

**Examining the Radicalization of Proposed Policies on Multiculturalism
within the EU-28 Post 2007**

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Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Public Policy

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Public Policy

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Budapest, Hungary

2015

Author's Declaration

I, the undersigned, **Christina Herrmann**, hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

This is a true copy of the thesis, including final revisions.

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Abstract

The 2007 financial crisis has made many countries within the European Union worse off. The presence of poor economic and financial conditions creates what many authors believe as a prime ground for the existence of extreme political parties. This thesis will examine the nature of policy proposed on matters of multiculturalism through analyses of the EU-28's most recent manifestos, utilizing data obtained from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). The results reveal that the countries most likely to include negative sentiment on multiculturalism and propose more radical policy post-2007 are in fact the more economically successful ones, rather than the less successful ones.

Introduction

The rise of political parties advocating extreme agendas has been a topic of escalating importance within the European Union in recent years. Whether seen through prominent examples in countries such as the United Kingdom, Greece or Hungary; little has been done so far through the use of national or regional public policy to curb the rising growth and influence of such parties. Any potential effort to combat political extremism is often plagued by issues relating to coordination as well as conflicting political interests.

Often thriving due to poor economic conditions at home, extreme parties gain footholds into their national governments through completely legal means. It is often through undesirable economic conditions that foster the growth of and allow for a platform onto which more extreme ideas as well as propositions for public policies can then gain footing. It is on these propositions that a political party campaigns in order to become elected. Should they then become elected, or gain representation in their respective parliament or legislative, these extreme ideas stand a much better chance of implementation and execution.

One of the most prominent ways that potential public policies can be seen is through an analysis of a political party's manifesto. Usually published shortly before an election, a manifesto serves to detail a particular party's stances towards a variety of issues. It explicitly says what the party believes in and what the party will do with regard to that issue should they gain the power to do so.

I aim to discuss the rise of extreme parties within the EU-28 with regards to proposed public policy regarding the issue of multiculturalism before and after 2007. In narrowing down the scope of public policies to this specific area, a more narrow idea of how the political landscape has changed with regard to this topic will hopefully be created. An

especially topical area of policy today that stems from multiculturalism is immigration, something that currently ranks high on the list of topics that many EU members must currently deal with, especially those with more porous borders to Northern Africa and the Middle East.

Creating and executing effective policy on issues related to multiculturalism is imperative on both the regional level through the European Union as well as on the national level. Unless this issue is adequately tackled, increased levels of xenophobia, racism, as well as illegal—and extremely dangerous immigration will be seen, with significantly added strains at the political and economic levels. This is particularly evident in countries such as Greece and Hungary, both of which are currently struggling to accommodate massive numbers of undocumented and illegal immigrants (despite not even often being final destinations themselves of immigrants), in the face of poor economic conditions themselves in addition to experiencing the successful rise of extreme-right parties such as Jobbik and Golden Dawn. Understanding best-practices on this type of policy is of grave importance, yet necessarily understanding what constitutes best-practices is highly subjective.

The variety of what constitutes proposed attitudes toward immigration will be examined in this thesis. This thesis will not attempt to map what exact policy should be created; rather it will argue that extreme policy—in any form, is an inadequate avenue for governments to pursue. Whether this means extreme right-wing or extreme-left wing policy, the creation of rules and laws that are based around more moderate lines of reasoning and logic should be considered the most optimal. While an issue such as immigration is a serious issue, as it denotes big enough differences between two (or more countries) that motivate an individual to completely resettle themselves, the European Union must be a role-model in encouraging policy that is moderate. Extreme policy, which is often based around conceptions of hateful propaganda, stereotypes and xenophobia, must be disincentivized.

During the course of this analysis, a more nuanced understanding of how political parties are trying to shape their national agendas through the writing of their respective campaign manifestos will be undertaken. The year 2007 will be used as a turning point in determining how parties have attempted to deal with increased levels of multiculturalism. Seeing how extreme (or not) proposed policy has become will be the end-result.

While the proposition and actual implementation of policy are two separate processes, they uniquely shape each other. A policy that has been proposed is much more likely to be eventually implemented than one that has not been proposed. By already gaining traction through inclusion on a party's manifesto, this signals that should that party come to power, these proposals will be very strongly championed for. In this sense, while manifestos reveal only potential future policies, they are extremely good indicators of what a party's exact platform is, and what policies might come into fruition should these party experience electoral success.

In pursuing this line of research, data collected will span all current member states of the European Union (also referred to as the 'EU-28'). The EU-28 is an amalgamation of all countries currently in the European Union including the newer member-states of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. A data-centric approach will be used, using one specific code from the Comparative Manifestos Project, albeit divided among all countries and top political parties. Derived analyses as well as conclusions from my Bachelor's thesis ('Party Radicalization in Response to Financial Crises Post 1990 in the Visegrad Four') will also be utilized in further understanding this topic as well as the relative advantages related to this database.

Chapter 1: Why is This Topic Important?

