

# Does authoritarian personality covariate with populist attitude? A gender differences cross-sectional study based on a sample from the USA Amazon's Mechanical Turk

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## Abstract.

This study contributes to a better understanding of gender differences in personality and political attitudes. Men and women differ in a plethora of attitudes, from expressing interest in politics to the level of political knowledge. (Burns, Schlozman, & Verba, 2001) In this study, I test the assertion that authoritarian personality overlaps with populist attitude (Hawkins, Ridding, & Mudde, 2012) and show that in the case of male respondents there is a significant ( $p=0.01$ ) and negative ( $-0.15$ , standardized result) relationship between these two concepts, while in case of women there is not enough evidence to claim the same ( $p=0.09$ ). For women, being traditional does not trigger populist attitudes like in the case of men. In order to show this, I have used structural equation modeling (SEM). The data came from a study made online in 2012 on the Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk online platform and consisted of 644 respondents, all residents in the United States of America at the moment of the survey. This study has potential applications in educational policy, political communication and political psychology.

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## Introduction

Women and men are different not only in their genome, but also in their attitudes or behavior. While it is not clear if the genome influences these differences more than the environment in which one lives or the context in which these differences are expressed, it is nevertheless interesting to mention some of the instances in which men and women have different attitudes. Mondak & Anderson (2004) shows that the political knowledge gap comes partly from the way the concept is measured, and that men being more predisposed to guess leads to biased result in their favor. However, even when moderating for factors that might influence the outcome, men still know more about politics than women. (McGlone et al., 2006) Other studies recorded the big difference regarding immigration between men and women, with women being significantly more positive about immigrants than men. These smaller or bigger differences between the sexes can be explained through personality. Men and women have heterogeneous personalities, and this fact was strengthened recently by the development of various personality measurement scales, all of which are reliable and valid. The results of some of these studies show that women are more neurotic and agreeable than men (Chapman et al., 2007), that women also consider themselves more extravert, neurotic, and agreeable than men (Weisberg et al., 2011), that males have higher self-esteem and are more assertive than females (Feingold, 1994), that females perform lower in problem solving in high-school (Hyde et al., 1990), and that women are more prejudiced than men. (Ekehammar et al., 2009)

Burns, Schlozman, & Verba (2001), in their seminal study, showed that "[m]en are no more likely than women to report that they heard political discussion in the family" (p.140-141), that "[w]hile boys are more likely to be involved in athletics, girls are more likely to be active in school government and other organizations, a difference with potential consequences for participation" (p.151), that there is a "small masculine education advantage" (p.151) in the American society, and that these differences appear as a result of the way women and men are selected into institutions and the different way they are treated within these institutions. More specifically, "[a]mong wives, those of a more egalitarian disposition on gender issues, are better educated than are the traditionals" and "they are more likely to be in the work force full time" (p.158), "husbands spend more time than wives on paid work, and wives spend more time than husbands on housework and child care" (p.182), "wives contribute roughly a third of the income and roughly two-thirds of the housework time" of the total contributions of household time and

money (p.183), “according to the wives, husbands are doing somewhat more housecleaning now than they did four decades ago” (p.187), “men work, on average, more hours than women” (p.218), “having children at home is associated with higher work force participation for men and lower work force participation for women” (pp. 310-311), and “husbands who bring in a larger share of the family income or who exercise greater control over financial decisions are, all else equal, more politically active”. (p.331) The gender gap in political participation translates, in my opinion, quite intuitively, in a gender gap in political attitudes and behavior. The more one participates in political activities, the more its thoughts and beliefs are shaped in a specific manner. But maybe the most important,

*"any investigation of differences between women and men must recognize the heterogeneity within these two groups and, thus, take into account the differences among women and among men; and that simply because a social process works in a particular way for men does not mean that it will work in the same way for women."*  
(Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001, p.39)

This study is a study of personality, attitudes, and gender. Personality is defined here as "[a] biologically influenced and enduring psychological structure that shapes behavior" (Mondak, 2010, p.6) and this definition enables me to measure personality empirically and to link it to other political attitudes such as populism. Attitude is defined here as "a mental and neural state of readiness organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related" (Allport, 1929 in Eysenck, 1954, p.13) and is a hypothetical construct which allows the researcher to deduct it from other events that are observable. What is most important for these definitions is that whatever type of personality or attitude one has, it influences behavior.

I will start with a description of the concepts that I will use in this thesis and the existing literature, beginning with how gender differences are dealt with in the existing literature and continuing with a presentation of authoritarian personality and populist attitude. I will use structural equation modeling to show that for men, authoritarian personality is an independent and significant explanatory variable for populist attitude, while for women this relationship, due to the way authoritarian personality is formed in my model compared to how men's authoritarian personality is formed in the same models.

According to Brandt & Henry (2012)'s theory, women should be less authoritarian than men in countries that possess and promote gender egalitarian societies, in contrast with countries which are more gender unequal and where women are more authoritarian than men, because of intuitive security reasons. The latter situation is present in the United States of America, for example, and the former in collectivist states like Pakistan. Other studies which tackled the gender-differences in terms of authoritarian personality are numerous. (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1996; Whitley, 1999; Stenner, 2005; Napier & Jost, 2008; see also Feather, 1993; Nagoshi, Terrell, & Nagoshi, 2007; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Mavor, Louis, & Laythe, 2011; Oesterreich, 2005; Chuang & Su, 2009; Henry, 2011; Peterson & Lane, 2001) In this study, I will show, among others that women are, on the contrary not only less authoritarian than men.

The literature on the topic of authoritarian personality is very broad and many scholars have improved both the theory and the method. (see also Altemeyer, 1988, 1998, 2007; Stenner, 2005; Zakrisson, 2005; see also Duckitt et al., 2010) Authoritarian personality is defined here as a person's rigid beliefs about the members of the same group in which she or he belongs, about the leaders of this group, and about the members of other groups, in which she or he does not belong and which she or he perceives as enemy groups. Adorno et al. (1950) constructed the F-scale with which one can measure authoritarian personality and Altemeyer (1981) built the famous and reliable authoritarianism scale. Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde (2012) asserted that populism (at individual level) might be correlated either with authoritarian personality, either with an opposite concept, openness to experience. (for the Big Five personality types, one of which being openness to experience, see Monday et al., 2010; for the study which hypothesized the relationship, see Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde, 2012) It was already proved that populism tends to lean towards conservative ideas. (Hawkins, 2010; Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde, 2012) Authoritarian personality also overlaps substantially with conservative attitudes. (as was proved by Tarr & Lorr, 1991; Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013) Therefore, if A equals B and B equals C, roughly speaking, then it should be also that A equals C, that is populism and authoritarianism might overlap (at individual level). This is the main goal of this study: whether there is a connection between authoritarian personality and populist attitude. How is authoritarian personality formed, how is populist attitude formed and what are the gender differences between the relationship of these two latent variables?

Hawkins et al. (2012) suggested that “while populism should not be reduced to a personality type or trait, it is probably influenced by basic traits such as those associated with an authoritarian disposition” (p. 4) At the first sight, these two seem diametrically opposing concepts, authoritarian personality being a system of belief that encourages the conservation of status quo and populist attitude being about radicalism and anti-establishment feelings. Authoritarian personality favors outgroup hatred, while populist attitude encourages solidarity with the marginalized.

In order to achieve this research question, I will employ also a recently introduced method of collecting data: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk. (Buhrmeister, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012) This new online platform is cheap, its resulting samples are slightly more educated and urban than the American population, however slightly more liberal, younger and more educated than other samples collected on the field or by phone interviews. (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012) This thesis will contribute to the literature by bringing more light to the understanding of the connection between populist attitude and authoritarian personality, while also testing the measuring scales, which in the case of populist attitude at individual level is also very novel (Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde, 2012). And in order to demonstrate the theoretical overlap between populist attitude and authoritarian personality, I turned to the literature. These concepts, luckily, can be operationalized easily and fast. The current literature measures populism at individual level thanks to the approach of Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde (2012). When it comes to authoritarian personality, Altemeyer (2007) proposed a 22-item scale, from which this study uses six. The choice to drop items despite the proved positivity in measuring the concept of authoritarian personality was encouraged by the successful attempts in the past by other researchers. (Zakrisson, 2005; Ratazzi, Bobbio, & Canova, 2007) This thesis therefore also proposed new ways to measure authoritarian personality and populist attitude, by building two new scales, much refined and refreshed from the initial studies, based on the empirical results present later in the methods part of the thesis.

This study used a sample of 644 respondents, selected from the users of Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk online data collection tool. (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012) The sample is gender balanced, the majority of the respondents being highly educated, and majority white. In the next section I will present the two concepts which I will use in this study, then I will present



the method, describe in details the sample, and then turn to results of the exploratory factor analysis, which helps to build the new scales. Then the structural equation models are presented, which helps to assess the way authoritarian personality is formed in males and in females, and what are the effects of authoritarian personality on populist attitude. Finally, the study will conclude that populism is overlapped with authoritarianism at individual level only for men and not for women, that the link is not as strong as expected, but that can have a lot on implication on political psychology and political communication.

