

WHO ELSE SPEAKS SECURITY? SECURITIZING ACTORS DURING THE LIBYAN UPRISING

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Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Word count: 13.657
Budapest, Hungary
2015

Abstract

Securitization theory has been one of the most influential frameworks for analysis of security issues during the past few decades within the wave of the so called “critical approaches to security”. The original concept has undergone a number of criticisms and revisions, however, there are still certain issues that deserve further addressing. Namely, the notion of securitizing actors beyond political elites and moreover, within a non-democratic setting, has been underdeveloped. Furthermore, the question of applicability of the traditional ordinary/extraordinary politics distinction in the case of non-state actors, has not been sufficiently elaborated. Since weak states are more prone to revolutionary crises, and consequently, emergence of different types of actors, the case of Libyan uprising in 2011 was chosen to investigate these conceptual gaps. Thus, the aim of this research was to examine whether UN Security Council and Libyan rebels can actually be considered securitizing actors, with the particular focus on the notion of “extraordinary measures”. General conclusion derived after the analysis, is that securitization theory is indeed relevant in examining revolutions, however it needs a slightly different perspective in order to grasp all the features of such a context.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express gratitude to my supervisor, prof. Paul Roe, for guidance and advice throughout the entire research process. Also, I would like to thank my family and friends for encouragement and support.

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Introduction

Post-Cold War era is characterized by new, non-traditional challenges to security and consequently by reshaping and modifying of theoretical frameworks within security studies, in order to adapt to these newly created circumstances. Therefore, a variety of “critical security theories” have been developed over the past few decades. The main idea behind these approaches is the adjustment of theoretical and analytical frameworks, in an attempt to properly explain a broader security agenda.

Securitization theory has become increasingly influential in the field of security studies during the past years. The original concept developed under the auspices of the Copenhagen School of thought has faced many criticisms and redefining since the very beginning. However, the notion of securitization has become a commonly accepted and frequently used term within the security studies circle, and even more broadly, within the international relations academia itself. Nevertheless, there are certain questions which have remained unanswered, and thus require a more detailed elaboration.

Namely, one of the common questions traditional securitization theory is faced with, is its applicability to non-democratic regimes. The concept established within Copenhagen School is often criticized as western-centric, applicable solely to “Western liberal democracies”. Another issue which is usually highlighted as questionable is the notion of securitizing actors. The dispute revolves around the puzzle of whether different types of actors, besides political elites and the state itself, actually have the capability to make a successful securitizing move. Paradoxically, the Copenhagen School securitization theory characterizes itself as a representative of the, so called, “widening” and “deepening” approaches to security issues. The main objective of these approaches is to distance from traditional state-centric concepts.

However, at least in terms of securitizing actors, this school of thought has still remained closely tied with the state and political elites.

Traditional theory of securitization has gone through various important revisions since its inception. Relevant contribution was given by Thierry Balzacq who criticized the excessive focus of Copenhagen School on the speech act notion.¹ He emphasized the necessity of taking into account the entire socio-political context and environment within which securitization takes place. In like manner, Stritzel developed his own model or a “triangle” of securitization, which included text, context and actors.² Furthermore, Juha Vuori has drawn attention on the democratic bias of the traditional concept.³ Namely, he claimed that the framework was adaptable solely to the context of Western liberal democracies. Nevertheless, he recognized the usefulness of the securitization theory as an analytical framework and developed his own model applicable to non-democratic settings. Moreover, Vuori claimed that there is more to securitization than just legitimization of planned “special measures”. Accordingly, he created a unique typology, including different kinds of securitization processes. With a similar point, Claire Wilkinson has gone a step further through elaboration on individual unit components of securitization outside of the, usually examined, Western environment. She recognized that there are securitizing actors beneath the state level, and explained main relations between elements of securitization in that case.⁴ Wilkinson broadened the concept, concerning the actor/audience relationship, as well as the referent object. However, there is a gap within the securitization theory literature so far, in terms of special measures proposed by non-state actors. It has not been discussed if the traditional ordinary/extraordinary politics distinction can be applied if the

¹Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 171-201.

² Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond," *European Journal of International Relations* 13 no. 3 (2007): 357-83.

³ Juha Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no.1 (2008): 65-99.

⁴ Claire Wilkinson, "Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?" *Security Dialogue* 29, no. 5 (2007): 5-25.

“securitizer” does not have a formal position of power. Thus, considering there is no comprehensive elaboration of types of securitizing actors as well as its link with the notion of extraordinary measures, in the existing literature, it would be of great importance to research and examine this problem through certain empirical cases.

Throughout the research, I will try to connect the problem of applicability of the securitization theory to non-democratic regimes with the issue of actors. Within non-democratic regimes, more specifically in weak states, it is more likely that certain actors besides political elites have more space and possess enough social capital, necessary to securitize an issue. Moreover, in countries with low socio-political cohesion and inability of the authorities to deliver basic public goods to its citizens, or even inability to control parts of the territory, there is a greater possibility for a revolution to occur. Revolutionary context could be of great importance for analysis of non-state actors. Observing non-democratic regimes, more precisely, examples of revolutions which successfully ended a totalitarian era in certain countries, it seems possible to securitize the regime itself. The question arises, which actors are capable of doing so?

I have chosen the case of Libyan uprising in 2011 to examine the agency of non-state actors. Besides Al-Qaddafi’s regime as a main securitizing actor during this revolution, I would like to argue that there are other actors, both internal and external, whose actions could be considered securitizing moves. If a successful securitizing move by non-state actors is indeed possible, it is relevant to investigate sources of legitimacy or social capital needed for the acceptance of the audience. In the case of securitizing the regime/government itself, what can be perceived as “extraordinary measures” which leave the realm of “normal” political process, especially in the realm of non-democratic regimes?

Thus, the main research question that deserves thorough examination is: what measures could be considered “extraordinary”, in case of securitizers below and above the state level, within a

revolutionary context? The aim of this research would be to test the applicability of the securitization theory on to the non-democratic regimes. More importantly, it will entail the analysis of special measures proposed by non-state actors. Thus, it would be a minor contribution to the existing literature, when it comes to the notion of extraordinary politics.

In the following chapter I will explain main methodological tools used during the research as well as limitations. Within the next chapter, relevant existing literature will be presented. First, the main ideas and concepts of traditional securitization theory will be introduced. Secondly, important revisions and amendments will be elaborated. Finally, the chapter will conclude with the appropriate conceptual framework, which will be used to analyze the securitization discourse during the Libyan uprising. The second chapter deals with securitization streams both at the domestic and international level. The main elements of the theory will be investigated through discourse analysis, as well as facilitating conditions, in order to conclude whether it can be argued that securitizing moves actually existed. The third chapter will specifically engage in the notion of special measures and question whether the traditional distinction between normal and extraordinary politics can be applied on to the non-state actors within the context of revolution. Thus, it will be examined what can be considered a special measure in case of the UN as securitizing actor at the international level, and revolutionaries at domestic levels. Finally, the last chapter will summarize main findings and include some concluding remarks and recommendations for future research projects.

Methodology and caveats

In order to examine the possibility of existence of non-state securitizing actors within the revolutionary context, I have chosen the uprising in Libya in 2011 as a case study. Libyan revolution seems as a suitable case, since it fits the structure of research questions at all levels. In 2011, Libya was under the autocratic and repressive rule of Muammar Al-Qaddafi for a long period of 42 years.⁵ Nevertheless, it was a weak state, incapable of providing basic public goods to its citizenry. Years of discontent resulted in a peaceful uprising in February 2011, which escalated into violent conflicts, when the regime responded with repressive measures.⁶ Al-Qaddafi and elite that surrounded him, can be presumed to be a traditional type of a securitizing actor, claiming that rebel forces represent an existential threat to Libyan state and nation. However, this case study opens up opportunities for the identification of more types of securitizing actors, beyond the state elite. Namely, Libyan revolution case was selected because it involves both international and domestic actors, whose individual actions can be comprehended as a part of a wider securitization discourse.

A complex and comprehensive theoretical framework such as securitization process, can be empirically analyzed by using different types of methodological tools. Thus, for the purpose of this research it is important to clarify the specific methodological framework which will be used. Thierry Balzacq distinguishes four kinds of techniques applicable in securitization studies. Namely, those are discourse analysis, ethnographic research, process tracing and content analysis.⁷

⁵ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Muammar al-Qaddafi", accessed May 22, 2015, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/485369/Muammar-al-Qaddafi>.

