Central European University

THE SECURITY OF US OR THEM?
RECONSIDERING HUMAN SECURITY AND BIOPOLITICS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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ABSTRACT

Human security is a powerful language to talk about security after the Cold War era that aims at placing individuals and their multidimensional vulnerabilities to the centre of inquiry. However, as the biopolitical critique points out, human security and state practices in the name of it are embedded to the new power relations and the new problematization of security, as a result development efforts to help people becomes a technology of security. The thesis contributes to the literature on the biopolitical interpretation of human security, and aims at conceptually refining its historical view, especially based on Mark Duffield's works to get a better understanding of the current world order and the promises of human security. This refinement shows how the security considerations of the powerful North have continued to dominate development efforts, thus the unbalancing effects of 9/11 on the 'security of us' versus 'security of them' dynamics was not as powerful as scholars tend to suggest. To support the conceptual claims, the thesis presents empirical moments to highlight how the self-regarding security seeking behaviour perpetuated and influenced human security technologies after the Cold War, and how the politicized relationship with governments to support biopolitical technologies served the interest of the North rather than the people living in the global South.

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My dear cenka, I want you to know that your constant tolerance, support and patience was a true shelter during this year - I got more support from you than what one should ever expect from anybody. I am truly lucky that you are the one whom I always come home. Drága szüleim. Amióta csak ráléptem arra a régóta tartó útra, amely ezzel a szakdolgozattal – egy időre legalábbis bizonyosan – véget ér, minden energiátokkal támogattatok engem. Tőletek hallottam, tanultam, hogy bármit elérhetek, ha igazán akarom. Sohasem lehetek nektek elég hálás ezért. Last but not least, I would like to thank the Széchenyi István College for Advanced Studies and all its amazing members for the years we spent together. Without this institution and its people I would not be the person who I am today.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

"If you assume that a lack of conflict is equal to peace, then this is a false assumption."
(El Khidir Daloum, Director of Programs at Safeworld)

Human security is an unavoidable concept of the current literature on contemporary security. As the superpower rivalry of the nuclear age has vanished, and the security architecture and the nature of security concerns have changed, this powerful neologism has emerged with the aim to transform our conventional thinking on security. As the fear for the existence of states was no longer present, the inquiry of policy makers and security scholars was pushed towards actors and issues on the sub-state level that were previously forgotten, as part of a broader, expanding humanitarian agenda.[1] The human security concept tried to capture the significant developments that happened in the international level (e.g. radical global interconnectedness, the increased intensity of intrastate level conflicts, the experience of state failures and state weakness, pressing environmental challenges), and contributed to the now widely accepted "truth" that security and development are inextricably linked.[2] The human security concept constructed a successful and powerful new language to talk about security and was rapidly mainstreamed, however lot of critical voices has questioned the validity of its success. A significant critique of human security tries to capture that the practices behind the concept are extremely divergent and non-coherent, moreover, this new language not just enables, but sometimes justifies such acts that formerly were non-accepted. In this stream the biopolitical understanding of human security is a significant engagement. The biopolitical turn tries to capture how the idea of human security is a construct of

[1] Hettne, B. (2010). Development and Security. Origins and Future. Security Dialogue. Vol. 41. No. 1. pp. 31 – 52.
[2] Tschirgi, Necla (2005). Security and Development Policies: Untangling Relationship. Paper prepared for the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI) Conference. Bonn, Sept. 2005. Accessed: 15 May, 2015. http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CC108.pdf; United Nations (2004). A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report to the High-level Panel of Threats, Challenges and Climate. Accessed: 15 May, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf

social interactions that is dependent on the existing power relations and its technologies. Unlike the advocates of the human security concept or some critical scholarship streams, the biopolitical view does not try to explore the potentials that the term could bring to the security studies scholarship, but concentrates on the practices of actors that lie underneath the discourse.

However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 mark a decisive point in the evolution and possible future of human security, both according to its proponents and its critiques. The US led coalition to fight the 'War on Terror' threatened with the return to the old Cold War narratives and practices and a setback in prioritizing insecure individuals over states. For scholars of biopolitically understood human security this shrinking humanitarian space perspective meant prioritization of the national, homeland security of the global North over those security who are in vulnerable, insecure position in the global South. This understanding draws on the historical trajectory of human security, suggesting that its practices worked as biopolitical technologies of security right from their emergence, and did not attempt to bring equality to the world in terms of life chances, but to tackle underdevelopment as a security threat to external actors and the entire globe. However, scholars claim that until 9/11 security and development were in a balanced position within human security, and the interests of the insecure people were mirrored in the biopolitical interventions, nevertheless the terrorist attacks recalibrated the "security of us" versus "security of them" equilibrium, prioritizing the former over the latter.[3]

This thesis asks, nevertheless, if this view on the dynamics of the "security of us" versus "security of them" dichotomy within human security practices is appropriate. Therefore, the thesis

[3] Duffield is the most cited source of this idea, see eg. Duffield, Mark – Nicholas Waddell (2006). Securing Humans in a Dangerous World. International Politics. Vol. 43. pp. 1 – 23. Other scholars accept Duffield's claim and build on it, see eg. De Larrinaga, Miguel – Doucet, Marc D. (2008). Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security. Security Dialogue. Vol. 39. No. 5. pp. 517 – 537; Marhia, Natasha (2013). Some Humans are More Human than Others: Troubling the 'Human' in Human Security from a Critical Feminist Perspective. Security Dialogue. Vol. 44. No. 1. pp. 19 – 35.

investigates if the historical moment of 9/11 could indeed bring a new era compared to the Cold War and the pre-9/11 years, thus if there were significant shifts taking place where, for a period of time, technologies of human security could and attempted to prioritize the needs of people in a non-politicized way. I argue that from a historical perspective a relative continuity in states' security thinking and the application of biopolitical technologies is detectable, which led to the perpetuating dominance of the "security of us" considerations. By answering this question, the thesis aims at giving a more sophisticated view on the practices conducted in the name of this powerful contemporary phrase, human security, and refines the path of biopolitical technologies after the Cold War which allows us to better understand how power relations and its technologies of security enmesh and influence life in the liberal world order.

To answer the question, first of all, the thesis heavily draws upon Mark Duffield's understanding of biopolitics of human security and the historical trajectory of its practices. Among scholars of the biopolitical stream writing about human security, Duffield provides a comprehensive analysis of the concept, analyzing the systemic conditions and the properties of the liberal world order as necessary conditions of its emergence, and also current practices of actors even on the micro level to understand the current security architecture the furthest extent. The synthesis of his works provide the most detailed analysis in historical and contextual terms, which provides a fruitful basis to trace back the 'security of us versus them' dichotomy. Moreover, his comprehensive analysis provides a reference point for many other scholars to understand and criticize human security.[4] Therefore, refining his logic has more far-reaching effects on the literature on biopolitics of human security and the way we read those contributions.

[4] See for example Hettne, Development and Security: Origins and Future; De Larrinaga – Doucet, Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security; Chandler, David (2008). Human Security II: Waiting for the Tail to Wag the Dog – A Rejoinder to Ambrosetti, Owen and Wibben. Security Dialogue. Vol. 39. No. 4. pp. 463 – 469; McCormak, Tara (2008). Power and Agency in the Human Security Framework. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Vol.

The thesis structures as follows. The first chapter conceptualizes human security, and contextualizes it to show how the development of the term is closely linked to the state failure/state weakness discourse of the 1990s, and the emerging debate on the organic link between security and development. Moreover, the chapter highlights the main developments that human security intends to bring to the security thinking, which is directly followed by its biopolitical critique that questions its novelties based on the actual practices of states that lie behind the discourse. The second chapter presents historical path of human security that can be interpreted from Duffield's works, and provides a critique from a conceptual perspective. Building on these conceptual refinements, the second half of Chapter 2 demonstrates evidences that are helpful to understand the conceptual arguments of the thesis. Even if these empirical evidences are not comprehensive, their main goal is to illustrate and support the extended, conceptually refined claims on human security.

21. No. 1. pp. 113 – 128; McCormack, Tara (2011). Human Security and the Separation of Security and Development. Conflict, Security & Development. Vol. 11. No. 2. pp. 235 – 260; Keinscherf, Markus (2011). A Programme of Global Pacification: US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Biopolitics of Human (In)security. Security Dialogue. Vol. 42. No. 6. pp. 517 – 535.

