A thesis submitted to the Department of Environmental Sciences and Policy of Central European University in part fulfilment of the Degree of Master of Science

Indigenous Representation in the High North: Evaluating the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council

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May, 2015

Budapest

Erasmus Mundus Masters Course in Environmental Sciences, Policy and Management

MESPOM

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Supported by the European Commission's Erasmus Mundus Programme

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS submitted by:
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for the degree of Master of Science and entitled: *Indigenous Representation in the High North: Evaluating the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council*
Month and Year of submission: May, 2015.

In recent decades, indigenous peoples have increasingly played an important role in Arctic governance. For Arctic indigenous, this representation comes at a critical time, as climate change, economic development, and environmental degradation pose mounting threats to their traditional ways of life and livelihoods. Hence, understanding the effectiveness of representation mechanisms is essential to ensure indigenous voices are appropriately heard. A catalyst and principal facilitator of indigenous representation is the Arctic Council (AC), via its Permanent Participants (PPs)—six indigenous peoples organizations (IPOs) afforded consultative status to the Council and a seat at the international table. While a considerable body of literature exists concerning the AC, very little discusses the PPs. The objective of this research is to identify the factors affecting the PPs in order to better understand the key drivers and barriers to indigenous representation within the AC and at the international level. A qualitative research approach was used, employing interviews and observation methods for data collection. A qualitative analysis of data was performed with the SWOT (Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunity-Threats) and STEEPLE (Social-Technical-Economic-Environmental-Political-Legal-Ethical) conceptual frameworks. Results showed common internal and external factors affecting all six PPs, while also revealing unique factors shaping the individual organizations. While certain factors can be easily managed by the PPs, broader systemic issues need to be further addressed and managed within the Council. The most significant of these factors are analysed in this thesis and recommendations for future research are given.

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Keywords: Arctic governance, Indigenous representation, Permanent Participants, Arctic Council, Indigenous peoples organizations

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Acknowledgements

With gratitude abounding, here's to all of the people who made this thesis and experience possible…

To the Permanent Participants—for letting an inquisitive stranger into your everyday efforts to better represent the indigenous peoples of the North. Without your openness, kindness and guidance, this thesis simply would not exist. Particular thanks go to Jim Gamble, Cindy Dickson, Duane Smith, Outi Paadar, Mads Faegteborg, and Elle Merete Omma (IPS), who so generously welcomed me in Whitehorse and shared with me their experiences…

To the interviewees—for your willingness to speak with me (sometimes repeatedly) over the past few months. Your contributions drove me forward and kept me going when I was utterly lost. Special thanks to Timo Koivurova and Timo Seppälla for extending good will on my behalf—I think I would still be sending out emails had it not been for your recommendations and endorsements.

To my supervisor, Professor Alexios Antypas—for sharing a curiosity for the Arctic and solidifying my passion for environmental policy.

To my MESPOM family—for making these two years some of the best of my life. I am not quite sure how we pulled off such an amazing group of people, but I am sure as hell glad I was a part of it. I am humbled to call you all my colleagues and friends. Thank you. Love, Mom…

To the Homies—for crayfish in socks, mouse bits on the carpet, Greek wine, laughs and tears, nude beaches, palinka, kitty love, quotes taken out of context…I could go on filling the pages of this thesis. Saying I am going to miss you guys simply does not cut it. To the next adventure…

To Momma—For always allowing me to follow my own path, no matter how far wandering…for teaching me the boundlessness of compassion…and for showing me that some magic is very, very real. Thank you for choosing me. I love you…

To Dadd-o—for surrounding me with your extraordinary imagination and effortless wit…for making me laugh with my soul…and for being the single best person I have ever known. I love you.

To PP—for showing me the first, tiny stepping-stone on a vast ocean. And, oh, what an ocean it is…

And…

To Wolfgang—for being you. You have carried the burden of this degree and thesis with me and, sometimes, even for me. This would have been a very different journey had I ventured it on my own—I am so thankful I did not. Though it has been a sometimes rocky, sometimes heady road…we can now say we have lived in four countries in a year, all the while not (completely) losing ourselves in the thick of it. Thank you for never giving up on me, for standing by me, and for loving me at my most crazy. I like you…a lot.

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List of Abbreviations

AC	Arctic Council
AAC	Arctic Athabaskan Council
ACAP	Arctic Contaminants Action Programme
ACIA	Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
ACS	Arctic Council Secretariat
AEPS	Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
AHDR	Arctic Human Development Report
AIA	Aleut International Association
AMAP	Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
AMSA	Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment
ARCUS	Arctic Research Consortium of the United States
ATS	Antarctic Treaty System
CAFF	Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
CPAR	Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region
EPPR	Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response
GA	General Assembly
GCI	Gwich'in Council International
IASC	International Arctic Science Committee
ICC	Inuit Circumpolar Council
ILO	International Labour Organization
IP	Indigenous Peoples
IPCAP	Indigenous Peoples Contaminant Action Program
IPO	Indigenous Peoples Organization
IPS	Indigenous Peoples Secretariat
ITK	Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami
IWGIA	International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs
LRTAP	Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
MEA	Multilateral Environmental Agreement
PAME	Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
POP	Persistent Organic Pollutant
PP	Permanent Participant
RAIPON	Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North
SC	Saami Council
SCPAR	Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region
SD	Sustainable Development
SDWG	Sustainable Development Working Group
TK	Traditional Knowledge
TEK	Traditional Ecological Knowledge
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNPFII	United Nations Forum on Indigenous Issues
WG	Working Group
WGIP	Working Group of Indigenous People

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Arctic region is unique—a place once viewed as a 'frozen desert' is now seen as both a resilient wilderness and a barometer for global change (Byers 2010; English 2013). These variations in perception tell us one thing—the Arctic is transforming and the world with it. As such, those who live in the North and those who look to the region for development, research or adventure, all face new challenges and opportunities. However, no group is affected more than the Arctic indigenous who, for millennia, have called the North their home and in recent decades have felt the swift change of a warming climate on their traditional ways of life. However, this is not their first confrontation with change—rather, merely the most recent evolution in a history of inequitable compromises. From losing their homeland to the encroaching territorial sovereignty of nation-states to watching it literally vanish before their eyes, the indigenous (like the Arctic) have shown incredible resilience.

Yet, the Arctic is now warming two-times faster than anywhere else on earth, leaving the region and its indigenous peoples in an increasingly vulnerable state (ACIA 2004). Over the past thirty years, however, the changing perception of the Arctic has offered up new avenues for international cooperation and indigenous representation. Long-standing indigenous peoples organizations are recognized for their contributions to and knowledge of the Northern environment, particularly by intergovernmental organizations and the Arctic states. Since the 1980s, indigenous peoples of the North have helped to raise significant awareness of the region, with regard to climate change, sustainable development and the impact of globalization (Heininen & Southcott 2010) In 1991, heralding the end of the Cold War, the establishment of AEPS formalized the first of these recognitions through the integration of indigenous perspectives into a formalized governance structure. Five years later, the Arctic Council would emerge as the primary forum for international cooperation in the Arctic. Since that time, Arctic

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governance has continued to change in response to the needs of both the indigenous and non-indigenous within the region.

As the geopolitical climate of the Arctic develops alongside, and greatly in response to, the changing physical environment, research gaps continue to emerge from this evolution. One major gap exists in assessing the role of indigenous peoples organizations (IPOs) in representing the indigenous peoples of the North. A primary case of this representation can be seen in the Arctic Council's Permanent Participants (PPs). With consultative status in the Council and a guaranteed seat at the table, Arctic indigenous peoples have secured a voice in the international arena.

As the Council is the leading forum for intergovernmental cooperation in the Arctic, and the PPs function as its connection to Arctic indigenous (Koivurova 2008; Young 2000), it is important to understand whether these organizations have been able to successfully represent indigenous interests and concerns, as well as integrate them into the Arctic Council agenda. Although the PPs have maintained their seat in the Arctic Council for nearly two decades, very little research has discussed the internal and external circumstances that affect their representation of Arctic indigenous peoples. Therefore, understanding internal and external factors affecting the successful representation of indigenous, by the Permanent Participants of the Council, can help to create a more candid dialogue between the indigenous and various other stakeholders in the Arctic.

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The overall aim of this research is to further develop knowledge of indigenous representation in the Arctic, by critically assessing the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council. The hope is that such an analysis can help to identify some of the major systemic issues affecting indigenous representation, and in doing so, provide recommendations as to how PPs can manage these

threats and take advantage of the opportunities available to them. To achieve this, four objectives are laid out: identify the factors affecting the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council; establish a framework for future research and identify important research gaps pertaining to factors affecting the PPs; create a deliverable that can be used to strengthen intra/inter-organizational efforts, as well as bolster external awareness, of the PPs; and offer lessons learned to existing and emergent indigenous representation bodies engaging at the international level.

A qualitative and exploratory research approach is used to collect primary data, employing interviews and observations as the methods for retrieval. Various stakeholders (both internal and external to the Council) are consulted, as well interactions with Permanent Participants during a capacity workshop in Whitehorse, Yukon. Relevant data is analysed using two conceptual frameworks: i) the SWOT (strengths-weaknesses-opportunities-threats) for analysing internal factors, and ii) the STEEPLE (social-technological-economic-environmental-political-legal-ethical) for analysing external factors affecting the PPs.

Results show that a complex set of factors, both internal and external, affect the PPs in their efforts to represent their indigenous constituencies. Many of the weaknesses are specific to each of the IPOs, though communication and lack of coalescence affect all of them. Strengths are also sometimes unique to the individual IPOs, but strong leadership, dedication and a role as validating entities in the AC should not be overlooked, as these often outweigh the weaknesses and even have the potential to manage threats. External factors show major opportunities for growth (such as environmental and regional awareness, and evolving indigenous rights paradigms). However, the presence of significant threats will be difficult to overcome without the Council's efforts, particularly with regard to economic stability, organisational cooperation, and political interference.

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Important conclusions and recommendations should be drawn from this research. Firstly, the PPs need to work better individually and cooperatively to manage their relative strengths and weaknesses. Many of the factors identified are 'in-house' and deserve better attention in order to help eliminate unnecessary problems. If the PPs are short on resources, they should do their best to use all avenues and support structures available, while also seeking alternative help. This could relieve some of the unnecessary burdens on already overburdened organizations and overworked staff. Secondly, while some of the opportunities and threats might force the PPs to adapt or respond in creative ways, major systemic barriers will continue to cause problems for the PPs down the road. Without the support of member states, the ability to manage these problems on their own is remote. This might mean that it is time for the PPs to venture outward of the Council for more substantive support and opportunity for connection with their constituencies. Without more innovative approaches, the PPs could unfortunately remain restrained by the same problems the Council has maintained for the past 20 years with regard to its indigenous representatives.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problem definition

For millennia, the indigenous peoples (IPs) of the Arctic have lived in balance with their environment, ensured by sustainable ways of life and traditional knowledge passed down through generations (English 2013). However, IPs now face increasing difficulties stemming from climate change, transboundary pollutants, resource development, and over-harvesting of both marine and terrestrial species (IPCC 1990; ACIA 2004). Moreover, indigenous representation is not only important for the wellbeing of those residing in the North, but also for the greater health of the global environment. As with many indigenous groups throughout history, the IPs of the North have been marginalized by their colonizing states and have struggled to maintain their health and livelihoods, while trying to ensure that their voices are heard amidst the dominant cacophony of national interests and geopolitics.

As the geopolitical climate of the Arctic develops alongside, and greatly in response to, the changing physical environment (Dodds 2010), research gaps continue to emerge out of this evolution. One major gap exists in assessing the role of indigenous peoples organizations in representing the IPs of the North. One case of this representation can be seen in the Arctic Council's Permanent Participants. When the Arctic Council was established, two conceptual pillars were erected to define and continue to guide its mandate—environmental protection and sustainable development (Ottawa 1996). Both pillars are important to the indigenous peoples of the North, but the latter in particular. With the inclusion of sustainable development into the AC's mandate, combined with a consultative status guaranteed by the PPs, Arctic indigenous peoples were finally afforded a voice in the international arena.

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Although these PPs/IPOs have been accorded a permanent seat in the AC, very little research discusses the internal and external circumstances that affect their representation of Arctic indigenous peoples. As the Council is the leading forum for intergovernmental cooperation in the Arctic, and the Permanent Participants function as its connection to Arctic IPs, it is important to understand whether these organizations have been able to successfully represent indigenous interests and concerns, as well as integrate them into the Arctic Council agenda.

The health of the global environment is inextricably tied to how human beings interact with it. This reality is all the more relevant in the Arctic, where temperatures are warming two times faster that anywhere else on earth and sea ice is rapidly disappearing (ACIA 2004). Any efforts made to mitigate or adapt to these changes, therefore, need to begin with all the actors involved. However, it seems the people most affected by these changes and decisions are often the ones externalized from conversation. For the indigenous peoples of the Arctic, legitimate representation comes at a critical time. As the AC evolves and solidifies it place in circumpolar governance, its recognition of indigenous (via its unique structure and mandate) is essential in incorporating the voices of the North into national, international and global discussions. Therefore, understanding the factors affecting the successful representation of IPs, by the Permanent Participants of the Council, can help to create a more open and effective dialogue between the indigenous and various other stakeholders in the Arctic.

> "We believe that neither science nor traditional knowledge alone can provide the answers needed to face the impacts of Arctic change. The Arctic Council as a consensus-based model is instrumental in addressing these changes. A true strength of the model is that it requires that we really work to understand each other´s positions, perspectives and histories. Such understanding is decisive in order to maintain stability and cooperation in the Arctic (Áile Javo: IPS 2015)."

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1.2 Research aims and objectives

In light of the problem definition, the overall aim of this research is to further develop knowledge of indigenous representation in the Arctic, by critically assessing the Permanent

Participants of the Arctic Council. The hope is that such an analysis can help to identify some of the major systemic issues affecting indigenous representation, and in doing so, provide recommendations as to how PPs can circumnavigate or eliminate these threats and take advantage of the opportunities available to them.

To expand on this, the particular objectives of this thesis are to:

- **Identify** factors affecting the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council;
- **Establish** a framework for future research and identify important research gaps pertaining to factors affecting the PPs;
- **Create** a deliverable that can be used to strengthen intra/inter-organizational efforts, as well as bolster external awareness, of the PPs; and
- **Offer** lessons learned to existing and emergent indigenous representation bodies engaging at the international level.

1.3 Research questions

In order to achieve the above objectives, three questions were selected to establish the framework of this thesis.

1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the PPs, both individually and collectively?

This first question requires identifying the internal capacities of the Permanent Participants, as it is important for understanding how the PPs can increase their effectiveness as indigenous representatives. Moreover, through identification of their strengths and weaknesses, the PPs can potentially use this knowledge to better seize opportunities and avoid threats.

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2. What are the significant opportunities and threats to the PPs?

While identifying strengths and weaknesses is important for internal success, a variety of external factors also affect the PPs. The opportunities and threats refer to broader, systemic factors and usually involve cooperation with or influence by other actors. Although threats are often the most difficult issues to overcome, identifying them might spur alternative approaches or particular calls to action. Moreover, by identifying significant opportunities, new avenues for organizational effectiveness are revealed.

3. What are the main drivers for and barriers to indigenous representation, by the PPs of the Arctic Council?

Assessing the results from the first two research questions, the most significant drivers and barriers need to be identified. These tended to be broader thematic factors that incorporate one or more of the various sub-themes presented in the analysis. The selection of the drivers and barriers were determined by frequency of occurrence in the data and relative influence on organizational effectiveness.

1.4 Scope

Though it is important for this thesis to approach the Arctic Council in its entirety, in order to provide context and scope, the focus of the research will be on the internal and external operations of Permanent Participants. This being said, a short description of topics not covered should be laid out. While Arctic governance and indigenous rights are briefly expressed in the literature review, this is not to begin a deeper discussion into these issues, but rather set the stage so that the AC and PPs may be understood in the context of international law and governance. There are a variety of alternative governance structures that exist, in part, to ensure

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representation of Arctic IPs—however, focusing on all of them would take away from the opportunity to view one particular structure more intimately.

Additionally, indigenous representation in the Arctic involves many organizations and a variety will be briefly presented in the subsequent literature review. However, discussion of these organizations is meant to recognize the diversity of indigenous representation in the High North and further situate the AC and PPs within this framework. The purpose of this research is not to provide a comparative analysis of all existing IPOs, and therefore was considered outside the scope. As such, the Permanent Participants were used as something of a case study, particularly due to their unique role in the Arctic Council, giving insight into one particular faction of indigenous representation in the North.

Finally, as the AC integrates indigenous peoples from the eight Arctic member states, there was the potential to discuss the role of the PPs as seen from the perspective of indigenous communities in the North. However, due to the seasonal restrictions of travel and limited mobility in the time given, the choice was made to set indigenous community interaction outside the scope of the research. Moreover, as there is little research and literature concerning an in-depth approach to the PPs, interaction with indigenous communities would have been premature without the data presented by the narrower scope of this research. As such, this thesis included perspectives of Arctic member states, Permanent Participants, working groups, observers, academics, and consultants—this selection assured both breadth and depth of relevant data.

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1.5 Audience

Arctic research, governance, and cooperation comprise a relatively small circle of interested parties. When looking at the Arctic Council, this circle shrinks considerably. This research is

primarily directed at this more intimate circle, including the IPOs of the High North, all factions of the Arctic Council, as well as academics and NGOs involved (by some extension) in the work of the AC. The Permanent Participants are, without a doubt, the inspiration for this thesis and, therefore, its output is very much created for their direct consultation and use. However, the applicability of this research can extend beyond this particular forum and potentially help to identify gaps and problems within other IPOs, so that similar issues can be avoided or assessed more systematically. As the qualitative nature of this research sought to be straightforward and intuitive, it is the hope of the researcher that others can use its structure as an effective guide for exploratory research methods, particularly those surrounding organizational and governance structures.

