Living the Global Muslim Protest

Boycotting Israel in Two European Urban

Locales

By

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To

My dad, for being my main editor and giving great advice that I often stubbornly questioned.

I'm sorry for being a brat.

My mom, for being a source of love and support my entire life. You told me at age 12 that a

9-5 is not for everyone. You were right.

My sister, for being levelheaded and practical when I am not. Twix, you are the anchor, and I

am the wings.

And lastly, my dog Sid, for accidently shutting down my computer that one time. I lost a bad

paragraph that day. Thank you for that.

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i

Statement

I hereby state that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. The thesis contains no material previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

Jana Jevtic

Budapest, June 16, 2015

Abstract

The present thesis is an ethnographic study of the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign in two locales of Muslim activism in Europe – Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad. It is divided into four major chapters. Chapter 1 provides a general theoretical framework of my study. It calls for balance between recognizing transnational forms of activism and grounding research in the peculiarity of historical contexts in which a particular social movement emerges. Chapter 2 looks at the transition from multilateral state-driven to global NGO consumer-focused boycott of Israel. It argues that the Arab League boycott succeeded in combining economic and political considerations with cultural and moral aspects via consumerism. However, the boycott began to dismantle against the backdrop of a massive policy apparatus by the United States (US) in the 1970s and 1980. Although official, diplomatic appeals of the Arab League echoed in a number of conferences and meetings during the early 2000s, a different, pan-Islamic ideology emerged in part as a response to what was perceived as a failure of Arab state leaders to cut ties with the State of Israel and the US. The pan-Islamic movement was led by students groups and trade unions in the Middle East who viewed it as a way of supporting the Palestinian uprising but also addressing the economic insecurity created by the increasing commercial influence of the US in the region from the mid-1990s onwards. The movement was supported by a wide range of Arab public figures – professors, TV scholars, *muftis* (Islamic scholars who are interpreters or expounders of Islamic law), and preachers. Drawing from earlier pan-Islamic movements against imperialism, they took to the World Wide Web in order to let Muslims know that they could fulfill the duty to wage *jihad* (struggle or resistance) through peaceful consumer activism. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 situate the long history of political protest in the form of boycott in two contemporary sites of Muslim activism – Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad. The

ethnographic material points to a specific global-local account of the boycott that is anchored in the Arab world and cannot be substituted easily by other markers. These chapters further show that in both locales BDS becomes appropriated within a global Muslim discourse of suffering mediated by local projections of victimhood, vulnerability, and fear to which different generations and classes respond in different ways. The campaign offers an arena for a number of individuals to act out their claims to be the "genuine" voice of "their community." My ethnographic study of BDS in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad works with these issues of power, legitimacy, and representation at the forefront.

Acknowledgements

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Finally, in spite of my seemingly omnipresent frustration caused by years of fieldwork, good and bad drafts, exhausting write up, and several formatting troubles, a number of loving and caring people have stuck by my side. Thank you to my family for the love, understanding, and support. This thesis is dedicated to you. A big thank you also goes out to all of my friends, especially John – you have been a big brother to me since 2000 (or 2001 if we listen to Asja), and you remain the only person who truly understands the importance of being Dr. Doucheyeon; Sanja – I know you like to be referred to as "Shiva," but you're more like Yoda to me. Not green and wrinkled, of course, but just as wise; Malin – I appreciate the mock thesis defense you organized for me in spite of it having absolutely nothing to do with my actual work; Una – your daily motivational talks are almost as good as your ability to set up a beach umbrella so that I tan and Asja is in shade; Daniella – at the time when PhD seemed like a surefire way to alienate people you stood by me. I am forever grateful for that or, at the very least, forgive you for making me watch Peter Pan Live.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

CEU eTD Collection

List of Abbreviations

AAM Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa

AAUP American Association of University Professors

AIO Active Islamic Youth

AIPU Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union

AMP American Muslims for Palestine

AUT Association of University Teachers

BCB Boycott Central Bureau

BDS Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions

BMI British Muslim Initiative

BNC Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee

BNP British National Party

CBO Central Office for the Boycott of Israel

COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions

ECCP European Coordinating Committee for Palestine

ESF European Social Forum

FOA Friends of Al-Aqsa

HOCS Home Office Citizenship Survey

ICJ International Court of Justice

JFJFP Jews for Justice for Palestinians

JVP Jewish Voice for Peace

KCL King's College London

MCB Muslim Council of Britain

MFS Medjunarodni Forum Solidarnosti (International Forum of Solidarity)

MST Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Brazil's Landless Workers Movement)

MTV Muslim Television

NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

NATFHE National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education

NRMs New Religious Movements

NSMs New Social Movements

PACBI Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel

PBC Permanent Boycott Committee

PIC Palestinian Information Center

PSC Palestine Solidarity Campaign

PSI Policy Studies Institute

PSM Palestine Solidarity Movement

POS Political Opportunity Structure

RM Resource Mobilization

SDA Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action)

SDP Socijaldemokratska Partija (Social Democratic Party)

SJP Students for Justice in Palestine

SMO Social Movement Organization

SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies)

UAR (United Arab Republic)

UCU University and College Union

TUC Trades Union Congress

YMCA Young Men's Christian Association

YMMA Young Men's Muslim Association

Notes on Transliteration

This thesis uses standard American style in hopes that this simplified transliteration will prove useful when dealing with concepts, places, and personal names in Arabic and Bengali. I use the Anglicized "Muhammad" instead of "Mohamed," "Mohammad," or "Mohammed," use "Fuad" instead of "Fu'ad" or "Fouad," "Assad" instead of "Asad," "Yasser" instead of "Yaser" or "Yasir," etc. Names of prominent public figures are transliterated according to their better-known form; hence "Gamal Abdel Nasser" instead of "Jamal 'Abd al-Nassar," "Ghaleb Saad" instead of "Ghālib Sa'ad," "Ahmad Khazaa" instead of "Aḥmad Khazā'," and so forth. The exception to this practice is the bibliography, where I retain authors' own spelling preferences. When dealing with the names of organizations in languages other than English, e.g., AlMinbar, Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, or Medjunarodni Forum Solidarnosti, I provide the original name – omitting any special characters that are not on a standard keyboard, e.g., č, ć, š, ž, đ, ü, ö, é, ā, or ç – the first time I use it along with an English translation and its abbreviated form that is used later in the text. Lastly, I italicize all words and phrases in Arabic, Bengali, and Bosnian and provide a translation in brackets the first time I use them in the text.

Introduction

> Today's [BDS] movement − like the anti-apartheid movement before − broadens the base of people and institutions involved in decisions and actions based on equal rights for all […]. Through boycott and divestment campaigns, a much wider range of actors − churches, students, trade unions − now seek nonviolent means to end Israel's military occupation and systematic denial of Palestinian human rights. To be clear, morally responsible investing, divestment, boycotts and sanctions are nonviolent, moral, economic measures that seek to change the bad behavior of corporations and of governments for moral reasons. […] When Rosa Parks, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Black community in Montgomery, Alabama mobilized a bus boycott, it was not to eliminate buses or the bus company. It was to end Jim Crow policies of segregation that the bus company refused to give up. The community chose a nonviolent form of protest to galvanize public and economic pressure to end an unjust system (Wildman, 2006).

Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) is a global campaign instigated by representative of Palestinian civil society on July 9, 2005. It invites people all over the world to fight Israel's system of occupation and apartheid by imposing extensive boycotts and executing divestment schemes against the State of Israel and international companies complicit in Israeli policies that violate human rights and international law. While proponents hail the universal character of BDS as a milestone in a decades-long struggle (Bakan and Abu-Laban, 2009; Erakat, 2010; McMahon, 2014), critics claim that this international movement is essentially anti-Semitic (Cohen, 2007; Yudkin, 2007; Weissmann, 2007; Babbin, 2014). Proponents and critics alike, however, typically fail to recognize that, in spite of its global reach, BDS is also a product of particular places and sites. My goal in this thesis is to emphasize its situated nature and propose that what occurs on ground is less a consistent, collectively organized global campaign and more a network of local BDS movements that are, as Carter Hallward explains, "linked together via certain key activist nodes, […] conferences, email listservs, and organizational websites" (Carter Hallward, 2013, p. 2). The author further notes that Palestinian initiators of the 2005 BDS call have consistently emphasized "context sensitivity" by urging activists to devise campaigns based on local needs and values as well as act as

brokers between different groups involved in the campaign. Hence, if we wish to grasp the global BDS campaign, then we need to pay close attention to its diverse local expressions and realize that BDS is not "a one-size-fits-all type of process" (Barghouti, 2011, p. 148). In this thesis I posit that the campaign is articulated and appropriated in accordance to local relationships of power, justice, economy, and identity. Working within a frame of global-local relations that reverberate through faith-based calls for political and social change in two European urban locales, I show that parts of the campaign emerge as features of what I define as the global Muslim protest against Israel's system of occupation and apartheid – a movement that retains the key objective of BDS, i.e., the recognition of Palestinian rights in full compliance with international law, but also conveys local values and needs as well as conflicts and competitions within and around Islam. My question "how the global BDS campaign gets locally appropriated" is, therefore, answered by putting a finger on the situated histories of Muslims in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad.

The idea that BDS can be used as a frame for faith-based activism in Europe developed few days into my fieldwork, after I met Harith, the coordinator of Friends of Al-Aqsa's (FOA) "Not in my Fridge" campaign which calls upon the boycott of Coca-Cola until it stops operating in 262 Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Seated in a small coffeehouse in London's Bethnal Green, he told me how crucial it was for those spearheading the BDS movement to be clear and concise in their strategies; how focusing on a handful of companies is better than pushing for what he called "unrealistic" goals of targeting too many firms at once. To illustrate his point, Harith explained that Coca-Cola has suffered a major financial loss from the 1960s until early 1990s as a result of a comprehensive pan-Arab campaign. The same extensive pressure, he declared, needed to be applied today. What happened next was a Freudian slip or perhaps should be chalked up to a rookie mistake and my lack of sleep. Maybe it was due to my thrill over starting fieldwork? Whatever the reason,

when the waiter came over I ordered Coca-Cola, and I did it while Harith was still explaining how effective the Arab League boycott was. I braced myself for the worst. I envisioned him cutting the interview short and leaving in repulsion. Slow motion, dramatic music, and all other truisms merged in my head, but then Harith did something unexpected. He ordered Coca-Cola as well. I was strangely excited watching him sip the drink while simultaneously telling me about the boycott. The whole thing was bizarre, but it made me realize that BDS is not strictly concerned with the degree of economic impact. In spite of this seeming carelessness about individual behavior, as revealed by Harith, BDS is also about raising awareness, shifting opinions, and educating on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among the communities in which it operates. In my study of the local appropriation of BDS in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad, I argue that while these efforts impact upon the lives of distant others, they also affect more proximate social relations through the development of political discussion, cultural contestation, and perceptual change loosely grouped around the question of what it means to be a Muslim in Europe.

This foregrounding of "space," that is to say, the conception of BDS as a result of particular places and sites, is an exciting contribution to the existing literature on the campaign because it shows that local activists often hold conflicting conceptions of "success," describe "justice" in opposing terms, identify with diverse worldviews, and/or make use of different levels in a multifarious political opportunity structure. Moreover, the attention to a rage of possibilities in a broader scope of global-local articulations made possible by BDS shows that Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad are sites of what I call the global Muslim protest – an ethical, mobilizing, and framing repertoire that develops and operates under the aegis of BDS but is shaped by different readings of Islam driven by generational and class claims as well as migrations and claims to citizenship. This is not to suggest that BDS is a religious campaign. In fact, a number of organizations engaged in the campaign do not refer to religion

3

at all in their narratives, targets, goals, and mobilization tactics. What I put forth instead is that the global BDS campaign can get locally tailored and adjusted and this local adjustment can have a distinctively religious character, as is the case in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad.

Before I outline the structure of my thesis, I need to say a few words about Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad and explain why these locales were selected for my study of local BDS movements in Europe. I did my undergraduate study at King's College London (KCL), and it was during this time that I first noticed how incredibly popular BDS was amongst student groups and academics in Britain. For instance, KCL students created an e-petition against the school's involvement with Ahava, an Israeli cosmetics company located in the illegal Israeli settlement of Mitzpe Shalem, in 2011. Four years prior, the University and College Union (UCU), a merger of the Association of University Teachers (AUT) and the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE), endorsed a Palestinian civil society call for boycott, following years of discussion, lobbying and political awareness-raising. Requests for boycott also extend to churches and trade unions. For instance, the Methodist Church leadership has regularly corresponded with large supermarkets asking for details of their policies on settlement produce since 2009, whilst Unison, Britain's second largest trade union, suspended all relations with Histradut, Israel's organization of trade unions, in 2012. In addition, public figures like Emma Thompson and Elvis Costello endorse the campaign. The British singer-songwriter was due to play in Israel in 2010 but said his conscience dictated that he pull out of the performance. On his website, Costello wrote, "[…] there are occasions when merely having your name added to a concert schedule may be interpreted as a political act that resonates more than anything that might be sung and it may be assumed that one has no mind for the suffering of the innocent" (Dodd and McCarthy, 2010).

In a rich plethora of boycott initiatives, some of the most creative recent calls come

from Tower Hamlets and its Bengali Muslim commune, e.g., "Check the Label" and the aforementioned "Not in my Fridge." I do not wish to arbitrate high grades in virtue but rather to suggest that since the 2008 global financial crisis new alliances have formed between previously separated actors that were working locally on a number of ad-hoc "identity" and "lifestyle" agendas. Whatever the term "neoliberal globalization" signifies, it now represents a common program that is both locally relevant as well as globally framed. This is particularly noticeable in the case of BDS where Israel is typically portrayed as a part of the global North, while Palestine is depicted as a characteristically poor and dispossessed part of the South. Tellingly, in response to the Occupy Movement, which first received widespread attention in 2011, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee (BNC), the Palestinian steering committee of the BDS movement established in 2008, issued a statement noting how proud it was to stand in solidarity with organizations fighting for a new world based on democracy, human rights, and economic justice. The largest Palestinian civil society coalition suggested that global mobilizations provide "a much needed reminder of something that Palestinians have always known – that another world, a dignifying one, is possible, and ordinary people can create it" (The Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee, 2011). Furthermore, the BNC called upon a joint quest for freedom, equal rights, environmental sanity, and world peace, stating that, "We can no longer afford to be splintered and divided; we can no longer ignore our obligations to join hands in the struggle against wars and corporate exploitation and for a human-friendly world community not a profit-maximizing jungle" (ibid).

On February 7, 2014, the protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina driven by long-simmering discontent at a slow-moving economy, mismanagement, corruption, and unemployment, which saw government buildings on fire, showed that the global cycle of contestation was far from over. Having witnessed similar anti-government demonstrations in Zagreb in 2011 and

Maribor in 2012 and 2013, Bosnians and Herzegovinians took to the streets and publically conveyed anti-capitalist ideas. In Tuzla, a city with an extensive working class tradition where the protests began, demonstrators voiced profound dislike for the political and economic elite and requested legal action against postwar economic crimes, the seizure of illegally obtained wealth as well as equal wages and health protection for workers. "Death to nationalism" was scribbled on the walls of a burning government building, sending a powerful message to the local elite who, for decades, relied on nationalism in order to rationalize its political and economic oppression. The establishment of the plenum movement, a political body for democratic decision-making, was perceived as a refreshing step in a struggle to offset corrupt local and national political institutions. However, this early enthusiasm was short lived, and in the months that followed the protests, not much has changed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Six months after the February riots, on August 14, the 20th Sarajevo Film Festival (SFF) kicked off. I watched the city's political and economic elite – the same elite targeted by the protests – mingle with producers, directors, and actors on a red carpet laid out in front of the National Theatre. One block away from a charred government building, in a parade of dresses, two figures stood out. Sabina Sabic, a theater company executive producer, and her young daughter turned their red carpet fashion into a political statement with matching gowns made from Palestinian flags. I watched a TV broadcast of the opening night at a packed Sarajevo bar, and was bemused by the excitement of young men and women who cheered and applauded as the "flag dresses" made their way down the red carpet. "Bosna je uz vas" (Bosnia is with you) was one of the many cheers I heard. However, four years into my ethnographic study of BDS, I was aware that such jubilation was a rare indication of support in a city that has, by large, remained on the outskirts of a global movement against Israel's system of occupation and apartheid.

Organizations in London, such as FOA and the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC),

managed to integrate their BDS efforts within a larger network of protest movements that have exploded across the world since the 2008 financial crisis by presenting the campaign as a token of dignity against local discrimination and global imperialism. Organizations in Sarajevo, however, failed to make such a connection. Instead, Medjunarodni Forum Solidarnosti-Emmaus (International Forum of Solidarity-Emmaus or MFS-Emmaus), Stand for Justice, Mladi Muslimani (Young Muslims), and IslamBosna drew parallels between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 1990s war in which Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims were by far the most likely to be murdered, violently expelled or otherwise mistreated. It follows that NGOs in both Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad linked their BDS efforts to a global Muslim discourse of suffering with its focus on Palestine, but they did it in very different ways.

From spring 2009 to spring 2014, I engaged with some of the leading BDS organizations in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad along with 40 of their supporters. I first reached out to my friends and associates – I was born in Sarajevo and, as mentioned earlier, I studied in London – and with their help, got in touch with my first group of participants. Those I spoke to initially were supporters of FOA and Mladi Muslimani, who then recommended further individuals I needed to contact. I used an interview timetable that consisted of four sections and sixty questions. Most interviews were tape-recorded. Frequently, an informal atmosphere prevailed where I felt free to go into issues beyond the limits of interview questions. Participants welcomed me to their homes, offices, and universities. Others spoke to me in religious centers and coffeehouses as well as the streets of London and Sarajevo during protests, rallies, and demonstrations. I tried to give them as much clarity and specificity as possible by referring not only to religious appeals of their involvement in BDS but also asking how their participation connects to the lived experience of class in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad.

My Bengali participants shared a similar socioeconomic background, predominantly

working class. Younger members of the PSC and especially FOA, however, inspired towards a more middle class status and saw in BDS a chance to transcend what they believed to be a historical victimization of the Bengali Muslim community in Tower Hamlets. This idea of victimhood was understood and constructed differently across generations, and it was precisely this generational twist that constituted one of the most important factors in the local appropriation of BDS in the borough. By comparison, Bosniaks were more diverse in terms of their socioeconomic standing. I interviewed unemployed supporters of IslamBosna, who saw in BDS a link to the *Ummah* (the global Muslim community), as well as those who earned well above the national average and joined organizations like MFS-Emmaus in hopes of asserting their belonging to Europe. Without the readiness of my participants to explain themselves, and to do so at great length over and over again, this thesis would not have been possible.

I begin my research on how the global BDS campaign gets appropriated in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad by outlining two important theoretical fields – discussions and approaches in the field of social movements and debates regarding the long history of reforming Muslim tradition and protest. I first trace the emergence of the collective behavior approach as well as theories of resource mobilization (RM), political opportunity structure (POS) and new social movements (NSMs). I discuss the most pertinent features of each theory, linking them whenever possible to my ethnographic findings. I then argue that these theories are shaped by the experience of politically open societies, which brings into question their applicability when it comes to social movements stemming from societies characterized by higher degrees of political control. I highlight a number of studies that not only test the hegemony of the American and European models but also call for greater appreciation of the role of religion in movement motivation, mobilization, and justification. I focus on the role of Islam as a social movement discourse and argue that, in the case of BDS, long-lasting

8

conflicts over religious authority impact upon class and generational rivalries that inform an array of local displays of the campaign. It follows that BDS is in the constant state of making; it changes as it passes through different social groups.

In Chapter 2, I ask how different models of the anti-Israeli campaign understand political resistance and the role of the individual within it. I start by looking at the Arab League boycott, the first instance of an anti-Israeli movement, and argue that a number of strict legal measures and stipulations were put in place in order to prevent the member states from steering away from a joint, pan-Arab boycotting objective. However, against the backdrop of American meddling in the regional politics, these tactics failed to resolve increasingly conflicting national goals. The pan-Islamic boycott of Israeli and American commodities led by student groups and trade unions in the Middle East sought to fill the void created by supposed governmental "softness" that followed the Oslo Accords. I argue that the movement was in many ways empowered by new information technology, particularly the Internet. Arab preachers, *muftis*, TV scholars, and professors who gave legitimacy to the pan-Islamic campaign took to the World Wide Web in order to popularize the idea of *jihad* as a peaceful act of consumer resistance against the charge of terrorism that followed the September 11 attacks. These public figures drew extensively from earlier anti-imperialist movements and inspired a range of anti-Israeli calls amongst Muslim communities worldwide, thus pointing to an interesting case of the global-local nexus. I argue that the pan-Islamic movement built on the long history of engaging critically with Muslim tradition and protest. In the same vein, contemporary campaigns in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad represent the current stage of the continuous reform.

I first look at Tower Hamlets. I suggest that Bengali Muslims, regardless of their age, join the BDS movement in an attempt to understand the changing nature of Tower Hamlets and situate themselves as effective agents of that change. Their struggle is also within and

9

around Islam. In contrast to members of the first and second generation, who tend to wage their symbolic fights either in the privacy of their homes or through secular, municipalist politics, the British-born generation uses BDS to communicate a form of openly political Islam concerned with what it means to act as a good citizen within modern British society. These three generations expose plural political imaginaries that organize types of political participation based on religious faith that are presently evolving within Tower Hamlets.

I then look at Stari Grad. I argue that those with historically established autochthonous rights to the city link their particular versions of Islam to "Western modernity." Supporters of MFS-Emmaus typically insist on Islam as a form of individual expression confined within the private realm, while young followers of Stand for Justice see Islam as a common culture and a communal force more actively engaged in the reform of Muslim political identity in Europe. BDS becomes a stage upon which both groups assert themselves against, on the one hand, the alleged attacks from an array of "newcomers" to the city – a category that includes the in-migrated Bosniaks from ethnically cleansed villages and a new wave of religious believers who adopted a version of Islam supposedly foreign to Bosnia and Herzegovina – and, on the other, the business-political elite which emerged out of the war. It is important to note that most Serbs and Croats have left Sarajevo before, during, and after the war and, therefore, represent less relevant "others" in the everyday experience, especially for young Bosniaks. In additions, there exists, in political rhetoric as well as everyday life, great ambiguity and shifting between exclusive Bosniak nationalism and inclusive pro-Bosnian statism. As a result, the hypothesis I had before I started my fieldwork that the engagement in the BDS campaign could represent a way for Bosniaks to distance themselves from Serbs and Croats living in the city was proven wrong.

In the concluding chapter I focus on the two narrative strands of my thesis – the global BDS movement against Israel's system of occupation and apartheid and local sites of its

10

manifestation. A number of scholars have paid attention to a broad range of adaptive strategies developed and pursued by Muslims in Europe in response to different economic, social, and political conditions (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore, 2003; Cesari, 2003; LeVine, 2003; Nielsen, 2003; Bagguley and Hussain, 2005; Begum and Eade, 2005; Geaves, 2005; Klausen, 2005; Birt, 2009; Meer, 2009), but no work thus far has focused on the use of BDS as a tactic for impacting behavior, attitudes, cultural debates, and value systems of the "home front." How do global protest frames get discursively constructed through locally tailored activism? Can we speak about the emergence of the global Muslim protest against Israel's system of occupation and apartheid? How do campaigns in Tower Hamlets compare to campaigns in Stari Grad? What makes them similar and what makes them different? What are the objectives of these local campaigns? How do they differ from past efforts in the Middle East? These are some of the questions that inform the present thesis in which BDS is understood as a lifestyle – an aspect of "lived Islam" under globalizing conditions.

Chapter 1 – Literature Review: Beyond Disciplinary Boundaries

The present research is an ethnographic study of the global BDS campaign. It argues that, in some instances, the consumer boycott of the State of Israel as well as multinational corporations investing in the country becomes articulated and appropriated in different settings of Muslim activism in vastly dissimilar ways. I focus on the process of appropriation within the histories of Muslims in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad. I argue that what happens on the ground is less a singular, collectively organized campaign and more a network of locally tailored initiatives. The aim of the present chapter is to construct the broad theoretical architecture of my study. The chapter develops from two main theoretical fields – discussions and approaches in the field of social movements and debates regarding the long history of reforming Muslim tradition and protest.

I start by broadly outlining theories related to social movements, beginning with the earlier part of the 20th century, when the Chicago School first conveyed ideas of collective behavior. Prior to the 1960s, theorists of this school used a primarily psychological lens to define social movements as modes of irrational deviation produced by isolation and discontent. The African-American Civil Rights Movement put this notion to the test. It pointed to rational decision-making that connected those at the bottom of the society with collective action, most notably organized boycotts. This led to the emergence of two new strands of thought in the study of social movements: theories related to RM and those grouped around the concept of NSMs. I argue that both theories were essentially shaped by the experience of highly differentiated and politically open societies and were, for this reason, frequently thin in perspectives from social movements in the Global South and Global East. This is important for my research because, while I start from the inherently shifting, compound, and constructed nature of social life, most social movement theories, as Fuss

12

explains, believe in the constant and fixed properties that define the "whatness" of a given entity (Fuss, 1989, xi, cited in Munck, 2007, p. 24). By pointing to research on social movements originating from the Global South and Global East (Guha, 1983; Vishwanath, 1990; Kearney and Varese, 1995; Kuppinger, 1997; Davis, 1999; Walker, 1999; Bayat, 2000; Toth, 2004) I do not wish to overemphasize the distinctiveness of "the Third World" or imply that all previously colonized settings are the same. Rather, I call for balance between recognizing transnational patterns of activism and grounding studies in the peculiarity of historical contexts in which social movements arise, regardless of whether this is in the North or the South, the West or the East.

The existing literature on BDS has failed to strike this balance. Packed with praise of the movement's global character but focused almost entirely on its human rights dimension (Bakan and Abu-Laban, 2009; Erakat, 2010; McMahon, 2014), it has often ignored the role of multiple historical and contextual influences that structure the ongoing campaign. It bears repeating that I do not suggest that BDS is a religiously defined movement. Rather, my argument is that in certain locales of BDS activism, Islam and faith-based mobilization play an important role in the organizational forms, frames, and strategies adopted by the movement leaders – some of whom I deal with in the present thesis. This fact has been largely ignored in the existing literature. When acknowledged, this role is reduced to recent "re-Islamization" or "coming out" of Muslims in a non-Muslim majority setting. What I suggest instead is that BDS and, more concretely, its appropriated manifestations represent one instance within the current stage of the long history of reforming Muslim tradition and protest. The notion of historical continuousness proposed in this chapter provides important knowledge about the ways in which both Muslim tradition and protest have been prone to changes through meetings with other, competing traditions as well as internal interventions.

The binding element between the concept of continuous reform and my empirical cases is the emphasis on the shifting configurations of power that impact upon, for instance, intergenerational change and class. I argue that the completion and interplay amongst generations and classes, which reverberate through the symbolic and relational field of BDS, drive the very dynamic and often fragmented nature of local identities. Social movement studies are actually weak on understanding these local dynamics, consigning "the self" to a rather reified form. By moving to a micro-level analysis and building outwards, I identify the situated histories of those who boycott and those who lead them. The proposed approach reveals that local identities are continuously made and remade in the boycott movement framing.

1.1 Evolving Theories of Social Movements

In the late 1960s, the world was seemingly undergoing profound, dramatic changes. Della Porta and Diani (2006) cite the civil rights and anti-war movements in the US, the Mai 1968 rebellion in France as well as the student protests in Britain, Germany, and Mexico, as examples of the looming transformations. The authors suggest that in light of these changes, the study of social movements developed at a swift pace. If, at the end of the 1940s, critics grieved the "crudely descriptive level of understanding and a relative lack of theory" (Strauss, 1947, p. 352, cited in della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 1) and in the 1960s complained about fairly little emphasis received by social movements in the study of social changes (Killian, 1964), from the mid-1970s onwards, commentators noted a virtual explosion of theoretical and empirical writings on collective action and social movements (Marx and Wood, 1975; Turner, 1981; McPhail and Wohlstein, 1983). More recently, the importance of studying social movements was reaffirmed as different kinds of collective action with new goals and

values started to appear. The democratization wave of the 1990s, for instance, produced a collection of studies about the role of social movements and their links to regimes in authoritarian and post-authoritarian conditions (Foweraker and Craig, 1990; Cook, 1996; Alvarez et al., 1998), while the upsurge of mobilizations for "globalization from below," inspired studies which combined "themes typical of class movements with themes typical of new social movements, like ecology or gender equality" (della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 2).

Despite the fact that terms like "globalization from below," "global justice movement," and "counter-hegemonic globalization" refer to an umbrella of heterogeneous organizations with myriad of concerns, a number of authors note that social movement studies often commit the error of "reification," that is to say, they associate the movement with particular organizations or individuals (della Porta and Diani, 2006; Munk, 2007). Furthermore, they frequently confuse social movements with their activities, thus mistaking specific movement actions with the social movement itself. In reaction to these shortcomings, Giugni (1998) and Tilly (1999) called for a more interactive approach to social movements. The former wrote about a catalogue of political practices whereby a group of opponents, who are part of the definition but by no means exhaust it, partake in collaborative claim making with power-holders with the goal of influencing their decisions and behavior, while the latter focused on bounded and interactive performances by constantly changing actors. Both authors recognized that history and identity of any social movement is contested and continually in the process of formation through narratives of those involved in the movement itself and those who stand on the outside.

Castells (1997) and Beckford (2001) developed on these arguments further and described social movements as sets of relationships and interactions between actors fighting for power, in the form of rights, resources, and recognition within a given social system. Castells argued that social movements act upon institutional politics, defining them as

"purposive collective actions whose outcome, in victory as in defeat, transforms the values and institutions of society" (Castells, 1997, p. 3). Beckford also highlighted this ability to radically restructure societies, adding that social movements "pursue their grievances and campaigns mainly outside the channels of institutionalized politics" (Beckford, 2001, p. 235). Hence, although movements commonly have partners within institutions and may even become institutionalized themselves, a central feature of any social movement is its position outside of the institutional structures of power (dell Porta and Diani, 2006; Smith and Wiest, 2012). Material collected in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad reveals that BDS is attractive precisely because it represents an alternative strategy for political engagement of those who deliberately avoid involvement in the formal sphere of representative politics.

The following overview of major developments in the field of social movements exposes a variety of opinions amongst theorists about the nature of relationships between movements and power-holders. I also identify the gaps in social movement research and discuss these in reference to my study of BDS in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad.

1.1.1 Collective Behavior Theory

Even though social movements did not officially appear as a concept in social science theory until the 1960s, a number of current debates within the field were built around the concept of "collective behavior," formulated in the 1920s by theorists of the Chicago School. Influenced by Gustave LeBon's school of "collective psychology," which sought to provide an explanation for the maddening crowd born of social, political, and economic challenges to the status quo in Europe during the 18th and 19th century, Robert E. Park contrasted "social organization," which entailed institutionalized, conventional patterns of everyday life, with "collective behavior," a category that included sects, crowds, mobs, and mass movements –

all of which he believed to be "symptoms of societal disequilibria and harbingers of new patters of social relations" (Park, 1967, cited in Edelman, 2001, p. 287). While Park's concept of "disequilibria" was rejected as "too strong" by theorists who attributed collective behavior to tensions that exceeded the capacity of societal mechanisms to generate social cohesion (Lang and Lang, 1961; Smelser, 1962), the prevailing approach continued to assume that shared feelings of deprivation and segregation are necessary conditions for the emergence of social movements in a collectivity. This position, also known as the theory of relative deprivation, understood group behavior, which manifested in either short-term incidents, e.g., panics and lynch mobs, or longer-term movements, e.g., revolutions and religious cults, as a sign of irrationality rather than a rational tactic of communicating discontent. Smelser, for instance, repeatedly referred to "hostility" and "craze" (1962, 1963), while Parsons et al. (1961) emphasized "irrational fears" as characteristic of crowds that join together in order to deal with social instability.

These attitudes were to change in 1960s America, "when for the first time in history large numbers of privileged people […] had considerable sympathy for the efforts of those at the bottom of society to demand freedoms and material improvements" (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003, p. 5, cited in Munck, 2007, p. 21). What Goodwin and Jasper allude to is the influence of the African-American Civil Rights Movement on social movement studies. Gone were the notions of irrationality and irresponsibility as theorists like Olson (1965) started to emphasize the reasonableness of collective action in which the individual essentially conducts a cost-benefit analysis of whether participation is logical or not for them. McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977) later extended this analysis from the individual onto the social movement organizations (SMOs) that sell their brand, recruit staff and compete in the social movement industry. This paved the way for the arrival of a new approach interested in how social movements mobilize time and money in pursuit of their goals.

1.1.2 Resource Mobilization Theory

In the 1960s, especially in the US, a number of social scientists started to articulate a new approach to social movements, also known as resource mobilization (RM) theory. This model moved away from the social psychology of collective behavior and focused instead on ongoing problems and strategic dilemmas of social movements. Drawing from E. P. Thompsons's *The Making of the English Working Class*, Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* and Charles Tilly's *The Vendee,* RM theorists looked at a variety of resources that must be mobilized, the nature of relationships between social movements and other groups, and the reliance of movements upon external support for success (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Snow at al., 1986). Kalb shows that Thompson's insight into the making of the English working class, "not out of people's positions but out of their experience of their particular forms of social being" (Kalb, 2015, p. 7), was particularly informative given its interest in "how people became aware of, publicly thought about, and organized themselves against the social forces that were preventing the full flowering of their human capacities" (ibid).

The 1955 bus boycotts in Baton Rouge, Montgomery, and Tallahassee revealed the capacity of people to organize against the experience of perceived stagnation. These boycotts also tested earlier explanations like deprivation and stressed instead the role of larger networks of support concerned with resource availability and preference structures. Movement "entrepreneurs," e.g., local ministers, community leaders, and the members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), were in charge of mobilizing resources and channeling dissatisfaction into organized boycott frames. They did so by making it obvious that bus discrimination was not "a private misery but a public issue

and a common enemy – a widespread social grievance shared throughout the black community" (Morris, 1984, pp. 48-49, cited in Friedman, 1999, p. 94).

While instrumental in challenging the concept of relative deprivation and calling for a new approach to social movements, the bus boycotts are largely disregarded in RM theory. This is due to the fact that RM theorists tend to emphasize resources controlled by the social movement elite, therefore, disregarding the self-organization potential of the most disposed social groups. Edelman shows that, in contrast to earlier works of Thompson, Moore, and Tilly, research from the 1980s onwards often put aside situations in which social movements, typically of the poor, "appeared with few resources" (Edelman, 2001, p. 290). Glickman reveals that boycotts are in fact very often "weapons of the weak," tactics accessible to the "downtrodden" and those low on the economic scale (Glickman, 2009, p. 119), whilst Nash proposes that boycotts have become representative of dissent by the "dispossessed and impoverished" (Nash, 2004, p. 3). More recent RM literature, however, fails to recognize this fact and pays more attention to interest group politics driven by elite actors and those socially connected. Edelman cautions that by viewing social movements as interest group politics, "the model understands 'success' primarily as the achievement of policy objectives rather than in relation to broader processes of cultural transformation" (Edelman, 2001, p. 290). This is a major setback when trying to apply RM theory to my study of the BDS appropriation in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad. Without a doubt, the realization of political objectives is important. However, I suggest that social movements may also succeed in terms of changing behavior, attitudes, cultural symbols, and value systems that, in the long run, confront political power.

One of the leading voices of the new social movements (NSMs) approach, Alberto Melucci (1980, 1988) also dealt with the question of policy success vs. cultural transformation. He noted that wider processes of social and cultural change along with

feelings of solidarity and communal sharing do not feature in RM theory given its inability to grasp the collective identity at the heart of all social movements. Singular focus on the instrumental rationality of the individual, in this regard, comes at the expense of appreciating the role of larger collective processes. Additionally, Melucci asserted that in reaction to earlier perceptions of social movements as irrational and illogical, the RM approach overemphasizes the rational and organized character of contestation, thus ignoring the role of emotions. Building on Melucci's criticism, Piven and Cloward argued that by underlining the social integration effects of social movements, RM theorists normalize "the organizational forms typically associated with protest" (Piven and Cloward, 1978, p. 153, cited in Munck, 2007, p. 21). In practice, however, contestation seeks specifically to disrupt and not normalize conditions. The goal of the BDS campaign is precisely that – to oppose the historical denial of Palestinians' fundamental rights of freedom, equality, and self-determination through "ethnic cleansing, colonization, racial discrimination, and military occupation" (The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement, n.d.).

1.1.3 Political Opportunity Structure Theory

Shortcomings of RM theory were addressed in part by political opportunity structure (POS) theorists on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, Sidney Tarrow sought to understand the environmental factors that influence the existence of social movements. He suggested that when mobilization is on the increase, movement leaders can either confront or ignore the existing institutions. However, when it decreases, fewer new participants are available, and those who stay often choose to participate in institutions that provide more certain rewards. To survive in a period of quiescence, Tarrow argued, "it [social movement] must retain the memory of injustice that gave it birth" (Tarrow, 1989, p. 319). In 1994, he extended the

argument further by noting that social movements develop when ordinary citizens "respond to changes in opportunities that lower the costs of collective action, reveal potential allies, and show where elites and authorities are vulnerable" (Tarrow, 1994, p. 18). From this perspective, as Edelman explains, the movement strategizing was observed in a context of "the balance of opportunities-threats for challenges and facilitation-oppression by the authorities" (Edelman, 2001, p. 290). Tilly (1978) similarly regarded social movements as equivalent to the interaction between insurgent populations and authorities. Others like Ash-Garner and Zald (1987) indicated that it is the level of centralization of the state and the size of the public sector that shapes the development of social movements. On the one hand, the authors argued that the marriage of decentralized systems and a non-interventionist state paves the way for the arrival of more prominent social movements. On the other hand, they noted that political systems that involve weak parties facilitate more space for social movements to function autonomously.

In Western Europe, similar efforts led to the emergence of theories that examined how the opening and closing of POS impacted upon the collective actors' capacity to integrate into the political system (Pizzorno, 1970, 1978). Accordingly, social mobilization and contestation were reduced to participants' desire to be included within the political market, which is no more useful for the understanding of modern social movements than the "economic rationality" framework developed by RM theory. Both models essentially fail to recognize that movement participants often seek rewards that cannot be quantifiably measured. I explained already how this shortcoming correlates with my study of BDS, but I want to make an additional, equally important observation related to the treatment of identity in the POS approach. Gamson and Meyer (1996) criticize the broadness of POS theory, stating that it tries to absorb every aspect of the social movement environment. In trying to do too much, it overlooks the discursive qualities of identity as well as the social production of POS itself,

that is to say, the links between motivations of those who join social movements and a creative construction of cultural markers inherent to the process. As I show in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, it is precisely this relationship between the objectives of local BDS movements and the making of dynamic Muslim identities that symbolizes the appropriation of BDS in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad.

1.1.4 New Social Movements Theory

Against the backdrop of cultural revolts across Western Europe in 1968, especially in France, Italy, and Germany, a range of social theorists such as Alain Touraine, Claus Offe, and the aforementioned Melucci put forth the idea that social movements were made out of people who no longer required more material goods but sought instead self-realization in everyday life. This European approach, according to Touraine (1985), brought the social actor back in by drawing attention to the process of identity formation as central to new social movements (NSMs). Touraine built on Marx's notion of "central conflict" in society, noting that while the "old" movements revolved around the struggle between capital and labor, in a "post-industrial" society, other social rifts appear that generate new forms of identity and new sources of conflict. According to the author, the new major conflict was all about the struggle over culture and meaning, thus implying that NSMs were concerned with the setting of "a way of life, forms of behavior, and needs ... [or] ... the control of cultural patterns" (Touraine, 1988, p. 25). Manuel Castells (1997) developed on this shift in more recent times. Following the path of Touraine, he argued that in a world of global flows of wealth, power, ideas, and images, the quest for identity, collective or individual, assigned or constructed, becomes the main source of social meaning. According to the author, in contrast to the labor movement, which was crucial for gaining access for the working class with the extension of citizenship

and representation, NSMs concentrate on generating social mobilization via cultural innovations, development of new lifestyles as well as transformation of identities. The problem with this approach, and its particular take on the labor movement, is that it understands "materialism" as the opposite of culture and identity, consequently reducing class to a purely pecuniary issue. My study of the local BDS appropriation has a thoroughly materialist approach to culture and identity, yet it deals with class is a non-reductionist manner. I return to this point later in the text when I look at several shortcomings of NSMs theory. Before I do that, however, I want to focus on the NSMs literature in more detail.