The rise of extreme political parties is an area of important study with regard to the application of public policy. Policy is a tool that can address the various elements of the life system of party system radicalization at various different levels. As a party system experiences more and more radicalization, the steps required to combat it through the use of effective public policy often becomes much more challenging and lengthy. Effective policy in the very early stages of suspected party system radicalization is the most useful tool in addressing this increasingly prevalent issue.

Due to the extreme wealth of potential topics that are often up for discussion at any one given time, it is important to narrow down the themes to be discussed within this line of research and the concept of radicalization. This is however obviously constrained by the data available in the Comparative Manifestos Project, as every possible type of policy is clearly not coded (although an extremely large number are). According to the definition of radicalization to be discussed later, this thesis will focus on one of the most relevant and contested areas of policy: multiculturalism.

1.1 A Party's Ability to Create Legislation

Specifically, party system radicalization is important because it is these parties that will then have the direct ability to create and influence legislation once elected. This impact can be potentially seen at the local, regional or national levels, with many prominent examples seen today across the European Union. Given the extent to which a party system can be deemed radicalized renders the relative degree to which public policy may end up being shaped.

Important to consider is that the ultimate implementation of public policies are very much dependent on the government and institutions in place within a respective country. A policy can only be implemented so far as a government is willing to do so. Given a country with few democratic controls and a radicalized government that holds a majority of the power, change through the implementation of national public policy is unlikely to happen—let alone even be suggested. The same is also true reversed, given a country with many democratic controls and moderate legislators, change through extreme policy is unlikely to happen. This suggests that for non-extreme public policy to have a chance of implementation there are likely two preconditions: 1. That radicalization is still in its early stages (or non-existent), as a government that can be considered extremely radicalized is unlikely to bring about policy that goes against its own longevity and 2. There need to be sufficient democratic checks in place to ensure the policy cycle can be properly executed, from beginning to end.

1.1 The Importance of Manifestos

One of the best ways of knowing in advance of what a particular political party will advocate for and support if they are elected is by analyzing their particular manifesto. While a manifesto is by no means a fool-proof technique of knowing what the future might hold within a party system, it is a very good indicator nonetheless of fairly accurately knowing what very well might happen given electoral success. Within these manifestos will be detailed synopses on how domestic and foreign policy will be handled in addition to other matters considered important by the electorate. A more radical party system will thus likely include a number of parties advocating for more extreme ideas within their manifestos as compared to a less radical party system.

1.2 Background on the Topic

In order to more fully understand the importance of studying potential radicalization within EU member states, it is important to discuss the history of the region in general with regards to the concept of radicalization.

The European Union currently consists of 28 member states. It operates as political-economic entity as well as single market, which negotiates common supranational policies. While member states are in charge of their daily running of their affairs, many issues of national importance have been agreed to at the supranational level and to which member states agree to abide by. Through the European Parliament, citizens of EU member states have a direct input into the decisions agreed upon. Despite official membership, member states often deviate or stray from official procedure. The increase of radicalization thus suggests a lessening of ties of a member state with the European Union, and the desire to drift (if not leave) this institution. Examples where this can be suggested include the United Kingdom, Hungary and Greece.

In exploring this topic, it is interesting to delve more closely into a specific facet of multiculturalism policy—namely, immigration policy. As multiculturalism is created by the presence of people who migrate to a different country, the two terms are inherently linked to one another. In an increase in immigration will obviously cause an increase in multiculturalism within a country. Before further exploring this topic though, it is pertinent to distinguish between the different types of immigration possible. In brief, someone who migrates to the European Union can either be a legal or illegal immigrant. A legal immigrant is one that has followed all the correct legal procedure for resettlement. This can be as simple as being a citizen of another country of the EU-28, or obtaining the correct paperwork to stay on a long-term basis. An illegal immigrant is one that has bypassed the correct legal channels

for lawful settlement. These types of immigrants are usually un-documented and come from much more dire political and economic circumstances in their home countries to the more affluent European Union. While this difference is important to note, political parties often make little distinction when crafting policy and gaining voter favor, especially if the party is known to be more extreme.

1.4 Multiculturalism with the Context of the EU

The topic of multiculturalism is an important one within the field of public policy. As the topic has become an especially focal issue in 2015 due to massive waves of immigrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa coming to Europe due to political instability, it is extremely pressing to have the appropriate types of policies in place in order to adequately address this issue. While this line of research does not suggest what exact types of policies should be implemented, it does suggest that the most effective one is likely to be of a moderate variety. While deviations are likely to exist from member-state to member-state, the creation of policy that addresses direct issues stemming from multiculturalism—such as immigration, should protect the current interests of citizens within the European Union, while also serving as a model for other regions and countries that are experiencing similar (or even worse) issues.

As member states of the European Union, the twenty-eight countries that currently exist within the bloc must have relatively similar policies with regard to immigration, for example. Procedures which dictate how immigrants can claim asylum, file cases for review and receive potential residency are all highly regulated at the EU level. While this does not imply a loss of total political control to the European Union, as a political and economic zone, member-states must abide by certain agreements and institutions that are regulated at the regional level. Immigration is one such area where extensive regulations and agreements

are already in place. Immigrants with no right to immediate stay in the European Unions, who arrive in whichever European Union member state have a right for their cases to be reviewed in the hopes of receiving a potential stay in that country (or another EU member country).