1.7 Disposition

Chapter 1 provides an introduction to thesis by providing the problem definition and establishing the research aim and objectives, as well as the research questions that form the framework for the research. The scope of the thesis is also discussed, with recommendations for appropriate audience reception.

Chapter 2 provides a literature review, comprised of three sections concerning Arctic governance, indigenous representation, and the Arctic Council. This section intends to lay the groundwork for the thesis by offering a state of the art on these topics, in order to contextualize the research.

Chapter 3 provides the methodology and justification of the research approach, as well as the methods used to conduct the research and analyse pertinent data.

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Chapter 4 provides the findings from all primary and secondary research, expressed through the chosen conceptual frameworks.

Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the findings, suggestions on possible theoretical frameworks for analysis, as well as recommendations and thoughts from the researcher. Lastly, further research opportunities are noted.

Chapter 6 provides a broad and conclusive look at the research, in order to determine if the aim and objectives were met and research questions sufficiently answered.

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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Over the past thirty years, the changing perception of the Arctic has offered up new avenues for international cooperation and indigenous representation (Young 1996). Indigenous peoples organizations (IPOs)—recognized for their connection with and knowledge of the Arctic environment—have demanded a place in the emerging governance identity of the North. In 1991, heralding the end of the Cold War, the establishment of AEPS formalized the first of these recognitions through the integration of indigenous perspectives into a formalized governance structure (Koivurova 2008). Since that time, Arctic governance has continued to change in response to the needs of both the indigenous and non-indigenous within the region. The following literature review looks more closely into these changes in governance, as well as the developments of indigenous rights and representation that have emerged alongside and sometimes in response to them. From there, the review will look into the Arctic's leading governance structure—the Arctic Council—in order to understand the context in which it emerged, as well as the successes and failures it has seen over the past twenty years. All of these elements help situate the Permanent Participants within the broader context of international cooperation and indigenous representation in the High North.

2.2 Arctic Governance

Arctic governance is complex—a patchwork of multi-level systems, sovereignty claims, indigenous rights, and international cooperation (Young 2000). Though it is a piecemeal group of governance bodies and organizations, sometimes troubled by disorganization, over the past twenty years, the international Arctic has been defined by cooperation, collaboration and innovation (Young 2002). For the purpose of this discussion, Arctic governance can be understood as, the "creation and operation of rules of conduct that define practice, assign roles and guide interaction for dealing with collective problems (Stokke & Hønneland 2006; Young

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1994)." This section sets the stage for governance in the High North by highlighting its predominant institutions and discussing the concepts of sovereignty, & self-determination, and self-governance. All of these factors influence one another and discussing the Arctic to their exclusion would paint an unclear picture of governance in the North.

2.2.1 The Emergence of Arctic governance

While Arctic sovereignty was the hot topic emerging at the beginning of the 1900s, thoughts of international cooperation and governance did not come until nearly a century later (English 2013). Even before the 1980s, the Arctic was not a place for international governance, much less international cooperation (Heininen & Southcott 2010). Political and legal presence in the Arctic was tied to the individual Arctic states and their advancing interests in the region, with much of the attention focusing on the Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union (Koivurova 2008). During the early 80s, concerns surrounding the Arctic Ocean and strategic tensions became prevalent, drawing the attention of states to the North. Though both Canada and the U.S. showed early interest in developing international cooperation, broader interests in the region were sparse (Pedersen 2012). In part, disinterest also stemmed from the long-standing view of the Arctic as a "frozen desert", with little to offer other than geopolitical tensions and an endless, ruthless chill (Koivurova 2012).

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Rather suddenly, inspired undoubtedly by Gorbachev's 1987 Murmansk speech, the view of the Arctic shifted, revealing an opportunity for Arctic states to come together in a multilateral forum, notwithstanding their differences (English 2013). Gorbachev's speech cast the Arctic in a new light, illuminating the absence of much needed governance and representation, both for the Arctic environment and its people. As several academics note, this moment implied great significance for Arctic governance and policy-making (Koivurova 2008; Young 2000; Graczyk

2011). Since that time, an array of governance structures have emerged in the northern most region of the world, with the Arctic Council representing the most influential of them. Keskitalo (2007) notes that in this emergence, North American ideologies and interests have dominated the governance approaches in the High North, which could hinder collaboration between stakeholders moving forward. Yet, even if this is the case, the upwelling of energy towards Arctic issues has been, undoubtedly, a positive development (Young 2000)—it is better to have some governance than none, especially in a rapidly changing region such as the High North. Moreover, the empowerment of IPs in recent decades has altered emergent governance systems (AHDR 2014).

Defining the Arctic

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Where the continents of the world are understood by long-standing borders and boundaries, the Arctic's ambiguity of land, ice and sea have made delineation all the more difficult (English 2013). Still today, there is no legal definition of the Arctic and no singular political entity, by which it can be identified. The Arctic is defined synonymously by temperature, treeline, permafrost, latitude, indigenous presence, and political relevance—and none of these definitions are inaccurate, much less wrong (CAFF 1994, AMAP 1994, AHDR 2014). Even within the AEPS and Arctic Council, which early on recognized the need for a definition, there are multiple delineations used today (see figure 1). Still, these definitions should be discussed, in order to situate Arctic governance within, at least, a conceptual boundary. Koivurova (2012) notes that it is best understood as a tangential region from the view of the Arctic states, though this should not diminish its social and political importance. Before the 1980s, the geographical region of the

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Arctic was significantly smaller, many using the Arctic Circle as the primary delineation. However, with the emergence of international and environmental cooperation, the geographical area has expanded considerably. The establishment of the AC and the cooperation of the Arctic 8 influenced previous delineations, including regions beyond the Arctic Circle, but not below 60 degrees north latitude (Keskitalo 2004). Though the region is still characterized by a multiplicity

of definitions, without doubt, the emergence of Arctic governance and cooperation redefined the Arctic as a distinct region, both physically and conceptually.

Figure 1. Map showing various Arctic delineations. Sourced: AHDR 2014.

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2.2.2 Sovereignty & Indigenous Rights

Defining the Arctic also has implications for sovereignty claims. Sovereignty means many things. Carnahgan & Goody (2006) note both the traditional interpretation of jurisdictional control, as well as sovereignty as a kind of territorial responsibility. Kusugak (2006) takes the latter definition a step further by including stewardship as a dimension of sovereignty, particularly regarding the role of indigenous in ensuring it for states. For some indigenous peoples of the North, sovereignty 'begins at home' – a prerequisite of equal treatment, by all standards, if true state sovereignty is to be claimed (Simon 2009). Sovereignty also means that states are charged with the responsibility of enforcing international principles intended to safeguard human rights (Araujo 2000). In the context of Arctic governance, sovereignty is most often discussed with regard to territorial disputes—disputes that are all the more complex bearing the effects of climate change (Byers 2010). These definitions and their interpretation by individual member states are important for understanding how Arctic states interact and how their indigenous peoples are represented and respected.

Moreover, it is difficult to discuss Arctic sovereignty without addressing the role of indigenous peoples in the High North. Throughout human history, IPs have often been used as chess pieces to lay claim to lands, thereby extending a state's territorial rights (Hutchins 2011). This has been particularly true of the Canadian IPs, who have been inextricably tied to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic throughout the state's history. In 1953 and 1955, seventeen families were relocated to Resolute Bay by decision of the Canadian government. As Michael Byers (2010) bluntly states, "The Inuit, whom government officials identified by numbers rather than their names, were essentially treated as flag poles." Twenty years earlier, the Canadian government called on Inuit interests to refuse commercial access to the Svedrup Islands by Norway. Canada's strategic placements and it capitalization on its Inuit is one case of a nation-state using indigenous peoples to lay claims to desirable Arctic territories.

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However, something interesting has developed out of this relationship. With successive Land Claims agreements, the Canadian government entered into a contract with its Inuit over land rights. Particularly since the 1993 Nunavut agreement, there has been growing frustration on the part of the Inuit, as the government has done little to hold up their end of the agreement (English 2013). The dynamic created is an important one. While the Canadian government strategically uses the Inuit to lay claims in the Arctic, it simultaneously disregards their distress calls and fails to uphold its end of the Land Claims agreements (ITK 2014). During a session in 2009, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues noted, "Some indigenous peoples of the Arctic enjoy a good degree of political representation…this does not always guarantee that their tights are recognized and respected in practice (UNPFII 2009)." For the Inuit of Canada, this has most certainly been the case. Yet strangely, this has actually also strengthened the role the Inuit play in maintaining Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and highlighted the state's hypocrisy on the international stage, potentially creating vulnerability of Canada's claims (Byers 2010).

On the other hand, the Saami people have maintained a high level of mutual interest and cooperation with the Nordic governments, and similarly Greenland's Inuit with Denmark (AHDR 2014). However, in order to understand these relationships and their development, the principle of self-determination must be defined and discussed.

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Self-Determination

Self-determination is related to both sovereignty and decolonization, though it is a comparatively new concept within international law, in great part originating after World War I (MacFarlane 2010) and legally emerging after World War II in the 1945 UN Charter (Crawford 2006; MacFarlane 2010). Hurrell recognizes self-determination as a:

> "*political ideology* asserting that the nation can be distinguished from the state, that nations and states should be coextensive in their boundaries, that every nation should have a state corresponding to it, and that any state that does not express a nation or national ideas is potentially illegitimate (Hurrell 2007: 125-6)

The 1970 International Law Principles Declaration, reaffirming both the Decolonization Declaration and the UN Charter, states that:

> "[b]y virtue of the principle of…self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development (UNGA 1970).

While the above declarations recognize self-determination and provide it legal context, none offer a clear definition of the term itself or that of the term 'peoples,' to which *self*-determination refers. This ambiguity of the term 'peoples' proved problematic during the establishment of the Council, as the U.S. was concerned of its use regarding role indigenous peoples and the Permanent Participants in AC affairs. One of the caveats in the 1996 Ottawa declaration clarifies that any use of the term 'peoples' does not have any significance in international law, ensuring that indigenous rights of self-determination would remain outside of the Council forum (Ottawa 1996; Young 2000).

Self-determination comes with other caveats. Firstly, any form of self-government or expression of self-determination cannot threaten the political unity and territorial integrity of sovereign states (UNGA 1970). Secondly, as stated in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, while self-determination affords IPs the right to autonomy and self-government, this only applies to internal and local affairs (UNDRIP 2007). This "partial" self-determination was the result of nearly 20 years of negotiation, where the indigenous fought for full self-determination in the declaration, but in the end settled for a moderated version pushed by wary nation-states (Koivurova 2015).

Notwithstanding the Arctic Council's position and legal caveats, self-determination and self-government have an established history in the Arctic region, particularly in the past 50 years. The

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unique features of self-determination and paths to autonomy vary in the Arctic, defined greatly by regional dynamics (McBeath 2010). Moreover, increasing awareness of resource development, environmental conditions, and indigenous wellbeing has bolstered indigenous efforts in seeking self-determination and self-governance rights from their respective nation-states (Nuttall 2000). For the IPs of the North, these are momentous steps in the right direction, but there is still no assurance that states will fulfill their commitments—and in a standoff between self-determination and sovereignty, international law inscribes that sovereignty reigns supreme.

2.2.3 Self-Governance

Though the issues between sovereignty and self-determination are complex, many Arctic indigenous peoples have led successful campaigns for their right to self-determination, manifested in a variety of self-governing structures in the Arctic region. These unique governance structures directly affect how the indigenous of the North are represented, both within national governments and the international community.

Though self-determination does not necessarily grant statehood, it is obligatory that states offer opportunities for political representation and local administration (Byers & Baker 2013). Moreover, decentralization and legal growth of Arctic IPs have been greatly responsible for the proliferation of these local and regional governance structures (AHDR 2014). Table 1 provides some of the major self-governance structures in the Arctic. It should be noted, such as in the case of the Saami Parliaments, each nation-state has different positions relating to self-determination and self-governance. Moreover, many of the self-governance regimes present today are the work of indigenous groups over the course of decades (AANDR 2014). Self-governance in the Arctic, is therefore, in a constant state of transformation and evolution, without a predetermined outcome (Henriksen 2008). All of these governance structures are key

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examples of decentralization in the Arctic—an important occurrence for the future of indigenous representation.

Self-Governance Structure	Year	Overview
Nunavut Government	1999	Canadian government created its 3rd territory, covering 1/5th of Canadian territory with a population of roughly 33,000 people (85% Inuit). This was the culmination of indigenous efforts starting in 1973.
Sami Parliaments	Norway: 1989 Sweden: 1993 Finland: 1996 Russia: 2008	All are formalized political institutions, recognized by their respective governments, representing the Saami nationally and internationally,. They manage Saami rights as indigenous peoples, as well as their languages and cultures.
Greenland Home Rule	1979	Home Rule was granted to Greenland by Denmark and in 1981 full self-government commenced. A parliament and premier oversee Greenland's government, while residing under the Danish monarch. These

Table 1. Key examples of indigenous self-governance in the Arctic. Sourced from: AANDC 2014; Henriksen 2008; GHRA 1978.

2.3 Indigenous Representation in the High North

This section introduces indigenous representation as an emerging aspect of Arctic governance. It discusses the significance of representation in the North, as well as the stimuli for its emergence. In closing, particular organizations are briefly outlined, to provide a more holistic view of indigenous representation in the High North.

2.3.1 The Importance of Representation

Before delving into the organizations for indigenous representation in the Arctic, it is helpful to understand why indigenous representation is important. Firstly, indigenous peoples represent a small portion of the global and Arctic population. Of the 4 million people living in the Arctic, roughly 500,000 are indigenous (AC 2015). Small populations, combined with widespread distribution throughout various sovereignties, as well as financial and political inequities, mean that indigenous perspectives are often disregarded (AGP 2010). Some Arctic states, such as Iceland, recognize this problem and emphasize the inclusion of IPOs into international

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platforms in order to maintain their cultural identities and improve their standards of living (IAP 2011).

Similarly, Martello (2008) refers to Arctic IPs as an "at-risk" population, particularly with regard to climate change, stating, "The effects…are most pronounced in largely voiceless and invisible indigenous communities that are at risk of losing their distinct cultures, languages, identities, environments, and livelihoods." Others take this position a step further, viewing indigenous representation as a human rights issue, thereby externalising indigenous concerns to the global forum (Semenova 2005; Koivurova et al 2013). Viewed from the perspective of climate change, indigenous representation may also have implications for emergent climate regimes (Koivurova et al 2013), as well as monitoring, adaptation and innovation (Salick & Byg 2007).

Lastly, Arctic indigenous representation is not only important for those living in the North—the successes of the Northern IPs also carves a path for indigenous peoples worldwide, offering a guide to other marginalized indigenous groups (Tennberg 2009). Such opportunity should be taken seriously, as a growing awareness of the Arctic might very well help to shift or bolster paradigms of indigenous representation elsewhere around the world.

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2.3.2 A Growing Awareness

It is a reasonable question to ask: from where does this growing awareness of the Arctic and indigenous representation stem? In part, this it is in response to scientific contributions over the past few decades, underlining the vulnerability of the North and its people (IPCC 1990; ACIA 2004). However, globalisation has also played a critical role. In light of this, globalization should briefly be recognized in its role as a driver and barrier of societal interaction and change, especially with regard to indigenous representation.

Globalisation is responsible for many of the changes taking place in the Arctic—both physically and conceptually altering how the world engages with a previously ignored region. While, globalisation can be viewed through political, economic and cultural lenses,this discussion focuses on the latter, though recognizes the interconnectedness of the perspectives. On the one hand, it is easy to see globalization as a threat to the IPs of the North. International interests have increased, affecting both the livelihoods and ways of life of indigenous peoples in the region. With the spread of Western cultural colonialism, the homogenization of traditional cultures is a legitimate and common fear (Ritzer 2003). Moreover, O'brien & Leichenko (2000) brought forth the concept of "double exposure"—an issue that endangers certain regions and/or groups of people to both the influences of climate change and globalization. In the case of the Arctic and its indigenous peoples, this "double exposure" effect is quite pertinent and has resulted in degradation of ecosystems as well as traditional livelihoods. Experts have expressed that, next to climate change, globalization might well be the largest threat to the Arctic and its indigenous peoples (IPPC 2001; ACIA 2004). Undoubtedly, globalization contributes significant threats, especially with nation-states increasingly prioritizing energy security and resource development in the North (USGS 2009).

On the other hand, in response to this there has been a sort of de-globalisation—spurring decolonization and growth of regional autonomy, as well as global recognition of indigenous rights (Smith & Ward 2000; Heininen & Southcott 2010). The versatility of indigenous ways of life has spread, creating opportunity for increased diversity—an increase in heterogeneity driven by local, traditional cultures (Ritzer 2003). Furthermore, increasing interconnectivity has allowed spatially distant indigenous groups to come together with a common voice, while at the same time allowing IPOs to engage with them and non-indigenous actors more effectively (AHDR 2014).

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Whether one looks at globalization in a positive or negative light, it has undoubtedly contributed to a growing global awareness of indigenous peoples and the importance of indigenous representation. However, it is not the only contributor to this shifting perspective, particularly in the case of the Arctic. Awareness has also been the direct result of bodies, like the Arctic Council.

2.3.3 International, National & Regional Representation

Though the Council is the predominant forum for intergovernmental cooperation in the Arctic, other organizations also represent the interests of the indigenous. A brief discussion of these serves as a background, to which we can compare the current and future progress of the Permanent Participants, IPOs and indigenous peoples of the High North. These organizations should be seen as complimentary to one another, each with unique mandates but all dedicated to ensuring fair representation of indigenous at different governance levels. It should be noted that, at the institutional level, both the ILO and UNDRIP Conventions play important roles for indigenous peoples, worldwide, by ensuring that states recognize basic indigenous rights (Dingman et al 2014).

UN Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII)

Established in 2000, followed by its inaugural meeting in 2002, the PFII was the UN's response to a call from indigenous peoples for a distinguished body for permanent representation. The PFII's mandate is to discuss indigenous issues related to economic and social development, culture, the environment, education, health and human rights (UNPFII 2015). Some see the Forum's establishment as an historic milestone--the first UN body that gave indigenous equal status with governmental representatives (García-Alix 2003). Others note that while indigenous

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have a seat in the room, it does not ensure that state relations have or will improve, much less that their voices are duly heard (Corntassel 2007).