Melucci (1988) argued that NSMs organize around "points of antagonism" that arise when the identity of a subject is negated either through a refutation of rights or through a relationship of subordination. This dichotomy of alienation vs. identity was perceived as central to the transformatory potential of NSMs. It evoked the notion of relative deprivation formulated by the Chicago School, however, shifting the attention to culture and identity. NSMs theorists focused on the apparent eruption of "points of antagonism" as a signal of the emergence of new social subjects whose numerous social positions problematize explanations of political agency based on a single, privileged criterion of identity (Touraine, 1977; Laclau, 1983; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). In short, they argued that contemporary struggles involve actors whose identities do not have a pre-discursive existence nor derive from a particular economic logic. Several critics have warned that because of its tendency to emphasize the individual as a protagonist of social change, NSMs theory often minimizes the collective base that inspires many NSMs (Escobar, 1992; Edelman, 2001; Nash, 2004). It also needs to be said that this focus on the identity of social subjects is by no means restricted to present-day social movements. However, what is apparently different about the NSMs approach is the attention to identity as absolutely central in the social movement work due to the modern

23

supremacy of symbolic reproduction and of the social relationships that shape it (Melucci, 1996; della Porta and Diani, 2006).

Drawing upon the idea of "colonization of lifeworld" conveyed by Habermas in 1981 – in short, occupation of family and public sphere by the market and the state that leads to a perversion of public life – Melucci (1989) argued that NSMs oppose the growing intrusion of the state and the market in social life by reclaiming individuals' right to define their identities and to regulate their private lives. In contrast to theorists of the collective behavior approach who believed that it was the most deprived members of a society that engaged in non-institutional politics, Offe (1985) proposed that the middle class was in fact a distinctive source of "new" movements due to its ability to think and act independently in the face of the growing state imposition. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) expanded on this argument further by suggesting that NSMs react against the increasing commodification of social life created by the extension of capitalist relations into all spheres of life. Klein, similarly, linked the rise of NSMs to "the entanglement of branding with culture and identities up to a point where individuals felt bombarded and threatened by corporate wrongdoing" (Klein, 1999, cited in Edelman, 2001, pp. 308-309).

Some of the leading advocates of the NSMs approach changed their positions over time to include the impact of traditional-style political action on social movement practices (Offe, 1990) and the means by which particular depictions of individual and collective identities are produced and altered over time (Melucci, 1989). Even so, the approach appears as rather challenging in relation to my study of the local appropriation of BDS. Firstly, in contrast to POS theory, which became influential in interpreting interactions between institutional and non-institutional actors as crucial for the success of social movements, NSMs theorists stressed the anti-systemic character of NSMs, believing them to be outside the standard modes of expression available within the political structure. For example, Castells

24

stated that the novelty of NSMs lies in the fact that "they are not necessarily limited to or bound by the rules of the game and the institutionalization of dominant values and norms" (Castells, 1983, p. 294). Melucci (1988) similarly claimed that NSMs involve all types of behavior that contravene the norms that have been institutionalized, thus concluding that they are better suited within the realm of civil society and the cultural sphere. These were believed to be major arenas for collective action that, according to Offe (1985), bypasses the state. I find this idea quite problematic. While it is true that many of my participants, especially younger ones, avoid participation in the formal sphere of representative politics, they still do take part in alliances, joint actions, strategic interaction, and struggles that occur widely in the politics of established institutions. "Lobby your MP" initiative led by British-born supporters of FOA is quite telling in this regard, as is the pro-Palestine importune of relevant government officials by Stand for Justice and the PSC.

Secondly, to argue that NSMs are detached from the institutional actors ignores that fact that, as Scott shows, many of the so-called "cultural" demands made by NSMs, e.g., the request for personal autonomy, have "a distinctively political incline" (Scott, 1990, p. 23). Other critics warn that because of their denial of the role of politics in NSMs, advocates of the NSMs approach often neglect the relationships between civil society and the state, on the one hand, and social movements and political reform, on the other (Bagguley, 1992; Canel, 1992). Although the end of the Cold War opened up political space for all manner of civil society proposals, it also speeded the economic liberalization and put pressure on welfare-state institutions. Fiscal adjustments in public-sector services made states the key targets for forces seeking to prevent further cut backs in healthcare, education, housing, and transportation programs (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Turner, 2003; Dagnino, 2007). For this reason, as Edelman points out, it becomes "increasingly artificial to envision NSMs as unengaged with the state" (Edelman, 2001, p. 308).

Thirdly, in spite of calling for a more compound take on social positions via the concept of "points of antagonism," the NSMs approach, as argued earlier in my discussion on Touraine and Castells, has a fairly reified and reductionist theory of class. It assumes a certain stability of class positions, particularly when it comes to middle class originators of social movements, that often is not justified, "for what seems like a clear-cut position at one moment in time may in fact be transient, an unstable signifier in a volatile system, and known as such by the person in it, whose identity would then properly be not 'occupant,' but 'passer-by'" (Kalb, 2015, p. 15). This instability of positions has heightened in the recent decades of capitalist development. Therefore, it becomes imperative to approach class from an angle of its dynamic multiplicity and not let it be boxed in categories of income, education, and occupational status. The present thesis assumes a thoroughly "holistic" approach to class as it explores how the BDS campaign can be used for the (re)assertion of the middle class (MFS-Emmaus and FOA) or as a symbolic pathway towards a higher social class (Mladi Muslimani and the PSC).

1.1.5 Transnational Social Movements: Ethical Consumption and the Fairtrade Movement

Since the 1990s, there has been a growing body of research that looks at the development of modern social movements in relation to processes of globalization (Smith, 1997; della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Munck, 2007). It is by now ordinary to argue that globalization produces identity politics in both developed and developing countries (Castells, 1997; Cunningham, 1999; Friedman, 2003; Toth, 2004; Taylor, 2005; Bayat, 2010; Masquelier, 2010), that attacks on welfare-state institutions intensify resistance movements (Cook and Barrett, 1992; Falk, 1993; Edelman, 2009), and that supranational governance institutions are part and parcel of

each process (Albert, 2003; Stiglitz, 2003; Hahnel, 2008). However, as Edelman suggests, it is less common to find analyses that connect these trends to "the increasing movement against corporate power and unfettered free trade" (Edelman, 2001, p. 308). Given its similarities with BDS, most notably in terms of the appraisal of the moral worth of objects for sale, I am especially interested in research on ethical consumption and the Fairtrade movement – a growing social movement that seeks to provide a counterpoint to the privatization and individualization of global exchanges by introducing a strong moral component that challenges the alienation implied by commoditization (Grimes, 2004; Berlan, 2012; Luetchford, 2012).

Defined as a form of consumption in which people base their purchasing decisions on their "moral evaluation of objects for sale," of the ways that they are produced and distributed, and of the companies that offer them (Carrier, 2012, p. 22), ethical consumption is actually a set of social and cultural turns that were caused by the deregulation of markets during the 1980s and capital's need for new consumers of excess commodities from the early 1990s onwards. Small companies that typically carried organic coffees, Fairtrade coffees, and other seemingly socially responsible varieties, gained footing during the free-market triumphalism and began to develop a specialized market for non-industrially produced coffee. What made this market different was its alleged flexibility as well as its consumer-oriented and consumer-driven approach (Harvey, 1989; Bingham Hull, 1999). Roseberry explains that in response to a radical decline in sales, from 1962 to 1980, coupled with the fact that coffee drinking was "skewed toward an older set," coffee producers, distributors, and roasters started to imagine a segmented market made out of the so-called "me" generation (Roseberry, 1996, p. 765). The crucial questions "me" oriented customers ask of all types of products are, "What's in it for me? Is the product 'me'? Is it consistent with my lifestyle? […] What will it cost me? Is it necessary? […]" (ibid). For this new market to become a reality, consumers

27

needed to be fashioned through clever advertising. And so the specialty coffee was born – one type of coffee to appeal to a single person.

Since the mid-1990s, the making of new consumers became closely linked to images and symbols of environmental stability, environmental conservation, and global justice (Grimes, 2004; Bingham Hull, 1999). A number of smaller companies like Sustainable Harvest, Song Bird Coffee, and Sanctuary Coffees communicated to potential consumers that their labor practices were fair and ethical, that their coffee was pure, and that they wanted to help the farmers. Luetchford explains that "rather than hide production processes and leave the qualities of the beverage free for appropriation by consumers," these brands presented a message about the conditions of its production and described a way for shoppers to relate to those conditions (Luetchford, 2012, p. 63). As a result, many consumers started to perceive "unethical" coffee as corrupted, and saw themselves as being tainted if they used it. The same assessment of the moral value of objects for sale explains activities like ecotourism, refusal to buy cosmetics that have been tested on animals, ban of South African wines under the old apartheid regime, the recent boycott of Nestle products, and the ongoing BDS campaign.

It follows from the discussion above that in light of their portrayal as potentially complicit in corporate wrongdoing mainstream consumers and their views of the world represent the main targets of ethical consumption. This, according to Kozinets and Handelman (2004), challenges Touraine and other supporters of the NSMs approach that view consumers as activists' clients and potential beneficiaries of their benevolent work. In their research on the meaning of boycotting behavior, the authors argue that boycotts are often perceived as actions that distinguish those who take part from those who are "less aware" and even "less compassionate" (Kozinets and Handelman, 1998, p. 480). This separation from mainstream consumers is also central to Berlan's work on cocoa industry (2012) and Luetchford's work on Fairtrade coffee (2012). Both authors show that contrary to mainstream

consumers ethical consumers feel that they are disconnected from what they consume, prompting a desire to have a connection with producers. From this perspective, ethical consumption emerges as the point where the economic world of production and trade meets the social world. Carrier states that "ethical consumers are motivated by what they believe the relationship between the two realms is like and what they think it should be" (Carrier, 2012, p. 3). Therefore, ethical consumption is a collective commentary and, as such, it is inherently, if not always openly, political. People can buy organic food because they think it will improve their health but, as Carrier explains, if personal desire is the only reason to do so, then "the collective aspect that makes ethical consumption a social practice and not an idiosyncrasy" is missing (Carrier, 2012, p. 3).

When recognized as a collective commentary, ethical consumption challenges the idea of buying as a purely materialistic practice of "using up" (Miller, 2001; Slater and Miller, 2007; de Solier, 2013). It does so by bringing wider ideologies, beliefs, and interests to the act of buying, or put simply, by placing the weight of the world in the shopping baskets of the consumer. In this regard, ethical consumption is marked by activities and motivations associated with morality and the politics of responsibility. Barnett et al. (2005) argue that it is through ethical consumption that "moral selves" are assembled together with other ethical and political activities. The problem here is that by tapping into and reinforcing moral politics ethical consumption also encourages the very public making of the middle class. Just as middle class activism via social movements and NGOs has long been perceived as a display of class-based status anxiety (Eder, 1993; Turner, 2003), so ethical consumption can be seen to support a similar objective. The ethnographic material in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 shows that it is precisely through the act of buying that many of my participants try to (re)assert their middle class status (MFS-Emmaus and FOA) or aspire towards a higher social class (Mladi

29

Muslimani and the PSC). It follows that the BDS campaign is equally about new possibilities for the making of the middle class and contestations that surround them.

To wrap up my discussion on ethical consumption, I place it within a broader social movement analysis as it developed in the 1990s. During this time, social movement studies sought to integrate the European and American traditions. Cohen, for instance, argued that logics of collective action implicit in these two approaches actually represent a "dual logic" of the present collective action (Cohen, 1987, cited in Munck, 2007, p. 22). The emerging synthesis included "political opportunities," "mobilizing structures," and "framing," a category that describes the ways in which collective identities develop in addition to the interpretive, discursive, and dramaturgical practices that inform how movement participants understand their conditions and possible alternatives (Goffman, 1974; Snow et al., 1986; Benford, 1997; Shupe, 1998; Benford, 2000; Snow and Benford, 2005). Therefore, it can be argued that in order to mobilize consumers to shop ethically, Fairtrade and other socially responsible producers have to openly discuss the problems of more conventional brands and put forth a range of ethical alternatives. In this way, they pursue the core tactic of framing. From this perspective, ethical consumption has the ability to both impact upon personal and collective identity formation and articulate instrumental strategic activities.

In more general terms, as Munck rightly points out, it is impossible to "separate analytically the process of identity making and political mobilization through what contemporary social movements came to be" (Munk, 2007, p. 23). The NSMs approach explains why social movements emerge, while the RM approach shows how they organize for their particular objectives. The problem here is both theories developed from and reflected a rather narrow world of liberal democratic regimes. In what follows, I call for a more carefully contextualized approach to social movements that I deem more effective in studying the local appropriation of the BDS campaign.

1.2 Essentialism and Social Movement Studies: the Reification of Identity

In his article on Islamism and social movement studies, Bayat (2005) notes that the paradigms of social movements proposed by most theorists are rooted in and orientated towards the highly differentiated and politically open societies. "Their 'Westocentric' orientation," the author states, "undermines their ability to account adequately for the dynamics of social activisms in the societies of the Global South" (Bayat, 2005, p. 893). Foweraker shows that, for instance, both European and American social movement theories tend to assume "the presence of a dense, articulate and communicative civil society […] just as they tend to assume liberal democratic regimes" (Foweraker, 1995, p. 6, cited in Munck, 2007, p. 23). However, a number of social movements that emerged across the Global South and Global East during the 1970s and 1980s did so under authoritarian leaderships (Toth, 2004; Escobar, 2004). Edelman explains that RM and POS perspectives on movements' interactions with states had little appeal outside developed democracies precisely because it was hard under authoritarian regimes to "imagine political opportunity as a significant explanatory category" (Edelman, 2001, p. 292). Furthermore, civil society was itself something that needed to be constructed or, as Munck puts it, "a project of the pro-democracy movements and not a pre-existing social reality" (Munck, 2007, p. 23).

Writing about the relationship between the state and civil society in Latin America, Davis (1999) called for a theory of social movements based on space and location. The author argued that, "it is the extent of citizens' distance from the state that explains their likelihood of joining social movements, the strategies they are likely to pursue, the meaning they attribute to movement activism, and even the identities enshrined in those collective actions" (Davis, 1999, p. 601). While citizens who organize into social movements in Europe tend to seek distance from the formal sphere of representative politics, as has been stressed by a

number of NSMs theorists, in Latin America, "it is distance that is the culprit" (Davis, 1999, pp. 611-612). In other words, social movements in Latin America often desire access and proximity to the formal institutions of government. At the same time, the author recognized the influence of NSMs theory on regional intellectuals, a fact that has been well documented (Brachet-Marquez, 1992; Paoli, 1997; Edelman, 2001), and for the most part reflected its emphasis on the transformative power of civil society.

Although more influential than its American, state-centered counterparts, the NSMs approach is widely criticized for its denial of experiences of resistance within Latin America. Escobar, for example, cautions that by suggesting that NSMs can only arise in contexts in which the democratic revolution has crossed a certain threshold or where, as Laclau and Mouffe state, the space has been opened up for "a radical pluralist democracy" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 166), the approach ignores those contexts in which "the post-war hegemonic formation of development resulted […] in a multiplicity of antagonisms and identities" that commonly formed the base of protest movements (Escobar, 1992, p. 39). Similar arguments have been made in two outstanding anthologies that reassess approaches to collective action in general and NSMs theory in particular (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Alvarez et al., 1998). The key criticism emerging from these works concerns the reification of identity. In short, the fear is that social movement studies that originated in Europe and the US are often weak on recognizing the local dynamics of identities.

Based on the discussion above, I argue that social confines, political institutions, and types of awareness are mixed across the world and Western modalities cannot be the norm. Clearly then, as Munck acknowledges, "an international approach to social movements cannot be derived solely from the experience in advanced capitalist countries of the West" (Munck, 2007, p. 24). Tarrow correctly argues that "terms like globalization and resistance open up topics for investigation […] but they do not help us to grasp the mechanisms and processes

involved in contentious interaction and how one episode of transnational contention may differ from another" (Tarrow, 2002, p. 23, cited in Munck, 2007, p. 24). In other words, globalization and contestation may offer general parameters within which global social movements organize and mobilize but they do not provide an explanation.

In his study of global contestation movements, Munk argues that it is quite common for social movement theorists to assume "a direct correspondence between globalization and a given act or process of resistance" (Munck, 2007, p. 24). The author cautions that far too often globalization features as a sort of "homogenizer" of fairly diverse movements that may be responding to different issues at different social scales and may be only indirectly related to globalization (ibid). In addition, several authors observe a tendency within social movement studies to view globalization as a carrier of largely Western social movement models via transnational NGOs and networks (Bayat, 2005; della Port and Diani, 2006; Smith and Wiest, 2012). Such totalizing view ignores various historical and contextual influences that structure movements in the Global South and Global East, which may contain certain exports but also include local and national particularities. What follows is an overview of some of the research on movements located in the Global South and Global East that I believe better accounts for a creative and eternally shifting symbolic construction of cultural markers via social movement fields.

1.2.1. Social Movements in the Global South and Global East: an Overview

In his work on peasant insurgency in India, Guha (1983) explored resistance movements in the colonial period which have been dismissed in both Indian nationalist and colonial accounts of history that tend to focus solely on the activities and ideas by which the Indian elite responded to the institutions, opportunities, and resources generated by colonialism.

33

Research on India in particular and South Asia in general by Kaviraj (1972), O'Hanlon (1988), Prakash (1990) and Vishwanath (1990) similarly sought to restore the experience of those "hidden from history." The central concern of this body of work, which closely corresponded to Wolf's *Europe and the People Without History* (1982), was the possibility of writing history that was not, as O'Hanlon states, only from Europe's periphery in its rejection of modes of interpretation that dominate the study of social movements but which also took as its focus "the disposed fragments of that periphery" (O'Hanlon, 1988, p. 190).

Ethnographies of colonial movements in Latin America (Stoner, 1991; Kearney and Varese, 1995; Walker, 1999; Maxwell, 2004; Hylton et al., 2007; Lora et al., 2009) also tried to break up the hegemony of more dominant modes of interpretation or, as Langfur calls it, "the Western pretensions to comprehensiveness and universality" (Langfur, 2006, p. 22). They did so by giving these movements their own specific content with their own history and development. Research on the Middle East and Africa, for instance Bayat's study of organized trade unions in Lebanon, Tunisia, and Jordan (2000), Kuppinger's work on urban transformations in Egypt (1997), and Lauziere's analysis of Sufi movements in Morocco (2012), similarly drew attention to economic, political, social, and ethical context of movements that fought exploitation of subaltern groups during colonialism, in regard to both the colonizing state and the local elite. These authors demonstrated how important it is for social movement studies to recognize that the origins of numerous current movements in formerly colonized settings can be traced, at least in part, to relations of power established during the colonial period.

The ethnographic mission to "recover the experience" of those "hidden from history," to cite O'Hanlon (1988), has much to thank to the study of women's movement – an area in which extensive work has been done on collective mobilizations across the Global South and Global East (Morgan, 1984; Basu, 1995; Paidar, 1995; Molyneaux, 1998; Taylor, 2005; Sen,

2007). In their research on the links between recent trends in global industrial restructuring and women's involvement in political action, Chhachhi and Pittin put forth the idea of viewing women's possibilities for action through the prism of time, space, and place in order to understand how "the very multiplicity of roles and plethora of pressures may provide both the impetus and the necessary networking" for them to push demands at numerous work sites (Chhachhi and Pittin, 1999, p. 74). The authors, however, indicated that the question of women's consciousness remains an underdeveloped area in theorizing identity politics. In his work on changing paradigms of social movements, Edelman (2001) challenged this assertion by pointing to considerable ethnographic research on women's movements in the Global South and Global East that examines how identities emerge from and configure each other as well as political action, subjectivity, and memory (Abdulhadi, 1998; Arditti's, 1999).

Similar debates on relational identities, their limitations and potential, can be found in studies of the gay and lesbian movement (LGBT). Johnson, for instance, revealed that the concept of America as well as ideas about American love relationships provide a conceptual space and vocabulary for the articulation of Philippine gay transgendered identities (Johnson, 1997, cited in Moore, 2004, p. 81). The author noted that the concept of America is not about a shared homosexual identity and solidarity with American gays but about the possibility of truelove relations that exceed the relations of exchange on which sexual encounters for transgendered gays in the Philippines are based. Therefore, although the America referenced in Johnson's work is an imaginary one, it provides a sharp distinction from the local Muslim community and creates spaces in which new, transnational identities, both personal and collective, are created. Stein (1992) and Adam (1995) have done similar work on socially constructed gay and lesbian identities inflected by race, class, and national origin.

Cunningham's analysis of the Sanctuary Movement in Mexico (1999) mirrored Johnson's in that it chronicled the making of identities that are simultaneously local and

global. The author showed that by referring to global Christianity, the movement members gradually replaced their "beyond American" character with a new identity as "global citizens." The global, in this light, became a field in which people imagined themselves and their practices in novel ways as well as "a representation of particular types of local activities and conditions" (Cunningham, 1999, p. 584). Both Johnson and Cunningham moved beyond binary oppositions between the local and the global and illustrated how to operationalize the connections between them. Werbner's work on imagined diasporas amongst Manchester Pakistanis (2002), Evan's research on transnational alliances of trade unions against transnational corporations and the state (2005), Glick Schiller's analysis of localized conflict and protest (2006) along with the collection of studies on Muslim societies in the age of mass consumption edited by Pink (2009) similarly revealed that the local is not just mediated by transnational processes – it is itself transnational.

Abaza's research on new protest culture in Egypt (2013) further deconstructed the traditional notions of spatial levels of social activity. The author explored the influence of cyberspace and virtual communication on new styles of political activism that point to a "relaxation of norms" among young activists operating within an Islamic frame of reference. According to Abaza, a new generation of cyber campaigners puts forth ideas of protest that attempt to fill the democratic void created by failed political reform and unrepresentative politics. Similar work on the impact of new technology and social media has been conducted by Hofheinz (2011), who focuses on more long-term historical developments that promote a greater role for the individual vis-à-vis established authorities in the Middle East, Allievi (2003), who addresses the process of construction of transnational Muslim communities via Islamic networks and new media, and a number of authors in the book edited by Cooke and Lawrence (2005), who look at how technology raises expectations about transnational pathways that reshape the perception of faith, politics, and gender in Islamic civilizations.

Ethnographic material collected in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad similarly shows that new technology emerges as a medium for change utilized by young Bengali Muslims and Bosniaks who are eager to formulate new styles of political activism in reaction to unrepresentative party politics.

In his account of Islam in the digital age, Bunt (2003) suggested that young Muslims often turn to the Internet to infuse terms like *jihad* and *fatwa* (Islamic legal pronouncement) with a new form of activism. Mandaville (2001), Karim (2002), Bayoumi (2010), Masquelier (2010), Stadlbauer (2013) as well as the multi-author volume on some of the central issues currently facing young Muslims in both localized and globalized contexts edited by Seddon and Ahmad (2012) collectively demonstrated that young Muslims are increasinly willing to challenge the established sources of religious authority by not only adapting to historical circumstance but also rising above it and innovating. They do so by promoting virtual sites of communication in which the content and meaning of Muslim tradition and protest is continually shifting. This does not deny the agency, interests, and struggles of people situated in specific places, but it does, as Kalb rightly points out, "challenge the ways in which we think of their sources and meanings" (Kalb, 2006, vii). In the following, I address the role of religion as a frame for political and social activism. I argue that new technology accelerated the appearance of more public forms of engagement in the name of Islam. These forms of engagement developed much earlier in Muslim majority societies, thus pointing to the long history of reform rather than a disruption of Muslim tradition.

1.3 Religion as a Social Movement Text

Most theorists tend to perceive of social movements as homogeneous and harmonious entities that are identified with and represented by leaders (Ash-Garner and Zald, 1987; Melucci,

1996; Tilly, 1999). Bayat (2005) argues that in this view, the leadership epitomizes the emotion, energy, and desire of the participants. According to the author, the expressed ideas of leaders are "assumed to be internalized by the 'constituencies,' thus making up the ideology of the movement" (Bayat, 2005, p. 896). My aim is to challenge this popular view by posing a methodological question about how the movement leaders imagine BDS and how this imagination plays out locally. In contrast to much that has been written on the campaign (Bakan and Abu-Leban, 2005; Wildman, 2006; McMahon, 2014), I highlight an array of discourses adopted by various local constituencies who are likely to exhibit different opinions about the objectives of their participation. Of course, this does not negate the cross-organizational collaboration since the movement leaders often work together on a number of common programs, e.g., "Check the Label" in Tower Hamlets and "Let us Remember Gaza" in Stari Grad. The aforementioned concept of framing represents a strategy through which leaders reach out to those with similar objections, clarify uncertainties, and mobilize larger recruits. With regard to BDS, a number of those spearheading the movement frame their objectives in religious terms, utilizing religious codes and concepts as well as resources. Given that the global BDS campaign is explicitly secular, it comes as little surprise that this fact has been largely ignored in the academic treatment of the campaign; however, it also reflects the exclusion of religion in general and Islam in particular from the mode of inquiry developed by social movement theorists in the West.

There are a number of reasons for the neglect of religion in social movement studies. Smith (1996) argues that the field has been ruled by secularization, that is to say, the impression that modernization is suppressing the impact of religion in society. Thus, when the basis for social movement studies was being laid, religion was not seen as an important social factor. Moreover, the author states that early theories were shaped by structural-functionalism, which considered religion as part of society's need for social cohesion, "but it did not

recognize its potential in making social changes" (Smith, 1996, p. 2-4). When the anti-systemic potential of religion was acknowledged, it was primarily through the lens of marginal religious movements and cults that were seen as manifestations of irrational belief systems created by material deprivations (Parsons et al., 1961; Smelser, 1962). As noted earlier, Park and other second-generation pioneers of American sociology identified social movements as forms of collective behavior irrelevant to the thrust of social progress. This was especially true for religious movements that appeared exotic, expressive, and retreatist.

Williams (2006) shows that the emergence of RM theory, with its emphasis on rational politics above irrational factors, attributed even further to neglect of religion in social movement studies. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a handful of researchers borrowed from RM theory in order to analyze the rise of new religious movements (NRMs) as both a local and global phenomenon in terms of leadership, finances, and other organizational factors (Bellah, 1976; Snow and Machalek 1983; Robbins, 1988). However, in more popular research, the cases that featured prominently were not influenced by religion. With the exception of the African-American Civil Rights Movement in which black churches played a significant role, religion was actually considered detrimental to the development of social movements, further explaining its neglect in social movement studies.

The tide began to turn in the late 1980s and early 1990s when a number of authors looked to European NSMs theory. Stark (1987), Beckford (1990), and Hannigan (1991) were amongst the first to draw attention to powerful spiritual currents running through the ideologies of ecology, feminism, and other otherwise secular NSMs. This "new spirituality," according to Beckford, characteristically favored "synoptic, holistic, and global perspectives on issues transcending the privatized self and the individual state" (Beckford, 1990, p. 9). In his later work on social movements as free-floating religious phenomena, the author points to numerous similarities between the operation of institutionalized religious groups and social

39

movements in terms of their "promotion of values, collective identity, and communal solidarity" (Beckford, 2001, p. 235). According to Williams, these similarities are exemplified in a collective ability to "integrate personal and social identity and provide the networks and rationale for action" (Williams, 2002, p. 250). Focusing on the concept of collective identity in particular, Smith states that religion, "as a pre-existing collective identity that can be conferred upon or coopted by a movement," represents a valuable resource for the task of collective identity construction and maintenance (Smith, 1996, p. 17). The author notes that contemporary social movements must overcome a host of geographical and social factors that can divide and disperse support. However, religious identity has the ability to "transcend local and national boundaries and supersede differences based on other social cleavages, such as race, ethnicity and class" (Smith, 1996, p. 18). In addition, several authors argue that against the backdrop of globalization, religious identity is often used for mobilizing since it awards movement organizers with a transcendent frame of reference (Haynes, 1995; Shupe, 1998; Wickham, 2002; Williams, 2002; Wiktorowicz, 2003; Stanczak, 2006).

Tarrow emphasizes the emotional resources offered by religion in forms of "ready-made symbols, rituals, and solidarities that can be accessed and appropriated by movement leaders" (Tarrow, 1994, p. 112). The author notes that in addition to being a powerful source of inspiration and motivation, religion also provides organizational means for social movements. Bayat (2005) shows that Islamic leaders in the Middle East, for instance, frame their movements in primarily religious terms utilizing Islamic codes, resources, and concepts such as *shahada* (martyrdom), the sovereignty of God, and *haram/halal* (religiously forbidden or allowed). They also use mosques, ceremonies and *zakat* (almsgiving) committees for mobilization purposes. This is not to say that leaders fake religiosity, although some might indeed use moral issues for political purposes. Rather, as the author explains, the point is to underline their deliberate use of religious symbols and resources for the cause of mobilization.

In his assessment of various social movements in Poland, Spain, Brazil, the Philippines, South Korea, and South Africa, Casanova (2001) argues that religion can provide a moral justification for activism and support movements by referring to a higher truth in the face of challenges from outside forces. In the same vein, Toth argues that in order to understand how local Islamic militancy in southern Egypt morphed into a transnational movement, it is vital to recognize the importance of moral criticisms against the corrupt elite and "principled arguments against the misuse of authoritarian power" which supposedly derive directly from the Qur'an (Toth, 2004, p. 118). The author notes that an Islamically framed focus on poverty and power, corruption and arrogance, gave the movement its peculiar sense of frustration but also its uncommon appeal and strength. Studies of Latin American movements inspired by liberation theology also focus on the economic, social, political, and ethical dimensions of faith-based movements, analyzing their emergence in relation to both colonial legacies and the modern forces of globalization and neoliberalism (Levine, 1988; Yoder, 1990; Cleary and Steigenga, 2004).

The discussion above suggests that religion can be an important factor in the formation and mobilization of social movements; however, it is often only one of a host of factors that correlate in order to inspire groups towards mobilization and action. Smith (1996), for instance, argues that religion frequently combines with class in order to facilitate the formation of a social movement. He looks at the Hindu nationalist movement in India, the Iranian revolution, and the movement to abolish slavery in order to illustrate that while religion may have had a significant role in each of these cases, none can be understood in terms of religion alone. Similarly, Eickelman shows that any study of religiously inspired movements calls for the understanding of wider notions of class and social groups, as these adapt religious beliefs, identities, and practices to a point where they often have implications "far removed from those that were consciously intended by their original carriers"

41

(Eickelman, 1982, p. 11). Hence, research on the role of religion in social movements need to contextualize it as one among many available forces that influence their emergence, operation, and impact.

1.3.1 BDS and the Local Dynamics of Identities

My study of BDS in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad pays attention to the situated histories of the movement leaders and their constituencies in order to answer the question how global protest frames get locally appropriated. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I address the role of Islamic codes, concepts, and resources in these local adjustments, but I also pay attention to the role of generation, migrations, claims to citizenship, and class. I argue that a supposedly standardized movement transforms as it passes from one social group to another or, in other words, as it gets appropriated within local and global histories of Muslims in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad. By linking the relational field of BDS to an eternally shifting production of local identifications, I caution against the reified interpretation of identities evident in social movement studies and stress instead their dynamic and fragmented nature. The extended case method coined by the Manchester School of social anthropology is especially useful in this regard. In an exploration of the social structure of South Africa through bridge-opening ceremony in Zululand in 1940, Max Gluckman focused on the way the macro was present in the micro situation and was, as Burawoy points out, "less concerned with their mutual determination as two different levels of reality" (Burawoy, 1991, p. 277). As a result, Gluckman and, more specifically, his followers opened up villages, strikes, tribal associations, and urban situations to wider political and economic forces (Epstein, 1958; Van Velsen, 1960; Garbett, 1970).

In the 1990s and 2000s, Burawoy (1991, 1998, 2009) developed on the idea of "extending out" from the field by calling for the expansion of the observer within the time and space of social actors "living the global." The identification of the critical connections between the local and the global as proposed by the extended case method is essential for the understanding of class as inherently dynamic and diverse. Haney's work on welfare in Hungary (2000) along with more general reflections by Tsing (2000) and Gille and O Riain (2002) on doing global ethnography demonstrate that class is a "set of global, uneven, social and geographic power balances, surrounded by an array of unevenly assembled myths, ideologies, and practices of individualism, temporal salvation […], space making […] and the like" (Kalb, 2015, p. 14). These authors show that by "extending out" the observer uncovers locally, socially, and culturally specific manners in which people comprehend the place of their locality within a global scheme of things and actions they take to shape that place. They negotiate, challenge, and even recreate the complex global web that entangles them. Movements in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad against Israel's system of occupation and apartheid are examples of how this can be done in practice.

Defined as an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by "urging individual consumers to refrain from making selected purchases in the marketplace" (Friedman, 1985, p. 97), consumer boycott has traditionally been conceptualized and empirically examined as a communal act of consumer resistance (Garrett, 1987; Friedman, 1991). John and Klein (2003) treat it as a collective action problem in which individuals' motivations to partake are restricted by the realization that they are small relative to the market and by their opportunity to free-ride on the boycotting of others. Sen, et al. (2001) interpret it as a social dilemma, wherein an individual chooses between the individual benefit of consumption and the wish of a collective to refrain from consumption so that all receive benefits of a successful boycott. In his study of ordinary or "banal" consumption as a vital

source for political action, Hilton (2008) draws from Deshpande (1998) and Harvey (2000) to make the case that those who take part in consumer boycotts often form communities active in creating places of progressive potential that, as Crosfield (2012) also recognizes, advance political debate, cultural contestation, and perceptual change. Similarly, Kozinets and Handleman (2004) and Bekin et al. (2007) approach consumer boycotts from an angle of resistance to cultural homogenization and political disenfranchisement. In her work on anti-consumerism and cultural change, Littler pushes the argument further by acknowledging that there is "a cultural economy to boycott that moves away from studying celebrations of its resistance and instead tries to understand the complex motives and reflexivity of its actors" (Littler, 2005, p. 227).

In their exploration of boycotting behavior online, Kozinets and Handelman (1998) state that traditional views of boycotts rarely recognize the personal meanings attached by boycotters to their boycotting efforts. The authors propose that two themes emerge to challenge the conventional understandings. First, boycotters see their involvement not merely as part of a collective effort but also as a complex expression of their individuality. Second, boycotting serves as a vehicle for moral self-realization that, by reaching out, outlines "the boundaries of a community of responsibility" (Werbner, 2002, p. 59). Carter Hallward's study of the Presbyterian Church in the US as an important actor in BDS (2014), Cetinkaya's work on the Young Turks and the Boycott Movement in the early 1900s (2014), the study of product boycotts in the Middle East by Knudsen et al. (2008), and Collins' exploration of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain (2012) all show that the making of "the self" through boycott can have a distinctively religious dimension. Building on this exceptional body of research, I argue that BDS is a porthole into dynamic Muslim identifications in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad. Meanings, dialogues, and purposes of the campaign represent concrete expressions of "being Muslim" as they are articulated and

44

inflected under varying circumstances and in relation to various social actors. Subsequently, I put forth that BDS is not only a matter of individual realization but also a catalyst of social ties and a symbol of group awareness.

1.3.2 The Continuous Reform of Muslim Tradition and Protest

To make sense of the local appropriation of BDS in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad it is crucial to trace forms of Muslim religiosity that emerge in tandem with new interpretations of power and political action. In what follows, I put forth the concept of continuous reform of tradition in order to show that BDS goes beyond usual interpretations of recent and rapid "coming out" of Muslims or "re-Islamization" (Waardenburg, 1996; Tibi, 2000; Boubekeur, 2007). Instead, it points to a much longer and more complex process that has to "simultaneously account for the reform of Muslim traditions and the shifting configurations of social powers affecting gender, intergenerational change, class, and migrations" (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore, 2003, p. 54).

In their study of the phenomenon of new veiling in two Western European societies – France and Germany, Amir-Moazami and Salvatore define religious traditions as "both institutionally and discursively grounded and […] a set of moral and social references, which shape discourses and social practices" (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore, 2003, p. 54). Building on MacIntyre's idea of "living traditions" (1981), the authors suggest that traditions are an eminent part of the motivational prism of social agents – "living" because they continue a "not-yet completed narrative, confront the future whose determinate and determinable character, so far as it possesses any, derives from the past" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 223). From this perspective, the reform of tradition is understood as a dynamic that cannot be limited to social-structural fields but also has to account for – as in Asad's words – the inherent "search

45

for coherence" (Asad, 1998) of traditions, a force that produces an incentive to self-reform. Amir-Moazami and Salvatore further propose that this process of reform also occurs because traditions, i.e., their discourses and their institutions, as well as the practices they authorize, "have been exposed to permanent internal interventions, and this for quite a while, not only in the modern […] eras, but since their inceptions" (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore, 2003, p. 55).

The authors argue that prior to the arrival of modern reform movements at the turn of the 19th century Muslim traditions were largely indifferent to the regulation of political authority and economic activities. Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) did deal with a vast array of social issues ranging well beyond ritual obligations; however, "a comprehensive concern for the 'common good,' articulated with regard to standards set by the modern institutions of the state, society, and the economy (as well as the very conceptualization of these three spheres) has been only developed by Muslim reformers (and their more secular counterparts who were often the reformers' pupils)" (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore, 2003, p. 55). Islamic reform movements emerged at the time when the monopoly of *ulema* (religious elite of scholars) – neither then nor now representing one coherent group (Al-Azmeh, 1993; Bayat, 2005) – was challenged by the arrival of the book, pamphlet, and newsletter (Eickelman, 1988; Robinson, 1993; Faist, 1998; Mandaville, 2001). New print technology allowed Muslims to bypass *ulema* in a quest for both "authentic" Islam and new ways of thinking about their religion. Freed from mnemonic control, Islam could be defined and interpreted in a more flexible manner. Moreover, as Eickelman points out, "Islams of elite and non elite, theologians and peasants were all equally valid expressions of fundamental Islamic principles" (Eickelman, 1982, p. 1). New public intellectuals of the reform asserted their authority via claims of concrete Islamic commitment and correct moral disposition. Both were considered necessary in order to "address and admonish a fellow Muslim and thereby rebuild a moral community of the faithful and contribute to its prosperity" (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore, 2003, p. 57).

46

One of the more crucial incentives for reform was the British presence in the Middle East. From 1915 to 1917, Britain entered into agreements with three different parties: the leader of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks – Sharif Hussein of Mecca, the French government, and the head of the Zionist movement in Britain, Lord Rothschild. The Sykes-Picot agreement of May 16, 1916, divided the former Ottoman territories in the Arab east between Britain and France as administered areas and zones of influence – what became Syria and Lebanon under the French and Transjordan and Iraq under the British rule. This French-British contract challenged the prior agreement with Sharif Hussein, of October 24, 1915. According to this agreement, in return for launching an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks, Britain was ready to recognize and support the independence of Arabs in all regions within the limits demanded by Sharif Hussein. Amongst the Arab rebels, the accord was viewed as the base for a united Arab kingdom in the former domains of the Ottoman Empire that included Palestine. Moreover, the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 – a letter sent by the British foreign minister, Lord Balfour, to the Zionist leader Lord Rothschild – stated that His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. This caused protest and resistance amongst the Palestinian middle class and highly politicized segments of the urban population.

In his work on the formation of Palestinian identity, Khalidi (1997) notes that the press and the educational system developed an Arab nationalist discourse which displayed distinctly Palestinian aspects in the frame of larger Arab nationalism and facilitated the spread of these ideas beyond the cities and the literate population. At the same time, as Budeiri (1997) illustrates, Islamic discourse played a significant role in mobilizing national protest. The author states that from the beginning of the British Mandate, the Islamic movement in Palestine adopted a nationalist discourse. Furthermore, secular nationalist movements were

47

often headed by *ulema*, thus creating a discourse that merged religious, nationalist, and pan-Arab ideas.