⁶ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Libya Revolt of 2011", accessed May 31, 2015, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1766291/Libya-Revolt-of-2011>.

⁷ Thierry Balzacq, "Enquires into methods: a new framework for securitization analysis," in *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, ed. Thierry Balzacq (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 38.

Firstly, in further research I will use discourse analysis. Thus, a detailed elaboration of this method will be provided. Discourse analysis is considered to be an “official” methodological foundation of securitization studies, which is in accordance with the understanding of security as a “speech act”. According to Iver Neumann, the main goal of discourse analysis is “to analyze the linguistic and material as a whole, and that can be done by observing discourses both as linguistic and material phenomena [...] to study how there is a set of conditions for what is said and done; how one statement triggers or ‘includes in the game’ a series of social practices”.⁸

I will try to map and examine newspaper articles connected to the chosen case study. Moreover, I will analyze those articles containing certain statements or speeches that entail various elements of the notion of securitization. In order to evaluate whether these statements are a part of a broader securitization discourse, I will try to identify and highlight relations between main units of analysis (actors, audience, referent object etc.) and test facilitating conditions.

Another method suitable for the investigation of securitization streams is document analysis, especially when taking into consideration revised versions of the theory, based on broader definitions of the discourse itself. Discourse, in a broader sense, entails more than a mere utterance or speech act. It might be defined as a system of ideas and practices, both written and spoken linguistic creations, visual symbols or persisting social practices. Thus, I will include certain official documents in my analysis of securitization. Namely, on the international level, I will examine whether UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya can fit into the securitization framework and which extraordinary measures it proposes. Extraordinary measures will be juxtaposed with principles of international law, which can be considered a framework of “normal political process” on the international level. When it comes to domestic actors, I will try to interpret the Constitutional Declaration of the National Transitional Council,

⁸ Iver B. Neumann, *Značenje, materijalnost, moć: uvod u analizu diskursa* [Meaning, Materiality, Power: Introduction to Discourse Analysis] (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2009), 99.

which served as a basis for the establishment of the interim government during the revolution. Similarly to the analysis on the global level, I will set special measures, suggested by the opposition forces, in contrast with what can be regarded as a realm of “normal politics” within an autocracy. Precisely in this case I will compare extraordinary measures to the principles contained in the “Green Book” written by Al-Qaddafi himself. Since Libya never had a constitution as such, this book can be analyzed as the basis of Al-Qaddafi’s regime.

Thus, I will try to distinguish streams of securitization among different securitizing actors, on the international and domestic level. Naturally, I will try to evaluate securitization discourse within a broader socio-political context. As Balzacq emphasizes: “Discourse does not occur nor operate in a vacuum, instead, it is contextually enabled and constrained.”⁹

Naturally, there is a huge amount of other examples susceptible to the same analysis which do not fall under the scope of this research. Moreover, due to the size of the research, timeframe is also limited. Analysis includes only the events around the formation of the interim government and the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution. Nevertheless, academic contribution of this research is valuable in terms of identifying, throughout the case study of Libyan uprising, two categories of non-state securitizing actors. Thus, findings of the research can serve as a direction to follow, in an attempt to create a more thorough typology of securitizing actors. Furthermore, this research will deal with the notion of special measures proposed by non-state actors, which have gained little attention in the existing literature. Naturally, no general conclusions can be drawn without a more detailed research project, including more case studies and a detailed discourse analysis encompassing a longer time period, which was not possible due to the scope of this research.

⁹ Balzacq, “Enquires into methods,” 36.

Chapter I

Traditional securitization theory

The process of securitization refers to the discourse by which political elites identify threats and require legitimacy from the society to fight those threats. The very notion was developed under the auspices of the Copenhagen School of thought, along with two other basic theoretical frameworks of the school: sectoral approach and theory of regional security complex.¹⁰ Copenhagen School evolved around a group of researchers within the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), created in 1985. The very term "Copenhagen School" was coined by Bill Mc Sweeney, and although with a negative connotation, it reflected the creation of a specific school of thought.¹¹ One of the core writings dealing with the issue of securitization is certainly the one authored by Ole Waever in 1995, "Securitization and desecuritization".¹² A book published in 1998. "Security: A New Framework for Analysis"¹³ is another piece and the review of the theory, essential for the common theoretical development of the school.

The main question posed in front of these researches is why are certain issues perceived and treated as threats and require urgent and extraordinary action, whereas others are not. Generally speaking, some issues are treated as threats to security because they are socially constructed in such a way, thus, securitized. Copenhagen School theorists based their work on the speech act

¹⁰ Notion of regional security complex and sectoral approach was originally developed by Barry Buzan in: Barry Buzan. *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Birghton: Wheatsheaf, 1983. Idea of securitization first appeared in: Ole Waever, "Security The Speech Act, Analyzing the Politics of a Word." *Working Paper 19*, (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1989)

¹¹ Bill Mc Sweeney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School," *Review of International Relations* 22, no. 1, (1996): 81-93.

¹² Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security* ed. Ronnie D. Lipshutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995): 46-86.

¹³ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998)

theory, originally developed in linguistics by Austin and Searle.¹⁴ The main argument of this theory, as Austin suggests, is that not all declarations and statements are descriptive in nature. On the contrary, some pronouncements are “performative”, meaning they are linguistic representations of a certain action, they “do” things. According to the Copenhagen School, securitization is a “speech act” which formulates a certain political problem as extremely important for the survival of the community and, in that way, transfers it out of the field of established rules of the game or “normal” politics. These authors argue that each political or public issue can be found on a continuum that ranges non-politicized to securitized. Thus, they distinguish three types of issues. First, non-politicized, which are neither a matter of public debates and discussions, nor the state itself deals with them in any way. Second, politicized, which are included in public political debates and are a part of government decision-making process. And finally, securitized, which are placed outside of the realm of normal politics, by marking them existential threats for a certain referent object and calling for special measures to face them. Generally, any issue can be found anywhere on this continuum from non-politicized to securitized, depending on the time period, actors, states etc.¹⁵

If, as a result of a speech act or a securitizing move, “extraordinary measures” which otherwise would not be legitimate, are accepted, then we are witnessing a successful securitization. Namely, securitization is a process which entails rhetorical construction of threats and undertaking of special measures in order to deal with them. Special measures can have various forms such as use of force, coercion, secrecy, levying the taxes, conscription, limiting otherwise inviolable rights or any type of suspension of human rights which goes out of the framework of a “normal” political process.¹⁶ The actual implementation of special measures is not necessary

¹⁴ Thierry Balzacq, “A theory of securitization: origins, core assumptions, and variants,” in *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, ed. Thierry Balzacq (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 1.

¹⁵ Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 23-24.

¹⁶ Ibid, 24.

in order to consider a securitizing move successful. It is enough for the actors utter the inevitability of its usage, and for the audience to accept that claim.

Also, Buzan and Waever distinguish three different types of units of analysis or actors involved in the securitization process. Firstly, the referent object, which varies along different sectors (the state, the individual, the identity, environment etc.) and entails the object which is existentially threatened and can claim survival. Second, there are securitizing actors, who actually perform the securitizing move by uttering that a referent object is existentially threatened. Finally, there are functional actors, who are not directly involved in the securitization, but do influence the process and affect its dynamics. These would be actors who influence decision making in security field to a great extent.¹⁷

Undoubtedly, another important concept, since securitization is an intersubjective process, is the concept of audience. It is necessary for the audience to accept the existence of a threat to survival for the referent object and undertaking of extraordinary measures. In fact, as representatives of the Copenhagen school point out "successful securitization is not decided by a securitizer, but by the audience of the security speech act".¹⁸

Moreover, there are certain facilitating conditions that need to be fulfilled for a securitizing move to be successful. First, a particular "grammar of security" is supposed to be used. Thus, including expressions and phrases that emphasize the urgency of action against the threat is necessary (e.g. a point of no return, existential threat, survival etc.). Second, securitizing actors need to possess a certain amount of social capital, so a securitizing move can have influence on the audience, thus, they need to have a certain position in the society. Third, threat to which

¹⁷ Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 35-36.

¹⁸ Ibid, 31.

securitizing actors are pointing must be already generally accepted as dangerous in the community.¹⁹

Beyond the Copenhagen School

Although very influential and often used in empirical research, traditional securitization theory has been criticized and revised from various viewpoints in the past few decades. This theoretical framework has been discussed and complemented to fit the reality of a dynamic arena of international relations to a great extent. However, there are still some weak points in the literature that deserve further elaboration. In the following subsection I will try to single out the most important critiques and revisions, directed to the Copenhagen School, which relate to different elements of the theory, and conclude with the question of applicability to the non-democratic regimes and securitization actors within them.