International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA)

Since 1968, IWGIA has supported human rights at the international level, particularly with regard to indigenous territorial rights, self-determination and cultural integrity (IWGIA 2015). IWGIA provides support to indigenous organisations at the local, regional and national levels, offering outreach, advocacy and project support. IWGIA currently holds observer status in the Arctic Council, offering better connection with the PPs/IPOs and indigenous peoples of the North (AC 2015).

Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR)

Originally designed to support the creation of the Arctic Council, CPAR now holds observer status at Council meetings, while also seeking to actively promote its own activities (CPAR 2015). Like the AC, conferences are held biennially and include representatives from the Arctic 8, the European Parliament, as well Arctic indigenous peoples (via PP status) and observers. The PP status of CPAR does not imply the same participants as the Council and its Standing Committee does not include its PPs in its deliberations. While the Council is a forum interacting within the executive branch, CPAR engages the legislative branches of its member states, making this a unique and complimentary forum to the AC (AHDR 2014). CPAR focuses primarily on shipping, research, human development, education and climate change (ARCUS 2015). Moreover, CPAR and SCPAR have played notable roles in urging the Arctic states to run an assessment of current MEAs in the Arctic, in order to identify and bolster existing regimes (Koivurova 2008). As such, CPAR is an important structure in the Arctic, both with regard to governance and indigenous representation.

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Working Group of Indigenous Peoples (WGIP)

WGIP was permanently established under the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) in 1995. It is represented in both the Barents Regional Council and Regional Committee, while the WGIP Chair represents at the biennial BEAC ministerial meetings. Initiated in 2013, the WGIP Action Plan of Indigenous People seeks to secure indigenous rights, while establishing groundwork for trade, language, culture, and society (WGIP 2013). AS WGIP has its operational role under the auspices of BEAC, the Saami, Nenets and Komi indigenous peoples are represented, as they are present in the Barents Region. Additionally, two PPs—RAIPON and the Saami Council—hold observer status to BEAC and, therefore, also participate in WGIP initiatives where appropriate (BEAC 2015).

Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK)

ITK is the predominant IPO representing the Inuit of Canada and a primary example of successful indigenous representation at the local, national and regional level. ITK is presided over by the presidents of the four regional land claims organizations: Nunavut Tunngavik Inc; Makivik Corporation; Nunatsiavut government; and Inuvialuit Regional Corporation. The organisation effectively functions as a bridge between the 55,000 Inuit it represents and the government of Canada (ITK 2015), emphasising the important role that IPOs play both horizontally and vertically. ITK played a fundamental role in the initiation of land claims settlement starting in 1973 (AANDC 2015).

All of these representation bodies play significant roles in ensuring that indigenous are represented both horizontally and vertically in Arctic governance. Moreover, these organizations and institutions compliment one another in fulfilling this task to Arctic indigenous, with many of looking to the Arctic Council as the primary driver for indigenous representation. With this in

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mind, the following section introduces in more detail the Arctic Council, its historical context, and its role thus far as the predominant forum for international cooperation in the Arctic.

2.4 The Arctic Council

The Arctic Council was established in 1996, with the signing of the Ottawa Declaration. As we near the 20-year anniversary of its inception, there is much to look back on with both approval and criticism. Over the past two decades, there is broad consensus that the AC has grown substantially and has come to play an influential role in the Arctic (Nilsson 2012; Koivurova 2010; Koivurova & Vanderzwaag 2007; Young 2000; English 2013). The following section provides a description of the Council's organizational structure and a brief historical evaluation of the AC, its evolving role as a governance body, and a critical assessment of its activities over the past two decades. These aspects establish an important foundation upon which to situate the analysis and discussion of the Permanent Participants.

2.4.1 Mandate & Structure

The Arctic Council has two main pillars comprising its mandate: environmental protection and sustainable development. Impacted greatly by the 1992 Conference in Rio, as well as existing governance fora embracing the initiative (IASC 1990; CPAR 1993), the AC was primed to include sustainable development in its mandate from the outset. Moreover, the development of the Council was overseen by ICC and its Inuit president Mary Simon, determined that the Council include indigenous peoples in both its decision-making and mandate (English 2013). While environmental protection and sustainable development comprise the core of the AC, its mandate has reformed and evolved over the past two decades (Koivurova 2012; Fenge 2014). In 2004, the results from the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) were released, which bore

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great significance for climate science and policy, as well as governance in the Arctic. Moreover, with the recognition that climate change was a real threat, particularly in the High North, ACIA effectively altered the mandates of all the WGs to include more climate driven approaches (ACIA 2004; Fenge 2014). In recent years, sustainable development has very much taken a larger role in Council activities, undoubtedly due to the role of the PPs in representing indigenous interests and concerns (Semenova 2005).



Figure 2. Structure of Arctic Council and interaction between bodies. Adapted from USDS 2014.

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Member states

Commonly referred to as the Arctic Eight, the member states of the Arctic Council are the eight countries with sovereignty in the Arctic. The member states are the only bodies in the AC with voting rights, whereby all decisions are carried out on a consensus basis (AC 2014). Each member state is responsible for a commitment as chair of the Arctic Council, during which it is responsible for holding the Senior Arctic Official (SAO) meetings and the biennial Ministerial meeting. The member states are, in order of chairmanship cycle:

Arctic State	Chairmanship Year	Location of Ministerial Meeting
Canada	1996-1998	Iqaluit, Canada
United States (Alaska)	1998-2000	Barrow, Alaska
Finland	2000-2002	Inari, Finland
Iceland	2002-2004	Reykjavik, Iceland
Russia	2004-2006	Salekhard, Russia
Norway	2006-2009	Tromsø, Norway
Denmark (Greenland & Faroe Islands)	2009-2011	Nuuk, Greenland
Sweden	2011-2013	Kiruna, Sweden
Canada	2013-2015	Iqaluit, Canada
United States	2015-2017	TBD

Table 2. Member states, chairmanship cycles, and location of ministerial meetings. Sourced from the AC 2015.

Ministers & SAOs

The member states are represented at two levels in the Council. Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) are high-level officials, such as foreign ministry officials or ambassadors, and responsible for organizing the general proceedings of the AC and its subsidiary bodies (AC 2014). They convene at least twice a year, in order to assess the progress of the Council's agenda. Biennially, the Council Chair holds a Ministerial meeting, directed by officials from the state Ministries of Foreign Affairs or the Environment and, by consensus, either approve or deny projects and actions for the subsequent chairmanship (Bloom 1999). Due to their high-level status and potential disconnection with Arctic affairs, the Ministers rely on the work of the SAOs to provide them adequate information in decision-making. The output of this decision-making process is a non-binding declaration that recognizes past accomplishments and establishes the path. (Koivurova 2008).

Permanent Participants

Permanent Participant status was established with the inception of the Arctic Council, in order to ensure that the indigenous peoples of the North would have a voice in Arctic discussions (AC 2015). Specified in its founding documents, the PP status provides, "active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council (Ottawa 1996)." Six of the seven available PP positions are currently filled by indigenous peoples

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organizations (IPOs) that represent varying constituencies throughout the circumpolar North. The current PPs are the:

- **Arctic Athabascan Council (AAC)**
- **Aleut International Association (AIA)**
- **Gwich'in Council International (GCI)**
- **Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)**
- **Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON)**
- **Saami Council (SC)**

As shown in Figure 2, these organizations either represent one people living in multiple countries (AIA, AAC, GCI, ICC & SC) or many peoples living in one country (RAIPON) (IPS 2015). As the PPs are the focus of this research, they will be discussed more thoroughly in the presentation of results.

Figure 3. Map showing the locations of the six Permanent Participant constituencies. Source: AHDR 2014.

Working Groups

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There are currently six permanent working groups that conduct the majority of activities within the Council (Riksrevisjonen 2013). Four of these WGs (AMAP, EPPR, CAFF, & PAME) were established with the AEPS and merged into the Arctic Council, while ACAP and SDWG were established later under the auspices of the Council (Graczyk 2011). The WGs lead the majority of projects, with interaction and support from member states, PPs and observers. Each WG has its own mandate and all produce scientific assessments as their primary deliverables—these assessments are used to advance knowledge of the Arctic, while helping to guide international policies for Arctic environmental protection and sustainable development.

Working Group	Mandate
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP)	Pollution Identification
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF)	Biodiversity
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME)	Marine Pollution & Prevention
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness & Response (EPPR)	Environmental Impacts & Threats
Arctic Contaminants Action Programme (ACAP)	Pollution Reduction & Prevention
Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)	Arctic Communities & Indigenous

Table 3. List of working groups and their mandates.

Established in 2000, SDWG is particularly involved with Arctic indigenous peoples, strengthened by its close relationship with the PPs. Though the PPs interact with all WGs relative to their focus areas, SDWG provides the most direct support for interaction with IPs and projects/initiatives (SDWG 2015). This relationship is critical to indigenous representation and is the driving force behind successful initiatives, including indigenous health, languages and traditional knowledge.

Task Forces

While the WGs are the strategic initiatives of the Council, the task forces (TFs) are tactical initiatives, dealing with short-term issues that need specific attention and expertise. Unlike the permanent WGs, once the objective of a TF has been achieved it is deactivated. The TFs are comprised of expert groups from the WGs, as well as member state representatives. Recently,

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two TFs resulted in the first binding treaties of the AC[1]. Table 4 details the TFs, both past and present, as well as their associated deliverables. Considering the success of past TFs, they will continue to play a role in Council proceedings and should be seen as significant opportunities for interaction by the PPs.

Task Forces	Status	Deliverable
Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention	Active	N/A
Black Carbon and Methane	Active	N/A
Scientific Cooperation	Active	N/A
Circumpolar Business Forum	Active	Arctic Economic Council (2015)
Search & Rescue	Inactive	Binding treaty (2013)
Arctic Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness & Response	Inactive	Binding treaty (2011)
Institutional Issues	Inactive	Permanent Secretariat (2011)

Table 4. List of task forces, current statuses, and deliverables.

Observers

Currently, twelve non-Arctic states, 9 intergovernmental bodies and eleven NGOs hold observer status in the Arctic Council (AC 2015)[2]. Observer status is a controversial topic within the Council, as participation is limited (both substantively and financially) and outspoken positions towards sensitive topics can result in suspension (Graczyk 2011). In 2011, the Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies was created to provide guidelines for interaction and to bolster efforts by subsidiary bodies within the Council (Nuuk 2011). Though Observers are restricted, they contribute most successfully through interaction and partnerships with the WGs and PPs, offering project contributions, resources and financial assistance.

Arctic Council Secretariat

Operational since 2013, ACS is the permanent, administrative hub of the Arctic Council, providing logistical, communication and outreach support to the Chair of the Council and its subsidiary structures, including the PPs (ACS 2015). Prior to its creation, the secretariat rotated biennially with each chairmanship. The establishment of ACS should be seen as an important

[1] The Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic was signed in May 2011 and the Agreement on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response was signed in 2013.
[2] See appendix for full list of observers.

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evolutionary step for the Council, helping to maintain continuity and provide more stable support during and between chairmanships.

Indigenous Peoples Secretariat

Established under the auspices of AEPS, the IPS also merged into the AC structure. IPS is responsible for administrative and logistical matters supporting the PPs, as well as communicating activities to the Arctic IPs and the Arctic Council (IPS 2015). Recently, the secretariat has helped to coordinate and spearhead efforts to establish a permanent funding mechanism for the PPs, holding two workshops over the past year.

2.4.2 Historical context & significance

Emergence of Arctic International Cooperation & the AEPS

Though the Arctic Council was established formally in 1996, the seed of its creation emerged with the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991. AEPS was established in light of growing interest in the high North and increasing pollution problems that were affecting the fragile Arctic environment: its primary mandate being to promote environmental protection (AEPS 1991). The output of the AEPS were scientific reports, highlighting the significant pollution issues affecting the Arctic region (Nilsson 2012). As discussions between the Arctic member states continued, the need for a more formalized forum for Arctic governance quickly emerged and, in 1996, the AEPS was integrated into the newly formed Arctic Council.

Koivurova & Vanderzwaag (2007) note that the AEPS provided a stable framework for the AC, which then helped define and institutionalize the AEPS overtime and provide it with a clear spatial scope. Others note that the AEPS, in contrast to the AC, lacked political

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support (Hauksson 2009) and potentially would be more effective under the new AC structure. However, before discussions began around the AEPS in 1989, the Arctic was not perceived as a place for international governmental cooperation (Hauksson 2009; Kestkitalo 2009; Koivurova 2010). The AEPS was critical, then, in creating an international forum for Arctic issues and bringing together the eight Arctic states that now represent the members of the AC.

The Role of the Council

The establishment of the AC was intended to broaden and stimulate Arctic cooperation, by offering an organizational framework (Ottawa 1996). Conceptually, there was a clear distinction made between the AEPS and the Arctic Council, as the AC included in its mandate the issue of sustainable development. This mandate is clearly expressed in its establishing declaration:

> "To provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic (Ottawa Declaration 1996)."

Additionally, the AC was assumed oversight of the four existing Working Groups (established under AEPS), the newly established Permanent Participants (representing the indigenous peoples of the Arctic), and any additional subsidiary bodies established within the forum. More than a governance body, the AC functions as a forum for scientific research and international cooperation.

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Beyond its written mandate, the role of the Arctic Council has become much more in the eyes and minds of those who observe it. Some authors see the AC as a literal or conceptual forum for facilitating cooperation among different stakeholders (Koivurova & Vanderzwaag 2007; Rhemann 2012; Hauksson 2009), allowing the Arctic to be perceived as a distinct political region. However, others see it as something more abstract and transformative in nature—Young (2000) and Breum (2012) recognize its agenda setting capacity and role as both the symbolic and

literal voice of the Arctic. Dodds (2011) describes it as a body seeking to gather and attract human and non-human aspects of the Arctic. It is, perhaps most abstractly, seen as a cognitive forerunner and new form of inclusive, adaptive governance (Nilsson 2012; Kestkitalo 2009). This latter point is an important one, as it suggests that the AC sets the stage—possibly even trajectory—for governance in the North to include a variety of perspectives and approaches for adaptation to a rapidly changing region.

Although all seem to agree on the AC's mandated presence as a scientific and governance body, more nuanced understandings illustrate the complexity and dynamic nature of what the Council can and does represent.

2.4.3 Retrospective evaluation

Achievements & Strengths

The AC, in its relatively short existence, has successfully established itself as a scientific and research hub for the High North. Through the diligence and achievements of its Working Groups (especially the ACIA and AMAP), the Arctic has moved out of the periphery and grabbed the attention of a diverse set of international actors, regimes and organizations. Koivurova & Vanderzwaag (2007) note the AC as a catalyst for knowledge production and scientific data, as well as an energizer for Arctic indigenous peoples. Similarly, Koivurova (2010) and Shadian (2013) highlight the achievement in establishing a distinctive role for the indigenous, helping to integrate these communities into the policy-making process. The AC has also provided practical guidance for risk reduction and knowledge generation, while successfully tackling Arctic pollution and progressing emergency preparedness' and response (Hauksson 2009). Both Nilsson (2012) and Koivurova (2010) emphasize its influence on policy development through unbiased and holistic scientific assessments, while Rhemann (2012)

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notes its success in fostering political harmony in the Arctic. This latter point is often argued against, addressed in the following section, as the AC has managed to stay politically neutral by refusing to discuss sensitive topics that might lead to conflict amongst the member states.

Shortcomings & Weaknesses

Although the AC shows considerable achievements in the realm of science and indigenous representation, a cloud of failings also plagues it. Many of these problems stem from the AC's soft-law structure, rather than from the quality of work the Council performs. As Koivurova & Vanderzwaag (2007) point out, soft initiatives are lacking in teeth, in turn making them less respected within the international political forum thereby making it extremely difficult to affect decision-making with regard to the Arctic. Moreover, as soft-law has no legal status (but rather relies on the words and goodwill of signatories and national bodies), the AC is not capable of enacting or enforcing regulations (Hauksson 2009).However, this changed with the two recent binding agreements passed in 2011 and 2013, though it is difficult to say how well these will be regulated. Nilsson goes on to note that without overarching regulation, there is an absence of common goals, targets and timetables, upon which the member states can or must agree. Nilsson (2012) discusses this lack of political agreement within the Arctic 8 and emphasizes how this can weaken the presence of the AC—the United States and the Russian Federation are often pointed to as main instigators in such political schisms. Additionally, Koivurova (2010) focuses on fragmented, external legal frameworks and absence of effective instruments as the main barriers to AC success, while Rhemann (2012) and Kestkitalo (2009) blame the lack of essential, stable funding and resources as a perpetual problem.

However, intramural problems also exist within the AC. Although the Working Groups have successfully delivered scientific support, their individual mandates and divided purposes result in a lack of initiative and capacity to communicate (Breum 2012). This lack of communication

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affects both the internal and external relations of the AC, making its impact and influence scattered and weak. Moreover, it can significantly reduce efficiency, if resources are used to gather information that already exists and are simply not being shared between the different initiatives/groups. Perhaps most critically, the AC is criticized by Koivurova & Vanderzwaag (2007) for its "study and talk" mentality, which can be fruitless and, in some cases, lead to failed initiatives. These latter, internal problems are those that most significantly affect the PPs, as they rely on the WGs for project implementation and the member states for support.

Conclusion

Arctic governance is saturated by a multitude of national and international regimes, organizations and institutions. Moreover, indigenous rights vary greatly between the Arctic states, making international indigenous representation, within these structures, all the more complex. Although discussing a particular aspect, to the exclusion of others, can paint an unclear, incomplete or even unfair picture of the governance dynamics of the High North, scoping down provides opportunity to see how the most influential of these governance structures has come to represent the Arctic and its indigenous peoples.