In the mid-1920s, the monopoly over Arab political discourse held by the elite was challenged by the arrival of a number of youth movements, most notably the Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA). A boarder coalition, which was a direct response to the British-associated Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), was founded in Egypt in 1927 with a goal of preserving Islamic values among young Muslim men (Mitchell, 1969; Botman, 1991; Hourani, 1991). One year later, Palestinian Muslims formed their own branch to challenge what they believed to be "Britain's preferential treatment of Christians, both internationally and locally" (Haiduc-Dale, 2013, p. 80). Although the YMMA did not seek political power, the group did involve itself in the intellectual debates regarding Islam and modernization. This was not an attempt to discard the theological and conceptual apparatus of established traditions. Instead, as Amir-Moazami and Salvatore (2003) show, it was an effort to make them fit. Similar developments were taking place across the Arab world in the wake of Islamic reform movements founded by figures such as Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh. The most famous and long-lasting organization to emerge during that time was the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The organization exerted a considerable influence over lower and middle class members of the Egyptian society – perhaps best demonstrated in countless demonstrations, marches, and protests staged between 1945 and 1948 against the backdrop of anti-colonial nation-state formation.

The crisis of nationalist-developmentalist project in the Middle East and the worldwide rise of mass media in the late 1960s provided additional motivation for the emergence of religious and secular reform movements that allowed deprived masses to reconstruct meanings in what Castells calls "a global alternative to the exclusionary global order" (Castells, 1997, p. 20). Myriad of voices "reading, debating and, effectively,

reformulating Islam on the Internet, satellite television, and in a plethora of widely distributed books and pamphlets" (Mandaville, 2001, p. 179) further obscured the locus of "authentic" Islam and the identity of those allowed to speak on its behalf. In order to account for these more recent stages of the reform, one needs to pay close attention to intergenerational change and conflict or, more precisely, "the Islam of parents vs. the Islam of their children" (Mandaville, 2003, p. 128). Of particular interest for my work on BDS is the locus of leadership within Muslim communities in Europe, especially in regard to the question of where the younger generation is looking to find explanations of Islam that are compatible with the day-to-day realities of European life.

In their research on forms of faith-based political participation in modern-day East London, Back et al. (2009) show that young Bengali Muslims often condemn their elders for engaging in constant and apparently trivial debates, e.g., proper prayer technique, that say little about how to live one's life in a non-Muslim society and the specific challenges posed by those circumstances. Moreover, they complain that more critical engagement with traditions and prescriptions of Islam is largely prohibited by elderly mosque leaders who represent the "local" Islam from the villages of Bangladesh, which is criticized for being tainted with sectarian or ethnic overtones. Frustrated at being told, when querying certain aspects of Islam, "that's just the way it is" (Mandaville, 2003, p. 135), young Muslims are turning to new technology that allows for the production of virtual communal spaces in which issues of faith are more freely discussed and carried out. These virtual spaces inspire public forms of engagement in the name of Islam that fit the nation-state framework according to circumstances, interests, and policies but remain rooted in what is a genuine sense of belonging to an Islamic tradition. BDS is my case in point.

Transformative potential of media in Muslim communities has been well documented (Davis and Davis, 1995; Eickelman and Anderson, 1997; Hirschkind, 2001; Anderson, 2003;

Gonzalez-Quijano, 2003). However, while earlier literature frequently focused on the political impacts, more recent studies on "Arabellion" and new technology (Lynch, 2006; Hofheinz, 2011; Lotan et al., 2011; Abaza, 2013; Halverson, 2013) engage more concretely with the social and cultural effects of the Internet and its bearing on the role of the individual in the construction of knowledge and values. These works demonstrate that young Muslims rely on new technology to structure and reproduce certain divisions and ways of thinking as well as generate new modes of organization. From this perspective, local BDS movements in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad are organized and navigated by competing voices of authority that establish themselves partly through the competition and interplay among generations.

Conclusion

I began this chapter with a broad overview of social movement studies. I traced the emergence of the collective behavior approach as well as theories of RM, POS, and NSMs. I outlined the most relevant aspects of each theory, linking them whenever possible to my work. I then looked at ethical consumption as an example of synthesis between the European and American traditions and argued that much of the literature on social movements is shaped by the experience of politically open societies, thus questioning its applicability when it comes to social movements stemming from societies characterized by higher degrees of political control. For this reason, I highlighted some of the key readings on movements that emerged in the Global South and Global East where terms like "welfare-state," "trade union," and "civil society" have a different connotation than what is normally assumed in social movement studies. I emphasized that these readings not only test the hegemony of the American and European models but also call for greater appreciation of the role of religion in movement motivation, mobilization, and justification.

The proposed context-sensitive approach points to an array of symbols, codes, narratives, and resources available to BDS supporters who are likely to assert themselves through their boycotting behavior – a fact that has been largely overlooked in more traditional studies of boycotts which tend to focus on their collective nature. I stated that the extended case method coined by the Manchester School helps explain how these public constructions of "the self" develop and change over space and time. Ethnographic evidence produced through "extending out" is not concerned with particular practices per se. Rather, its focus is on the processes that make these practices meaningful, compulsory, or contestable. Applying these general remarks to my study of BDS, I argued that the continuous reform of tradition and protest which impacts upon intergenerational change, class, migrations, and claims to citizenship authorizes the campaign as it calls for more public engagement in the name of Islam. In the next chapter, I look at how this global consumer-focused campaign developed from a multilateral state-driven initiative.

I show that in response to September 11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, a distinctively secular narrative of the Arab League was replaced with the concept of pan-Islamic resistance that drew its legitimacy from the fact that it was articulated and endorsed by a wide rage of Arab public figures – preachers, TV scholars, *muftis*, and professors. The idea that Muslims could fulfill the duty to wage *jihad* via peaceful consumer activism initially appealed to trade unions and student groups in the Middle East but gained global popularity on the Internet. This legitimized the authority of Arab public figures, on the one hand, and allowed for the emergence of moral communities based around a common goal of supporting the Palestinian uprising while contesting neoliberal programs that encourage trade with Israel's supporter the US, on the other.

51

Chapter 2 – From the Arab League Boycott to BDS: Tracing the Transition from Multilateral State-Driven to Global NGO Consumer-Focused Boycott of Israel

Most research on Middle Eastern boycotts stems from the 1970s, when legal and diplomatic historians as well as political scientists wrote extensively about a regional policy of economic pressure (Shamir, 1975; Zacher, 1979). The focus then was on "Arab" rather than "Muslim" boycotts since those who sustained these political instruments as lawful by international legal criteria did so using a distinctively secular, national and transnational language. I begin this chapter by exploring the Arab League boycott of Israel in order to show mechanisms and processes that made this language a dominant vigor of consumer resistance from 1948 to the early 2000s. I then turn my attention to Arab preachers, TV scholars, *muftis*, and professors and their role in the development of a different, pan-Islamic rhetoric. Drawing from English translations of some of the key arguments, I assert that before September 11 and, more persuasively, after the attacks, those who had different opinions on the aims of boycotting, e.g., Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, and different views on the role of state authorities, e.g., Saleh al-Fawzan and Hamoud al-Aqla al-Shuebi, encouraged a move away from a state-led initiative and tried to motivate Muslim consumers to come together and boycott as a way of peacefully supporting the Palestinian resistance whilst protesting Western dominance.

In July 2005, more than 170 Palestinian civil society organizations called for a comprehensive BDS campaign against Israel. The call mimicked a global boycott and divestment movement that put pressure on the South African apartheid regime, but it also took cues from the previous Arab League boycott and the pan-Islamic campaign. On the one hand, it drew from the Arab model by combining economic and political concerns with

cultural and moral aspects via consumerism. On the other hand, it built on the pan-Islamic idea of integrating the individual within the political sphere. Furthermore, the notion that shared religious grievances over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Western hegemony could be expressed via boycotting, as suggested by Arab public figures at the center of the pan-Islamic campaign, forms an important part of the contemporary BDS agenda. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I show that these religious grievances are lumped together under the aegis of "Muslim suffering" which reverberates through claims to citizenship and a variety of migration experiences as well as the competition and interaction among generations and classes.

Though important in expressing the ethic and spirit of the pan-Islamic boycott via *fatwas* (a legal opinion or decree handed down by an Islamic religious leader), preachers, TV scholars, *muftis*, and professors in the Middle East actually followed rather than led the movement. In the previous chapter, I discussed the relationships between class and social mobilization through my discussion on NSMs, ethical consumption, and the history of political protest in the Arab world during the first half of the 1900s. Here, I develop the argument further by showing that labor unions and student groups formed the backbone of the pan-Islamic campaign. The intersection of economic, political, and moral issues as bundled in the pan-Islamic movement provided both groups with means to address the rising economic insecurity produced by the proliferation of American brand names in Middle Eastern malls since the mid-1990s. It follows that the pan-Islamic boycott of the US was inspired not only by the country's support of Israel and its military presence in the Middle East but also by concrete fears that jobs will be lost as a result of neoliberal globalization. This explains why many boycott *fatwas* published during the early 2000s had a characteristically economic tone. These *fatwas* targeted workers directly by suggesting that Muslims can triumph in their fight

against the State of Israel and the US if they purchased their own national products and "put fellow Muslims to work" (Mukhaymar, 2000, cited in Halevi, 2012, p. 61).

I show that many of these boycott *fatwas* were replicated and even recycled by boycotting websites in the Middle East but also worldwide. Subsequent chapters on Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad reveal that the World Wide Web made it easier for those who are not traditional sources of scholarship and knowledge to steer the juridical discourse. These new authoritative voices are especially popular among young Muslims who no longer seek answers from more conventional sources of knowledge, e.g., *imams* (worship leaders) in local mosques. Instead, they turn to forms of a global online authority through which the message of Islam is more easily discussed and carried out.

2.1 The Arab League Boycott of Israel

In spite of fervent political and ideological rivalries within the Arab world during the mid-1940s, the intra-Arab subsystem was largely characterized by what Kober calls "a commitment to cooperation on the issue of Israel" (Kober, 2002, p. 39). Consequently, a joint Arab reaction to the creation of the State of Israel reflected "both strong emotional commitment to Arab unity and a fear of the disruption of the familiar regional order and the order of the Arab world" (ibid). The concept of "Arab unity" which formed the backbone of regional alliances and coalitions that were meant to counterbalance the perceived Israeli threat also drove the establishment of institutions like the Arab League.

On October 7, 1944, five committees with representatives from Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon consented on what became known as the Alexandria Protocol. The representatives agreed on the foundation of a joint Arab Organization, which led to the formation of the Arab League in the following year. The aim of the organization was to

sustain relations between Arab states and to participate actively in the coordination of their political plans and foreign policy. Though it lacked any binding power, the Arab League did reflect a great measure of pan-Arab commitment as made obvious in its statement regarding the Proclamation of Independence published by the Provisional State Council in Tel Aviv on May 14, 1948. The first Secretary-General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha, told the *Jerusalem Post* that the Arab League was fighting for an Arab Palestine. "Whatever the outcome," Pasha continued, "the Arabs will stick to their offer of equal citizenship for Jews in Arab Palestine and let them be as Jewish as they like. In areas where they predominate they will have complete autonomy" (Segev, 2011; Diab, 2012). Pasha explained that Arab disapproval was a result of the unjust decision by the United Nations (UN) to give more than 50% of Palestinian land to the newly created state of Israel although legally it was only entitled to 7% of the territory. Subsequently, he declared, the Arab world was determined to act within a framework of alliances and coalitions when dealing with Israel. In this sense, the Proclamation of Independence and what this meant in terms of rights of the Arab nation in Palestine and the occupied Arab territory became the central trope in the campaign for Arab unification into one centralized structure. This was especially marked in the case of "Nasserism."

Gamal Abdel Nasser's rise to power was preceded by several years of popular mobilization, protests, and grassroots initiatives that were not only aimed against the British occupation of Egypt, which dated back to 1882, but also confronted the widespread inequality and corruption in the country. The Free Officers emerged at the forefront of the opposition movement. The leading members came from the middle class and were not affiliated with the supposedly corrupt Egyptian elite. This allowed the group to embrace a populist discourse based on social equality and national dignity. The Free Officers originally made Muhammad Naguib, a well-known war hero, its figurehead. Following a 1954 Muslim Brotherhood-led

55

attempt on his life, Nasser, at time acting as the Deputy Prime Minister, ordered a clampdown on the organization, put Naguib under house arrest, and assumed executive office.

The Egyptian leader fast became an iconic figure in the region. His adherence to neutralism regarding the Cold War, recognition of communist China, and arms deal with the Eastern bloc, announced in September of 1955, alienated the US but made him the undisputed leader of the Arab people. Nasser's appeal was also due to his persistent defiance of colonial powers that resonated quite powerfully in the case of Israel, seen as a colonizer and oppressor of the Palestinian people. In 1960, Nasser declared that only pan-Arabism would allow the Arab world to take "a step forward towards liberation of Palestine" (Laqueur and Rubin, 2001, p. 90). Three years later, during the commemoration of the return of the United Arab Republic (UAR) troops from North Yemen, he suggested that this joint project requires "a human and national preparation as well as a preparation with weapons and plans in all fields" (ibid). The Egyptian leader was especially keen on the production of own armaments, jet aircrafts, and tanks. He noted that it is not enough to free Palestine on paper for political consumption. Instead, the Arab leaders were once again encouraged to come together under the banner of pan-Arabism and then face the State of Israel as well as forms of imperialism that stand behind it.

The model of boycott organized and navigated by the Arab League was very attractive to Nasser who saw in it a method of upsetting Israeli masterplan for expansion. The Egyptian President believed that this plan was demonstrated by "the utilization of Jordan River waters for irrigation, the struggle for the right of passage through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, and the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with Asia and African countries" (Feiler, 1998, p. 94). His ideas reflected a trend that was in place before the State of Israel was even created. For instance, on December 2, 1945, the Council of the Arab League reached Resolution 16 which stated that Jewish products and manufactured goods in

Palestine "shall be [considered] undesirable in the Arab countries; to permit them to enter the Arab countries would lead to the realization of the Zionist political objectives" (Reich et al., 1996, p. 35). Subsequently, the document called upon all Arab institutions, organizations, merchants, and individuals to refuse to deal in, distribute or consume "Zionist" products and manufactured goods.

Less than a year later, in February 1946, the Permanent Boycott Committee (PBC) was formed in the interest of formally organizing the boycott. In 1951, the board founded the Central Office for the Boycott of Israel (CBO) with an aim of giving the Arab League boycott more energy and effectiveness, assisting its methods and speeding up decision making. The CBO's leading figures frequently stressed that the institution had neither racial nor religious character, e.g., the Commissioner General of the CBO, Muhammad Mahgoub, in 1975, and the Boycott Commissioner, Zuhair Aqil, in 1994.

In December 1954, the CBO announced a set of rules that specified the conduct of the member states. The rules included travel bans and diplomatic embargos, but a larger aspect of the boycott was a long-lasting taboo regarding Arab-Israeli commercial ties that was difficult to break even after the agreements in Madrid and Oslo had been signed. This was mostly because national boycott offices, which worked closely with both the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade and a wide range of representatives of the Boycott Central Bureau (BCB), monitored regional trade and reported their findings at the Arab League summits. Those member states that traded with the State of Israel and, therefore, resisted the claims of pan-Arabism were often exposed to harsh penalties and sanctions. In spite of this, the trading ban was far from efficient. Kaye explains that "the primary boycott of Israel" has had limited effects since intra-regional trade and investment were actually relatively small (Kaye, 2000, p. 37). By comparison, the boycott of international companies that did business with the State of Israel, also known as "the secondary boycott," and the boycott of firms, most notably

suppliers, that were linked to companies blacklisted by the CBO, known as "the tertiary boycott," had far more severe economic implications and were feared throughout the corporate world.

2.1.1 Economic Implications of the Secondary and Tertiary Boycotts of Israel

From an Arab perspective, the success of the boycott largely depended on the readiness of other states to cooperate with the Arab policy, especially insofar as the secondary and tertiary boycotts were concerned. Feiler argues that when it came to Western democracies it was "highly unlikely that any state as such would cooperate with it on ideological grounds" (Feiler, 1998, p. 127). As a result, the Arab League put pressure on Western companies to refrain from doing business with the State of Israel, and these companies were then expected to pressure their governments not to implement an anti-boycott policy. Firms in Europe in particular refrained from pursuing commercial interests in Israel precisely because anti-boycott legislations were either of limited success, not enforced, and even nonexistent. The same was true for most of East Asia.

Members of the US Congress appealed to the European Community (EC) and Japan to take concrete measures to counteract the secondary and tertiary boycotts. However, O'Sullivan shows that these efforts "fell on stony ground" (O'Sullivan, 1991, p. 8). The Japanese government formally stated that it lacks the authority to prohibit companies from complying with the boycott. France passed the anti-boycott law in 1977, but its application was cramped by ministerial ruling issued shortly thereafter that excluded government guaranteed contracts in the Middle East. Turck notes that due to its ambiguity "the law appeared to have had little if any effect" (Turck, 1978, cited in the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008). In Britain, the House of Lords conducted an extensive

investigation of the Arab League boycott, but "the government did little or nothing" (The United States Department of the Treasury, 1983, cited in Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008). The letter from Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, to the British-Arab Boycott Coordination Committee stated, "We firmly believe that it would be wrong to interfere with the commercial judgment of firms, and we leave it to individual firms to decide whether or not to comply with the boycott. We believe that the introduction of legislation on this matter could seriously damage British commercial and political interests" (ibid). What this shows, at the most general level, is that when it comes to boycotts, it is not only measurable outcomes that matter but also particular moral, ethical, and political meanings that those involved attach to their boycotting behavior. Even in countries like Germany and the Netherlands, where anti-boycott laws were in place, no company was ever prosecuted for violating them.

Following the reduction of the secondary and tertiary boycotts in the late 1980s and early 1990s, companies in countries that for many years avoided all contacts with the State of Israel, e.g., South Korea and Japan, began to slowly pursue contacts in the fields of technology, telecommunications, and construction products (Fershtman and Gandal, 1998; Weiss, 2013). At the same time, a number of international firms that were on the CBO blacklist for years, e.g., Coca-Cola, Cadbury, Ford, Xerox, Schweppes, and Colgate, were free to enter the Israeli market. O'Sullivan (1991) shows that the secondary and tertiary boycotts made Ford and Xerox wait until the mid-1990s to see any profits from the Arab market. Similarly, Besok (1994) reveals that Coca-Cola waited until 1991 for the boycott that started in 1966 to be lifted. The author further notes that, according to an assessment by economists at the Israel Federation of Chambers of Commerce, the secondary and tertiary boycotts caused about $44b in damage to the Israeli economy from 1948 to the mid-1980s. Hufbauer et al. calculate an annual loss of $258m from 1951 to 1980, "averaging from 2.3% of Israel's GNP

(1951-60) to 5.9 % (1973-80)" (Hufbauer et al., 1985, p. 184). Figures very, but few question serious implications of the secondary and tertiary boycotts on Israeli economic growth.

2.1.2 The End of Pan-Arabism?

In the previous section I looked at the primary as well as the secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel organized by the Arab League. I also argued that pan-Arab ideology at the base of the campaign gained its most charismatic supporter in Nasser. Under his leadership, pan-Arab nationalism reached new heights. With that said, several regional developments exposed the limits of Arab solidarity. Masters and Sergie (2014) note that a decline of British and French colonial empires as well as the start of the Cold War changed the architecture of power in the region. The authors show that Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 may have been perceived as a victory for Nasser, but it influenced the Eisenhower administration to offer economic and military support to the State of Israel in hopes of offsetting flows of Soviet assistance to Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. The arms race climaxed in the Six Day War in 1967 that ended in a defeat for Arab armies. The decision by Nasser's successor, Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat, to open unilateral peace negotiations with Israel in November 1977 further intensified the tensions within the Arab world. Following the signing of the Camp David Accords on September 17, 1978, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League. Soon thereafter, the country was targeted by the Arab League boycott – a move that several authors describe as rather ineffective (Sarna, 1986; Barnett, 1998; Kaye, 2000; Kober, 2002).

The signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979, resulted in a split between Egypt and more radical states like Syria, but it also problematized its relations with moderate countries that were inclined to form alliances amongst each other and maintain a great deal of cooperation with the US. Hence, in spite of Sadat's best efforts to expand the

peace process to Jordan, King Hussein of Jordan did not act upon it. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 drove the wedge even further and was generally perceived as "yet another attempt to divide the Arab world" (Kober, 2002, p. 114). Nevertheless, the Peace Treaty of 1979, which marked a radical shift in politics of a previously pivotal member of the anti-Israel coalition, suggested that additional links in the chain would soon follow. The First Persian Gulf War eliminated Iraq as a possibly vital actor in the coalition; the oil-producing states that supported an ideology of pan-Arabism experienced a decline in wealth and status; and the fall of the Soviet Union (USSR) stripped the Arab world of its superpower backing. On October 30, 1992, it was Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that found themselves engaged in peace negotiations with Israel. The Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO, also known as the Oslo Accords, was reached on September 13, 1993. [1] Jordan followed suit on October 27, 1994.

It follows that the concept of Arab unity, which at the height of its popularity dictated the political consciousness of the Arab world, began to loose its appeal as national interests, e.g., foreign trade and investments, became more attractive. At the same time, competing ideas of political resistance, most notably in the form of movements that sought to challenge the neoliberal agenda via the use of an Islamic vernacular, were on the rise. These ideas developed against the backdrop of the global recession of 1973-1975 and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War that, according to Mazrui (1978) and Ajami (1981), linked the "barrel of oil" and the "crescent of Islam." Following the collapse of oil prices in 1985-1986 and the social and economic reformation prompted by the structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, a wide variety of Islamic movements, e.g. Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), Hizbullah (Party of Allah), and the Muslim Brotherhood, spoke against foreign domination and exploitation of "the people." Throughout the Arab world, they established a popular base by developing a characteristically Islamic criticism of

61

corruption and authoritarianism of the Western aligned elite as well as providing important social services such as medicine and tutoring.

The pan-Islamic boycott, which came to the front when the second uprising shook the climate of normalization, was similarly embedded in global capitalist relations. Those who led the movement and those who promoted it internalized the opportunities created by neoliberal globalization to develop a new take on *jihad* as a duty that all individuals can fulfill through nonmilitary actions. The pan-Islamic boycott, as an act of this passive resistance, grew at an age when "computer networks facilitated communications among Muslims who wanted to support the Palestinian intifada while protesting neoliberal policies designed to increase trade with Israel's ally the United States" (Halevi, 2012, p. 63). The historical origins of this narrative were not located in official pan-Arab requests for boycotting but in earlier calls to oppose imperial control and Zionism through boycotts and embargoes that had a characteristically Islamic underpinning.

2.1.3 The Arab League Boycott in the Aftermath of the Oslo Accords

In the first eight years following the Oslo Accords, a quorum of the regional CBO had failed to meet, exposing the apathy of Arab League members towards the boycott and their determination to end the secondary and tertiary campaigns. While governments generally opted for diplomatic ties, cooperation, and trade, "pressure groups pushed for reinvigorating the isolation of Israel in the understanding that the Palestinian struggle was hindered rather than aided by Oslo" (The Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 2007, p. 28). Following the Palestinian rejection of the "Bantustan solution" and "normalization" imposed by the Oslo Accords, there was rising global interest for the activities and calls from civil society and Palestinian solidarity movements which were inspired by the AAM in South

62

Africa but also took cues from the emergence of movements that reinvented progressive and grassroots politics, e.g., Zapatistas of Chiapas, the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) of Brazil (Brazil's Landless Rural Workers' Movement) as well as a number of alliances formed under the tag of "counter-hegemonic globalization."

The first significant move from global civil society came in August-September 2001, during the NGO Forum of the UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination and Related Intolerances held in Durban. The meeting produced what is known as "the NGO Declaration" which assumed a high international profile and was signed by groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Article 164 of the document states that, "targeted victims of Israel's brand of apartheid and ethnic cleansing methods have been in particular children, women and refugees" (Maisel, 2003, p. 746). Article 425 announces a subsequent policy of "complete and total isolation of Israel as an apartheid state as in the case of South Africa, which means the imposition of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions and embargoes, the full cessation of all links […] between all states and Israel" (Walden, 2004, p. 172). The document was supported by an array of international actors from churches, political parties, trade unions, and social movements, who came to Durban with their own agendas and programs, thus revealing strong links between the Palestinian uprising and other struggles.

Amongst Arab League member states the boycott was also back on the agenda, at least in theory. The Arab League issued a statement after a summit held in Amman on March 28, 2001, declaring that in light of Israeli suspension of the peace process the interest in the CBO has been rekindled. Seven month later, at an official regional meeting in Damascus, 19 of the Arab League's 22 member states focused on internal structural issues in line with Arab League's call for renewal of the CBO and the boycott. Two years later, the Council of the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union (AIPU) held an emergency session in Damascus where it called for "stopping all forms of normalization with Israel, and the full implementation of a

complete boycott against Israel, and reactivating all the means of this boycott" until the State of Israel complied with international law and UN resolutions (The Council of the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2003, cited in the Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 2007, p. 25). The 72nd conference of the Arab Regional Offices of Liaison Officers in 2004 and a four-day conference of the Arab Boycott Bureau in 2006 similarly sought to inject new energy into the CBO but also, for the first time, publically describe the boycott as a peaceful method to bring about change. The General Commissioner for the Arab Regional Offices, Ahmad Khazaa, indicated that the call "to reactivate the political and economic boycott" represents an "active reaction to the barbaric policy" of the State of Israel (*People's Daily Online*, 25 June 2004, cited in the Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 2007, p. 25). He further noted that, "the boycott concept represents a moral […] value and forms a kind of peaceful resistance to spread the boycott culture by all available means" (ibid). I argue that this was an attempt to rebrand the Arab League boycott to match solidarity discourse in other parts of the world, especially a number of well-publicized BDS movements led by student groups and trade unions in the US and Europe.

However, in spite of their repeated statements and promises, the member states continued to pursue policies to build ties with, rather than cut off, Israel. Their continuous requests to reactivate the boycott proved to be little more than examples of rhetorical pretense. When asked about the status of the boycott, one Arab official, who was present at a 2002 session of the Arab League devoted to examining how best to answer Israel's reoccupation of the Palestinian territories, professed that the boycott is something that is often talked about and included in the official documents, "but it is not something that we actually carry out – at least not in most Arab states" (Ezzat, 2002). This, nevertheless, did not stop the Arab League from making additional calls for boycott in the years to come. In September 2011, when the member states met in Cairo to discuss the boycott for the first time in ten

years, the Commissioner General of the CBO, Ghaleb Saad, stressed the importance of holding the meeting in a city where the Arab League boycott was initiated sixty years ago. He further argued that Arab unity represents "the main principle from which the boycott derives its legitimacy and support" (*Middle East Monitor*, 7 September 2011, p. 11). Traces of this nationalist discourse were also evident in a statement by the Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab League for Palestine and the Occupied Territories, Muhammad Sobeih, who noted that the boycott could only be effective if it becomes once again the main goal of all Arabs.

In what follows, I trace the rise of an opposing, pan-Islamic discourse that supported the idea of peaceful resistance, however, saw the boycott as a duty of all Muslims who wish to fight in the path of God. This narrative resembled the earlier anti-imperialist rhetoric of Grand Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi, a famous Iranian cleric, who led the revolt against an 1890 tobacco concession granted by the Shah to Britain, Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, who called for boycott of Britain in 1946, and others who sought to defy imperial hegemony via a progressive understanding of *jihad* as a form of consumer resistance, thus challenging more usual descriptions of *jihad* as a "military" or a "spiritual" struggle. Arab preachers, TV scholars, *muftis*, and professors who granted legitimacy to the pan-Islamic movement developed on prior narratives and, in response to September 11 as well as the US incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq, used new media, particularly the Internet, to appeal to Muslims to join a global movement against the State of Israel and the US.

2.2 The Pan-Islamic Boycott of Israel

In January 2002, 130 scholars from Europe, Africa, the Far East, and the Middle East met in Beirut at the Conference of the Scholars of Islam, under the umbrella of Tajammu' al-'Ulama al-Muslimin (Association of Muslim Ulema), an organization led by Mahir Hammud (a

Sunni) and Zuhayr Kanj (a Shi'a) that emerged in Beirut after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and called for Muslim unity against the State of Israel. Against the backdrop of September 11, the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the pending invasion of Iraq, the aim of the conference was to put forth an all-encompassing program and ideology of political mobilization for the task to fight in the path of God. I argue that the boycott appeared as particularly attractive to these scholars, but also groups like Hizbullah and Hamas, since it offered a lawful, easily justifiable, and even moral method of protesting against Israel's apartheid policies and the US. In April 2002, Muslim intellectuals from 50 countries gathered at a second conference in Cairo to discuss the effects of September 11 for the global Muslim community. At the time when the pressure to disavow the language of violent *jihad* was on an all time high, they issued a joint call in Arabic that encouraged Muslims to boycott, thus meeting their duty to wage *jihad* without taking up arms. Halevi shows that many of those who attended these conferences, together with other experts on Islamic law, subsequently unleashed "a torrent of boycott *fatwas* across the World Wide Web" (Halevi, 2012, p. 46).

Boycott *fatwas* first appeared on the personal websites of Arab preachers, TV scholars, *muftis*, and professors and other, highly trafficked, websites like IslamOnline, a global website managed by the Al-Balagh Cultural Society in Doha, and Sahab (Owner), also known as Sahab Salafi Network, an Islamic website registered in Kuwait. What is especially interesting for my study of the global-local relation at the base of the boycott is that these *fatwas* were then translated to English by a number of websites in the Middle East, e.g. OnIslam and AlMinbar (Pulpit) as well as the US and Europe, e.g., Innovative Minds (InMinds) and IslamBosna. I argue that these websites had a joint task of revitalizing the Muslim community politically and providing it with a strong weapon in its battle against the common enemies that, following the *Jyllands-Posten* Muhammad cartoons controversy in 2006, also included Denmark.

The idea that Muslims could be brought together under the boycotting banner was expressed very eloquently by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian Islamist theologian best known for his program "Shariah and Life" on the satellite television network Al Jazeera. In 2002, he published a well-known *fatwa*, "The Boycott of Israeli and American Commodities," on his website. Writing in Arabic, the author claimed that each piaster Muslims spend to buy Israeli products becomes in the end "a bullet fired into the chests of […] brothers and sons in Palestine" (al-Qaradawi, 2002, cited in Halevi, 2012, p. 51). One year later, in response to a question about buying from Israeli sources which was posted on the IslamOnline website, al-Qaradawi explained that, "it is an obligation not to help them by buying their goods. To buy their goods is to support tyranny, oppression, and aggression. Buying goods from them will strengthen them; our duty is to make them as weak as we can" (OnIslam, n.d.). 2 The author went on to say that Muslims are also obliged to boycott American goods given that "America today is a second Israel" (ibid). He argued that destruction and vandalism in Gaza and the West Bank has relied upon American money, weapons, and veto for decades without any concrete reaction from the Muslim world. In his response, the author channeled earlier, pan-Islamic efforts to resist imperial power through boycotts and embargoes that stretch back to an 1891 decree attributed to Grand Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi that warned Iranians that consuming tobacco, in a concession to British commercial dominance, was "tantamount to war against the Imam of the Age" (Moaddel, 1994, p. 15, cited in Halevi, 2012, p. 49). Other examples of this anti-imperialist narrative include the early 20th century resistance movements in Iran against Russian and British goods, *fatwa* issued in 1921 by Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind (Organization of Indian Islamic Scholars) that forbade trade with Britain, and a call by Hassan al-Banna in 1946 that summoned Egyptians to *jihad* while encouraging them to boycott Britain economically, culturally, and socially. It is important to note that the long history of disseminating religious practice continues today as revealed by the fact that al-Qaradawi's

fatwa forms the backbone of some of the existing BDS calls by groups like InMinds and IslamBosna.

In support of this argument, I draw attention to the fact that al-Qaradawi's *fatwa* placed female consumers at the center of the pan-Islamic campaign given their role as the rulers of the house who controlled the needs of the household and purchased the necessary commodities. In Chapter 4, I show that this interpretation of boycott as a link between women and the domestic sphere had a huge impact on Nezim Halilovic, one of the movement leaders in Stari Grad. This suggests that the boycott is a specific global-local relation that is anchored in a particular region that cannot be substituted easily by other markers. In this regard, it is also important to note that al-Qaradawi did not reduce the role of women to just shopping. He suggested that they educate boys and girls during childhood and cultivate their *jihadi* spirit. Thus, when children gain awareness, "they will commit themselves to [the cause] and lead their own fathers and mothers (al-Qaradawi, 2002, cited in Halavi, 2012, p. 51). This "generational" interpretation of the boycott is clear in the case of first-generation Bengali Muslims in Tower Hamlets who see BDS as a form of instruction transmitted from one generation to the next but stress that when the parents get older, it is up to the children to make sure that the boycott continues. The campaign, therefore, represents a diffusion of religious practice that is not necessarily a linear process or a one-sided transmission from one generation to the next but can very well work the other way around. This is also essential in the discourses advocated by young members of FOA who often claim to provide an insight into the "correct way" to boycott which is often contrasted to supposedly "incorrect" forms of participation amongst elderly Bengali Muslims who are supposedly hard to teach without infringing on their customs.

In his *fatwa*, al-Qaradawi further suggested that the pan-Islamic boycott was necessary in light of the Arab League's inability to revitalize the boycott and compel the member states

to refrain from cooperating with the US and the State of Israel. The author explained, "We tell the politicians, 'Break relations!' but they do not listen to us. For this reason, we turn to people, that they might boycott […]" (al-Qaradawi, 2002, cited in Halevi, 2012, p. 53). Even more radical authors like Hamoud al-Aqla al-Shuebi recognized the importance of the pan-Islamic boycott. In a *fatwa* published on June 26, 2001, and available in English on the InMinds website, the Saudi-born cleric argued that in a situation when armed *jihad* is prevented by apathetic rulers who lack any passion for the battle against the states of infidels with which they engage in close relationships, the boycott becomes the only alternative (Innovative Minds, n.d.). Therefore, the apparent disappointment of the Arab League boycott paved the way for a distinctively anti-state perception of popular resistance shaped by those who believed that leaders and state institutions could not play a positive role in economic *jihad*. Perhaps the only exception to this was Saleh al-Fawzan, a member of Saudi Arabia's highest *fatwa*-issuing council.

In February 2006, the *mufti* received a following question: "If the ruler of a Muslim polity does not commend us to boycott Danish commodities, nor prohibits us from doing so, may I personally boycott, knowing that they will be harmed by the boycott in support of the Prophet?" In a response that was posted on the Sahab Salafi Network website, al-Fawzan criticized the attacks on Danish embassies in Beirut and Damascus and argued that, "When the ruler commands the boycott of a nation, boycotting becomes obligatory for the public at large. Obedience is due to the ruler because this act contributes to the common good [of the citizens of the Muslim state] while damaging the enemy" (Sahab Salafi Network, 2006). However, the *mufti* noted that when the ruler does not command boycotting, "then the people have a choice – they can boycott or not boycott, doing whatever they want as individuals" (ibid). This perception of the boycott highlighted a responsibility of individual members of

society and suggested that the entire Islamist turn is about the process of moral self-realization.

As revealed earlier, the state-driven boycott also displayed a moral dimension against the occupation and expulsion of the native population, but what made the pan-Islamic boycott different was the idea that by simply shopping Muslims could strive in the path of faithfulness and be politically emancipated with a sense of communal unity and global power. Al-Shuebi, al-Fawzan, and al-Qaradawi along with the Grand Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman, Ahmad bin Hamad al-Khalili, and the late Deputy Chairman of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, Faysal Mawlawi, turned this idea into a global lifestyle by taking over the nationalist, secular boycott of the Arab League and lacing it with references to, for instance, the Temple Mount, Al-Quds, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. All of this made for a particular global-local account that is fixed in the Arab world and remains important in the current campaign.

Thus far I argued that in the wake of the second uprising, Arab public figures, who are not limited to those I quote in this chapter, supported the "very modern notion that Muslims should take up consumer boycotts as weapons of *jihad*" (Halevi, 2012, p. 55). Following the September 11 attacks and the drumbeat that preceded the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Arab *muftis*, professors, preachers, and TV scholars joined the boycott movement *en masse*. Their *fatwas* focused on everyday concerns, most notably feelings of economic anxiety within student groups and labor unions which were produced by the explosion of American brands in Middle Eastern malls and the free trade pacts signed between the US and several Middle Eastern countries.

During an online *fatwa* session on the IslamOnline website in October 2000, Fuad Mukhaymar, a former professor of Islamic Studies at Al-Azhar University, proposed that Muslims can triumph in their economic *jihad* against industrialized nations by "favoring their

70

own national products […] and by putting fellow Muslims to work" (Mukhaymar, 2000, cited in Halevi, 2012, p. 61). Three years later, he expanded on these claims when an IslamOnline visitor asked him to provide clear religious directives on boycotting. Mukhaymar suggested that after a boycott is imposed; Muslim governments have a task of creating job opportunities for those who worked in factories ran by Israeli and American companies. In his answer translated to English by the OnIslam website, Mukhaymar further noted that even though casual laborers will be less paid, the issue will be easy for them to accept if they consider it a form of *jihad* that is exerted for the sake of their religion and homelands (OnIslam, n.d.). Similarly, in an interview in December 2002, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a prominent Lebanse Shi'I cleric and a longtime opponent of American intrusions into the Middle East, stated that the US has a clear goal of "transforming [the] world into consumer market for [its] goods" (Fadlallah, 2002, cited in Halevi, 2012, p. 53). He claimed that the US has a policy of "despoiling the world of the weak, especially the Islamic world," whereby the only counter measure is to purchase national, Muslim-made, products (ibid). Both Mukhaymar and Fadlallah enjoyed massive popularity because, as Halevi explains, they preached what the audience wanted to hear – that they could fulfill their duty to strive in the path of faithfulness without risking life and limb by "simply shopping, wherever possible, for Muslim things" (Halevi, 2012, p. 64; see also, Kramer, 1997; Utvik, 2006).

2.2.1 Boycott Fatwas Online: the Global Muslim Protest and New Media

In the previous section I argued that Arab preachers, TV scholars, *muftis*, and professors generally agreed that popular resistance in the form of boycott was the best alternative to *jihad* of arms. In this section, I make the case that new technology, especially the Internet, played an important role in disseminating information and images that fired the pan-Islamic

71

movement as well as the making of virtual links between crowds of potential boycotters and those expected to guide them by issuing clear religious directives. The Internet allowed for the formation of what Roy (2004) describes as "window institutions" – for instance, certain websites provided boycott *fatwas* for people who requested them, but there was by definition no obligatory implementation. The Internet made it possible for them to speak on an equal footing with traditional sources of knowledge and authority, but this disruption of the hierarchy of knowledge does not imply that more conventional sources have been replaced. On the contrary, IslamOnline, OnIslam, AlMinbar, and other boycotting websites that engaged in the campaign commonly quoted and referenced modern Arab figures like al-Qaradawi and Mukhaymar. While this legitimized a characteristically Arab take on the boycott and produced an account that was rooted in the Arab world, it also led to a creation of virtual communities gathered around a shared sense of responsibility for others. These virtual communities paved the way for complex processes of moral self-realization that, as revealed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, strengthen real places and sites through the development of cultural contestation, political questioning, and perceptual change.