Firstly, an unavoidable criticism of the very notion of securitization as a “speech act” and review of the theory, has been developed by a few authors such as Holger Stritzel and Thierry Balzacq. These authors have criticized the excessive reliance of Buzan and Waever on the speech act theory. Thus, they were the first to make serious attempts to revise the theory.

Balzacq has, for instance, pointed out the tension that exists between the self-referential “speech act” (which has its own inherent universal grammatical rules) and security as a “social, pragmatic act” (set in a broader socio-linguistic context).²⁰ In accordance, he made a distinction between philosophical and sociological approach in security analysis, that are not mutually exclusive and analyst is free to determine the ratio of these frameworks which is the most appropriate. He argues that the speech act approach to security issues, although very good in theory, is not entirely appropriate and applicable in practice and many more factors need to be

¹⁹ Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 33.

²⁰ Balzacq, “Three Faces of Securitization,” 177-178.

taken into account. Balzacq highlights that in order for one securitizing move to be successful, audience and its acceptance of securitizing claims is much more important than the utterance coming from securitizing actors. Moreover, the author distinguishes two types of support which securitizing actor may strive to gain.²¹ On one hand, there is formal support, usually connected to the approval of a certain official institution. On the other, there is moral support, which usually refers to the support of general public, for the introduction of special measures. These two sorts of support do not necessarily have to coincide, but more harmonized they are, it is more likely for securitizing move to be successful. Also, he asserts that successful securitization depends to a great extent on the context and environment within which it takes place. As Balzacq highlights it:

*“[...] securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.”*²²

Likewise, Paul Roe discusses the notion of “institutionalized securitization”²³ where the audience itself does not have a big role. This type of securitization is characteristic for military sector where certain constant and durable threats are institutionalized and the approval of general public is not necessary for the employment of emergency measures. Roe also emphasizes that audiences can be different, depending on the type of the political system, as well as the nature of the issue.²⁴

²¹ Balzacq, “Three Faces of Securitization,” 184.

²² Ibid, 172.

²³ Paul Roe, “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision To Invade Iraq,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 6 (2008): 618.

²⁴ Roe, Paul. “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures,” 620.

Stritzel criticizes traditional securitization theory in a similar manner. Namely, the author criticizes the securitization concept: speech act, securitizing actor and audience, claiming that relations between these elements are insufficiently clear and determined. In the article Stritzel presents his "consolidated" version of securitization theory throughout the triangle: text, context and positional power. These three levels of securitization are followed by three securitizing forces: performative force of security text, inveteracy in the existing discourses and positioning of the actors which influence the process itself.²⁵ First layer of securitization presumes not only speech act as a mere utterance, but symbolic language, visuals or sounds, as well. Moreover, the essence of text is not given, it is constructed through social processes. Second level implies that texts are always a part of a broader discourse or they are embedded in a unique 'socio-linguistic' context. Finally, the third element refers to the social capital of actors. As Stritzel explains it, securitizing actors must have certain amount of power, official or not, that enables them to influence the construction of public opinion.

These reviews of the theory have been focused mostly on the general notion of security as a speech act. The emphasis of the context within which securitization takes place is of course of great importance. Going further, a question arises whether this traditional conception can be applied to a securitization process which takes place within a context of a non-democratic political system?

Probably the most relevant contribution to the debate of applicability of the theory to non-democratic regimes is an alternative model of securitization developed by Juha Vuori. Namely, what this author has proposed is that it is important to define securitization in a different way. In order to overcome the "democratic bias" of traditional securitization theory, Vuori tries to adapt it to the studies of non-democratic societies. He claims that:

²⁵ Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond," 370.

*“(...)all societies have ‘rules’. These ‘rules’ are products of historical and social contingencies, as are the referents objects and threats in security. When security logic and rhetoric is utilized to legitimate the breaking of these rules, we have a case of securitization.”*²⁶

He asserts that securitization might be used for achieving different political goals, not only for getting the legitimacy for taking special measures. Vuori distinguishes five different types of securitization. Besides securitization for legitimating future acts, which is what the Copenhagen school understands as securitization, there are: “(1) securitization for raising an issue on the agenda, (2) securitization for deterrence, (3) securitization for legitimating past acts or for reproducing the security status of an issue, and (4) securitization for control.”²⁷ This model developed by Juha Vuori is very useful as an analytical tool, because it enables, not only “conceptual travel” from democratic to autocratic regimes, but also a systematic differentiation of securitizing processes which take place within democracies. Similar critique pointed at the Western-centrism of the Copenhagen School can be found in Claire Wilkinson’s work.²⁸ The author argues that the traditional securitization theory is dressed into a “Westphalian straitjacket”²⁹, meaning that it presumes that western concepts of security and the state itself can be applied throughout the globe. Moreover, the theory has not been able to overcome this “Westphalian straitjacket” due to the institutionalized Eurocentrism. She also criticizes Copenhagen School for neglecting other forms of expression besides the speech act, such as physical action, claiming that this creates even bigger bias towards Western world. Wilkinson

²⁶Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization,” 69.

²⁷Ibid, 76.

²⁸Wilkinson, “Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan,” 5-25.

²⁹ The very term was coined by Barry Buzan and Richard Little and refers to a strong trend within the IR academia to treat all international systems in accordance with the one created after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. They point at the sort of “collective a-historical and Eurocentric arrogance” within the discipline. Thus, the notion entails both imposition of Western models to the rest of the world and neglecting the historical variations and changes present among IR scholars. (See Buzan, Barry and Little Richard. “Why International Relations Has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do about it.” *Millennium* 30, no. 1 (2001): 19-39.

argues that the constitution of agency within theory of securitization is problematic. Namely, especially in domestic politics, action can forego the speech act which is essential for the securitization theory. As she explains, the Copenhagen School currently does not have an appropriate “theoretical vocabulary” which would allow elaborating the notion of “sufficient action” that could replace the speech act. Yet, she believes that Copenhagen School can develop the necessary vocabulary to fill in this gap.³⁰

Who are the securitizing actors?

Another issue which is usually highlighted as questionable, is the notion of securitizing actors. The dispute revolves around the puzzle of whether different types of actors, besides political elites and the state itself, actually have the capability to make a successful securitizing move. Paradoxically, the Copenhagen School securitization theory characterizes itself as a representative of the, so called, “widening” and “deepening” approaches to security issues. The main objective of these approaches is to distance themselves from traditional state-centric concepts. For that purpose Copenhagen School has developed “sectoral approach” to security, which presumes focusing on other sectors besides military one (economic, environmental, societal and political). Moreover, representatives of this school of thought advocate for an approach to security issues which would include different levels of analysis except the state. So, they cover levels above and under the state: individual, regional and global.

However, when it comes to securitization theory at least in terms of securitizing actors, this school of thought has still remained closely tied with the state and political elites. Many have criticized this omission of the theory, but no one has suggested a certain typology of securitizing actors or researched this topic in detail. Thus, considering there is no comprehensive elaboration

³⁰ Wilkinson, “Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan,” 22.

of types of securitizing actors in the existing literature, it would be of great importance to research and examine this problem through certain empirical cases.

When it comes to the problem of securitizing actors, Lene Hansen criticizes the Copenhagen School for neglecting other types of actors besides political elites and the state.³¹ Moreover, she criticizes the traditional approach for being value-neutral and thus, responsible for deepening the implications of the so called “negative securitization” by leaving out other, sometimes “silent actors”.

Nevertheless, the issue of non-state securitizing actors has been launched by Claire Wilkinson and her findings can serve as an appropriate initial theoretical framework for further analysis. Throughout the examination of applicability of securitization theory on to the non-democratic regimes, the author emphasizes the relevance of considering the specific socio-political context, where the intersubjective actor/audience relation might be different. She analyses the case of Tulip Revolution which took place in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 in order to highlight the importance of taking off the Westphalian straitjacket when explaining securitization processes in non-Western world.

Namely, it is crucial to leave behind the state-centric viewpoint, because probability of the existence of non-state securitizing actors in non-democratic regimes, especially in those with the elements of state “weakness”, is much higher than in strong western democracies, which have the authority over its entire territory and are capable of providing basic public goods to its citizens.

³¹Lene Hansen, "Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School," *Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000): 285-306.

