THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN ON ELECTORAL OUTCOMES IN

DIVIDED SOCIETIES:

A discourse analysis of party competition in the Brčko District and the City of Mostar

By

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Abstract

This thesis examines the cause of different electoral outcomes in the cases of Brčko and Mostar. The population of both cities consists of a mixture of different ethnic groups; the character and structure of both towns has changed due to war, hence the residents of Mostar tend to vote for nationalist, war-time parties (the SDA and HDZ), while the electorate of Brčko inclines toward a multi-ethnic alternative, the SDP. This thesis argues that the main cause of that is the significant difference in the institutional design of both cities that the international community introduced. Therefore, the casual relationship between institutional designs and the differing character of party competition is examined. To approach the given problem, this thesis used three spheres of analysis. Firstly, it used the institutional approach to analyze the governmental structure and electoral rules in the cities. Secondly, a comparative method approach is used to analyze the similarities and differences in Brčko and Mostar's institutional design. Finally, a discourse analysis is used in the last part of this work in order to analyze the rhetoric of local political actors in both towns. The major finding of this work is that there can been seen a causal relationship between the two variables. However, there are always issues that, to a certain extent, impact the local discourse. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that those are less influential than the adopted institutional designs themselves.

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Introduction

The tragic events of 1992-1995 still have a great impact on Bosnia's society, politics, economy, education, media and many other spheres. Even if it has been 20 years since the war ended, Bosnia and Herzegovina has not stopped drawing the attention of international community and it still needs to be supervised by it. Dayton Peace Agreement has created a totally new country after the war; geopolitically, the country consists of two entities- Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska and separate District of Brčko. Politically and institutionally, the country is managed under the power-sharing system and complicated design of institutions. The power within the country is proportionally divided among three constituent people- Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, and because of constant tensions among these groups, the administration of the country is very slow. Society of the country is defined ethnically and also religiously divided. Each constituent group seeks to meet only its own interests (while "others" are set aside), and that is the reason why events such as elections or census are the tool of political representatives and elites to go back to the questions of ethnicity and ethnic belonging. Institutional setting of the country does not mitigate tensions between ethnic groups, but it rather has opposite effect on the society.

This thesis is not going to look at the institutional setup of BiH as such, even if it will be necessary to briefly review it, but it is going to compare two cities that have completely different institutional designs- Mostar and Brčko. The main task of the thesis is to analyze party competition after the war and in 2012 in these two cities. In Mostar, ethnic tensions and radical rhetoric are still present while in Brčko, that is considered as success, ethnic tensions are minimized and radical rhetoric as well. Success might be defined in many ways; it can be a successful intervention of international community that created stability in the region, as for

example Matthew Parish suggests[1], or it can be an economic success; however for this thesis success means that institutional design in Brčko is set in a way that it promotes cooperation between ethnic groups and political representatives in order to ensure fair and moderate party competition.

Research question and hypothesis

The main question this thesis is going to answers is why in Brčko, which ethnic composition of the community is very similar to the one of Mostar and so is the experience from the war, rather moderate parties win the elections, while in Mostar radical parties are rather successful and supported by the residents? To what extent are, in this respect, interests of each of the constituent groups, and especially of those that are in the minority status, represented by the political parties within the region?

The main focus regarding the analyzed question will be given to party competition in these two cities in order to examine the elections and their results. Brčko and Mostar are interesting cases, as it is stated these two cities have a lot in common, such as ethnic structure, wartime legacies and both happen to be under the supervision of international community (IC). The steps that the international community has undergone in these two cities differ. However, to identify what differs the most when it comes to IC and its intervention is the different institutional setup it imposed in each city- Mostar is rather divided one with ethnically divided institutions while Brčko is rather integrated when it comes to institutional framework.[2]

The main argument of this thesis therefore is that when it comes to party competition,

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[1]   Matthew Parish, A *Free City in the Balkans: Reconstructing a Divided Society in Bosnia* (London: New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd., 2010)
[2]   Adam Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013)

what matters the most is the institutional setting of the two cities. Because each of the analyzed regions has different institutional design, we can also talk about different party competition. Party system in Brčko and its electorate is rather integrated than divided while in Mostar people still vote within two systems (Bosniak and Croat one) divided along ethnic lines. The reason for this is that institutional setting in Brčko does not consider ethnicity as a variable that political leaders would use in their rhetoric in order to gain support in the elections, while in Mostar ethnicity is a decisive variable. Because of that moderate parties win the elections in Brčko, while in Mostar radical parties are elected. Rhetoric of the political representatives therefore causes that ethnic cleavages in Mostar are preserved. Moreover, institutional setup introduced in Mostar encourages *intra*-ethnic competition while in Brčko intuitional setup promotes *inter*-ethnic party competition.

I argue that there is causality between institutional design and party competition: institutional design, rather than something else, influences to what extent are radical parties supported and how the party competition looks like. Because in the case of Brčko institutional design promotes party competition that is blind toward ethnicity, political representatives center their campaigns on different issues such as economic growth or education. In Mostar, electoral rules are set by the design in a way that party competition is separately carried out between Bosniak parties and between Croat parties, therefore, when it comes to interactions between the two, rhetoric that is used by local elites is concentrated on the importance of ethnic belonging rather than on addressing problems society faces such as poor economic situation. Ethnic belonging is therefore overrated in order to hide these problems, and the divided institutional design of the city allows this.

Structure of the thesis

In order to examine my argument, this study is divided into three thematic parts. The first part of the thesis provides theoretical background to party and electoral systems. The second part of the thesis is devoted to institutional background in Mostar and Brčko and their developments after the war. The last part of the thesis analyzes party competition in the first elections held after the war and compares it with the elections held in 2012. The reason why this study focuses on these two elections is that it identifies nature and possible shift and change in the local party competition since the war, while looking at the cases of the two cities. Even if there were no local elections conducted in Mostar in 2012[3], this situation cannot be ignored; it is also considered as an outcome of the imposed institutional setup, and local political leaders react to this situation in their speeches and in the media that are to be analyzed.