On September 13, 2001, under a photograph of the burning World Trade Center and a photo of a 12-year-old Muhammad al-Durrah, who was reportedly shot dead by Israeli soldiers, the Palestinian Information Center (PIC), an independent Palestinian organization established in Arabic in December 1997 and English in January 1998, claimed that Israeli media has started a hateful campaign against Islam and Muslims around the globe by taking advantage of tragic events in the US. The website responded to this alleged Islamophobia by publishing a text of the speech made by Muhammad Deif, the Commanding General of Hamas's armed wing the Qassam Brigades. The text included the following quote from the Qur'an: "Fight them, and Allah will punish them by your hands, cover them to shame, help you to victory over them." This was not a call to violence. Rather, as Bunt clarifies, it was a

message to state leaders that Muslims across the world have opted to "take matters in their own hands" (Bunt, 2003, p. 91). On its Facebook page, the organization posted a video that called upon the boycott of Israeli commodities. The video depicted a group of people singing the following words to the beat of "We Will Rock You" by the Queen: "They've got blood on their hands, it's not too late to end support for the apartheid state. We will boycott Israel" (The Palestinian Information Center, 2015). Previous calls, while not as creative, appeared to make a strong case for the boycott by highlighting its potential as an alternative to violence and referring to past examples of pan-Islamic movements that resisted imperial hegemony and Zionism through consumer activism. Particular attention was paid to the aforementioned 1891 ruling attributed to Shirazi.

AlMinbar, a popular website registered in Mecca, similarly familiarized its audience with historical cases of pan-Islamic boycotts against the common enemies of Islam, which spanned from the already mentioned trading ban in 1921 that targeted the British Empire to "a great *fatwa*" issued in 1935 by the *mufti* of Jerusalem that condemned the sale of Palestinian land to Jews. The website declared that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict represents "a central Islamic issue that concerns the entire Muslim *Ummah*" (AlMinbar, n.d.). It referred to the al-Aqsa sermon from Yusuf Abu-Sunaynah who called upon Muslims to wake up from their heedlessness and unite their ranks in an extensive campaign against not only the most obvious targets but also Britain for its role in the creation of the State of Israel and Russia for "trying to fortify themselves from the Islamic movements within their territory, which is why they are defending Israel" (ibid). It is interesting to note that no mention was made of Arab unity as an important factor in this endeavor. In contrast to Arab League's call that continued to espouse state-led proposals well into the 2000s, AlMinbar called upon Muslims who "have been sleeping for such a long time" to "take lessons from the words of [the] Lord" (ibid) and join

the pan-Islamic campaign that offsets "a shameful betrayal of the Arab leaders" (Bunt, 2003, p. 100).

IslamOnline is another website that played an important part in popularizing the pan-Islamic boycott. Founded in June 1997 with the help of al-Qaradawi, this Doha-based website initially featured sections in English and Arabic on cyber counseling, submission of questions via "Ask the Scholar," and real time *fatwa* dialogues between scholars and visitors in which uncertainties on a number of topics could be sent to an expert with a response immediately posted back. Unsurprisingly, al-Qaradawi was the website's chief religious expert. His influence was made clear through a number of *fatwas* posted in the "International Relations and Jihad" section. The author repeatedly cautioned against senseless violence and called for "intelligent rage via consumer boycotts" (IslamOnline, 2001). Other figures who provided similar guidance via IslamOnline were the aforementioned Mawlawi and Mukhaymar as well as Munzer Kahf, a Syrian scholar of Islamic Economics, Ibrahim Salih al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Nigeria, and Sayyid Muhammad Nuh, a professor of *Hadith* (reports of the teachings, deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) at Kuwait University.

In 2010, after a lengthy battle against the Qatari financers over editorial independence and a decision by the Ministry of Social Affairs to relieve al-Qaradawi from his position as the head of the Al-Balagh Cultural Society, which owns IslamOnline, the team that created the website decided to launch OnIslam. The new English website, which sought to review and renew contemporary Islamic discourses, paid particular attention to the institution of family and the challenges facing Muslim families in non Muslim-majority countries. In terms of forms of faith-based participation that were compatible with Europe, OnIslam stressed those that were more social in nature, e.g., giving meat to the poor during Qurban Bayrami, but also supported the idea of boycott as a form of nonviolent resistance against those who "usurped the land of the wronged and forcibly drove them out of the land of their ancestors for no

reason" (OnIslam, n.d.). The website referenced al-Qaradawi's *fatwa* regarding the issue. "The choice of peace is no longer practicable for us Muslims, […] especially with many obstacles hindering its course. Hence, we have no effective weapon but to boycott the Israeli products. That is why it is obligatory upon Muslims to boycott the Jews economically, culturally and politically" (ibid). Furthermore, the author extended the call to encompass those "warring factions from the People of the Book such as the Serbs, Americans who attack Muslims, Hindus as well as those who relentlessly wage war against Islam or even support those who wage war against Muslims" (ibid). This "broader" understanding seems particularly attractive to younger Muslims who, as I show in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, have an active interest in, and awareness of, Muslims everywhere.

The InMinds website is one of the key outlets of the current boycott movement in Britain. In a section called "Fatwas given by Islamic Scholars on the Boycott of Israel," this Leicester-based website links to the previously mentioned Fadlallah as well as Ali Khamenei, the present Supreme Leader of Iran, and Ali al-Sistani, an Iraqi *marja* (religious authority). Where InMinds and OnIslam overlap is their heavy reliance on al-Qaradawi, whose well-known *fatwa* served as the basis of InMinds' call for boycott of more than 100 companies suspect of supporting the State of Israel. In Chapter 4, I show that this call was subsequently copied by the IslamBosna website in Sarajevo, thus indicating that boycotting websites often draw from one another. Important in this regard is also that IslamOnline regularly collaborated with muslm.net and kate3.com in order to spread boycotting tips, for example, how to use a barcode to determine where a product originated.

Arab boycotting websites like the PIC, AlMinbar, and IslamOnline, which formed overlapping networks that got together on the boycott issue, received most traffic at the beginning of 2006, during the pan-Islamic movement's heyday. Halevi refers to a company that analyzes web traffic to show that their audience were mostly men in their thirties and

75

forties who attended college; "they came primarily from Egypt but also, in significant numbers, from Algeria and the United Arab Emirates" (Halevi, 2012, p. 61). When the boycott of Danish commodities began to wind down in the spring of 2006, websites that catered to Muslims in non-Muslim majority countries, e.g., OnIslam and InMinds, started to promote the boycott as a form of Islamically inspired activism that was rooted in tradition but was equally ingrained within the nation-state framework in terms of interests, circumstances, and policies. This appealed to younger Muslims mindful of the fact that Islam of their elders was learned in different setting and different time. As a result, a number of boycotting websites joined the ranks of those that delivered religious guidance to Muslims trying to make sense of their hybrid conditions, e.g., ask-imam.com, the Fiqh Council of North America, and troid.org. These websites provided Islam with a mirror to hold up to itself and "gaze upon its many diverse faces" (Mandaville, 2002, p. 88, cited in Bunt, 2003, p. 15). The shifting identity of those speaking on behalf of "real" Islam paved the way for new forms of faith-based participation. My case in point is BDS in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad.

2.2.2 The Emergence of BDS as a Form of Faith-Based Activism in Europe

The origins of BDS can be traced back to the early years of the second Palestinian uprising, which broke out in September 2000 against the Israeli occupation, when a number of student groups in the US launched extensive divestment campaigns. Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), an anti-Zionist, pro-Palestinian college student activism organization, was established at the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley) in 2001, where the group organized the first Palestine Solidarity Movement (PSM) conference the following year. The aim of the conference was to coordinate a nationwide corporate divestment scheme against the State of Israel. In addition to its divestment campaign against Israel, the PSM focused on ending US

76

aid to Israel. Annual conferences held at the University of Michigan, a motel close to Rutgers University following a failure to get permission to use a university facility, Duke University, and Georgetown University reaffirmed the movement's goals – the right of return for Palestinians, a full decolonization of all Palestinian land, and an end of the Israeli occupation. Much of the increased role and organization of student groups in the US can be traced to the efforts of American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), a Chicago-based organization that has committed its resources to coordinating anti-Israel activity on campus via SJP and PSM.

In 2004, several dozen federations, associations, and unions of Palestinian academics and intellectuals joined the growing BDS movement when they established the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI). On July 6, this coalition called upon colleagues in the international community to "comprehensively and consistently boycott all Israeli academic and cultural institutions as a contribution to the struggle to end Israel's occupation, colonization, and system of apartheid" (The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, 2004). While a number of groups, most notably the AUT, responded to PACBI's call, others like Cary Nelson, the former president of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), criticized the campaign for violating the principals of academic freedom and encouraging censorship. Advocates of the former, however, underlined "the incompatibility between emphasizing the academic freedom of one group while denying (and even censoring discussions about) the fundamental human rights of another" (Barghouti, 2010, p. 105, cited in Carter Hallward, 2013, p. 28).

Three days after the call was made, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague issued an advisory ruling on Israel's separation barrier that, according to Carter Hallward, symbolized a major turning point in the BDS movement, "as it called for states to hold Israel accountable to upholding the Geneva Convention and declared that states were obliged to withhold any assistance in the barrier's construction, a form of international

sanction" (Carter Hallward, 2013, p. 28). States and international institutions did little in response to the ICJ's ruling, but it was precisely this lack of support that drove 171 Palestinian civil society organizations to issue an official call for a comprehensive BDS campaign against the State of Israel on July 9, 2005. They emphasized a set of non-punitive measures at the root of the campaign that not only raise awareness of moral dimensions of buying Israeli goods as well as products made by companies that support Israeli economic and military development but also apply "concrete economic pressure for change" (The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement, 2005).

The BDS call was quick to spread on a global level. In spite of its US roots, the campaign gained more traction in Europe. Carter-Hallward explains that this has a lot to do with "the extent to which the popular narrative of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as portrayed in mainstream media differs, which leads to different discursive space for engagement in the issues" (Carter-Hallward, 2013, p. 20). The shifting of the discourse in the US, according to Cooper and Adlerstein, is seen as threatening by those who are part of the institutionalized Jewish community, "as evident by the resources leveraged against the Presbyterian Church […] vote on divestment from Caterpillar, Hewlett Packard […], and Motorola [in a protest against Israeli policies toward Palestinians] and the framing of the vote as an attack on the Jewish community" (Cooper and Adlerstein, 2012, cited in Carter Hallward, 2013, p. 20). However, there is evidence to suggest that the discourse is changing. In February 2009, Hampshire College became the first in the US to divest its holdings in companies whose business supports the Israeli occupation. In the following year, Code Pink, an NGO that describes itself as "a grassroots peace and social justice movement working to end US-funded wars and occupations" (Code Pink, n.d.), began a campaign against the Israeli cosmetics manufacturer Ahava for its role in helping "finance the destruction of hope for a peaceful and just future for both Israelis and Palestinians" (The Stolen Beauty Campaign, n.d.). The

organization joined a global network of BDS supporters that includes, amongst others, the European Coordinating Committee for Palestine (ECCP), the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the European Social Forum (ESF) and the aforementioned Presbyterian Church in the US. These groups have urged consumers not to buy products manufactured, grown, or otherwise exported by Israel – those with a bar code beginning in 7-290. Before the second uprising such calls typically came from Arab or Muslim groups, however, "in recent years the consumer boycott has developed significantly in entering the consciousness of shoppers across the world" (The Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 2007, p. 46).

The Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, founded in the city of Ramallah in the central West Bank, argues that in contrast to the boycott lists of the Arab League that were "cloaked in secrecy and composed behind closed doors," BDS relies on as much publicity as possible in order to "gain in strength and mobilize as wide an audience as possible (The Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 2007, p.45). There seems to be a trend among those calling for BDS to distance themselves from the previous Arab League boycott. For instance, a number of organizations I have interviewed during my fieldwork, e.g., FOA and the PSC, strongly rejected coercive tactics of the Arab League in favor of moral pressures similar to those that motivated the international campaign against the South African apartheid regime. Those who stressed the "consciousness-raising" dimension of BDS marked by the fact that the campaign attracts activists whose sole incentive is the attainment of rights and justice for others, frequently referred to a strategic position paper adopted in 2009 by the BNC, the Palestinian coordinating body for the BDS campaign worldwide, titled "United against Apartheid, Colonialism and Occupation: Dignity and Justice for the Palestinian People." The paper characterized Israel's regime over the Palestinian people as a system that combines apartheid, occupation, and colonialism (The

Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee, 2008). Furthermore, it described BDS as a modern-day successor of the AAM. In the next chapter, I show that both the PSC and FOA use this analogy in order to assert the legitimacy of their campaigns.

For those who take part in the campaign, BDS is not simply a matter of impacting change in faraway places; it is also about the politics at "home." For the younger generation of Bengali Muslims these entail more active participation in community life that stands in opposition to political introversion characteristic of the early phase of settlement. A new generation of activists involved in BDS refuses to disengage with non-Muslims and, for many, the boycott represents a marker of inclusion. Even in places like Stari Grad, where we can no longer speak about the second or the third generation of politically engaged Muslims and refer to the nth generation instead, intergenerational conflicts that manifest partly through the symbolic and relational field of BDS play an important role. Clashes within and around Islam produce divergent understandings of the boycott as either a form of participation that confines Islam within the private realm or a form of more politically engaged involvement in the name of Islam which not only reframes the concept of Bosniak political identity but also radicalizes connections with Europe. Young followers of Stand for Justice, for instance, argue that Europe is imperfect from a contemporary, historically relative perspective, and it is a task of Islam to help it return to its neglected, superior self.

A number of influential faith-based organizations in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad that were previously engaged in strictly local campaigns, e.g., FOA and IslamBosna, have added BDS to their portfolio of action almost immediately after a call for boycott was issued in the summer of 2005. Young activists who form the backbone of these organizations echoed earlier claims that the Palestinian resistance can be supported peacefully through boycotting. While appeals for the pan-Islamic boycott which originated in the Middle East during the early 2000s sought to defend Islam from the charge of violence produced by the September

11 attacks, the organizations I describe in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 work in response to the 2004 Madrid train bombings, the July 7 or the 2005 bombing in London as well as other iconic tropes that coordinate much of the current discussion on Muslim presence in Europe. BDS is still about the defense of human rights and international law. It still mobilizes across a wide range of supporters of different races, ethnicities, and religions. However, I argue that this seemingly homogenous campaign is in fact a network of locally tailored movements and these movements, as I show through the examples of Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad that by no mean point to an archetype of BDS participation in Europe, can be used to encourage Muslims to fulfill their duty to fight in the path of God by simply exercising their consumer choice in the marketplace.

Conclusion

In this chapter I traced the shift from multilateral Arab state-driven to global NGO boycott of Israel. I argued that following the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Arab League called for a three-tier campaign that depended on mutually informing networks of local, national, and regional bodies assigned with a task of monitoring compliance with boycott rules and regulations in the member states. Countries that resisted the claims of pan-Arabism were penalized and sanctioned. The case of Egypt, however, revealed that these punishments were often not enough to halt the peace process that began in Camp David and continued in Madrid and Oslo. Subsequently, the Arab League boycott became little more than an exercise in rhetorical bravado. Promises to reenergize the boycott made in Amman in 2001 and Cairo in 2011 failed to materialize, as the vast majority of Arab League members, Syria being the only exception, continued to pursue policies that strengthen economic and diplomatic ties with the State of Israel.

I then focused on the development of a different, pan-Islamic discourse. I argued that a number of Arab public figures of liberal and conservative tendencies put forth the idea that a passive, consumer resistance in the form of boycott represented a modern-day strive in the path of faithfulness. In their call for boycott, they reacted to September 11, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the growing fear of American commercial influence in the Middle East. The last point in particular helps explain why boycott *fatwas*, which first appeared on the websites of Arab preachers, TV scholars, *muftis*, and professors and were then reposted on a number of boycotting websites, appealed to student groups and trade unions that sought to support the Palestinian resistance but also protest neoliberal policies designed to boost trade with the US. The fact that boycotting websites, both Arab and those that originated in the West, could claim authority by quoting from and referring to *fatwas* issued by an array of Arab public figures suggests that the process of reform which began in the second half of the 19th century continued well into modern times.

The long history of political protest in the form of boycott legitimizes the current BDS campaign as it provides Muslim activists with an explicitly nonviolent vision of popular resistance. In addition, their efforts are fuelled by common belief that the Muslim community can come together behind the boycotting banner with a sense of global power. In what follows, I explore how these more general conclusions relate to contemporary attempts to use BDS as a frame for faith-based activism in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad.

Chapter 3 – BDS and Intergenerational Debates in Tower Hamlets: Victimhood, Islamic Political Participation, and Social Change

> There is no necessary association between nearness and significance. We can live and interact with and be near people to whom we feel distant or from whom we feel estranged […]. We can have close relationships […] even if we are separated by oceans and continents […] (Fennell, 1997, p. 90).

The long history of reforming Muslim tradition and protest opened up space for novel, syncretic, and complex links between Islam, social movements, and political mobilization. With regard to Muslim communities in Europe, this pluralized cartography of power frequently invokes more participatory political engagement based on religious faith that, according to Back et al., represents "a spectrum rather than a typology of characters, separated by degrees of religiosity and biography" (Back et al., 2009, p. 5). From this perspective, a span of religious observance from forms of faith-based politics to extreme moments of action is marked by "biography and varying degrees of affinity more than categoric boundaries" (ibid). In other words, shades, degrees, and contradictions of Islamic political participation need to be carefully contextualized within histories of the people we study, which in turn calls for a description of prerequisites of their living space and material social context. I define "the political" in terms of sites of contestation and reinforce the idea that "the relationship between identification and mobilization is highly contingent on the sites through which conventional power relations are contested" (Back et al., 2009, p. 12).

This chapter draws from fieldwork material collected between 2009 and 2014 in order to establish BDS as a practice through which new spaces of "the political" are created and navigated by different groups of Bengali Muslims living in Tower Hamlets. I also extract from secondary data gathered by others in the same field and quote from it whenever it is relevant – using it in order to trace the change in arenas that qualify as "political" as well as

actions that count as "participation." I show that political participation in the form of BDS goes beyond common interpretations of consumer boycotts as collective efforts to influence distant outcomes. In Tower Hamlets, BDS is equally about shaping more proximate social relations of the "home front."

The first generation of Bengali Muslims, who settled in Tower Hamlets during the 1960s and early 1970s, repeatedly expressed a feeling of being under a vigilant "British gaze." Afraid that their loyalty to the British nation would be called into question, these elders typically avoid all forms of organized protest that seemingly counter mainstream political institutions. As a result, anger over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is negotiated and carefully managed within public spaces. It reaches fever pitch in individual households, where the boycott represents an ordinary part of everyday consumption. Its ordinariness, invisibility even, may conceal questions of subjectivity, authority, and power, but it is precisely through this apparently ordinary consumption that I discover individual and collective articulations of "the Muslim self" amongst the first generation of migrants in Tower Hamlets. I further argue that the Islam of elderly Bengali Muslims has a defensive, at times non-compromising, quality. In their research on the shifting boundaries of Islamic discourse in Europe, Mandaville (2003) and Schiffauer (2007) show that, driven by fears that their traditions, practices, and values will be corrupted, first-generation elders prefer to keep contacts with the wider society to a minimum. This "isolationist" approach has profound implications for the BDS campaign.

The matter of "isolationism" features heavily in intergenerational debates within Tower Hamlets. In contrast to their parents' "defensiveness," the second generation tends to project multiple versions of what it means to be British that are laced with positions arising from confrontations with the host society. 3 Against the backdrop of a populist national rhetoric by the New Right that came to the front in the 1980s and early 1990s, those in the

thirties-fifties age band sought to shift the border between the opposites of insider/outsider where alternative accounts of belonging could be created. Hybrid identities such as British/Bengali, for example, produced highly imaginative links with diasporic cultures but also added to politics of cultural representation that connected the second generation to other non-white British people in Tower Hamlets, most notably blacks from the Caribbean. I argue that in a context of widely accepted understanding of racism as a part of the everyday experience, BDS emerges as a token of dignity and pride. In comparison to their parents, who usually participate as individuals rather than organized groups, second-generation supporters of the PSC have at their disposal a wider choice of outlets for popular protest and dissent.

The second generation had become a majority of the ruling Tower Hamlets Labour Party in 2002 and a majority of the local council in 2006. Yet, in my ethnographic material, it was this secular, "left of center, municipalist politics – closely linked to a machine that could mobilize particular villages and regional groupings from the diasporic subdivisions of Bangladeshi Sylhet – that was opposed by a new generation of idealistic activists" (Back et al., 2009, p. 10). Although knowledgeable about the history of Bangladesh and the revolutionary independence war in 1971, these British-born activists are more inclined to reject predominantly ethnic and sectarian concerns of their elders and develop instead a strong interest in geopolitics of Palestine but also places like Chechnya, where great injustices are committed against the Muslim population. Young followers of FOA, typically in their twenties, propose that BDS is an example of public engagement in the name of Islam, on the one hand, and what it means to act as a good citizen within modern British society, on the other. These aspects reflect dual processes of "becoming" and "being" Muslim in Tower Hamlets. The former calls for a vocal affirmation of religious progressiveness that, according to my participants, entails values of equality, religious freedom, and respect for diversity, while the latter relates to concrete social actions and relationships made possible by declaring

85

oneself a progressive Muslim. It follows that the concept of "being" Muslim corresponds to regular collaborations between followers of FOA and organizations like Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JFJFP) or Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP).

The present chapter shows that different networks of BDS in Tower Hamlets are mediated by local and global projections of victimhood, vulnerability, and fear to which my participants respond in different ways. They act as a fragmented rather than a unified group – consistently imagined, invented, invoked, and performed. Their conflicting perceptions of BDS inevitably induce the issue of authenticity – not only who are "insiders" and "outsiders" in the borough but also who are the "authentic" or most "genuine" insiders. From this perspective, the campaign offers an arena for a number of Bengali Muslims to act out their claims to be the actual voice of "their community." In what follows, I ask, "who boycotts," "how," and "why," with these issues of power, legitimacy, and representation at the forefront.

3.1 Mapping Tower Hamlets: Historical and Demographic Contours

The 2001 Census posed a question of religious affiliation for the first time since 1851. Muslim population of Britain stood at just below 1.6 million, "with slightly more than 1.5 million in England, fewer than 43,000 in Scotland, and slightly fewer than 22,000 in Wales" (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 4). The majority of Muslims in Britain were of South Asian heritage, with Pakistanis constituting the single largest group – 43% of Muslims in England, 33% in Wales, and 67% in Scotland were of Pakistani ethnicity (bid). The Census also revealed that many Muslims in Britain identified themselves according to other ethnic categories. For example, "7.5% of Muslims in England, 4.6% in Wales, and 4.4% in Scotland identified themselves as 'Other White;' 6.2% in England and 6.8% in Wales identified as 'Black African;' and 5.8% in England, 7.6% in Wales, and 6.3% in Scotland identified as

86

'Other Asian'" (ibid). The diversity of both origin and heritage of Muslims in Britain was also mirrored in statistics on the place of birth. In England, "4% of Muslims were born in Eastern Europe and a further 6% each in both the Middle East and South and Central Africa" (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 5). Above all, however, the Muslim population of Britain was British-born. "Nearly half of all Muslims in England (46.4%) were born in Britain" (ibid).

Exploring these concentration patterns further, the 2001 Census confirmed what has long been known in the research on British Muslims from across the social sciences (Dahya, 1974; Khan, 1977; Lewis, 1994; Southworth, 2005) – that the Muslim population is not only mainly urban but also highly clustered in just a few cities. In terms of regional distribution, three cities alone – London, Birmingham, and Bradford – "account for over half (51.7%) of the combined Muslim population of England, Scotland, and Wales" (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 7). Concentrating on London specifically, the 2001 Census showed the overriding extent of concentration of Muslims in the city. "Approximately 40% of the English Muslim population resided in London," where they made up 8.5% of the overall population (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 6). Muslims were mainly concentrated in East London boroughs of Newham, Waltham Forest, and Tower Hamlets, where they made up 36.4% of the population. In 2011, this percentage dropped slightly to 34.5 % (Office for National Statistics, n.d.).

	Number	% total
All persons	**196,106**	**100**
Christian	75,783	39
Muslim	71,389	36
No Religion	27,823	14
Religion not stated	14,591	7
Buddhist	1,938	1
Jewish	1,831	1
Hindu	1,544	1
Sikh	682	~0
Any other religion	525	~0

Table 1 Tower Hamlets population by religion, 2001, source: Office for National Statistics (n.d.)

Variable	Measure	Tower Hamlets ⓘ	London ⓘ	England ⓘ
All Usual Residents (Persons)[1] ⓘ	Count	254,096	8,173,941	53,012,456
Christian (Persons)[1] ⓘ	Count	68,808	3,957,984	31,479,876
Christian (Persons)[1] ⓘ	%	27.1	48.4	59.4
Buddhist (Persons)[1] ⓘ	Count	2,726	82,026	238,626
Buddhist (Persons)[1] ⓘ	%	1.1	1.0	0.5
Hindu (Persons)[1] ⓘ	Count	4,200	411,291	806,199
Hindu (Persons)[1] ⓘ	%	1.7	5.0	1.5
Jewish (Persons)[1] ⓘ	Count	1,283	148,602	261,282
Jewish (Persons)[1] ⓘ	%	0.5	1.8	0.5
Muslim (Persons)[1] ⓘ	Count	87,696	1,012,823	2,660,116
Muslim (Persons)[1] ⓘ	%	34.5	12.4	5.0
Sikh (Persons)[1] ⓘ	Count	821	126,134	420,196
Sikh (Persons)[1] ⓘ	%	0.3	1.5	0.8
Other Religion (Persons)[1] ⓘ	Count	825	47,970	227,825
Other Religion (Persons)[1] ⓘ	%	0.3	0.6	0.4
No Religion (Persons)[1] ⓘ	Count	48,648	1,694,372	13,114,232
No Religion (Persons)[1] ⓘ	%	19.1	20.7	24.7
Religion Not Stated (Persons)[1] ⓘ	Count	39,089	692,739	3,804,104
Religion Not Stated (Persons)[1] ⓘ	%	15.4	8.5	7.2

Table 2 Tower Hamlets population by religion, 2011, source: Office for National Statistics (n.d.)

Hopkins and Gale note that in terms of socioeconomic conditions, "the 2001 Census revealed the Muslim population to be disproportionately disadvantaged in comparison with the wider population" (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 7). Looking at England specifically, the 2001 Census exposed that in regard to people aged between 16 and 74, i.e., the economically active population, "a much smaller than average proportion of Muslims are within the top socio-economic categories of managerial and professional occupations – 14.7% of Muslims are within the 'higher' and 'lower' managerial and professional occupations, as compared with 27.3% of the population overall" (ibid). At the same time, significantly more Muslims were either long-term unemployed or have never worked – nearly one quarter (24.1%) were in the "never worked" and "long term unemployed" category, "as compared to 3.7% of the wider population" (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, pp. 7-8). The unemployment rates were especially prominent for women. The findings mirrored the overall British statistics – nearly two-fifths of Muslim women living in Britain (39%) had never worked (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 8). Many, even those with educational qualifications, were more inclined to stay at home in a

88

carer role for elderly in-laws and, as Sircar and Saraswati (2012) show, found it difficult to achieve the know-how to integrate into the labor force.

The economic disadvantages experienced by British Muslims manifest themselves spatially. According to a study undertaken for the former Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (now the Department of Communities and Local Government), "Muslims in England and Wales are significantly over-represented in areas of relative material hardship" (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 8). The research further revealed that while Muslims constitute around 3% of the British population, they form slightly more than 10% of the population in areas below the bottom decile of virtual deprivation. In Tower Hamlets, the social and economic difficulties of the inner city impact most severely upon Bengali Muslims. The existing data suggests that disadvantages experienced by the first generation may well be extending into the second and British-born generations, albeit displayed in different ways. Eade (1997b) shows that second-generation migrants are typically reliant on the employment sectors that their elders had entered, e.g., the local garment industry, ethnic retail and wholesale shops, coffeehouses, and restaurants. They are restricted to largely working class neighborhoods in a borough that has been radically renovated by the "regeneration" of London Docklands. By comparison, disadvantages experienced by the British-born generation manifest most clearly in recent educational statistics. For example, while this group made up 61% of the total number of students entering sixth-form classes in 2011, it accounted for only 42% of those proceeding to university (Corporate Research Unit, 2011).

One of the most prominent features of the existing literature on British Muslims is the focus on the role of religion in challenging stereotypes that portray them as alienated failures (Khan, 2000; Geaves, 2005; Birt, 2009). Even though the 2001 Census provided substantial information on problems encountered by Muslims in Britain, it is it is of "questionable value in illuminating substantive issues of interest to sociologists or geographers of religion, such as

89

the relationships between forms of religious identity and the nature and intensity of religious beliefs and practices" (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 9). A good starting point is the "Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities" conducted in 1994 by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI). The survey revealed that for large numbers of all groups of British South Asians, religious identification was "very important" to the way they live their lives (Modood et al., 1997, p. 301). These findings resonated strongly within the sample group, in spite of the greater ethnic diversity that characterized it vis-à-vis other religious designations. More recent evidence on the religious commitment of British Muslims is available from various rounds of the Home Office Citizenship Survey (HOCS). The 2005 analysis showed that more Muslims than members of any other group said they were "actively practicing" their religion (Home Office Citizenship Survey, 2005, cited in Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 10). The survey also addressed the ways in which aspects of Muslim identities – religious, social, and political – are reconciled showing that roughly 44% of Muslims identified themselves as belonging "very strongly" to Britain. What these findings show at the most general level is that "the nation" is by no means a stable container of identity. Instead, it represents "a mutable social construct that resonates in different ways for different groups within the polity and is subject to contextual change and (re)interpretation" (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 12). With this in mind, I ask how different aspects of identity – British/Bengali/Bangladeshi/Muslim – are brought together in Tower Hamlets and what is the role of BDS in the process.

3.1.1 The Rebranding of Tower Hamlets: Polarization, Scarce Public Resources, and the Politics of Race and Ethnicity

Tower Hamlets makes up the very core of London's East End. Established in 1965, the borough lies north of the River Thames and east of the medieval walled City of London – the

90

center of Britain's national and international finance and banking houses. It is one of the highest minority concentration spots in the capital. Over half of its 254,000 residents come from non-white British ethnic groups. Residents from Bangladesh are, by far, the largest single migrant group who comprised just over half (53%) of the borough's migrant population in 2001 (Corporate Research Unit, 2011). Out of 81,000 Bengalis currently living in the district, fewer than 5,000 identify as Hindu. For the most part, they are Muslim. The origins of their settlement can be traced back to the late 1960s when around 5,000 migrant workers arrived to Tower Hamlets from Sylhet region in northeast Bangladesh (Gardner, 1995; Garbin, 2005). The early settlers were ex-sailors who had established themselves as travel agents and owners of coffeehouses and restaurants. Upon arrival, they entered the local garment industry, ethnic retail, and wholesale shops. Eade shows that the building of docks during the 18th and 19th century meant that their settlement patterns were "strongly influenced by the flow of international trade as Britain's industrial revolution and overseas trade became closely intertwined" (Eade, 1997a, p. 129). According to the author, between 1880 and 1980, a fairly steady pattern of social and economic division was upheld throughout the East End, as residents developed a sense of working class culture that was closely tied to "local struggles at the workplace and within the growing political arena" (ibid).

In 1980, the creation of the London Docklands Development Corporation together with the rapid redevelopment of redundant docks led to a massive redistribution of resources and generated an influx of the global elite and white middle class migrants. Global and national corporations followed, relocating from the City of London. The result was a move from industry to services and the rebranding of Docklands. The once derelict dock area – a symbol of Britain's industrial past – was revitalized as a symbol of the free market philosophy, the freedom from interfering local authorities, and the efficacy of global investment. The local working class was excluded from the process. This radical rebranding

91

produced a clear socioeconomic divide between the highly paid white middle class, ingrained within the service sector, and working class population reliant on local manual occupations. At the same time, it failed to inspire new politics of place where social and cultural differences between working class whites and their Bengali neighbors could be "accommodated within a strategy of local working class resistance" (Eade, 1997a, p. 144). In fact, the polarization resulted in long-term conflicts between the two groups over scarce public resources, particularly council housing. Marriott (2006) describes how the issue of housing became racialized. The author notes that social tensions developed as senses of national and local identity were thrown into crisis by the postwar settlement of previously colonized people. White locals often justified their distinctively chauvinistic positions by referring to working class patriotic traditions and the legacy of imperialism.

From the mid-1920s to 1986, the main beneficiary of the local electoral support was the Labour Party. Prior to their return in 1994, labourists did little to ease the rising tensions in the borough. In fact, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, they repeatedly opposed the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, thus altering the pattern of economic migration and affecting modern minority communities in Tower Hamlets. While already apparent in the 1940s and 1950s, most notably during the Atlee government, influence of the Labour Party during the 1960s and 1970s fully unmasked what Hudson (2006) describes as "a litany of capitulation to the demands for ever-stricter immigration control dressed up as humanitarian concern." The author states that a peculiar two-tier legislation on race and migration first produced the climate of hostility to ethnic minorities and then led to their more recent incorporation into local institutions in general and New Labour membership in particular.

The first tier was the system of controls that turned Bengali Muslims and other ethnic minorities into second-class citizens. According to Hudson, the legislation was "an open invitation to less powerful but violent racists to vent their anger on the newcomers" (Hudson,

2006). The second tier was the framework for evolving race relations that prescribed the codes of conduct to be applied towards "the body of people made inferior in status by previous immigration controls" (ibid). It resulted in the legitimation of state force, the demonization of the dispossessed sections of the white working class, the establishment of cultural identity as a prerequisite for the allocation of scarce resources, and the inclusion of a narrow branch of the ethnic minority as a new leadership to supervise the distribution of such resources. The first generation of settlers controlled the political representation of the Bengali Muslim community up until the 1980s when its leadership was challenged by "a more Anglicized second-generation cohort, which forged highly effective alliances with [left-wing] radical activists […]" (Begum and Eade, 2005, p. 184). The second generation gained positions of responsibility not only within the local political system but also a broad range of public groups, development agencies, and community organizations. At the time, the political discourse was dictated by secular debates on anti-racism and class, but it was already obvious that issues concerning Islam were emerging at local levels (Eade, 1993; Ahmed, 2005).

3.2 BDS of the First Generation: Individualized Politics in a "Foreign" Country

I met Assad (a pseudonym) in 2009 when I developed a habit of visiting his flower shop on Columbia Road every Sunday. He arrived to Tower Hamlets in 1977. Before retiring and pursuing his hobby of gardening, Assad worked in a dry cleaning shop for over two decades. He married young. His wife and children arrived to Tower Hamlets in 1987. Seated in front of his shop, Assad told me that there were times when he was earning twelve pounds a week. "We lived in one room in a rented house. If I was home, I would have it much better, but I can't afford to go home now. My children study here. They will work here. I had a hard life but my children will have a better one." The interview exposed the pioneering spirit of mainly

male sojourners who intended to stay in Britain for a limited period of time and return to Bangladesh after accumulating a certain amount of capital. However, "the increasing demand for remittances and the inability to save as much capital as they would need to settle down to a comfortable life in Bangladesh meant that the temporary sojourners soon became settlers" (Ahmed, 2005, p. 195). This reflection on home and away was also captured by Ashur (a pseudonym), a sixty-five-year-old retired cook from Brick Lane. "I belong to Bangladesh with all my heart," he said. "Nobody in Britain sees me as part of this country. It doesn't matter how long I've been here, I'm described as 'someone from abroad. I don't want to be integrated if it means giving up who I am. I want to celebrate my identity and go back home a proud man some day." Ismail (a pseudonym), a sixty-one-year-old who runs several corner shops thanks to, as he declared, "years of perseverance and hard work," expressed his identification with Bangladesh in similar terms. He told me, "I belong in Bangladesh, but it's necessary for me to be here for economic reasons. Staying is not what I want, but it's something that I have to do. I belong in Bangladesh but I live here where I don't belong."

I conducted nine interviews with first-generation Bengali Muslims who had remained in Britain into old age. Most described their experience in Britain as isolating and beyond their original expectations. High commitment to Islamic beliefs and practices associated with the homeland appeared to play an important role in the mediation of cultures of "here" and "there." It also inspired the preservation of familiar traditions and values in an attempt to uphold some kind of equilibrium in the lives of the first generation. Ahmed shows that "the large and close-knit nature of the community in Tower Hamlets offered individuals a safe environment in which to express and practice their faith and allowed this type of social reproduction to flourish collectively across the community" (Ahmed, 2005, p. 199). Ismail described Brick Lane and its adjoining streets as "the heart of the community" and one building in particular as the symbol of Bengali settlement in Tower Hamlets. The Huguenot

chapel became a Jewish religious center in the late 19th century before it was transformed into Jamme Masjid (the Great Mosque) in 1976. Throughout the 1980s, the mosque was regularly renovated in order to accommodate larger congregations. Today, it serves the largest concentration of Bengali Muslims in Britain. All sermons are delivered in Sylheti Bengali and follow the traditions of Sayyid Ahmad of Balakot, who called for a return to the original Islamic purity and preached adherence to *Sharia* (Islamic law) rather than spiritual union with God. Together with the impressive East London Mosque, which virtually commands the scenery at the City end of the borough, the Brick Lane Jamme Masjid, a place Ismail called "second home," is a domain of elderly Bengali men. Otherwise, new leaderships have appeared, with much greater representations of the British-born generation.

3.2.1 Doing Nothing? BDS as an "Ordinary" Part of Everyday Consumption

- Hey, what have you done today?
- Nothing, just some shopping.

Sitting at the window of my Bethnal Green Road flat, I had become accustomed to such an exchange. It was frustrating at times. What is there to examine if nothing seems to happen? Consumption is a routine. It creates what Ehn and Lofgren define as "rhythms and temporalities in everyday life" (Ehn and Lofgren, 2009, p. 99); however, it is rarely noticed or reflected upon. Ordinariness of consumption may hide questions of subjectivity, authority, and power but, as I show below, it is precisely this apparent obviousness that characterizes BDS of the first generation. In contrast to young supporters of FOA and to a lesser extent second-generation members of the PSC who portray BDS as a spartan political movement that transforms mainstream views through forms of energetic community activism, elderly Bengali Muslims engage in less visible ways. The campaign is confined to "safe zones," e.g.,

individual households and community spheres, where it fits within the narrative of like-minded people who give each other mutual support against the trend of anomic experiences. Abra (a pseudonym), a fifty-four-year-old housewife who arrived to Tower Hamlets in the early 1980s, says, "There are not a lot of places here that feel like home. You are at home when you are with your family, but otherwise the feeling of 'closeness' comes from being around people who are just like you and feel the same way you do. BDS gives me that feeling of a close-knit commune." She believes that boycotting is a part of Bengali culture, as supported through anecdotes of prior campaigns that originated in Bangladesh, most notably the boycott of Lord Curzon and British goods in the 19th century. Abra is also aware of the country's involvement in the Arab League boycott. She says, "Bangladesh imposes the primary boycott. It also prohibits its citizens from travelling to Israel. There's a stamp [in the Bangladeshi passport] that says you are not allowed to go there." When I ask her how these historical legacies influence her present efforts, she shrugs her shoulders and simply says, "Why change now? In Tower Hamlets, everyone is boycotting."

The fact that BDS cuts across ethnic, religious, and racial divides makes it possible for Abra to describe it as "unproblematic" in relation to mainstream political institutions. This broad appeal was also highlighted by Fatima (a pseudonym), a fifty-five-year-old housewife from Blackwell. She tells me that she has been boycotting well before the BDS campaign was even started. "We never drank Coca-Cola at home or consumed any products from the occupied territories. It's something I learned from my parents, and I've done my best to pass it on to my children. They know right from wrong; they understand how their actions impact upon the Palestinian people." She goes on to say, "I see all kinds of folks boycotting these days. That's a good thing. I think it makes the fact that so many Muslims are taking part a lot less suspicious, if you know what I mean." Before I can respond, Fatima declares, "We don't want anyone to call this an Islamic movement. That would cause problems for us here."

96

Delicately poised in relation to authority, with the risk that their political allegiance to the British nation may be called into question, Abra and Fatima prefer to show support for BDS within individual homes and other realms "relegated" to women. For instance, Abra goes shopping every Friday, always to the same store where no Israeli goods are sold. She states, "I used to take my daughters with me. They are the mistresses of their households now and they go to the same place. When I'm grey and old, they'll do my shopping for me." The boycott, therefore, appears as a tradition that is passed on from one generation to the next. At the same time, the process can be reversed when, as Abra puts it, "elders turn grey and old" and the children assume leadership positions.