Another concept that should be introduced is that of the so called "weak states".³² This notion is connected to the political and societal security sectors and state strength. The internal state strength should be distinguished from the external one, or the notion of power. Internal strength refers to the socio-political cohesion of a political community, whereas the weakness is reflected in a socio-political disintegration. Internal strength also reflects in the ability of the state to fulfill its basic functions. Moreover, any state can be located somewhere along the diversified spectrum from strong states to the collapsed ones. Thus, based on certain criteria, different degrees of state strength or weakness can be distinguished.³³ Strong states have a full empirical sovereignty and an ability to deliver basic public goods to its citizens, who, in return, accept government as legitimate. On the other hand, weak states are not capable of providing public goods to its citizenry, due to a bad economic situation, ethnic or religious differences, and thus, they question the legitimacy of the government, partially or on the entire territory. In failed states, authorities are unable to deliver basic public goods and security on a majority of its territory. Often, instead of the government, violent non-state actors start delivering public goods. As Rotberg highlights: "the official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state".³⁴ Finally, collapsed states are places of chaos and lawlessness, where central authorities have extremely low or no empirical sovereignty. Categories of strength and weakness represent extremes of a continuum, not exclusive categories. States are not either strong or weak, but can be placed somewhere in

³²For more details on the notion of weak states see: Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003., Rice, Susan E., Corinne Graff and Carlos Pasqual ed. *Confronting Poverty: weak states and US national security*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010.

³³Robert I. Rotberg, "Weak States, Failed States, Collapsed States: Causes and Indicators" in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. by Robert Rotberg (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 1-29.

³⁴ Ibid, 5.

between these two extremes. It would be hard to imagine a state with a perfect socio-political cohesion, as well as a state with no support of society.

In 2008, Brookings Institute published a study concerning Index of state weakness in developing world.³⁵ As authors Susan Rice and Stuart Patrick argue, the contribution of this study is a more transparent and comprehensive tool for “measuring” state weakness. They criticize previous literature and attempts to rank states by strength, condemning the excessive focus on extreme cases of failed and collapsed states. Furthermore, the authors have pointed out that more factors should be taken into account, than just two main ones, security and political legitimacy. Therefore, they have ranked 141 developing states following 20 criteria, classified into four “baskets”. These represent four categories: economic (indicators of state’s capability to create a balanced economic environment), political (transparency and accountability of state institutions and political legitimacy), security (physical security and political stability within the country) and social welfare (fulfilment of basic human needs of the citizenry). Libya is ranked 86th on this table, with the lowest scores within the political basket. Namely, Libya received very low scores by examining indicators of “voice and accountability”, as well as “freedom”.³⁶

In connection to the securitization theory, more precisely, the notion of securitizing actors, within the realm of different levels of weak states, there is more space opened up for non-elite actors to securitize an issue.³⁷ The case of Libya is an interesting one, since it falls into a specific category of weak states. Namely, as Erin Jenne argues, extreme examples of autocracies such as North Korea, Belarus or Iraq, can be considered strong in terms of having authority and

³⁵ Susan E. Rice and Stuart Patrick, “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World”, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2008), 7-8.

³⁶ Ibid, 15.

³⁷ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and powers*, 24.

control over its entire territory, but however fail to supply population with essential public goods.³⁸ Thus, in these cases, regarding the state strength, there is an imbalance between provision of security and basic goods. Likewise, in Libya, on the eve of the revolution in 2011, although al-Qaddafi seemed to possess capability to exercise power and control over the entire territory, confidence of the population in public services was on a very low level. Among other problems, with the level of corruption constantly increasing, economy was hampered in spite of the country's huge resources of oil. Namely, citizens of Libya were unsatisfied with the infrastructure, housing projects, healthcare etc. "There was such low trust in local healthcare, for instance, that most Tripoli residents would drive to Tunisia for even the most basic medical treatment."³⁹ Moreover, during a year preceding the uprising, according to the Fund for Peace Failed State Index report, Libya has taken the 111th place, with a score somewhere in between "moderate" and "warning".⁴⁰

Using the language of the Copenhagen school, securitizing actors are those possessing enough social capital to make a successful securitizing move. Thus, securitizing actors are not necessarily representatives of political elites. In the context of weak states, where usually a large proportion of population does not accept the legitimacy of the government, other actors, besides the elites, can make a securitizing move and thus, securitize a certain issue. Moreover, weak states are more prone to revolutions and civil uprisings. According to Skocpol, due to the accumulated discontent of citizens, as well as inability of the state (mainly its coercive

³⁸Erin Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State" in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. by Robert Rotberg (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 219-245

³⁹Line Noueihed and Alex Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012.), 175.

⁴⁰The Fund for Peace, *The Failed States Index 2010*, The Fund for Peace Publication CR-10-99-FS (11-03G), 2010, Accessed May 24, 2015, <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-10-99-fs-failedstatesindex2010-1103g.pdf>

apparatus) to control society and to sustain state autonomy, revolutionary crises are more likely to emerge within weak states.⁴¹

Thus, the aim of this research will be to examine whether actors below and above the state level, within a revolutionary context, can be considered securitizers. The greatest puzzles concerning non-state actors in this case evolve in terms of the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary politics. Namely, at the international level, one could argue, there is no sovereign to declare emergency situation and suggest the use of special measures. Moreover, it could be discussed what would the realm of normal politics entail on the global level. When it comes to sub-state actors, their social capital necessary to raise an issue on the security agenda can be disputed. Moreover, the notion of regular politics might be hard to identify within the insurrectional context and dynamics. Nevertheless, I would like to argue that there are supranational as well as subnational actors able to carry out a securitizing move. Thus, I will use revised and supplemented models of securitization in order to identify all the necessary elements. Moreover, I will try to argue that “normal/extraordinary political process” division indeed can be applied on to the non-state actors, just from a different perspective.

⁴¹ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 29.

Chapter II

Libyan rebels as securitizing actors

In the following section I will focus on Libyan rebels during the uprising and examine if they could be considered securitizing actors, and moreover what special measures they advocated for. Throughout the evaluation of the Constitutional Declaration of National Transitional Council, which enabled the establishment of the interim government, and its international recognition, I will determine the legitimacy of opposition forces as securitizing actors. Moreover, through newspaper articles I will attempt to identify elements of securitization within the statements of these actors. Therefore, three facilitating conditions will be tested and relations between crucial units of analysis indicated. Thus, I will try to identify and elaborate on the essential elements of securitizations process: audience, actor, referent object, threat, and most importantly, “extraordinary” measures that actors seek to legitimize.

The revolution started on the so called “Day of Rage”⁴², followed by a series of demonstrations against the repressive regime of Muammar Al-Qaddafi, which officially started on February 17, 2011. What is characteristic of this first period of the uprising is extremely scarce media presence and hard media censorship by the government.⁴³ Namely, most of the media were state-owned and thus, anti-government demonstrations were not covered at all. On the contrary, Libyan TV stations continuously broadcasted news and shows about pro-Al-Qaddafi protests. The only Libyan source that reported about anti-regime protests was a private newspaper based in London, Libyan Al-Yawm.⁴⁴ All the other newspapers, owned by the government reported

⁴² The activists have called the Libyan citizens for a protest on the anniversary of the day of rage in 2006, when several protesters were killed during the clashes with security forces. Ian Black, “Libya’s day of rage met by bullets and loyalists”, *The Guardian*, February 17, 2011. Accessed May 21, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/17/libya-day-of-rage-unrest>

⁴³ “Libya: The Propaganda War”, *Al Jazeera*, March 12, 2011. Accessed May 21, 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2011/03/20113121012263363.html>

⁴⁴ “Libyan state media silent on protests”, *BBC News*, February 17, 2011. Accessed May 21, 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12496420>

solely on the pro-regime demonstrations as well as Al-Qaddafi's public appearances and speeches. Moreover, in the first days of the uprising, anti-government protesters did not have any formal structure or representatives whose coherent discourse could be analyzed. However, in a very short period, during the next month, demonstrators and residents in eastern parts of Libya formed an interim administration named National Transitional Council (NTC). The purpose of the Council was not long term, it was not a government, but it served as "the face of the revolution".⁴⁵

Therefore, in further analysis, I will concentrate on the discourse presented by the officials of NTC, symbol of anti-Al-Qaddafi resistance, as representatives of the "opposition forces" and all the demonstrators. By being appointed as officials of the interim administration, these actors had gained enough social capital to securitize the actions of Al-Qaddafi's regime and present it as an existential threat to the referent object. Also, the very moment of continuous demonstrations and fight against the government, makes it clear that the intersubjective relation between securitizing actors, who called for a revolution, and the audience, who accepted it was established. Namely, the actors had social capital both in a formal and moral sense.⁴⁶ When it comes to the referent object itself, it is naturally, the Libyan civilian population threatened by violent measures undertaken by the government. In this case, people of Libya are both a referent object, as well as the audience whose acceptance is needed in order to legitimize special measures. NTC, as a securitizing actor had to justify and persuade Libyan citizens in the legitimacy of actions against the regime.