### Authoritarian Personality

Authoritarian personality is an important concept in political psychology. It was elaborated by Berkeley scientists Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford in 1950. They came up with a scale, a nowadays common method in testing psychological traits of persons, named F-scale (after Fascism scale, their motivation was to understand Hitler and Nazi regime). The validity and reliability of this scale was tested in the next 60 years all over the world: Australia (Ahrens & Innes, 1994; Heaven & Bucci, 2003), Canada (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1998, 2007), Israel (Rubinstein, 2003), New Zealand (Duckitt, 2000; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003), Russia (McFarland, Ageyev, & Djintcharadze, 1996), South Africa (Duckitt, 1993; Farre & Duckitt, 1994; Gray & Durrheim, 2006), USA (Feldman, 2003; Lambert, 1999; Peterson, Duncan, & Pang, 2002; Smith & Winter, 2002; Whitley, 1999; Stenner, 2005), Belgium (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002), Germany (Petersen & Dietz, 2000), Italy (Giampaglia & Roccato, 2002; Aiello, Chirumbolo, & Leone, 2004), Sweden (Ekehammar et al., 2004)

Before defining the concept, it is important to note that there are two theories and schools about the causality of authoritarian personality. On one hand, there is the Freudian theory of parenting and the parent's total influence over the child future personality (and more recently, genetic theory which undermines the Freudian parental education, but nevertheless considers that we cannot neglect who gave us birth in evaluating how we think and act). On the other hand, there is the view that personality in general and authoritarian personality in particular are caused by the experiences one has had throughout the early adulthood, including meeting new persons and socializing outside the group.

*Berkeley theory* assumes that authoritarian behavior can be traced in early childhood. “[T]hreatening, forbidding, and status-conscious parents punished unconventional behavior harshly and arbitrarily”, concluded Adorno and his colleagues (1950). Therefore children, continued the same scholars, repressed their hostility towards these distant parents, shaping their personality in an aggressive manner. Adorno et al. (1950) noted that “anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism [two of the earlier considered signs of authoritarian personality] were not merely matters of surface opinion, but general tendencies with sources, in part at least, deep within the structure of the person.” (p.223) Authoritarians want power, admire power, are self-righteous, and educate children in the spirit of submissiveness towards authority. They also think in terms of social Darwinist terms, only the fittest survive. (p.246) They shift the responsibility towards supernatural forces, clear manifestation of frustration and fear. Their intolerance is higher when it comes to the lower socioeconomic status people. (p.257) Aboud & Doyle (1996) assumed that parents do not influence the children’s racial attitudes, the maximum they can shape in the personality of the offspring being the attitude towards other groups, and that friends are also shaping one’s racial attitudes.

The falsified Berkeley theory was replaced by the same school with a new, genetic authoritarian personality theory. The genes, according to McCourt et al. (1999), influence the children’s authoritarian level. After separation of genetic and environmental influences, they found that genes explained 50% of the variance, while environment explain only 35% of it. Ludeke et al. (2013) also found that obedience towards established authorities is an inherited factor. Bouchard et al. (2002) found that conservatism is influenced also by genetic factors. The limits of the genetic based Berkeley theory, as Charney (2008) points out, is the impossibility to separate nature from nurture. A person’s authoritarian personality variation is explained only 16% by the parent’s authoritarian personality, Altemeyer asserts. (1988, 65) So other explanation had to be found.

*Social learning theory* states that a personality is formed by the experiences one had and observations one made throughout the late childhood and early adulthood, especially how many groups one has interacted with. Myers (1983) proved that, in particular, “early twenties are important formative years...[t]he attitudes formed then tend to be stable thereafter.” Social learning theory was developed by Bandura (1977) and could also incorporate the hereditary

factor. Contributors were Newcomb (1961), Allport (1954), and Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996). What is unclear about social learning theory is not that we can learn by seeing typical behaviors in others, but when we are motivated to imitate these behaviors. Altemeyer was the most recent contributor to the theory and we can learn from his studies of introductory psychology students since 1973 until today that the personality traits are acquired from other people “through direct teaching and modeling and through own experience with the objects of these attitudes”. (1988, p. 54)

He found in his numerous studies that there are three parts of the authoritarian personality: authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submissiveness, and conventionalism. Building his authoritarianism scale comprised from 30 items carefully selected from Adorno et al. (1950) plus personal attachments, he multiplied the 30 items with a maximum score of 7 (the items were measured with a scale from 1 meaning strongly disagree with the item to 7 meaning strongly agree with the item) and calculated score of all his students at the University of Manitoba in Canada. On a scale from 30 to 270, 30 meaning less authoritarian and 270 meaning most authoritarian, his students always scored around the 150 threshold, 10 points more than the neutral point of the scale, therefore stating their pretty authoritarian personalities. In contrast, measuring also the level of personality authoritarianism of the parents of his students, he found a slightly higher score of 175, 16% higher and raising concerns because this is significantly higher than a desired score of 140, the same neutral point.

Altemeyer then defined authoritarian personality as an *intolerant* personality, a person who considers members of outside groups (for example, if you are a Christian, then a Muslim would usually be considered an outsider) as usually “lazy, promiscuous, and irresponsible” (1988, p. 123), *submissive*, especially a type of persons who consider that “those who challenge authority and violate custom will hardly preserve our society” (p. 123), conventional, with a “high degree of adherence to the social conventions perceived to be supported by the authorities” (p. 2), and *aggressive*. Women tend to be more conventional, while men tend to be more aggressive. (p. 30) However, authoritarian personality is not a fix construct, according to the same author. In some situations, one’s score on the authoritarianism scale can be strongly increased or, on the contrary, decreased. Education and media, for example, might cause a person to change its opinion, behavior, and attitude toward groups that one can’t meet in day-to-day life. (p. 71, p. 87)

Moreover, attending English classes and history classes, also tend to alter the level of authoritarianism. (p. 68) Superior education decreases roughly by 10% the authoritarianism score, while getting married increased one's score by a bigger rate. (p. 98) Six or twelve years after graduation, one is most probable more authoritarian than in college. (p. 82) To conclude, according to Altemeyer, an authoritarian is aggressive, frustrated and fearful person, which directs physical pain, verbal threats and insults towards homosexuals, women, criminal, and other religion believers, aggressiveness usually reinforced by economic stimulus and cognitive control, by feelings of self-worth and lack of self-criticism. Authoritarian is also submissive, accepting in a blindfold any single decision that the recognized authority is making, and refraining from criticism toward it. Finally authoritarian according to the same author are conventional, embracing values, beliefs, goals, problem solving mechanisms, perceived to be endorsed by the established authorities. Conventional people usually reject laziness from principle, reject moral relativity and promiscuousness. Authoritarians do not have life experiences, are closed types of personalities, lack genuine and real knowledge about other groups in the society. 77% of the authoritarians, in the findings of Bob Altemeyer, did not meet any homosexual compared with 54% of the non-authoritarians; 64% of the authoritarians did not meet any non-traditional type of family; 40% of the authoritarians did not break any social rule, compared with only 10% of the non-authoritarian. (Altemeyer, 1988, p. 89)

There are many criticism of Altemeyer (1981)'s authoritarian personality theory, mostly regarding the uni-dimensionality of the authoritarianism scale. In other words, scholars who study the authoritarianism scale found out that it might measure not only a type of personality, the authoritarian type, but actually three types of personalities, which makes the authoritarianism scale a multi-dimensional scale. In this respect, Duckitt & Fisher (2003), Duckitt et al. (2010), Mavor, Louis, & Sibley (2010), Ratazzi, Bobbio, & Canova (2007), and Funke (2005) discovered using techniques of computational exploratory factor analysis (EFA) that authoritarian personality is not a unidimensional construct, but a multi-dimensional social attitude split into a number of sub-categories, mixed mostly based on Altemeyer (1981, 1988)'s initial concepts of authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism. According to Duckitt et al. (2010), these categories can be named *authoritarianism*, *conservatism*, and *traditionalism* (corresponding to aggression, submission, and conventionalism). Ratazzi, Bobbio, & Canova (2007) found only two factors, one corresponding

to a combination of “authoritarian aggression and submission”, with “conventionalism” as a second separate factor. Duckitt & Fisher (2003) and Tarr & Lorr (1991) found also two factors which they named authoritarianism and conservatism, corresponding to Altemeyer’s aggression and submissiveness, and conventionalism separately, just like in the case of the Italian scholars, just that they named the factors differently. Funke (2005) and Mavor, Louis, & Sibley (2010) found three factors, using structural equation modelling.

Because of this lack of consensus over how to measure authoritarian personality, this study combined the two approaches. On one hand, this study took a set of 22-items measuring authoritarian personality in the most recent Altemeyer (2007) study, applied exploratory factor analysis on them and choosing out of the items that were loading powerfully on the same factor the 6 items that had the appropriate combination of two indicators: 1) they were loading satisfactorily enough for my purposes and 2) they were a mix balance of conservatism items (two out of six), traditionalism items (two out of six), and authoritarianism items (two out of six), therefore respecting the guidelines of the most recent advancement in the literature of authoritarian personality (Duckitt et al., 2010) The categorization into authoritarian leaning, conservatism leaning, and traditionalism leaning belong entirely to the author.

### Populist Attitude

Populism is a difficult concept without consensual definition, but nevertheless much more structured as an idea now than it was fifty years ago. Populism has different flavors globally, with Eastern European populism being structurally different than Latin American populism and the American populism of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Populism is a thin ideology in the sense of Freedman (1996)’s morphological distinction between thick and thin ideologies. While a thick ideology, like liberalism or socialism, has a vast universe of literature and have answers to most of the dilemmas of modern political constituencies, thin ideologies are more chameleonic (like nationalism) and can take forms both on the left and on the right side of the political spectrum of politics.

Populists are demanding the retreat of the corrupt elites and the empowerment of ethnically or civically constructed identity of the people. Historically, in the USA, the (populist) People’s Party had potential to become the third party in the American party system, but it failed once it supported of the Democrat candidate William Jennings Bryan in the 1896 election, after if

gained considerable success in the 1892 elections, especially in Midwest states like Kansas or Nebraska. In all, populists are people who demand the redistribution of wealth towards the ‘true people’. The *people*’s identity which can be said to be formed around American farmers of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, American factory workers of the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, or even other collectives, big and marginalized enough to make an impact on the inequality speech, like workers or women.