Another interesting aspect that emerged from the interview data was a common belief that a spread of satellite technology and a bigger choice of channels such as Al Jazeera and Bangla TV made it possible to show support for the boycott in a way that was not possible during the first and second uprising. Support reaches fever pitch at home, in front of the TV. Lama (a pseudonym), a fifty-eight-year-old seamstress from Brick Lane, tells me that watching the news is "a family event." She explains, "We gather in front of the TV and discuss the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. It's a tradition, if you want to call it that way. I didn't have that experience when I was younger." Lama further notes that she does not comprehend how anyone who watches the news can purchase Israeli products or products from companies that finance the State of Israel. She declares, "Information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is everywhere. It's impossible not to know what is happening. If you don't boycott you have no heart or sympathy for those in need. Simple as that." Lama tells me that she cares about oppressed people living in far-away places as well as issues from which she may never profit, and she makes sure I understand this during our numerous conversations over sweet tea in coffeehouses around Whitechapel. Similarly to Abra and Fatima, Lama considers BDS to be a natural continuation of a long historical effort against

97

Israel's system of occupation and apartheid that has always been individual and required no formal organization. The interview material shows that when discussed publicly BDS is often mediated and managed through a specific Bengali vernacular.

A number of elderly Bengali Muslims started the interview by referring to legacies of Bangladeshi nation-building. Violent repression of democratic nationalism by the Pakistani army during the 1971 war led to a massive and putatively genocidal slaughter. Many involved in the losing side of the nationalist struggle fled the country, some inevitably to London. Ashur was of them. During our chat in a coffeehouse on Bow Road, he said, "Monsters who engage in cruelty and coercion in order to destroy the independence of Bangladesh must be brought to justice; same as those fiends in Israel who kill innocent people in pursuit of their Zionist agenda." Similar mediation was clear in the case of Naaz (a pseudonym) and Omar (a pseudonym), a couple in their sixties I met at a local supermarket. I watched them read labels, discuss, and ponder for almost 30 minutes before approaching them at the counter. "We had a hard time today," Omar sighs. "We've never been to this store, so we didn't know what products it stocks. Normally we go to our local market but it was closed today." Many parts of Tower Hamlets are deemed "BDS friendly zones," as strings of businesses have stickers on their doors and windows letting the public know that they stock no products from Israel, the occupied territories, or firms involved in Israeli violations of international law. The store I approached Naaz and Omar in had no BDS sign on its doors. "Shopping took longer today, but we don't mind," Naaz says. "We're the victims of the independence struggle. People in Gaza are similarly oppressed as they fight for freedom and human rights. This makes it worth our time." While for Ashur, Omar, and Naaz BDS reflects traces of migrant history, for others it reverberates through Islam and diasporic sensibility.

3.2.2 Defensive Religiosity of the First Generation: an "Isolationist" Approach

Seated in his home on Bow Road, I discussed BDS with Rahil (a pseudonym), a fifty-nine-year-old who runs a family restaurant in Brick Lane. Rahil, who started boycotting in 2006, considers Muslim identity to be a decisive factor in both local and global mobilizations for BDS. "Those who boycott are people of consciousness who understand what it feels like to be stigmatized and attacked. Muslims. Right? Some have an anti-conflict stance; others believe in civil rights. What brings them together is a shared understanding of what the Palestinian people are going through." Rahil explains, "Muslim experience has always been difficult. For example, I fled Bangladesh in the 1970s but still consider it my home. Britain definitely isn't because integrating would force me to give up my Muslim identity. Palestinians feel the same way. They're homesick and homeless all at once." Assad holds a similar opinion. Unlike Rahil, he does not dismiss the role of non-Muslims in the campaign. However, Assad does believe that as a Muslim he is more equipped to comprehend what Palestinians are going though. He says, "I have experienced hardship because of who I am, and I still deal with it on everyday basis because I am a Muslim in Britain. For this reason, the boycott means more to me." Rahil and Assad connect their expressions of social concern via BDS to one particular identity – that of a Muslim victim.

When speaking about the East End it is hard to think of, much rather depict, a civil society that has ever been completely secular. As Back et al. explain, "the conventional forms of religious identification have historically fed directly into an understanding of […] participation" (Back et al., 2009, p. 7). In the late 19th century, concerns over health and sanitation raised questions regarding physical and moral welfare of people living in the area. At the turn of the 20th century, this issue was taken on by the Salvation Army and a range of Christian missionaries. More recently, a number of social reform movements and voluntary

sector organizations around housing, health, alcohol, and substance abuse were either run by the church or had a faith-based core to their activity. This does not imply that all reform movements that emerged in London's East End are characteristically religious. Rather, it points to the fact that faith-based community activism has always played an important role in the area.

Historical settlement of Jewish and Irish migrants in the area and the impact of religion on their political participation are both well documented (Fishman, 1978; Gidley, 1999). While their move into mainstream politics remains less recognized, available data suggest that to brand Islam as uniquely problematic in terms of links between state secularism and faith-based community activism would be wrong. Instead, the current Islamic participation needs to be situated within specific regimes of governmentality since there are no movements that emerge independently from the institutional expressions of government and power (Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose, 1999; Back et al., 2009). When it comes to first-generation Bengali Muslims in Tower Hamlets, more recent tensions between migrant and host communities provide important clues for understanding their particular take on religion and its role in community activism. Unlike Bengali Hindus, who show high levels of social mobility and integration, those I interviewed, who have migrated at roughly the same time and from the same region, have the same socioeconomic origins, and have settled in the same social housings, often proclaimed their disappointment with Britain and wondered whether it would not have been better if they had remained at home. Islam helps them deal with this question.

Driven by their wish to suppress anxieties and fears about losing themselves in a foreign land, elderly Bengali Muslims developed what Schiffauer (2007) calls "a defensive religiosity" meant to preserve and protect their own values and life designs. As a result, their interactions with the majority society are reduced to a minimum. Ismail believes that any deeper connections might "poison the community with ideals that disagree with own thoughts

100

of who we are." Assad likewise warns against customs that "erase our sense of self." Rahil expresses concerns over threatened values, e.g., parental authority and sanctions on marriage choice, by stating that, "If a girl steps outta line, just threaten to send her to Bangladesh." Ashur focuses less on these "foreign" influences and more on potential solutions. He says, "Even after living in Britain for decades, I still hold onto familiar values and customs. My worship leader is a man I know from Sylhet. We grew up together. Hence, when I go to the mosque, I feel like I have a place to call my own." These and similar attitudes suggest that BDS cannot be a locally homogenous campaign. First-generation elders do not take part in conferences, meetings, rallies, or any form of organized activity. Their participation is a private matter shaped by legacies of Bangladeshi nation building as well as present-day strives to protect familiar values that are allegedly under attack in a foreign country.

The first generation conveyed principal cultural standards and experiences of life in Bangladesh to the second generation. As a result, those in the thirties-fifties age bracket were familiarized with power dynamics in which ethnicity was recognized as an important symbol of belonging and political mobilization. They commonly identify with being British by virtue of citizenship but, contrary to their parents, seem more willing to challenge racialized formations of Britishness by developing new hybrid identities. In what follows I ask how these general properties impact upon their BDS efforts in Tower Hamlets.

3.3 BDS of the Second Generation: the Campaign as a Token of Pride in Tower Hamlets

During the 1980s, against the backdrop of local campaigns for greater minority representation within the Labour Party, the second generation of secular nationalists emerged as a powerful force in community and party politics. In contrast to their parents who dealt with anomic

experiences by developing defensive religiosity that virtually turned its back on Britain, second-generation migrants were more ready to cooperate with "outsiders," most notably left-wing radical activists and those engaged in anti-racist campaigns. They formed alliances in order to fight discrimination in the housing, educational, and cultural spheres. By the late 1980s, many entered the Labour Party and sought to break into local administrative and political institutions. In the process, they went beyond reservations and negative experiences and created their sense of Britishness as citizens. To this extent, as Bagguley and Hussain suggest, "external factors can influence and modify the […] sense of ethnicity" (Bagguley and Hussain, 2005, p. 217). At the same time, those in the thirties-fifties age band waver in their own self-representations between dominant and demotic modes of identity. Werbner shows that the argument about ethnic naming stresses the fact that "it is not only Western representations of 'the other' that essentialize. […] Within the spaces of civil society, the politics of ethnicity […] are not so much imposed as grounded in essentialist self-imaginings of community" (Werbner, 1997, p. 230). Second-generation Bengali Muslims I spoke to during my fieldwork seem to essentialize collective identities in their quest for state grants and formal leadership positions. However, they also "narrate and argue over these identities in the social spaces which they themselves have created, far from the public eye" (ibid).

The second generation is connected in various ways to the avowedly secularist Awami League (previously the Awami Muslim League). Its founder, Mujibur Rahman, was closely involved in the independence of Bangladesh and the original interest in secular nationalism based on the Bengali language and cultural traditions. While he later sought to emphasize Bangladesh's Muslim heritage – moreover, Islam has played an important role in discussions about Bangladeshi national identity since his death in 1975 – his supporters in Tower Hamlets seem to downplay Muslim identity and reject all forms of Islamic political mobilization. They do, however, accept Islamic cultural requirements. For instance, Rabah (a pseudonym), a

forty-two-year-old shopkeeper from Brick Lane, tells me that when the Bow Central Mosque needed support for its renovation of the Islamic Center he chipped in. On the other hand, he was less eager to contribute when "people from the mosque started using Islam as a part of politics." Numerous activities that break away from Islamic political mobilization and disregard the Islamization process altogether flourish within the borough, e.g., festivals, national holidays, youth cultural awareness programs, and celebrations of independence movements. A non-partisan secular cohort that promotes Bengali cultural traditions is also one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the PSC in Tower Hamlets.

3.3.1 The Palestine Solidarity Campaign: BDS as an Anti-Zionist Campaign

The PSC is an independent, nongovernmental, and nonparty political organization with members from many communities across Britain and increasingly across the world. Established in 1982, during the build-up to Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the organization has since become the main actor in a global campaign for justice for Palestinians that includes "the right to self-determination and the right of return to occupied territories" (The Palestine Solidarity Campaign, n.d.). In their call for boycott, the PSC states that a global movement of solidarity, which succeeded in categorizing South Africa as "a pariah state," provides inspiration for the current BDS campaign (The Palestine Solidarity Campaign, n.d.).

On March 19, 2011, during the "Celebrate Palestine" event held at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, I spoke to Martial Kurtz, the organization's longest-serving staff member. He told me that the PSC aims to build a global campaign that lets Palestinians know that they are not forgotten and that the justice of their cause is recognized. Martial explained that BDS sends a message that the world will not sit by while Israel acts with impunity and disobeys international law, the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, and the Geneva Convention. He stated, "BDS lets people use their everyday shopping choices to refresh and reinforce opposition to the Israeli policy of apartheid." He further noted that the campaign exerts moral pressure on the British government by giving expression to the need to move towards a more ethical foreign policy. Martial explained, "BDS stirs public debate. People are willing to disagree with the government on an important issue and, in doing so, put forth moral pressures that force our politicians to oppose Israeli violations of international regulations and principles of justice."

According to the PSC, there are five ways of opposing Israel's system of occupation and apartheid. First, people are called to demonstrate. Second, they are urged to educate others about what is happening in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. "Resources are online, including ten things about Gaza and Israel's timeline of aggression," states an email I received in November 2012 having joined the organization's mailing list. Third, people are encouraged to lobby their MPs. Forth, they are instructed to keep informed through PSC's updates – news, actions, and events on Palestine (see *Figure 1*). Finally, they are asked to foster solidarity through activism. The same email notes that the PSC is building "a movement for solidarity and liberation. We need to build activism locally and nationally and, as a result, mobilize against Zionism globally!"

The movement against Zionism is nothing new in Britain. However, before 1948 and during the early stages of the Israeli state, activists tended to be members of the establishment, most commonly "former army officers, colonial officials, conservative politicians, Christian missionaries, and the Arab *ulema* from elite universities" (Wistrich, 2012, p. 552). Today, it is more likely to discover loose alliances of peace activists, left-wing radicals, anti-globalists, and Islamic NGOs spearheading the campaign. Many get involved through the PSC. For instance, in 2005, the organization provided great support to anti-Zionist academics trying to inspire the AUT – at time the largest university teachers' coalition

Figure 1 PSC booth at the "Celebrate Palestine" event, March 2011, photos taken by the author – personal

collection

in Britain – to break all links with Israeli universities. In 2006, the PSC worked with "anti-Zionist Christian groups like the Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology organization headed by the Reverend Dr. Naim Ateek" (Wistrich, 2012, p. 553). It also developed connections with the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), "the leading organized representative body of British Muslims and with more radically anti-Zionist Muslim Public Affairs Committee" (ibid). Drawing upon its diverse pool of supporters, the PSC emerged at the forefront of a campaign that strives to associate Zionism with racism. Martial clarifies that while the organization is in no way anti-Semitic, "Israel's policy of attributing an inferior status to members of non-Jewish ethno-national groups and claiming territory on behalf of 'the Jewish people' is racist and, therefore, needs to stop." It is precisely this promise of an anti-racist campaign that makes the PSC so popular amongst second-generation Bengali Muslims living in Tower Hamlets.

3.3.2 Challenging the "Alien" Status of the Second Generation through BDS

"I was born in a shed in a small village in Sylhet, northeast Bangladesh. My father moved to Tower Hamlets in the late 1960s, and we joined him in 1975. I grew up in a largely Bengali neighborhood. Brick Lane. The memories I have are of extreme poverty, overcrowding, and daily racism." Sitting in his family's restaurant in Bethnal Green, Jaan (a pseudonym), a forty-six-year-old maître d, describes the everyday experience of living in a neighborhood where white people, who regarded themselves as "real" locals, openly opposed the presence of culturally different "newcomers." He says, "Whites were quite abusive when I was growing up. They would swear and throw rocks at me. Yell that I should go back to where I came from." Gangs, mostly comprised of National Front members, passed out leaflets, vandalized property, and spat at children like Jaan who, as Tatari notes, "had to be left out of

schools early and walked home guarded by parents shielding them from attacks" (Tatari, 2014, p. 116). Over the years, Brick Lane became home of many families arriving from Sylhet. The success of the British National Party (BNP) in the 1993 election inspired a number of racially motivated attacks but, as Jaan tells me, these attacks gradually subsided, as the once dominant community of allegedly white "insiders" became a minority.

Dabir (a pseudonym) gives a similar account. A forty-nine-year-old managing director of a media organization that caters to ethnic businesses in East London proclaims that racism makes up much of his experience in Tower Hamlets. He says, "I was bullied at school. My parents had their store vandalized. My brother could not find employment despite being at the top of his class. When you take all of this into account, you really have to wonder where your alliances lie." Dabir identifies as British/Bengali. He explains that he uses "British" when applying for contracts and when he is travelling. However, when it comes to his national belonging, Dabir identifies as Bangladeshi. He presents here a common practice of describing national belonging in terms of origin that is relativized by referring to composite hybrid identities such as British/Bengali. These moments of uncertainty where "home" is not securely located coincide with a creative and eternally shifting symbolic construction of identifications that is made possible through BDS.

When Dabir joined the campaign in 2006, he did so in order to challenge racialized constructions of national belonging and put forth a more complex concept of Britishness where varied cultural resources could be utilized. He states, "BDS does not deny the importance of my heritage. I would say it compliments it actually because it promotes democracy, secularism, freedom, and equal rights for everyone – values upheld by the war in 1971." At the same time, Dabir notes that the campaign fights racism. He says, "As a member of the PSC, I feel like I'm proving that I'm not a stereotype. I want to be an active participant in mainstream political debates. I want to make a change." Many of second-generation

107

supporters of the PSC I interviewed were born in Bangladesh during the 1960s and came to Britain in the 1970s. Consequently, they experienced both the Bangladesh Liberation War and the discrimination in the streets and schools of Tower Hamlets. These social experiences needed to be publically proclaimed in order to create a link between nationalist heritage and cultural identity, on the one hand, and the mobilization of class and ethnic identity on the other (Eade, 1991; Bagguley and Hussain, 2005). I argue that BDS emerges as an example of this link as it holds pride of both cultural traditions and local belongings.

Rabah joined the movement in 2007. Like Dabir, he identifies as British by virtue of citizenship though he struggles to explain what Britishness is. "I think it's a journey to integration. No matter what, I'm British." At the same time, Rabah makes a distinction between British and English. He says, "I'm British but not English. You have to consider what that identity entails." Refusal to identify with the term "English" appears to be linked with assumptions about race. For Rabah, BDS symbolizes a set of norms in everyday life, e.g., cooperation and solidarity, which are driven by the necessity to escape and alter types of stigmatization that bring "races" into being. His account of taking part in a BDS conference held at Birkbeck, University of London, is telling in this regard. Rabah says, "People from all over the world talked about what needs to be done in order to stop the Israeli violation of human rights. I asked questions and raised concerns, and no one could tell me that I have no right to do so because of my skin color." Amna (a pseudonym), a thirty-six-year-old caregiver from Brick Lane, says that BDS allows her to link to other non-whites in Tower Hamlets who are troubled by the same difficulty of being politically and socially active in a context where they are described as "outsiders." She notes, "We're British but we're treated like second-class citizens – those with no voice." The fact that BDS cuts across ethnic, religious, and racial gaps tests these discrimination patterns because, as Amna explains, "it'd be hypocritical of whites to campaign for the end of Israeli racism but tolerate racism at home."

I first met Amna in December 2012. "Crazy country," she yells while entering Ashbys Sandwich Bar in Aldgate an hour late for our meeting. "One snowflake and nothing works. State of emergency," Amna declares, and I cannot help but wonder if this has less to do with snow that paralyzed the city's public transport and more with racist propaganda sweeping over Tower Hamlets. "A National Emergency today, in 20 years a catastrophe," warns Extortion for London. The group calls for all Eastenders who feel victimized by rapid ethnic cleansing to take a stand against the borough becoming a mirror image of Bangladesh. Pamphlet I was given on my way to meet Amna states, "Their birth rate is the highest in the developed world and quite possibly the highest in the whole world. […] Over the next two decades the population is predicted to rise exponentially. With nowhere for this community to expand, chronic overcrowding, disease, and poverty will become a national disaster." In order to capture the alleged "migrant boom," Extortion for London uses a drawing by an American cartoonist Derek T. Devareaux (see *Figure 2*). An image of a pregnant veiled woman also appears on the organization's website where claims are made that "the Blitz generation" has watched helplessly as their children were forced to move out of their historic homeland. "Housing policy, especially, has wiped out the native population and has continued for decades without […] constraint." Today, it is suggested, "only a few isolated and ageing pockets survive" (Extortion for London, n.d.).

Reflecting on these statements, Amna suggests that BDS represents a key counterpoint to ideas that equate the Bengali Muslim community with poverty, disease, crime, and backwardness. She says, "I go to many BDS meetings, and when I encounter someone who doesn't know much about Bangladesh I confirm that I identify with Bangladesh because I was born there. Normally, this would put me at the bottom of the heap, but my presence at the meeting sends a clear message that I don't conform to what I'm usually described as. I am educated, I keep informed, and I act accordingly."

Figure 2 "Migration boom," a cartoon by D. T. Devareux, 2006, source: Exertion for London (n.d.),

<u>http://www.exfl.com</u>, last accessed May 15, 2015

Just like Dabir, Amna engages in the BDS campaign in order to contest interpretations of her community as fundamentally regressive but also, as she later tells me, as introverted, quiet, and "easily pushed around." She looks at it as an opportunity to present a side of her community that is vibrant and active. In this respect, BDS is not simply about educating the public about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as much of the PSC material available online seems to suggest; it is also about concrete expressions of collective identity that challenge more stereotypical portrayals of the local Bengali Muslim community.

Jaan believes that the 1978 murder of Altab Ali, a twenty-five-year-old Sylheti factory worker who was attacked in Adler Street by three teenage boys as he walked home from work, represents an important element in the process of prompting perceptual change. He says, "I think that white people need to be more aware of severe implications of racism. Stricter immigration law announced in the 1960s and 1970s legitimized the idea that Bengalis did not belong here. We were blamed for everything and became easy targets of racist attacks. In 1978, blood was spilled because of that." The murder was often mentioned in the interview material as a part of a larger victim narrative that seems essential to ideas of personhood and identity. However, this narrative was shaped differently by different generations, so while Muslim identity appeared as central in the concept of victimhood developed by first-generation elders and, consequently, emerged as vital for their BDS participation; in the case of the second generation, it played little to no part.

Those promoting secular nationalist views still consider themselves Muslim, perform public rituals, and convey their religious identity through various observances at home. However, their engagement in BDS has more to do with the interweaving of social relations and political dynamics in Tower Hamlets. Jaan, for instance, declares, "Religion is not an important part of who I am, so I can't say I boycott because I'm a Muslim. Instead, I boycott as a Bengali Muslim because as a Bengali Muslim I have been attacked, stigmatized, and

111

made to feel worthless." He goes on to say, "In both official policy discourse and media I am described as a Muslim first and foremost. I think this makes it easier to rationalize endemic harassment and racism in Tower Hamlets. Like, it's all to do with Islam and the fact it has no place in Britain. But Gujarati Muslims have done exceptionally well in this country, so it's not really a Muslim thing. It's not a Bengali thing either. Look at Bengali Hindus and how well they've done. I think it's a mix of our Bangladeshi roots and our Islamic faith that makes us more susceptible to racism." This quote conveys a tension between an individual's self-definition and categories used by others to describe that specific individual, on the one hand, and a certain tendency amongst the second generation to bring these categories together and discuss their interrelationships, on the other. What emerges are complex hybrid identities shaped by cultural differences assembled through ethicized and racialized discourses that organize themselves in part through the symbolic and interactive field of BDS.

Those I interviewed experienced and continue to experience virulent and occasionally violent racism. This galvanizes the campaign and turns it into a token of pride to stand up to organizations like Extortion for London. BDS is not only an expression of collective identity that challenges racialized constructions of national belonging; it is also a collective effort. "One is powerless as an individual," Dabir notes, in this way showing that, contrary to elderly Bengali Muslims who boycott as individuals, the second generation stresses communal solidarity and sees in BDS a form of joint resistance against racial discrimination. With that said, contemporary efforts like BDS were made possible by high levels of political activism amongst the first generation during the 1970s that paved the way for the second generation to emerge as politically active from quite a young age. In the late 1980s, these young activists entered the Labour Party and strived to break into local administrative and political bodies. For middle class residents of Tower Hamlets local institutions seem rather distant but for the second generation they represent critical parts of access to health, housing, education, and

112

employment (Sircar and Saraswati, 2012). It is exactly this left of center, municipalist politics that is opposed by the British-born generation. In what follows, I show how these intergenerational clashes manifest in the case of BDS.

3.4 BDS of the British-born Generation: New Politics of Local and Global Resistance

Participation within conventional structures of local politics has confirmed the success of the ethnic mobilization process in capturing a certain kind of power but also, as Back et al. show, "the limits within which such mobilization is constrained" (Back et al., 2009, p. 10). After the Labour Party's defeat in the 1986 election there was more room in the borough's political arena for the expression of links with the global Muslim community, as opposed to alliances with left-wing radical activists and solidarities built around kinship, village, and language. Political visibilization of networks gathered around more recognizably Islamic organizations was informed by the work of three overlapping imagined communities. As argued earlier, moral community defines the sense of concern for others. Aesthetic community, by comparison, calls for the reproduction of communal expressions of "humor, tragedy, popular culture, national, and religious narratives" (Werbner, 2002, p. 63). Finally, political community or "community of suffering" takes up more official discourses that are, as Birt points out, "often infused with these moral and aesthetic sensibilities" (Birt, 2009, p. 215).

Political community makes two claims on the state. On the one hand, a demand for the recognition of ethnic and/or religious rights and, on the other, a demand for protection against racism. In the previous section I looked at how the experience of racism in Tower Hamlets impacts upon BDS efforts of a secular second-generation cohort of the PSC. In what follows, I explore how "community of suffering," which is organized and navigated by the British-

113

born generation, turns to Islam as a source of inspiration for the making of moral and aesthetic communities that reinforce new, transversal multi-ethnic alliances. My case in point is FOA.

3.4.1 Friends of Al-Aqsa: Framing Muslim Identities in Tower Hamlets

FOA is a non-profit organization formed by Ismail Patel, a spokesperson for the British Muslim Initiative (BMI). Patel, who was on board the *Mavi Marmara* ship as one of six British representatives, is also an advisory board member of the Conflicts Forum, a director of IslamExpo, and a member of the Special Advisory Board of Clear Conscience. He founded FOA in 1997. The organization, which derives its name from "the significance and the centrality of the al-Aqsa Mosque to the Islamic faith and the Muslim identity" (Friends of Al-Aqsa, n.d.), aims to gather international disapproval for Israel's apartheid policies and to manifest it through a global boycott of Israeli goods as well as products of those international companies that are complicit in Israeli violations of international law and UN resolutions. FOA educates on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through conferences, lectures, and publications, and by working in combination with international heritage, cultural, and humanitarian organizations on a number of joint ventures. These include BDS but also the "Red Card Israeli Apartheid" campaign which aims to move the UEFA U21 finals from Israel as well as the "Keffiyeh Project" which seeks to ensure that Palestine's only *keffiyeh* (traditional Middle Eastern headdress) factory stays in business.

In addition to these more globally framed campaigns, the organization is very active locally. The FOA website states that, "there are 650 MPs, and we want as many of them as possible to be lobbied directly by their constituents. Let's make sure they know that Palestine is one of the biggest issues for our country. It has never been more important for us to make

our elected representatives aware of the growing and unstoppable pressure for peace and justice" (ibid). Rajnaara (a pseudonym), a twenty-two-year-old student of Biochemistry at KCL, and a FOA volunteer since 2006, explains that lobbying is done through local branches that provide leaflets, offer direct links to MPs, and, in general, "simplify the process." The campaign, as she tells me, challenges the pervasive feeling of powerlessness among young Muslims in Britain to push claims onto the state in which they comprise a minority.

In contrast to the first and second generation of Bengali Muslims in Tower Hamlets, a British-born cohort of FOA deliberately evades membership in conventional party politics and instead focuses on collective action which merges global Muslim concerns with local issues like welfare, housing, and education. Fardeen (a pseudonym), a twenty-year old who at the time of our interview had been accepted to do a biology degree at London Metropolitan University, highlights the plight of Muslims in detail. He talks about Palestine, Bosnia, and Chechnya, before turning his attention to the British-born generation in Tower Hamlets. While second-generation followers of the PSC downplay the role of Muslim identity in their victimhood narrative, Fardeen believes that precisely Muslims undergo bullying in schools. Moreover, he suggests that although they study at same universities, the unemployment rate for Muslims is over twice the national average when compared to their non-Muslim counterparts. Fardeen suggests that this explains why "they're not capable to flourish as individuals in Britain, which is the only home they know." He concludes that the government needs to deal with discrimination and provide young Muslims with equal opportunities, instead of constantly pioneering dead-beat initiatives. 4

New spaces of the political created and navigated by the British-born generation articulate suspicion of not only mainstream political institutions but also the supposed co-option of Bangladeshi community politics. The appeal of FOA amongst young Bengali Muslims in Tower Hamlets in many ways reflects the failure of second-generation

115

community leaders to address what Rajnaara calls "the moments of injustice." She explains, "Our leaders have let us down. They're so occupied with what happened in Bangladesh during the 1970s that they fail to address current issues important to Muslims in Tower Hamlets but also Muslims worldwide. We do not look to the past – our focus is on improving the position of Muslims now!" By joining FOA, the British-born generation is hoping to revise its image as supposedly oppositional "outsiders," and establish itself as a stigmatized minority wronged by the wider society. In order to compensate, the majority needs to reorganize its own collective identity, that is to say, the notion of "being British," in order to make room for Islam and Muslims in it. Defensive religiosity of the first generation and secular, municipalist politics of the second generation are deemed impractical in this pursuit.

3.4.1.1 "Becoming" Muslim in Tower Hamlets

Part of being a young Muslim in Tower Hamlets is having an active interest in, and awareness of, Muslims everywhere. Frequently in the interview material a critique of mainstream community politics was contrasted with "a set of geopolitical issues that were of relevance to Muslim communities across the world" (Back et al., 2009, p. 14). Moll suggests that this interest is sacralized in the discourse and seen as "stemming from the very 'nature' of Islam as a borderless, organic entity" (Moll, 2007, p. 8). The association of the Palestinian cause with Islam is clear in the case of FOA. The website is watermarked with Islamic calligraphy, though the content is not always "Muslim" in nature or even written by Muslims. Furthermore, the website draws from diverse sources and news feeds that have a clearly campaigning objective; however, these are usually linked with the historical origins of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, its construction by the Prophet Adam, and its rebuilding by Ibrahim and Ismail. These aesthetic values are further reinforced via Qur'anic quotations used to discuss the role of Al-Aqsa for Muslims in general and BDS specifically. Upal (a pseudonym), a

116

second-year student of Sociology at London Metropolitan University, who joined FOA in 2011 says, "One of the reasons I got involved was because I read an article about attacks on the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Frustrated, I browsed through the FOA website and saw that one of their goal was to end the Israeli demolition of holy sites in Jerusalem. The organization wanted to take immediate action to stop Israeli excavations and to offer protection for holy sites, which are an important part of the Palestinian culture and civilization." Upal concludes that rather than raging silently, "BDS provides a channel to resist in more concrete ways."

In contrast to supporters of the PSC who tend to ignore the role of Islam in the mobilization process, young members of FOA often refer to religious symbols, values, and commitments as the grounds of BDS recruitment. For example, Hamzah (a pseudonym), a twenty-two-year old student of Middle Eastern Studies at SOAS, declares, "As a Muslim, I feel a strong connection to Palestinians. They're not just my brothers and sisters; they're a big part of me." He further notes, "The Prophet declared that believers are similar to human body, meaning that when one part hurts, the entire body does too." I met Hamzah at the G-20 London summit protests in 2009. He spoke about the role of faith-based mobilization in both local and global protest movements, which led to a long discussion on BDS. Hamzah joined the campaign in 2006 because his faith compelled him to. "It's crucial to be aware of the type of torment Muslims help prolong by buying Israeli products," he said. "I go to mosques and religious centers, speak to imams and my fellow believers. I educate. The Qur'an tells us that God loves just dealers." These ideals and practices represent what Hamzah described as "a progressive approach to Islam" that calls for the engagement with ostracized communities worldwide that are challenged with a real context of injustice. In his work on democracy and human rights project for Muslim societies, Esack notes that one of the primary goals of those who describe themselves as "progressive Muslims" is to ensure that "the oppressed are once again active agents of history" (Esack, 2006, p. 127, cited in Duderija, 2011, p. 118).

117

For British-born supporters of FOA, BDS represents an assertion of their religious progressiveness. This does not imply a sudden reorientation from one form of Islam to another. Instead, these young activists believe that the campaign communicates their visible commitment to the core sources of Islam, the divine text, and prophetic praxis that stress fairness, religious liberty, respect for diversity, and fair dealings. By taking part in BDS, they hope to bypass not only culturally fixed perceptions of Islam held by their elders but also its more extremist forms. Faraz (a pseudonym), a twenty-year-old student of Politics at SOAS, who joined FOA in 2009, tells me that he is daily confronted with the highly popular Hizb ut-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) – an organization that seems to dominate Muslim student societies at London's colleges and universities. Faraz speaks about the BBC Newsnight special, aired on August 27, 2003, where Hizb ut-Tahrir's representative argued that, "there is no such thing as a British Muslim." He described Islam as an anti-nationalist, transnational, and global reminder for Muslims in Britain to take "a long, hard look at themselves and decide what is their identity." The representative challenged all British Muslims to examine whether they are British or they are Muslim, concluding that, "We [Hizb ut-Tahrir] are Muslims. Where we live, is irrelevant."

I argue that although radicalization of Muslim youth in Tower Hamlets should not be laid decisively on the door of Hizb ut-Tahrir – in fact, such one-dimensional approach fails to recognize its much broader context, from the first Gulf War to the genocide of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Palestine – it is important to recognize that those Muslims who describe themselves as progressive and feel victimized by the wider society also believe that Islam is wronged by groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir who twist its message of peace, justice, and equality. Faraz says, "Just because Hizb is active in the East End and works on issues that are also relevant to FOA doesn't mean we're anything alike. People confuse us and it's frustrating." This general reluctance to recognize rivalries within and around Islam places

118

upon progressive Muslims a unique task of continuously having to explain themselves, "mostly in order to say who they are not" (Klausen, 2005, p.1). This is evident in Faraz's observation that whilst Hizb members are radical, FOA members are not. To illustrate his point, Faraz stresses the organization's partnership with other faith groups like Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) and Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JFJFP).

Young supporters of FOA frequently claimed that in order for Britain to take on a more inclusive definition of itself; there needs to exist a more comprehensive definition of what it means to follow Islam and be a Muslim in Britain. Faraz tells me BDS echoes a distinctively Islamic call for tolerance, inclusivity, and pluralism. In other words, it embodies what "true" Islam is all about. Rupna (a pseudonym), a twenty-three-year-old student of History at SOAS, declares that this take on Islam allows her to be a more active member of the society. She says, "BDS is a great way of asserting who we are as Muslims, what we stand for, and believe in. It is also about being a good citizen. By that I mean, exercising a right to be politically active without mistreating someone else." Rupna's remark points to some of the ways in which majority norms are appropriated by a minority for their own local and global projects. On the one hand, the concept of progressive Islam as articulated by supporters of FOA turns on its head the notion of Islam as exclusivist, intolerant, and repressive by stressing instead tolerance, inclusion, and diversity. On the other hand, these young activists adopt the official model of a pluralist nation-state and then use the appropriated global BDS campaign to Islamize it.

3.4.1.2 "Being" Muslim in Tower Hamlets

The key feature of what British-born supporters of FOA believe to be "true" Islam is its unlimited inclusivity. Islam, they suggest, is (or should be) tolerant enough to include even those who do not believe in God. Fardeen, who joined the organization in 2010, declares that

Muhammad himself embodied such an inclusive stance. He says, "If the Prophet didn't have connections to non-Muslims, we would not have Islam. He dedicated his life to building bridges with others." Fardeen speaks enthusiastically about Skype sessions with the aforementioned JVP and JFJFP but also Code Pink and the Global Women's Strike. Rupna exchanges emails with French activists she met in Glasgow at a conference that commemorated two years after the Gaza massacre which took lives of 1400 people over a three-week period, while Shamiul Joarder, the Head of Public Affairs at FOA, talks about the organization's links with the South African campaigners. He says, "My boss just came back from South Africa, and a lot of comparisons were made between what is happening in Gaza and the apartheid system that existed over there." Shamiul explains that the FOA head wanted to share knowledge and see what the South African experience was, "what they went through, and how we can learn for the AAM campaign."

The extension of social ties is also important to Upal who equates it with having an open mind. "Look at us for instance," she says. Upon hearing I was a Bosnian woman doing research on the BDS campaign, Upal wrongly assumed that I was Muslim. Sitting in a coffeehouse on Cable Street, she tells me that regardless of the fact that I am not, "it is important we exchange views and share ideas." Upal states, "I never met a person from Bosnia and Herzegovina, so I'm eager to hear your thoughts on BDS, especially given your country's wartime experience. I'm always interested in meeting new people and talking to them. We can learn from each other." Therefore, if "becoming" Muslim is all about expressions of religious progressiveness, then "being" Muslim points to tangible relationships and actions that are made possible by the announcement of Islamic "vibrancy, intelligibility, and diversity" (Moosa, 2007, p. 126). The practice of "being" is especially obvious during the month of Ramadan.

3.4.2 "Check the Label" Campaign in Tower Hamlets

In October 2009, I watched Shamiul speak at the PSC Tower Hamlets branch meeting. There he emphasized the role of the borough in the global BDS movement. Shamiul explained that the Palestinian people are looking towards London to see what the city is doing; to see that they are not forgotten. "But, London," he declared, "London is looking towards Tower Hamlets, brothers and sisters, and friends. The Free Palestine movement is being led here, by you, in Tower Hamlets." The case in point is "Check the Label."

FOA, the PSC, and Easy talk launched the campaign under the umbrella of BDS in 2009. With a tagline "This Ramadan, don't break your fast with an Israeli date," Check the Label calls for Muslims to use Ramadan as a time of year to remember those less fortunate (see *Figure 3*, *Figure 4*, and *Figure 5*). The month provides a direction for mankind, clear proofs of the guidance, and the criterion of right and wrong. Thus, "it would be an affront if at such a time Muslims helped support oppression" (Friends of Al-Aqsa, n.d.). On their website, FOA explains that Israel exports millions of pounds worth of dates to the world, which many Muslims unknowingly buy and use to break their fasts. Aware that its audience is made out of "day to day people who have a consciousness but […] don't have time to read everything and see where all the products are coming from" (ibid), FOA decided to start "Check the Label." The campaign lists dates "grown in illegal settlements in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley – on land that has been stolen from Palestinians" (ibid). By buying these dates, the organization warns, "Muslims are helping Israel to continue its occupation and oppression of the Palestinian people" (ibid). Other products to look out for are "citrus fruits and herbs and manufactured products including cosmetics, carbonation devices, plastics, textile products, and toys" (ibid).

121

Figure 3 "Boycott Israeli Produce Card" - front, source: Friends of Al-Aqsa (n.d.),

http://foa.org.uk/campaigns/boycott-israeli-produce, last accessed May 15, 2015

Figure 4 "Boycott Israeli Produce Card" - back, source: Friends of Al-Aqsa (n.d.),

http://foa.org.uk/campaigns/boycott-israeli-produce, last accessed May 17, 2015

Figure 5 "Stop before you Buy" poster, source: Friends of Al-Aqsa (n.d.), http://foa.org.uk/campaigns/boycott-israeli-produce, last accessed May 22, 2015

In his Tower Hamlets address, Shamiul recounted how the launch of "Check the Label" was modest. "The first *Jumma* [Friday prayer] of Ramadan, we were outside of the London Muslim Center. There was about six or seven of us distributing the leaflets." He looked at the pamphlet in his hand and continued, "What we found, obviously as you can see, people are thinking, 'Ok, why are these guys standing outside with the Israeli flag?' But, as we were distributing them out, we told them, 'Don't break your fast with a blood date. Don't break your fast with an Israeli date. Make sure you check the label. Don't buy from Israel, West Bank, Jordan Valley.'" Shamiul went on to say, "There was a support there from the community. 'We don't wanna buy dates from Israel. We don't wanna buy dates that support apartheid. We don't wanna buy dates that are a part of oppression.'" Inspired by this early communal support, "Check the Label" extended towards local shops, supermarkets, and vendors, targeting Muslim consumers directly. "Unfortunately we had a few cash and carries that still supplied Israeli dates," Shamiul noted. "Now, Easy Talk and FOA went to these organizations, went to cash and carries and said, 'Look, what are you guys doing?' and they said, 'Oh, profit margin, profit margin, profit margin'. So, obviously, we went back to the community. And this is why Tower Hamlets is so important. After two weeks of campaigning, when the community knew that Israeli dates are on the shelves in Tower Hamlets, they said, 'No'. As a result some supermarkets, some cash and carries had to take their dates off the shelves. Those who didn't found themselves ostracized by the community." This shows that, as argued earlier, BDS has a profound impact on the commercial landscape of Tower Hamlets. The borough is covered with BDS promotional material partially because many local stores are jumping on the BDS wagon in hopes of pleasing a new wave of conscious consumers gathered around organizations like FOA.

"Check the Label" proceeds in two stages. Firstly, FOA contacts national retailers and wholesalers. At the same time, six local branches reach out to local vendors. The letter sent

out to shops across Britain notes that the boycott movement is growing very quickly and more and more people refuse to buy products that come from Israel. "Please do not source […] from Israel, Illegal West Bank settlements, or the Jordan Valley" (Friends of Al-Aqsa, n.d.). The letter lists a number of companies that should be boycotted as well as a number of approved alternatives. "There are varieties of dates from various other countries to source […] from. If you would like Medjoul dates from Palestine that help the Palestinian farmers they are available from YAFFA. You can order these dates through FOA, as we are helping them distribute this year. Another provider is Zaytoun, www.zaytoun.org.uk" (ibid). The first time I met Shamiul in April 2009, he told me that shopkeepers commonly claim that the affordability of Israeli dates means that customers are not complaining. However, Sarah (a pseudonym), who works as a Zaytoun representative in Tower Hamlets, suggests that the goal is "not to try and compare the two prices but to question why something might be so cheap." In a conversation we had during the "Celebrate Palestine" event, she stated that "Check the Label" forces Muslims to question the ethical nature of Israeli products. "Dates offered by Zaytoun might be a little more expensive," she recognized, "but conscience will be free."