One of the opposition leaders Ibrahim Jibreel stated: "I think the demonstrations are going to be rather serious. Libyan people have been oppressed for more than 41 years and they see to

⁴⁵ "Libyan Protest Leaders Form National Council in East", *Voice of America*, February 27, 2011. Accessed May 21, 2015. <http://www.voanews.com/content/ex-libyan-justice-minister-forms-caretaker-govt-in-east-117005953/135684.html>

⁴⁶ Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization," 184.

the west and to the east of them, people have been able to rise and to change their fate." From this statement it can be seen that the facilitating condition concerning the general acceptance of the threat as dangerous is fulfilled. Namely, a large proportion of Libyan civilian population had already felt dissatisfied and oppressed by Al-Qaddafi's rule for decades. Consequently, when the uprising began, and the securitization process in parallel with it, securitizing actors did not have a problem presenting Al-Qaddafi's regime as a threat to their own survival. A great segment of the population had already seen the repressive regime as a threat to their well-being and security, otherwise, securitization probably would not have occurred or the intersubjective element between the audience and the actor would not exist.

However, the audience in this securitization process was twofold. Namely, opposition forces had to convince both the people of Libya and international actors in the necessity of undertaking special measures. When it comes to the persuasion of the international actors into the severity of the situation and urgency of acting, recognition of the interim administration in the international arena comes as a logical measure of legitimacy of rebels as securitizing actors.

France was the first country to recognize the interim government on March 10, 2011.⁴⁷ France was followed by other countries such as Qatar, Maldives, Italy etc. Spokesman of the Quay d'Orsay stated that France "pledges support for the principles that motivate it and the goals it has set itself"⁴⁸. Also, they commended "the will for unity that led to the creation of this council and urges its leaders and the movements within it to continue to pursue this course"⁴⁹

The international community accepted the securitizing act performed by the pro-democratic movement in Libya and this intersubjective element is confirmed by the start of another

⁴⁷ "Libya: France recognizes rebels as government", *BBC*, March 10, 2011. Accessed May 21, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12699183>

⁴⁸ "France welcomes Libyan rebel council, UK in diplomatic bind", *RFI*, March 6, 2011. Accessed May 21, 2015. <http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20110306-france-recognises-libyan-rebel-council-uk-diplomatic-bind>

⁴⁹ Ibid.

securitization process at the international level. Firstly, they supported the actions of Libyan rebels directed against the authorities. Secondly, individual countries started advocating undertaking of special measures Libyan opposition had asked them for.

On several occasions leaders of the opposition have called international community to intervene and help them struggle with Al-Qaddafi's measures. For instance, Abdurrahman Shalgam a longtime Al-Qaddafi's friend and ally, who decided to leave and condemn his action, held an influential speech before the UN Security Council. Various elements of securitization can be identified during this speech. Firstly, Shalgam as a representative of Libyan opposition forces, and securitizing actor, claims in front of the world greatest powers, that there is an existential threat to the referent object. Namely, he stresses out that "Muammar Al-Qaddafi is telling the Libyans 'either I rule you or I kill you'".⁵⁰ Thus, Al-Qaddafi is threatening the survival of Libyan population. Moreover, referring mostly to France and Britain who showed previous will to react, Shalgam invites the employ special measures: "We need a courageous resolution from you".⁵¹ Furthermore, he respects facilitating condition of using the "grammar of security". By asking for the help from the international community "within hours, not days", this securitizing actor points out the urgency of a threat and necessity of a quick reaction.

To summarize, besides Al-Qaddafi, who represents a traditional type of a securitizing actor as a sovereign, in a realm of Libyan revolution, there is another actor on a sub-state level capable of making a successful securitizing move. National Transitional Council had enough social capital to move the issue of a longtime repressive regime into the "sphere of security", thus to securitize it. In this process two types of audience were identified. Revolutionaries have searched for the acceptance of "extraordinary politics" from Libyan people, as well as from the

⁵⁰ "Libya's UN ambassador denounces Gaddafi", *The Telegraph*, 25 February, 2011. Accessed May 21, 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8349048/Libyas-UN-ambassador-denounces-Gaddafi.html>

⁵¹ Ibid.

international community. Finally, this process can be considered a successful securitizing move, since the intersubjective element, the acceptance of the audience, is present. Libyan people have shown their acceptance by relentless involvement in the revolution. At the international level, succeeding UN Security Council Resolution confirmed the acceptance of the audience and thus, the existence of an intersubjective element of securitization. At a certain point, caused by the securitization process led by rebels, another strand of securitization developed at the international level.

In an endeavor to acquire the UN mandate

As violence escalated, international actors have taken the calls of the domestic securitizing actors and started warning on the situation in Libya and calling the international community to take actions. Thus, another securitization process outside Libya itself, started to unfold. It would be of great importance to identify these actors and elaborate on their securitizing moves.

During the first month of the revolution, mostly individual countries can be noticed as the ones contributing to the process of securitization of Al-Qaddafi's regime within the international community. Certain countries, such as France or Great Britain, which later had a major role in Libyan intervention, have constantly tried to convince international community of states to undertake necessary measures against Libyan government. These actions can be considered acts of securitization, since they fulfill the necessary criteria. For the illustration, several statements will be singled out in order to explain the main elements of the securitizing process.

David Cameron, British Prime Minister has declared the following:

"It's not acceptable that Colonel Al-Qaddafi can be murdering his own people, using aeroplanes and helicopters gunships ... and we have to plan now to make sure that if it happens we can do something to stop that".⁵²

Thus, Al-Qaddafi's regime in Libya has been identified as an existential threat to the referent object. The audience these actors have been referring to, is the international community of states. Since opinions towards undertaking extraordinary measures were divided among different countries, these actors have tried to persuade the rest of the world in the necessity of "taking action" in Libya. The final aim was to convince UN Security Council members, since no action could be undertaken without its mandate. As for the referent object, citizens of Libya were mostly identified as the ones threatened by the brutal regime of Muammar Al-Qaddafi. In a demand for a no-fly zone over Libya coming from French and British administrations, French President Nicolas Sarkozy wrote a letter to all of the UN Security Council members, emphasizing that:

"Together, we can save the martyred people of Libya. It is now a matter of days, if not hours."⁵³

Throughout this declaration, all of the necessary criteria suggested by the Copenhagen School, can be examined. Firstly, this statement is in compliance with the so called "grammar of security". It calls on the urgency in action, because if not, the referent object might be seriously endangered. Secondly, as the president of a permanent member country to the UN Security Council, Sarkozy had enough social capital to raise an issue on the security agenda. His social capital comes from the formal position of power that France has within the international security structure. Finally, it can be concluded that in the light of certain events during the past few

⁵² "Britain considers Libya no-fly zone", *Al Jazeera*, March 1, 2011. Accessed May 23, 2015.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/03/201131151117619377.html>

⁵³ "Libya no-fly zone supporters push for UN vote", *Al Jazeera*, March 17, 2011. Accessed May 23, 2015.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201131715122293202.html>

decades and new security challenges, the threat of humanitarian disaster or severe violations of human rights within autocratic regimes is generally accepted as dangerous. Human security problems have already been very high on the international security agenda since the end of Cold War.

In order to gain the necessary majority of votes in the Council, these actors have sometimes pointed to the endangerment of a different type of referent objects. Thus, Italian interior minister Roberto Maroni has declared the following:

*"This is not just a problem for Italy and the Mediterranean countries, it's a problem for Europe and the world. This is a catastrophic humanitarian emergency."*⁵⁴

What comes as a logical conclusion is that international securitizing actors have also warned that the conflict in Libya is a threat to global peace and security. Since the UN Security Council is, formally, the final arbiter deciding on security issues, all of the securitizing actors were aiming to convince the others in the legitimacy of undertaking measures against Al-Qaddafi.

