeting with Leaders of Republics within North Caucasus Federal District - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/7308
40. April 21: Joint News Conference with President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/7518
41. May 9: Victory Day Speech- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/7688
42. *September 10: Meeting with leading Russian and foreign political analysts http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/8882
43. November 4: National Unity Day- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/9425
44. December 24: Review of the Year with President of Russia - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/9888
45. December 31: New Year's Address- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/9976

2011

46. May 9: Victory Day Speech - http://www.dailymotion.com/video/ximaco_president-medvedev-gives-victory-parade-speech_news
47. November 4: National Unity Day Speech - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/13340
48. December 31: New Year's Address- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/14193

2012

49. March 2: Address to Russian Citizens: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/14647
50. May 9: Victory Day Speech- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/15272
51. November 4: National Unity Day Speech- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/16752
52. December 31: New Year's Address- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/17260

2013

53. *February 11: Meeting with Russian Foreign Ministry staff- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/17490
54. May 9: Victory Day Speech - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/18092
55. **July 28: Celebrations of Russian Navy Day and Ukrainian Navy Day - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/18963
56. *September 5: Opening Remarks at the meeting of BRIC leaders- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/19161
57. November 4: National Unity Day Speech - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/19562
58. December 12: Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/19825
59. **December 17: Speech at a meeting of the Russian-Ukrainian Interstate Commission - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19853
60. December 31: New Year's Address- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/20022

2014

61. March 18: Address by President of the Russian Federation: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/20603
62. March 18: Meeting in Support of Crimea's Accession to the Russian Federation: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/20607

63. May 9: Victory Day Speech- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/20993
64. *July 21: Statement by the President of Russia Vladimir Putin: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/46262
65. **August 29: President of Russia Vladimir Putin addressed Novorossiya militia - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/46506
66. *September 3: The 'Putin Plan' for settling the conflict in Ukraine- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/46554
67. November 4: National Unity Day Speech- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/46916
68. December 4: Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/47173
69. December 31: New Year's Address- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/47446

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70. *February 7: Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov delivers a speech and answers questions during debates at the 51st Munich Security Conference - http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/4E7CDDD252FDEF1F43257DE60031E493
71. March 18: Concert Celebrating Crimean Reunification- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/speeches/47878
72. May 9: Victory Day Speech - http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49438

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