About populism there are many important articles or books. (Fairchild, 1897; Black, 1928; Bogart, 1944; Gollan, 1965; Kauper, 1968; Goldschmidt, 1972; Polack, 1962; Ionescu & Gellner, 1969; Shapiro, 1968; Harris, 1971; Briel, 1981; Berman, 1987; McFarland, 1987; Hogan, 1989; Ferkiss, 1957; Sinclair, 1975; Johnson, 1983; Laclau, 2005; see also Mudde, 2007) American populism was initially a matter of lack of finance for small farmers, tariffs on corn and wheat that made the American farmers vulnerable to imports, and the high costs of transportation because of the railroad monopolies by Eastern capitalists. Therefore, the American farmer was increasingly indebted which made him marginalized both socially and economically. The frustration between the belief that the American farmer is the *true American*, the myth of the real people, and the reality of severe deprivation in face of various forces, both internal and external ones, gave rise to *populist attitudes* among American voters. (Gollan, 1965) After the First World War, when Woodrow Wilson partially improved the status of the farmer, there were again frustrations in the population which coagulated around the McNary-Haugen movement, which demanded subsidized agriculture. (Black, 1928) After the Second World War, the populists continued to advocate for the necessity of bringing the decision-making powers back to the people, because it was thought that these powers were hi-jacked by the owners of capital and industry. (Shapiro, 1968) This anti-elitism is specific to the populist movements, which see the world as a struggle between the interests of a powerful elite and the interests of the inoffensive and powerless masses. The populists had a reason to believe this - Senator Harris (1971) calculated that 1% of the manufacturing companies in the USA in the 1970s owned 70% of the market. This share rose from 47%, its 1945 level. Sinclair (1975) noted that since the 1930s, farmers also became bigger and bigger, but that did not translate into more employment for the peasants. The populists argued against foreign owner of big amount of land, owned by the British lords and capitalists and by the railroad companies, owned by Dutch and British companies or aristocrats. (McFarland, 1987) The populists demanded also a new international

economic order. (Johnson, 1983) As Laclau (2005) brilliantly puts it, populism “is not a fixed constellation but a series of discursive resources which can be put to very different uses”. (p. 176) In terms of demographics, populists in the United States of America were in the past decades mostly Irish and Scandinavian ethnic Americans, farmers from Midwest, miners from counties with mono industrial states, “urban pietists”, and to some degree Southerners that felt disadvantaged by the policies coming from Washington. (Briel, 1981; see also Berman, 1987)

The populist legacy after more than one century of constant struggle against the established parties is a third way besides socialism and capitalism, a way that describes the nation as torn apart between conflicting interests, where good and evil fight each other: producers versus parasites, workers versus oligarchs, the ones for the nation versus the ones without national sentiment. The four principles that populists gave to the public discourse in the USA are *first of all* the way of seeing the real citizen, the real people, as the only people that matter, the only people from the society. *Second of all*, they demand direct democracy and the banning of the middlemen between the leaders and the real people, i.e. the banning of bureaucracy. *Third of all*, populists assert that there is no way how to do this reform of the state without violent and aggressive measures. *Last but not least*, populists like to delimit themselves from the socialists in the sense that populists do not want social revolution, but just the reform of the current capitalist structure, implementing instead the lost “golden age”. (Sinclair, 1975)

But populism globally is a Latin American concept and populism also has recent developments on the American political scene, with movements like Occupy Wall-Street and Tea party emerging a few years ago and keeping them in the game still. In Latin America, populism emerged in the twentieth century as a reaction to the industrialization of the continent and to the reducing powers of the agrarian oligarchs. Socially, populism in Latin American is an alliance between the industrial bourgeoisie and the new urban workers, in which the former accepts political reforms in favor of the latter, with the promise that in exchange the urban working class will favor a more authoritarian state and the private enterprise. Populism in Latin America was not consistent and was in a permanent state of change. If in the 1930s populism was more on the right side of the political spectrum, with Getulio Vargas’ Brazilian fascist Estado Novo, in the 1950s populism crossed the road massively to the left side, with iconic regimes being the one of Victor Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia. Typically, their leadership was charismatic and was appealing

to the basic instincts of the voters instead of a generalized rationality. Later on, in the 1980s, together with the rising of neoliberal policies of Reagan and Thatcher, Fernando Collor in Brazil and Carlos Menem in Argentina are the first names that come to mind as typical populist leaders on the continent. The economic populism they pursued was obsessed with growth and redistribution, but neglected inflation and deficit, which skyrocketed in the second part of the last century for most of the Latin American countries. (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991) Recently, names like Hugo Chavez, Christina Kirchner, Evo Morales, but also Alberto Fujimori, leaded or are still in power in Latin American countries, countries which are rich, but nevertheless corrupted and very unequal. In the USA, recent populism is connected with the increased inequality in the economy: the 99% against the leading 1% of the households, because the richest 1% own 35% of the wealth in the USA and the next 19% own another 51%, leading 80% of the population to own barely 15% of the country's wealth. Also, nationalism emerged as a serious topic on the agenda of Tea Party, the right-wing populist movement within the Republic party.

The populist way of making politics is based on rationality, but on an anti-elitist rationality. The elite is not part of the nation, there is no above and below, everybody is in the "middle". This anti-elitistic view is based on an old cleavage in the American society: those who see America as too democratic vs. those who see America not enough democratic. This latter view is also the so-called populist view, which is demanding the re-conquering of American government from those who see only their interest and who are have sold the country towards special interest groups.

Empirically, populism was studied intensively and was found to be positively correlated with 1) a statist economic development (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Di Tella, 1965; Germani, 1978; Weffort, 1973); 2) an economic policy that appeals to the poor (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991); and 3) a political strategy based on a charismatic leader (Weyland, 2001). At individual level, Stenner (2005) linked populism with high morality and patriotism. Farrell & Laughlin (1976) were the first to come up with a 20-item scale that can measure populism at psychological individual level. Their pioneer article published in the *Journal of Psychology* tested the public opinion with regards to the facts: "wealth and power are unfairly distributed in the United States", "support for tax revision", "governmental pessimism" and "disillusion with the political process". (p. 33)



Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde (2012) came up with an interesting method to study populism at individual level. They also came up with a much shorter, 11-item, scale to measure *populist attitude*. The authors defined populism as a Manichaeian way of seeing the world, in which the Good means the “will of the people” and the Evil means the interests of the political and economic elite. Moreover, they consider populism as a “latent disposition activated by the political context”. (p. 2) Hawkins and his colleagues used three concepts when defining and measuring populist attitude: populist ideology, pluralism, and elitism (in fact it is Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s (2002) concept of “stealth democracy”). The underlying idea for using pluralism scale to test populism is the same idea that populists might overlap with pluralism when it comes to popular sovereignty, that in some cases there is something useful to learn from opposition. Finally, the overlap of the elitist items to test populist attitude comes from the fact that populism might be elitist, or rigid, or hierarchical, formed around a charismatic figure. Webb (2013) found out that in the UK there is a connection between populists and the so-called stealth democrats (persons who declare themselves as having democratic values but in fact they believe in the uselessness of politicians and the need of replacing them with experts or businessmen).

### Method

I started with 30 items, 19 measuring authoritarian personality and 11 measuring populist attitude. The missing values were coded correspondingly and the descriptive statistics was the next step. Getting to know your data and your sample of people helps you a lot in being authoritative about your results. The 11 populist attitude items consisted of four populist doctrine items, three pluralism items, and four stealth democracy items. After initial exploratory factor analysis, it was obvious that one of the populism items has to be dropped due to poor results. In addition, all the stealth democracy items had bad loadings, and therefore were altogether dropped as well. In the end, pluralism items were also dropped and replaced with the anti-elitism items, which had better loading on the populism factor. These decisions were made after exploratory factor analysis was tried with 1, 2, 3, or even 4 factors. When it comes to the authoritarian personality items, the decision was even easier. Looking at the means of the items, it was obvious that they tap into right-wing authoritarianism, and I was looking only for more neutral authoritarian personality items. Out of the 19 items, 11 were pro-trait and 8 were con-trait items. Out of the 11 pro-trait items, I have chosen the ones with the lowest 6 loadings on the right-wing

authoritarianism factor and performed again exploratory factor analysis, which confirmed that all can be considered as a scale measuring authoritarianism at individual level.

Next step in the process was to take each of the 13 items that I was left with and compute histograms and t-tests, splitting the sample between men and women, above 34 or below 34 years old, earning more than \$50 000 or below that sum, and the means of the authoritarian personality and populist items among married and never married respondents. Finally, there had to be computed the structural equation model and to build the graphics of it. The model was run in MPlus 6, and the code can be found in the final appendix. SEM models were built for the overall sample, for women respondents only and for men respondents only.

### Sample

This study uses data collected from Amazon's Mechanical Turk online platform, which is proved to give reliable, cheap, and representative samples of American society. (Buhrmeister, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012, Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012) 644 individuals responded to a set of 13 items, 6 of them measuring authoritarian personality (Altemeyer, 2007), and 7 of them measuring populist attitude (Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde, 2012). All respondents had to choose between 1 meaning strongly disagree with the statement presented and 7 meaning strongly agree with the statement, a Likert - scale with a neutral answer usually considered around the number 4. All items, which can be found in Appendix 1, were part of a larger experiment survey, being placed chronologically after an IQ test and before a need for cognition (NFC) scale. The data design showed the respondents only a part of the items, randomly, because of reasons of time and reducing the errors in measurement. This means that the data can be considered missing completely at random (MCAR) (see Littvay, 2009) and can be used successfully for structural equation modelling without concerns of biases and measurement errors.