Moreover, understanding the history of the Arctic Council, its strengths and weaknesses, is essential for assessing its Permanent Participants. Though the PPs are independent organizations that also function externally to the Council, they are very much bound to its decisions when functioning within it. Therefore, noting how and why the Council fails and succeeds can be a helpful roadmap for the PPs moving forward.

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3. METHODOLOGY

The following section discusses the methodological processes of this thesis, as well as the methods used for data collection and analysis, relevant limitations, and approaches to ensure validity.

3.1 Justification

Responding to an absence of literature and data on the subject, the researcher selected a exploratory, qualitative approach. A qualitative approach seeks to answer questions and produce undetermined, broad-reaching findings (Jack & Clarke 1998), and was preferred for its flexible, descriptive and inductive approach (Mason 2002). Moreover, inductive analysis is useful for generating themes and identifying patterns (Patton 2005). While a quantitative approach could be useful at later stage, in order to test the developing theory, the initial lack of data made a strong case for an inductive, exploratory approach. Exploratory research helps to generate a posteriori hypotheses, rather than situating the research into already existing ones (Jaeger & Halliday 1998). Moreover, this approach does not necessarily seek to contribute to a concrete theory (Edgar & Sedgwick 2002). Additionally, as time in the field was segmented and interaction with participants unique, the researcher employed triangulation to ensure the most representative and substantive results (Anfara, Jr., Brown & Mangione 2002; Stake 2005).

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3.2 Data Collection

Data, both primary and secondary, were gathered from a variety of sources. Primary data was gathered via unstructured and semi-structured interviews, as well as participation in and observation of a three-day capacity building workshop with the Permanent Participants.

Secondary data was gathered through media and document analysis, particularly of AC and PP meetings and reports from the past 20 years.

The researcher used a purposive sampling strategy, as the broader generalisations offered by probability sampling were not applicable to the research objectives (Oliver & Jupp 2006). Using stakeholder sampling and analysis, the researcher ensured that a broad set of Arctic Council stakeholders were represented (Reed et al. 2009): this included member states, permanent participants, workings groups, observers, policy advisors, consultants, and academics in the field. As many of these groups were difficult to contact, a snowball sampling technique was also used, in order to identify pertinent individuals and establish connections (Goodman 1961). This technique was particularly helpful at the outset of research, as stakeholders were many and difficult to reach without pre-existing connections. A limitation of this strategy is its vulnerability to bias, as the researcher determined selection criteria—therefore, it is possible that pertinent individuals were not included, either intentionally or unintentionally. Moreover, as the strategy is not representative, it cannot be generalized to a broader population (though this was not a desired outcome) (Biernacki & Waldorf 1981).

During the period between February and May of 2015, the researcher conducted 22 interviews with 20 interviewees. Individuals were located throughout the eight Arctic states, ranging from capital cities to remote towns in the North. Table 5 provides an overview of the participant spectrum.

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Stakeholder Group	Number	Description
Member states	2	Canada; Denmark
Permanent Participants	7	AIA (1); ICC (2); AAC (1); GCI (1); SC (1); RAIPON (1)
Working Groups	3	AMAP/ACAP; SDWG; CAFF
Observers/Other AC bodies	3	UArctic; ACS; IPS
Consultants/Policy Experts	2	N/A
Academics	3	N/A

Table 5. List of interviewees by stakeholder group, number of individuals, and descriptions.

Interviews lasted at most 1-½ hours and at least 30 minutes, with the majority lasting roughly an hour. Due to varying location and time restrictions, roughly half of the interviews were conducted via telecommunications (primarily Skype). All other interviews were conducted in person during field research in Ottawa, Canada and Whitehorse, Yukon. As confidentiality was a concern for some interviewees, individuals were identified by correlated codes (P1, P2, P3…). Both semi-structured & unstructured interviews were used in fieldwork, as this method allowed the researcher to gather information that was otherwise not available (Hox & Boeije 2005). Unstructured interviews allowed the researcher and participant more room for open discussion and contextualization of the topics, providing greater depth to both the content and context (Given 2008). Moreover, they proved useful at the start of research, helping to generate pertinent themes and establish a protocol for semi-structured interviews. The researcher utilised a semi-structured format for the majority of interviews and, while a basic protocol framed these discussions (see appendix), often, new questions emerged or evolved. Interviews were supplemented by group discussions, informal conversations and e-mail correspondence.

The researcher was invited to attend the PP Capacity Workshop held in Whitehorse, Yukon from March 17-19, 2015. In attendance were representatives of the six PPs, guest speakers, academics, and a Council Chair representative. Not only did this allow for observation of the Permanent Participants in a formal Council setting, but offered invaluable opportunities to get to know the PPs, engage them in conversation, and experience how they interacted individually and as a group. The researcher was also invited to activities after each day of the workshop, which allowed for more candid interaction with the PPs and other attendees. Observation was an important aspect of the research, helping to expose the researcher to the topic, allowing more nuanced details to emerge during interviews, and helping to validate the research through group discussion (Ritchie et al 2013). During both interviews and observations, the researcher took notes both to record occurrences and conversations, but also to generate ideas and create new

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approaches to the data (Strauss 2009). Table 6 illustrates the methods, sources, and documentation method used for primary data collection.

Documents were selected that offered a foundational understanding of the Council and its evolution, as well as reports and papers that contributed to knowledge of the Permanent Participants. The literature review focused on three topics: Arctic governance, indigenous representation, and the Arctic Council. General literature was selected through investigation using these topics and narrowed down according to applicable sub-topics. Selection of appropriate literature was evaluated on the number of scholarly citations and review of paper abstracts.

Method	Source	Documentation
Stakeholder/Expert Interviews	Member state representatives Permanent Participants/IPOs Consultants/Policy advisors Observers Working Groups Research Institutions/Academics	Notes Audio recordings
Observation	PP capacity workshop Informal interactions	Media, field notes
Document Analysis	Arctic Council declarations PP reports Working Group reports	Synthesis matrices

Table 6. Data collection methods, sources and documentation.

3.3 Data Analysis

Content analysis was used to identify underlying themes, which were quantified to show emergent patterns in the data. Data were analysed employing the help of the qualitative research software, Nvivo. The researcher transcribed all interviews and commenced coding. A recursive process allowed the researcher to revisit the data and systematically narrow-down and categorize the existing codes into themes and sub-themes (see figure 4). From these, three major drivers and barriers were selected, determined by frequency in the data and significance denoted by the interviewees.

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

Figure 4. Data analysis and coding process chart.

SWOT & STEEPLE

Both STEEPLE and SWOT frameworks were used for analysis of the data. In conjunction, the two methods developed a strong set of internal and external factors affecting the PPs, from which major drivers and barriers were be established and discussed. Additionally, using both methods aided in establishing validity in the primary data. The researcher used a SWOT analysis (see figure 5) to broadly categorize data into its four themes (strengths-weaknesses-opportunities-threats) in order to identify the factors assisting or impeding indigenous representation by the PPs. The SWOT focused on primary data for categorization. The STEEPLE framework, comprised of seven categories (see figure 6), focused on external factors and complimented the SWOT analysis. STEEPLE used both primary and secondary data for categorization.

Figure 5. SWOT framework



Figure 6. STEEPLE framework

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3.5 Limitations

The most significant limitations to this research can be considered logistical in nature. As the research focused on an intergovernmental forum, with locations in eight different countries, the proximity to pertinent locations and individuals was a difficult barrier to overcome. Fortunately, telecommunications (primarily Skype) allowed remote access to interviewees. An extension of this limitation could affect data content, as the researcher lacked the face-to-face interaction that can be essential in connecting with participants. Additionally, as the research period of this thesis extended from January to May, the April 24th biennial ministerial meeting ensured that contacting individuals and securing interviews would be all the more difficult due to hectic schedules.

Perhaps the most unexpected limitation, confidentiality concerns were immediately expressed by some of the interviewees. Therefore, portions of collected data could not be used directly in this thesis, as doing so would violate confidentiality agreements and the sporadically invoked Chatham House Rule. Respecting the principles of ethics, all interviewees were given a reference code, in order to ensure both anonymity and confidentiality during research and throughout the thesis.

3.6 Validity

The researcher performed triangulation of the data sets (both primary and secondary) to reinforce emergent, as well as eliminate unrepresentative, themes. Furthermore, a few of the interviewees offered to provide their expertise through a review of draft chapters of the thesis as it progressed, which helped in assuring validity.

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4. RESULTS

4.1 The Permanent Participants

"The PPs cannot be treated as a block—they must be understood and treated independently (P8)."

Previous literature concerning the PPs has mainly focused on their historical context within the Council, with a few pieces of literature elucidating their interactions with the Council member states and subsidiary bodies (Semenova 2005; Dingman et al 2014). However, what the current literature lacks is detail on the similarities and differences of the PPs, which creates a sense that all of the PPs are equally concerned with the same issues. While the role of Permanent Participant affords all of the IPOs the same position in the Council, this should not be seen as a representation of common interests and needs. Conversely, in order to understand the success of the PPs, as a group, the distinctions between the IPOs must be clear. Not only are these distinctions essential in identifying drivers and barriers affecting the PPs, they are centrally important in understanding the individual mandates and concerns of the IPOs. The inclusion of this new data hopes to shed light on some of the more nuanced, as well as contrasting, differences of the PPs/IPOs. Table 7 offers an overview of the IPOs and highlights their individual strengths and weaknesses.

IPO	Year Est.	PP Status	Pop. (~)	Human capacity	Strengths	Weaknesses
SC	1956	1996	50,000	• 4 branches	✓ **Presence in international fora** ✓ Reputation ✓ **Well established**	⊗ Unstable funding ⊗ Variation in support ⊗ **External communication**
ICC	1977	1996	150,000	• 4 branches • 3 permanent staff • 7-8 project support • 2 consultants	✓ **Strong member support** ✓ **Community presence** ✓ Presence in international fora ✓ Reputation	⊗ Funding limits projects ⊗ **Variation in branch capacity**
RAIPON	1990	1996	250,000	• 35 branches • 5 permanent	✓ **Strong interaction**	⊗ Remote constituencies

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				staff	**with WGs**	⊗ Coordination ⊗ **Political intervention** ⊗ **No funding**
AIA	1998	1998	15,000	• 2 branches • 4 permanent • Occasional contractual	✓ **Good use of resources** ✓ **High commitment** ✓ Reputation	⊗ Lack of communication ⊗ **Limited funding** ⊗ Human resources
GCI	1999	2000	9,000	• 3 branches • 1 permanent • Occasional contractual	✓ **Participation in alternative fora**	⊗ **Limited capacity** ⊗ **Remote constituencies** ⊗ External communication
AAC	2000	2000	45,000	• 2 branches • 1 permanent • 1 contractual	✓ **Strong sense of solidarity** ✓ Commitment to environmental initiatives	⊗ **Limited resources** ⊗ **Disorganization** ⊗ Outreach to constituency

Table 7. Description of PP organizational backgrounds, capacity, and primary strengths & weaknesses

4.2 SWOT & STEEPLE Results

The following section presents the results of the SWOT and STEEPLE analyses used to categorize and contextualize the relevant data. Four categories were used to organize sub-themes: Structural capacity, human capacity, cultural, and organizational. In discussing the results, many of the issues were interrelated and often contingent upon one another--weaknesses can be circumvented to optimize strengths or minimized to avoid threats, strengths can be used to avoid threats or take advantage of opportunities, opportunities can overcome weaknesses, and threats can be managed to capitalize on opportunities (Pearce & Robinson 2013). The following process intends to make explicit these interactions and establish the major barriers & drivers affecting the PPs.

4.3.1 Strengths

Although the strengths discussed here are exhibited by most of the PPs, themes were also included that identified potential strengths. For this research, identifying potential strengths was

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equally important to presently exhibited strengths. These more latent strengths can often be the most valuable and are commonly neglected or taken for granted. For example, during interviews and discussions, *solidarity* was frequently discussed but rarely was it explicitly addressed as a strength.

Structural Capacity:

Connection of IPOs

The PP status provides a common forum for the otherwise independent IPOs. Though the organizations occasionally interact in alternate fora, their status in the AC ensures a permanent structure for discourse and collaboration. Moreover, the PPs have direct influence not only in Council decisions, but also in the WGs and TFs, helping them to better facilitate projects and initiatives of interest to their constituencies. As one PP noted:

> I strongly believe in the Council and its ability to connect the IPs and bring in some of the best scientists in the world. It has created experiences and opportunities we do not have elsewhere (P4)."

Though there are certainly problems related to the AC and PP status, all interviewees agreed that the Council offers something wholly unique and helps to bridge the gap between Arctic member states, indigenous peoples, and the broader international forum.

Human Capacity:

"Like everything, the success of the organization is all about people (P18)."

Dedication

The human dynamic of the Council was an important topic. It was not uncommon that many individuals would make reference to a particular person within the PPs, praising the amount of commitment they displayed. Moreover, all of the PPs *at least* briefly discussed the commitment of their staff. It quickly became evident that, not only are the PPs passionate, they are extremely dedicated to ensuring that indigenous voices are heard and represented in the Council. Speaking

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with one PP representative it was clear that commitment is at the heart of how the IPOs function:

> "I mean, our people are not working here and doing this because they have to or because of the money—they are here because this means something to them, and they are committed to helping create a dialogue between the communities and others. These are our communities, so of course we want to do out best to represent them (P19)."

Management/leadership

Similarly, much of the focus on human capacity and resources comes down to leadership and management. It is entirely possible to have a brilliant and dedicated staff, but if they lack the proper direction that stems from good leadership, then significant resources can be wasted. From the outset of the Council, leadership has played a critical role, especially for the PPs. The Council's creation was, in part, due to the persistence and dedication of leaders like Mary Simon and inspired voices like that of Rosemarie Kuptana (English 2013). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Sheila Watt-Cloutier would, first, play a key role in demanding the attention of the international community concerning POPs in the Arctic, and later, push policy recommendations from the ACIA report that established the Arctic as the face of climate change (cite). Reflecting back on these achievements, one individual said:

> "We were surprised at our success. We didn't realize that if we organized ourselves well, thought strategically, and had a charismatic leader, we could actually make some gains (P7)."

And these were not just gains, but tangible actions that led to the creation of an international agreement on POPs and global awareness of climate change and the Arctic. Perhaps early leaders in the Council and PPs set the bar high, but this does not diminish smaller efforts and achievements made at the organizational level. Therefore, management should not be understated, especially when the tasks at hand are difficult. While speaking with one of the WGs, they echoed the importance of management to their organizational effectiveness:

> "Our executive secretary takes great initiative, gets projects going, and has a great staff. This is hard for a group like SDWG, without a permanent secretariat, as it creates problems and a lack of continuity (P18)."

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This latter point concerning SDWG is an important one with regard to the PPs. Due to its mandate, SDWG has the most interaction with the PPs (P9) through, inter alia, traditional knowledge, human health, and indigenous languages. However, because the SDWG chair rotates with the chairmanships, both the management and leadership roles are in a constant state of fluctuation. If SDWG is the primary connection with the IPs of the North, then it creates a significant barrier to organizational effectiveness. While this is not common to the other WGs, who all have permanent secretariats, it should be noted as a critical example of the problems that can arise from lack of leadership or proper management.

However, more recently, the PPs have begun to initiate projects on their own, greatly in response to a lack in leadership and continuity. Moreover, spearheading particular initiatives has helped to resolve some of the other systemic leadership issues throughout the Council. The Indigenous Peoples Contaminant Action Program (IPCAP), one of the expert groups under ACAP, is a primary example where lack of leadership led to problems with effectiveness. Recently, AIA played a big part in spearheading the Alaskan/Russian Black Carbon Project, which one interviewee recognized as an important catalyst:

> "The challenge has been that IPCAP is very much cultured by the countries and lack of leadership has led to stagnation. This changed when AIA opened the Black Carbon project—AIA is a huge participator and the project now looks very promising (P2)."

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Strong consultants

Relatedly, while the PPs are able to thrive in many of the SDWG projects due to their implicit knowledge and experience with the issues, they have a much more difficult time working with the other WGs. Though lack of leadership might surely play a role, a large part of this deficiency stems from limited technical knowledge. In lieu of this, the PPs contract with consultants to help them deal with policy and scientific/technical issues. Though these individuals are, more often

than not, non-indigenous, they fill a very important gap in the human capacity of the PPs. However, one interviewee discussed potential concern of PP reliance on consultants:

> "With the consultants, though they provide much needed technical capacity, you have to wonder how much they control or define the agenda of the PPs (P9)."

This was not to say that all of the consultants have divergent agendas from the PPs, but rather that there should be some caution in relying upon them for every initiative. However, from observation and interviews—including both PPs and consultants—there was general consensus that a great deal of trust and appreciation between the two groups. Moreover, some consultants have long-standing working relationships with the PPs (as with AIA and ICC), which creates a greater sense of trust and transparency. Overall, their presence is one that not only supports the PPs, but also is an aspect that they desperately need to stay up to par with the technical initiatives and policy discussions.

Cultural

Solidarity:

Permanent Participant status presents a forum where the IPOs can come together and discuss issues affecting them, both individually and as a group of organizations representing IPs of the North. Being able to balance individual interests with those of the group is an inherent strength, especially considering the influence PPs have when they act together in the Council. In discussing the role of the PPs in the Council, one individual noted that:

> "There is fairly strong consensus that it [the Council] does provide a strong status for the PPs. If they are united, they can easily block a project." (P1)

During discussions with all of the interviewees, it was apparent that a sense of solidarity most often emerges when the PPs are against something. However, this same solidarity approach is evident when the PPs want to bring something to the table. In order to achieve anything, however, similarities need to be identified and embraced. As stated by one of the PPs:

> "When you get down to the community level, there are always more similarities than differences. Because whether you are a herder, hunter, sealer, Inuit, G'wichin, or whatever—there are more

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> similarities, so many similarities—and there would be greater strength in the PPs banding together in solidarity with one voice…[Our organization] has always tried to promote this kind of interaction and solidarity." (P4)

Another way that solidarity was discussed was through emphasis of a shared vision, particularly with regard to securing permanent funding. During the capacity workshop, foundation representatives urged the PPs to find a shared vision, as many external organizations need to be approached with clear objectives and direction from the applicants. Without a sense of shared vision, foundations might easily be dissuaded, resulting in missed opportunities.