A country such as Hungary is a prime example of this principle. Hungary has been the beneficiary of massive block grants to maintain detention centers and adequate housing facilities for immigrants in the southern parts of its country, and thus must abide by current procedure found at the EU level regarding illegal immigrant intake and processing. While many political parties often do not favor such practices, the reality is that unless countries wish to disobey EU regulation, many of their hands are often begrudgingly tied with regards to this issue. As levels of immigrants have dramatically increased, especially from war-torn countries such as Syria and Afghanistan, several EU member countries have expressed discontent and disapproval with having to take care and accommodate these migrants, who flee to the European Union in the hopes of a more stable life.

Immigration towards the European Union consists of other sending countries that are not found in war-torn zones. Within recent years, many have fled the Balkan countries in hopes of reaching the European Union. A particularly poignant example of this has been the massive exodus of Kosovar citizens, especially in 2014 and 2015. Tending to wealthier countries of the European Union such as Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden, these migrants have created heated discourse surrounding immigration policy within the majority of the EU member states, especially within their respective electorates.

Specifically looking at radicalization of immigration policy through the lens of manifesto data is particularly noteworthy and relevant issue to examine. By analytically examining how extreme it has gotten in individual member states and putting the data in

context with current discourse, a more complete picture can be seen about how future immigration policy should be undertaken, given sentiment at the national levels.

1.3 Research Question

The question to be evaluated within the scope of this research will be: How radicalized have proposed policies on multiculturalism within the EU-28 become, post-2007?

1.4 Hypothesis

I believe that countries that have experienced the worst shocks to their economic and financial institutions will be the ones most likely to have proposed more radical policies on issues related to multiculturalism post-2007. By creating an environment by which extremism can gain a greater foothold, poor economic conditions allow radical parties to come to fruition and appeal to a wider audience as compared to under more favorable economic conditions. Furthermore, countries that have experienced poor economic conditions and are hubs for immigrants will be the most affected among the EU-28, as they experience having both under-performing economies as well as the burden of processing and potentially integrating migrants.

Chapter 2: Project Inspiration

This nature of this thesis was inspired from a previous body of work written in fulfillment of my Bachelor's thesis at Binghamton University, New York, USA. Entitled, *The Case of Financial Crises on Party Radicalization in the Visegrád Four Post 1989*, this thesis attempted to establish links between the degree of party radicalization within Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic based on the timing of the three most influential financial crisis since 1990: the 1990 transition to market capitalism, the 2000 'dotcom' bubble burst and the 2007/2008 financial crash. In order to construct correlations and tables, data was used from the same source as this thesis, namely, the Comparative Manifestos Project.

2.1 Results of Earlier Research

The results of this above research yielded the fact that out of the four countries being analyzed, Hungary acted in the most extreme manner with respect to the data being presented. When conducting research for my Bachelor's thesis, I exclusively used the Right/Left scores (RILE scores) in examining their changes with respect to the indicated financial crises. Under the results gathered, the strongest results pointed to a radicalization in Hungary (and Slovakia to an extent) since 2007. Poland and the Czech Republic also seemed to move in similar graphical patterns.

In this sense, clusters of countries moving the same directions could also be observed. Where Hungary moved, typically Slovakia moved in tandem, albeit to a lesser degree. The same could be said for Poland and the Czech Republic, both of which had relatively weak signs of radicalization within their party systems. The data confirmed the hypothesis, in the sense that movements after each of the three financial crises being analyzed demonstrated a

higher propensity for these countries to demonstrate characteristics of radicalization through their respect Right/Left scores. The results were especially prominent for the years since the 2007 financial crisis.

2.2 Expansion upon Earlier Research

As this topic has remained relevant in the year since it was published, expanding on this pre-existing topic seemed to be very suitable. In this sense, the data being used has been dramatically expanded upon, now encompassing all countries currently in the European Union. By drastically expanding the scope of countries being analyzed, a clearer picture of party radicalization with Europe can hopefully be seen. The types of policy that should be advocated given the level of perceived radicalization will then be discussed as well, something that was not addressed at all in the earlier thesis. Throughout this line of research, frequent remarks will be given in relation to the original paper created on this topic. Additionally, as the scope of countries has significantly expanded from the previous four countries composing the Visegrád Four¹, it is important to narrow down the scope of proposed policy being analyzed. In this sense, choosing a specific area of policy is important both for issues of conciseness as well as clarity.

Another differentiating factor between theses will be the relative emphasis on the year 2007 (marking the start of the most recent financial crisis) as a marker for party system radicalization. Given the wealth and amount of data, specifically concentrating on the most recent financial crisis as a turning point will allow for a more thorough analysis of the most time-sensitive events. In this sense, looking at before and after 2007 will allow for a succinct analysis of the most recent changes in policy positioning, according to the data being analyzed. As most public policy enacted deals with matters of contemporary importance,

¹ The Visegrad Four is a regional economic union composed of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

concentrating on this latter time seems to be the most appropriate decision in light of the relatively large number of sample cases being tested. It will also allow for an in-depth analysis of how various political systems have reacted with regards to what are likely the effects of the financial downturn.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

In terms of the sample countries, each of the member-states within the EU-28 was used. The data collected is based on coded manifestos found in the Comparative Manifesto Data Project (CMP). The Comparative Manifesto Project is a comprehensive data set including nearly all elections of more than 40 countries post-1945. For each political party and election, the political party's manifesto is uploaded and coded according to a set of pre-determined codes. These codes gauge a particular manifesto's leanings towards major political, economic and social issues such as military spending, immigration, the European Union (where appropriate).