47 per cent of the sample was male, while 7 persons out of 644 did not specify their gender. Age varied from 18 to 77 years, with an average of 36 years old, very similar to the American population average age of 37. The standard deviation of age is 12 years. All respondents had permanent residence in the USA at the time of the survey, April 2014. 34 per cent were married, 39 per cent were never married, and 16 per cent were partnered but not married. The rest were

divorced, widowed, or did not specify their marital status. 92 per cent of the sample had 13 or more education years, with 40 per cent of the sample holding a bachelor degree, 14 per cent a master's degree, while 30 per cent of the sample did not earn any degree. 63 persons did not specify their type of education type. Again as a sign of representativeness, the sample consisted of 82 per cent of white people, higher than the whole white American population of 77%, but in the standards of previous studies. (Berisnky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012) Finally, 26 per cent of the sample earned less than \$25 000 dollars per year, 14 per cent of the sample earned between \$25 000 and \$34 999, 16 per cent earned between \$35 000 and \$49 999, 20\$ earned between \$50 000 and \$74 999, 12 per cent earned between \$75 000 and \$99 999, 6 per cent earned between \$125 000 and \$149 999, and 2 per cent earned at the time of the survey \$150 000 or more.

### The scales

Populist attitude scale was tested successfully before by Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde (2012) in two samples in the USA. They found that populism in some cases accepts opposing views, advocating direct democracy while believing that there are elites whose interests prevents the progress of the country. In the authors' words, the populism items in the 2012 study measure "key elements of populism, especially a Manichaeian view of politics, a notion of reified popular will, and a belief in a conspiring elite". (p. 7) The populist attitude scale in this study, as opposed to the above-mentioned study who used also pluralism and stealth-democracy scales, is composed of three items which measure direct populism and four items which measure anti-elitism, a concept that is well embedded in the belief of the populists in the conspiring elite and they are all borrowed from the aforementioned study, and which has not been used before in studying populism at individual level, at least not in the form of a measurement scale.

Authoritarian personality scale was measured many times before and is a reliable and valid scale. The current 6 items were selected from the 22 items used in Altemeyer (2007), the reason for eliminating the most of the items being the very strong right wing component in the initial 22 items. Because I did not want to test right-wing extremism, but just the authoritarian component of this personality measurement scale, this decision seemed correct. Even so, the results are still not satisfactory because these 6 items still tap significantly in the right-wing component of authoritarian personality. Out of the 6 items, 2 measure conservatism, two measure, traditionalism, and 2 measure authoritarianism. (Duckitt et al., 2010) All items were measured

with the same Likert-type 7 points scale, 1 meaning strongly disagree and 7 meaning strongly agree.

The populist attitude scale was composed by adding the responses of the seven corresponding items. The items being measured from one to seven, then the final scale has a minimum of seven and a maximum of forty-two. Missing responses were coded as the item's mean. The average of the populist attitude scale stand at 36, while the median of the scale stands at 29, therefor the scale being skewed to the right. This is presented in figure 1 below. All the items in the two scales are presented in Appendix 1.

**Figure 1. Histogram of the populist attitude latent variable**





Figure 2. Histogram of the authoritarian personality latent variable



The authoritarian personality scale was composed by adding the responses of the six authoritarian personality items, two of them measuring authoritarianism at individual level, other two measuring conservatism at individual level, and the last two measuring traditionalism at individual level. As in the case of the populist attitude scale, the items being measured from a theoretical one to a theoretical seven, then the final scale should have had a minimum of seven and a maximum of forty-two. Missing responses were coded as the item's average. The average of the authoritarian personality stands at 22, while the median is 25, therefore the distribution is skewed to the left. This is presented in figure 2 below. All the items in the two scales are presented in Appendix 1.

### Descriptive Statistics

This study assesses the gender differences in terms of authoritarian personality and populist attitude. As it may seem natural, in terms of authoritarian personality and populist attitudes, women's responses are different than men's responses, sometimes statistically significant, according to the two sample t-test. There is a mean of 2.75 for men and 2.47 for women when it comes to the item "The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off their ignorance". The difference of approximately 0.3 on a 7 point scale, even though it seems minuscule, is statistically significant with 90% confidence. ( $p=0.08$ ) Men are more submissive than men towards the established authorities. This is also true for the second and the last statistically significant t-score for the authoritarian personality six items, which states that "It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds". Men also tend to agree much more with this items which taps not only into submissiveness towards established authorities, but also in religiousness anti-liberalism. However, both men and women answers for these two items that were worth mentioning because of their statistically significant differences of means were below the neutral point of the scale, four, therefore we can consider this sample as a liberal sample, or at least not too authoritarian in their personalities. Women tend to agree more than men that "Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber", mostly because of the strength of the word "perversion", which is associated more with threats that endanger women. The most similar

answers came from the item “The old fashioned ways and the old fashioned values still show the best way to live”, with practical no difference between the answers of men and the answers of women. Women also agree more with the immorality present in the American society and its negative effects on the society together with the need of the elimination of these causes. Surprisingly, women are more radical than men when it comes to the solutions to the perceived threats towards the society as a whole. Finally, the only item that brought a mean above the neutral point of four, meaning that there is a tendency to agree more rather than disagree with the statement was the last authoritarian personality item, “Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers”. Men respected more the founding father, perhaps because they know more about them than the women. The results can be seen below in table 1.



Table 1. Two sample t-tests for gender in authoritarian personality scale					
Item	Mean men	SD	Mean women	SD	T-Score
A1 The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off their ignorance	2.75	1.49	2.47	1.54	<b>1.74 (0.08)*</b>
A2 It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds	2.75	1.58	2.45	1.72	<b>1.79 (0.07)*</b>
A3 Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs	2.87	1.98	3.07	2.16	-0.93 (0.35)
A4 The "old-fashioned ways" and the "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live	3.61	1.92	3.61	2.12	-0.03 (0.98)
A5 There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action	2.94	1.84	2.99	2.03	-0.25 (0.8)
A6 Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers	4.16	1.82	3.91	1.97	1.23 (0.22)

**Note.** P-values are in parenthesis. P-values smaller than 0.01 are marked with \*\*\*, p-values smaller than 0.05 are marked with \*\*, and p-values smaller than 0.1 are marked with \*. which means the differences of means are statistically significant with 99%, 95%, or 90% confidence respectively.

Table 2. Two sample t-tests for gender in populist attitude scale.					
Item	Mean men	SD	Mean women	SD	T-score
<b>POP1</b> The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people.	5.74	1.31	5.71	1.21	0.26 (0.79)
<b>POP2</b> The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress	5.11	1.69	5.25	1.58	-0.8 (0.42)
<b>POP3</b> The people, not the politicians, should make the most important policy decisions	4.82	1.64	5.21	1.42	<b>-2.43 (0.01**)</b>
<b>ANT1</b> Elected politicians sell out to various interests groups	5.63	1.39	5.64	1.42	-0.04 (0.97)
<b>ANT2</b> Elected politicians sell out to big business	5.5	1.45	5.6	1.33	-0.69 (0.49)
<b>ANT3</b> High level public officials seek power for its own sake	5.19	1.51	5.25	1.39	-0.43 (0.66)
<b>ANT4</b> Politicians do not want to improve the lives of ordinary people	4.53	1.71	4.61	1.63	-0.47 (0.64)

**Note.** P-values are in parenthesis. P-values smaller than 0.01 are marked with \*\*\*, p-values smaller than 0.05 are marked with \*\*, and p-values smaller than 0.1 are marked with \*, which means the differences of means are statistically significant with 99%, 95%, or 90% confidence respectively.

When it comes to populist attitude items presented above in table 2, the only item that brought a statistically significant difference of means between men and women was “The people, not the politicians, should make the most important policy decisions”, with women agreeing much more. ( $t=-2.43$ ,  $p<0.01$ ) The average answer of women was 5.21, incredibly high compared to the one of men, 4.82, which was much closer to the neutral point of four. In fact, with the exception of the first item, all the other six populist attitude items brought higher means for women than for men, which can be generalized and said that in this sample, women are more populist than men, using this seven items scale.

There are significant differences in responses to populist attitude and authoritarian personality scales among the 18-33 years old and above 34 years old age cohorts, and also there were items who were not statistically different when it comes to standard 95% of confidence but still the differences are worth mentioning. I split these the sample in these two clusters after I observed the median age and this is 33 years old. I will not mention here the ones that were not statistically significant. Among the most important differences are when it comes to item “Elected politicians sell out to various interests groups”, which brought more agreement among older respondents again. ( $t=-2.17$ ,  $p<.05$ ) from the populist attitude scale and items “Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs” ( $t=-1.17$ ,  $p=.24$ ), where older people agreed more with the statement, not surprisingly because the older people are more traditional, item “The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live” ( $t=-4$ ,  $p<.001$ ), again with older people agreeing more with this statement, item “There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action” ( $t=-1.23$ ,  $p=0.22$ ), again with older people being in more agreement with this statement, and item “Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers” ( $t=-1.26$ ,  $p=0.21$ ), again with older people agreeing more than older respondents. The full results are in the tables in Appendix 3.

The results for income - split in more than \$50 000 and less than \$50 000 yearly salary, according to the median, are presented in Appendix 4. None of the two sample t-test brought statistically significant differences among the means of the respondents in the sample both in the populist attitude scale and authoritarian personality scale; however, there are some items that are

worth mentioning. Item “The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people” has a mean of 5.8 out of 7 among the respondents which earn less than \$50 000 a year, and a mean of 5.65 among respondents which earn more than this sum. ( $t=1.08$ ,  $p=0.28$ ) This results is as expected, as richer household tend to be less populist and more elitist. Item “Elected politicians sell out to big business” brings a mean of 5.65 among those who earn less than \$50 000 a year and a mean of 5.42 among those which earn more than this sum. ( $t=1.51$ ,  $p=0.13$ ) Lower income people tend to agree more with this statement which is conspirationist in its nature. Item “Politicians do not want to improve the lives of ordinary people” has also a higher level of agreement among lower income than among richer respondents. ( $t=1.59$ ,  $p=0.11$ ) This last item is almost statistically significant with 90% of confidence. Among authoritarian personality, item “It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s minds” brings a mean of 2.66 among lower income respondents and a mean of 2.49 among higher income respondents. ( $t=1.06$ ,  $p=0.29$ ) Lower income people are more submissive towards the authorities than the higher income. Item “The "old-fashioned ways" and the "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live” bring a mild statistically significant difference among the mean of the lower and higher income. ( $t=-1.61$ ,  $p=0.1$ ) Higher income people tend to agree more with the traditional ways and values. Finally, item “Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers” brings a mean of 3.94 among lower income and a mean of 4.19 among higher income respondents. ( $t=-1.25$ ,  $p=0.21$ ) Higher incomes agree more with honoring the old values, principles, and in general with a conservative way.