CHAPTER I - HUMAN SECURITY: GOVERNING HUMAN LIFE AS SPECIES-BEING

In the first chapter in order to contextualize and conceptualize human security, I summarize the debate on the link between security and development mainly fostered by the experience of state failure, and how this analytical turn is inherently linked to and enabled the emergence of the human security concept after the Cold War. After that, in order to establish the basis for the conceptual critique of the second chapter, I summarize the biopolitical understanding proposed by Mark Duffield based on the synthesis of his works. I try to highlight how the move what Duffield makes can be understood as a challenge to the human security advocates, building on the actual practices of states, which also shows why analyzing practices later will be important when refining the conceptual assumptions of Duffield.

1.1. Development as Security and the Human Security Debate

"State collapse is a long-term degenerative disease. However, it is also one whose outcome is not inevitable: cure and remission are possible."[5]The problem of state failure and fragility, as such states experiencing violent conflict, being at the edge of the collapse of governance or actually without a central government, thus incapable of providing public goods to citizens has rapidly became a highly contested and debated topic in the early post-Cold War years. At the dawn of the new era, all at once several states seemed to qualify as a failing or failed state. The Democratic Republic of Congo experienced a civil war, the most severe conflict since it gained its independence.[6] The case was similar in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, or Mozambique, just to name a few.[7] However, state failure is not a modern phenomenon. The diversity of states, that is, actors in

[5] Zartman, William (1995). Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse. In: Zartman, William (ed.). Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London. p. 8.
[6] Turner, Thomas (2007). The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality. London, Zed Books.
[7] Zartman, Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse.

the international system in terms of internal quality is nothing new or typical to the post-Cold War era. Problematizing the phenomena and considering it as one of the most pressing issues of the existing international architecture, however, is typical to (and since) the early 1990s. State failure and state collapse are the most extreme case of state weakness, but evidently there are separate analytical stages of weakness[8], and one could draw a detailed taxonomy of what can possibly collapse[9], if the empirical cases are to be compared to an ideal type of statehood.[10] Nevertheless, this problem set has induced a more generalized discussion about whose security matters, and what is the relationship between the level of development and security.

The problem of failing and failed states directed attention to the intensifying intrastate conflicts, showing how domestic sources, especially underdevelopment can be as meaningful as systemic factors or interstate relations regarding international instability and insecurity. This recognition directly links security and development, often referred to as the security-development nexus: security is not possible without development, and vice versa. The nexus suggests that there is a complex dynamic between security and development, failure of one leads to the failure of the other, likely resulting in a vicious cycle.[11] Due to this merging of the two concepts, since the 1990s the 'securitization' of development (meaning the enhanced integration of security concerns to international development activities) is an observable phenomenon both in the academic and policy research field, and within international institutions leading development interventions.[12] On the

[8] Rotberg, Robert I. (2003). Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators. In: Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.). State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
[9] Gros, Jean-Germain (1996). Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti. Third World Quarterly. Vol. 17. No.3. pp. 455 – 471.
[10] See eg. Bilgin, Pinar and Morton, David (2002). Historicizing Representations of Failed States: Beyond the Cold War Annexation of the Social Sciences? Third World Quarterly. Vol. 23. No. 1. pp. 55 – 80.
[11] Collier, Paul et al. (2003). Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. The World Bank and Oxford University Press, Washington D.C.; Menkhaus, Ken (2004). Vicious Cycles and the Security Development Nexus in Somalia. Conflict, Security and Development. Vol. 4. No. 2. pp. 149 – 165.
[12] Buur, Lars – Jensen, Steffen – Stepputat, Finn (2007). Introduction: The Security-Development Nexus. In: Buur, Lars – Jensen, Steffen – Stepputat, Finn (eds.). The Security-Development Nexus. Expression of Sovereignty and

other hand, 'developmentalization' of security is also detectable, which includes the potential to modify the traditional understanding of the security concept as the defense of territorial integrity and sovereignty.[13] Understanding development as security implies that properly targeted development can strengthen security and support peace, thus aid can be employed strategically to maximize its security effects.[14]

Even if the logic of this novel approach is rather simple, the very substance of the security-development nexus is eventually contingent on how the two linked concepts are defined. However, security and development are essentially contested concepts, the nexus lacks conceptual coherence and clarity among policy makers, moreover the academic discourse has also not addressed the question in a comprehensive manner.[15] Understanding the nexus, therefore presupposes to understand how the nexus is filled with meaning through the power to define security and development. From a critical perspective, meanings attributed to certain concepts can be seen as "discursive constructions that produce the reality they seem to reflect".[16] The different constructions invoke different possible narratives related to the nexus. Possibly the most widespread of these possible narratives since the 1990s is human security that intended to bring a paradigm shift as opposed to the formerly existing, dominant understandings and practices of security and development. Human security represents a fusion of the two, and tells a specific narrative about how to bridge them - approaching from the security side of the nexus.[17]

Securitization in Southern Africa. HRC Press, Cape Town. Accessed: 18 May, 2015. http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:275697/FULLTEXT02.pdf

[13] Ibid.

[14] Duffield, Mark (2010). The Liberal Way of Development and the Development-Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide. Security Dialogue. Vol. 41. No. 1. pp. 53 – 76.

[15] Stern, Maria – Öjendal, Joakim (2010). Mapping the Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence? Security Dialogue. Vol. 41. No. 1. pp. 5 – 29.

[16] Ibid, p. 7.

[17] Duffield, Mark (2006). Human Security: Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror. In: Klingebiel, Stephen (ed.). New Interfaces between Security and Development. Bonn, Institut for Entwicklugspolitik. pp. 11 – 38. Accessed: May 18, 2015. http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/Studies_13.pdf

Human security is an integrative security perspective with welfare provision goals, it encompasses the governance and protection of political communities with "broader goals of individual welfare and invulnerability" against non-military threats.[18] In this regard threats do not only concern the physical existence but also the economic situation and well-being of referents. Defeating human insecurity means overcoming vulnerabilities and direct threats, therefore security is closely linked to the level of development of a state.[19] Moreover, this insecurity can be interpreted on the level of individuals, it is a human-centered approach, which represents an analytical shift if compared to the traditional state-centric view of security.

Human security emerged as a policy concern organically linked to the above detailed experiences and conceptual shifts in the 1990s with the aim to put more focus on people's insecurity, and complement the 'freedom from fear' understanding of security with 'freedom from want'.[20] There are three identifiable core proponents of the concept that significantly contributed to the development of human security and shaped our understanding of it, however they did not attempt to give an extensive, coherent definition at that time. Probably the core source of origin of human security is the Human Development Report (HDR) of the UNDP published in 1994. The report proposed to widen the definition of security, replace the security understanding of the age of nuclear confrontation with an all-encompassing concept by incorporating new dimensions (such as economic, political, environmental or health security).[21] It sets the improvement of living conditions and welfare of underdeveloped regions as a global agenda. Besides the HDR, later in

[18] MacLean, George (2000). Instituting and Projecting Human Security: A Canadian Perspective. Australian Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 54. No. 3., pp. 270.
[19] Thomas, Nicholas – Tow, William T. (2002). The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention. Security Dialogue. Vol. 33. No. 2. pp. 177 – 192.
[20] Glasius, Marlies (2008). Human Security from Paradigm Shift to Operationalization: Job Description for a Human Security Worker. Security Dialogue. Vol. 39. No. 1. pp. 31 – 54.
[21] United Nations Development Programme (1994). Human Development Report 1994. New York, Oxford University Press. Accessed: 17 May, 2015. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf

the decade the bilateral endeavor of Canada and Norway, the so-called Lysøen process also supported the spread of the concept by setting a humanitarian agenda, including principles of human security.[22] Finally, the Japanese government adopted the term and initiated an intellectual dialogue in ASEAN on human security.[23]

Originating from these policy triggers, a discourse on human security has quickly unfolded and also reached the academic field, however turning the initial concept into an analytical category that is useful for research has proved to be problematic. This difficulty is well reflected in the debate between the proponents of the narrow and broad understandings of human security. The narrow stream tend to focus on violent threats to humans. It does not question the importance of non-violent threats, nevertheless it states that in order to have analytical rigor, keep human security as a meaningful analytical tool and guide for policy practices, the concept should be narrowed. Otherwise, as Krause suggests, the concept will become a "shopping list", covering a range of "bad things that can happen" - as a result it would not be clear what is distinctive about 'security', in this way the concept loses its possible connection with the existing academic and policy agenda.[24] McFarlane approaches from a different angle, adding that from a conceptual and policy making perspective the broad definition cannot be justified, the more comprehensive the definition is, the less likely is that the objectives of human security will be reached.[25] In this understanding the all-encompassing nature of the human security concept can be sacrificed in order to meaningfully protect the affected individuals, and consciously direct the resources and efforts. From the other side of the debate, however, security is more than being free from violent threats (the 'freedom