Traditional knowledge:

As the Arctic transforms from the pressures of climate change, the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples is playing an important role in the way we confront these changes. While scientists have advanced technologies and vast resources to assess and monitor Northern environmental change, their relationship with the Arctic is young. Therefore, integration of TK into the workings of the Council comes at a critical time—however, until very recently, this integration has been a slow process. In discussion with interviewees, they noted:

> "Currently, the AC is trying to formulate how traditional knowledge is integrated into the Working Groups. They also need to focus on getting the information out there and into the communities, which they are working on but not enough (P4)."

> "Though it has been present since the beginning, there is currently a big push to incorporate traditional knowledge into the Council (P9)."

Optimistically, the outgoing Canadian chair made great strides for integrating TK into the work of the Council. Again, one of the concerns discussed with SDWG was the lack in continuity stemming from the rotating secretariat. There was hope, however, that the U.S. and its SDWG chair would continue these efforts. A policy advisor to the PPs noted, "While much research needs to be done, it seems that TEK could help to provide the 'workable criterion for making decisions about human/environment relations' identified by Oran Young, and ensure that sustainable development is more than declaratory rhetoric (Fenge 2014)." In short, there is

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reason to believe that integration of TK could have lasting and tangible effects on Arctic initiatives.

From the WG perspective, there was also an interest in TK and hope that it will continue to become a larger part of the Council and its initiatives. All of the respectively interviewed WGs affirmed their interest in TK, with one stating:

> "The PPs have great ideas for projects and initiatives. [Our organization] is very interested in all types knowledge and would like to integrate more, especially indigenous peoples and traditional knowledge (P18)."

While some of the smaller organizations have more difficulty in working with the communities on a regular basis, whether due to remote location or lack of resources, the larger organizations interact with and rely heavily on the indigenous communities for TK. This connection with the communities is essential for the sharing of any kind of knowledge. One of the member state representatives emphasized this commitment:

> "For example, ICC is very focused on involving their [indigenous] communities--they always say that they are not the experts and need to involve the locals who know best (P10)."

During observations, TK was a common topic of discussion and one that all of the PPs seemed to agree on as a strength. When discussing the topic of funding, TK was repeatedly referenced as a place for common ground between the PPs, and an initiative that would attractive to external parties. One participant noted:

> "I think TK initiatives, getting all the Permanent Participants on one page, would be an attractive option for a pilot project for funding opportunities (P14)."

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Organizational

Common Needs:

During observation of the PPs, frequent discussion surrounded the identification of common needs. When contextualized in the conceptual framework, this can be viewed as opportunities for turning their mutual weaknesses into strengths. Regardless of the unique structures or

capacities of the PPs, all of them are concerned with particular issues: proper representation, capacity building, funding, indigenous wellbeing, environmental health, and sustainable development. This is not to exclude the reality that there are a great number of initiatives that are unique to each PP and their constituencies, but rather to accentuate that there is a substantial amount of common ground between them. However, while interacting with the PPs and watching them engage with one another, it was apparent that finding this common ground was something of a novelty. It was emphasized many times throughout their interactions that they were, surprisingly, in agreement. One PP stated,

> "I think we should recognize the importance of all six of us being at the table for this discussion and agreeing that we should move forward together (P16)."

Throughout the workshop, the focus of discussion was on capacity and funding, so a great many issues were not discussed in detail. However, as it was clear that funding was a primary concern for all of the PPs, the interaction focused on how the PPs could work together towards securing the common need of permanent funding. And, though lack of funding was the primary concern, there was also a recognition that the PPs need to channel their needs in order to effectively engage internal and externals actors.

> "The current reality is that there is insufficient funding, which in turn affects the ability and quality of our participation. Finding a common language between the PPs will help to secure external support (p14)."

Moreover, one of the greatest common needs of the PPs is their responsibility to represent their constituencies in international fora. During the Canadian chair, a strong focus was placed on the human dimension of the Arctic, which opened opportunities for the PPs to advocate for their IPs more effectively. This emphasis on sustainable development is something at the centre of all the PP agendas, so this gave them an opportunity to appeal to both external and internal stakeholders:

> "The AC is beginning to focus more and more on the human dimension. The thing that is important to us is to make others know that the Arctic is an inhabited area and cannot be compared to the Antarctic. It is important for us to say that we actually live here and have our own rules and own cultures, so we are happy to highlight this area. (P10)."

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Continuity:

One of the common strengths mentioned was the essential role PPs play in providing continuity to the Council. As the chairmanship rotates biennially, the AC is in a constant state of change. While the WGs play an important part in maintaining some of this continuity, it is the PPs who have been present and engaged in nearly every decision, since the Council's inception. One interviewee noted the importance PPs play in maintaining continuity at meetings, stating:

> "The Permanent Participants provide continuity to the Arctic Council, giving it more objectivity to cross-cutting issues and clashes. An example of this was the recent SAO meeting, where 90% of the substantive comments were coming from the PPs, because they know the issues from experience. The PPs have a lot of influence and help to prevent a lot of recurring issues that would not be understood by the changing SAOs and member state ministers (P9)."

From this, it seems that PPs are not only essential in maintaining continuity, but also make the Council more effective and efficient by preventing it from being side-tracked by recurrent issues or topics. Another interviewee also cited experiences with PPs at meetings:

> "The role the PPs play in the [SAO] meetings are at the centre of how the Council functions. In fact, the PPs are the ones that ground these meetings, conceptually and practically, because the PPs do not change, while the SAOs and subsidiary groups do. During the meetings, it is obvious that PPs are smart, good, experienced people—they know how and when to deploy their strengths, understand when they can/cannot make a difference, and contribute invaluable perspectives (P8)."

The PPs need to recognize this unique role and use it to bolster their efforts within the Council.

Validation:

> "The presence of the PPs makes the Council what it is and having them there is what separates the Arctic Council from other intergovernmental forums. The PPs function as the validating entity of the Arctic Council (P8)."

As discussed, the AC is unique in its treatment and recognition of the indigenous organizations, via its designation of the IPOs as Permanent Participants. Moreover, though the PPs do not have a "vote" in Council decisions, their consultative status gives them a unique and influential place within AC proceedings and decisions. This recognition affords the PPs a strangely permeating power, in that the member states must take care to respect their positions when making decisions. Much of this influence is rooted in the role IPOs, particularly ICC, played in the early 1990s in demanding that the emerging Arctic Council would respect the interests of the

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indigenous peoples and secure them a permanent seat at the table (P15). If it were not for the ICC, SC and RAIPON, as well as the efforts of individuals like Mary Simon, in infusing indigenous representation into the Council's physical and conceptual framework (English 2013), the strength of the PPs as validating entities might not exist as it does today. However, as it stands, for the Council to maintain its support from the PPs, IPs and a variety of external actors that influence its presence and trajectory, it must respect the role PPs play in giving unique purpose to both the Council initiatives and its identity. One individual addressed this by saying:

> "The PPs have a strong voice compared to other forums. And, although the member states have the final word, there is no other forum where the indigenous peoples are heard like the Arctic Council (P17)."

This is not to say that member states heed every recommendation from the PPs. In fact, it is written into the Council's Rules of Procedure that the member states have the right to meet, in particular circumstances, without the consultation of the PPs (AC 2014). Though this is rare, it does happen when member states feel issues are at hand that might potentially affect the interests of the member states outside of the Council. However, so long as the PPs maintain their position in the Council, as such, their presence as a validating entity should be held as a valuable bargaining chip.

Categories	Factors	Strengths	Weaknesses
Structural	Connection of IPOs	•	
	Communication		•
	Allocation of resources		•
Human	Dedication	•	
	Leadership/Management	•	
	Strong Consultants	•	
	Limited HR		•
	Lack of accountability		•
	Technical knowledge		•
Cultural	Traditional knowledge	•	
	Solidarity	•	
	Lack of coalescence		•
	Discord		•
Organizational	Validation	•	
	Continuity	•	
	Common needs	•	
	Funding		•

Table 8. Prevalent strengths and weaknesses of the SWOT analysis.

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4.3.2 Weaknesses

Structural Capacity

Communication

Though IPS provides some translation services the PPs, language is a significant barrier, especially for organizations like RAIPON. Moreover, communicating with the communities is even more difficult, due the many dialects spoken in some regions. This is difficult for the PPs, on the one hand, interacting with their own constituencies. On the other hand, it creates barriers for the WGs and TFs that are trying to work in these communities on particular projects and initiatives.

> "Also, there is an international dynamic—considering the indigenous people might not speak English, this adds complexities when TFs and projects need to come on-line (P5)."

The role of the PPs in bridging this gap is important, but in some cases has led to failed or stalled projects. Beyond language, communication becomes a problem when engaging with the indigenous, due to lack of capacity and outreach.

> "The local indigenous populations are trying to understand what the AC actually does for them, but here is HUGE disconnect between the AC/PPs and the indigenous communities (P3)."

It was felt by some of the interviewees that the PPs need to do a better job of representing the indigenous peoples. A few of the PPs who agreed with this view noted lack of capacity and resources as the main barriers to more effective interaction and representation. Still, there was a sense that this is only part of the problem.

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Use/Allocation of resources

It is also important to look at the broader structural capacity of the AC, particularly the capacity offered by IPS and ACS. Both of these secretariats are in place to facilitate the actions of the Council, with the IPS designed specifically to aid the PPs with logistical and administrative efforts. From observation and discussion, it was apparent that neither of these resources is adequately used, and sometimes can even be viewed contentiously by the PPs. This would seem

contradictory, as all of the PPs during interviews voiced concern regarding significant lack of resources.

An area where the PPs can improve is through properly using resources at their disposal, such as ACS and IPS (particularly for logistical needs). As both secretariats have established relationships with all six PPs, this would be a natural place to seek resources. During discussions, one interviewee emphasized the need to focus on available resources, particularly noting the potential role of IPS:

> "Enhancing capacity means that PPs can be part of setting the agenda, shaping discussion and setting priorities based on a strategic plan. So how do we do this? One—Money. Two—Available resources—understanding how we can use what we already have more effectively and efficiently. What is IPS? I think it is what the PPs want it to be (P12)."

Moreover, with modern telecommunications, meetings can be attended remotely, if attending in person is impossible or impractical. This was brought up repeatedly during observations, though there was a sense that some of the PPs did not see these existing resources as preferable options. One individual, while discussing their view on this problem said:

> "It can be very difficult to get them [the PPs] to respond, either through emails or calls. I'm not sure whether this is due to a lack of capacity, lack of interest, or lack of technical knowledge. The ACS can offer very concrete things to the PPs, so, I would imagine, the lack of communication is problematic (both for the PPs and the ACS) (P14)."

This view was reinforced by observation and interaction with some of the PPs, as some were wary to speak through telecommunications while others simply did not respond or engage at all. In part, this is related to the strain on human resources (which many interviewees expressed), but also that certain individuals were in locations without access to reliable telecommunications. However, it should be noted that sometimes it felt as though there was simply not interest. The reasons for this could be many, but it was seen as an unfortunate occurence to observe and discuss as it results in missed opportunities that could support the PPs.

Human Capacity

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Limited HR

Human resources and capacity were commonly discussed. Both of these weaknesses are tied to broader external and structural barriers, making them particularly difficult to manage. Looking at each organization's permanent personnel, it is obvious that most of the PPs have more on their plates than they can handle alone. If it is not enough that they must handle organizational issues, they are required to be in many places at once (something difficult to achieve with a limited budget and few hands on deck). One interviewee explained this by saying:

> "There is so much going on in the Council, the PPs can simply not be a part of all of them. They can only be in so many places or involved in this many projects at once. So, each needs to pick and choose the most appropriate (P15)."

Although it is reasonable to suggest that not all PPs can be a part of every project they are interested in, it was unanimously felt that limited human capacity made engaging with certain projects difficult or even impossible. Some of these issues can only be resolved with more stable funding and systemic changes, but there are also issues internal to the PPs that arose as potential problems. Fortunately, even though these human capacity issues exist, it also means they can be managed, by the PPs, to create more efficient and effective organizations.

Lack of accountability & stagnation

All organizations run the risk of stagnation, particularly when coupled with a lack of accountability. Moreover, often these things occur without the organisation's explicit awareness—they happen over time and might only be apparent to external actors. In speaking with individuals, predominantly those external to the PPs, both of these issues were seen as potential problems.

> "Another big problem is lack of accountability. The PP members do not all have terms or elections, so it might be the case that individuals remain in the same positions for as long as they wish (which can create problems if certain perspectives are maintained or particular interests are being protected) (P3)."

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Even if representatives or members of the PPs are, in fact, chosen through elections, this does not guarantee that new individuals or ideologies will take their place. After speaking with all the PPs, it was not explicitly expressed that one-directional agendas caused problems for the organizations. However, it is easy for individuals with the best intentions to get bogged down by their interests and objectives, thereby affecting the creative power and growth of an organization. Moreover, even if current members are dedicated and progressive, it is always important to incorporate new ideas and new perspectives—without these things, organizational stagnation might occur:

> "Looking at the internal structure of the PPs, there are not always elected officials, which means that stagnation can occur in their approach and ideologies. Perhaps a new generation and model could help break though this (P10)."

Stagnation seems to be a sort of natural trajectory—If organizations do not actively ensure that their agendas and approaches are challenging current paradigms or at least pushing the envelope, organisational charisma and effectiveness can decline. The Arctic Council provides a great space to instigate movement, particularly via its WGs and TFs, which can help to avoid functional stagnation. However, the PPs need to recognize (as discussed previously) the power of leadership and be willing to step down or make change when it is in the interest of the organisation.

Lack of technical knowledge

While the PPs retain a voice at the Arctic Council table, this does not ensure that they have the needed technical capacity to sufficiently contribute to the conversation. The output of the AC, via the WGs, is heavy on technicality and driven primarily by hard science. Though some of the PPs have consultants that assist in filling technical capacity and information gaps, it is necessary for PP members to have a basic understanding of the projects and initiatives. This is particularly important in communicating these projects to their constituencies.

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> "At the SAO meetings, the PPs are not representing with technical people, but rather administrative or political. Moreover, they are almost always shorthanded in all of the meetings (P2)."
>
> "Another problem is a lack of technical knowledge. SAO meetings can really show the lack of education, regarding technical aspects, amongst particular PPs—usually this is not an issue, but when it is it is very obvious. ICC, Saami, and AIA are usually up to par—understand projects and technical aspects—but, in terms of RAIPON, you never really know what to expect. Who are they going to send? Why are they sending this person? (P8)."

With reference to RAIPON, it seems this unpredictability is most problematic, as the representatives often have no prior experience with the Council and its projects. This is, at least in part, an all-together more complex issue stemming from bureaucracy, rather than human capacity. It is important to note, however, in that presentation by the PPs, especially during SAOs meetings, can have a significant impact on whether or not projects are considered by member states. If a project is represented poorly or its empirical basis cannot be expressed, then the member states might easily disregard it.

Cultural Aspects

Lack of coalescence

When discussing coalescence among the PPs, it was emphasized that they represent very different organizations, with unique agendas and histories. Many of the interviewees expressed that it was not only about variations in mandate, but the relationships the individual IPOs have with each other, external actors, and alternate fora. For the three original PPs (ICC, SC & RAIPON), their relationship with one another has developed for nearly twenty-five years, making coalescence more natural between them. The IPOs created after the Council's inception, without pre-existing organizational structures or mandates, did not have opportunity to establish early relationships with the original PPs. As SC, ICC and RAIPON all played a role in the creation of the Council, there is no doubt that this experience created bonds between them—this relationship does not extend to the newer PPs, creating a rift between the IPOs, dividing them (at least, conceptually) and making coalescence more difficult.

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One individual noted a major weakness of the PPs as their *"lack of coalescence,"* describing them as *"often fractured and divided (P7),"* while another emphasized their *"lack of unity (P9)."* To reiterate, this lack of coalescence is not something that has only troubled the PPs in the past—the problem is still very much present and creates weaknesses in the PPs, both individually and as a group. Citing a recent meeting in Yellowknife concerning PP capacity, one individual noted:

> "In the past, we [the PPs] have not been very good about coming together. Last year in Yellowknife [2014], we were trying to talk and simply could not get on the same page (P11),"

while another interviewee explained:

> "Each of the PPs has particular interests and concerns, which sometimes overlap with the others—but often, there are more differences recognized than similarities (P8)."

Although the IPOs are structurally independent and greatly unrelated, the PP status provides for them a forum to come together over common issues and concerns. Yet, nearly twenty years after the Council's creation and the PPs have still not found common grounds, upon which they can coalesce. At the capacity workshop, observation revealed that many of the PPs were surprised by the sense of unity in the room, some even noting how unique an occasion it was to have everyone on the same page.

Discord

With a lack of coalescence, discord can also arise. Divergent agendas often result in the PPs functioning quite independently of one another. However, as observation confirmed during the workshop, tensions can run high over both significant and trivial issues. Even in trying to find the right words for a proposal, which is not an easy task with just one stakeholder (not too mention six), conflicting opinions created discord in an otherwise cooperative setting. A member state representative also noted the behaviour of the PPs within, and external to, the Council, saying:

> "The PPs are very different. However, the PPs cooperate well in other fora, like the UN, but this does not seem to happen in the AC. I think this is a huge disadvantage and can cause problems for the PPs (P20)."

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Not seeing eye-to-eye, especially on common issues, makes objectives harder to clarify and achieve—and without clear objectives, there was concern over how the PPs will move forward together on any issue.

Organizational Aspects

Funding

Although many of the funding problems result from external factors, the issue also has internal roots. Through observations during the capacity workshop, it was addressed that funding sources are sometimes a point of contention. One individual emphasized this:

> "Often there is disagreement among the PPs about who they will take money from—there is not always consensus (P17)."