When it comes to race and marital status, the thing is a little bit more complicated. I cannot establish a mean, because there is no ordinal scale in measuring these two independent variables. Being married is not higher than not being married and being white is not two times higher than being white. Therefore, now I computed contingency table and I will present here the results. 79% of the women in the sample are White, 7% are Black, approximately 4% are Asian, and 3% are Hispanic. Conversely, 85% of the men are White, 3% are Black, 3% are Asian, and approximately 5% are Hispanic. Of the White women, 7% have a score of 23 out of 49 of the populism scale, which is constructed by adding all the scores of the seven populism items, 23 being a little bit higher than the neutral point. Conversely, of the White men, 7% of them have a score of 28, which is much more than the women’s biggest group score, much higher than the 21

point - the median and the virtual neutral point of the scale. When it comes to authoritarian personality scale, which is constructed by adding the scores of the six items, and therefore having a neutral point of 18, of the White women, the biggest cluster of 9% stand at a score of 4 out of 38, which is incredibly low authoritarian, while in men the biggest cluster stands at the score of 8, and represent 6% of the white men. This is also an important finding, that among the biggest groups of respondents, that is white men and women.

In the sample, there are 34% married women and 35% never married women. 33% of the men are married and 42% were never married. 8% of the never married women have a populist attitude aggregate score of 28 out of 49, which is a way above the neutral point of 21, therefore can be considered leaning towards a strong populist attitude. This is the biggest cluster of never married women. Conversely, 8% of never married men have a score of 19 out of 49, which is below the neutral point of 21, which makes never married men way less populist than never married women. 9% of the married women have the neutral score in the populist attitude of 21 out of 49, representing the biggest cluster of married women. 9% of the married men stand at 22 out of 29 on the same populist attitude scale, which is really close to the neutral point and very similar to where married women stand, and this 9% represents the biggest cluster of married men. On the authoritarian personality scale, 9% of the married women stand at number 4 out of 42, incredibly low on the authoritarian personality scale. Conversely, 10% of the married men stand at 11 out of 42, also way below the 18 neutral point. Among never married women, the biggest cluster when it comes to authoritarian personality has a score of 3 and they represent 11% of the never married women. Among never married men, 10% of them stand at number 4 out of 42, also way much below the neutral point. Married men and married women are much more authoritarian than never married men and never married women. The difference is significant, but not very surprising. It is in line with that Altemeyer (1988) has found out, that human beings tend to become much more authoritarian when they get married.

## Results

This study is a study of two diametrically opposing concepts, authoritarian personality, which is system of belief that encourages the conservation of status quo and populist attitude, which is radical and against the establishment. Expected results were much higher given the distance

between the two concepts. Authoritarian personality favors outgroup antipathy, while populist attitude encourages solidarity with the 80% of the population that owns just 20% of the wealth in the USA. In this section, I will present how I selected the items for the two scales, the structural equation models I have computed and analyzed, the results of the analysis and some possible explanations.

### Exploratory Factor Analysis

Initially, in the survey there were 19 authoritarian personality items and 10 populist attitude items. Exploratory factor analysis was applied in order to explore the number of factors. This reduced the number of authoritarian personality items from 19 to 6 and the populist attitude scale from 10 items to 7 items. The process of selection is presented in this part of the thesis.

### Authoritarian personality

Exploratory factor analysis in case of authoritarian personality consisted in asking the software to extract 4 factors. The number of eigenvalues over 1 was three, and with the fourth eigenvalue being very close to 1, meaning that the 19 items in the pool were measuring almost four distinct factors, or latent variables. The rotation used was oblique, meaning that these four factors have a connection with each other, are not orthogonal. The expectations were that the 19 items should measure only three factors, that is authoritarianism at individual level (a sort of aggression), conservatism at individual level (or submissiveness towards the established authorities), and traditionalism (a sort of conventionalism at individual level). Realizing that the pool of 11 pro-trait and 8 con-trait items are powerfully right-wing, collaborated that this study was not searching to measure left or right wing authoritarianism but authoritarian personality solely determined me to choose the items that had the lowest significant (that is above 4.5) loadings from the first factor. In other words, I have chosen as representative for authoritarian personality scale the items with the lowest loading on the right-wing authoritarianism pool of 19 items. The decision was justified by the thought that these low loading items on the right-wing authoritarianism scale measure mild authoritarianism at individual level, that is a form of authoritarian personality stripped of the right wing ideology.

<b>Factors</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
"loud mouths" (RWA1)	<b>0.471</b>	0.187	-0.292	-0.031
"obey their husbands" (RWA2)	0.355	-0.469	0.036	0.133
"mighty leader" (RWA3)	<b>0.871</b>	-0.014	-0.025	0.059
"gays and lesbians" (RWA4)	-0.101	<b>0.663</b>	0.031	0.23
"rabble-rousers" (RWA5)	<b>0.475</b>	-0.021	-0.35	0.093
"atheists" (RWA6)	-0.122	0.395	0.295	0.171
"traditional values" (RWA7)	<b>0.845</b>	0.036	-0.1	-0.027
"nudist camps" (RWA8)	-0.046	<b>0.495</b>	0.174	0.107
"free thinkers" (RWA9)	-0.042	0.076	<b>0.768</b>	0.002
"smash the perversions" (RWA10)	<b>0.72</b>	-0.083	-0.003	-0.17
"own lifestyle" (RWA11)	0.11	<b>0.75</b>	0.271	-0.05
"old-fashioned ways" (RWA12)	<b>0.497</b>	-0.128	0.023	-0.503
"women's abortion rights" (RWA13)	0.042	0.315	0.291	0.393
"strong, determined leader" (RWA14)	<b>0.818</b>	0.021	-0.039	-0.025
"challenging our government" (RWA15)	-0.041	0.006	<b>0.638</b>	0.216
"immoral people" (RWA16)	<b>0.499</b>	-0.513	0.089	-0.093
"God's law" (RWA17)	<b>0.719</b>	-0.102	-0.027	0.077
"woman's place" (RWA18)	-0.022	<b>0.655</b>	0.113	-0.02
"forefathers" (RWA19)	<b>0.45</b>	0.074	-0.029	-0.507

After selecting the final items of the authoritarian personality scale, I double checked my decision computing the same type of exploratory factor analysis but only for the six items of the final scale. The exploratory factor analysis in case of the authoritarian 6-item scale shows positive results. The scale is reliable and all the items load into a single factor which measures authoritarianism at individual level. The results can be seen in table 5. Item “The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance” loads the lowest, 0.59, and can be rightly considered the least powerful items from the authoritarian personality scale. Item “It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s minds” came close to the first items in terms of loading into the authoritarian personality scale, with 0.6. The next on the strength of its effects on the authoritarian personality scale were items “There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action” and “Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers” each with a loading of 0.69. The best items in terms of their power in measuring authoritarian personality in the all 6 items scale were items “Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs” and “The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live”, both with loading of 0.85. This means that authoritarian personality is less concerned with punishing protestors and being submissive to the authorities in power, but more with morality and traditional ways of living. Authoritarian personality is here less about religion and punishing atheists, and more about remembering the great minds that created the American polity. An authoritarian is nowadays more concerned with preserving a rightist way of thinking that persecuting the loud mouths who talk nonsense and want to create doubt in people’s minds.



Table 5. Results of exploratory factor analysis for authoritarian personality items	
Item	Factor Loadings
<b>A1</b> The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off their ignorance	<b>0.59</b>
<b>A2</b> It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds	<b>0.6</b>
<b>A3</b> Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs	<b>0.86</b>
<b>A4</b> The "old-fashioned ways" and the "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live	<b>0.85</b>
<b>A5</b> There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action	<b>0.69</b>
<b>A6</b> Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers	<b>0.69</b>

### Populist Attitude

Exploratory factor analysis in case of populist attitude was made to force 4 factors. The eigenvalues above 1 shows that there are two main factors, one strong and one weak, one with an eigenvalue of 4.3 and the other with an eigenvalue of 1.1. These results were expected, as the 10 items in the group of items I tested in case of populist attitude consisted of items who were meant to measure populist ideology at individual level with a focus on popular sovereignty, and of items who were meant to measure anti-elitism, with a focus on the destructive effect of politicians on the population's well-being. The exploratory factor analysis rotation were oblique, meaning that the factors should not be totally different from each other. In other words, there is a common element in the two factors that resulted. Considering the results of the loadings of the 10 populist attitude items, three items should have disappeared from the final form of the scale. However, I have decided to keep the last populist ideology item that was loading 0.394 on the same populist attitude first factor. This item tapped strongly into populist sentiment and in case I removed it, the populist ideology part of the populist attitude scale would have been measured only by two items (first items loaded extremely low and was excluded without discussion), too low for measuring something meaningful.