Secondly, FOA reaches out to Muslim consumers directly. The organization not only posts "Check the Label" material on its website, it also sends out relevant information to local mosques, schools, and religious centers. Furthermore, supporters of FOA take to the streets, distributing leaflets and pamphlets, in hopes of educating and mobilizing a vast Muslim constituency. One of the leaflets states:

> Dear Respected Brother, I pray this letter finds you showered in Allah's Mercies. As Ramadan approaches, Muslims around the country will be preparing to welcome the arrival of this blessed month, which will include buying various goods to break their fasts. We would like to draw your attention to a very important campaign that we run annually, and we hope that you can support us. […] If you would like to order any of the free literature to distribute please contact us and tell us which area or mosque you can cover. The focus right now is encouraging shops, wholesalers and importers not to source their dates from Israel. We would like to ask if your *Masjid* would like to

126

help with this and support the campaign. We have seen a huge shift in the way the State of Israel and the occupation is viewed globally – however, there is still a lot of work to be done. This is your chance to be a part of the free Palestine movement. We look forward to hearing from you.

The campaign, therefore, appeals to geographical scales both below and above the nation-state. Subnationally, it generates communitarian engagement that is opposed to standard party politics and confounds them through new forms of collective action in the NGO sector. Transnationally, it links young Bengali Muslims to an abstract realm of worldwide shoppers, on the one hand, and inserts them within a larger narrative of Muslim suffering, on the other. In both cases, they are strengthened by communalism of shared beliefs and ideals over the use of boycott language and practice.

In June 2012, I accompanied Upal to Ali's Superstore, a local vendor on Fashion Street. She browsed through products on offer, nodding approvingly at a large selection of dates. She told me to keep an eye out for any that were grown in Israel. "The money that comes from these dates," she stated, "is blood money. It directly helps the Israeli regime and we know what they are doing to our Muslim brothers and sisters." She then turned her attention to a young man working behind the counter. She asked him to talk to his boss about the "Check the Label" campaign and remove all Israeli products from the store. "There are all these loopholes in European food labeling laws," Upal explained. "Products from illegal settlements somehow find their way onto our shelves, and Muslims spend a fortune on them to break their fast during Ramadan. Unless they check the label, they're funding murders and expulsions of the Palestinian people." In this light, Upal appears completely convinced that she is not only more socially conscious but also more mindful than average consumers.

Rajnaara also declared on numerous occasions how different she was from other consumers "out there." During the PSC Tower Hamlets branch meeting, I watched her engage in an endless discussion with a group of Birkbeck students. "At the heart of 'Check the Label'

lies the uniqueness and inherent worthiness of each and every human being. It all comes down to a simple but radical idea," she told them. "Every human life, Muslim and non-Muslim, rich and poor, 'Northern' and 'Southern' has exactly the same inherent worth. It is our responsibility to keep this in mind whenever we enter a supermarket." Metaphors of worthiness and solidarity point to the emergence of an activist dogma that takes consumption beyond rational considerations of changing business principles and practices. Instead, these metaphors convey immanent wisdom or, as Kozinets and Handelman note, "a knowledge of things hidden that is concealed from […] all consumers who do not go through a similar activist realization" (Kozinets and Handelman, 2004, p. 696). With that said, Rajnaara did not believe that anything said at the PSC meeting was actually going to make people "see the light" all of a sudden. "They have to be ready for that change themselves."

After the meeting, we sat down for a coffee at a small restaurant in Brick Lane. Rajnaara asked, "What do you think all those students were doing at the meeting? I imagine that they came to assess their presumptions against what others have to say, to see if their questions are answered. They came to be critical, right?" Rajnaara believed that by being at the meeting students confirmed their right to form an independent judgment, "to show why they think something is true or not. They should be free to do this without a fear of being labeled 'radical.' It's their right to think freely and speak freely." According to this discourse, young supporters of FOA are refusing to "privatize" their religion by making it unrelated to public life and consigning it to rather limited parameters of individual ethics. This presents a counterexample to defensive religiosity exhibited by the first generation that is criticized for being far too docile. In its place, British-born followers of FOA put forth the idea of religious progressiveness that takes Islamic participation in Britain as a given.

3.4.3 Register of Voice: BDS and the Issue of Active Muslim Youth

In July 2009, Shamiul spoke at the launch of "Kafa" – a movement to defend Muslim communities worldwide. In front of 200 attendees, he argued that subjecting Muslims to a treatment that you would not subject any other community to is Islamophobic. "The issue about politicians, the media, the massive fascination they have with my identity, no other community seems to be subjugated to these kind of questions – to choose between your religion, your race, over being British." Shamiul asserted that Muslims do not wish to be suspended between competing identities and belongings. He asked, "Why can't my identity be left to me? Why is it that everyone is telling me what I should be?" Shamiul continued, "I stand here born and bred in London. I'm Bengali by heritage and I'm very proud. I'm British; I'm born on this great island. And I'm Muslim. And I'm very proud to be all three. So, that's my identity." He then noted that, "the government is always, continuously, telling me that I have to choose […]. That's the problem." In order to tackle this problem, Shamiul called for more public engagement in the name of Islam that is capable of not only internal critique and dialogue but also external dispute.

In his talk, Shamiul noted that he was not someone who enjoys giving public talks but he felt obliged to step up. "I've been going to universities; students have been telling me, 'Oh, I don't want to come to certain meetings […].' And I said, 'Why?' They don't want to be targeted. They don't want the police to look at them. They don't want to be associated with political activity." Shamiul continued, "Now, that's really, really sad. […] When you are at the prime of your political activity, when you are at the prime of your thinking outside the box, you are being made to feel as though you cannot think. You are being made to feel as if you cannot engage with your society. But through political engagement you are the part of society." He went on to say that he hopes to lead by example and inspire young Muslims to

129

oppose the voices that are trying to convince them that they are not part of the society or that they are extremist because they oppose British foreign policy. "It's my government, if I oppose it, I will say that I oppose it. […] I have the right to oppose the government if I disagree with its domestic or foreign policy, cuz I'm born here. […] I want the students to come up and not be afraid of being political."

Disproportionate to mainstream party-based participation, FOA uses BDS in order to mobilize those who deliberately evade engagement in the formal public sphere of representative politics. In April 2009, few months prior to the "Kafa" launch, I first met up with Shamiul for an interview. Sat in a small diner on Caledonian Road, he laid the foundations of his "Kafa" talk and picked up on what Back et al. (2009) outline as crucial for political participation in Tower Hamlets – register of voice is important. "It is not just the issue of Palestine; it was the same with Iraq." Shamiul explained that although the majority of people did not support the war in Iraq, the British government refused to take the troops out of the country. "Our government does not listen to its people," he concluded. Frequently in the interview data, my participants questioned their British identity in relation to actions of the British government. Rupna explained it best by saying that if being British means "going to an illegal war in Iraq," then she chooses not to be it. She doubts her British identity, while Shamiul is sure of his if it means "wanting good health-care, education, and walking the streets without a fear of persecution." Because the very crux of their identity lies in the opposition of all forms of perceived injustice, young supporters of FOA will continue to condition their sense of Britishness upon interactions with political institutions at both local and national levels. For them, BDS is about bringing no less than justice to the society. With this comes a new sense of political assertiveness along with calls to participate fully in the public life. In contrast to calls by the second generation that disregard the Islamization process completely, calls by FOA are considered to be in the name of Islam.

Conclusion

In this chapter I explored the appropriation of BDS though the lens of Tower Hamlets. I argued that different generations of Bengali Muslims have considerably different interpretations of the campaign that are produced by their attempts to come to terms with social relations and political dynamics in the borough, on the one hand, and act out their claims to be the actual voices of "their community," on the other. Their struggles are also within and around Islam. As such they inform the making of what I call the global Muslim protest against the Israeli occupation and apartheid – an ethical, mobilizing, and framing repertoire that emerges under the umbrella of the BDS campaign but is molded by different interpretations of Islam driven by generational and class claims as well as migrations and claims to citizenship.

I first made the case that, against the backdrop of tensions between migrant and host communities in the recent history of Tower Hamlets, the first generation developed a distinctively defensive sense of religiosity concerned with preserving familiar values and customs. Watchful of citizenship and identity issues and positioned cautiously in relation to the state, elderly Bengali Muslims tend to confine BDS within the private realm. In spite of their general belief that the campaign cuts across ethnic, religious, and racial divides, BDS still fails to generate concrete links between the first generation and others who take part in it. By comparison, those in the thirties-fifties age bracket commonly form political and social alliances with other non-white residents of Tower Hamlets. I showed that in this case BDS emerges as a token of dignity and pride that confronts stereotypical perceptions of the local Bengali Muslim community as backward and passive. Lastly, I argued that the symbolic and interactive field of BDS provides a platform upon which an aspiring cohort of the young educated middle class articulates its political identity in opposition to both "defensiveness" of

131

the first generation and secular, municipalist politics of the second generation. For followers of FOA, BDS represents a form of public participation in the name of Islam that is compatible with the nation-state framework but is believed to be deep-rooted in a sense of belonging to an Islamic tradition.

In the next chapter I expand my argument on space and meaning further by placing the campaign within the context of Stari Grad. In order to understand how global protest frames get locally appropriated, it is important to explore the situated histories of the people concerned, including the competition and interplay among generations and classes. This approach unmasks a plethora rather than an archetype of imaginaries that structure forms of political participation based on religious faith and the kinds of mobilization they call for.

Chapter 4 – BDS and the Fragmentation of Bosniak Community in Postwar Stari Grad: Old, Urban and Moderate vs. New, Rural and Radical?

> History had never made such a joke with anyone as it did with us [Bosniaks]… We had been torn away and disconnected and were not accepted. Like a branch of the river which had been separated from the mother river by a torrential flood and it had neither a stream nor its mouth of the river, too small to be a lake and too big for a soil to absorb it within itself. We live at the crossroads of the two worlds, on a border of nations; we bear the brunt of everybody, and we have always been guilty in the eyes of someone. The waves of history break themselves over our backs, as on a reef (Selimovic, 1966, cited in Karic, 1997, p. 88).

In the previous chapter I focused on various forms of BDS participation in Tower Hamlets. I argued that the engagement in the campaign unmasks rivalries within and around Islam that are driven by the competition and interplay amongst generations and classes. In her work on individual memory management in postwar Sarajevo, Sorabji suggests that previous class-based divisions blurred during the 1990s as prewar Sarajevo Bosniaks "played down differences between them in the interest of unity" (Sorabji, 2006, p. 4). Local attachments, in other words, were assumed to play a significant part in the process of inclusion and exclusion. Even so, this does not indicate that current disparities between "insiders" and "outsiders" are less those of class and more those of territorialism. My case in point are local BDS movements in four neighborhoods located in Stari Grad: Bistrik, Vratnik, Logavina, and Kovaci. I show that the "territorialism" argument may only stretch so far and not as far as to inspire a locally homogenous BDS campaign (see *Figure 6*). From this perspective, BDS is not simply an expression of solidarity. Rather, it represents a stage for clashes regarding the very nature of that solidarity. Like in the case of Tower Hamlets, it resonates struggles within and around Islam that are structured by generational rivalries, class claims, migrations, and claims to citizenship.

Figure 6 Map of Stari Grad with focus on Logavina, Bistrik, Kovaci, and Vratnik, source: Stari Grad

Municipality (n.d.), http://www.starigrad.ba, last accessed: June 10, 2015

I begin the chapter by outlining the spatial context of my study. I use the prism of place
in order to show that, in contrast to much of the existing research that portrays Bosnia and
Herzegovina as an "ethnic mosaic" that has been ruptured by the war (Rezun, 1995;
Mousavizadeh, 1996; Bose, 2007), the country has commonly been and continues to be
"multilayered" (Bougarel et al., 2007). Distinctions based on class, origin, occupation, and
access to resources have traditionally been far more significant than the ethnic ones. The war
did amplify ethnic divisions, but it also blurred some of the previous ones, as those who
consider themselves "insiders" with rudimental rights to the city reacted against two new
categories of resident – "the in-migrated Bosniak displaced persons from ethnically cleansed

134

villages" and "a new wave of religious believers who have adopted a version of Islam widely associated with [Saudi donors and] some of the Arabs who participated in the war" (Sorabji, 2006). I argue that the BDS movement articulates itself vis-à-vis these new groups. I also show that although the attack on the "Gaza Freedom Flotilla" in 2010 led to an increase in the number of local NGOs involved in a global campaign for solidarity with the Palestinian people, not many got involved in the consumer boycott of Israel. Organizations I selected as my ethnographic points of entry represent not only the leadings voices in the local adjustment of BDS; they also point to an array of situated dynamics that drive the process of appropriation in a place much smaller than Tower Hamlets.

I first look at middle class supporters of MFS-Emmaus. Contrary to the globally oriented elite and the truly deprived, the Bosniak middle class has been left without an ideological project of its own following the disintegration Yugoslavia, the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its violent partition. Two decades later, NGOs committed to universalistic values and "quality of life" issues fill the void. BDS emerges as a token of cosmopolitanism and Europeanness for educated Bosniak urbanites, typically in their late forties, employed, and earning above the national average. They are also well travelled but remain mostly loyal to neighborhoods they were raised in and had remained in during and after the war. Many derive their sense of authority in Stari Grad from this fact and, therefore, perceive the materialization of the postwar business-political elite as particularly problematic. The arrival of new categories of resident is similarly feared especially as related to the rise of a version of Islam pejoratively called "Wahhabi." Many believing Muslims in the borough and particularly those who define themselves as *dobra, stara, porodica* ("the good, old family") perceive this version of Islam as an attack on their own religious authenticity. I argue that in this case, BDS represents an accurate portrayal of the reality of the Islamic renewal in the country – one that is limited to religious and cultural spheres.

135

I next focus on Stand for Justice. In contrast to elderly supporters of MFS-Emmaus, who reconcile "East" and "West" in a unique Bosnian hybrid form, followers of Stand for Justice are eager to redefine and radicalize their links to Europe. These young educated Bosniaks describe Europe as flawed from a modern, historically relative viewpoint. Its ontological values remain the same; however, as Sarajlic notes, it is the task of Islam to awaken it and "help it return to its forgotten, better self" (Sarajlic, 2009, p. 72). Redefinition of Europe calls for redefinition of Islam. While elderly middle class urbanites commonly keep Islam confined within the private sphere, young followers of Stand for Justice favor a more active approach to their religiosity. They are engaged in a number of separate local campaigns that are compelled by constant reflection on what it means to be a Muslim in Europe. BDS appears as their common project that is both locally significant and globally framed. The campaign is portrayed as an example of the "Bosnian way" of living Islam as a source of inspiration and spiritual identification compatible with Europe.

I continue the chapter by looking at Mladi Muslimani. Current supporters show rather low profiles that greatly diverge from the organization's image in the past as the cradle of the Bosnian Muslim elite. I show that the organization mobilizes amongst practicing Muslims typically in their forties and fifties who arrived to Stari Grad during the war. They are not as financially situated as the first group nor as politically and socially active as the second. Consequently, their BDS participation remains entirely symbolic. The campaign represents, on the one hand, an attempt to reclaim the celebrated status that the organization enjoyed during the 1940s as an openly anti-communist and anti-fascist alliance and, on the other, a communal commentary on the lack of Bosniak participation in both political community and civil society. Furthermore, a sense of betrayal at Europe's failure to prevent the war produced great disappointment with Europe amongst everyone I have spoken to. Contrary to supporters of MFS-Emmaus and Stand for Justice who hold onto the idea of Europe's significance,

religious nationalists gathered around Mladi Muslimani view Europe as extremely dangerous. For instance, Adnan Jahic, one of the organization's more prominent members, perceives the relationship between Islam and Europe in terms of structural opposition and suggests that Bosniaks "do not belong [to Europe] culturally and spiritually" (Jahic, 1995, pp. 52-3, cited in Bougarel, 2007, p. 112). It is within this frame that I examine BDS. The campaign is portrayed as an important part of Bosniak identity in Stari Grad. However, those who boycott but otherwise link to Islam in superficial and irregular ways are dismissed as "false" Muslims and "worse" Bosniaks.

Finally, I turn my attention to IslamBosna and Nezim Halilovic. While followers of MFS-Emmaus and Stand for Justice reject and even ridicule neo-Salafis, thus providing examples of reverse osmosis, willingness of Mladi Muslimani to collaborate with the otherwise ostracized group reveals a more direct diffusion. In January 2004, IslamBosna printed a flier called "Raise Our Heads" which describes Islam as "a social, political, economic, state, and, above all, moral and ethical system." The flier was actually an excerpt from a text written in 1942 by Esad Karadjordjevic, an ideologist of the Mladi Muslimani movement. More than ten years later, the relationship persists. Supporters of Mladi Muslimani contribute to the Salafi magazine *Saff*, while Anes Redzic of *Saff* praises the organization on the IslamBosna website. Nonetheless, these organizations diverge when it comes to BDS. In contrast to supporters of Mladi Muslimani who comprehend their participation in a highly localized manner, young neo-Salafis gathered around IslamBosna are more in tune with the global character of BDS. Several authors have noted that diehards of the neo-Salafi fringe exist outside of the auspices of religious institutions in the country, recruiting members within the Bosniak diaspora (Foschetti, 2010; Karcic, 2010; Merjdanova, 2013). In this chapter I focus on economically, socially, and politically marginalized Bosniaks who had remained in the country and have been absorbed by the *Islamska Zajednica* (Islamic

Community). They are fiercely patriotic and avid supporters of the former army commander Halilovic. His sermons, reproduced on the webpages of the Islamic Community and IslamBosna, are a fusion of the battle for faith, honor, and the state. According to Halilovic, Palestinians and Bosniaks both are in danger of losing this fight. The solution is to return to the Islam of the *Salaf* (predecessors). From this perspective, BDS is a reform movement, much like in the case of Stand for Justice. Here, however, it aims to bring young Bosniaks back to the purity of origins and enable them to approximate more closely to the *Ummah*. 5

4.1 Mapping the Field: "Newcomers" and the Blurring of Prewar Distinctions?

Sarajevo's city center has historically been perceived as a domain in which Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats meet and interact at school, at work, and in the shops, markets, and coffeehouses. In the 1960s, in response to the city's massive growth and development, the area known as Novo Sarajevo (New Sarajevo) was built on the northern bank of the Miljacka River, between Novi Grad (New City) and Centar (Centre). It was developed by business enterprises and inhibited by employees of the firms and their families, suggesting that, similarly to the city's center, "different ethnic groups lived alongside each other" (Sorabji, 1994, p. 111). According to the 1991 Census, the most recent source of population data in Bosnia and Herzegovina given that the final results of the 2013 Census have yet to be released, Novo Sarajevo had 95,089 residents – 33.9% of which were Muslim, 34.6% were Serb, and 9.3% were Croat. By comparison, Muslims made up 77.7% of Stari Grad's population. Furthermore, *mahalas* (old Muslim neighborhoods) scattered throughout the municipality were "felt to be, and preserved as, Muslim in a way that the rest of the town's space is not" (Sorabji, 1994, p. 112). If other parts of the city were domains where one typically played down religious identity, then *mahalas* have been historically seen as spheres of Islam. "A mass of steep winding cobbled

streets lined with small houses, their courtyards and gardens hidden from the street by high fences and gates, small neighborhood mosques dotted around, these neighborhoods are places where people use Arabic and Turkish greetings (*salaam 'aleikum*, *merhaba*, *aksam hajrula*) instead of the standard […] greetings […] of the town outside" (ibid).

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	Croats	%	Muslims	%	Serbs	%	Yugoslavs	%	Other	%	Total
Centar	5,428	6.8	39,761	50.1	16,631	21.0	13,030	16.4	4,436	5.6	79,286
Hadžići	746	3.1	15,392	63.6	6,362	26.3	841	3.5	859	3.5	24,200
Ilidža	6,934	10.2	29,337	43.2	25,029	36.8	5,181	7.6	1,456	2.1	67,937
Ilijaš	1,736	6.9	10,585	42.0	11,325	45.0	1,167	4.6	371	1.5	25,184
Novi grad	8,889	6.5	69,430	50.8	37,591	27.5	15,580	11.4	5,126	3.8	136,616
Novo Sarajevo	8,798	9.3	33,902	35.7	32,899	34.6	15,099	15.9	4,391	4.6	95,089
Pale	129	0.8	4,364	26.7	11,284	69.0	396	2.4	182	1.1	16,355
Stari grad	1,126	2.2	39,410	77.7	5,150	10.1	3,374	6.6	1,684	3.3	50,744
Trnovo	16	0.2	4,790	68.5	2,059	29.5	72	1.0	54	0.8	6,991
Vogošća	1,071	4.3	12,499	50.7	8,813	35.8	1,730	7.0	534	2.2	24,647
Total	34,873	6.6	259,470	49.2	157,143	29.8	56,470	10.7	19,093	3.6	527,049

Table 3 Population of Sarajevo by municipality and national identity, 1991, source: Robert J. Donia (2006),

Sarajevo: A Biography, London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 266

Sorabji suggests that many Sarajevans perceive *mahalas*, with their greetings, gossip, and old women in *dimije* (flowing, baggy trousers), as "prized embodiments of the Bosnian tradition" (ibid). However, while city voices have been heard to claim that, "before the war we didn't even know who was Serb or Croat or Muslim; we were all just friends" (Sorabji, 1993, p. 33), this does not seem as an accurate portrayal of old Muslim neighborhoods where people have always been very aware of the central role played by Islam in the popular understanding of identity (see *Figure 7*). In *mahalas* where "to bore" (*dosadjivati*) is an active verb (*dosadjivati se*), and elders spend their days sitting at the window just observing, ready to inquire, "What family do you come from?" (*cija si*) when you come barging into their neighborhood equipped with a camera and a notepad, the words *nacija* (nationality) and *vjera* (faith) are used interchangeably. The answer to "what is your *nacija*?" is, therefore, "Muslim"

139

Figure 7 Kovaci neighborhood, April 2013, photos taken by the author – personal collection

rather than "Bosnian" or "Bosniak." [6] What this shows is that "Muslims" are simultaneously members of a larger national community – *Muslimanski narod* (Muslim people) and a smaller Islamic community of believers who vary in levels of religious observance (Bringa, 1995; Abazovic, 2012). There are those who fast token days of Ramadan and partake in certain religious rituals. Some never pray and drink rather openly. For them, "the consumption of alcohol no more prevents a Muslim being a Muslim than petty thefts stop a Catholic being a Catholic" (Sorabji, 1993, p. 34). Others pray regularly, fast during Ramadan, and view infringements of Islamic regulations as telling signs of an "inadequate" Muslim.

Hence, the spectrum of Islamic identities is in no way limited to constricted and dichotomized divisions between "local" and "foreign" Islamic elements. Instead, it exhibits what Sarajlic (2010) calls a "patchwork of micro-identities that are far from homogeneous and cannot be aggregated into simple categories." Those with historically established autochthonous rights to the city seek to reconcile Islam with "Western modernity." Elderly middle class urbanites encourage its individual expression, whilst the younger generation sees in Islam a form of common culture central to how the diversity of the Bosniak community should be organized. In what follows, I draw from Bougarel, in particular his 2007 study of Bosnian Islam as "European Islam," as my secondary source, in order to trace the emergence of BDS as an arena in which both groups reproduce themselves against the alleged threat posed by an array of postwar "newcomers."

4.2 BDS as a Window to Europe: MFS-Emmaus and "the Good, Old Family"

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country with a high concentration of international NGOs. Shortly after the war, there was a steep rise in their numbers. Sarajlic shows that during a four-year period, between 1994 and 1998, "the number rose from 50 to 332" (Sarajlic, 2010).

141

The author notes that a large number of these NGOs had their headquarters in Muslim countries or among Muslim migrant populations in Britain. Most left with the stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina but a few stayed on. Turkish organizations that remained in the country developed a clear religious policy over the last decade. Ross Solberg's 2007 study on the local appeal of *Naqshbandiyya* and other Turkish neo-Sufi networks in the country provides ample evidence of this fact. In addition to Turkish networks that received less academic attention than Iranian and Saudi ones (Sadovic, 2008; Alic and Kaletovic, 2008; Karcic, 2010), the country also hosts many smaller groups that take Islam as their reference and, while not very influential on their own, serve as links between the local population and the *Ummah*. MFS-Emmaus, a humanitarian organization whose representative Yasser Sabbagh was on board the *Mavi Marmara* at the time of the Israeli raid, is my case in point.

The organization was founded at the beginning of 1999 with the purpose of helping categories of citizens in need. With offices in Doboj Istok, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica and 153 employees, it is one of the largest NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Registered as a local nonprofit organization, MFS-Emmaus is a part of the global Emmaus International network founded in 1969 in Bern. The organization assists "refugees, displaced persons, illegal migrants, victims of human-trafficking, old and helpless persons, homeless, individuals with mental disabilities, HIV positive individuals, youth at risk of this contagious disease and young delinquents" (Medjunarodni Forum Solidarnosti-Emmaus, n.d.). In 2008, MFS-Emmaus expended its portfolio of action even further when it joined a global movement against Israel's system of occupation and apartheid.

On September 26, 2013, I met up with one of the leading man of MFS-Emmaus in his office on Cekalusa Street. Yasser arrived to Bosnia and Herzegovina more than three decades ago as a political exile from Syria. "Al-Assad's regime was something that I had to stand up against. I wasn't trying to be a 'smartass.' I was just voicing my opinion, but this had grave

consequences for me. I was a child back then, only seventeen. I had just finished high school and already found myself at odds with the government. My two options were being locked up for a long time or leaving Syria. I left alone and came to Yugoslavia in 1981." Yasser enrolled in the Technological Faculty, University of Tuzla, where he studied Environmental Protection. After years of working as a translator, Yasser started to focus on communal activism. This coincided with the outbreak of war in the spring of 1992. He worked on child welfare programs, first with the Iranian Cultural Center in Tuzla from 1992 to 1994 and then with the Saudi Islamic humanitarian organization Igasa from 1994 to 1999. From 1999 to 2001, Yasser was employed by the Islamic World Committee, a humanitarian NGO from Kuwait. In 2002, he joined MFS-Emmaus. Pushed out by government repression and frustrated by the absence of legitimate channels for political participation and social protest, Yaser carried with him dissatisfaction created at home and used the turmoil during the 1990s to emerge as an important figure of Islamic charity which provided beneficiaries with a range of services otherwise not available from government offices.

In 2008, when MFS-Emmaus got involved in the global BDS campaign, Yasser was the man in charge. He explains that after his initial attempt to enter Gaza via Egypt failed, he sought assistance from other organizations engaged in the campaign that could help distribute the aid collected by MFS-Emmaus in Bosnia and Herzegovina. "I emailed various NGOs in Britain. They all worked on BDS, and this made me realize the potency of the campaign. Not only does it impact the mindset at home; it also establishes transnational networks that get things done. It was through my BDS connections that I ended up in Cairo for the second time." However, history repeated itself as the Egyptian government halted the activists. They responded by protesting in the city streets, in front of embassies, and the UN agencies. The government eventually caved in and allowed 100 activists to enter Gaza on December 30. Yasser was the only representative from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"I think it may be a policy of local NGOs to strive towards 'prominence.' They want their name out there as the only Bosnian NGO working on the Israeli-Palestinian issue," Yasser tells me. "Of course, this has clear economic benefits. When you enter a network like BDS you find that many organizations not only share information but also support each another financially. On the downside, when we called for help from local organizations in collecting donations for people in Gaza hardly anyone responded. So, in the end we mostly work alone." According to Yasser, the local NGO environment functions on the back of micro operations where "everyone is fighting their own battle that is more about personally conceptualized objectives than a joint goal of assisting the Palestinian people." He gives the example of Solidarnost (Solidarity), a network of activists operating from Bihac. "They'll organize an event that only 20 people attend. Or they'll ask for donations and collect no more than 10,000 KM [circa 5,000 EUR]. Sure, there is effort behind all of this but their calls are poorly formulated, and they're basically addressing the wrong crowd."

I tried to arrange an interview with Zemira Gorinjac, the founder of Solidarnost. I was asked to send my questions in advance. Most, if not all, were to do with local manifestations of BDS. One week later I received a rather rude reply. My questions, the rejection email stated, had nothing to do with the campaign. I was told that the goal of those "who want to help the Palestinian people" should be to look at how "the campaign is organized in the world." During my interview with Yasser a very different approach was evident. For instance, he repeatedly criticized local organizations that copy BDS calls from Britain. "I doubt that these would work. To call for extensive consumer boycotts on websites frequented by unemployed youths is ridiculous. The same goes for mobilizing amongst the displaced poor. Bosnia is a small market and, as such, it needs a concentrated and carefully thought out campaign. Our main focus is on those who can afford to boycott, so to say, but we only concentrate on two, maybe three, companies at once. Right now, it's Coca-Cola and Nestle.

144

Both have a big market in Bosnia, and our job is to mobilize people against these companies."

When I ask how this is done in practice, Yasser explains, "Israeli forces control the amount of aid per household. Each family member is given the exact amount needed for fulfillment of basic caloric needs. This is not that different to what was happening in Bosnia during the war. I remember lunch packs and bread queues. So when I think of a campaign that will resonate locally I pay attention to the common experience of being under siege." Yasser believes that even though it became customary to draw parallels between Palestine and Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of genocide that produces anger and disappointment towards Europe, the focus should be on the feeling of besiegement. This feeling, according to Yasser, resonates strongly amongst the urban middle class.

4.2.1 Longevity and Urbanity as Status Symbols in Stari Grad

"Islam in Bosnia is under siege," Dzenana (a pseudonym) declares as we are talking in her office on Logavina Street. She is fifty-five and works as a corporate lawyer. Her husband is a government employee. Both of their daughters live abroad. Dzenana grew up in a middle class family in Kovaci. She lived in the neighborhood both during and after the war and derives a certain sense of pride from this. Dzenana says, "When a person believes they believe for themselves, but it seems we entered a postwar 'frenzy' where to be recognized as Muslim you need to be all up in everyone's face about it. People do it for money and power, even out of sheer naivety." Dzenana, who joined MFS-Emmaus in 2009, represents a group of highly paid, educated Bosniaks who feel their own sincerity as believers and legitimacy as religious authorities slipping away in postwar Sarajevo. For them, BDS conveys a "privatized" understanding of Islam that essentially positions the group against the corrupt business-political elite that emerged out of the war, on the one hand, and the in-migrated displaced persons and "new" religious believers, on the other. These middle class Bosniaks

realize that their situation is better than that of most others living in the country. However, as Sorabji (2006) shows, they seem more focused on what they have lost during the war than what they currently have. Broken relationships, lost ambitions, over-association with the postwar business-political elite, and feelings of entrapment in a country that Jansen (2009) calls the European Unions' (EU) "immediate outside" are some of the lasting sorrows that shape the BDS participation of this particular group. 7

Elma (a pseudonym) joined MFS-Emmaus in 2011. She was raised in a family of architects and has travelled the world before returning to Kovaci in 1989 with her Croat husband. Today, Elma has a professional job in the public sector where her salary is well above the national average. Her husband is a software engineer. Their daughter, born at the tail end of the war, just started university in London. Elma lives a comfortable life in the house she grew up in. She tells me that with her education and connections she could have easily secured a job with the UN peacekeeping forces during the war. However, she opted to stay in the state sector and build a professional role and stake in postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina. She has this stake today but feels that the country she decided to stay in does not exist anymore. "This is not the country I remember or one I want my child to thrive in. 'Thriving' now means to get rich by cheating. My daughter is abroad, studying. I keep telling her that if she can stay in London, she shouldn't come back." Elma explains how simple it was during the war; "you knew precisely who was your friend, but today it is hard to trust anyone beyond my immediate circle. If ever a shell falls on Sarajevo again I'll be the first to leave." In the early days of the war staying was understood as the brave and patriotic choice. Two decades later, very few Bosniaks claimed that, "given the choice again, they would stay in besieged Sarajevo. Staying is seen as having been pointless" (Sorabji, 2006, p. 5).

During the war Sabina (a pseudonym) worked as a newly qualified medic in the General Hospital where she helped rehabilitate those injured during the war. She left the

146

hospital in 2013, following what she believes was a politically motivated firing of Dr. Bakir Nakas who was replaced by Dr. Sebija Izetbegovic, the wife of Bakir Izetbegovic – the leading man of Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action or SDA) and the Bosniak constituent of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. "My family was devastated by my decision. My parents were doctors, and I think it was always expected that I'd carry their legacy. It was hard to leave after all those years, especially given the current economic hardship, but I no longer felt valued," Sabina says. "Hard work didn't matter as much as your political ties. I didn't have friends in mainstream parties. I never even voted and suddenly that was all that mattered. I could not prosper and that was that." Sabina is now hoping to start a private practice. She is linked to prewar neighborhood communities that offer a degree of mutual support and have managed to built upon the remnants of prewar and wartime networks of *veze* (connections) that, now more than ever, are of crucial importance for gaining employment, receiving medical treatment, or registering a child at a good school. [8]

Before the war, Senad (a pseudonym) was a successful businessman and the owner of one of the small private businesses allowed in socialist Yugoslavia. "Business was good. I had enough money to buy a car and could afford to drive my family to the coast most summer weekends." When the war started Senad and his wife agreed that she should take their young son to Sweden. Senad did not go; he felt it was his duty to stay behind and defend the country. As we are drinking beer close to his house on Logavina, Senad tells me that he did not think the war would last so long and be so brutal. "Had I known then what type of life awaits me," he proclaims, "I would have been gone when the first grenade hit." In 2013, thanks to his vigor and inventiveness, Senad's business was alive and thriving. His marriage, however, was over. "The country has been overtaken by war profiteers and charlatans," he says. "I don't blame my ex for staying in Sweden. She made a good life for herself. Here, corruption is the norm. I do better than most, but there are a lot of things that make me think I should have left.

The biggest change is within religion. Observance became a pretense designed to 'bootlick' with the political and economic elite. I call these *novokomponovani* [new] Muslims 'melons' because they appear to be 'green' on the outside [the color of Islam], but they were 'red' [communist] on the inside before the war." Mirsad (a pseudonym), who was born in Bistrik, one of the oldest Sarajevo neighborhoods in 1963, agrees. "I am disappointed by the *licemjerstvo* [hypocrisy] of those *muljatori* [scammers] who now claim to be 'authentic' Muslims. Islam is not something you need to wear like a badge for everyone to notice." He goes on to say, "I was raised in a pious family. As far as I know, my ancestors settled in Sarajevo more than 400 years ago, right here in Bistrik. I am proud to be *mahalac* [a person raised in *mahala*]. Our house was never dirty; we were never heartless with the guests. Those were far more relevant signs of being a 'genuine' Muslim than fasting and praying."

Like many Bosniaks from the same social milieu, Mirsad, who joined MFS-Emmaus in 2010, defines himself through the idiom of "good, old family." Part of its significance lays in longevity, which implies that the family in question predated socialism. This bestowed certain prestige because longevity meant that socialism was restrained and contextualized within an older and deeper moral tradition that, from the Bosniak perspective, also "contained Islamic piety" (Sorabji, 2006, p. 4). During the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslims whose families had Party links frequently argued that socialism and Islam were built on the same principles. Such adjustment was obligatory given the openly oppressive regime. However, as Sorabji points out, this should not be dismissed as "an artificial concession to the authorities made through guilty self-delusion" (Sorabji, 1993, p. 34). Instead, by describing Islam as a moral system, Bosniaks of "the good, old family" were able to bring it closer to other traditions. 9

In addition to longevity, a family gained its status from urbanity. Contempt towards rural dwellers meant that those Sarajevans whose parents had moved to the city from villages

did not publicize this image-tarnishing fact. Disdain took on a more serious dimension in 1992 as those with historically established rights to the city began to speak of "a rural aggression" and blamed *seljaci* (peasants) for the violence. As the shelling of Sarajevo intensified, they held firm onto a belief that they were too refined for hostility and "would remain calm and reasonable in the face of it all" (Sorabji, 1993, p. 35). From a specifically Muslim position, this approach was in accordance with not only Islam of rationality and civility but also Europe – regarded as cosmopolitan, middle class, and controlled. As a result, the attacks on Sarajevo easily fitted within the metaphors of "barbarian peasants" attacking "civilized Europeans."

4.2.2 Sacralized Europe and Secularized Islam?

When used in a discourse that produces a complementary and coherent value system, "Europe" and "Islam" create an interesting symbolic setup that, as Sarajlic recognizes, becomes entangled with "the politics of identity, power, and political legitimacy" (Sarajlic, 2009, p. 53). This is emblematic of my experience in Stari Grad since those I observed participated, of course in different ways, in symbolic exchanges between concepts of "Europe" and "Islam." Supporters of MFS-Emmaus understand Europe as something to be attained and deserved. It is a standard to be reached in any given area and a representation of the ultimate good. It embodies freedom of expression and offers choice. BDS becomes a window to Europe or, at the very least, an assertion of democratic and cosmopolitan will of the Bosniak middle class. The idea of self-realization through consumer activism separates the middle class from the wealthy elite of cadres and administrators of global corporations and international speculators who became the postwar champions of the neoliberal project, on the one hand, and the truly deprived who joined ethnonationalist and identity-based

149

movements, on the other.

Sabina, who joined the BDS campaign in 2010, tells me, "I do not engage in leaflet distribution and similar nonsense. This is something that young people do. And it doesn't really do much. BDS of concrete consumer pressure not of marching and yelling yields results. You see how much consumers can do and think, 'Thank God,' someone finally got it right. Someone finally understood that consumption is a powerful way of expressing opinions. Actually, expressing solidarities!" Yasser concurs. Reflecting on his experience on board the *Mavi Marmara*, he explains that BDS calls for the engagement of a more tangible kind. He says, "To organize a convoy, for example, you need thousands of dollars. I'm all for protests and peace walks, but they cannot be the limits of Bosnian involvement. If you target the right people; they won't be."

In order for the Bosniak middle class to get involved, organizations like MFS-Emmaus presented BDS as genuinely European. Yasser refers to it as "a plea upon Europe that comes from Europe itself." It follows that Palestinian roots of a global BDS campaign – I am ignoring here the previous calls made by student groups in the US given their national character – are overlooked as a narrative that represents the boycott as a contemporary symbol of Bosniak belonging to Europe takes center stage. This narrative separates the urban middle class from a wide range of postwar "newcomers." Dzenana says, "I have nothing against *saljaci* who know their place – those who adjust to their surroundings and work to prove themselves in order to 'earn' their spot. I accept and welcome them. What irks me are uneducated packs [*copor*] that bully to get ahead. They came to the city thanks to their *babo* [father] and his cows, sheep, and other livestock, and are now trying to 'buy' their *gradjanstvo* [urbanity], when the reality is they'll never fit in." Similar anger was evident among all supporters of MFS-Emmaus that I have spoken to. Although very strong, it was still not nearly as intense as their criticism of religious believers who adopted a version of

150

Islam described as completely foreign to Bosnia.