3.1 The Comparative Manifestos Project

Before going into further depth, it is important to discuss what the Comparative Manifestos Project is in a bit of depth. The CMP is a vast collection of election data, detailing information on nearly all respective elections from over fifty countries, mainly in Europe. As explained by the organization,

“Since its formation as the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project (MRG/CMP), the Manifesto Project has dealt with different aspects of party performance as well as the structure and development of party systems. The project is based on quantitative content analyses of parties' election programmes from more than 50 countries covering all free, democratic elections since 1945. The MRG/CMP project seeks to substantively analyse how parties meet challenges posed in the established OECD democracies and in the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Within this broader context, MARPOR specifically examines the quality of programmatic representation by comparing policy preferences of parties to the left-right self-placements of voters over time and across regime types through to the present” (Manifesto Project Database).

As stated above, this database is particularly valuable because it measures policy positions across elections and regime types. Due to the consistency of its data over the years, trying to measure changes over time is very much possible in an objective way. A variety of other measures are included within the database, included but not limited to individual subject

codes for each set of election manifestos. This individual subjects includes a manifesto's calculated frequency and share of that respective manifesto dedicated to discussing a specific subject. These subjects include categories such as military (positive/negative), internationalism (positive/negative), multiculturalism (positive/negative) and European Community/Union (positive/negative).

3.2 Use of the Code 'Multiculturalism (negative)'

I will isolate my examination to one key code, namely, multiculturalism (negative). This code will allow for an analysis of how often multiculturalism is mentioned—and ultimately how much of a percentage this topic is covered within a given manifesto. In this sense, multiculturalism will serve as a proxy for immigration within the scope of this research, as immigration is a defining aspect of the term. The time frame would be from approximately 2000-present, depending on the timing of elections in each country. Start-years will vary as the data will start from the point of two election cycles before 2007, creating a slight bit of variance among countries with regard to start-years. However, this will allow for a minimum of four election cycles in each country and allow for measurement based on the number of elections before or after 2007, as opposed to absolute years.

As there is no code specifically dedicated to immigration, the code of 'Multiculturalism' is the closest parallel, which will be used to substitute for immigration. In this respect, the code 'Multiculturalism' (negative) will serve as a proxy for negative sentiments on immigration. As immigration constitutes greater multiculturalism by virtue of introducing other cultures and nationalities into a certain country, the two terms can be considered synonymous to each other with regard to this line of research. This code will be evaluated in light of the twenty-eight member states in the European Union, with respect to two elections cycles before 2007 and any subsequent elections after 2007.

Specifically what will be looked at will be the share of a particular manifesto that is dedicated to the specific code being measured. When looking at the CMP code specific data, there is a 'Frequency' as well as 'Share' mentioned with respect to each code. 'Frequency' refers to how many times each code is referenced within that particular manifesto. 'Share' represents the total percentage of that manifesto dedicated to the specific code. As manifestos can greatly vary in length, using the total share of the manifesto is the most appropriate measure, as it measures a total percentage as opposed to total value. The corresponding manifesto shares dedicated to the code 'Multiculturalism (negative)' will then be tabulated and analyzed in related to each other, both before and after 2007. To more clearly see any results, graphical interpretations will be included alongside written commentary. Graphs will be limited to seven countries each (creating four graphs in total for the entire EU-28), in order to allow for easier visualization given the number of sample countries being surveyed.

Another important element of this analysis is that only the top two political parties to experience success in a country's election will be used. Success will be determined by the number of seats won at the conclusion of the election. Using this approach is also practical because often times, the top two parties change with each election cycle or form coalitions with other parties. By seeing where the top two parties stand—regardless of which ones they are, system radicalization will be easier to detect with regards to issues related immigration.

3.3 Analyzing Rightward Shifts in Policy

While radicalized systems by definition, become more leftward or rightward leaning by definition, the most common examples in Europe current suggest that radicalization implies an mainly increased tendency to the right. For the purposes of this line of research, it is thus assumed that radicalization implies a greater rightward shift in policy.

Large changes over election cycles are potential cause for worry as this indicates that a party system is getting more extreme (whichever direction it may be). Use of this time-frame would also allow me see how the how the public policy has looked like before and after 2007, using 2007 as a marker for change.

One part of the analysis to follow will involve looking at how often the specific code being interpreted is expressed in a particular political system over each election cycle. The countries could also be compared in relation to each other in this same manner, in order to see if there are any diverging cases among the countries and whether the results are as strong amongst them.