Whether the hesitation is towards member states, observers, or other external sources, depends on the individual perspectives of the IPOs. However, it was also observed that the PPs come to disagreement about sharing mutual funding with one another. While discussing this issue with interviewees, it was not unreasonable to see that certain PPs have made greater contributions and efforts than others. In part, this is due to their presence in other fora or comparative organizational capacity—but it also seemed to stem from their histories together as organizations.

> "Interestingly as well, [____] does not want to share the funding—much of this comes from the fact that they have worked hard to get the money in the first place and feel like there is not equality among the PPs with regard to who should get what (P7)."

While inequitable contribution from the PPs might be a reality, it is unfortunate that it creates barriers to both collaboration and growth. However, when discord arises, funding is often at the centre of the problem—and this is not just a problem between the PPs. While IPS is charged with supporting the PPs, both administratively and logistically, they also draw their funding from member states. Until recently, IPS was supported primarily by Denmark. However, with the secretariat's impending move to Tromsø, funding could become an issue, as it is most likely the case that the member states will have to divide up the financial responsibility. The outgoing

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Canadian chair supported even the recent capacity workshop, organized by IPS. In the eyes of some PPs, this funding (100,000 CAD) could have been used by their organizations. One individual noted:

> "Canada just recently said—well, the IPS is moving the secretariat to Norway…now Denmark will not fund IPS. So now, what we are looking at is all 8 countries funding IPS and our SAO said that, you know, if we now have to fund IPS, then we have to take funds away from the PPs to fund them—which is another huge concern, as this could put us right out of business (P4)."

With existing strains on funding, inter-organizational frustration and competition will only lead to more problems for the PPs. Unfortunately, while the member states could be of greater help to create much needed security, their indifference and selectivity only weighs more heavily on an already burdened group. This latter point will be discussed further when addressing the major external threats affecting the PPs.

4.3.3 Opportunities & Threats

The results of the SWOT and STEEPLE analysis are presented in the following section. To avoid repetition, the STEEPLE framework was used to organize the opportunities and threats of the SWOT. Table 9 provides an overview of the emergent factors, according to each category. The most common of these factors are discussed subsequently.

STEEPLE	FACTOR	OPPORTUNITY	THREAT
SOCIAL	Shift in attitude	•	
	Health, education & mobility		•
	Reputation of PPs	•	•
	Community awareness	•	•
	Outreach & knowledge sharing	•	
	Globalization	•	•
	Lack of access		•
TECHNICAL	R&D hubs	•	
	Communication	•	•
	Logistical		•
ECONOMIC	Stable economy	•	
	Local economic concerns		•
	Access to external funding	•	•
	Securing donors		•
	Partnerships	•	
	Globalization	•	•
ENVIRONMENTAL	Arctic awareness	•	
	Regulatory decisions	•	•
POLITICAL	Chairmanship	•	•
	Member states	•	•

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	Geopolitics		•
	Foreign pressure	•	•
	Bureaucracy		•
	Rhetoric		•
	Transparency		•
LEGAL	Environmental regulations	•	
	Indigenous rights legislation	•	•
	Binding treaties	•	
ETHICAL	Human rights & CC	•	•
	Indigenous rights awareness	•	
	Inequity		•

Table 9. Opportunities and Threats structured outlined within the STEEPLE framework.

4.3.3.1 Social

Respect/Reputation of PPs

The issues of respect and reputation seemed to be more latent barriers, and ones that affect the PPs quite differently. While some of the IPOs are older than the AC, others emerged after (and in response to) its establishment. For these latter PPs—AIA, AAC and GCI—the road to respect is a difficult one, especially in the shadow of IPOs like ICC and SC. One study, looking at the development of reputation in firms, expressed, "Publics construct reputations on the basis of information about firms' relative structural positions within organizational fields (Fombrun & Shanley 1990)." For the PPs, this would mean that external views and opinions of the individual IPOs affect their position relative to the other IPOs. This could help to explain why ICC and SC seem to have a better reputation than AAC and GCI. It is not to say that the work and commitment of the latter are not without value, but that they are less respected compared to the former. In discussing this occurrence, interviewees noted:

> "Another important factor…certain PPs are also extremely active outside of the AC (like the UN Permanent Forum), so they are used to representing the communities and countries outside the AC. Bluntly, they simply have more respect from member states (P10)."

> "The PPs have no respect in Canada (for example), as ITK deals with the Inuit—this comes back to understanding the actual role of the Arctic Council with regard to the PPs and indigenous peoples (P3)."

Firstly, it would seem then that the longer standing IPOs have more weight and respect, both in and outside of the Council, which creates tensions and inequities between the PPs. In the second

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comment, however, an all-together deeper issue is at hand. ITK, discussed previously, is the Inuit IPO representing the four land claims regions and their indigenous. It is a well-organised and respected IPO, managing more crosscutting issues affecting the Inuit. IN short, ITK demands a great deal of respect from Canada and the international forum, putting the PPs of the Council in a sort subsidiary position. It also raises the question as to why the larger organisations are not represented in the Council?

Some of the imbalances between the PPs are tied to their resources and support structures, with larger, more dominant IPOs having better financial support and established relationships. However, AIA (though established at the outset of the Council) has done an incredible amount of work with little capacity. This makes a claim that the PPs, regardless of their situations, can certainly increase their respect and reputation within and external to the AC community. Though it might take more effort, given the lack of resources and uphill battle, AIA is evidence of turning threats into opportunities, by way of dedication and engagement.

Outreach & Knowledge Sharing

Part of the engagement and dedication that yields respect and a good reputation is directly tied to the indigenous communities. The more interaction and on-the-ground presence the PPs have in their communities, the better these individuals will respond to their representation. On the one hand, this is a difficult task for the PPs, as many of their communities are in remote locations, spread across large areas. If the PPs cannot establish a presence in or connections with these communities, misunderstandings and frustration might arise. As one interviewee discussed:

> "The local…indigenous populations are trying to understand what the AC actually does for them—there is *huge* [emphasis in original] disconnect between the AC/PPs and the indigenous communities (P3)."

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While discussing this issue with one of the PPs, they agreed that representation is a problem and one that they are most concerned with—yet, at the same time, their hands are often tied because of lack of resources to appropriately engage with their communities.

> "From [our] end, we get in trouble sometimes because we cannot outreach to the communities as much as we would like, so the community starts to ask why we are doing these projects and not informing them and why they don't hear about it. And that's because we can put it on the Internet and in newspapers, but a lot of our members… don't have Internet. And we don't have any money to print newsletters and send them to the communities. (P4)."

A lack of resources and capacity might well be the root of the problem, as it was evident in speaking with all of the PPs that there principal responsibility is to their communities. Moreover, from speaking with other PPs who are generally better resourced, it was apparent that their community interactions were much more pronounced and reciprocated. As one individual discussed:

> "There is a strong connection from the community level to the international level in terms of commitment and communication of information. I am also part of various community organizations that connects our [IPO] organization with the local communities. In some cases we even have volunteers who help where they can. We are very effective in bringing forward local issues (P17)."

Although it might be difficult for all of the PPs to achieve this level of effectiveness and interaction, undoubtedly, outreach and knowledge-sharing between the communities and IPOs is a major opportunity for the PPs.

4.3.3.2 Technical

Technological issues were rarely discussed explicitly, but a couple are worth briefly noting. Similar to other remote locations in the world, the Arctic does not have adequate infrastructure to support basic telecommunications in all areas. Moreover, it might often be that indigenous communities do not have an interest in modern technologies that connect them to the globalized world. This would be less problematic if the Arctic was not so immense or less prone to extreme conditions—as it stands, however, these aspects only complicate communication and logistical efforts for the PPs. This is particularly true of RAIPON, for example, as the organisation is

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under-resourced and charged with representing 41 indigenous groups over a vast expanse of the Arctic region. Not only is traveling to these (often tiny) communities impractical, if not impossible with current funding or permission, there are not reliable telecommunications with these groups either. Even with the 35 regional organisations representing the various groups, communication is often strained. This was emphasized during conversation with one of the members of ACAP, who recollected the difficulty in assessing pollutants in these areas when they simply could not reach or contact them.

> "Even with IPCAP, we [ACAP] never really had any contact with RAIPON indigenous—and when we did consult them as to what the contaminant issues were, they would say 'empty barrels' (P2)."

Moreover, and as noted above, it is often the case that communities do not have the technical capacity to describe the problems at hand. If IPOs are the only representatives for these remote indigenous groups, then this can be considered a serious threat to the PPs representing them.

Very briefly, a second technological aspect can be seen as a potential opportunity. As the PPs are lacking in technical capacity, one strategy might be for the organizations to target research and development hubs in the Arctic and develop working relationships with them. This could help the PPs to identify, which of their projects current R&D networks might fund.

4.3.3.3 Economic

Economic concerns and opportunities are critical to the success of the PPs. As made clear thus far, funding is critical for the PPs to represent their indigenous. However, broader economic realities also impact the Arctic and its people. With the global economy slowly emerging from recession, countries might be more willing to contribute funding from budgets that were previously too tight to include Arctic affairs. As one interviewee discussed:

> "Many non-Arctic states do not have a primary interest in the Arctic. Even if they do, their limited state budgets do not prioritize Arctic activities. With growing economic stability and

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> interest in the region, states might begin to contribute more regularly to projects and initiatives, which could help to support the IPOs (P20)."

With a projected 44 billion barrels of natural gas and 90 billion barrels of oil (USGS 2009), economic interests in the Arctic cannot be ignored. Moreover, as Arctic waters are becoming ice-free for longer periods, potential shipping routes like the Northwest Passage could have significant impacts on the cost and time of trade (AMSA 2012). The Arctic states have taken great care to keep non-Arctic states from seeking claims in the North—however, it is difficult to see how these relationships will evolve over the coming decades, as more states begin to take interest in Arctic research and development. Whether from AC observers or external interests, the PPs and IPs will continue to feel the presence and pressure of a growing, Southern gaze towards the North.

Funding

> "Always look to where the money comes from (P7)."

For the IPOs, money comes from many sources. With regard to the Council, however, it might first be important to look where the money *does not* come from. Currently, there is still no permanent funding mechanism in the AC. All funding, whether from member states, observers or external organizations, is ad hoc. This, unquestionably, maintains insecurity and instability within and between the PPs. Likewise, to ensure initiation of projects that are not funded by member states, the PPs must assertively seek funding. As stated by one individual:

> "As there is no formula financing, all is voluntary. Therefore, someone has to contribute to get things going (P7)."

The lack of permanent funding, therefore, creates unnecessary barriers to projects. Moreover, it was explicitly noted by nearly all of the interviewees that this was seen as a control mechanism of the member states, ensuring that the states are not supporting projects and initiatives that are not in their interests. This is, undoubtedly, a huge threat to the PPs. However, the funding issue

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can also be problematic for PPs when attending SAO and Ministerial meetings, which are already restrictive of their delegations and are located in remote areas. As one PP noted:

> "This has been an issue since the AC started, and it is very unfair, because countries often bring [to meetings] these huge delegations and have experts for every little project and it's not really equal. For some of the PPs, we simply do not have the resources needed to be appropriately represented (P4)."

Concerning funds that *are* provided to the PPs by their member states, often designated for travel to meetings, there are also barriers. Most of the PPs noted that state funding, though appreciated and helpful, comes with a great many string attached.

> "[Our] government only provides about half the amount of funding that the regional bodies contribute, and this can only be used for AC activities. There is financial support to go the meetings, but not to needed in-house capacity and support. Plus, there are a lot of strings attached to this funding, which is problematic (P19)."

It was recognized by all interviewees that, though funding should certainly be sought from various bodies (both within and external to the Council), the member states simply fail in their responsibilities and commitments to the PPs. It is felt by many that, the fact that no permanent funding mechanism exists, after twenty years of mentioning it in declarations, can only be seen as intentional disregard of the PP needs and a gesture of disrespect. With the grace and speed that the Canadian Chair used to a task force to develop the Arctic Economic Council, it is not a far reach to think that the same could be done to establish a permanent funding mechanism.

In response to this, the PPs have come together (without member states) in the hopes of establishing a permanent funding mechanism to support their efforts. The days spent at the capacity workshop in Whitehorse focused on establishing a proposal and options for partnerships, which included, inter alia, observers, foundations and NGOs. The success of such a project remains to be seen, but is an important example of how the PPs can navigate threats to take advantage of opportunities.

Partnerships:

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Blaser et al (2004) argue that partnerships between IPs and external actors can have transformative effects. As the PPs provide a platform, upon which to build, development of partnerships is an area of great opportunities for their organizations and constituencies. As the PPs can only accomplish so much within and between their own organizations, it is critical they seek, establish and maintain external partnerships. Partnerships are essential to the Ps, whether for technical capacity, community engagement, project initiation and support, or general funding needs

> "We have always been of the mind-set that partnerships are important and consistently try to enter into these with different willing groups, so if the observers are willing to participate then it is welcomed. We are focused on getting our message out there, so even if their views do not always reflect [our] views, debate is always good and sometimes people change their minds or become more aware—and this can be helpful (P4)."

Moreover, as the Council functions as a forum that can facilitate bilateral and multilateral partnerships, member states do not necessarily need to be included. The PPs can, therefore, establish relationships with external actors (such as Observers), which could help them to achieve certain goals. Through bilateral partnerships with Observers, collaborative partnerships with foundations or NGOs, or partnerships with alternative Arctic fora, the PPs can try to mitigate some of the economic restraints currently supressing them. In the case of funding, this might very well be the best option, considering member states have been successful at blocking an appeal for a permanent funding mechanism. Though partnerships with the states are important, the very nature of the Council gives the PPs a broad set of options for collaboration.

> "Many of the observers are interested in how they can help, but politics remain and get in the way (P11)."

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4.3.3.4 Environmental

Arctic awareness

Global awareness of the Arctic is both good and bad for the northern environment and its people. As Thoreau stated, "In wildness is the preservation of the world," and though this

sentiment may be true, in our most honest attempts to maintain a state of wildness we often do the very thing we sought to avoid. While environmental awareness of the Arctic has created, in great part due to efforts by the AC and the PPs, an affinity for helping to protect it, this same awareness has brought industry and development to places previously protected by indifference, ignorance or (very literally) a vast swath of frozen ocean.

Regulatory decisions

The Arctic Council can now be credited with the development and establishment of two legally binding agreements regarding international cooperation in the High North. Though it is doubtful that it will or intends to become a treaty-based institution with a legal personality (Koivurova 2008; Young 2010), these two recent binding treaties are positive outcomes for the people of the North, as well as the IPOs that represent them. As the indigenous voices are represented in the Council by the PPs, this gives a direct line of influence concerning pertinent indigenous issues. Though there is no guarantee that further binding treaties will result, these are important achievements for both environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic. Moreover, as individuals like Sheila Watt-Cloutier have shown in the past, influence of the PPs can have tangible impacts on global treaties (English 2013; Fenge 2014). One effective way to pursue such opportunities would be through collaboration with the WGs and TFs, considering the effectiveness of these bodies when directed at a particular issue.

Moreover, the opportunity for other international or national level treaties still stands. As the Kyoto Protocol comes to an end, a heavy focus is on an emergent, global climate regime (COP 2015). Though how this will manifest and what it will entail is still unknown, opportunities such as these cannot be underestimated regarding their impacts on North, as well as the PPs and their constituencies.

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4.3.3.5 Political

Chairmanships

Each chair is unique and its domestic interests, in part, drive the agenda of Council. As the Council rotates chairmanships on a biennial basis, both opportunities and threats stem from this process. The chair is charged with guiding the work and maintaining the agenda of the AC. Although frequent change can be seen to create a lack of continuity between chairmanships, the quick, biennial turn-over ensures that the interests of one member state do not overwhelm the mandate and overall agenda of the Council. However, the interests of the presiding chairmanship can weigh significantly, not only on initiatives, but on the PPs and WGs as well.

> "The Canadian chair of the Council, Minister Leona Agluukaq, has politicized everything…the chairmanship has very much been viewed through the lens of domestic, electoral politics (P7)".

One of the main concerns surrounding chairmanships is the role politics can play in guiding or determining the Council's actions. The outgoing Canadian chairmanship seems to be an example of the interference and ill effects that politics can play, both for the overall Council as well as its subsidiary bodies (particularly the PPs). During interviews, it was unanimously expressed that the recent Canadian chairmanship was one of the worst in the Council's history. Looking at the deliverables presented at the recent ministerial meeting in Iqaluit, there is no doubt that some important objectives were successfully achieved: a framework for short lived climate pollutants and black carbon; an initiative for mental health and wellbeing; and establishment of the Arctic Economic Council, to name only a few (Iqaluit 2015). However, what is not obvious to the onlooker or present in current literature is the politically charged nature of the past Canadian chair. As one interviewee stated,

Bureaucracy

It was clear during interviews and observations that the pace of the Council is problematic, reflecting the stagnation that often accompanies process-heavy bureaucracy. With member states as the decision mechanisms of the Council, it is difficult to say to what degree this can be

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avoided or remedied. However, it was repeatedly noted during discussion that the PPs cannot afford to move at the Council's pace, particularly with regard to securing permanent funding. One PP emphasized:

> "If this is going to be successful, it cannot be at the AC pace, hence why the push for a business case. We need to have a sense of urgency if we are going to make progress (P16)."