[22] Suhrke, Astri (1999). Human Security and the Interests of States. Security Dialogue. Vol. 30. No. 3. pp. 265 – 276.
[23] Glasius, Human Security from Paradigm Shift to Operationalization.
[24] Krause, Keith (2004). The Key to a Powerful Agenda, if Properly Delimited. Security Dialogue. Vol. 35. No. 3. pp. 367-368.
[25] McFarlane, S. Neil (2004). A Useful Concept Risks Losing its Political Salience. Security Dialogue. Vol. 35. No. 3. pp. 368 – 369.

from fear'), and other non-violent threats are necessarily should be included in human security. Even if there is a relative divergence among its proponents how broad the definition should be in terms of threats, and whether it should include context-specific elements, they all emphasize the "substantive importance of a wider range of issues".[26] As Axworthy emphasizes, there are other serious constraints and determinants of life, and even if "conflict, particularly civil war, continues to harm, the impact of environmental disasters, communicable disease, and poverty are often far greater."[27]

Even if this important theoretical debate has nearly vanished from the literature compared to the its initial intensity[28], the greatest supposed benefits of the proliferation of human security outlined by its proponents can be detected and interpreted: providing new potential directions for the conceptualization of security, and showing how development is essentially an integrative part of it ('development as security'). First of all, human security challenges the traditional military-centric view of security. It horizontally expands the concept, and incorporates a broader set of issues such as economic, environmental, educational or health concerns. This expansion has important implications for development: not only material military capabilities define the security situation, but also factors that are dependent on the level of development in a country both qualitatively and quantitatively. This need of broadening the concept of security has already been elaborated by the Copenhagen School from the 1980s.[29] However, what is novel about human

[26] Owen, Taylor (2004). Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus, Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition. Security Dialogue. Vol. 35. No. 3. p. 375.
[27] Axworthy, Lloyd (2004). A New Scientific Field and Policy Lens. Security Dialogue. Vol. 35. No. 3. pp. 348.
[28] Burgess, J. Peter – Owen, Taylor (2004). Editor's Note. Security Dialogue. Vol. 35. No. 3. pp. 345-346.
[29] See eg. Buzan, Barry (2008). People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire. The first edition of the book was published in 1981. Nevertheless, the distance between the human security agenda and the Copenhagen School is well Buzan's critique. According to him, human security reductionist view of international relations with little analytical value; and it idealizes security making it a 'desired end', while the Copenhagen School states that security not a positive term, but a failure – the failure of normal politics. Buzan, Barry (2004). A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion that Adds Little Analytical Value. Security Dialogue. Vol. 35. No. 3. pp. 369 – 370.

security (even as opposed to the Copenhagen School) is its willingness and ability to encompass the needs of people, thus putting individuals as referent objects of security. Security can be understood as a first image concept[30], it can treat not only collective political entities (states or societies), but also individuals as concerns of security, moreover it can differentiate between people based on their vulnerabilities along the dimensions of security.

This shows an apparent shift from the traditionalist state-centric view, nevertheless, the relation of human security to the state is rather ambiguous. One the one hand, it discredits the rather taken-for-granted supremacy of the state as a provider of security, highlighting that in many cases the state itself can be the source of human insecurity, even if it is not the only possible source.[31] On the other hand, it considers human insecurity as the failure of the state, thus assumes that the state should take care of their inhabitants in the first place.[32] However, it admits that the state can be substituted as the provider of security by other actors (other states or international organizations) if the need for human security dictates so. This assumption respects the sovereignty of states to exercise power over their citizens, but only to an extent that does not threaten human security – consequently, sovereignty can be justifiably limited. Nevertheless, due to the lack of theoretical coherence, this threshold for justification is unclear and flexible.

Finally, unlike other prevalent approaches, security is a firmly positive notion for human security. For instance, in the traditionalist/realist scholarship security (defined in terms of the balance of military capabilities) is a natural desire of states, however it is a scarce resource over which the competition can cause trouble, primarily through the security dilemma. Consequently,

[30] The term comes from Waltz, Kenneth (1959). Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis. New York, Columbia Press.
[31] Bellamy, Alex J. – McDonald, Matt (2002). 'The Utility of Human Security': Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow. Security Dialogue. Vol. 33. No. 3. pp. 373 – 377.
[32] MacLean, Instituting and Projecting Human Security.

security is not purely positive: the security-seeking behavior and the stabilizing effects of security have serious limitations. The prevalent critical stream of security studies, the above mentioned Copenhagen School operates with a more holistic view of security compared to traditionalists, but for them security is a rather negative concept as it provides justification for acts, and leaves extraordinary measures unquestionable.[33] For human security, however, the focus of inquiry is the *in*security of people, which is a problem to defeat. The existence of insecure people is a result of a failure, and the apparent solution to overcome this failure is providing them security, leading to positive outcomes (physical integrity, welfare and well-being) as a result.

As we could see from the conceptual development of the term, the purpose of human security is to provide a more comprehensive view of security that covers dimensions other than the military as well, and shifts the focus from the state to individuals, however in a rather ambiguous way. It allows to treat security as something positive that could justify acts to secure desired ends, even by bypassing the state. One should note, however, that the policy origins, and lack of theoretical coherence, but also its substantive conceptual consequences allow room for different understandings and interpretations, and entirely different acts can be conducted in the name of human security. This is a remark that critical voices of human security often accentuate.

Even if the concept got increasing attention and it has been rapidly mainstreamed[34] from the 1990s, several critiques tend to point out that the lack of theoretical rigor is either not important or not unintended. From this perspective, what really matters lies behind the definitional debate, mainly the actual practices that are enabled and conducted in the name of human security. Paris suggests, for example, that the eclectic understanding of human security tempts the broadest

[33] Buzan, Barry - Waever, Ole - de Wilde, Jaap (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
[34] Chandler, David (2008). Human Security: The Dog That Didn't Bark. Security Dialogue. Vol. 39. No. 4. pp. 427 – 438.

possible coalition of actors, and harmonizes their interests under the umbrella of human security.[35] According to this explanation human security has no game changing role, international actors have the same interests and behavior as before the formulation of the concept, but they can instrumentally and strategically use it to serve their own interests, for example to manipulate the perceptions of their acts.[36]

From a critical scholarship perspective, however, the notion of human security is a social construct, and has a constitutive power of itself. The important topic of inquiry is what enabled the emergence of this new language, what are the practices shadowed by it, and what made it possible to "talk about issues of security in ways that were not possible when security was understood to relate directly to the state."[37] In this stream of critique the biopolitical turn is a significant engagement. Unlike many other critical scholars who focus on how the conceptual changes that human security represents could be used to broaden and deepen our understanding of security and integrate vulnerable individuals or groups of people who were previously neglected, the biopolitical understanding analyzes human security with an empirical focus.[38] In the next section I present this biopolitical understanding building on the works of Duffield.

1.2. Human Security as an "Essentially Biopolitical Concept"[39]

The idea of biopolitics and biopower originates from Michel Foucault's works and lecture series where he elaborated on the nature of the modern political power in developed societies and

[35] Paris, Roland (2004). Still and Inscrutable Concept. Security Dialogue. Vol. 35. No. 3. pp. 370 – 372.
[36] Burgess – Owen, Editor's Note; Paris, Roland (2001). Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? International Security. Vol. 26. No. 2. pp. 87 – 102.
[37] Christie, Ryerson (2010). Critical Voices to Human Security: To Endure, To Engage or To Critique? Security Dialogue. Vol. 41. No. 2. pp. 170.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Duffield, Mark (2008). Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society. Journal of Refugee Studies. Vol. 21. No. 2. pp. 149.

its technologies of governance. Understanding biopolitics (and the biopolitics of security) starts from the different historical problematizations of security and threats.