Ultimately, a rightward shift implies a greater focus on a country's immediate needs, with more emphasis on nationalistic feelings, marginalization of minority groups, rejection of regional or supra-national governing bodies and fewer democratic checks. The use of this code is thus particularly relevant and it demonstrates keys aspects of radicalization and regimes that have embraced more potential rightward leaning policies.

3.4 Use of 2007 as a Benchmark

Important to note is that this research will use 2007 as a benchmark to measures changes in data. Recognizing that poor financial conditions often create a breeding ground for political instability and radicalization, using this year as turning point to measure change is thus important. Using this year also allows for an extremely contemporary analysis to occur, one where the public policies created today can be adequately molded and adjusted to reflect any drastic changes seen in the last few years.

While there are arguably more codes that could be used in evaluating the scope of radicalization with the member states of the EU-28, for purposes of brevity, it is important to

limit the number of codes being used. In looking at one of the most pertinent issues that often influence party radicalization, a thorough analysis with respect to the topic can still be done.

Specifically what this research will track is the frequency that these topics are addressed with each political party's manifesto within each country, both in elections before and after 2007. In deciding what the scope of time-series, the data will include two elections before 2007 and each election after 2007. This will allow for adequate long term visualization of how these topics are being perceived over the course of approximately four election cycles. It will also allow for an in-depth analysis of the most recently available data. The recommendations suggested at the very end will then be the most applicable, given the recent nature of the data.

3.5 Criticisms of the Comparative Manifestos Project

One distinct criticism that is often discussed at length about the Manifesto Database Project is the relative subjectivity that comes with coding manifestos. While a solid set of standards exists in how to code manifestos, human interpretation is ultimately used in deciding whether a certain part of a manifesto exhibits signs of belonging to a certain code category. Decisions on whether or not to include a certain section in code category is an absolute decision on behalf of the coder, as it either fits into the code category, or it does not. As with the type of research, results would likely vary from coder to coder, with exact duplications unlikely. This reliance on human interpretation and the potential for subjectivity within the data points is another point—albeit a minor one, to consider.

While criticisms of the database exists, it remains by far one of the extensive and most reliable datasets for measuring policy positioning in some of the world's biggest and most influential countries. Regularly used by other scholars and frequently cited in literature on

political parties, it is an excellent source for quantitative research on this topic. It is for this reason that the Comparative Manifestos Project was used for the purposes of this research.

Chapter 4: Literature Review

Substantial literature exists on the roots of radicalization. While much of it is often country or region specific, authors commonly point to a few core reasons as to why it tends to appear in certain places, most importantly in extreme parties as opposed to others. In order to understand the relation to immigration policy, it must first be understood what radicalization is, why it happens and what the root causes of it are within Europe.

4.1 Defining Radicalization

Important to consider is also what radicalization means. Establishing a more clear definition based on how scholars currently frame the term is critical to establishing a framework by which to evaluate it within a greater context. A potentially very relative term, this line of research accepts certain preconditions to what radicalization entails based on the literature surveyed. While there are arguably many sides to what radicalization entails, a single definition reflecting an amalgamation of the most current arguments on what it entails will be used. As elaborated on in the my previous thesis,

“This definition of radicalization consists of three parts. Firstly there will greater election of traditionally left and/or right wing fringe parties into a country’s parliament. Secondly, parties adopt more extreme rhetoric. This can be examined by viewing material such as manifestos, speeches, press releases and campaign slogans. Lastly, public policy created by those in power will reflect the increasing leftward or rightward leaning of government. It can also take more extreme stances if the same party remains in control over time” (Herrmann, 2014).

Within the scope of this definition, the first two parts are directly measurable components.

The third component, public policy created, is an effect that comes as a result of the first two components. This is best seen through the level of proposed policy in each manifesto, seen by the ‘Share’ of each code. The use of the Comparative Manifestos Database is a tool that can adequately measure three components within the scope of the larger definition of radicalization.

4.2 Classifying Radicalization into Groups

Within literature on radicalization there is a tendency to when not being country specific, classifying European countries into Eastern and Western Europe. When dealing with issues that specifically related to immigration policy and radical parties, a clear divide is then seen within Eastern and Western European regimes, according to authors. Within Eastern European regimes, the tendency is that extreme political parties serve as harbingers against minority groups already established within that respective country. These minority groups are usually seen as threats and ‘outsiders’ to a relatively otherwise homogenous society. As these countries are not typically locations for immigrants, these groups take the place of a group that is usually resented by extreme parties. Within Western European regimes, the tendency is that extreme political parties’ campaign against immigrants that actively migrate to these countries due mainly to economic reasons. As opposed to seeing the threat as an internal one, it is rather seen as an external one.

4.3 The Impact of Poor Economic Conditions Explanation

One of the most prominent ideas seen in literature is that poor economic conditions lead to greater rates of radicalization (Pirro and van Kessel 2013). Poor economic conditions in a country serve as a trigger for radical political parties to capitalize on. Taking the stance that current government action is inappropriate relative to the issue at stake, these parties are able to gain momentum off feelings of government inadequacy with regards to policy created. By claiming themselves as the ‘ultimate advocates of popular sovereignty’, they are able to command attention and relevance on the national stage, gaining more momentum as economic conditions are then worsen and deteriorate. Within the scope of this argument, the authors specifically focus on one distinct area of party radicalization: EU policy.