UN Resolution 1973 and its legitimization

In the following section UN Resolution will be carefully examined, along with the statements of UN officials, whose purpose was to justify its adoption and implementation. UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1973, on March 17, 2011.⁵⁵ By adopting Wilkinson's framework we can conclude that passing a resolution is a securitizing move as well. In this case, the securitizing actor is the Security Council itself, thus, an international body authorized to maintain global peace and security. The resolution gave the green light for the imposition of a

⁵⁴"World leaders weigh Libya response", *Al Jazeera*, February 24, 2011. Accessed May 23, 2015.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011224143852557185.html>

⁵⁵ UN Security Council, S/RES/1973, *Resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya]*, March, 17, 2011, Accessed May 23, 2015,
[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973\(2011\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011))

no-fly zone over Libya and the use of “all necessary measures.” Ten out of fifteen member countries have voted in favour of the resolution, however the rest did not vote against it, but merely abstained.⁵⁶

Throughout the resolution, the Security Council had expressed: “*grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties*”, condemned “*the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions*” and considered that “*that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity*”⁵⁷

Therefore, it can be concluded that the existentially threatened referent object is the civilian population of Libya. Al-Qaddafi and his forces are presented as a threat. Similarly as in the case of rebels as securitizing actors, there is a twofold audience in front of which the Security Council had to justify their resolution. Firstly, there is the rest of the international community, since the resolution is adopted by only fifteen UN member countries, more precisely by five permanent members. In this case UN Security Council certainly had the formal, institutionalized social capital necessary to securitize pro-Al-Qaddafi forces. However, not all of the UN countries supported the resolution nor the actions that resulted after its adoption. Thus, the moral support of this securitizing move can be questioned. Nevertheless, the formal support necessary for the establishment of the intersubjective actor/audience relationship had been present. More importantly, Security Council had to legitimize the use of “all necessary measures” in front of the domestic audience. In terms of the domestic, Libyan audience, it can be said that the Security Council gained the necessary moral support. Namely, Libyan rebels

⁵⁶ “UN authorizes no-fly zone over Libya”, *Al Jazeera*, March 18, 2011. Accessed May 23, 2015.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201131720311168561.html>

⁵⁷ UN Doc. S/RES/1973, preamble.

backed up the measures defined throughout the resolution. After all, the intervention of the international community is a part of “extraordinary politics” that opposition forces tried to legitimize within their process of securitization and in efforts to overpower Al-Qaddafi. Also, rebels welcomed the adoption of the resolution as well as the general attitude of international actors. That is because National Transitional Council as transitional administration was recognized as “legitimate and credible” by the main international actors.⁵⁸

In a statement of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon that: "Given the critical situation on the ground, I expect immediate action on the resolution's provisions",⁵⁹ it can be concluded that on behalf of the UN he tried to legitimize the resolution, by highlighting the severity of the situation in Libya. Thus, the facilitating condition of using “rhetoric of security” has been complied with. Emergency mode and necessity of immediate action were requested.

French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, explaining the resolution, said: "In Libya, for a number of weeks the people's will has been shot down... by Colonel Al-Qaddafi who is attacking his own people[...] We cannot let these warmongers do this, we cannot abandon civilians." In this statement we can observe another speech act directed towards the justification of “special measures” under the UN Resolution 1973. Securitizing actor is highlighting again the endangerment of the referent object by its own sovereign. He also stressed that the international community “should not arrive too late” emphasizing the pressure of urgent application of resolution’s provisions.

In conclusion, throughout the analysis of the prevalent discourse during the Libyan uprising, it can be claimed that the framework of securitization does indeed apply to the context of revolution. Thus, both rebels and UN Security Council can be identified as securitizing actors,

⁵⁸ CNN Wire Staff, “No consensus in Middle East on Obama speech”, *CNN*, May 19, 2011. Accessed. May 21, 2015. <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/05/19/obama.mideast.reax/index.html>

⁵⁹ “Libya: UN backs action against Colonel Gaddafi”, *BBC*, March 18, 2011. Accessed. May 21, 2015.

below and above the state level. That can be inferred with respect to the main notions of securitization (actor, audience, referent object, facilitating conditions), which are all recognized within these securitizing moves. In addition, the main conclusion derived from the analysis of securitization discourses in the case of Libyan insurrection, is that a revolutionary context opens up space for more parallel securitization streams. Thus, we can identify securitization in a traditional sense, coming from the Libyan regime, which is not within the scope of this research. On the other hand, there is a sort of chain of securitization, starting from revolutionaries in Libya, transferring on to the global level and finishing with the UN Security Council as an international body. Within this chain of securitization, the elements are so intertwined and connected, that securitizing actors can be audience some point as well, audience can at the same time be a referent object etc.

Nevertheless, one of the most important elements of securitization theory still has to be discussed. That is the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary politics. The question remains whether the notion of special measures can be properly applied on to the revolutionary context, in the case of non-state actors?

Chapter III

Realm of normal politics within a revolutionary context

So far, securitization theory has served as a good conceptual framework for an analysis of a revolutionary context. However, it seems that the notion of extraordinary measures is a point where this framework requires questioning. In the following section I will try to argue that within the realm of an autocracy, endeavor to introduce democracy can be perceived as an “extraordinary measure”. Revolution, as such, represents an attempt of a regime change, which in this case can be explained as an example of “leaving the framework of normal political order”. Taking into account the context of a non-democratic regime and moreover, a very specific revolutionary context, “Westphalian straitjacket” must be removed in order to discern special measures appropriately. Therefore, the first task would be to clarify, in case of the Libyan uprising, what are the “established rules of the game”.

In order to discuss special measures proposed by a securitizing actor, one must clarify what exactly is considered to be the realm of normal political process, in a given context. It might seem complex to clearly define the framework or rules from which special measures derogate, in case of non-state actors during an insurrection. The notion of “normal politics” might be particularly problematic to explain in a revolutionary context. The starting point when determining a normal political sphere, would be the securitizing actor itself. Thus, the presumption would be that the sphere of politics, as opposed to the sphere of security, has to be set in relation to the securitizing actor. Accordingly, in a revolutionary context, the very environment of a revolution, insurrection or an uprising as such, should be considered normal politics. It seems very difficult to distinguish “normal mode” and “mode of emergency” of a revolution. Within a realm of a revolution, where the main aim is, in fact, the regime overthrow and a radical socio-political turnover, extraordinary politics is hard to identify and define. The

question arises if a revolution can actually have “rules of the game” from which special measures can deviate. I would like to argue that the basic concept of securitization, namely, the normal/exceptional politics distinction fails to explain such a specific context as the revolutionary setting. This is mainly because revolution itself might be perceived as an exceptional state, a special measure, and must be perceived in a broader context. Namely, identity of revolutionaries, thus, them as securitizing actors, is transient in nature. Being a revolutionary is not a constant state. Therefore, the realm of revolution would not be the realm of normal politics for the revolutionaries as well. If we look closely into the Libyan case, revolution is a mode of emergency from the viewpoint of the people who started the rebellion and opposition forces generally, as much as it is from the perspective of Al-Qaddafi. The regime was “ordinary politics” of revolutionaries prior to the uprising, regardless of their approval for certain features of that system. The revolutionaries themselves claimed that their representative body, NTC, is not supposed to be viewed as a government or a permanent body, but a transitional administration.

Therefore, the revolution itself is one of the special measures proclaimed by the rebels. Under different circumstances, oppositional forces might not raise a rebellion against Al-Qaddafi. They might have used other channels envisaged by the framework of normal politics, in order to push through their demands and ideas.

In addition to the uprising, the changes that revolutionaries loudly demanded, are also a part of extraordinary politics. Thus, the introduction of democracy, can indeed be perceived as an exceptional measure, if we observe it through the lens of a non-democratic regime, with the “Westphalian straitjacket” left behind. In order to show this distinction, I will compare Al-Qaddafi’s ideology with the reforms requested by the opposition forces.

Since Libya never had a constitution as such, during the Al-Qaddafi's regime, his "Green Book"⁶⁰ can serve as a picture of what the regime was based on. The book was published in 1975 and it can be perceived as a foundational ideology of his rule in the succeeding decades.

On the other hand, all the ideas of the opposition forces are accumulated within the Constitutional Declaration of the National Transitional Council.⁶¹ Besides the main tendency that drove the revolution, to break free from the chains of the oppressive regime, rebels have continuously strived for fundamental changes in society and the political system. Aspirations and reforms they advocated for are in detail elaborated within the Constitutional Declaration. Thus, in further analysis, these two manifestos will be juxtaposed in order to examine whether "calls for democracy" could be considered special measures in Libya.