> "[From a Foucauldean perspective] different problematizations of security will be compromised of different discourses of danger. Different discourses of danger will revolve around different referent objects of security, such that different referent objects of security will give rise to different kinds of governmental technologies and political rationalities. Such problematisations will be derived from the specific complexes of power/knowledge." [40]

According to Foucault, the transition from the ancient to the modern age is marked by the emergence of a new power over life, namely biopolitics. The traditional problematization of security was the narrative of geopolitics, which regarded the territorially based sovereign state as its referent object, and gave the legitimate right to kill into the hands of the state.[41] The new power, however, applies a strikingly distinct problematization of security, as Foucault suggests the "ancient right to take a life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death".[42] The newer form of this power considers people as human-as-species, as members of the collective population whose life is characterized by contingency and exposed to uncertainty. However, these aleatory phenomena are only unpredictable at the level of the individual, but can be measured and probabilistically predicted at the level of the collective.[43] Biopolitics, that is, governance of contingency is a disciplinary and regulative power that acts upon mass societies in

[40] Dillon, Michael – Lobo-Guerrero, Luis (2008). Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century: An Introduction. Review of International Studies. Vol. 32. pp. 274.
[41] Senellart, Michel et al. (eds.) (2007). Michel Foucault: Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977 – 1978. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
[42] Foucault, Michel (1990). Part Five: Right of Death and Power over Life. In: Hurley, Robert (trans.). The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction. New York, Vintage Books. pp. 138.
[43] Dillon, Michael (2007). Governing Through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical Governance. Political Geography. Vol. 26. pp. 41 – 47.

order to improve resilience, control life's exposure to these events, and "its productive and profitable exploitation of contingent happenings and effects".[44]

There are two important features of biopower of security. First, the security mechanism of biopolitics differs from the traditional understanding of security as it "revolves around life and its properties rather than sovereign territories".[45] The referent object of security is biological life of people, which can be secured trough the fructification of their "defining properties and capabilities"[46], improving the welfare and well-being of individuals. Second, the modern power/knowledge complex is concerned with the direct transformation of human life. However, this mechanism of subject formation is highly dependent on the understanding of life as species-being. The meaning biological life is not fixed, thus biopolitics is dependent on "what the sciences of life say that species life is"[47], and what are the necessary interventions to realize its full potential.

Originally, Foucault did not apply his framework to underdeveloped societies, nor did he try to explain interstate dynamics from a biopolitical perspective. However, Mark Duffield offers an alternative reading of the Foucauldian ideas, and applies the logic to understand the contemporary practices of human security as a function of liberal global governance, but also the security and development narratives of today in general. By claiming that "human security is an essentially biopolitical concept"[48], Duffield highlights that human security works as a biopolitical security mechanism with the exact characteristics of the technologies of biopower: human security is concerned with human life, and in order to build resilience, thus to halt harmful circulations stemming from the state of insecurity, human security dictated practices act upon mass societies.

[44] Dillon, Michael (2008). Underwriting Security. Security Dialogue. Vol. 39. No. 2-3. pp. 315.
[45] Ibid, pp. 311.
[46] Idib. pp. 315.
[47] Dillon – Lobo-Guerrero, Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century. pp. 273.
[48] Duffield, Global Civil War, pp. 149.

From a biopolitical perspective, therefore, the 'development as security' that is an integrated idea of human security shows how development functions as a technology of security.

Extrapolating Foucault's work to the international level, and interpreting the biopolitical technologies of supporting people's life on the level of the collective, Duffield identifies a significant difference between underdeveloped and developed states, which distinguishes insured and non-insured species of being. The former is attributed by massified and pluralistic welfare systems, which is historically linked to the emergence and expansion of welfare states. Such risk-reducing practices and benefits include for example extensive healthcare, education, pension provision, funded through collective contributions (social insurance, taxation), but also through voluntary institutions and private savings. However, underdeveloped societies live outside of these protective mechanisms, which means that a greater majority of people, living in the global South, have non-insured lives. As a consequence, these people are extensively dependent on self-reproduction, and they live in the state of permanent emergency of self-reliance.[49]

The major goal of the biopolitical technologies of human security is to build sustainable self-reliance, thus to reach an equilibrium and stability in the concerned underdeveloped communities.[50] However, humanitarian relief functions as a last resort for the non-insured, while the ultimate end goal in the global South is the liberal way of development, that is, sustainable development based on the 'traditional' adaptive self-reliance, household and community relations.[51] In this way, biopolitical interventions of human security have a direct stabilizing and disciplinary security function realized through human welfare. On a Foucauldian basis the

[49] Duffield, The Liberal Way of Development and the Development-Security Impasse; Duffield, Mark (2005). Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians: Development, Security and the Colonial Present. Conflict, Security & Development. Vol. 5. No. 2. pp. 141 – 159; Duffield, Mark (2007). Development, Territories, and People: Consolidating the External Sovereign Frontier. Alternatives. Vol. 32. pp. 225 – 246.
[50] Dillon, Michael (2004). The Security of Governance. In: Larner, Wendy – Walter, Williams (eds.). Global Governmentality. Governing International Spaces. Oxon and New York, Routledge.
[51] Duffield, Global Civil War.

explanation of this expansive attention to the sustainability of non-insured life can be deduced from the historical problematization of security. According to Duffield's reasoning, in the post-Cold War era underdevelopment has appeared as a major security concern, replacing the military and sovereignty centric problematization that was typical to the age of nuclear arms race. The explicit articulation of the link between underdevelopment and international destabilization got extensively accentuated as the sponsorship of Third World states, typical in the shadow of the superpower rivalry, has been terminated, and the weak state and its underdevelopment got problematized. The destabilizing effects include inter alia conflict, displaced people and migrants, illicit networks and shadow economies.[52] These elements are not only 'development in reverse', meaning the capability to destroy sustainable development, but also threaten the biopolitical equilibrium in the North.[53]

What makes underdevelopment especially dangerous is its historical context and the nature of the international system. Duffield builds on Foucault's notion of circulation to identify sources of insecurity. Distinguishing between the good and bad types of circulation, then organizing and managing bad circulation by deploying technologies of security is the key to reach a stable equilibrium.[54] Duffield identifies the possible harmful processes and spillovers originating from underdeveloped states as the contemporary bad circulatory effects on the international level.[55] These circulations are enabled and reinforced by the process of globalization as an inherent quality of the current liberal order, where the division between national and international has gradually diminished due to the radical interconnectedness and international interdependence.[56] The

[52] Duffield, Mark (2007). Development, Security and Unending War. Governing the World of Peoples. Cmbridge, Polity Press.
[53] Duffield, Mark (2006). Racism, Migration and Development: The Foundations of Planetary Order. Progress in Development Studies. Vol. 6. No. 1. pp. 68 – 79.
[54] De Larrinaga,– Doucet, Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security.
[55] Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War.
[56] Ibid; Duffield, Human Security: Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror. By emphasizing the importance of interconnectedness and interdependence, but also the role of non-state actors as shown later, Duffield implicitly relates to the work of Keohane and Nye on this topic to characterize the post-Cold War liberal order (see eg.

minimization of the bad circulatory effects is what justifies the collective Northern endeavor to build self-reliant life in the South.

However, as Duffield interprets, this distinction between or ineffective states as sources of bad circulation and effective states inevitably leads to an 'unending war' between the developed and underdeveloped, or acceptable and non-acceptable ways of life, where the former aims at transforming the latter into predictable and stable entities.[57] This war is, nevertheless, not fought with weapons, but at the level of existence as species-of-being. Moreover, what makes biopolitics of human security embedded to liberal global governance is that these activities are not exclusively state-lead initiatives. Non-state actors, including NGOs and other advocacy groups have to a great extent joined the state to apply the biopolitical technologies of security, creating a global network of liberal governance.[58]

In sum, delineated along Duffield' logic, the biopolitically understood human security concept suggests that people-centered development works as a technology of security. Development efforts concentrating on individual vulnerabilities, after all, do not seek to overcome the existing life-chance divide between the global North and South, but to create a predictable, manageable security environment as opposed to the constantly experienced crisis situations at the borderlands. Otherwise, life that cannot live up to its full potential is not stable, therefore it can become dangerous. The biopolitical interpretation of the mechanism of human security interventions, however, allows room for a harsh criticism as opposed to the positive elements of the concept that its advocates emphasize.

Keohane, Robert O. – Nye, Joseph S. (2001). Power and Interdependence. New York, Logman). However, he does not see it as a chance for a more cooperative behavior among actors, but as a threat to the way of life, thus an urge for the global North to apply biopolitical technologies to reproduce the already existing power relations.

[57] Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War.

[58] Duffield, Mark (2001). Global Governance and the New Wars. The Merging of Development and Security. Zed Books, London & New York.

First, we can point out that human security in practice is not a truly human-centered security approach. It applies biopolitical technologies to reinforce existing power relations, and to contain bad circulation. In this process people do not have real agency. Human life is represented on the aggregate level, and human security driven interventions act upon to regulate and discipline populations collectively. Building individual self-resilience is merely an instrument, what matters is the outcome, namely lowering the probability of dangerous circulations. The real referent object of security, nevertheless, is the way of life. Second, advocates assume that human security represents an egalitarian, emancipatory shift in the security discourse, and serves the interest of those vulnerable, insecure people whose security was previously neglected or non-problematized. Nevertheless, in practice not all people are equal to live their lives in the same way. Not only is there no attempt to change the life-chance lottery, but also human security makes non-insured life an acceptable and desired end. While people in the global North enjoy the benefits of the state as a human security provider through collective mechanisms, people in the global South are "forced" to live a self-reliant life. In this way, security is not a purely positive term. Even if self-resilience is pictured as something beneficial and good, it reproduces the gap in the ways of life between the two groups. Finally, all these criticisms immediately reveal themselves if human security is considered as a social construct that made possible to talk about security in this way. It emerged after the Cold War as a language to problematize security in a new way that serves the stability of the liberal world order. It relates to the liberal problematic of security, and provides powerful technologies for those who are interested in the conservation of the current order.