But issues of bureaucracy often reach beyond process, becoming seemingly like the machinations of member states and political interests. This is particularly problematic when it creates a barrier to projects and initiatives that directly affect the well being of indigenous peoples living in the Arctic. One example of this was discussed involving ACAP's expert group, IPCAP:

> "IPCAP opened a new avenue for participation, driven by a need to understand indigenous peoples— the WGs could not reach the indigenous effectively, so this was a way to reach out and understand the problem of contaminants in these regions. It was largely developed by RAIPON, though they have been quite paralyzed due to lack of interaction with Russia, as the head of delegation wanted to have strict control over who was working and what they were doing in international forums…This is bureaucracy really getting in the way. (P2)"

It is difficult to eliminate bureaucracy—but being aware of its presence and effects can help, at least in part, to minimize its impacts. For the PPs, when dealing with issues like that of IPCAP, it is clear that they are more effective as whole, rather than apart. If one PP struggles due to bureaucratic processes, it is important for the others to help, particularly on projects of common purpose. And, while it is apparent that member states might not be willing to spearhead certain initiatives important to the PPs, there is always the opportunity for PPs to take the initiative. These initiatives can involve member states or also come out of collaboration with WGs, observers, or external bodies. As one member state rep expressed:

> "Bilateral issues between [member] states and PPs have always been present. 'When you set the pace, you control the race'—up until now, this conversation has been led by states--but not now, PPs have the opportunity to take the lead (P17)."

If bureaucracy is getting in the way of PP growth, then perhaps it is time to side-step the problem and seek partnerships elsewhere.

Geopolitics

> "Political systems and geopolitics continue to evolve, placing the Arctic at the global forefront of finding solutions to accommodate both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of an increasingly complex multilevel governance system." (AHDR 2014)

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Possibilities for natural resource exploitation and increased shipping activities have resulted in geopolitical ramifications (Dodds 2010). Moreover, the recent deterioration between the West and Russia has destabilized a balance that has been more or less present, since the end of the Cold War and beginning of the Council. While states need to maintain their national positions regarding geopolitics, Arctic cooperation needs to remain intact. Looking at the recent Canadian chairmanship, the Harper government seemingly has used the Council and current geopolitical tensions with Russian to guide electoral interests in its favour. This is problematic in a two-fold sense. As Lloyd Axeworthy recently put it, "We have to shield Arctic cooperation from the vicissitudes of geopolitics, not use the Arctic Council to score domestic political points (Axeworthy 2015)." This concern was emphasized at the recent Ministerial meeting in Iqaluit, with Jim Gamble of AIA noting:

> "The two Aleuts responsible for AIA's creation…would be impressed with what has become. But also frustrated, because we are still talking about the same issues. They might be concerned with the geopolitical issues influencing the Arctic Council that do not have to do with the Arctic (Iqaluit 2015)."

Both of these individuals bring up the concerns over geopolitical interests affecting the Council and the trajectory of the Arctic, but also a more unsettling truth. While there is a sense that geopolitics might seep into the Arctic from without, in reality, the Arctic actors of the region shape these dynamics themselves (AHDR 2014). If the member states cannot keep geopolitics out of the Arctic, or at least the Arctic Council, this barrier to the PPs and indigenous of the North will certainly be one of the most significant.

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Rhetoric

> "There is a lot of talk in the AC, but very little actually moves forward (P2)."

Nation-states are well steeped in rhetoric. States recognize the power words have on their constituencies, using rhetoric to persuade, inform, assuage, and even terrify. While reading through the recent Iqaluit declaration, the commitment of the member states to the PPs and indigenous peoples of the North might feel unconditionally genuine. The declaration reaffirms and expresses it tangible commitments of the past two years, as well as it conceptual

commitments moving forward. However, after reading through 20 years of Council documents and listening to state Ministers speak at Council meetings, the careful selection and positioning of (often loaded) words seems to confirm anything but genuine commitment or interest. This is not to say that the Council does not care about the PPs or IPs, but rather than it commitment is notably overstated. This point was affirmed in nearly all of the discussions and interviews, with one individual succinctly stating:

> "In terms of the Council, (and I have been going to the Council almost since it started), there is a lot of verbal support, but severly lacking in tangible contribution (P17)."

Another individual directly discussed their concerns over rhetoric in the Council, expressing:

> "While the focus of every SAO and ministerial meeting always emphasizes the IPs, it is difficult to see if this is merely rhetoric…and, if so, how long will the rhetoric last before the true agenda emerges (P3)."

New agendas are certain to emerge as the Council continues its evolution as the primary governance body in the Arctic. Even the Council's mandate has both evolved and reformed in light of the new challenges presented to the Arctic and global fora. Though it is still very much a soft law body, its role in recently establishing two binding international treaties suggests that it is no longer simply a forum for international cooperation and discussion. If this is the case, and the Council begins to function more as an institution, then perhaps it is time for some of the more sensitive issues to find their place on the table. Not only would this show tangible commitment to the PPs, but would also relieve of merely rhetorical dedication. The least controversial option would be to establish a permanent funding mechanism to support the PPs. If this, as the least sensitive issue cannot be discussed, then perhaps the loaded words and unfulfilled commitments will become all the more transparent moving forward. For now, however, this remains as a notable barrier to the PPs.

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Transparency

One of the more interesting ways that politics can express themselves is through a lack of transparency. This is particularly true with member states and even more so Council

chairmanships. Interviews and observations only reinforced these concerns, with the recent Canadian chairmanship as the primary reference:

> "It seems there have been a lot of political changes during the Canadian chairmanship, which has made Canada unwilling to speak with mostly anyone about its interests and direction (P2)."

> "This chair has been one of the worst. I certainly think it is the worst in terms of openness and transparency, communication, etc. I think, also, that it really halted the development of observer involvement—this might be a reason that observers are hesitant to commit money to the PPs, if they are not guaranteed a voice and position within the Council. It seems that, through the many talks I have had, people cannot wait for the end of this chairmanship (P6)."

The latter comment helps to illustrate the broader affects that opacity has on the relationships within the Council--it destabilizes trust between the members of the Council, while ostracizing groups that might otherwise lead to important partnerships. And though the Council, at least internally, was not always praised for its transparency (interviewees noted often being excluded at meetings, while member states and PPs sat behind closed doors), many of the interviews and discussions revealed that even the PPs felt rather ostracized during the recent chairmanship. Moreover, this was evident in Council documents. A letter from AAC to the SAO Chair discussed the lack of transparency concerning the emergent Arctic Economic Council. The document inferred that, while the PPs agreed to support the development of a business forum for the Arctic, the scope of the AEC had changed considerably from it initial presentation to the PPs (AAC 2014). Moreover, Michael Stickman (who wrote the letter) noted at the ministerial meeting that AAC was still confused as to the scope of the AEC and concerned that it could affect the Arctic Council agenda. While the PPs may have been on board at the outset of establishing the AEC, it was clear that the member states and the Canadian chair had diverged from its original objective without the consultation of the PPs.

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4.3.3.6 Legal

Binding treaties / Environmental regulations

Many opportunities stem from increasing environmental regulation in the Arctic. As mentioned earlier, the Council has been successful in establishing two binding agreements concerning Arctic

operations and development. The PPs took part in only one of the agreement processes and it was unclear why they did not take part in the other (though a few interviewees suggested that the Agreement on Search and Rescue was not a topic of focus for the PPs compared to other initiatives). However, the success of these two binding agreements offers an area of significant opportunity to the PPs, especially via their interactions with the TFs.

Indigenous rights

Many interviewees expressed a growing awareness of indigenous rights in the North. These perspectives are supported in the diverse set of indigenous nations and self-governance structures that have emerged over past decades. Beyond the bilateral negotiations between IPs and their nation-states, there is also a broader global awareness emerging. As one individual noted:

> "There is increasing demand from part of the whole global community that indigenous peoples have a right to self-determination. With the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the UN was able to consult directly with indigenous peoples (P1)."

Conversely, many discussions highlighted the tensions that remain between IPs and states, either resulting from a lack of follow-through in negotiations or a disregard for outdated national policies.

> "Indigenous rights and self-determination issues with the indigenous peoples of the North has had much to do with antiquated policy and a manipulated interpretation of that policy. (P7)."

Although member states avoid discussing these sensitive issues within the Council (and even externally), they remain as undertones in their interactions with the PPs. While interviews and discussions often noted both of these perspectives, it was not expressed that anyone felt the Council would begin discussing these issues anytime soon.

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4.3.3.7 Ethical

Human rights & Climate change

Ethical issues concerning indigenous peoples are a loaded topic, but a topic mentioned by all of the interviewees. Sheila Watt-Cloutier was the first to frame climate change (CC) as a human rights issue and, since that time, indigenous wellbeing has emerged as an important issue in the national and international arena. One individual reflected on this new paradigm, stating:

> "The Inuit decided to petition the US commission for relief due to unregulated GHGs from the US. This was the first time that anyone had categorized climate change as a human rights concern. This also occurred later with the Athabaskans on Black Carbon (P7)."

This was and remains an important opportunity for the PPs and IPs of the North, especially with regard to external support of PP initiatives. These previous petitions also serve as a model for how the PPs can move forward on issues of concern, like Black Carbon.

Inequity

The more commonly cited issue was inequity within the Council. This was not only in reference to the subsidiary role the PPs hold relative to the member states, but also distribution of resources, representation at SAO and Ministerial meetings, and continuing indifference to funding concerns. Interviewees expressed these concerns in different ways, two stating:

> "Though the Council does provide a unique structure, the PPs still do not have a vote…when it comes down to it, member states act or comply when it is in their interests to do so (P19)."

> "It is very effective by the member states to choose the location of the meetings in such esoteric places like Iqaluit—it actually becomes a burden, especially for the PPs, because it is immensely expensive to go to these places, which they could allocate in other ways and use on other travel and attending more meetings—so it is very effective in restricting more involvement from particular actors (P6)."

The latter position was one shared during many of the interviews and discussions, with different individuals noting that this was a problem created and maintained by the member states. Though it was also noted that the more "esoteric" places also offer cultural value to the meetings, allowing delegations to experience the North more authentically. Even so, another individual expanded on this noting that getting to these places was only part of the problem:

> "We are not allowed to send more than one person to a [SAO] meeting, but the member states are allowed to send ten people to the SAO meetings and the SAO's can have their full delegations. It's simply not fair (P4)."

It was unclear why different restrictions on attendance are in place. One individual noted that it followed from restrictions on Observers sending too many representatives and PPs technically

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follow the rules pertaining to subsidiary bodies (P20). Regardless of the reason, it is another example of the inequity affecting the PPs.

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5. DISCUSSION

The data analysis revealed that, like the uniqueness of the IPOs, the internal factors affecting each of the PPs vary. These variations stem from, inter alia, organizational tenure, financial support, constituency respect and involvement, human resources, and PP communication and interaction (both internally and externally). Furthermore, it showed that external factors play a significant role in affecting all of the PPs, though the degree of influence sometimes varies depending on the organization. As the internal and external climates of the PPs undoubtedly influence one another, strengths and weaknesses interact with opportunities and threats in a variety of ways. This latter realization made it more difficult to prescribe a single set of drivers and barriers that represent all PPs equally. However, a handful of organizational and external factors were cited repeatedly during interviews and discussions as primary areas of optimism and concern. The primary strengths were: solidarity (the importance of a shared vision and common needs/goals); human capacity (particularly with regard to motivation and leadership); and organizational validity (emphasising the uniqueness of the PPs and a need for respect by external actors). The major drivers were: environmental/social (growing awareness of both the Arctic environment and its indigenous); economic (opportunities for partnerships and funding); and legal The major barriers were: economic (financial and resource instability); political (member state interests and geopolitical interferences); and organizational (primarily with regard to PP/AC communication and coordination.

Internal		Drivers		Barriers	
Solidarity	• Common needs • Shared vision	**Environmental/ Social**	• Awareness	**Disorganization**	• Lack of coordination • Poor communication
Human resources	• Leadership • Motivation	**Economic**	• Partnerships • Endowment	**Economic**	• Capacity
Validation	• Respect • Uniqueness	**Legal**	• Binding treaties • Indigenous rights	**Member states**	• Political interests • Geopolitics

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Table 10. Primary internal strengths & external drivers and barriers affecting the PPs.

Each member state has its own interests in the Arctic—its own concerns—but the AC as a collaborative forum has made incredible strides in creating a sense of solidarity and common vision between the states. Though states certainly still maintain their own agendas, they come together over collective issues and needs. Solidarity, thus, is a primary strength for the AC—the strength of the Council comes from their ability to work together, despite differences. The Permanent Participants should do better to recognize this strength and the opportunities that arise from it. During interviews and observation, solidarity was discussed more as a hope than a reality—an aspect that many PPs value individually, yet cannot cultivate as a group.

The illusive nature of solidarity could stem from the combinations of PPs engaging with one another outside of the Council or simply represent divergent interests. While lack of coalescence and discord between the IPOs might not have devastating impacts, both result in missed opportunities. While the PPs argue their different perspectives and defend their organizational strategies, opportunities pass that might only be realized with a unified approach. Whether it involves engaging observers, seeking external funding, or collaborating on projects and initiatives, PPs need to find a way to set aside their differences when the result does not only benefit their individuals organizations and constituencies, but the whole of indigenous peoples in the North.

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However, both the AC and PPs struggle with disorganization—a systemic lack of coordination, which tends to emerge from poor communication and use of resources. As the Council can be seen as a hub with many working parts, coordination of these parts is complex. Each of the WGs and TFs hold meetings independently, the SAOs hold meetings twice a year in different

locations, and the PPs try to have a presence in as many of these as possible (whilst carrying out there own agendas). Moreover, rarely are any of these meetings in the same place, at the same time. This creates unnecessary problems, while a more streamlined system could allow for greater participation and interaction on all parts. For the PPs, these structural barriers and weaknesses are felt most heavily. With a lack of technical capacity and limited resources, the PPs need to be able to interact with the subsidiary groups (like the WGs), as they are the ones one the ground, in indigenous communities, carrying out projects. However, long distances, tight budgets, and scarce human resources make this exceedingly difficult.

Nilsson suggests a practical approach that includes continuation of policy-relevant assessments, a need for structural integration and knowledge sharing, a broadening of expertise in the WGs, and enhanced internal and external communication (2010). Structural changes could also help to mitigate some of the problems that have occurred historically and increase the efficacy of the AC. Nilsson (2012) notes that reorganization of the WGs might also offer integrated perspectives that can support the member states, the political decision-making process, while also enhancing efficiency. One possible option could be to organize all of the WGs under one overarching group or integrate their mandates, thereby potentially increasing, efficiency, productivity and communication. Moreover, a broad range of Arctic cooperation organizations have the potential to impact the AC's initiatives and direction—perhaps suggesting that the Council should reach out to these bodies for collaborative support (Koivurova & Vanderzwaag 2007). Rhemann emphasizes this point, promoting the use of internal resources (like the UArctic and APECS) to bolster the capacity of the AC while bolstering external relations (2012).

Notwithstanding, something seems inherently amiss when an organization, established for communication and cooperation, has problems achieving both. Moreover, poor communication

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makes coordination exceedingly difficult. In the Council's defence, international and intergovernmental cooperation makes for a logistical nightmare and is something that the Council has managed quite elegantly for its relative breadth and depth (Koivurova 2008). Still, one would hope over the course of nearly twenty years that some of the more basic logistical problems would have been at least formally recognized, if not also managed. It even begs the question as to whether these systemic failures are (in some part) intentional. The reality is that disorganization affects all aspects of the Council: communication, coordination, relationships (both internal and external), trust, efficiency, and effectiveness. If the Council cannot develop and maintain a functional, organizational strategy, then it will continue to face the same barriers.

A possible way for the PPs to circumvent or mitigate some of these organisational issues is by using their human dynamic as a strength. After understanding some of the PP weaknesses, maintaining motivation and commitment speaks to the character of the people who work for these organizations. It is not a stretch to say, that in most ways, these individuals *are* their organizations. Although most of the PPs are stretched thin in terms of human resources, some (like AIA) have managed to use their human capacity to create direct impact in their communities and the international forum. Undoubtedly, this stems for an unwavering dedication and motivation of staff, but also from leadership. In the case of AIA, executive director Jim Gamble is a primary example of how strong, charismatic, persistent leadership can yield pragmatic results, enhance organizational effectiveness, and bolster respect from other actors and organisations. Nearly every interviewee noted this leadership and dedication, and this was substantiated during observation and discusses while in Whitehorse. By the examples set by Mary Simon and Sheila Watt-Cloutier, it is evident that one person can lift an organisation and redefine how external actors interact with it.

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Still, a major barrier to these strengths stems from a limited capacity, making it difficult to bolster human resources and engage charismatic individuals in the PP initiatives. Simply, the problem of funding needs to be addressed. This could mean opening up to the possibility of an endowment rather than seeking out the low hanging fruit, such as observers and organizations—and perhaps a better strategy would be to do both. There was hesitation from the PPs over the possibility of an endowment, some individuals worrying that an endowment would take to long when funding needs to be available now. The fact of the matter is, however, that the PPs have made it nearly twenty years without a permanent funding mechanism. This does not mean they need wait another twenty, but an endowment is very much in the scope of possibility, even if it takes years to develop.

Again, pursuing a long-term, stable funding mechanism does not require that other shorter-term opportunities be abandoned. Dodds (2011) suggests that the inclusion of non- Arctic states, beyond observer status, could help to enhance the financial and resource stability of the AC. This might be possible mimicking the administrative infrastructure of the ATS and its Consultative Meetings (ATS 1959), so that non-Arctic states could have a greater degree of participation without full involvement (Rhemann 2012).

Interestingly, at the start of research, it appeared the dominant problem would be funding. However, reflecting the diversity of issues discussed, the results showed a much more complex web of factors affecting the PP capacity—and while funding is one of the most significant, it should not be seen as the problem from which all other things stem. What the results also show is that even if one of the major issues is resolved, such as development of a permanent funding mechanism, it does not mean that it will solve more systemic problems such as disorganization, poor leadership, lack of solidarity, and so on. The assumption by some of the PPs was that in solving the funding problem you thereby fix everything else. This is not to say that the PPs are

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naive to this complexity or to the host of problems at the root of their past and current difficulties—but it is easy to focus on the major external issues and not take time to critically assess the internal factors that are causing problems. Similarly, major drivers and strengths might also be overlooked; such as the role the PPs play as a validating entity to the Council (Graczyk 2011).