Middle class Bosniaks, particularly those close to the prewar "good, old family" end of the spectrum, perceive this manifestation of Islam, sometimes dubbed "Wahhabi," as an attack on Bosniak national identity, shared beliefs, and practices as well as their own religious authenticity. For instance, Mirsad declares that "an Arab version of Islam" is ridiculously strange to him. He says, "*Vehabije* [Wahhabis] talk about some Islamic state of Bosnia, but it's all just for *furka* [attempting to be something that you are not]. They really have no clue and let themselves be swayed by all kinds of lunatics who came here during the war." Ejup (a pseudonym), who quit his job as a financial advisor at an international taxing agency to focus on lecturing full-time at a private university, goes even further. "Wahhabis are the same as *sminkeri* [individuals who flaunt their wealth through material possessions]. *Sminkeri* have cars and Wahhabis have long beards. As if having a beard makes you a Muslim." Those I interviewed were quick to dismiss Wahhabism as simply a fluke. Their eagerness to describe it as completely alien to Bosnia and Herzegovina, nonetheless, points to a widespread fear that its visibility threatens to undermine Bosniak insistence on European belonging. [10]

In a sense, not much has changed since before the war when one of Sorabji's informants told her, "It's modern to be Muslim" (Sorabji, 1994, p. 116). Attempts to reconcile Islam with "Western modernity" continue today within a socioeconomic context that facilitates them even more intensely. They reverberate through symbolic interactions between the ideas of old and new, moderate and radical, urban and rural as well as "West" (European) and "East" (Islamic). BDS is directly exposed to these relations. When it comes to supporters of MFS-Emmaus, the campaign sacralizes Europe and secularizes Islam. It is broadminded, it is European, and, above all, it encourages individual rather than collective expressions of Islam. Next I ask how these findings compare to BDS of Stand for Justice.

4.3 BDS as a Wake Up Call for Europe: Stand for Justice and the "Intergenerational Twist"

Nermina Karacic is the founder of Stand for Justice, a civilian network organization founded in 2012. Pretty blonde in her late twenties, a former employee of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and now a tourist guide, explains that the youth network was created rather spontaneously. "In November 2012, one *novokomponovani* 'believer,' who *do juce* [until yesterday] was stealing cassette players out of cars, told me that posting Rihanna videos on my Facebook wall on the day when a massacre occurred in Gaza made me a 'non-Muslim.' This got me thinking. First of all, I didn't have a clue that this massacre happened. There were no media reports about it. Secondly, had I known, I wouldn't have been posting songs online. I was irritated by his rash and prejudiced comment. He didn't even bother to ask me if I had heard about the situation in Gaza. And, on top of that, he allowed himself to judge whether I'm a sincere Muslim or not." Nermina tells me that after she looked up all available youtube videos of the massacre, she began to cry. "I remembered my childhood in Vratnik. Four years of horror and constant worry if my loving father would return home from the trenches. That isn't a way a child should live. I had worries that adults could hardly bear. I feel younger today than I felt back then when I was six." She goes on to say that children of Bosnia had to wait for years before the world finally reacted. "As I watched those videos, all my childhood traumas came back. I thought about who to call, what organization to contact. Then it hit me. Is there a more powerful force than the help of God? I prayed to God to make me a part of His plan for Palestine. That's how it all started."

Nermina first contacted five of her closest friends through Facebook. She informed them that she was planning to organize a mass protest in Sarajevo with a goal of educating the local population about what is happening in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. "Two friends

responded. One of them told me to open a group on Facebook and get people to comment and post. I wanted them to know about the massacre but also about the suffering of innocent children." Nermina called her group "Stand for Justice" because, as she explains, she needed to be on the "right side of things." She needed "the voice of children from the previously occupied Sarajevo to resonate worldwide" and show that injustices will not be tolerated. The protest was scheduled for November 19. "I suggested we first gather at *Trg Djece* [Children's Square] because children were the focus of my campaign. When I was a child I was unable to help my country though I wanted to. Now I have the capacity to help children in need and, therefore, relieve my consciousness. This makes me happy."

Muhammad al-Saidi, a thirty-one-year-old exile from Palestine, who runs a tourist agency in Ilidza, was one of the first people to get behind Nermina's initiative. Drinking coffee in the cafeteria of Sarajevo School of Science and Technology (SSST), he tells me that things were "prepared" for him. "It's not like I had to do anything," he says. "The context was ripe for activism. People no longer wanted to be silent. The campaign started off as an individual thing, but it quickly grew into a network of people willing to act. I started posting on the Stand for Justice page. I did not need to plea with people or phone people up begging them to join the protest. They did not need any instructions either. They were ready." Nermina notes that as the number of supporters rose to 2,000, her initial enthusiasm was replaced with worry. "I was told that I needed to obtain a permission from the police to hold the protest. It was only two days away, and I was paralyzed by anxiety. I kept telling myself that maybe no one would show up. I turned to God for guidance and serenity. When I finally calmed down I contacted Dzemila (a pseudonym) who organized protests before, and she recommended pushing the event for next week in order to avoid any troubles with the police. 'Too late,' I told her. '2,000 people are now saying they want to join and they are coming from all over the country.'"

Nermina describes how Dzemila was stunned at first. "She warned me that people burn flags and cause commotion at these kinds of rallies, and it would be my fault because I organized the whole thing. She advised me to start writing a formal request to the police and make a list of twenty *redars* [supervisors] who would be in charge of making sure the protest is orderly." Nermina tells me that she franticly started reaching out to people on Facebook. "I saw that Mr. 'believer' was online. The same guy who told me I wasn't a 'good' Muslim. I asked if he'd be willing to help. I needed his national identification number and signature, but he started to feed me some story about how he works for the government and how he doesn't want to risk being called out at work for being involved in the protest. He sounded so pathetic, so I cut him short and began calling friends." However, Nermina was met by a similar reservation within her more immediate circle. "Everyone had an excuse for why they couldn't help. They were all 'busy.' I realized that I have no 'real' friends *kad zagusti* [when times are hard]. The only thing to rely on was Allah and my two hands."

Compared to MFS-Emmaus supporters who use BDS to put forth a more "privatized" form of Islam that stands in opposition to a version of Islam widely associated with some of the Arabs who participated in the war, Nermina embodies a new generation of activists who reject such "privatization" of faith and openly oppose the integration of Islam into pre-established normative frameworks. This tendency is reinforced by high degrees of social influence and competence amongst the groups as demonstrated by their transnational networking, intellectual avatars, political tools, and media knowledge. In order to motivate political participation in the name of Islam, these young activists need to be able to cope with legal procedures, local political actors, and public authorities. When her attempt to get her closest friends involved in the protest failed, Nermina reached out to various embassies and local politicians. "When the topic of Palestine was brought up," she says, "they were reluctant to get involved. There exists such a passive stance within the government that is produced by

154

conflicting loyalties of the ruling political elite. What happens in the end is a virtual standstill on the political front." In response to this status-quo, Nermina declares, "*Revoltirana sam* [I'm frustrated] that *gradska raja* [urban crowds] seem to be 'hiding' in the corners somewhere like *misevi* [mice]. Meanwhile, our lives are dictated by *cobani* [hillbillies] who are unwilling and unable to see past their own agendas."

In her frustration, Nermina started approaching people in the streets of Sarajevo, looking for anyone willing to get involved. "I asked strangers for help. I was amazed by how many reacted positively. In less than thirty minutes I had a list of supervisors." Nermina then went to the police station ready to plead her case. "The chief welcomed me but explained that he cannot bend rules. I felt so defeated, but I was not going to give up. I told him that I grew up during the war and felt so insignificant to the world. I told him that I believe that this was also how the Palestinian children feel. The chief told me that, while this is not a common practice, he will honor my request under one condition – I needed to change the date to November 20."

Soon thereafter, the media started calling. TV Sarajevo, Al Jazeera, BHT, Network Plus, and OBN were just some of the outlets eager to speak to Nermina. "I contacted Muhammad, a friend of a friend, and asked whether he'd be willing to talk to cameras and explain what is happening in Gaza and why it is important for us in Bosnia to get involved." Muhammad tells me that he wanted the protest to show that "Bosnia was joining Britain, Germany, the US, and so forth in a global struggle against Israel's apartheid policies. BDS is about educating people and raising awareness. It is not only about buying some products and rejecting others. I think that people in Bosnia appreciated the fact that someone finally took initiative and stepped up after what seemed like a lifetime of complete silence." From this perspective, the BDS campaign is justified in part by the fact that the government had done very little.

155

Seated in a coffeehouse on Sarajevo's Ferhadija Street, I meet Muamera (a pseudonym). At the time of our interview she was finishing Social Work studies at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo. Muamera notes, "Our politicians have let us down. They are too occupied with fueling ethnic tensions and prolonging the status quo that serves their political and financial interests. Milorad Dodik [the President of the Republic of Srpska] is a stubborn brat, and leaders from the Federation are cowards who do whatever America tells them. This is why nothing has been done to help our brothers and sisters in Gaza and the West Bank." [11] Muamera also believes that there is very little funding for NGOs that are pro-Palestinian. "Funds usually come from the Western world, and we know how they feel about Palestine. Organizations funded by the US are reluctant to take a stand against what is happening because they reflect the views of their donors. Maybe if your money comes from Turks or Arabs? But, and I don't mean to sound prejudiced, their agenda is kind of wrong. It popularizes the view that, on the one hand, all Palestinians are Muslims and, on the other, that religion is the main reason for fighting." Strategies, mobilization, and framing of BDS are closely linked to these local relational structures and available resources.

4.3.1 Faith-Based Mobilization: BDS as a Part of the New Political Landscape

Young followers of Stand for Justice depict BDS as not only a global campaign but also a local mode of resistance. Muhammad states, "Neither Bosnians nor Palestinians got their liberation. Both are under the occupation and control from the outside. There exists the same lingering desire to have a country that feels like home. Even after all the fighting, they haven't achieved that. Bosnians feel like they cannot go to their political leaders, but they can express their frustration through BDS. It's a sign for the government that says, 'We don't accept this treatment of Palestine and we do not accept it for ourselves.' So, they are making a comment

156

about their local situation." He goes on to say, "I moved to Bosnia in 2009. My kids will grow up here. BDS is my way of ensuring that I do my best for this country and my kids. I have to do everything I can for Bosnia because this is the place my children call home. Who is to say that if we give up now, the same bloodshot that occurred in the 1990s won't occur again?" Muhammad states that sadly very few locals have a similar mindset. "Those who got involved in the campaign were already working on a number of local issue before Stand for Justice was even created. They worked separately and fought for justice on their own, but they also wanted their efforts to be larger, to be more prominent, to gain momentum." Muhammad concludes that participation in the BDS campaign offers precisely that. "Networks, larger audience, and more room to develop and expand." In this light, the campaign makes it possible for formerly separated and strictly local actors to get together under the boycotting umbrella with a sense of community and power (see *Figure 8* and *Figure 9*).

Nermina conveyed a similar message in her interview with TV Sarajevo on November 21, 2012. "I don't remember all the questions but one was about whether this network can grow. I said, 'Absolutely!' Bloodshot in Gaza has to end. That's our primary objective. But Stand for Justice is also saying enough is enough to our local political elite. There is a lot we can do for this country, especially when in comes to taking a more serious stand against corruption that exists on all levels of power. We speak against ethnonational clans that have been destroying Bosnia for decades." She goes on to say, "I think it's important to reach out to other youth organizations in Europe. I think we are connected by the experience of disappointment in our political leaders who are incapable or unwilling to act in the best interest of their people. Rather than remaining silent like our parents, we joined a global movement that is openly confrontational. BDS is about making a change for the better. It starts with Gaza but it also impacts our lives here. That's what the campaign is all about."

157

Figure 8 "Protests for Gaza 1," November 2012, photos taken by Branimir Prijak – personal collection,

http://www.branaprejak.co.ba

158

Figure 9 "Protests for Gaza 2," November 2012, photos taken by Branimir Prijak – personal collection,

http://www.branaprejak.co.ba

159

Social networks were essential in carrying a message of BDS that, Muhammad believes, resonated with the youth. He says, "I think that the international community has generally preferred to keep its eyes closed when it comes to endemic mistreatments of Muslims worldwide. No local leader came along and said, 'This is how we will make sure that these persecutions end.' The tight leash of the international community and the obstruction from Croat and Serb leaders make this difficult, I know. In this context, young Muslim voices appeared that are not so constrained, and these voices came from the BDS network." Dino (a pseudonym), who was born in a family of doctors in Kovaci and currently studies Management at the Faculty of Economics, University of Sarajevo, says, "To be perfectly honest, we mistrust our leaders. Even when you look at BDS this is the case. Most of those leading the campaign are not locals." Muhammad recounts how worried he was the first time Nermina spoke to him about the protest. "How could I take such a big role? How could I lead the protest in a country that is not my own? I'm a foreigner," he proclaims. "What I found out is that people trusted me. I speak honestly and from the heart. I speak on the basis of my personal convictions that have not been spoiled by greed." According to Muhammad, his Islamic faith is key in this regard.

Muhammad believes that acting in accordance with well-known teachings of Islam is the most effective way to gain local trust. He explains that Islam is a higher force that both restrains and provides concrete guidance in life. It also lets Muslims know that everything they do in this life will be reflected upon in the life that follows. Subsequently, as Muhammad tells me, "the main purpose in this life is to do good, and if you do not live in accordance with this simple principle, you are much less likely to join campaigns like BDS." His thank-you note posted on the Stand for Justice page following the protest in Sarajevo is particularly telling in this regard. It states that while initially surprised by large numbers of people who

160

joined, Muhammad is thankful to Allah for "enlightening his brothers and sisters" and "prays Allah protects all people of humanity and justice" (Stand for Justice, 2012).

During our interview, Muhammad tells me that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict forces Bosnian Muslims to sober up to realities of what awaits them in the future unless they change their ways. "What are the values of our society?" he asks me. "Accumulation of wealth, perhaps? People spend more money on houses and cars than they spend on those who are struggling for their existence. Houses are getting bigger, while families are getting smaller." For Muhammad, Islam provides the only solution to this moral crisis that left Bosnian Muslims in a complete spiritual vacuum. He also views it as the only insurance that no wars will be fought again and no innocent lives will be lost. This is because, as Muhammad explains, Islam brings true inner peace found by submitting to God Almighty, living this life for Him, and remembering Him. "When you find this peace within yourself, you can reach out and bring peace to others. Is there a place in the world that needs peace more than Palestine?" From this perspective, BDS represents an authentic call upon Europe that originates from Europe itself, as was previously argued by Yasser. However, it comes from young Muslims who see Europe as fundamentally flawed.

4.3.2 Islam of Shared Culture vs. Islam as Individual Faith

For supporters of Stand for Justice, BDS is a highly intellectualized and localized campaign driven by their enduring thoughts on implications of what it means to be a Muslim in contemporary Europe. The campaign is seen as a vocal and open commitment to Islam that is meant to inspire Europe's return to its better self. Muhammad says that faith is a value forgotten by most Europeans. "It is time for them to return to God. Islam is so powerful and

you can see it by how public it has become. Churches are empty, while young Muslims flock to mosques and pray in the streets of London and Berlin."

Mirza (a pseudonym), a twenty-two-year-old student of Management at the Faculty of Economics, University of Sarajevo, states that although he agrees with elderly Bosniaks that faith is, first and foremost, an intimate feeling, this feeling cannot remain lively unless it is embedded in everyday lives and culture. "I always say that Europe is my home, but Islam is my spiritual guide." Azra (a pseudonym), a twenty-year-old student of Sociology at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, similarly states that, "Bosniaks are Europeans by origin, by language, and by numerous elements of our culture." She goes on to say that, "politicians will have us believe that all forms of 'Islamic' participation hinder Bosnia and Herzegovina politically. To openly side with the Palestinian people allegedly drives the country further away from its European aspirations." However, as Azra notes, "BDS does not 'radicalize' Muslims." If anything, she explains, "it makes them the best possible Europeans they can be" since the campaign is founded upon values that Azra describes as characteristically European, e.g., pursuit of justice, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. She goes on to say that somebody should reveal Dodik's ties to Israel. "Then, these idiots from the Federation should officially recognize Palestine. For this to happen Bosniaks need to stop being ignorant and realize that our interests are not Wahhabi interests. Arab missionaries and their local followers insist on a 'fruitless' religious formalism, but this is not what Islam in Bosnia is all about."

In his article "Nase bosnjastvo i nase evropejstvo" (Our Bosniak Identity and Our European Identity), Enes Karic, a professor of Qur'anic Studies at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, writes that the Islam of Bosniaks is under attack from all sides but first of all from "neophyte and aggressive local Muslims working for [Islamic] humanitarians with dubious intentions" (Karic, 1998, pp. 20-22, cited in Bougarel, 2007, p.

162

108). They, the author suggests, assault Islam exactly where it contributes the most to "the affirmation of Bosniak national identity and spiritual matrix" (ibid). Muamera echoes these thoughts and further suggests that Bosniaks are dealing with a skewed, problematic perception of culture. "Everything that happened during and after the war caused a primitive expression of our collective identity that has nothing to do with an Islamic understanding of life. Wahhabis are interpreting Islam completely wrong. They are a poor representation of our community. We should not and must not be identified with them. To be honest, I am scared. It only takes going to the King Fahd Mosque during *juma'ah* [Friday prayer] to be terrified."

This new wave of religious believers appeared as a shared counterpoint for local organizations that otherwise have very little in common. In contrast to Eurocentric supporters of MFS-Emmaus who react by emphasizing a distinctively "privatized" form of Islam, young supporters of Stand for Justice encourage a more collective expression of Islam through active and typically anti-state participation in campaigns like BDS. Symbolic relationships between "East" and "West" remain quite powerful; however, new radicalized boundaries are drawn between the two in order to respond to continues deliberation of the younger generation regarding their role as Muslims in Europe.

4.4 BDS as an Anti-European Response: Mladi Muslimani and "Good" vs. "Worse" Bosniaks

The Mladi Muslimani movements was founded in Sarajevo in 1939, in a reaction to the creation of the Croatian *banovina* (autonomous province), which would have split the Muslim community and worsened the general predicament of Muslims in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Friedman, 1996; Magnusson, 1999; Kostic, 2007). Its political program, concisely defined as "the practical achievement of Islam" (Mladi Muslimani, 2002), mimicked similar pan-Islamic

movements in the world, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood.

Anes Dzunuzovic became the secretary of Mladi Muslimani in 2009. Four years later, he welcomed me in his office in Morica Han. Over coffee Anes opened up about his past, his ideals, his commitment to the organization, and its role in the global BDS campaign. Anes was born in 1972 in Nova Varos, Sandzak. He studied at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Montenegro. After graduation, he worked as a journalist, actively contributing to *Ljiljan* and, more infrequently, *Saff*. He currently edits and presents a weekly program broadcasted by the Muslim Television Igman (MTV Igman). [12] Anes joined Mladi Muslimani in 1999, when he moved to Sarajevo. He explains that the move was not voluntary. Rather, it was motivated by pressure he was subjected to as a political activist in Varos. Anes recounts that although he initially perceived the signing of Dayton as a window into political freedom – he even ran for the local council as the SDA representative – in 1996, threatening phone calls and police harassment became staples of his everyday experience.

According to Anes this harassment, caused by his political engagement and journalist exposes of numerous cases of Muslim discrimination, culminated in 1999, following the NATO bombing of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Anes says, "Serbian nationalism experienced a novel boost, which is understandable. This boost sadly manifested in increased persecution of people who were members of the opposition, like myself. I was eager to make a difference for Muslims in Varos. Part of it had to do with my own youthful bravery. I was alone with no support behind me. In a way, there was no *hajra* [significance] in what I was doing. At the same time, it cost my family quite a bit." Anes explains that his father died relatively young from a heart attack. "He never voiced disapproval or tried to stop me, but I know he was worried. He experienced a great dose of difficulty at his workplace because of me. My brother could not find employment. We lived in a small community, so everyone knew what I was up to and their disapproval manifested in bigotry towards my

164

family." What finally caused Anes to move to Sarajevo was an encounter with a former thesis supervisor. "I was running late for a class. On my way up the stairs I met this professor. I'll mention his name, but I'm asking you not to use it. He is a very intelligent, educated man, a professor of theology and philosophy. However, he is also a huge nationalist, and when we met at the stairs he wouldn't speak to me. He just had this look in his eyes that said, 'What are you even doing here?' That was my breaking point. I moved to Sarajevo, hoping to start a new life for myself."

Like Yasser, Anes carried with him all of the bitterness and resentment he felt at home when he arrived to the city. "I knew Mladi Muslimani had a similar experience to mine. Some of our founding remembers spent years in prison simply because they defied the government by declaring themselves as Muslims and refusing to 'revise' their position. They worked in the best interest of this country without ever endangering others. They only endangered themselves. I did the same thing." Anes says, "I knew about the hardship and the struggle, the pressure in 1946, and the arrests in 1949. All of this resonated with me. I too felt victimized because of my convictions."

Anes tells me that he "returned" to Islam in 1994. "I say 'returned' because I want to describe how I discovered Islam for myself. It was during the early 1990s that I read a book *Muhammad Aleyhisselam* given to me by a family friend. Osman Nuri Hadzic wrote it in the 1930s. A whole new world of knowledge opened up, and I wanted to know more. I asked my friend to give me more books and he gave me Mustafa Mahmud's *Understanding the Qur'an: A Contemporary Approach*." Anes states that the book propelled him to think more critically about God and presented him with a novel understanding of Islam in the modern age. "It took me some time after reading that book to mature in a sense of understanding what existence of Allah meant for me and what kind of relationship we have. Initially I was satisfied with just knowing that God exists without following any rituals or observing Islam. That was all a part

165

of my maturing process and my gradual move towards where I am now. I 'returned' Islam, so to say, little by little mostly by reading."

By 1998, Anes started observing through *namaz* [prayer] and *post* [fasting]. "It was this 'visible' commitment to Islam that awakened an even greater political side of me," he declares. "I realized what the 'righteous' path was. It was my duty to do more for the Muslims across the world. I felt like I needed to mimic the type of activism of Busuladzic, Biber, Izetbegovic, Behmen brothers, and others who led the Mladi Muslimani movement during the 1940s. Back then Muslims faced imprisonment, even death, for being for they are. Today, we still face obstacles, but nothing excuses political introversion that Bosniaks have succumbed to."

When Anes joined Mladi Muslimani in 1999, he volunteered, organized conferences, and distributed leaflets. "I wanted to belong, which I never did in Varos. I tried to get involved as much as possible and surround myself with likeminded people." He notes, "It was hard. My involvement was very demanding, and I still needed to make money on the side. I had many jobs and was basically trying to make ends meet." In 2001, Anes started writing for *Ljiljan*. He tells me that he was exposed to Mladi Muslimani even more intensely through his journalism. "I wrote about the organization all the time. I followed every event and participated in every meeting. Eight difficult years later, the head of the association offered me a secretary position. It paid well, and I was thrilled to be a part of the association that I believed has done a lot for Bosnia and Herzegovina. So my motivation was not strictly financial. I also truly admire everything that Mladi Muslimani stand for."

Anes tells me that one of his first official tasks was related to Palestine. "I worked on 'Quds Day,' an annual event that began in Iran in 1979. It is commemorated on the last Friday of Ramadan. The event expresses solidarity with the Palestinian people and opposes Zionism. In London, it generates media attention and takes a form of peaceful protests. In Sarajevo, our

approach is more 'academic,' so to say." Anes explains, "We show a documentary on Palestine or invite an expert to speak on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or we promote a book about it. It is not a big event, but our goal is to send out a message and say that Bosnian Muslims are not willing to accept what is happening in Gaza. What we do is symbolic. But we do it regardless because history needs to record that we were on the 'right' side." Back in 1941, Mladi Muslimani signed a petition demanding that the Independent State of Croatia stops slaughtering Jews, and the Roma. At the time when Europe was overtaken by fascism, the organization took action. According to Anes, this historical legacy of Mladi Muslimani needs to continue today. "We want our descendants to be proud of how we acted in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the same way we feel proud of what our ancestors did for others in 1941. That's the essence of BDS."

4.4.1 Islam as a Prejudiced Ideology: the Relationship between Europe and Islam in terms of Structural Opposition

Current supporters of Mladi Muslimani show fairly low profiles that greatly diverge from the organization's image in the past as the hub of the Bosnian Muslim elite. During the World War II, Mladi Muslimani advocated the notion of autonomous Bosnia and Herzegovina under German patronage. Banned by communist leaders, the organization worked in secret with the goal of establishing "a common state for all Muslims in the Balkans, similar to Pakistan on the Indian sub-continent" (Bougarel, 1999). In 1949, a wave of arrests shattered the organization. Those who were not arrested had to cease all political activity or escape abroad. The organization was only informally reestablished in the 1970s. Bougarel (1999) shows that against the backdrop of general political liberalization and national affirmation of Bosnian Muslims, remaining members sought to breathe new life into the organization by reaching out

to students at the city's *medresas* (religious schools). As a result, Mladi Muslimani encompassed two different generations. The leading figure of the regenerated movement was Izetbegovic. In 1983, he was accused of Islamic fundamentalism and sentenced to a prison term. Paradoxically, the persecution of Izetbegovic and 12 other members of the organization established them as martyrs in the public eye. This enabled them to overcome their marginal role in the society and, seven years after their arrests, play a key role in the founding of the SDA. The party's base initially included urban intellectuals, former Communist Party networks, and more secular-minded Muslims. At the onset of war, however, the SDA began to convey more conservative expressions of identity built around Islam. Helms (2008) shows that while the balance between secular and religious nationalists has been gradually redistributed through new political parties and institutions, debates over the place of Islam continue today.

In her study of four groups of young practicing Muslims in postwar Sarajevo, Foschetti (2010) argues that the former character of Mladi Muslimani persists today through members who are more social than political. This implies that they take part in various activities of a social nature, e.g., Qurban Bayrami for the poorer households. The author further suggests that a lack of political potency is caused by the organization's inability to attract younger Muslims. I disagree and put forth instead that the younger generation is not the intended target of Mladi Muslimani. During our interview, Anes frequently mentioned that he does not expect a lot from students. "In terms of concrete actions, there is not a lot that students can do," he said. "They should get involved through conferences and leaflet distribution, like I did initially, but this is all a part of their maturing process towards something bigger."

Anes further argued that it makes more sense to focus on those he described as "already situated." He explained, "I'm speaking about Bosniaks who are willing but also able to do more. I guess you could say the middle class. The problem is that most Bosniaks and

especially middle class ones are politically and socially passive. If I ask them about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they all say that they support the Palestinian people. But if I call them to join BDS, they won't follow through." To illustrate his point, Anes told me that Mladi Muslimani have been printing BDS leaflets every year since 2006. They hand them out to people who seem genuinely enthusiastic and willing to get involved. However, as Anes declared, not many do. He contrasted the example of Bosniaks to the example of Muslims in Britain who, according to Anes, "spend an extra hour in the supermarket going though products on offer in order to make educated choices. Bosniaks, however, prefer to spend that hour in front of the TV."

Nedzad (a pseudonym), who joined Mladi Muslimani in 2001, tells me that the problem lies in the fact that Bosniaks have been *uskraceni* (deprived) of "real" Islam for too long. "Most Bosniaks live with no guidance in their life. Nothing impels them to do better. They don't know anything about Islam but have become its biggest critics. They speak against Mladi Muslimani; they do not fast or pray; however, they claim religious authority. I cannot understand this kind of arrogance." Nedzad was born in Kiseljak, a small town located northwest of Sarajevo, in 1965. His family moved to Sarajevo in 1971. He grew up in Bistrik and never felt like venturing far from it. "I even studied at the School of Tourism and Hospitality Management because it was close. I'm a cook by profession, but I only worked in that field for a year. I am a salesman really." Nedzad explains, "I come from a merchant family. We owned shops in Bascarsija before communists nationalized our business. My father started working as a carpenter and money was always short. I needed to take care of myself. I started selling souvenirs in the 1980s during the Olympics. It was not a classy job, but I was making money. I have my own store now and I get by just fine." Seated in his shop in Bascarsija, Nedzad opens up about his distaste for MFS-Emmaus and Stand for Justice.

Firstly, Nedzad states that to relegate Islam to individual faith is "an attempt to 'make

169

good' with Europe." He says, "I don't understand those who cling onto Europe knowing that we are not welcome as Muslims. We become aware of this during the 1990s." Resentment towards Europe and its mismanagement of the war typically appears where the nation emptied religion of its original content. "Islamization" of Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s was, from this perspective, "nationalization" of Islam under a particularly Bosnian cap (Sarajlic, 2010; Foschetti, 2010). 13 Those who developed a clear sense of national identity began to articulate anti-European feelings. For instance, Adnan Jahic, a supervisory board member of Mladi Muslimani who Anes describes as "family," believes that the war was "the final confrontation between the autochthonous national and cultural values of the Bosniaks and the alien ones, imported from the Western world, which have been imposed on us [and presented] as our own for a long time" (Jahic, 1995, pp. 52-3, cited in Bougarel, 2007, p. 112). He argues that Bosniaks "belong […] in terms of geography and, partly, in terms of civilization," but in no way do they belong culturally and spiritually (ibid).

Secondly, Nedzad criticizes those who "minimize the importance of Islam in everyday life by reducing it to cultural domains." He says, "Those who adopt some of its principles but abandon others – those who fast during Ramadan but drink once its over – should be aware of their inconsistency and hypocrisy. If some of its elements are not implemented; Islam cannot exist." Similarly, Jahic writes, "We want Islam to be our moral, cultural, and intellectual impetus, as we do not consider that it could be the Western culture and civilization, whose goals we know as well as those of their local supporters. This is the reason why it is important to understand that Islam is a collective issue and not an individual one, an issue requiring the largest possible consensus, and not any subjective free will" (Jahic, 1995, pp. 390-1, cited in Bougarel, 2007, p. 115). For this reason, BDS emerges as possibly problematic. It allows those who Nedzad describes as "false" Muslims to assert their religious legitimacy. By comparison, Nedzad sees the campaign as only a part of his Muslim identity.

170

This kind of monolithism is viewed by members of Mladi Muslimani as a symbol of consistency in *niyyah* (intention in Islam). For instance, Mirhuniza (a pseudonym), a forty-year-old stay-at-home mom, who moved to Logavina from Foca, a town on the Drina River, notes, "Bosniaks are well aware of 'good' and 'bad' as described in the Qur'an. We spend our whole lives implementing that awareness through mosques, *namaz*, and *post*. There is no room for interpretation there. We are also in charge of inviting others to see the truth and live by the morality of the Qur'an." She goes on to say, "Allah has given the following command to the faithful in *Surah Al'Imran*, 'Let there be a community among you who call to the good, and enjoin the right, and forbid the wrong. They are the ones who have success.' Islam commands us to protect the needy and do good to others. BDS is one expression of this command."

4.4.2 Remembering as Project: Remembering Gaza – Remembering Bosnia?

Writing about the war, Mahmutcehajic argues that for Europe Bosnia and Herzegovina was "the lawless Balkans they pretend not to understand" (Mahmutcehajic, 2003, p. 41). In contrast to cities in Croatia where shelling could be interpreted as an attack on "one of the symbols of ancient Europe" (Povrzanovic Frykman, 2002, p. 76), Bosnia was a part of Europe as much as it was a part of "Eastern" and "foreign" Ottoman hinterland. When Europe finally stepped up as a mediator and observer of self-contained ethnic identities, it did little to address the "us" and "them" enigma. It took on a participant role in the ethnic dynamics of the region and engaged in endless peace talks and negotiations. This had a profound effect on the content of ethnic identities, as Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats sought to assert themselves in reference to Europe. Helms argues that both Serbs and Croats adopted a rather "Huntingtonesque" explanation of the war as a clash between European and Islamic

civilizations and portrayed themselves as superior defenders of Europeanness, while casting their "Southern and Eastern neighbors as part of the inferior, Oriental 'East'" (Helms, 2008, pp. 91-2).

In light of such "Europhilia," the apparent "acceptance or rejection of competing claims to European identity mattered greatly" (Sorabji, 1993, p. 35). De facto partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosniak enclosure into a small central area of it led to believe that the Bosniak bid has been rejected. In contrast to supporters of MFS-Emmaus who view BDS as a present-day reaffirmation of their European belonging and young supporters of Stand for Justice who depict it as a form of more actively engaged Islam compatible with Europe, supporters of Mladi Muslimani reject the idea of Europe's ontological relevance. Mirhuniza asserts, "I don't want my country to be a part of the EU. What's so great about that? Europe has turned its back on us. My brother died defending this country while Europe just stood on the sidelines. Now sympathizers of my country's EU future are telling me that this Europe is our friend. I have more in common with Arab countries that helped us during the war, but it is problematic to speak about these things openly because you're automatically branded as a religious fanatic."

Fatmir Alispahic is a forty-seven-year-old author and columnist from Tuzla, most famous for his editorials in *Saff*. Following a lengthy email correspondence, he invited me to the "Let us remember Gaza" panel on December 28, 2010. The panel organized by Mladi Muslimani and moderated by Anes commemorated the second year anniversary of a twenty-two-daylong attack on Gaza that left more than 1,000 Palestinians dead. The panel took place in the Bosnian Cultural Centre. The venue, which seats around 200, was packed. In the crowd, I noticed mostly elderly men and few elderly women dressed in current styles of *hijab* (veil) (see *Figure 10*).

172

Figure 10 "Let us remember Gaza" forum, December 2010, photos taken by the author – personal collection

173

The panel discussed the importance of remembering events that took place on December 27, 2008. Mirnes Kovac and Muhammad Velic, columnists of *Preporod*, a bimonthly magazine published by the Islamic Community, spoke about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the role of Islam in a wider mobilization in solidarity with the Palestinian people. Fatmir summed up by drawing parallels between Israel and the Republic of Srpska, on the one hand, and Bosnia and Palestine, on the other. "Israel and the Republic of Srpska have the same geneses," Fatmir proclaimed. "Both were created on the back of genocidal crusades that were, in different ways, sponsored by the international community." With regard to links between Bosnia and Palestine, Fatmir noted that Bosniaks have been forcefully moved around since 1878. Today, he suggested, their numbers in diaspora are larger than their numbers in the country. According to Fatmir, the same can be said for the Palestinian people. "Jews established their country by kicking out a group that was legitimately living there." He went on to say, **"**Brutality of the war and torment that Bosniaks experienced can be compared to what Palestinians experience for decades. Their suffering is even greater because it's been ignored for such a long time. The accomplice nature of the international community is, therefore, even greater."

Following the panel, I spoke to Emir (a pseudonym), a forty-year-old taxi driver from Foca, who now lives in Vratnik. Emir, who became a member of Mladi Muslimani in 1998, tells me that people got so used to hearing about crimes in Gaza that they are willing to accept them as normal. As we are chatting outside of the Bosnian Cultural Center, he says that Dodik wants to mimic the "Israeli model" and prolong the status quo in Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Already now you can tell that the Republic of Srpska is behaving like an independent state. They have their representing offices throughout the world. With the help of Russia, Dodik keeps Bosnia 'frozen' and hopes this will eventually lead towards the autonomous Republic of Srpska." Durmo (a pseudonym), a forty-nine-year-old carpenter who lives in Bistrik,

174

chimes in, "The international community is truly showing where their alliances lie once again. They already made this clear during the war when they instigated the weapons embargo and made it difficult for us to defend ourselves. I lost my brother during the war. We both fought for the Bosnian army and had to use self-made weapons against Serbian tanks and rocket launchers." During my interview with Anes a similar view was apparent. "At the onset of war," he noted, "Bosnian army was virtually non-existent. It had to organize from scratch against the Yugoslav forces that were the second largest in Europe. The international community refused to help. This was a betrayal that can be compared to what has been happening to the Palestinian people for decades. I see boys and men throwing rocks at fully armed Israeli soldiers. The way the international community acted during the 1990s in Bosnia is how they act in Palestine for year. They just keep their eyes shut."

Aida (a pseudonym), a thirty-year-old stay-at-home mom, who joined Mladi Muslimani in 2007, tells me that 100,000 people were killed during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and today, decades since the massacre of 8,000 Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica, "the aggression is far from over." Sitting in a coffeehouse on Logavina Street where Aida's family sought shelter during the war, she explains that the aggression continues via other means of control and oppression. "Following the September 11 attacks, the international community tightened its leash on Bosnian Muslims. There's great hypocrisy in the way foreign officials act. They give a lot of leeway to the Republic of Srpska on their path towards autonomy. My fear is that the international community is making a sort of ghetto in Bosnia that already exists in Palestine. We can already see traces of this in all those travel bans that they keep threatening us with. These bans are meant to keep us away from Europe. Like queuing for visa." According to Aida, this experience of being targeted as Muslims can actually have a counter effect because it leads to the emergence of radical Muslims who are

175

"supported by transnational networks and foreign money." Otherwise, it results in general unwillingness within the Bosniak community to get actively involved in criticism of Europe.

Fatmir expressed a similar opinion when we talked a few days after the panel. "Bosniaks are 'arrested' people," he noted. "They are incapable of making connections to the Islamic world since they reject Islam and flee from their true identity. Personally, I would love for BDS to unite the Bosniak community under a common banner. But we are not united and we never will be. Most Bosniaks feel pushed into a corner by the international community and believe that there is no way out other than to accept the imposed project of 'self-hatred.' They have turned into the biggest Islamophobes who blame Islam for their current situation." This rejection of Islam is seen as a threat to the very core of religious Bosniak nationalists who cultivate their moral legitimacy through narratives of victimhood at the hands of atheist Europe.

Furthermore, during our meeting Anes suggested that the international community has compelled Bosniaks to deny their victim. "I was writing about the genocide in Srebrenica and spoke to mothers who witnessed their 15-year-old sons snatched away by the Serb forces. There is no greater loss than that; however, they remain mum about the perpetrators. They let criminals walk around freely, that's how sure they are that nothing will be done if they spoke up. Their loss is forgotten and negated. The Hague has done nothing to change this situation." At the same time, Anes criticizes thousands of Bosniaks who, for instance, know more about the September 11 attacks than they know about Srebrenica. "There is no vigor amongst Bosniaks to put Srebrenica on the front pages; to make it relevant in public discourse. Those who try are typically accused of being against the multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina." Anes asks how against the backdrop of such personal negation can Bosniaks be made to honor victims of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Islam seems to be the solution; however, in contrast to faith-based activism of Stand for Justice that seeks to return Europe to its forgotten self,

176

members of Mladi Muslimani portray BDS as a collective commentary on the lack of Bosniak political engagement instigated by Europe itself.

4.5 BDS as a Return to the Islam of the Salaf: IslamBosna and Nezim Halilovic

Against the backdrop of postwar worries and changes, both religious and secular Bosniaks sought to position themselves against small but visible communities of what the public calls Wahhabis, though they themselves reject this label and are more correctly referred to as neo-Salafis. The origins of the movement trace back to the early and mid-1990s, when simply and persuasively formulated epistemological promise of being the only guardians of correct Qur'anico-Sunnahic teachings gave major credibility to male fighters from the Middle East and South Asia who came to Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war.

Estimated to range from 600 to 700, *mujahideen* (foreign fighters) comprised a number of loose and independent fighting units – the best organized being the El-Mujahid unit that consisted of approximately 200 Arabs and 500 Bosniaks (Karup, 1998; Karcic, 2010). In May 1995, the Bosnian Army Centre for Analytics and Security compiled and delivered a report to the Bosnian military and political leadership regarding El-Mujahid activities for 1994 and 1995. The analysis stated, "The El-Mujahid commanders and soldiers are showing less interest in combat but instead increased their activity in persuading Bosnian Muslims in central Bosnia to practice radical Islam" (The Bosnian Army Centre for Analytics and Security, 1995, cited in Alic and Kaletovic, 2008). Eager to "reislamize" their co-fighters who had supposedly adopted "un-Islamic" trends or were simply seen as "bad" Muslims, *mujahideen* proposed a new approach to Islam that followed in the footsteps of the righteous predecessors. From this perspective, Islam manifests itself in a belief that the historical legacy of the Prophet's embodiment of the Qur'an, as assumed by the most distinguished authorities

belonging to the first three generations of Muslims, is normative, static, and universalistic in nature. Duderija (2006) notes that, as such, it is to be accurately adhered to and copied across all space and time by the following generations.

The possibility of materializing the past in the future also resonated amongst Bosniak civilians who sought refuge from the war in Islam – the faith that most of them had not practiced for nearly half a century. They commonly found themselves unable to get religious guidance from the Islamic Community whose employees were, as Karcic shows, "more preoccupied with individual survival than with providing counseling or religious guidance" (Karcic, 2010, p. 155). At the time, the Islamic Community frantically lobbied for help and although substantial diplomatic assistance was not provided, Muslim countries did manage to send large quantities of food, medicine, and money. Similarly to *mujahideen*, humanitarian and relief workers in charge of allocating the aid assessed that typically secular Bosnian Muslims were not Muslim enough. This resulted in the extensive distribution of free Salafi literature along with food packages.