CHAPTER II – RECONSIDERING THE SECURITY OF US VERSUS THE SECURITY OF THEM FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

As we could see from the logic outlined based Duffield in the previous chapter, the human security concept and its biopolitical technologies relate to the problematization of security of the post-Cold War period. The biopolitical understanding of human security, and through this, the biopolitical understanding of security and development provide invaluable insight to the practices of the global North to contain bad circulation stemming from underdevelopment. However, this chapter points out that in order to get a more sophisticated view of human security practices, and by doing so, better understand how referent objects of security and the technologies related to it have developed, there is a need to refine Duffield's understanding of the historical process – more specifically, his understanding of the balance of security and development within biopolitical technologies, the "security of us" and "security of them" dichotomy. In general, I do not try to challenge his basic logic. The aim is to extend the focus, and show the continuity in actors' practices that Duffield misses to consider in his works.

One of the most important implications of Duffield's work is pointing out how the interpretations of the same notion and the different practices conducted in the name of it are embedded to the historical context. Actors' behavior also changes by the changing nature of power relations and security concerns. However, the chapter tries to highlight that even if the problematization of security (the sources of insecurity) has changed over time, there is a relative continuity in the actors' practices within the separable historical periods that Duffield identifies. He suggests that what is important is what's new in the monotonous relationship of security and development.[59] However, elaborating what is not new about security and development could give

[59] Duffield, The liberal way of development and the development–security impasse

an insight how the human security technologies were never about the "security of them" as Duffield assumes, meaning that actors of the Cold War have not fundamentally changed after the fall of the bipolar order, and 9/11 was not a complete restart for self-regarding security concerns. Development as a technology of security helped the continuity and survival of the 'security of us' understanding**.**

To support these ideas, the first section points out the historical timeline of the problematization of security and using development as a technology of security based on Duffield, then unfolds its underlying assumptions to articulate the conceptual critiques. The second part presents two radically interconnected aspects to show how the conceptual critiques are reflected in the discourse and practices of actors.

2.1. Historical Trajectory and Its Conceptual Critiques

Duffield identifies two turning points in history that fundamentally shaped the understanding of security and the actors' reaction to those dangerous conditions: the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. As the first important historical juncture, the end of the Cold War marks a remarkable shift. In the Cold War era, state centered security matters dominated the security discourse, and development assistance was contingent on the existing power relations, namely the superpower rivalry. The Cold War revolved around the traditionally understood security by which reaching stability and overcoming security concerns meant the protection of territory and sovereignty on a global scale. At this time, development was already a technology of security. Development assistance was used, especially in the newly independent states, to build global geopolitical alliances through political patronage.[60] Development aid, in this understanding, was an interaction between states, or more precisely, between governing authorities of states with

[60] Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War.

a purely political focus. Even if the external contributions did have some economic aspects, the results in terms of long term development effects are rather negligible.[61] Involvements concentrated on building alliances with loyal governing leaders where sovereignty was the driving notion: internal instabilities started to matter from the point when they threatened the central authority and the sovereign power.

From the fall of the bipolar order, however, conflicts primarily are not fought between states, but within states on the level of people.[62] The experience of massive number of state failures shifted the focus to intrastate conditions that were formerly neglected, or even reproduced by external actors through development assistance provision. The transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era is characterized by the radicalization of development that directly engages into social engineering to combat the source of insecurity, namely underdevelopment. Formerly, further details or aspects of the conduct of governance was not important, nor the development of people, or the effectiveness of assistance. These were typically short-term involvements, a longer term development intervention was manifested on the level of governments through budgetary support.[63] By realizing that the newly problematized security concerns require larger-scale transformative effects, the biopolitical technologies of human security were introduced in the beginning of the new era. Even if the genealogy of these technologies can be traced back to the colonial times and administrations, it has mutated itself to a broader and much heterogeneous rationality to build self-resilient people.[64] The emergence of a new type of security problematization lead to the replacement the former technologies of the Cold War.

[61] Griffin, Keith (2008). Foreign Aid after the Cold War. Development and Change. Vol. 22. No. 4. pp. 645 – 685.
[62] Duffield, Mark (2007). Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjusment States and Private Protection. Civil Wars. Vol. 1. No. 1. pp. 65 – 102.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Duffield, Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians.

The second important historical juncture in Duffiled logic is the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In the pre-9/11 era the biopolitical technologies of human security were targeted in a non-politicized way with the object to transform whole societies.[65] Nevertheless, by the events of 9/11 security priorities have shifted, and so did the practices conducted in the name of human security to act upon Southern societies. Up to this historical point "security and development were different but equal" and "human security encapsulated a vision of integrating existing aid networks into a coordinated, international system of intervention able to complement the efforts of ineffective states in securing their citizens and economies".[66] However, 9/11 unbalanced this fragile relationship, and strengthened the security concerns behind development efforts of human security. Instead of improving individual self-resilience within entire populations in the global South through biopolitical coordination and regulation, the focus now shifted to the homeland security of the North. As a result, a more centralized and prioritized biopolitical technology has revealed itself where resources are strategically allocated to certain regions and goals that are considered as most threatening to best serve the suspension of dangerous circulations. Human security stimulated interventions are dictated by the direct homeland security concerns of the North, the need to overcome human insecurity became relevant only if it directly serves the protection of the Northern inland population.[67]

These historical points appoint different periods of time that can be sharply distinguished based on their characteristics. From Duffield's point of view, there is a clear a rupture between the Cold War and post-Cold War era in terms of problematizating security and its technologies. In the

[65] Duffield, Mark (1997). NGO Relief in War Zones: Towards an Analysis of the New Aid Paradigm. Third World Quarterly. Vol. 18. No. 3. pp. 527 – 542.
[66] Duffield, Human Security: Linking Development and Security in the Age of Terror, pp. 11.
[67] Ibid; Duffield, Mark and Nicholas Waddell (2006). Securing Humans in a Dangerous World. International Politics. Vol. 43. pp. 1 – 23

age of biopolitical regulation, a less fundamental, but significant change happened by 9/11 in terms of employing biopolitical technologies. Moreover, based on these historical junctures, the dynamics of the *security of us* versus the *security of them* dichotomy can be identified.[68] The Cold War can be interpreted as the era of the "security of us". State security, that is, the protection of homeland in a direct way was the ultimate security concern, which also meant that development as a technology of security in the global South was about "us". The first stage of the age of human security and biopolitics, starting from the end of the bipolar order until 9/11, however, shifted the focus to the development of "them". During this time, human insecurity was non-politicized and had a universal outreach, and was more concentrated on the "security of them" through development. Even if without an attempt to overcome existing life-chance divide, these biopolitical technologies represented something mutually beneficial for the North and the South: they concentrated on the defeat of human insecurity of vulnerable people with positive outcomes for them and the whole globe. Nevertheless, from 9/11 on biopolitical technologies do not concentrate on finding the most insecure in the need of self-resilient life. Human security and its developmental efforts targeted the strategic maximization of the disciplinary, regulatory effects of biopolitics against bad circulation, especially those stemming from fragile states and conflict affected countries.

The thesis, however, states that these historical periods are not as sharply distinct as Duffield assumes, and through the continuity between these stages the "security of us" and "security of them" dichotomy of human security was not completely balanced even before 9/11. The exposition of the argument starts with moving away from Duffield's certain underlying

[68] Originally, in his above cited works Duffiled shows the move from the security of them to the security of us attitude in relation to the changes that followed from 9/11. However, the thesis extends the understanding of this dichotomy in time to support its argument.

assumptions. His logic assumes that the transition from a zero-sum security environment (which characterized the Cold War) to a more positive-sum, interdependent environment took place, and in this new architecture "our" security is dependent on "their" insecurity, thus their development. This transition could happen because in the emerged liberal order the immanent threat of state level conflicts has vanished, and was replaced by the abstract notion of underdevelopment and its bad circulatory effects. Moreover, these circulatory effects did not seem to have specific targets but were floating on the global scale, which further reduced the territory related concerns. Thus, states no longer have permanent anxiety for territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the new threats have economic roots, they started to replace their former practices to non-politicized actions with economic focus. Applying biopolitical technologies, this logic means that development actions are assessed and managed based on the direct needs of the people ("them").