EU policy has an important link to the sentiments on immigration as the two are also uniquely tied together. While this is an area that will not be directly addressed within this thesis, it is important to note that many of the directives regarding immigration as well as asylum are policies coordinated at the EU level. Significant level of funding with regards to maintaining institutions for potential migrants are handed down from the EU to member-states, with explicit instructions for use. Therefore, in discussing the impact of potentially increased radicalization of immigration policy, one must also take into consideration how political parties view the European Union, as the two issues are tied together.

4.4 Euro-skepticism Explanation

The idea that euro-skepticism as a common as a common denominator in radicalized parties is a recognized feature (Pirro and van Kessel 2013). Pirro and van Kessel (2013) discuss how PPR parties (populist radical right) are influenced by economic crises, in the sense that these crises prompt much more radical discourse and policy positioning with regards to issues such as EU integration. This in turn is termed to be ‘radicalization’ by the authors, who discuss two prominent case studies in depth: Jobbik (Hungary) and Party for Freedom (the Netherlands). Both of these parties serve as excellent case studies for not only radicalized parties, but radicalized parties that have in turn become even more right-ward leaning over time. The authors note that this point can be seen because over time, these parties have gone from embracing a ‘Euro-skeptic’ position to a ‘Euro-reject’ position. They argue that a complete rejection of the EU on behalf of ‘PPR’ parties, as seen in these two case studies, may cause other parties within such national systems to adjust their respective agendas, in order to remain competitive (Pirro and van Kessel 2013).

Along this line of logic, the 2007 financial crisis would certainly fall under the criteria mentioned by the above authors as a potential cause for party radicalization. While the

authors specifically focus on issues related to the radicalization of EU-policy by member states, the arguments presented serve to provide an excellent foundation for the examining one of the aspects of party radicalization that this paper is seeking to analyze.

4.4 Radicalization as a Relative Feature Explanation

The authors also make the important point that the idea that political parties does not exist within a vacuum on the national level. If euro-skepticism is being embraced relative to the stances of the other political parties within a country, then it should be perhaps expected that PPR parties will embrace the issue in relation to what the political system is tending to, and then some. The authors conclude their article by reiterating the belief that PPR parties within Europe have been indeed subject to radicalization, with regards to their policy stances.

“We suspect that the critical attitude of PRR parties has radicalised during the past few years, bringing PRR parties’ (often erratic) Euro-sceptic position on the issue in the direction of Euro-rejection. We consider a change in a PRR party’s position vis-à-vis EU membership (i.e. from original support for continuing membership to recent calls for country’s ‘exit’) to be the ultimate expression of this radicalisation. Moreover, because of the economic and political crises, PRR parties in Europe have had an incentive to move their anti-EU discourse at the top of their agendas, presenting themselves as the main critics of the current status quo” (Pirro and van Kessel 2013).

4.5 The “Crisis of Access” Explanation

Another useful piece of literature to consider is Langenbacher and Schellenberg (2011). These authors discuss an important term they coin, “The crisis of access”, which is what more radicalized parties sometimes feels that they are experiencing as a result of the status quo. This term refers to the feeling of disenfranchisement that certain groups may feel in response to existing government policy. These feelings include the perception that they are being disadvantaged in relation to another group and that the rights they are entitled to are not being adequately protected by the regime in place. As a result of seeing the existing

governmental institutions as inadequate, these people opt for political parties that seek to adjust and reverse the status quo through more extreme policy making. It is through the advocacy for and potential implementations of more extreme policy that people are drawn to such parties, in order to fix the status quo. While more general in their description of party radicalization, the authors present this interesting secondary reason (besides poor economic conditions) that spur the growth and popularity of radical political parties.

4.6 Coalition-Building with Extreme Parties

Bale (2003) makes the argument that in recent years more and more center-right parties have had to include far-right parties when forming coalitions or ‘support parties’. With this innate support came a greater normalization and respect for the extreme party as a result of being adopted by the larger, more center leaning party. As the author states,

“Over time, but especially recently, it has helped to prime (and therefore increase the salience of) the far right’s agenda – most notably, though not exclusively, on immigration, crime and welfare abuse – thus rendering it both more respectable and more of a vote-winner” (Bale 2003).

The importance of this point cannot be understated. By virtue of having governments where coalitions are often necessary in order to have a majority, European regimes must often include smaller, right-wing parties in their decision making. By including such parties, compromise is often necessary as result, meaning that policy goals must shift towards a point that is most agreeable to all. By simply allowing this to happen, larger political parties that are in the center left and center right give greater legitimacy to these smaller and more extreme parties. Of course, this does not always occur; however, it is a possibility that must be accounted for given the absence of a plurality within a country’s respective parliament.