Firstly, the revolution itself represents a "special measure", especially within an autocratic context. Naturally, in a dictatorship such as Al-Qaddafi's Libya, appeal for a violent or non-violent regime change, seems to be a call for the use of extraordinary measures. A section in "The Green Book", which elaborates on what are the proper ways of dealing with deviations in the society and regular modes of readjustment, characterizes revolution as a wrong direction to go. Namely, in Al-Qaddafi's vision of democracy it is "a way to dictatorship, for this revolutionary initiative increases the opportunity for an instrument of governing, representative of the people to arise."⁶² Thus, revolution as such can be interpreted as an emergency politics, since it implies a regime change which departs from the settled rules. The act of rebels, who called on for the dismissal of Al-Qaddafi, steps out of the domain of regular politics.

⁶⁰ Muammar Al Quathafi, *The Green Book*, 1980. Accessed May 21, 2015, https://archive.org/stream/TheGreenBook_848/Greenbook#page/n27/mode/1up

⁶¹ The Interim Transitional National Council, *The Constitutional Declaration – Draft Constitutional Charter For the Transitional Stage*, February, 17, 2011, Accessed May 24, 2015, http://portal.clinecenter.illinois.edu/REPOSITORYCACHE/114/w1R3bTIKEIG95H3MH5nvrSxchm9QLb8T6EK87RZQ9pfnC4py47DaBn9jLA742IFN3d70VnOYueW7t67gWXEs3XiVJJxM8n18U9Wi8vAoO7_24166.pdf

⁶² Al Quathafi, *The Green Book*, 41.

Furthermore, the reforms revolutionaries suggested were in a clash with the basic concepts of the previous political system. Above all, general comprehension of the nature of the political system intended for Libya and proposed by the opposition forces diverges to a great extent from the one elaborated throughout “The Green Book”. Namely, Al-Qaddafi had characterized commonly accepted definitions of democracy as aberrant and presented his own interpretation of a proper “instrument of governing”.⁶³ For this purpose he developed a unique version, a model of direct, or pure democracy. He criticizes fundamental features of representative democracy. For instance, parliaments, as a wrong instrument of governing, are devoted a special chapter. According to the traditional understanding of democracy one of the primary functions of parliaments is representation of people. However, Al-Qaddafi apprehends parliaments as a form of governance that does not meet this fundamental purpose. Contrarily, he claims that democracy presumes direct governance of people themselves, whereas parliaments present an authority deciding on their behalf. As he emphasizes, “mere existence of a parliament means the absence of people.”⁶⁴ In general, all types of representation are condemned as undemocratic.

*“[...] people are seduced into standing in long, apathetic, silent queues to cast their ballots in the same way that they throw waste paper into dustbins. This is the traditional democracy prevalent in the whole world, whether it is represented by a one-party, two-party, multiparty or non-party system. Thus it is clear that representation is a fraud.”*⁶⁵

On the other hand, if we look at the Constitutional Declaration of the National Transitional Council, we will notice that their requests and suggested reforms diverge from this model. For instance, the first part, which speaks about general features of the future political system, envisages creation of a multiparty system. This “political multitude”⁶⁶ would provide more

⁶³ Al Quathafi, *The Green Book*, 3.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 5.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 8.

⁶⁶ The Interim Transitional National Council, *The Constitutional Declaration*, 2.

competing forces in the country, and enhance the development of the system which would include counterbalancing and distribution of power. Nevertheless, Al-Qaddafi repels existence of any kind of a party system, claiming that it entails misrepresentation of people and creates divisions in a society.

Another element that is a point of discrepancy is the existence of a constitution. The Constitutional Declaration foresees adoption of a constitution, as a basis for governing the future democratic state. On the other hand, The Green Book interprets constitution as another undemocratic feature of modern democracies:

*“A constitution is fundamentally a (man-made) positive law, and lacks the natural source from which it must derive its justification. The problem of freedom in the modern age is that constitutions have become the law of societies. These constitutions are based solely on the premises of the instruments of dictatorial rule prevailing in the world today, ranging from the individual to the party.”*⁶⁷

Al-Qaddafi highlighted that any other form of law, apart from the one based on religion or tradition, must be considered invalid and deviant. Nevertheless, National Transitional Council anticipated preparation and adoption of a Constitution, approved by people through plebiscite (a form of vote strictly prohibited by according to The Green Book).

There are a lot of other reforms proposed which are at odds with “The Green Book” such as the ones concerning women or freedom of speech and press. However, some provisions of the Constitutional Charter refer to certain sides of Al-Qaddafi’s repressive regime that cannot be found within the book. Naturally, those are the provisions concerning prosecution of criminals, political refugees, private life or human rights and freedoms in general. Although these issues

⁶⁷ Al Quathafi, *The Green Book*, 34.

were not officially or proudly published, they represented the everyday practice, or “normal politics” in Libya, during the dictatorship of Al-Qaddafi. Thus, rebels pointed out these practices and the entire rule as a threat to survival of citizens of Libya, which requires special measures. In this case, suggested special measures were the overthrow of Al-Qaddafi and establishment of democracy as well as the act of calling the international community to intervene.

Extraordinary measures at the international level

By identifying the Libyan government, and Al-Qaddafi himself, as an existential threat to the survival of the referent object, Libyan population, the issue had been dislocated from the realm of “normal politics”. Therefore, special measures were required in order to repel the threat and protect the referent object. The question arises, from the perspective of the UN as a securitizing actor, what can be considered a realm of “normal politics”? On a state level, constitutional order may be regarded as a framework of the normal political process, and thus, any withdrawal from this framework can be identified as “emergency measures”. Moreover, according to some classical political theory concepts of exceptional state, the sovereign is the one deciding on the introduction of extraordinary politics.⁶⁸ The question arises what happens if we climb up from the state level on to the global level. On the one hand, one might argue that international arena represents a community of equal actors, without a sovereign to declare state of exceptional politics. On the other hand, it may also be asserted that there is no coherent “normal politics” to refer to when observing the international community of states. Nevertheless, I would like to argue that UN Security Council, although a collective body, represents a typical securitizing actor at the global level and discuss what can be taken for special measures in that case. UN Charter, as a foundation document of the system of collective security, can be a point of

⁶⁸Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Scwhab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 12.

reference when examining the “rules of the game” broken in cases of securitization on the global level. According to the UN Charter, Chapter VII, article 39:

*The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.*⁶⁹

The Charter does not specify explicitly what can be announced as a threat to international security and peace. Does it refer solely to interstate armed conflicts or it includes civil wars as well? It can be questioned whether it is possible to proclaim non-military challenges, such as terrorism or human rights violations, as threats to international peace and security. Therefore, UN Security Council has an exclusive right to construct and define any issue as a threat, thus, to securitize it.

Furthermore, there is no form of control or scrutiny over the processes of securitization on the global level. Namely, no international body or organization (for instance, UN General Assembly or International Court of Justice) has the obligation or right to monitor the work and decisions of UN Security Council. Therefore, in accordance with securitization theory, this international body, precisely its five permanent members have a prerogative to identify what undermines international peace and security.

Moreover, as a main securitizing actor on the international level, UN Security Council has a formal right to suggest appropriate “extraordinary measures” according to the UN Charter, Chapter VII, article 42:

⁶⁹ United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, June, 26. 1945, Accessed May 24, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/intro.shtml>

*Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.*⁷⁰

Therefore, the case of Libya can be considered as an example where UN Security Council called for the enforcement of exceptional politics. Using the language of securitization, in this case, state of “normal politics” would be the principle of non-interventionism, incorporated in the UN Charter and some later international documents. On the other hand, humanitarian intervention, enabled with the adoption of the UN Resolution 1973, represents a deviation from this principle and state of exceptional political process.

Since the basic framework for functioning of the system of collective security is the UN Charter, precisely this document serves as a starting point in discovering the nature of ordinary politics. Based on the analysis of the Charter, principle of non-interventionism emerges as a part of normal political process. In Article 2.4 of the Charter the following is stated:

*All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.*⁷¹

Consequently, the principle of non-interventionism can be understood as non-interference into internal affairs of other states, against the will of that state. The lack of consent of a given state would be an important element of defining an intervention.

⁷⁰ United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, June, 26. 1945, Accessed May 24, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/intro.shtml>

⁷¹ Ibid.

Furthermore, Article 2.7 of the Charter further explains this principle:

*Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.*⁷²

Thus, the non-interventionism can be comprehended as a prohibition to interfere or influence the changes in a given political order of another state in international relations, with the reservation in terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. Although the Charter does not explicitly define intervention, it can be claimed that the UN system is a normative space within which the principle of non-interventionism was constituted.