Understanding the implications of the new international settlement this way, it does not only mean that actors, that is, states adapted their technologies of security to the new challenges posed by underdevelopment, but something essential happened to the properties of the actors. Due to the lack of probabilities of interstate conflict, states of the global North started to see themselves as states differently in functional terms as opposed to the Cold War, and left their self-interested and self-help behavior behind. Their security seeking behavior changed fundamentally, became directed not by internal motivations, but external triggers: they discontinued to be security maximizers for themselves and started to maximize security on the global scale, as their security is only indirectly affected and contingent on underdeveloped states. However, it was 9/11 that awakened these actors that circulations stemming from human insecurity can specifically target certain territories and can have direct effects on the way of life in the global North. This realization politicized development actions in the name of human security and forced the return of prioritizing homeland security over the insecurity of the people in the global South.

Moreover, the logic assumes that besides the way states in the global North understand themselves and their security, their view on the states in the global South has changed - as Duffield indicates, the world of peoples emerged[69] instead of the world of states, mostly because of the poorly functioning, weakening Southern countries. As a result of a massive number of state failures these entities are not truly functional and compeer actors, in addition they can actively generate human security and underdevelopment. Biopolitical technologies of security should target populations and their economic situation, therefore there is no need to build relationship with the central authorities and governments as it happened during the Cold War, bypassing the state is a viable option.

Nevertheless, the thesis argues that such fundamental change did not happen in relation to states, there is apparent continuity in both the nature of actors and certain practices that follow from that. As a result, the application of biopolitical technologies of human security was politicized right from the end of the Cold War, and prioritized the "security of us", although to a lesser extent as after 9/11. First of all, states continued to be security maximizers on the actor level as well. Existing in an environment where security can be reached through absolute gains instead of relative gains did not devalue the homeland perspective. Strategically analyzing the external environment, the probabilities and sources of threats that have biggest affect their own security, and optimizing the allocated resources accordingly perpetuated as the way to act upon security concerns. Nevertheless, these strategic calculations shifted from geopolitical to biopolitical ones. Thus, by the changing problematization of security the technologies of security also did change, but the strategic nature of employing the new biopolitical technologies, the society level transformation to a self-reliant community, sustained. Furthermore, Duffield's logic extensively focuses on economic variables.

[69] Duffield, Security, Development and Unending War.

He comprehends targeted people as economic actors whose level of well-being and welfare has security implications to the way of life in the North. However, by doing so he misses the importance of state level, political interactions that have perpetuated after the Cold War. Because these vulnerable people live mostly within fragile states that are not able to act as properly functioning entities on the international level, he concentrates on the relationship between Northern decision makers and networks and the Southern population. In this way Duffield neglects an important politicized intervention on the level of governments that massively supports biopolitical technologies to secure desired ends. The global war is not only fought on the level of economic variables, but at the level of the political communities as well.

To support the insights outlined above, the thesis makes two conceptual claims to refine the historical trajectory of human security practices. First, the biopolitical technologies of human security did not aim to transform whole societies in a non-selective way even right after the Cold War. In the age of nuclear rivalry development as a technology of security was applied in a strategic way, nevertheless, the biopolitical turn could not change these calculations because states continued to allocate their scarce resources to maximize their own security interests in the most effective way. Second, transforming and disciplining societies through development interventions to build self-reproducing, self-reliant life did became the prevailing way of engaging in Southern states to contain bad security circulations. This focus on collectivity of people, however, should be complemented with the perpetuated, but renewed focus on governments. These engagements have fundamentally changed in terms of their characteristics, but continued to be motivated by self-interest rather than the interest of people living within these political entities with the purpose to support and secure biopolitical technologies. These two refinements are important to present that the biopolitics of human security was always politicized, and the "security of us" versus "security of them" dichotomy was unbalanced in favor of the former.

The following two sections present supporting arguments on the discoursive and empirical level to show how the logic of the Cold War (strategic aid allocation, however no longer with geopolitical logic, but the biopolitical logic of halting bad circulation) could survive, and how the longer term involvements enabled by directly the human security concept support the political transformation of the recipient states in order to secure the objectives of biopolitics of human security.

2.2. The Strategic Selectivity of Development

To show the strategic motivations and "security of us" concerns behind biopolitical development interventions this section builds on two elements. First, it presents the emerging discourse on state failure and development after the Cold War, and how it immediately incorporated a language to talk about the underdevelopment of weak states as a security concern for the global North, and how this underdevelopment was treated as subject for strategic calculations. Second, the section presents empirical data on development efforts to highlight the actual selective practices. The data will provide some details on the probably most important instrument of external actors for development in development aid/assistance, namely Official Development Aid.[70] However, even if the overview not comprehensive, it is illustrate the homeland security concerns of the period that, according to Duffield, was about the "security of them".

As mentioned before, it was the experience of state weakness and state failure that initiated the problematization of underdevelopment, and first raised attention to the insecurity of people, and triggered the human security discourse at the beginning of the 1990s. The very first

[70] Official Development Aid (ODA)) is defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC). According to their definition those flows to countries that are provided by official agencies (state and local government agencies) with concessional conditions, conveying a grant element of at least 25 per cent, for the economic and social development of developing countries can be counted as ODA. OECD (2014). DAC Glossary for Key Terms and Concepts. Accessed: 23 May, 2015. http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm#ODA

representation of the birth of this debate, using the term failed states and pointing out the importance of global policy response, was an article published in Foreign Policy by Geral Harman and Stephen Ratner (former policy makers of the US administration) in 1993. Urged by the examples of Haiti, Yugoslavia, Sudan or Cambodia, the authors emphasize that state fragility is a serious humanitarian issue, the destructive effects on the population can be terminated by tackling the internal sources of these problems. However, it can be clearly seen from their interpretation that these humanitarian considerations would not be sufficient for the ambitious global response from the international community that they suggest. As they punctuate, since this point of time external actors thought that these states "might be poor, but they would hold their own by virtue of being independent".[71] Nevertheless, sovereignty is not enough anymore to contain the bad effects of underdevelopment, and "it is becoming clear that something must be done" because "the need to help those states is made more critical by the evidence that their problems tend to spread".[72] From this problematization of underdevelopment human security aspect of those living in these states, and the security of people outside are clearly distinguishable right from the beginning. It suggests that certain consequences of underdevelopment from the security perspective of external actors are more pressing than others as they are more threatening to spread.[73]

The idea that bad circulations are distinguishable, moreover, there is a need to strategically evaluate them for the optimal allocation of resources has appeared already in the early years of the 1990s. The US Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, prepared a comprehensive strategy (including for example health, environmental aspects) in 1994 to foster

[71] Helman, Gerald B. and Ratner, Stephen R. (1993). Saving Failed States. Foreign Policy. No. 89. pp. 4.
[72] Ibid, pp. 3.
[73] The first document to suggest human security as a new framework, the Human Development Report is also relates to state failure as a specifically important category when it places the problem of underdevelopment in a greater context now complemented with more generalized issues. It does not explicitly uses the term state failure, but implicitly refers to these countries as exceptional threats to human security. "Identifying potential crisis countries […] is preventive development." United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994. pp. 3.

sustainable development in the word. However, the strategy implies that the United States should consciously allocate its aid resources because it affects the vital interest of its own population as well.

> „Why then is the issue of development so urgent now? It is no exaggeration to suggest that the challenges we face constitute potential global threats to peace, stability, and well-being of Americans and people throughout the world. [...] These threats pose a strategic challenge to the United States."[74]

From the perspective, the practice of state to strategically analyze the security environment to maximize their own security did not changed after the Cold War. Based on the unfolding discourse on security, development and state fragility, it is detectable that not all bad circulations originating from underdevelopment are equally important for the global North. Underdevelopment became problematized in general, however policy responses and considerations could separate issues that are important from a humanitarian and human security perspective for the South from those that in addition mean more pressing, more immediate security issues for the North. As a result, development intervention was driven by bad circulatory effects rather than underdevelopment as an abstract phenomenon. This led to the selective application of biopolitical technologies in the global South. Moreover, the strategic vision of states could dominate development interventions as they remained the primary actors in international development. The beginning of the post-Cold War era was marked by the rise in the number of nonprofit organizations that were established to support development endeavors of the North[75] which is emphasized by Duffield as well. However, even if these organizations extended the scope of interventions by

[74] Highlights/underline from the original. U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (1994). Strategies for Sustainable Development. USAID, Washington D.C. pp. 2. Accessed: 20 May, 2015. http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31822016873176;view=1up;seq=6

[75] Salamon, Lester M. (1994). The Rise of the Nonprofit Sectors. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 73. No. 4. pp. 109 – 122.

forming a larger network, the primary providers of development resources in terms of absolute resources, thus actors with the greatest transformative capacities remained states. This is illustrated by Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the Appendix. The diagrams show that NGOs and private advocacy groups did not significantly increase their aid contribution right after the Cold War, in addition, especially compared to the official aid flows from states, these contributions are rather marginal.[76] Therefore, states not only pertained their self-regarding security approach to evaluate security concerns, but could meaningfully realize their interests as decisive users of biopolitical technologies.