In the immediate years following the end of the war Salafi ideas found a sympathetic ear amongst the frustrated, economically, socially, and politically marginalized Muslim youth. In what follows, I address the role of IslamBosna, an Islamic website created in 1999, in the spread of Salafism. I argue that in this case BDS represents a reform movement that mobilizes amongst the younger generation of practicing Muslims who wish to pursue general attitudes of the Prophet and the early generations of religious and political authorities who remained faithful to the teachings of the Qur'an. Unlike British-born supporters of FOA who also call for a return to the doctrinal purity of Islamic teachings and prophetic customs, young followers of IslamBosna are apolitical in that they do not seek visibility on the political stage or engage in the public sphere in defense of Muslim interests. Furthermore, they are fiercely patriotic and avid supporters of Nezim Halilovic. Although not a neo-Salafi himself, this

178

prominent member of the SDA is admired for his ability to tap into deep-rooted anger fed by the memories of the war. His fiery *khutbahs* (congregational sermons held every Friday) – available on websites of IslamBosna and the Islamic Community – represent a fusion of the struggle for faith, honor, and the state.

On April 13, 2012, forty-eight-year-old Halilovic criticized the international community that "hindered Bosniaks by withdrawing arms for self-defense." The sermon tied into allegations he made a week prior that *gluha* (deaf) and *corava* (blind) Europe ignored "the biological termination of Bosniaks and tried to console itself by sending humanitarian aid as an amnesty for its shortcomings." In a packed King Fahd Mosque, built in 2000 with Saudi donations, Halilovic argued that this assistance revealed just how little Europe cared about the Muslim people. He used an example of Zepa, his hometown, to claim that Europeans sent Bibles and pork in spite of knowing that "the town was 100% Muslim." In spite of this, Halilovic declared, "Muslims prevailed both mentally and physically." This former pupil of the Gazi Husrev-beg *medresa* and Al-Azhar University, however, cautioned that young Bosniaks are not similar to those who fought during the war. He described them as "soft," further noting that most do not know how to defend themselves, let alone their country and their nation. It is precisely this accusation of "weakness" that young supporters of IslamBosna juxtapose to bravery and fearlessness of *mujahideen* who fought during the war.

Although many Bosniaks are not that charmed by a version of Islam pejoratively dubbed "Wahhabi" – for instance, Muamera expresses her disapproval of "all that Wahhabi stuff that we never had before" and Dzenana claims that Bosnian Muslims are European, unlike "those other, Arab Muslims" – for Alen (a pseudonym), such dismissal is a sign of hypocrisy by those who are alive thanks to "brave brothers who were ready to help when no one else would." He tells me that Serbs and Croats praise foreign fighters who fought against Muslims during the war. Only Bosniaks, according to Alen, are ashamed of "their Muslim

friends." He notes that dozens of brave men died for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but their sacrifice is ignored. Alen believes that this sacrifice represents a crucial part of a larger struggle to purify the *Ummah*. He explains that this mission is far from over since Bosnia is now threatened by internal enemies from the ranks of Bosniaks who derive their status by distancing themselves from what Alen calls "*mujahideen* Islam." Similarly to Fatmir, Alen believes that these Bosniaks are weak and largely Western influenced. Muslims he describes as "genuine" have a task of revitalizing the Bosniak community through principles adopted by the Prophet and the first three generations of Muslims.

Alen was reluctant to speak to me as first, fearing that I would "distort" his statements like "others who write about Islam in Bosnia." After weeks of pleading and many requests made by my affiliates in Mladi Muslimani, we finally sat down for a chat in Morica Han. Alen is twenty-five. As a young boy, he arrived to Sarajevo and settled with his mother and younger sister in an abandoned house in Vratnik. His father was killed in Srebrenica. "My entire life has been a struggle. I didn't finish highschool. I fell in with a 'wrong crowd' and lacked guidance. Mother did her best, but she worked two jobs, so it was up to me to create my own path. I would have ended up in prison or dead if it were not for Islam." Alen explains, "The first thing that spoke to me was Sayyid Qutb's concept of 'offensive *jihad*.' It made me realize that Bosnian Muslims had to be more aggressive in fighting daily oppression, both local and global." This idea was especially popular during the war and continues to live today through a number of smaller groups and associations. Most do not have registered branches or local offices; others have virtually perished following the general securitization of Islam after the September 11 attacks. Alen refers to the Active Islamic Youth (AIO) as an example of Islamic organization that has ceased its activities following the attacks. The founding members of the AIO were former soldiers of the El-Mujahid unit who attributed their conversion to Salafism directly to *mujahideen*. Their mission was to reawaken

180

religious feelings of Bosniaks who have supposedly been deprived of "real" Islam for too long – first by communist leaders of the former Yugoslavia and later by secularized champions of the country's European prospects.

In the early 2000s, former supporters of AIO, and other NGOs that were experiencing similar difficulty of remaining active, turned to virtual communal spaces in which issues of faith were easily discussed and carried out. In this light, certain state responses to what were perceived to be malicious vectors of Muslim transnationalism in reality served to reinforce a sense of absent stakeholding among young Bosniak men like Alen. This compelled them even more strongly to represent Islam in ways they deem genuine. The Internet provided a stage for new sources of power and authority that recognized young people as being carriers of obligation for the Islamic revival. IslamBosna is my case in point.

4.5.1 Global E-Jihad and the Question of Religious Authority

IslamBosna was formed in Sarajevo in 1997 and currently operates as a web portal. In 2010, I reached out to Fatmir in hopes of securing an interview with the group's spokesperson. He contacted his friends at *Saff*, and it was through their help that I got in touch with the site's administrator, Senad Ukka. During our first chat on December 10, Senad told me that this former NGO morphed into an Islamic website in 1999 when it became clear that there were plenty of Islamic NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina but not enough good Islamic media. He explained, "Specializing in one thing means that we can be the best at it but also that we get to fill the vacuum that was created by a growing number of Internet users and no Islamic websites." According to Senad, IslamBosna receives approximately 200,000 hits per month.

When I first visited the website in 2003, it was saturated by images of the Muslim Brotherhood, hyperlinked to articles and analyses. External authorities, according to Senad,

appeal to the younger generation of Muslims who doubt the relevance of Islam as it was traditionally practiced in Bosnia and Herzegovina and seek out alternative religious guidance. To illustrate his point, he mentioned an online poll posted by IslamBosna in 2005 that asked the question: "Which of the Islamic movements/parties/organizations do you trust the most?" Close to 2,000 people voted during a thirty-day period. The Salafi movement emerged as the trustworthiest source with close to 25% of the votes. Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh were especially praised for their reformist approach.

Alen, who has been visiting the website since 2001, believes that the reason why reformers are so popular is because they were able to reclaim the promise of earlier ideologies and retrieve the absent teachings of the Qur'an as exemplified by the Prophet. These reformers neither isolated themselves from nor were reluctant to engage with modernity. Instead, as Duderija (2006) shows, they tried to reconcile the realities of modernity and the emerging Arab nationalism with the Islamic tradition by "reading the values of modernism into the original sources of Islam." Tibi argues that this approach "attempted to espouse cultural and institutional modernity by seeking a synthesis between these concepts and Islam but doing so without rethinking the traditional Islamic theocentric worldview" (Tibi, 1998, p. 30, cited in Duderija, 2011, p. 44). Past was, therefore, meant to supply the answers by regularly imposing itself on the present. The notion of going back in time is attractive to Alen. He notes that it keeps him close to the origin, that is to say, close to a fixed point in time – that of the Prophet and the early Muslim community that exhibited what Alen assumes to be the authenticity and purity of Islam. In this regard, tensions within and around Islam cannot be explained without taking into account outside influences, whether the religious reformism of Abduh or the revivalism of Rida, that not only shape the ideological battle in terms of whose understanding of Islam is the most representative of God's intent but also account for the shifting configurations of religious power and principal norms and discourses.

182

4.5.2 Mujahideen in Cyberspace: BDS as a Joint Islamic Movement

Al-Qaradawi's "The Boycott of Israeli and American Commodities" inspired a leaflet printed by IslamBosna in the summer of 2005 that called upon Muslims to fulfill their duty of *jihad* via consumer activism. Short thereafter, IslamBosna conducted a survey that asked: "Do you take part in the boycott Israel campaign?" A total of 154 visitors voted during the month of April. These were the results – 115 (62.50%) said that they surely did participate in the campaign; 38 (20.65%) said that they sometimes took part in this campaign; 17 (9.24%) said that they were not interested in the campaign; and 14 (7.61%) thought there was no use in taking part. Senad believes that those who participate do so because IslamBosna managed to draw parallels between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He says, "This is based on our intuition only. We think it's a good way of customizing BDS so it fits our local audience." I argue that, contrary to what Senad claims, the model of boycott available on the IslamBosna website is not at all in tune with the local realities.

Going over targeted companies listed on the website on December 29, 2008 – this list was in fact copied from the InMinds brochure – I counted more than ten that do not sell their products in Bosnia and Herzegovina, e.g., River Island and M&S (see *Figure 11* and *Figure 12*). This coupled with the low purchasing power of the website's audience, suggests that BDS serves an entirely symbolic purpose. In contrast to more politically engaged youth gathered around Stand for Justice and FOA, followers of IslamBosna use the campaign to connect to an imagined community of "like thinkers" who strive to cleanse Islam from practices and doctrines that supposedly tarnish it. The fact that this community typically transcends the bounds of Bosnia allows these young Muslims to stress their co-identity with the *Ummah*.

Figure 11 "The Boycott Israel Card" - front, source: Innovative Minds (n.d.), http://www.inminds.com/boycott-

brands.html, last accessed May 15, 2015

COSMETICS & HEALTH CARE

Kimberly-Clark
Kleenex, Andrex, Kotex, Huggies

REVLON

Johnson & Johnson

All Dead Sea products inc. Gadi, SeaSpa, Ever Since

Premier by Dead Sea Premier

AHAVA
Essential Dead Sea Treatment

ESTĒE LAUDER
M•A•C, La Mer, Sean John, Aramis, Bumble and bumble, Michael Kors, Prescriptives, Bobbi Brown, Flirt!, Lab Series, American Beauty, Ojon, Darphin, Donna Karan, Clinique, Origins, Tommy Hilfiger, Missoni, Coach, Tom Ford, GoodSkin Labs, Aveda, Smashbox, Zegna, Kiton, Jo Malone, Grassroots

L'ORÉAL
Softsheen Carson, Maybelline, Redken, Kiehl's, Viktor & Rolf, Giorgio Armani, Diesel, Mizani, Vichy, Ralph Lauren, Garnier, La Roche-Posay, Matrix, Shu Vemura, Biotherm, Cacharel, Kerastase,

TEVA
TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS LTD
Israels Teva makes generic drugs. Ask your pharmacist for an alternative if given Teva, its your right & usually there is choice.

Israel is the world-leading net exporter of polished diamonds valued at nearly $20 billion (2008), generating $1 billion p.a. for the Israeli military. 50% of diamonds sold in USA are crafted in Israel (UK % less but still high). Avoid natural diamonds (esp. large stones which are more likely Israeli).

APPAREL & FOOTWEAR

YOUR **M&S**   **CATERPILLAR**   **Timberland**   **RIVER ISLAND**

DELTA
GALIL INDUSTRIES LTD.

Israels Delta Galil produces lingerie, mens underwear & socks that are sold by all major retailers & brands making it difficult to identify. Avoid Hugo Boss, Calvin Klein & Tommy Hilfiger underwear; Nike, Wilson & Converse socks; Maidenform lingerie.

TEFRON   BAGIR   VICTORIA'S SECRET   La SENZA

DIVESTMENT

Corporations to divest from (pension funds, etc): Veolia, Alstom, G4S & Israeli weapons maker Elbit. Join your local campaign to cancel Veolia local authority contract

VEOLIA   **Elbit Systems**   **G4S**   **ALSTOM**

for more details about card & what's changed from previous list see www.inminds.com/boycottcard

Innovative Minds
www.inminds.com

information valid 1 Jan 2012

Islamic Human Rights Commission
www.ihrc.org

Figure 12 "The Boycott Israel Card" - back, source: Innovative Minds (n.d.), http://www.inminds.com/boycott-brands.html, last accessed May 15, 2015

185

I met Hana (a pseudonym) at the "Let us Remember Gaza" panel. In contrast to members of Mladi Muslimani who developed a strong sense of national identity and view BDS as a comment on the current political disengagement of the Bosniak community, Hana identifies as Muslim only and uses the campaign to link to global supporters who are different than those she encounters on regular basis. "I see the same faces at BDS meetings. We are members of a larger network, but I don't identify with them. We have nothing in common. For me, BDS is an organized activity of 'true' Muslims whose ideas are rejected by those who think that BDS is their link to Europe. They're wrong. They mock us and Europe mocks them." Contrary to cohorts of Stand for Justice who use new technology to develop views on what it means to be a Muslim in Europe, supporters of IslamBosna use their transnational knowledge to enter networks that tackle a moral crisis created by the alleged neglect of key principles of Islam by positioning themselves against all things "un-Islamic." From this perspective, BDS is about the values outlined by al-Qaradawi in his famous *fatwa* – to gather the *Ummah*; to support friends of Allah and fight His enemies; to free Muslims worldwide of foreign domination; and to renew the obligation of extending the call of Islam.

Dzevad (a pseudonym) is twenty-three. At the time of the interview he was self-employed and living with his uncle in Kovaci. His father was killed in 1995 in Srebrenica, and his mother died of cancer five year later. Our conversation took place in front of the Begova Mosque where Dzevad has a makeshift stand. Together with digital copies of the Qur'an and videos of Izetbegovic's *dzenaza* (funeral service), Dzevad and his friend Kadir (a pseudonym) sell DVD footage from conflicts in Afghanistan, Gaza, Syria, and Chechnya. Dzevad, who began boycotting in 2011, tells me that the one from Gaza already sold out due to its novel approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as deeply rooted in religion. He says, "I don't know if you are familiar with this but under the Al-Aqsa Mosque books of black magic are hidden. Witchcraft is forbidden, so the Prophet Solomon wanted to destroy them. But they

186

were not destroyed and remain hidden under the mosque where Solomon's shrine was once located. That's why Jews are digging tunnels there and will likely destroy the mosque by doing so. That's one of the reasons I joined BDS." The symbolic relevance of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the boycott framing was already apparent during the earlier pan-Islamic campaign when in featured alongside references to Al-Quds and the Temple Mount. Its relevance is reaffirmed today by members of FOA and IslamBosna.

Dzevad goes on to say that, "Muslim brothers and sisters online agree that Jews are a cursed nation. They are servants of *Dajjal* [Antichrist]. Their main enemy is Islam because it is the only obstacle on their road to global supremacy. Muslims who buy Jewish products help their quest. It's like adding salt to the wound." Kadir agrees and makes an additional claim that although those who gather under the boycotting banner via online social networking appear to be strong in numbers; the boycott actually derives its strength from the quality of those who lead it. He says, "I know that the current campaign mobilizes across different groups and communities. That seems like a good thing but I don't think it yields any results. I believe that only those who look to Muhammad as their unquestionable guide can spearhead a strong movement against Israel's apartheid policies." Accordingly, BDS emerges as an Islamic movement that mobilizes amongst those loyal to the teachings of the Qur'an as exhibited by the Prophet and the first three generations of Muslims.

Kadir tells me about the "Palestine: Trial for Humanity" panel that was organized by Mladi Muslimani in February 2008. "This was the first time I heard Halilovic speak about the boycott. He said that Muslims in Gaza and the West Bank are dying because they have no electricity, no gas, no water, and no food, but we don't care and live a carefree life. He handed out a list of products and explained how these support the State of Israel and what needs to be done to end this support." Kadir notes that, for instance, Arabs purchase $100m worth of Marlboro cigarettes every day and Philipp Morris, the owner of the brand, gives 15m

187

to Israel. "This," Kadir explains, "means that our brothers supply the enemy with $30m every two days just by smoking Marlboro. Their money is used to buy weapons that kill the Palestinian people." Watching a video of the panel available on the IslamBosna website, I notice that Halilovic not only recognized the necessity of BDS but also the female centrality within it. Referring to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he suggested that Bosnian Muslims should be proud of having remained honorable despite their numerous victims. "They," Halilovic said, "cannot be lectured by anyone, especially not by Christians, about good behavior." The source of this morality, according to Halilovic, is the mother because she protects spiritual piousness. He first explained that his mother made him "a Muslim he is today" and then contrasted his own piousness to more Western influenced Bosniaks who wish to remove women from their "instinctive form." Halilovic used the BDS campaign to associate women with the domestic sphere. Much like al-Qaradawi before him, he argued that women play an important role because it is their duty to run the household and do the shopping.

Kadir's friend, Zlatan (a pseudonym), who joined our discussion following his classes at the Islamic Faculty, University of Sarajevo, has a very similar outlook. He describes Western influenced women as "secularized" and proclaims that "mini skirts and promiscuity," seen here as characteristic of Western customs, are manifests of "the postwar society that has forgotten its pious past." Zlatan says, "Bosniaks have long lived amongst the infidels with no personal example to guide them, so they lost their way. They forgot the mosque and the *zakat*. Those who claim to be Muslim but deviate from the teachings of the Qur'an are just blurring the truth. If you speak to them about the ways of the Prophet, their confusion is obvious." Zlatan believes that this "trivialization" of Islam leads to it becoming standardized as an everyday issue that lacks any real potential to mobilize and shape communities. For him, BDS represents a test that will clarify who the "real" Muslims are. Those who engage in the

188

campaign superficially, that is to say, those whose activities do not appear unconditionally guided by the teachings of the Qur'an, are accused of weakening the transformative potential of Islam.

Conclusion

Rivalries within and around Islam that manifest themselves through different versions of BDS in Stari Grad reflect uncertainties familiar to all Muslims in Europe. Bosniaks experience "the same difficulty in defining their Muslim identity in a context where the state claims to be secular, but where the society is still, at least implicitly, permeated with Christian traditions" (Bougarel, 2007, p. 119). However, as Bougarel shows, political events of the 1990s transformed the Bosnian case into an exception "rather than a model for the other Muslim communities living in Europe" (ibid). If at the onset of war, Bosniaks tried to appear as the undivided protectors of democracy and multiculturalism, the continued conflict sparked an outbreak of grievances and disputes that had remained concealed up until then. Islam emerged as one of the main sources of disparity and it continues to play that role today. It follows that different versions of BDS in Stari Grad represent markers of distinction that are not simply formed in terms of presupposed dichotomies, e.g., Muslim/Christian or East/West. The present chapter revealed an equally important role of the competition and interplay among generations and classes that inspire divisions based around the concept of belonging to categories of "true" vs. "false" Muslims and "good" vs. "worse" Bosniaks.

For members of MFS-Emmaus, BDS symbolizes a part of their continuous effort to assert their position in Europe. The campaign conveys the idea of Islam as individual faith, consequently positioning middle class urbanites against those who adopted a supposedly "non-modern," i.e., non-European, version of Islam. By comparison, supporters of Stand for

Justice and Mladi Muslimani assume a narrower Bosnian perspective when in comes to their BDS participation. In spite of their disputes regarding the nature of "real" Islam and the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Europe, those I interviewed strive to restore Islam as the locus around which the Bosniak community needs to be organized.

Young followers of Stand for Justice disagree with the concept of "privatized" Islam put forth by their elders and convey positions that are both openly confrontational in relation to the state and very political in terms of their religiosity. From this perspective, BDS represents a reform movement characteristic of intergenerational conflicts that inspire a more active participation within the public sphere in the name of Islam. The issue for these young activists is to find a new way of openly expressing their Islamic faith without that being interpreted as adversarial to European values. Conversely, members of Mladi Muslimani grasp the relationship between Islam and Europe in terms of structural opposition. As a result, BDS is no longer seen as a link to Europe but a reminder of how politically timid Bosniaks have become largely due to continues interventions by Europe itself.

Though similar in terms of their general opposition to atheist Europe, supporters of IslamBosna disregard more nationalist aspirations of those grouped around Mladi Muslimani and identify as strictly Muslim. BDS emerges as a platform for these young activists to affirm their place in a larger Muslim community. For them, the campaign symbolizes a global Islamic movement that not only evades politicization of Islam according to European principles – as was seen in the case of FOA and Stand for Justice – but also declines its apparent "trivialization" as an everyday issue that lacks any transformative potential.

Conclusion: the Spatiality of BDS – Faraway Outcomes and the Politics of the "Home Front"

"Hey, Jack, which way to Mecca?" In 1938, the *New Yorker* published a cartoon by Peter Arno of a stetson-hatted tourist leaning out of his convertible to ask directions from a turbaned man by the side of the road, his face down in prayer (see *Figure 13*). Writing for the *New York Review of Books* in 2003, Cliford Geertz suggested that Arno's caricature was not simply a relic. Vagabond notions of stallions, harems, deserts, palaces, and chants were, according to the author, displays of an enduring Western reluctance to engage in anything more than pure exoticization when writing about Islam. However, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Bali bombings, Osama bin-Laden, Afghanistan, and Iraq, began the process of constructing, rather quickly, an alternative to this casual mixture of ignorance and indifference. Geertz argued that an impressive flood of books poured from the Western public presses designed to give a crash course in, as the phrase goes, "understanding Islam." These books commonly invoked the opposition most crudely stated in Huntington's "clash of civilizations" theory. "Islam and the West," "Islam and Democracy," "Islam and Secularism" were some of the titles that exposed a tendency to doubt Islam's compatibility with Western norms.

In 2004 and 2005, respectively, the attacks in Madrid and London pushed debates on Islam even further into a progressively ossified chronology. What I mean by this is that both incidents appeared as iconic tropes that coordinate much of the discussion on Muslim presence in the West. In the same vein, the "ground zero" has become "the temporal no less than spatial reference point for a scale on which key 'moments' in the unfolding of the troubled relations between 'Islam' and 'the West' […] are plotted and chronicled" (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 2).

191

Figure 13 "Mecca," a cartoon by P. Arno, 1935, source: BizBag (n.d.),

http://www.bizbag.com/Cartoons/mecca.htm, last accessed May 15, 2015

When I began my ethnographic study of the local appropriation of BDS in 2009, I wanted to challenge the idea of homogeneity of Islamic identity and faith that seemed to saturate the existing literature on Muslim networks in the West. I was interested in meanings produced through practices, events, and relationships in the mobilization process that are built around solidarities largely devoid of references to shared ethnicity, language, place of origin, and local customs. My ethnographic points of entry were six organizations leading the boycott movement in two European urban locales – Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad. These organizations operate within available resources at the local level, including possible partners and main sociopolitical and economic issues of community concern. Moreover, in each case, they devise context-specific strategies directed at sociopolitical change in their local communities and in Israel/Palestine. From this analysis, it became apparent that in contrast to much that has been written on BDS, the campaign is less a comprehensive, global movement and more a network of locally tailored initiatives.

My research showed that these local initiatives can have a distinctively religious character and as such form a part of what I referred to as the global Muslim protest against Israel's system of occupation and apartheid – a framing and mobilizing repertoire that retains the key goal of BDS but also corresponds to different local needs and objectives in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad. In the former case, it concerns migrant communities that seek anti-racist and anti-imperialist politics and, in the latter, a postwar struggle between "insiders" with autochthonous rights to the city and two new categories of resident – the in-migrated displaced persons and a new surge of religious believers. By focusing on how local contexts shape the global movement against Israel's system of occupation and apartheid this thesis uncovered the very dynamic, situated, and often fragmented nature of Muslim identities in Europe driven by migrations, claims to citizenship as well as generational and class rivalries that expose themselves partly through the symbolic and relational field of BDS.

193

This is a major contribution to social movement studies that, as I argued in Chapter 1, tend to be weak on understanding the local dynamics of identities. I turned to the extended case method coined by the Manchester School in order to show the links between the situated histories of Muslims in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad and the process of customizing global BDS frames. Consequently, my study came together around the theme of "the spatial." Adapting the concept of "space" as the basis of my interpretive lens enabled a diversity of Muslim experience, identity, and tradition as expressed via BDS to come to the front. Moreover, the concept was interpreted broadly enough to include the ideas of "global" and "local" as well as the relationships between them. Because of this, I can now say that the boycott represents a specific global-local relation that takes cues from earlier campaigns in the Arab world that cannot be replaced easily by other markers. Furthermore, it points to the long history of critically engaging with the customs and prescriptions of Islam, on the one hand, and the standard understanding of the doctrine of *jihad* as either an armed struggle to spread Islamic rule or a spiritual struggle for moral reformation, on the other.

The binding element between the long history of reform and the local appropriation of BDS in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad was the emphasis on the competition between dominant norms and discourses articulated by Muslim activists – either publicly, as in the instances of Muslim reformers at the turn of the 19th century, or on a more informal level of life politics, or rather of the "reform of personal life" (Amir-Moazami and Salvatore, 2003, p. 54), as in the case of those who saw in the boycott of Israel a pathway towards moral self-realization. This notion of boycotting as a transformative act is largely missing in the available literature on consumer boycotts. The present thesis filled the existing void by looking at the rich history of Islamic movements that produced a surprisingly progressive understanding of peaceful consumer resistance through which Muslims could strive in the path of God while simultaneously supporting the Palestinian uprising and contesting Western

hegemony. I argued that although appeals for the official Arab League boycott – distinctively diplomatic and secular – could still be heard throughout the 2000s in a number of newspaper articles, diplomatic statements, and even, vaguely religious rulings, the authors of these rulings increasingly turned to a pan-Islamic vision of boycott as a way for noncombatants to fulfill their duty to wage *jihad*. A wide range of Arab public figures – preachers, TV scholars, *muftis*, and professors – granted religious legitimacy to the pan-Islamic movement via boycott *fatwas* that first appeared on their personal websites but were then spread all over the Internet by a network of boycotting websites in the Arab World as well as the West. This, I argued, created space for the emergence of what I called the global Muslim protest.

The idea that the boycott represents a specific global-local relation that is anchored in the Arab world was confirmed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. In Tower Hamlets, the influence was clear not only in a wide-spread understanding of the boycott as an Islamic act that is moral, easily defensible, and lawful, but also in the way that elderly Bengali Muslims interpreted the BDS campaign as a form of instruction passed on from one generation to the next. The chapter showed that this transmission also works the other way around, that is to say that the children can lead the movement once their parents are older. This "generational" reading of the boycott campaign, first expressed by al-Qaradawi in his famous "The Boycott of Israeli and American Commodities" *fatwa*, shaped the discourses endorsed by young supporters of FOA who claimed to provide guidance or insight into the "correct way" to boycott against supposedly "incorrect" forms of participation among their elders. I showed that in Stari Grad, IslamBosna, one of the leaders of the local appropriation of the BDS campaign, used al-Qaradawi's *fatwa* as the base of its call for boycott of more than fifty companies engaged in or profiting from the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Furthermore, Nezim Halilovic, who enjoys great popularity amongst young neo-Salafis engaged in the boycott, developed on al-Qaradawi's idea that women are key actors in the

195

boycott movement given their role as "the mistresses of the house."

The comparative approach to the study of local appropriation of BDS further revealed that in both Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad certain features of the campaign emerged as parts of a global Muslim discourse of suffering. However, this discourse was understood and communicated differently by different generations and classes. In Tower Hamlets, elderly Bengali Muslims often connected their present BDS efforts to their experience during the revolutionary independence war in 1971. Moreover, given their concern with the preservation of familiar values and customs and their careful position in regard to the state, they typically kept BDS within the private realm. The second generation also mediated and managed the campaign through a specific Bengali vernacular. Here, nonetheless, alternative accounts of belonging were created, as distinctively defensive positions of the first generation were replaced by highly imaginative connections to not only diasporic cultures but also other non-white British people in Tower Hamlets. I argued that against the backdrop of the growing polarization that followed the rebranding of the area in the 1980s, and the subsequent white working class resentment of migrants, second-generation supporters of the PSC sought to articulate what they believed to be the true nature of "their community" – vibrant, active, and engaged in the political and social life of Tower Hamlets. The BDS campaign allowed for this expression – it became one of the tokens of Bengali dignity and pride.

The attention various patterns of local appropriation of BDS in Tower Hamlets revealed that the first and second generation typically stayed clear of Islamic political mobilization. By comparison, young idealistic activists joined FOA on the back of characteristically Islamic perspectives that concern the emergence of intentionally political Islam but are also about what it means to act as a good citizen within contemporary British society. In this case, some features of the global BDS campaign appeared as forms of public participation in the name of Islam that is compatible with the nation-state framework;

196

however, it is also believed to be rooted in a sense of belonging to an Islamic tradition. One of the more interesting aspects of my ethnographic work is this ability of young activists to take on an entirely secular frame of BDS and Islamize it by placing it within a broader discussion on adaptive strategies developed and pursued by Muslims in Europe in reaction to particular political, economic, and social circumstances.

My study of Stari Grad similarly highlighted the role of BDS in the competition and interplay between generations and classes, on the one hand, and locality, local solidarity, and loyalty, on the other. I argued that the process of local appropriation creates arenas where Bosniaks could act out their claims to be the genuine voice of "their community" in a postwar setting. In contrast to Tower Hamlets where these claims were often constructed in relation to the majority society's reluctance to make room for Islam and Muslims in it, in Stari Grad, those who declared rudimental rights to the city used the campaign to reaffirm historical links between Bosnian Islam and Europe. The middle class Bosniaks in their forties and fifties typically supported the idea of boycott as a form of participation that confines Islam within the private realm, thus pointing to similarities to elderly Bengali Muslims in Tower Hamlets. The younger generation, however, generally perceived the boycott as an Islamic act that reformulates not only the concept of Muslim political identity but also radicalizes connections between Bosniaks and Europe. Both groups built their local versions of BDS on the back of Europe's ontological relevance and expressed them in relation to a wide range of postwar "newcomers," most notably, the in-migrated Bosniak displaced persons and religious believers who embraced a version of Islam typically associated with Saudi donors and some of the Arabs who fought in the 1992-1995 war.

At the same time, these two categories developed their own varieties of BDS as either a shared commentary on the lack of Bosniak participation in both political community and civil society or a global Islamic movement that extends the call for Islam but evades its

politicization according to European standards. Both perspectives declined "trivialization" of Islamic discourse, thus suggesting that if Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina is indeed an example of "European Islam," as claimed by the first two groups, it is not due to its tolerance and openness but rather because the fall of socialist Yugoslavia made it possible to "believe without belonging" or, at least, belong according to personal views. By moving to a micro-level of the analysis and pointing to various possibilities in the local adjustment of BDS, I wanted to critically engage with the idea of a free-floating religious identity, most famously explained by Grace Davie in 1990. In order to do so, I built outwards from the situated daily consumerist practices in which key facets of the self were recursively engaged and negotiated and, without focusing on the practice of boycotting as such, analyzed its role in the dynamization and non-essentialization of local Muslim identities.

The idea that BDS can be used as a prism into the dynamism of Muslim identities separates my work from not only more traditional research on consumer boycotts that typically fails to connect a particular campaign to expressions of individuality but also much of the existing research on Muslims in the West that often over-determines the homogeneity of Muslim subjectivities. It is, nevertheless, important to note that the personal meanings attached by boycotters to their boycotting efforts are inseparable from collective concepts and problems. This is important in at least two ways. Firstly, shifting identifications that organize themselves through the symbolic and interactive field of BDS draw from collective notions like "working class" and "Muslim." Secondly, the engagement in the campaign is conditioned by structures of possibility that are fixed in local relationships of power, justice, economy, and identity.

There are numerous active BDS movements throughout the world that operate in entirely different sociopolitical and economic contexts than those I describe in the present thesis. Given my interest in how local settings shape strategies, tactics, narratives, and goals

of BDS, I opted for two communities of Muslim activism in Europe to provide at least an amount of "control" for comparing thematically between them. Future work should look at campaigns beyond Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad that operate within a wider range of global-local articulations made possible by the BDS campaign. Depending on their choice of locales, these works could not only contribute to highly understudied topic of BDS but also enhance the research on the development of distinct forms of faith-based activism within a variety of traditions that can accommodate and reinforce but also challenge each other.

Notes

1 The 2000 Camp David Summit was a meeting between the US President Bill Clinton, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat. The meeting was an effort to end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. However, it ended without an agreement.

2 When the team that formed IslamOnline in 1997 launched the alternative OnIslam website in 2010, al-Qaradawi's statements were translated in English. I use the available translations in my chapter on the transition from multilateral state-driven to global NGO consumer-focused boycott of Israel.

3 In this paper I use the term "second generation" to identify those Bengali Muslims born in Bangladesh during the 1960s who came to Britain in the 1970s. I avoid the phrase "third generation" and use instead the term "British-born."

4 Fardeen is referring to Ruth Kelly's promise to tackle extremism by shifting financial support toward religious and community groups that are moderate and defend non-negotiable values. In an article for *the Guardian*, Patel heavily criticized the initiative that came to fruition in October 2006. He argued that with a budget of £5m, Kelly, a former Labour Party politician and MP, hoped to provide strengthened partnership and unity with a purpose of isolating those who seek to drive a wedge between the majority society and Muslims. "Cynical as it may seem," wrote Patel, "it appears Ms. Kelly is reading from colonialist history books and hoping to buy the 'ethnics' with a few bucks. This approach undermines her entire government as it reflects their own perception of Muslims as a separate entity within the British community, thus challenging their own professed objective - to abolish separateness."

<u>5</u> The research to this dissertation was sponsored by Central European University Foundation, Budapest (CEUBPF). The theses explained herein are representing the own ideas of the author, but not necessarily reflect the opinion of CEUBPF.

<u>6</u> Though essentially synonyms, terms "Bosniak" and "Bosnian Muslim" are treated with a slight distinction in this chapter. I attach a more ethnic meaning to "Bosniak" and a more religious one to "Bosnian Muslim." In essence, however, both terms refer to the same ethnic group and should not be confused with the term "Bosnian," which denotes anyone from Bosnia and Herzegovina regardless of ethnonational affiliation.

<u>7</u> Supporters of MFS-Emmaus long for times when travelling abroad did not require queuing at the entrances of embassies and consular offices, million forms, bank statements, health insurance, status of employment and fingerprinting. Jansen writes that, "[…] post-Yugoslav evocation of the red [Yugoslavian] passport […] functioned in retrospective narrative on current constraints" (Jansen, 2009, p 822). In 2010, these constrains were eased when the EU Council of Ministers for Interior and Justice abolished visa requirements for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina traveling within the Schengen zone. But even visa-free travel can be a profoundly sobering experience. Passport controls at Heathrow, Charles de Gaulle, or Schonefeld make no clear distinctions between EU and European citizens. I have learned my lesson now, but it took a few humiliating confrontations with airport officials for me to understand that I, as a Bosnian citizen, am not perceived as a European citizen. The line reserved for those who hold a Bosnian passport is marked "non-European."

<u>8</u> Before the war, neighbors were deemed to be important socially, ritually, and economically. They attended your rituals and lent you money. The expression *prvi komsija* (first neighbor) implied not only geographical closeness, but also profound relations of "trust, affection, and exchange" (Sorabji, 1995, p. 90). In social life, then, those you lived closest to

201

were of extreme importance, as the relation of "neighborliness" represented warmth, trust, and interconnectedness.

9 The loose Islamic revival movement of the mid-1980s that mobilized many students of the city's religious schools is a good case to explore in this regard. The process of revival that encompassed both urbanites and those who moved from villages to Sarajevo in order to study was dictated by "moral questions of modesty and respect" (Sorabji, 1993, p. 35). This allowed young Muslims engaged in the movement to stress their association with the *Ummah*. In 1990 and 1991, the old Islamic revival of the mid-1980s was joined by new enthusiasts who observed Ramadan and participated in religious rituals. Sorabji writes that the majority of those enjoying the new freedom of religious expression "saw their activities as intimately related to their new European future" (Sorabji, 1993, p. 34).

The freedom to worship was strongly associated with the values of Europe, therefore, allowing Bosnian Muslims to assert themselves as Europeans. In emphasizing their Europeanness, they did not deny their Islamic identity. On the contrary, Sorabji shows that Islam was conceptualized as one of the things linking Bosnian Muslims to Europe (Sorabji, 1993, p. 35). The restructuring of the Islamic Religious Establishment echoed this feeling. In its 1990 Constitution, the Islamic Community adopted Arabic names for a number of its organs. It replaced the previously established Serbo-Croatian titles, thus "legitimizing itself vis-à-vis the wider Islamic world" (ibid). This restructuring together with the new Constitution challenged the previous religious monopoly by giving voice to Muslims at the lower level of the establishment. On the one hand, democracy was celebrated as a sign of connections between the Islamic Community and Europe. On the other hand, it stressed the closeness of Islamic Community to the Western rather than the Eastern world.

10 Helms recounts her experience at a talk given by Ismet Spahic, a former Deputy Grand Mufti of the Islamic Community. In his talk, given shortly after the war had ended, Spahic

202

urged Bosniak men to attend mosques and refrain from drinking alcohol. Women were advised to be "honorable and modest" – to cover themselves in Islamic dress (Helms, 2008, p. 101). Afraid that Helms would take cleric's statements as representative of more general attitudes in the country, her friends "pointed to the throngs of teenage girls in miniskirts and men drinking beer as proof of different attitudes and ways of being Bosniak" (ibid).

11 In November 2012, the General Assembly was voting on whether to grant Palestine a "non-member observer state" status at the UN. Bosnia and Herzegovina abstained from voting. Yasser believes that the Israeli lobby worked better than the Palestinian one. He says, "The latter's representative was in Sarajevo; the Israeli representative was in Banja Luka. Dodik criticized the protest for Gaza in Sarajevo. He just restated his position from years before." In January 2009, Dodik sent a letter of support to the Israeli President Peres, expressing understanding for, as he called it, "the difficult position in which Israel and its citizens find themselves." At the same time he expressed his full support for efforts to secure peace and security for the people of Israel. The letter stated that the Republic of Srpska does not endorse the anti-Israeli campaigns, protest or events organized in the Federation. Socijaldemokratska Partija (Social Democratic Party or SDP) reacted by saying that by justifying the Israeli bombing of Gaza, Dodik actually justifies the policy of killing innocent civilians that was also pursued in Bosnia and Herzegovina by his idols Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The SDA similarly argued that Dodik's letter is a disgrace at the time when "thousands of civilian victims are still being counted in Gaza" (Gorin, 2009). In a statement given to weekly magazine *Blic*, the SDA underlined that Dodik's values cannot and are not shared by any reasonable person, including Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Every person naturally distinguishes between good and evil, and even more so [discerns] the principle that innocent people must not be subjected to massive killing for the sake of a political idea," notes the press release (*Blic RS*, 17 January 2009, p. 10).

In his visit to Israel a year later, Dodik remained firm on his position, noting that Israel understands Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On August 17, 2010, B92, a broadcasting company located in Belgrade, quoted Dodik as saying, "This was an opportunity for me to underscore that it is evident that the international community and its high representative had carried out political and legal violence in the Republic of Srpska and that it had altered the Dayton Agreement." Dodik concluded that he and President Peres had a lot in common on all issues, particularly those relating to Turkey's undesirable engagement in the Balkans.

[12] *Ljiljan* was a weekly political and cultural magazine founded by the SDA in 1990. It declared itself a national newspaper of Bosniak (Muslim) people and reflected stances of the SDA, often its more radical, ultranational, wing. It was printed in around 60,000 copies, 85% of those were sold abroad. The magazine employed thirty people; half of them were journalists; all were Bosniaks (Udovicic, 1996; Sadic, 2005). *Saff*, known as a more conservative and marginal paper, is quite limited in terms of circulation, with a modest 5,000 copies published biweekly. The Muslim Television Igman (MTV Igman) has a limited signal, mostly available in parts of the Sarajevo suburbs and "has no significant impact" (Sarajlic, 2009, p. 64).

[13] I think that "ethnicization" may be a more appropriate term given Islam's role in the building of Bosniak ethnic identity during the early 1990s.

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