However, the principle of non-interventionism was further conceptualized and widened with the adoption of the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations in 1970.⁷³ Through this declaration, prohibition of intervention has been broadened in two directions. In terms of forms of intervention, declaration proclaims:

*No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.*⁷⁴

Hence, the Declaration rules out any form of intervention, diplomatic, financial, economic, interventions directed against certain state values. Likewise, it is stated that any kind of

⁷² United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, June, 26. 1945, Accessed May 24, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/intro.shtml>

⁷³ UN General Assembly, A/RES/25/2625, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, October, 24. 1970. Accessed May 24, 2015, <http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm>

⁷⁴ Ibid.

assistance or support to “activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interference in civil strife in another State”⁷⁵ is prohibited.

Accordingly, if non-interventionism rule is considered to be a principle of ordinary politics within the UN system, then the UN Resolution 1973 which enabled intervention in Libya embodies the UN Security Council’s attempt to exercise the exclusive right of introducing extraordinary measures. Although envisaged by UN Charter, this act of UN Security Council fits in the realm of exceptional politics, and thus represents a part of a securitizing move.

Intervention in Libya can be considered a case of a “classic humanitarian intervention”, if we take into account the definition presented by Andrew Cottey. Operation Unified Protector coincides with the features highlighted by the author. The intervention was undertaken by Western powers, had a significant military and coercive element, and was done without the consent of the Libyan government.⁷⁶ Intervention was a consequence of a securitizing move, the adoption of the UN Resolution 1973. Thus, it is clear that when juxtaposed with the UN Charter and non-interventionism principle, the resolution and the intervention that followed represent a classical example of exercise of exceptional politics.

Moreover, in comparison to the securitization process at the domestic level, it can be claimed that the resolution adoption, necessary for the enforcement of any kind intervention, represents a case of “institutionalized” securitization. Namely, what UN Security Council needs in order to step out of the circle of ordinary politics is formal support, thus, majority of votes. In this case, the role of the audience is basically marginalized. Moral support would be desirable, but

⁷⁵ UN General Assembly, A/RES/25/2625.

⁷⁶ Andrew Cottey, “Beyond Humanitarian Intervention: The New Politics of Peacekeeping and Intervention,” *Contemporary Politics* 14, no. 4 (2008): 440.

it is not necessary for a successful securitizing move. Security Council does not need the consent of general public to securitize an issue.

Conclusion

In summary, the primary aim of this research was to complement the securitization theory literature and identify securitizing actors at the international and domestic level within a revolutionary context. Classical theoretical framework developed under the umbrella of Copenhagen School of thought, although certainly represents a “widening” and “deepening” approach to security, has not been enough to grasp the reality of the newly emerged structure of international relations after the Cold War. Most notably, the concept was trapped by the “Westphalian straitjacket”, and thus, often criticized for being Western-centric and excessively focused on the state. Various revisions of the theory have adjusted the concept, so it can fit the circumstances outside the realm of Western liberal democracies. However, it seemed that securitization generally remained tied to the state and political elites, especially in terms of “securitizers”. Namely, most of the empirical analyses concentrated their attention on securitizing actors on formal positions of power. A few authors have considered actors beyond political elites, as capable of performing a successful securitizing move. Nevertheless, it has been concluded that there are other securitizing actors besides the official political actors. In terms of relations with all the other elements of securitization process, non-state securitizers have fulfilled all the necessary requirements for a successful securitizing act. Of course, the biggest difference is the source of social capital. When it comes to non-state securitizing actors, the origin of social capital does not have to be political legitimacy. It could be intellectual capital, specialized knowledge about a particular issue or informal position within society. Notwithstanding the remarkable move towards a more comprehensive framework, certain questions still remained to be discussed. Namely, the most disputable notion, which was examined during this research, is the notion of special measures.

In order to understand the concept of non-state securitizing actors and what can be perceived as their “realm of normal politics”, securitization was connected to the weak state conception. Namely, weak states, with low socio-political cohesion and government’s authority questioned, partially or even entirely, open up more space for the agency of non-state actors. Within this environment, where the population is dissatisfied with the provision of basic public goods by the central authorities, it is more likely for sub-state actors to gain social capital necessary to securitize certain problems. Moreover, weak states are more prone to revolutionary crises, where rebels can obtain moral support and securitize the regime itself.

Accordingly, the case of Libyan uprising was selected in order to examine the main argument of this thesis. The central argument is that various actors involved in a revolution, beneath and above the state level, can be considered securitizers. Revolution in Libya was a suitable case, since it involved both domestic and international actors who tried to securitize al-Qaddafi’s regime and present it as a threat to survival of people in Libya. Not just in the case of UN, but rebels as well, all the facilitating conditions for a successful securitization can be considered fulfilled. Firstly, rebels as well as UN officials used the “grammar of security” and stressed the importance of urgent reaction. Second, in both cases actors had the indispensable social capital, based on different sources. UN had a formal position of power within the collective system of security, at the global level, originating from the UN Charter provisions. As for the revolutionaries, the examined actor was National Transitional Council, a collective body, chosen as a representative of rebels. Finally, it was not too troublesome to securitize al-Qaddafi’s regime, since the threat was generally familiar and recognized as dangerous both domestically and globally. At the international level, it was accepted within a broader discourse about human security and threats of humanitarian disasters, due to basic human rights violations in autocracies. In Libya itself, people were already so dissatisfied and tormented by al-

Qaddafi's long repressive rule, so the third facilitating condition was fulfilled in this case as well.

Except for claiming the presence of all elements of securitization and confirming that both UN and rebels can be securitizing actors, there is another observation worth noting. Namely, what can be perceived is that during the Libyan uprising, more parallel strands of securitization processes were happening. Firstly, there was the traditional type of securitization, perpetrated by al-Qaddafi himself, presenting the rebels as threats to Libyan state and people. On the opposite side, there was a "chain of securitization" starting from revolutionaries who called the international community to intervene and help them overthrow the regime. Next, individual states, such as Great Britain and France, started a new securitization strand on the international level, trying to securitize al-Qaddafi's regime in front of the UN Security Council. Finally, adoption of the UN Resolution 1973 triggered another securitization flow, with the UN as a securitizing actor. The dynamics of a process such as revolution, especially in case of Libya where international actors were involved, creates a bit chaotic structure of different securitization streams. In that unique chain of securitization even the major elements are not fixed. Those who are securitizing actors within one stream, become the audience within the other. Moreover, at certain points, referent object and the audience are the same.

Special measures within a revolutionary context were evaluated separately, since this notion has been insufficiently addressed in the existing literature. Precisely, the central question was whether the distinction between "normal" and "extraordinary" politics can be applied to the analysis of securitization streams on the international and domestic level. Puzzle revolves around the question what is ordinary politics on these two levels. It could be argued that neither international community nor revolutionaries have "rules of the game" coherent enough, or a sovereign which could advocate the introduction of special measures. However, after the research on I would like to claim that this process is indeed possible on both levels. At the

global level, UN Charter and principles of international law can be comprehended as the realm of normal politics. Thus, anything breaking these rules or going out of these frameworks can be understood as exceptional politics. So, it can be concluded that the humanitarian intervention conducted in Libya does fall into the category of special measures. When it comes to sub-state actors, namely Libyan rebels, it must be admitted that the traditional securitization ordinary/extraordinary distinction can explain such a specific context as revolutionary one. It would be extremely hard to grasp the essence of normal politics within such a chaotic and turbulent dynamics as during a revolution. However, what I would like to conclude is that since being a revolutionary is not a constant identity, circumstances of a revolution do not present the framework of normal political action. The environment of the previous regime, in this case al-Qaddafi's autocracy, presents the cadre of ordinary politics for rebels as well. Thus, anything that drops out of these limits is an example of extraordinary politics. This case of Libyans raising a rebellion, calling the international community to intervene, as well as requiring the introduction of democracy can be considered exceptional politics.

Finally, due to the scope of this research, no broad conclusions can be derived. For that purpose, it would be essential to make a comparative analysis of more revolutions. Also, it would be useful to juxtapose different types of revolutions (e.g. violent and non-violent or revolutions within a democratic and non-democratic setting) in order to draw more general assumptions about securitization streams in an insurrectional context. Nevertheless, the main goal of this thesis was to point out the importance of identifying more types of securitizing actors and within different contexts in order to comprehend the complex reality of contemporary international relations.

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