The politicized, strategic considerations are detectable in the empirical data on aid flows. If the "security of them" considerations direct biopolitical technologies, it would be reasonable to assume that resource flows increased, or at least flows were redirected to the most vulnerable, most underdeveloped countries. However, such quantitative change has not happened until 9/11. At some points contributions to the development of the least developed countries, for example, reached lower levels than the Cold War practices (see Figure 3 in the Appendix) while the aggregate amount of aid also did not increase on the global level.[77] In the pre-9/11 era the focus of state practices was on the qualitative change of aid, fulfilling the transition from its Cold War geopolitical function to the biopolitical one in the new era. The objective was to make aid more effective to support sustainable development and self-resilience[78], while the knowledge production of human security (how to best increase aid effectiveness to protect the security of individuals)

[76] The diagrams show data from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) community, the largest aggregate aid provider group, and the United States as the leadning political actor in the world, and the largest bilateral aid provider. In Figure 1, data from France and the UK are also presented as key mebers of the global North and traditionally active aid providers, however these numbers are significantly lower on the global level.
[77] OECD (2015). Net ODA statistics. Accessed: 20, May. https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm
[78] Woods, Ngaire (2005). The Shifting Politics of Foreign Aid. International Affairs. Vol. 81. No. 2. pp. 393 – 409.

could effectively contribute to this biopolitical turn.[79] Nevertheless, as development was adjusted to become a biopolitical technology of security, its scope was not as universal as Duffield suggests. Contributions were allocated based on how much the global North can or intend to spend instead of the needs of the South to live a self-resilient life. Moreover, besides the stagnating, sometimes decreasing aggregate contributions to the least developed states, there is an apparent high volatility in the donors' allocation decisions which depicts strategic considerations. The case of Somalia and Rwanda shows (see Figure 4 and Figure 5 in the Appendix) that certain bad circulations, in these cases, violent conflict provide more incentive for the global North to attempt the transformation of the underdeveloped countries through development interventions. Detailed data from the United Kingdom also shows that aid has heavily targeted conflict-affected countries, while among states that lack violent conflict those with better conditions for sustainable development were supported, not those in the biggest need.[80] The urgency of these circulatory effects is decided based on the strategic interests of the developed world.[81] Therefore, one can conclude that less emphasis was put on combatting underdevelopment in general and satisfying the needs of people, and more on certain circulations and their strategic importance from the homeland security perspective (especially certain circulations, such as those stemming from violent conflicts).

In sum, qualitatively aid was adjusted to the requirements of biopolitics of human security. However, actors did continue to strategically allocate their resources according to their own strategic interests. Certain circulations appeared to be strategically more important, thus resource

[79] Grayson, Kyle (2008). Human Security as Power/Knowledge: The Biopolitics of a Definitional Debate. Cmabridge Review of International Affairs. Vol. 21. No. 3. pp. 383 – 401.
[80] Wild, Leni – Elhawary, Samir (2012). The UK's Approach to Linking Development and Security: Assessing Policy and Practice. Working Paper No. 347, Overseas Development Institute. Accessed: 22 May, 2015. http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7658.pdf
[81] As Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero points out, „Circulation is concerned with flows, but flows have to be monitored and regulated." (Dillon – Lobo-Guerrero, Biopolitics of security in the 21st Century, pp. 268.) Violent conflict, mostly because of its intense and dynamic nature is much more hard to monitor and regulate, therefore its consequences are less predictable, and seem more threatening for external actors.

allocation has mirrored those concerns. The idea of sophisticating the development activity based on the nature of the circulation from a security perspective was already represented in the unfolding discourse on state failure and human security interventions. Therefore, the Cold War thinking on self-interested security maximization and the role of development has perpetuated, however the biopolitical turn changed the purpose of its instrumentality. All in all, as practices were driven by circulatory effects that are important for the North, more than the needs of the people in the South, we can say that in the pre-9/11 world development was already politicized, and was not primarily about the "security of them". By 9/11 however, assessing the strategic importance and likelihood of certain circulations has changed, former risks turned into direct threats. As a result, terrorism and illicit networks became the most pressing manifestations of bad circulations, which redirected the aid allocation for new purposes and geographical locations. Moreover, by realizing that homeland security, the territory and the people living within the states of the global North are more directly in danger than previously thought, the overall amount of aid has also significantly increased, extending the project of transforming societies to a greater project.

2.3. Good Governance to Support Biopolitical Technologies

Besides the enduring strategic allocation of development aid, which creates continuity between the Cold War and the post-9/11 periods, the politicized nature of biopolitical interventions can be identified if we consider how the intergovernmental political relations were placed to new grounds. After the Cold War biopolitical human security interventions have become key technologies of security. Nevertheless, these economic practices were complemented and directly supported by practices and policies that are essentially political in nature, namely good governance initiatives. This section argues that the unique emphasis on good governance in the post-Cold War

years is a direct consequence of the development of the human security concept and its biopolitical technologies.

As we could see from the conceptual development of the term, human security contributed to the redefinition of sovereignty. After the age of absolute sovereignty, which was a major characteristic of the Cold War era, through the new problematization of security the importance of sovereignty has been degraded. As from a human security perspective the focus lies on individual vulnerabilities, and states themselves can be sources of insecurity, protecting the life as species-being is more important even at the expense of bypassing the state. The human security discourse has two important consequences. First of all, it defines and justifies those exceptional circumstances by which external actors should and are expected to intervene. The interpretation of these interventions, thus, becomes different from the former practices. During the Cold War, the goal was to restore central governments in problematic countries to maximize security, however these interventions were always contested on the basis of principles such as sovereignty and non-intervention to domestic affairs. However, the human security allows for longer term involvements to gradually, fundamentally transform populations. Moreover, it builds partnerships with local actors, suggesting that there is a kind of mutuality in the relationship. This form of involvement creates a post-interventionist era where the presence of external actors is not questionable anymore.[82] Secondly, even if external interventions are enabled and justified, the human security concept does completely delegitimize that states can have important role in providing security for their citizens even within the global South. Moreover, the human security concept does not intend to delegate comprehensive responsibility to the international community, and the global North cannot and is not willing to take never-ending extensive commitments. The goal of the biopolitical

[82] Chandler, David (2012). Resilience and Human Security: The Post-Interventionist Paradigm. Security Dialogue. Vol. 43. No. 3. pp. 213 – 229.

regulatory and disciplinary mechanisms applied within the state is building sustainable self-reliance population, which should sustain itself even without external assistance.

To secure the desired ends of biopolitical technologies, economic development interventions were supplemented by conditions and requirements, good governance initiatives became extensively applied in underdeveloped countries. Such good governance interventions to the political management of state were enabled by the human security discourse through the redefinition of sovereignty and the justifiable interference to domestic affairs. Good governance became extensively applied as a required condition for aid flows, and became a core element of international development policies.[83] It was directly prompted by concerns to make development more effective, thus to support sustainable development.[84] The conditionality builds on both side for the success of biopolitical technologies: domestic actors can show willingness and commitment to accept biopolitical transformation, and external actors got insurances that their contributions are expected to have some effects and not will be hindered by local resistance or unfavorable environment.

The concept of good governance was established in the early years of the 1990s. The most basic and primary definition for good governance was set up by the World Bank, claiming that in general, governance is "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development."[85] The “good governance” model is a predictable, inclusive (being open for inputs by various external actors), reasonable and sophisticated policy-making, which policy decisions are executed by a professional bureaucratic structure – with the

[83] Neumayer, Eric (2003). The Pattern of Aid Giving. London and New York, Routledge.
[84] Santiso, Carlos (2001). Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality. The Georgetown Public Policy Review. Vol. 7. No. 1. pp. 1 – 22.
[85] World Bank (1992). Governance and Development. The World Bank, Washington, pp. 1.

requirement of accountability for the whole process.[86] In its 1994 report the World Bank list four distinct aspects for evaluating the quality of governance: 1. Public-sector management (technical operation of the civil-service and main formal institutions) 2. Accountability (both for decision-making and execution/enforcing level) 3. Legal framework enabling development (sound legal structure allowing businesses to grow) 4. Transparency and sharing of information (market participants and citizens)[87]. These aspects became the ground for assessing governance by the main development agencies, and formed the reference basis[88] – although from a rather economic standpoint. The emphasis lies on creating such a predictable, manageable environment that favors the sustainability of biopolitical technologies and the existence of self-resilient life. The governments are required to manage their economic and social resources to support life even within non-insured conditions of being. Moreover, it enables external actors to share the responsibilities with local actors.