<b>Table 4. Preliminary exploratory factor analysis for all the 10 populist attitude items</b>				
<b>Factors</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
"good and evil" (POP1)	0.013	0.197	0.181	0.206
"will of the people" (POP2)	<b>0.486</b>	0.411	0.331	0.313
"special interests" (POP3)	<b>0.629</b>	0.245	<b>0.484</b>	<b>0.508</b>
"people, not the politicians" (POP4)	0.394	1.097	0.357	0.297
"sell out to interest groups" (ANT1)	<b>0.888</b>	0.354	<b>0.625</b>	0.412
"sell out to big business" (ANT2)	<b>0.793</b>	0.296	<b>0.616</b>	0.437
"power for its own sake" (ANT3)	<b>0.635</b>	0.267	<b>0.723</b>	0.371
"politicians use power for own interests" (ANT4)	0.4	0.243	<b>0.463</b>	0.397
"politicians against ordinary people" (ANT5)	<b>0.589</b>	0.257	<b>0.857</b>	0.412

After selecting the final seven items out of the initial ten items, it was mandatory to check through another exploratory factor analysis my decision, that is, if the items load together into a same populist attitude factor. From the 7-item populist attitude scale, three items measure successfully a populism factor, with loadings all above the 0.5 threshold (see Steiger, 1990). In addition to this, the four items measuring anti-elitism also load into the populism latent factor, with very good loadings. The results of the exploratory factor analysis for the populism and anti-elitism items can be found in the table 6. Item “The politicians in Congress needs to follow the will of the people” load significantly well on the overall populist attitude latent variable, 0.74. The second item loads less getting to the point of actually having no real power on the overall populist attitude variable, with a loading less than the accepted threshold of .45, but pretty close to it. The third item “The people, not the politicians, should make the most important policy decisions” loads quite low as well, standing at 0.57, just above the standard threshold. The anti-elitism items stand quite good overall, with loading varying between 0.71 and 0.84, respectably nice loadings. The lowest of them is item “Politicians do not want to improve the lives of ordinary people” and the highest loading on the overall populist attitude latent variable is “Elected politicians sell out to various interest groups”. Item “Elected politicians sell out to big business” is also high on the loadings ranking, being similar to the previous item, just with the small difference that instead of interest groups, politicians are said to sell their interests to big business. Item “High level public officials seek power for its own sake” is also a big predictor of the populist attitude at individual level, with a loading of 0.72.


Table 6. Results of exploratory factor analysis for the populist attitude items	
Item	Factor Loadings
<b>POP1</b> The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people.	<b>0.74</b>
<b>POP2</b> The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress	0.41
<b>POP3</b> The people, not the politicians, should make the most important policy decisions	<b>0.57</b>
<b>ANT1</b> Elected politicians sell out to various interests groups	<b>0.84</b>
<b>ANT2</b> Elected politicians sell out to big business	<b>0.81</b>
<b>ANT3</b> High level public officials seek power for its own sake	<b>0.72</b>
<b>ANT4</b> Politicians do not want to improve the lives of ordinary people	<b>0.71</b>

## SEM

Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a very popular methodology used non-experimental research. It can be used effectively to address numerous research questions and has become one of the standard methods in social science research. Structural equation modeling is a statistical method that tests a hypothesis using latent variables measured by observed variables forming a structure. In this study, the hypothesis was that authoritarian personality is explaining populist attitude. In order to achieve this, MPlus 6.12 software was used.

The model consists of two latent variables or factors, authoritarian personality and populist attitude, the former being measured by 6 items or observed variables, and the latter by 7 items. A latent variable is a variable that cannot be observed freely and directly, but through other variables named observed variables. Authoritarian personality and populist attitude are two complex personality traits which cannot be observed by asking only a question or two in a questionnaire. Other examples of latent variables can motivation in psychology, powerlessness in sociology, verbal ability in education and capitalism or social class in economy.

The first structural equation model that is shown below is a general, involving the full sample. The model is represented graphically in the figure 3, and is very inspiring for the process of understanding better the underlying issue of populist attitude at individual level. The 7 variables on the right side of the graph mean the three items that measure populist attitude directly. Four items measure the anti-elitism and three items populist ideology. On the left side of the figure, there are the 6 items that measure authoritarian personality. Besides the numbers which represent the loadings of each item, the epsilon symbols represent the standard residual errors. All results are standardized, and all are statistically significant with 99% confidence.



**Figure 3.** SEM model for two latent variables: authoritarian personality on populist attitude

**Goodness of fit.** Chi-square = 254, Df = 64, Chi-square / df = 3.96, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .89, TLI = .86, SRMR = .08

To start with, there is a correlation between the loading of the items on the latent variable and its associated residual. Residual means the difference between the predicted value of the loading of an item and the actual value of it. For example, item “The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance”, which is an item that taps into conservatism, loads 0.6 on the authoritarian personality latent variable and has a residual value of 0.66. The correlation comes from the fact that the higher the loading is, the lower the residual value. In this case, the loading is not either high or low, and the associated residual the same or rather high. In the case of the item “It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s minds”, which taps also into conservatism, the loading is identical, however the residual is slightly lower. The explanation lays in the data, but there is not much sense to go further into details with the residuals.

These first two items on the left side of the graph have the lowest explanatory power on the authoritarian personality latent variable. Further, items “Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs”, which taps more into authoritarian personality than the first two, and “The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values”, which taps into traditionalism, still show the best way to live are the best explanatory variables for authoritarian personality. With loading over 0.8, more exactly 0.85 for the conservatism item and 0.84 for the traditionalism item, these are the items with the highest loadings and that influence the most the method of measuring authoritarian personality. “Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs” is the most representative item for the latent variable authoritarian personality. An authoritarian would be a person who would consider our society a dangerous place to live in because of the groups of perceived to be perverts that are immoral and cause the rotting of the society. An authoritarian in my sample therefore would be an intolerant person, with high level of prejudice, and he or she thinks that those who are critical about the government will also determine the destruction of the society and of the good old traditional ways of living. Close to this, “The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live” is loading almost as high as the previous variable on the concept. An



authoritarian, besides being traditional and anti-liberal, is intuitively also conservative with regards to what is the best way to live. Authoritarians, in my sample, reject everything that is new and look up only to the values of the past. The last two items that are loading on the authoritarian personality have identical scores, 0.69. Authoritarians are pretty much also anti-radical and nostalgic about a “golden age”.

On the right side of figure 3 above, there is represented graphically the dependent latent variable populist attitude, with the names of the observed variables, their loadings, and their residuals. At a first sight, we can observe that there are two items that load pretty poor on the factor. With a loading of 0.5, item “The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people” does not weight much on the measurement of how populists are individuals at individual level. With an even worse score, item “The people, not the politicians, should make the most important policy decisions” barely passes the threshold of 0.45 of being considered at all in the model. On the contrary, item “The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress” loads satisfactorily well, with a loading of 0.63. There is enough reason to consider that this item is quite important overall for the latent variable analyzed. It means that we can consider people with a populist attitude as mostly anti-elitist and radical, to say the least. Further, there comes the most important item when it comes to populist attitude. Item “Elected politicians sell out to various interests groups” has the highest loading, 0.86. “Elected politicians sell out to various interests groups” is a statement that taps in the anti-establishment feeling of the American people. The disillusionment with the government is however quite normal in every state in the developed economies of the globe. Therefore, a populist, at individual level, would consider anti-elitism and would even be ‘conspiracyist’ about the generalizability of corruption among the members of the Congress. “Elected politicians sell out to big business” comes close with a loading of 0.8. It is also a very important item on the overall measurement of the latent variable we are discussing here and taps in the same issue as the previous item, with the slight difference that here it is about the political connection of big businesses in contrast to various interest groups, which might be or not of an economic flavor. The last two items come with pretty high loadings as well, 0.7 and 0.68 and they are both representative for the whole concept. They tap into issues that are permanent in the public discourse on the left side of the political spectrum, that the established authorities possess too much power, and that elected politicians are selfish and do not do their job in representing the interests of the represented citizens.

There is a small and negative effect of authoritarian personality on populist attitude. The regression effect of -0.12 between the two latent variable is significant with at least 95% confidence ( $p = 0.017$ ). If one moves a standard deviation on the authoritarian personality scale, the effect on the scale of the populist attitude would be a negative -0.12. The fact that is significant is encouraging, however, -0.12 is not the biggest effect ever. Being more traditional makes you less populist and vice versa, being more anti-elitist makes American more likely to be authoritarian. This is a new finding in personality studies. There has also to be a discussion of the goodness of fit, if this result is to be taken serious. As much as the number -0.12 represents something, it would not suffice if the goodness of fit would not be satisfactory. The chi-square, which is a non-parametric measure designed to analyze group differences when the dependent variable is measure at a nominal level. Chi-square is robust to the distribution of data and it does not require equality of variance among the study group of homoscedasticity in the data. It is a significance statistic, and should be followed by a strength statistic, like the CFI or RMSEA. When there are more than 20 categories involved, it is very difficult to interpret it, but the literature says in these cases the interpretation of the chi-square should be chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom should be between 2 and 5. (Hu & Bentler, 1999) For the first model involving all the sample, chi-square is 254, and considering that there are 64 degrees of freedom, chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom equals 3.96, a decent result according to the standards. Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) test statistic is a test statistic for the goodness-of-fit in Structural Equation Models. There are authors who say that the standard for the RMSEA should be 0.05, but there are scholar who proved that there is little empirical support for this threshold, and that there can be accepted even higher results. (Chen et al., 2008) For this model, the RMSEA is .07. CFI is the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) is a widely used fit index for evaluating different stages of factorial invariance, including metric invariance (equal factor loadings), scalar invariance (equal intercepts), and strict invariance (equal unique factor variances). Its cut-off point is .90 and in the case of our model it is .89, therefore close to the accepted level. The SRMR is an absolute measure of fit and is defined as the standardized difference between the observed correlation and the predicted correlation. It is a positively biased measure and that bias is greater for small N and for low degrees of freedom studies. Because the SRMR is an absolute measure of fit, a value of zero indicates perfect

fit. The SRMR has no penalty for model complexity. A value less than .08 is generally considered a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). In this case, the SRMR is .08.