When assessing the strengths of a business or organization, an important attribute is uniqueness—what one organization possesses that others do not (Pearce & Robinson 2013). The uniqueness of the PPs is their role as a validating entity of the Council. In 1990, when the AC was in its embryonic state, Franklin Griffiths found himself at the helm of the Arctic Basin Council, which would soon become the Arctic Council Panel (ACP). The conceptual predecessor to the Arctic Council, Griffiths understood the importance of having indigenous voices at the table and criticized the Panel for not adequately integrating their members. Griffiths noted, at a meeting of the ACP in 1990, that indigenous representation was the very thing that would give the Council its legitimacy (English 2013).

Moreover, while assessing the continuity and validation that the PPs provide to the Council, an interesting parallel came to mind. During the earlier discussion on sovereignty, it was noted that many of the Arctic IPs provide critical validation and continuity to state sovereignty claims. The PPs of the Council provide something similar. As IPs gain a stronger voice in Arctic and international fora, these unique qualities offer not just security, but power. Less dramatically, the PPs need to recognize the strength in these qualities as well. The Council was created, in part, by the direct efforts of ICC—the inclusion of IPs was not an afterthought, but rather a precondition. Over the past 20 years, this principle has been lost and, after all of the interviews and discussions, would even venture to say, ignored. If the Council cannot recognise the value-

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added, by the inclusion of indigenous voices, then (like the Inuit of Canada) perhaps it is time to confront the member states.

This brings us to the primary barrier affecting the PPs. For many of the problems so far discussed, an uncomfortable number of them come back to the member states. This is an unfortunate reality, for while the PPs have a seat at the table, member states hold all the cards. And while verbal support and consultative duty abounds, tangible support is disproportionate in comparison. Moreover, out of all the actors involved in the Council, it seems to be the member states that have the least dedication to the PPs.

Looking through the Ministerial declarations delivered from the past nine chairmanships, every single one states a dedication to the indigenous peoples of the North, a commitment of the member states to support the PPs, and a recognition of the financial needs of the PPs (AC 2015). Though a few words might be altered, the messages are the same. Yet, twenty years later and still no permanent funding? What does this say about the dedication and commitment of the member states to the PPs? Though it is courteous of the Council to continue including these rhetorical notes in their declarations, it is not unreasonable to see why the PPs might feel slightly deceived. And though the Council does a fine job of recognizing those that have made ad hoc contributions, it does not call out those who continually neglect to contribute.

Though the member states have strategically avoided dealing with sensitive issues, particularly those affecting the PPs, such as permanent funding and indigenous rights, at some point they are going to have to face them. In speaking with one of the interviewees external to the AC, it was emphasized that the Council itself does not represent anything or anyone—rather it is merely a forum, within which different actors can come together. Though this may have been true at its outset in 1996 (and may still be true in the most literal sense), the Council has transformed and,

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in doing so, become a symbol for Arctic cooperation and representation. If the Permanent Participants represent the interests of their IPs, then the Council very much plays a role in representing them in the global forum. Just as the PPs are a collection of diverse IPOs, the Council is a diverse set of actors and interests. And, like the IPOs, ignoring the solidarity afforded by the Council's status leads to missed opportunities in representing the Arctic. If it is the view of the Council that it does not, in fact, represent the indigenous peoples of the North as it does the Arctic, then perhaps it is time to start doing so. Moreover, it should be seen as both misguided and negligent to think that the Arctic can be represented to the exclusion of its indigenous peoples. Though the Council may not be a full-fledged institution, it is certainly no longer just a forum for cooperation.

Whether or not it wants to recognize it, this evolution bears greater significance and responsibility with regard to the Arctic and its people, especially by ensuring an equitable representation. Though the Council may not be the place to legally tackle indigenous rights and rights to self-determination, this is not to say that it cannot be a forum where these issues are openly and respectfully discussed. The United States was adamant, during its creation, that the Council would exclude topics of state sovereignty and indigenous rights. Twenty years later, it seems high time this is one of the sensitive issues that need be addressed. As noted shortly after its creation, the choice of the Council in not affording the PPs an equal share and vote was both short-sighted and negligent (McIver 1997). As indigenous representation continues to transform and inspire Arctic governance regimes, this neglect will become all the more relevant.

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5.1 Lessons Learned

These drivers and barriers should not only shed light on the major systemic issues affecting the PPs, but should be taken as lesson learned by other IPOs. The most important of these are:

- Awareness of structural and organizational arrangements, which can help to avoid disorganisation, while promoting clear systems for communication and interaction.
- Dedication to transparency and trust between organisational bodies, to create a forum for solidarity, common vision, and coalescence.
- Structured financial system or permanent funding mechanism(s), ensuring that representation is grounded in pragmatic means.
- Strong, charismatic leadership, providing guidance, cohesion and inspiration to the organization.
- Partnerships, both internal to the organizational and with external bodies, to ensure a broad-based foundation for support and interaction.

5.2 Recommendations for the PPs

In light of lessons learned and what has been discussed, the researcher offers a few, pragmatic recommendations for the PPs moving forward.

- Stable Funding Mechanism: Although low-hanging fruits, like the AC observers, should certainly be tapped for short-term stability, the PPs need a stable funding mechanism. However, this research suggests that and endowment or something replicating to the PSI might be better for long-term organizational stability and health. Although the turn-around on funding might take longer, the investment in time is quite worth the benefits gained.
- Bilateral Relationships: If the Council is not going to offer substantive support, then the best way to manage is through building bilateral relationships. Within the Council, this would include bolstering relations with WGs and TFs (particularly TFs, as they have been extremely successful in securing deliverables). Observers, as stated above, are also

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obvious options and the research showed that this lack of these partnerships resulted in missed opportunities. However, external partnerships are also essential, whether for capacity building, funding, or collaboration on initiatives. One fruitful opportunity might be to collaborate with environmental justice organizations that can help the PPs better connect with their communities and better represent these communities within the Council. As climate change is often now seen as a human rights issue, these collaborations could emerge as strong bottom-up partnerships to compliment the PP participation in the AC.

- Strategic thinking: Related to both of these, the PPs need to think more strategically. Concerns over funding have lingered since the Council's start, so taking the time to make the best, long-term decision is worth the wait. Moreover, strategic thinking can help develop shared visions between the PPs (the common interest of TK was a clear example of this) that result in more successful projects and collaborative efforts.

5.3 Opportunities for Future Research

Finally, many of the issues discussed during interviews could not be addressed sufficiently in this thesis. Moreover, some topics were simply too new to discuss in any depth, though they will certainly provide an interesting road forward for the PPs. The researcher recommends the following as fruitful opportunities for further research:

- **The Arctic Economic Council:** The AEC is the most significant deliverable from the Canadian chairmanship. While member states are avid supporters, many of the PPs raised concern surrounding its scope and relation to the Council. With a similar mandate, the AEC could potentially compete with the Council and/or draw external interests away from it, potentially affecting the PPs.

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- **Role of Observers:** Observers have an ambiguous role in the Council, something that might well change in the near future. Moreover, understanding how the PPs can engage observers and why the observers are hesitant to reciprocate could prove to uncover some of the more systemic issues within the Council.
- **Traditional Knowledge:** This topic will continue to grow in Arctic governance and scientific discourse. Not only is it an opportunity for the indigenous of the North to engage the international community, its recognition by the scientific community and inclusion into policy-making could drastically affect environmental protection and sustainable development in the North.
- **Theoretical frameworks:** As the researcher sought to develop a theory in an otherwise unexplored area, she did not incorporate existing theory into its approach. However, Keck & Sikkink's transnational action network model and Lacy's theory of cooptation could be interesting frameworks for interpreting the Arctic Council and its relation to the Permanent Participants (Keck & Sikkink 2009; Lacy 1977).

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6. CONCLUSION

The Permanent Participants exist as a bridge between the Council and the indigenous peoples of the North. Through contributions to decision- and policy-making, the PPs are meant to ensure that the IPs not only have a voice in this forum, but that they are also heard. This research aimed to shed light on the success of these organizations in representing their indigenous constituencies, through identification of internal and external factors. Moreover, a discussion of evolving governance regimes, sovereignty claims & indigenous rights, as well as emergent structures for indigenous representation, help to provide a framework for understanding the drivers for and barriers to indigenous representation.

Identification of strengths and weaknesses revealed that the PPs have an immense cultural capacity and conceptual position within the Council, but that lack of resources, disorganization and infrequent collaboration are problematic. Moreover, it highlighted the organizational variations between the IPOs, which can be used as a reference framework for bolstering their strengths and managing their relative weaknesses.

However, further identification of opportunities and threats revealed that some of the PPs' strengths and weaknesses are resultant of external circumstances: while communication is a weakness for the PPs, the overall organizational structure of the Arctic Council creates a systemic failure, thereby presenting an external threat that reinforces an otherwise avoidable weakness. At the same time, opportunities, such as a growing global awareness of the Arctic, community outreach & knowledge sharing, and support from external actors, offset some of the damage done by threats. However, threats were also addressed, such as geopolitics, which should be seen as top-down failures on the part of the Council and member states—unfortunately for the PPs, these threats are much more difficult to manage.

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Addressing the final research question, these latter threats were considered the main barriers to effective indigenous representation by the PPs. Often stemming from member state disinterest, these barriers show that the Council itself impedes the work and participation of the PPs. Without collaboration of the Council to manage these problems, it is difficult to see how the PPs will be able to move forward within the AC structure. However, as the Arctic is changing and global awareness increasing, the emergence of new drivers should be seen as real opportunities for the PPs. If the Council is not willing to instigate the necessary changes and provide support, new external avenues are opening up that might better facilitate indigenous representation through partnerships, emerging self-governance structures, and human rights initiatives promoting indigenous representation through environmental justice.

In light of these discoveries, the research offered lessons learned and recommendations for the PPs and other indigenous organizations moving forward. Though these are broad responses to sometimes complex and unique problems, they hope to provide pragmatic, alternative approaches that might otherwise be overlooked. For the PPs, they need to assess what the Council has given them and what barriers it maintains to greater participation and representation.

For the Council, though it has certainly established itself as a scientific and cooperative forum, many problems exist both conceptually and structurally. Moreover, the role accorded to the Permanent Participants, though innovative, is often lacking in substance and is a topic for further research and discussion. The Council needs to look both retrospectively and introspectively in order to understand its strengths and weaknesses, and modify its approach accordingly.

For the indigenous peoples of the Arctic, legitimate representation comes at a critical time. As the Arctic Council evolves and solidifies its place in circumpolar governance, its recognition of

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indigenous (via its unique structure and mandate) is essential in incorporating the voices of the North into national, international and global discussions. Moreover, as governance structures in the Arctic begin to evolve, the resilience of indigenous voices is critical. Both the literature and representatives of the Council agree that the Arctic Council still has a significant role to play in the future of the High North (Koivurova 2012; Young & Kankaanpaa 2012; Dodds 2011). Though this role may change, it is safe to say the Council will maintain a dominant position within current and future governance regimes in the Arctic. However, what is less clear is the role the PPs will play in an evolving Council and Arctic. The success of the PPs, both individually and as a group, will depend on the ability of the IPOs to manage internal issues and come together when necessary—but the Council also needs to be willing to adapt and respect the role of the PPs and the growing rights and representation of indigenous in the High North.

Today's Arctic is momentously different than the Arctic Gorbachev spoke of over 25 years ago: climate change is altering the Arctic faster than anywhere else on earth (ACIA 2004); new shipping routes are, for the first time in our history, opening up year round from receding sea ice (AMSA 2012); recent geological surveys have confirmed vast reserves of oil and gas in the Arctic seabed (USGS 2009); and states, responding to rising geopolitical tensions and scarcity of resources, have directed their efforts towards energy security and development. Simultaneously, Arctic indigenous continue to challenge and transform governance paradigms in the region—an evolution that will continue, particularly as indigenous peoples are forced to adapt to a changing homeland. Moreover, this mixture of forces has given rise to unprecedented global awareness of the Arctic—an awareness that will, undoubtedly, continue to transform the region and, so too, those who reside within it.

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Appendix

OBSERVERS	Date of Admission
12 NON-ARCTIC COUNTRIES	
United Kingdom	1998
Germany	1998
Poland	1998
The Netherlands	1998
France	2000
Spain	2006
China	2013
Italy	2013
Japan	2013
Republic of Korea	2013
Singapore	2013
India	2013
9 INTERGOVERNMENTAL & INTER-PARLIAMENTARY	
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)	1998
Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM)	1998
Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR)	1998
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE)	1998
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO)	2000
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)	2000
International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	2000
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO)	2004
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)	2004
11 NON-GOVERNMENTAL	
International Arctic Science Committee (IASC)	1998
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)	1998
International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH)	1998
Northern Forum (NF)	1998
Association of World Reindeer Herders (AWRH)	2000
Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas (ACOPS)	2000
Circumpolar Conservation Union (CCU)	2000
International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA)	2000
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA)	2002
Arctic Institute of North America (AINA)	2004
University of the Arctic (UArctic)	2004

List of current Observers to the Arctic Council and admission dates.

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INTERVIEWS	INTERACTION	DATE	DURATION	TYPE
P1	Skype	2/12/15	1 hr	Unstructured
P2	Skype	2/17/15	1 hr	Unstructured
P3	Skype	2/23/15	1 hr	Unstructured
P4	Skype/In person	2/26/15 & 3/18/15	1 hr	Semi-structured
P5	Skype	2/27/15	30 min	Semi-structured
P6	Skype	2/27/15	1 hr	Semi-structured
P7	In person	3/11/15	1 hr 30 min	Unstructured
P8	Skype	3/11/15	45 min	Semi-structured
P9	In person	3/12/15	1 hr	Semi-structured
P10	Skype	3/13/15	30 min	Semi-structured
P11	In person	3/18/15	1 hr 30 min	Unstructured
P12	In person	3/18/15	1hr	Semi-structured
P13	In person	3/18/15	1 hr	Semi-structured
P14	In person/Skype	3/18/15 & 4/6/15	1 hr	Semi-structured
P15	In person	3/19/15	1 hr	Semi-structured
P16	In person	3/19/15	1 hr	Semi-structured
P17	In person	3/19/15	1 hr	Unstructured
P18	Skype	3/25/15	45 min	Semi-structured
P19	Skype	4/5/15	1hr	Semi-structured
P20	Skype	5/11/15	30 min	Semi-structured

Interview breakdown.

Participant	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
P1	• Strong status • Influence	• Lack of technical skill • Adequate resources	• Global awareness of IP RSD	• Funding • Diverse governance • Observers
P2	• Respect of opinion	• Lack of leadership • Lack of solidarity • Limited cooperation • Lack of technical skill	• IPCAR • Outreach & Information sharing	• Rhetoric • Bureaucracy • Access to IPs • Funding
P3	• Influence	• Capacity building • Lack of accountability • Poor representation of IPs • Lack of technical skill	• Outreach to IPs	• Rhetoric • Observers • Bureaucracy • Ad Hoc funding • Lack of respect
P4	• Connection of IPs • Solidarity • TK	• Capacity • Focusing on differences • Communication	• Observers • Partnerships • Outreach	• Funding • Representation • Government interests
P5	• TK	• Allocation of human capital • Communication barriers • Lack of resources • Inefficiency	• IP education • Translation services	• Funding • AC Mandate • Bureaucracy • Existing policy
P6	• Leverage	• Limited resources	• Observers	• State interests

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P7	• Influence of status • Commonalities • Validation	• Fractured & divided • Lack of coalescence • Competition for funds • Disorganization	• Strategic thinking • Charismatic leadership • Observers (EU) • Arctic interest	• Financing • AEC • Geopolitics
P8	• Validation • Respect of opinion • Provide continuity	• Communication • Education	• Observers	• AEC
P9	• Continuity • AC Influence	• Technical capacity • Inefficiency	• TK • Increased interaction & collaboration	• Disinterest from states • Role of consultants • Funding
P10	• Strong voice	• Not united • Lack of resources • Internal structure (stagnation)	• Relationship w/ member state	• Relationship w/ member state
P11	• Collaboration • TK • Conduit between AC & IPs	• Communication • Capacity • Differing objectives	• Observers • PP fund • Partnerships • Outreach • Efficient utilization of resources	• Funding • Lack of state contribution
P12	•	• Inefficiency • Capacity	• IPS • RSD • Outreach • Collaboration	• Funding
P13	•	• Coordination	• Solidarity • Partnerships	• Funding • Inequity
P14	• Project engagement	•	• Arctic Leaders Summit	• Politics • Capacity
P15	• Relationship building between IPs	• Capacity	• Outreach	• Funding
P16	• Solidarity	• Lack of resources • Capacity	• Observers • TK • Pilot projects	• Bureaucratic pace •
P17	• Solidarity • Common needs	• Lack of consensus • Accessibility of information • Short-term thinking • Differing objectives	• Relationship building w/ WGs • Observers •	• Funding
P18	• TK	• Lack of technical skill • Limited capacity	• Resolving deeper issues • Expanding beyond TK	• Funding

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P19	• Tangible influence	• Disorganization • Resources	• Cooperation • External support	• Bureaucracy • Politics • Funding
P20	• Commitment	• Short-term thinking	• Strategic thinking	•

Participant results of the SWOT analysis.

Interview Procedure

- What are the main concerns of the PPs with regard to the Arctic?
  - Are these concerns represented accordingly by the AC?
- Would you say the interests of the PPs and indigenous are justly represented within the AC and by the member states?
  - Around which issues does conflict most often arise?
- How is the mandate of the Council changing and what are the effects of this on the Permanent Participants?
- What are the strengths/weaknesses of the PPs?
- Barriers to the Council fulfilling its mandate(s)?
- How does the communication between the SAOs and subsidiary groups affect their interactions and efficiency (if at all)?
- Do you see any threats and/or opportunities presented by the inclusion of the Observers into the Council?
- How does communication between the WGs interfere with interaction and effectiveness?
- What is the extent of their interaction with the WG? (Referring to last question, what are the opportunities and barriers with regard to their participation)?
- What are the possible reasons for lack of a stable funding mechanism?

Example of interview procedure.

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