Good governance proved to be perfect complementary element, subordinated to the economic logic of biopolitical technologies. The idea to build relationships with governments has continued to perpetuate after the Cold War, but with different objectives. During the Cold War intergovernmental political relations were subordinated to geopolitical considerations, while from the end of the bipolarity geopolitics was replaced by biopolitical aspects, nevertheless government relations remained subordinated to the development technologies of security. This continuity and the importance of politically securing the results of biopolitical technologies at the locale of intervention is neglected by Duffield.

[86] International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (1999). Good Governance: An Overview. IFAD, Rome.
[87] World Bank (1994). Governance: The World Bank's Experience. The World Bank, Washington.
[88] See eg.: The Asian Development Bank (1995). Governance: Sound Development Management. AsDb, Manila. or The African Development Bank (1999). Bank Group Policy on Good Governance. AfDB, Abidjan. Both development banks use the same four aspect for evaluating governance performance.

The case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is an illustrative example to show the perpetuation, but changing nature of government interactions and the appearance of the support of biopolitical interventions. During the 1960-64 crisis of the newly independent state the central authority completely collapsed while a southern region, Katanga expressed its separatist endeavors. However, neither of the superpowers engaged directly to the conflict apart from expressing diplomatic support as the Soviet Union did or supporting one side by financial contributions as the US reacted (Benkes 2004, Hanskin 2005). A quick, 2-year UN mission (UNOC) did get deployed to the country, but their mandate ended when the separatism was defeated. As Mobutu Sese Seko came into power, all foreign actors receded to the background: the new leader established a harsh dictatorship, but at the same time he brought stability to the country which was completely adequate for the external powers. The United States, for example, continued to provide aid for the Mobutu regime in order to assist in the fight against communism[89] "despite widespread corruption, human rights abuses, and often counterproductive domestic policies."[90]

After the Cold War, however, the DRC experienced two consecutive civil wars, several international actors are currently involved, but this involvement is longer, especially in development terms (Turner 2007). After these struggles the country committed itself to hold democratic elections and satisfy the conditions of good governance. This process shows that the rebuilding of the DRC is now about stability within a particular kind of state arrangement. A non-negotiable regime building process is taking place with an end state that is taken for granted: liberal,

[89] Eizenstat, Stuart E. – Porter, John E. – Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2005). Rebuilding Weak States. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 84. No. 1. pp. 134 – 146.
[90] Fleck, Robert K. – Kilby, Christopher (2010). Changing Aid Regimes? US Foreing Aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror. Journal of Development Economics. Vol. 91. pp. 185.

Western type of state which is able to support the self-determination and self-sustaining nature of the economy.[91]

Building such states with good governance is important to secure the desired ends, and support the biopolitical subject formation. The predictability, reliability of these regimes in these terms is more important for the global North than the needs of the people or domestic conditions. However, other alternatives of state formation could be also possible. State failure or weakness do not necessarily mean chaos and anarchy within these states, certain kinds of governance mechanisms on the sub-state level can emerge than can be beneficial for local conditions[92] - these conditions could also provide basis for restructuring states. The undebatable end form of the state and way of governance, nevertheless, shows that not local interests, but global interests are at stake. The required form of governance is "good", first and foremost, for the global North External, and actors aim at securing the war against bad circulations stemming from underdevelopment by complementing and supporting biopolitical technologies in the political sphere. The adicalization and forceful realization of this interest can be detected in the post-9/11 era, mainly by the state building attempts in Afghanistan and Iraq, therefore this aspect also draws a certain level of continuity between the three historical periods proposed by Duffield.

[91] Eriksen, Stein S. (2009). The Liberal Peace is Neither: Peacebuilding, State Building and the Reproduction of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16. No. 5. pp. 652 – 666.
[92] Menkhaus, Ken (2007). Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping. International Security. Vol. 31. No. 3. pp. 74 – 106.

CONCLUSION

The thesis tried to offer a refined view on human security and its technologies from a biopolitical perspective. The biopolitical interpretation can successfully highlight how underdevelopment got problematized after the end of the constant fear of nuclear war, and how developing sustainable, but non-insured way of life in the underdeveloped states became a technology of security in the liberal world order. However, through the early discourse and actor practices the thesis demonstrated that there is an important continuity that the literature misses, but helps to expound that technologies of human security were never truly about the "security of them", thus the security of the insecure people in the global North, "security of us" considerations could always unbalance the other-regarding aspects. First, because the transition from a zero-sum environment to a more interdependent security environment did not degrade the strategic allocation of scarce resources to support self-interest, which is demonstrated in the selectivity of development based on circulatory effects rather than the needs of people.[93] Second, in the current liberal world order the ultimate technology of security is biopolitical development, however building governance insurances directly serve the interests of these technologies. By this, the disintegrated sovereign power becomes subordinated to the economic requirements of biopower. All in all, insecure people are pushed to live in communities where biological life is acceptably non-insured and self-sustainable as opposed to the life in the global North, however these technologies are complemented and secured through political guarantees that reflect Northern values and practices.

The critique of the biopolitical scholarship is invaluable by showing that biopolitical technologies of human security create powerful and enduring separation between the global South

[93] One can note that the narrow understanding of the 'broad vs. narrow' human security debate is much more reflected in practice as development interventions show sensitivity to violent conflicts and theats. However, the thesis argued that this sensitivity lies in the more urging circulatory effects stemming from these insecurities than others (e.g. hunger, environmental problems).

and the global North. Mainstreaming human security reinforces the hierarchies of power, while projects the interests of the powerful as universal claims values.[94] By the modification of Duffield's logic it became clear that biopolitical technologies build on the security concerns of the North rather than interests of insecure people, therefore domestic interests often sacrificed for the interests of others. Even if before 9/11 human security interventions were not exclusively directed by homeland security concerns of the North, the Cold War era and the post-9/11 period is more politicized and securitized in this regard, however this continuity is important for our conceptual understanding, but also has important policy implications.

Comprehending human security in this refined way does not only mean that the concept never was or intended to be an emancipatory project, as other critical security studies scholars, such as Ken Booth and the Frankfurter School envisions[95], but the policy recommendations from Duffield how to make development and human security work. He suggests that the "problem faced by humanitarian agencies is not a programmatic one, it is political. It involves understanding and moving beyond a design of power which encompasses us all".[96] This suggests practitioners should realize the return of old practices, and try to depoliticize the process again. However, the time of politicized interventions and the "security of us" domination has never passed, therefore uniting humanitarianism with human security practices is a greater step than scholars as Duffield tend to think. Biopolitics of human security, as every technology of security, is heavily contingent on the power structure and power. Even in a more interdependent security environment, avoiding the politicization of human security is difficult if the power relations between the developed and

[94] Chandler, Human Security II: Waiting for the Tail to Wag the Dog.
[95] See eg. Booth, Ken (1991). Security and Emancipation. Review of International Studies. Vol. 17. No. 4. pp. 313 – 326; Booth, Ken (2005). Critical Security Studies and World Politics. Boulder, Col, Lynne Rienner Inc.
[96] Duffield, Mark (2004). Carry on Killing: Global Governance, Humanitarianism and Terror. DIIS Working Paper. No. 23. Accessed: 21 May, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84585

underdeveloped world is no unbalanced as it is today. Until there is relative unanimity and no clash within the North, the power relations between the global North and South are untouched, and the properties of actors do not change fundamentally, the domination of the "security of us" thinking can perpetuate under the mask of human security.

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APPENDIX



1. Figure – Development grants provided by private agencies and NGOs, 1980-2013. Diagram is created by the author. Source of data: OECD 2015.



2. Figure – Official Development Aid (ODA) and NGO and Private Agency Grants, 1980-2013. Diagram is created by the author. Source of data: OCED, 2015.



3. Figure – Official Development Aid Distributed for the Least Developed Countries, 1980-2013. Diagram is created by the author. Source of data: OECD, 2015.



4. Figure. Bilateral Official Development Aid Allocated to Somalia, 1980-2013. Diagram created by the author. Source of data: The World Bank, 2015.



5. Figure. Bilateral Official Development Aid Allocated to Rwanda, 1980-2013. Diagram created by the author. Source of data: The World Bank, 2015.