The most important finding in this study is that men and women are different and unequal in their psychological measurement of how authoritarian personality determine or not anti-elitism and disrespect for politicians in general. The figures 4 and 5 below represent the SEM model with two latent variables and 11 items who measure them, just like the above model, with the important difference that figure 4 represents graphically the answers of only the female respondents in the sample and figure 5 represents graphically the answers of only the male respondents. Before interpreting the loadings of the items on the latent variables, there should be said that the most important fact here is that the regression effect of the authoritarian personality on the populist attitude is significant only for the men model (-0.15;  $p=0.03$ ), even though in both cases the effect is negative, small, and similar in magnitude, which could trigger doubts of the significance of the finding. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in the conclusion.


There are two main differences in the men and women models. First, there is a difference on the loadings of the items on the left side of the graph, that is the authoritarian personality independent latent variable. In the men graph of the model, there are significant differences in the loadings of the first two items, “The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance” and “It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s minds”, compared to the women loadings on the factor, where these two items had lower loadings. Translated into real terms, authoritarian women respect less the established authorities and are less submissive to these than authoritarian men are. Authoritarian women are more rebel, but not substantially. Authoritarian women hate less the critics of the authorities than authoritarian men do. Women are more tolerant of the opponents in general. Furthermore, there are significant differences of loadings on the main two components of the authoritarian personality, items “Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs” and “The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live”. For men, authoritarian personality

involves less traditionalism than for women than for men. Authoritarian women care more about a golden age than about the current established authorities than authoritarian men.


Second, there are significant differences on how the populist attitude is measured in men than in women in the models. More clearly, women with populist views differ than men with populist views when it comes to the perception over the elected politicians. A woman with populist views would consider less than a man with populist views that the elected politicians are there only for their own interests. A woman with populist views therefore has more trust in the elected politicians than a man with populist views. Anti-elitist women are more moderate than the anti-elitist men, reinforcing the findings from the authoritarian personality paragraph above. Anti-elitist women would think less than anti-elitist men that politicians are there not to increase the well-being of the citizens they represent.

There is better fit in the female respondents model than in the male respondents model. The chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom in case of the women model is 2.95, while in the male model it equals 3.2, therefore a slightly worse score if we have in mind that the standard goal is 2. Root mean square error of association is .07 in case of the women respondents and .08 in case of the male model both largely accepted within the .08 maximum threshold. Comparative fit index is .87 in case of the women model, quite low and definitely lower than the .90 expected and accepted threshold. In case of the male model, the CFI is .85, which brings some doubts about the validity of the model. Finally, the SRMR, standardized root mean square residual are satisfactory in both of the case, because the both SMRSs are less than .1, the standard threshold. (Hu & Bentler, 1999) Both of the models can be shown graphically in the figures below.

**Figure 4.** SEM model for two latent variable for women respondents



**Goodness of fit.** Chi-square = 189, Df = 64, Chi-square / df = 2.95, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .87, TLI = .84, SRMR = .09



**Figure 5.** SEM model for two latent variables for men respondents

**Goodness of fit:** Chi-square = 205, Df = 64, Chi-square / df = 3.2, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .85, TLU = .81, SRMR = .1

In this paper, I have built a model of how to measure authoritarian personality and populist attitude and shown that for men there are reason that these two influence each other, while for women there is not enough evidence to show the same. With the help of histograms, contingency tables, and SEM models, I have proved that in this sample of United States of America of mostly educated respondents, mainly White Americans, women are not more authoritarian than men, as Brandt & Henry (2012) assumed for individualistic countries, just like USA. There is not enough evidence to sustain this statement, as women seem to have the same levels of authoritarian personality than men do. There is evidence to consider quite the opposite. Two authoritarian personality items t-tests have shown that the mean of men answers were significantly higher than the mean of women respondents

I have tried to prove that in case of men, the latent variable authoritarian personality explains some of the variance of the dependent variable populist attitude. This was significant for men, but not for women, for several reasons. First of all, the answers of the women were less spread out, that is, at least in case of the authoritarian personality items there were many items with most of the answers clustered around one point of the scale than in the case of male respondents and this can be calmly considered a sign that men might have paid much more attention in selecting their answer based on diverse mechanics of their thought, while women might have chosen the first answer that came into their mind for that particular item.

Anti-elitism exists in the American society, and is high in both women and men clusters, but for women there are higher levels of populist attitude than in the case of men. However, in the end, traditionalism and conservatism is linked (even though negatively) more with anti-elitism for men than for women. For men, traditionalism and conservatism are more about elitism than for women.

Brandt & Henry (2012) documented the fact that women are more authoritarian than men as a function of the inequality present in the society and this thesis have proved this to be wrong. According to their study, women would be more authoritarian in countries that are individualistic, whereas in collectivistic countries, men would be more authoritarian than women. Does this mean that USA supports all of a sudden values of solidarity with the marginalized? I would doubt this very much. It is the sample bias, a bias towards more egalitarian views, because of the high levels of education of both men and women in my sample.

Finally, why would be men's authoritarian personality correlated with elitism? The logic behind it is that if low authoritarian personality is correlated with high populist values, then the opposite might be true as well. Why women who possess an authoritarian personality are not as elitist as men are? Or are they, and it is just the way these two latent variables are measured in this thesis? I have tried to give some explanations above, after Hawkins et al. (2012) suggested that "while populism should not be reduced to a personality type or trait, it is probably influenced by basic traits such as those associated with an authoritarian disposition" (p. 4) Authoritarian personality can be a determinant for populist attitude for men and not for women because women are not so afraid of the world. They have distinct mechanisms to cope with uncertainty. For men, possessing an authoritarian personality triggers an elitist attitude (therefore the negative effect on populist attitude), elitist view which guarantees men the rigidity of the hierarchy which makes them safe. For women, having authoritarian personality and seeking for safety does not trigger elitism in the way it triggers it for men, because they do not feel safe in a hierarchical and controlled world. For women, the new and the unfamiliar are what for men mean quite the opposite. They do not feel threatened by entropy because they were most probably socialized in their childhood that change is needed and should be accepted most of the times without thinking too much, by various institutions starting with family and ending with workplace. More interesting, a development of this study would be checking if authoritarian personality explain more populist attitude in the case of persons who were raised without a permanent authority, like orphans, children of single parents. It might seem that for men who are orphans or that were raised by single mothers authoritarian personality is not so developed and this might resemble similar populist attitudes with those of women, that is more receptive to changes, more flexible and less inclined to flight towards safe places in stressful situations. Oesterreich (2005) An old study linked authoritarian personality with imitation of aggressive models. (Epstein, 1966) In this were the case, then it is also worth mentioning it in the context of the effect that this thesis has found. If men find more aggressive models to imitate, like a father in a patriarchal house, and women find imitative models other than this aggressive type of the father, like the submissive mother, then this can also explain why authoritarian personality is an independent and explanatory variable for populist attitude for men but not for women.



## Conclusion

A lot of research has been done in defining and measuring authoritarian personality, and a lot less, if something at all, has been written on how authoritarian are men compared to women, how authoritarian personality is linked with populist attitude, and what are the gender differences of this causal relationship, and most of all how do we measure successfully these two concepts. In this study, I have proposed a way to measure populism at individual level, and in the same time I have tried to explain the gender differences appearing when measuring and linking such complex concepts. I have argued that gender differences are small, but consistent, and that there are many explanations of why authoritarian personality is a significant explanatory variable for populist attitude in case of male respondents but not in the case of female respondents.

I have used a new method to collect data, a method that brings reliable samples of American population. I have also used a professional software to analyze the results for the explanatory factor analysis and for the structural equation model. I have constructed two brand new scales, each of them with powerful loadings coming from the items that were observed in the survey. Initially, there were 22 authoritarian personality items, and I have restricted the authoritarian personality scale to only 6 of them through exploratory factor analysis. Also, there were 15 populist attitude items and I have restricted the populist attitude scale to only 7 items, according to my goal and to the best loadings of the EFA.

I have analyzed the data carefully through a variety of statistical tools, like descriptive statistics, contingency tables, histograms, and two-sample t-tests. This is a sample of mostly White and educated Americans: 40% of the sample holds a bachelor degree; average age is 37 years old; 82% is White. The results showed that lower income people are more submissive towards the established authorities than the higher incomes, and that White men are more populist than White women. We rejected the conclusion of Brandt & Henry (2012) who asserted that in more individualistic countries like the United States of America, women are more authoritarian than men because of survival mechanisms and tactics of coping with the inequality gap, because in this sample, women were as authoritarian as men overall. Women in my sample are not more and not less authoritarian than men, at least when it comes to White women. I have also found that never married women have a considerably stronger populist attitude than married women. Moreover, married men and married women are much more authoritarian than never married men and never married women.

The most important finding of this study, however, consists in the way how authoritarian personality differs in men compared with women, and more especially how authoritarian personality is negatively but significantly an explanatory variable for populist attitude in the case of male respondents in the sample. Actually, a move of one standard deviation on the authoritarian personality scale produces a -0.15 points movement on the populist attitude scale for male respondents, statistically significant with 95% confidence. On the contrary, the effect of authoritarian personality on populist attitude is not significant for women ( $p=0.09$ ), but significant for men with 95% confidence. ( $p=0.03$ ) Women tend to agree slightly more on average than men with a link between the interest of the politicians and the interests of some of the special groups in the economy. Women tend to agree more on average than men with a link between the interest of the politicians and the interests of big corporations. Women tend to be less conservative, but more moderate than men. However, women tend to be more traditional than men. All of these can be results of the long-time inequality present in the North American continent or of the different gender roles that were socialized in institutions like family and workplace. These results can also be the results of different expectation that men and women might have from politics or can be the results of only different sample sizes. The number of women in the sample used in this study is roughly 10% higher than the number of men.