4.7 Single-Issue Parties Explanation

One last important piece of literature to consider is Mudde (2007). In this article the author discusses the link between single-issue party thesis within ERPs (extreme-right parties) and the issue of immigration. He concludes that issues related to immigration have been ‘major catalysts’ for extreme parties a large number of times, especially within West Europe. This is because it has allowed political parties to connect feelings of nationalism and xenophobia with any fears or ideas of bitterness towards other issues. He makes an important note that most parties do not focus on this issue solely, and have moved to other issues as well, making him reject the single-issue party thesis, namely that immigration is a sole issue that such extreme parties focus on. Rather, the author succinctly makes the point that while immigration is an important policy point for most ERPs, it is by far not the only one.

Chapter 5: Results Analyzed

The below table shows the entirety of the data collected in its raw form. Using the publically available data from the Comparative Manifestos Project, the total percentage of each election manifesto dedicated to the code ‘Multiculturalism (negative)’ from the top two winning parties in each EU country was collected. Already evident are some extreme results, with the data ranging from a value of 0 to 10.9%. Several countries also have readings of 0% across both top-parties and across election cycles, an interesting observation that seems to indicate that these political systems have not been radicalized at all within regards to the issue of multiculturalism.

Graphical interpretations will be included below in order to allow for easier visualization of the corresponding results. Important to note is that each country does not have the same number of election cycles. This is either due to the fact that each country has a different number of years until an election, or simply because data was not available (mainly due to not being coded yet) within the Comparative Manifestos Project.


Table 1: Multiculturalism (negative) Share (%) of Each Country Manifesto

Election	Multiculturalism NEG Party 1	Multiculturalism NEG Party 2
Austria 2002	0	0
Austria 2006	1.2	2.2
Austria 2008	0.9	3
Belgium 1999	2.3	0
Belgium 2003	5.2	0
Belgium 2007	1.8	0
Belgium 2010	2.9	0
Bulgaria 2001	0	0
Bulgaria 2005	0	0
Bulgaria 2009	0	0
Bulgaria 2013	0	0
Croatia 2000	0	0
Croatia 2003	0	0
Croatia 2007	0	0
Croatia 2011	0	0
Cyprus 1996	0	0
Cyprus 2001	0	0
Cz Republic 2002	0	0
Cz Republic 2006	0	0
Cz Republic 2010	0.3	0.6
Cz Republic 2013	0	0
Denmark 2001	10.1	2.8
Denmark 2005	5.6	9.5
Denmark 2007	10.9	3.4
Denmark 2011	9.7	0.6
Estonia 1999	2	0
Estonia 2003	0	0
Estonia 2007	2.8	0.5
Estonia 2011	1.3	0.4
Finland 1999	0	0
Finland 2003	0	0
Finland 2007	0.6	0.6
Finland 2011	0.3	0
France 1997	0	0
France 2002	0	0
France 2007	0.2	0.7
France 2012	0	1.9
Germany 2002	0.6	1.7
Germany 2005	0.8	0.3

Germany 2009	0.1	0
Germany 2013	1.4	0.2
Greece 2000	0	0
Greece 2004	0	0
Hungary 2002	0	0
Hungary 2006	0	0
Hungary 2010	0	0
Ireland 1997	0	0
Ireland 2002	0	0
Ireland 2007	0	0
Ireland 2011	0	0
Italy 2001	0	0
Italy 2006	0	1.2
Italy 2008	0	0
Latvia 1998	0	0
Latvia 2002	0	0
Lithuania 2000	0	0
Lithuania 2004	0	0
Lithuania 2008	0.1	0
Lithuania 2012	0	0
Luxembourg 1999	1.8	0
Luxembourg 2004	1.1	0.4
Luxembourg 2009	0.9	0.8
Luxembourg 2013	0.7	0.7
Malta 1998	0	0
Netherlands 2003	0	1.8
Netherlands 2006	1.1	1.4
Netherlands 2010	3.9	1.2
Poland 2001	0	0
Poland 2005	0	0
Poland 2007	0	0
Poland 2011	0	0
Portugal 2001	0.7	1.1
Portugal 2005	1.1	0.9
Portugal 2009	0.7	0
Portugal 2011	0	0
Romania 2000	0	0
Romania 2004	0	0
Romania 2008	0	0
Romania 2012	0	0
Slovakia 2002	0	0
Slovakia 2006	0	0

Slovakia 2010	0	0
Slovakia 2012	0	0.5
Slovenia 2000	0	0
Slovenia 2004	0	0
Slovenia 2008	0	0
Slovenia 2011	0	0
Spain 2000	0	0
Spain 2004	0	0.5
Spain 2008	0	0.8
Spain 2011	0.3	0
Sweden 2002	0	0
Sweden 2006	0.3	0.2
Sweden 2010	0	0
UK 2001	0	0
UK 2005	0	0.3
UK 2010	0	0.4

Chart 1: Group 1 Countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark)




The above graph shows the first group of coded countries sorted alphabetically. All subsequent graphs will use a similar pattern in order to be able to visualize side by side comparisons. While the majority of Group 1 countries stayed consistent with no demonstrated, there were several that demonstrated higher recorded marks over time, especially after 2007. This includes Austria, the Czech Republic and Denmark. Belgium is additionally interesting case, as it first experiences a relatively high level of radical proposed

policy in 2003, then sinks in 2007, before once again increasing for the 2010 election.