This study has many limits. First of all, the fact that the data was gathered online and there might be a bias in the way the survey was filled in by the respondents. Second, structural equation modeling method might prove inappropriate to the goal of showing that authoritarian personality might have an effect on populist attitude. Third, there can be found limits in the way I have built the authoritarian personality and populist attitude scales. This does not necessarily mean that these items measure indeed authoritarian personality or populist attitude. These factors could be easily enough named traditionalism and anti-elitism.

Firstly, this thesis has set the framework for a new way to measure authoritarian personality and populist attitude with smaller but reliable scale. If one can measure these two concepts with six or seven items, this means that the cost of the studies of personality and political attitudes can go down. Faster ways means also more chances of getting results that can be generalized to a whole population.

Secondly, this study has contributed to a better understanding of how authoritarian personality and populist attitude differs between men and women and sets the stage to how to measure differences among men and among women. Moreover, this study can be expanded to studying regionally these two concepts. In Texas there could be that citizens overall are more authoritarian, while in New York or California citizens could be much less populist than in Midwest. With the help of the SEM model I have brought under scrutiny in this thesis, there can be found way of communicating political messages more effectively. If a political communicator knows that authoritarian personality increase the chances of neutralizing populist attitude, then this can have a practical effect on political communicators. Even more, educators can use strategically this finding as a way to eliminate the inequality from early institutions like school or college.

This study contributes also to improving the way salient issues are imposed on the daily agenda. If you know the relationship between authoritarianism and attitude towards homosexuality (Whitley & Lee, 2000), then a third instrumental concept, that of populist attitude, might help the political communicator impose a view on a sample or population, given the fact that we know that figures of the relationship between authoritarian personality and populist attitude from this study. Moreover, this study has not shown any evidence that there might be a significant connection between authoritarian personality and populist attitude, but it showed that there is evidence that women might be more prejudiced than men, prejudice which might mediate the relationship mentioned above. Other studies showed that stereotyping mediated the relationship between authoritarian personality and other variables, like attitudes towards homosexuality. (Whitley Jr., 1999)

This study can have implication for the question of how to respond to the rise of the right-wing populist parties in Europe, as we see the relative success of Tea Party and Occupy movements in the USA. If men support more the populist parties and there is a negative connection between authoritarian personality and populist attitudes for men, then it means that those men who support populist parties are partly low authoritarians, paradoxically as it may sound. This implication can be used by communicators of the rival political parties. On the same logic, populist parties can use the finding of this study to attract more women as their supporters. This political psychology perspective can be the new approach that everybody is expecting.

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## Appendix 1

### Populist attitude scale

Likert scale, 1 = strongly disagree | 7 = strongly agree

**POP1** - The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people

**POP2** - The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress

**POP3** - The people, not the politicians, should make the most important policy decisions

**ANT1** - Elected politicians sell out to various interests groups

**ANT2** - Elected politicians sell out to big business

**ANT3** - High level public officials seek power for its own sake

**ANT4** - Politicians do not want to improve the lives of ordinary people

### Authoritarianism scale

Likert scale, 1 = strongly disagree | 7 = strongly agree

**A1** - The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance **(C)**

**A2** - It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s minds **(C)**

**A3** - Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs **(A)**


**A4** - The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live **(T)**





**A5** - There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action **(A)**


**A6** - Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers **(T)**

## Appendix 2


Populist attitude histograms split by gender:












Populist attitude histograms split by gender:











## Appendix 3

**Table 1. Two sample t-tests for age in populist attitude scale.**

Item	Mean 18-33 yrs	SD	Mean 34+ yrs	SD	T-score
POP1 The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people.	5.69	1.28	5.75	1.23	-0.49 (0.61)
POP2 The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress	5.15	1.64	5.2	1.62	-0.32 (0.75)
POP3 The people, not the politicians, should make the most important policy decisions	5.08	1.51	4.99	1.53	0.56 (0.57)
ANT1 Elected politicians sell out to various interests groups	5.48	1.42	5.78	1.37	<b>-2.17 (0.03)**</b>
ANT2 Elected politicians sell out to big business	5.56	1.45	5.49	1.36	0.49 (0.62)
ANT3 High level public officials seek power for its own sake	5.26	1.43	5.16	1.45	0.70 (0.48)
ANT4 Politicians do not want to improve the lives of ordinary people	4.53	1.71	4.63	1.6	-0.6 (0.55)

**Note.** P-values are in parenthesis. P-values smaller than 0.01 are marked with \*\*\*, p-values smaller than 0.05 are marked with \*\*, and p-values smaller than 0.1 are marked with \*, which means the differences of means are statistically significant with 99%, 95%, or 90% confidence respectively.

**Table 2. Two sample t-tests for age in authoritarian personality scale.**

Item	Mean 18-33 yrs	SD	Mean 34+ yrs	SD	T-score
A1 The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off their ignorance	2.64	1.58	2.6	1.46	0.29 (0.77)
A2 It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds	2.53	1.64	2.65	1.66	-0.55 (0.58)
A3 Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs	2.86	1.98	3.11	2.19	-1.17 (0.24)
A4 The "old-fashioned ways" and the "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live	3.25	1.96	4.06	2	<b>-4 (0.00)***</b>
A5 There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action	2.86	1.9	3.11	1.99	-1.23 (0.22)
A6 Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers	3.92	1.91	4.17	1.86	-1.26 (0.21)

**Note.** P-values are in parenthesis. P-values smaller than 0.01 are marked with \*\*\*, p-values smaller than 0.05 are marked with \*\*, and p-values smaller than 0.1 are marked with \*, which means the differences of means are statistically significant with 99%, 95%, or 90% confidence respectively.

## Appendix 4

**Table 3. Two sample t-tests for age in authoritarian personality scale.**

Item	Mean <\$50000	SD	Mean >\$50000	SD	T-score
A1 The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off their ignorance	2.56	1.54	2.66	1.48	-0.6 (0.55)
A2 It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds	2.66	1.8	2.49	1.45	1.06 (0.29)
A3 Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs	3.06	2.06	2.98	2.11	0.34 (0.73)
A4 The "old-fashioned ways" and the "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live	3.5	1.96	3.85	2.09	<b>-1.61 (0.1)*</b>
A5 There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action	2.94	1.93	3.05	1.93	-0.54 (0.6)
A6 Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers	3.94	1.95	4.19	11.83	-1.25 (0.21)

**Note.** P-values are in parenthesis. P-values smaller than 0.01 are marked with \*\*\*, p-values smaller than 0.05 are marked with \*\*, and p-values smaller than 0.1 are marked with \*, which means the differences of means are statistically significant with 99%, 95%, or 90% confidence respectively.

**Table 4. Two sample t-tests for income in populist attitude scale.**

Item	Mean <\$50 000	SD	Mean >\$50 000	SD	T-score
POP1 The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people	5.8	1.26	5.65	1.26	1.08 (0.28)
POP2 The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress	5.23	1.73	5.08	1.55	0.82 (0.41)
POP3 The people, not the politicians, should make the most important policy decisions	5.04	1.58	5.02	1.48	0.15 (0.88)
ANT1 Elected politicians sell out to various interests groups	5.62	1.38	5.66	1.45	-0.29 (0.77)
ANT2 Elected politicians sell out to big business	5.65	1.37	5.42	1.42	1.51 (0.13)
ANT3 High level public officials seek power for its own sake	5.28	1.46	5.15	1.41	0.88 (0.38)
ANT4 Politicians do not want to improve the lives of ordinary people	4.7	1.68	4.43	1.66	1.59 (0.11)

**Note.** P-values are in parenthesis. P-values smaller than 0.01 are marked with \*\*\*, p-values smaller than 0.05 are marked with \*\*, and p-values smaller than 0.1 are marked with \*, which means the differences of means are statistically significant with 99%, 95%, or 90% confidence respectively.

## Appendix 5

### Code for R statistical package used for the thesis:

#### Reading the data:

```
data <- read.csv('polberg_mturk_0114_v1.1.3_numbers_only.csv', header=FALSE)
varnames <- unlist(strsplit(readLines("variable_list_final.txt"), ' '))
names(data) <- varnames
data[data== -999] <- NA
data <- subset(data, pilot == 0)
```

#### Latent variable histograms template:

```
histogram(data$pop, data=data, xlab="Populist Attitude", main="Figure 1. Histogram of the populist attitude latent variable")
```

#### Gender histograms template:

```
data$sex=ifelse(data$gender==1, "Male", "Female")
histogram(~data$pop2|data$sex, data=data, main="Histogram of POP1 split by gender",
xlab="The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people")
```

### Code used in Mplus 6 for EFA:

TITLE: Exploratory Factor Analysis.

DATA: FILE IS data\_0214\_final\_MPLUS.csv;

DEFINE:

age = 2014-year;

VARIABLE: NAMES ARE

pop1 pop2 pop3 pop4 plu1 plu2 plu3 sd1 sd2 sd3 sd4 ant1 ant2 ant3 ant4 ant5 ant6 rwa1 rwa2  
rwa3 rwa4 rwa5 rwa6 rwa7 rwa8 rwa9 rwa10 rwa11 rwa12 rwa13 rwa14 rwa15 rwa16 rwa17  
rwa18 rwa19 year marital eduyrs degree race gender state income;

USEOBSERVATIONS (num GT 50);

MISSING ARE ALL (-999);

USEVARIABLES ARE rwa1 rwa2 rwa3 rwa4 rwa5 rwa6

rwa7 rwa8 rwa9 rwa10 rwa11 rwa12 rwa13 rwa14 rwa15 rwa16 rwa17 rwa18 rwa19;

ANALYSIS:

TYPE = EFA 1 4;

ROTATION=GEOMIN(OBLIQUE);