Important to note is that there were inconsistencies between the first and second most successful parties in most of the countries, in the sense that they demonstrate very different recorded levels of radical policies vis-à-vis the selected code.

Additionally, in comparison to the results to be seen below of the subsequently analyzed countries, Denmark exhibited extremely high levels of the recorded code, a result that was certainly not expected within the scope of this research. After Denmark, the second highest recorded scores from this group were Austria and Belgium.

Chart 2: Group 2 Countries (Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland)



The above graph compares Group 2 countries. Evident from this sample is that these countries experienced little to no proposed policy that was of a more extreme nature, except perhaps Estonia, which recorded roughly 3% during their 2007 election. While Greece, Hungary and Ireland experienced zero levels of this, Estonia, Finland and Germany all recorded levels that were mainly 2% or lower of their total manifesto. While there were

minor increases evident after 2007 in Estonia and France, the levels were relatively small, to the point where they could be considered insignificant.

Chart 3: Group 3 Countries (Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland)




Chart 3 compares the next set of seven EU-member states. Once again, about half of countries do not register for this code while the others do. Particularly evident of an increase in manifesto percentage dedicated to the code is the Netherlands, where the most successful party in 2010 had almost 4% of their election manifesto dedicated to the negative issues related to multiculturalism. Other than the Netherlands, the other remaining countries experience extremely slight increases or decreases, but these changes are extremely small and likely due to regular cyclical fluctuations.

Chart 4: Group 4 Countries (Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom)




Chart 4 represents the last block of seven countries within the European Union. Within this chart, no country records an extremely high percentage of manifesto dedicated to the code being evaluated. While fluctuations are once again evident, they are likely too small to be considered significant (all under 2% of total manifesto space). In comparison the countries already seen above, Group 4 countries are least representative of any increase of radicalized policy post (or pre) 2007.

Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks

In general, the results found within this research contradict to a certain degree what current authors write about on this topic. Where countries have generally experienced the worst economic repercussions with regards to after 2007, it appears that there are lower levels of perceived changes to proposed policy, something that can be deemed as a result of greater party radicalization. There are of course exceptions to this rule. Interesting to note is that it seems that the more economically successful a country is, the more likely it is to have political parties that suggest more extreme policies with regard to multiculturalism. The most prominent examples in this line of research were Austria, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. As countries that attract large numbers of migrants due to some of the most favorable economic conditions within the European Union, these countries have in tandem experienced higher levels of proposed radical policy—in response to what seems to be a higher threat of multiculturalism.

6.1 Anomalies

Interesting to note is that a country such as the United Kingdom, which has remained by far, one of the more economically successfully members of the European Union, has under this research model demonstrated lower levels of radicalized policy. This can likely be attributed to the lack of election data representing the last national elections though. As a result, the last data point for the United Kingdom ends in 2010. The same can also be said for Germany, which as another highly-economically successful country (and hub for migrants) was last coded in 2009. This lack of data also extends to Greece, where it would have been extremely interesting to see if the results found here correspond with the current political-economic environment.

6.2 Complications

A few complications existed within the scope of this project that are worth mentioning. Firstly, like the vast majority of data-sets often used in an analysis, no data set is perfect. While the Comparative Manifestos Project is an extremely-comprehensive dataset, it requires constant update due to always upcoming elections. As a result, there are countries whose elections have not been updated to reflect the most recent election results due to the time required to code each manifesto. This has a negative result when researchers attempt to use this data in future studies as data points are then incomplete. Within the framework of this particular study, this problem was seen, as there were a few countries whose last election to be coded was in 2008 or 2009. While this problem was not seen along the majority of countries, this needs to be considered when understanding the final conclusions derived. In effect, this means that long terms results of how radicalized (or not) a country has become after 2007 cannot be adequately measured. For countries that were last coded in 2009 or 2010 (such as in Hungary), the changes can only be assessed keeping in mind only one election after 2007. While still beneficial, this greatly constricts a potential long-term analysis, as data may fluctuate significantly over consecutive election cycles.

6.3 What should be done?

What can—and what should governments do in the face of this though? The answer is neither simple nor easily achieved. It is important to note that if a government wishes to implement more radical policy, it is wholly within its sovereign right to do so. This does not imply that this constitutes a wise choice in the long-term or as a member of the European Union. As such as supra-national body is not empowered to intervene other than through diplomacy, change must happen primarily at the national level.

For governments that are resistant to change, the European Union must serve as a constant reminder for effective and suitable change. Any and all incentives given to that member state must be critically evaluated in light of that country's policy choices. Should it prove necessary, a withdrawal of any monetary support or financial incentives should be brought up for possible termination or reduction should a member state prove unwilling to set itself on a course for more moderate policy. It must also be seen that civil society within that country is empowered. While many people would argue that extreme circumstances often necessitate extreme responses, radical policy is not the answer. Such policy should not be promoted nor considered acceptable within the European Union lest increased xenophobia, racism and prejudice occur as a result of tolerating it.

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