The topic of this thesis is based on the theoretical framework of party systems within the study of political science. In the first part, theoretical framework is examining typology of party systems by mainly looking at the typology given by Sartori. Because BiH is a divided society, it also provides a brief analysis of electoral systems in divided societies as well. The second part of this chapter formulates a typology of Bosnian party systems and gives a brief introduction to the development of the party system and political parties in BiH after the war. The last part of this chapter is devoted to methodological framework and briefly summarizes main points regarding institutional approach and critical discourse analysis.

The second part of the thesis is devoted to institutional background of the two cities and their development after the war. The first part of this chapter is looking at the changes in

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[3]The reason for this is that Mostar did not reform its electoral system that is divided according to six districts Mostar consists of.

institutional setup in Mostar and its division into six administrative units-three Bosniak dominated units and three Croat dominated units, and at the slow reformation of Mostar from the Interim Statute to the New Statute. The second part of this chapter is analyzing the situation in Brčko. It compares the situation before and after the Final Award was introduced, so it is analyzing steps of unification of the District.

This paper is however not analyzing the whole design of institutions in the two cities, but it limits itself on the governmental sphere of institutional setup and so on the structures of municipal governments and the process of elections, more specifically, the electoral rules that have an impact on party competition and government formation after the polls in the two cities.

The last part of the thesis is the analytical part. In the introduction of the analytical part, the study briefly analyzes and compares the results of the general elections held in 2010 in BiH in order to give a picture of how citizens of Mostar and Brčko vote on the state level and what their party preferences at this level are. Based on the results from the last local elections the two cities had, I analyze character of party competition from the perspective of discourse the two nationalist parties- HZD and SDA and of moderate party, SDP use.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country with very complex institutional design in general. Local institutional designs of Mostar and Brčko has been changing since the war and they significantly differ. The main task of this thesis is to analyze how the divided system in Mostar and the integrated system in Brčko shape the party competition and how the rhetoric of local actors developed since the war. This study will also evaluate whether or not nationalist rhetoric has become more moderate or whether or not in the integrated model nationalist parties lose their nationalist language and in the end become moderate ones.

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Chapter 1- Theoretical background and Methodology

Theoretical background to party and electoral systems

As it is stated in the introduction, this thesis is looking at the relationship between institutional design and party competition. In order to examine this relationship it is necessary to look at the theories of party and electoral systems in which party competition takes place. Therefore this chapter formulates a theoretical framework to party and electoral systems in relation to party competition and campaigning. Later it also analyzes party systems and elections in divided societies so as to understand the situation in BiH properly. The last part of this chapter is devoted to formulating the methodological framework of the thesis.

Because this thesis is looking at political parties and inter-party competition a within given political arena, it is necessary to provide the definition of political party itself. There is probably no single definition of political party that all political scientists would agree on. J. White in the Handbook on Party Politics states that no definition of the political party is objective, thus rather provides several examples of such definitions.[4] One of these definitions for example says that "political party is a coalition of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by legal means."[5] Another definition says that political parties are "coalitions of elites to capture and use political office" and it is added that it is "an institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms and procedures."[6] It also has to be added that in democratic

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[4]   John Kennet White, *What is a political party?* In *Handbook of Party Politics*, ed. Richard S. Katz, & William Crotty, (CA, London, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2006), 5-15.
[5]   Anthony Downs, *An economic theory of democracy,* (New York: Harper, 1957*)*, 24-5. Quoted in Ibid. 6
[6]   John H. Aldrich, Why *Parties?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 19. Quoted in Ibid. 6

regimes, in order to get to power and govern the state, this coalition has to win elections[7]. All political parties are some organized group of men and work within some party system and rules, procedures, in other words; institutional design of the state.

Political parties that work and compete for power within a state are parts of a party system and shape it. As Wolinetz states in the chapter on Party systems and party system types, *"the number of parties contesting elections shapes the menu of choices which voters face when they cast ballots."*[8] In other words, in democratic societies voters have two or more options when it comes to selection of candidate in the elections. Usually, we divide party systems based on the number of political parties forming it. Wolinetz explains that this distinction is based on the comparative literature that examines number of political parties and patterns of party competition. According to this typology we can divide party systems into one-party, two-party and multiparty systems.[9]

The difference between these party systems is not only in the number of political parties that work within it, but also in different electoral systems they institutionalized. The electoral system that is inherent for multiparty system is known as proportional representation, unlike in the case of two two-party system that is connected with strong and more effective government.[10] Many political scientists argue that two-party systems are rather stable ones while proportional representation requires forming a coalition of the number of political parties, at least in most cases, and therefore such government and its decision-making processes might be slow and

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[7] Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Political Parties and the Winning of Office,* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). Quoted in Ibid. 6

[8] Steven B. Wolinetz, *Party systems and party system types* In *Handbook of Party Politics* ed. Richard S. Katz, William Crotty, (CA, London, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2006). 51.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid. 52

unstable.[11]

Party systems, however, are not characterized only by the number of political parties, even if that is a crucial factor, but also interactions between these parties matter and shape the system. Giovanni Sartori is one of the most influential thinkers and political theorists who argues that party system itself means that parties are a *part* of some unit. On the other hand, he does not deny that there are also parties that are strong enough to "monopolize political life."[12] He defined party system as "the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition."[13] Parties always operate with one another within a system and their main task is to either keep the support they have already gained from the electorate, or extend it by taking voters from the opponents.[14]

As it is already stated, Sartori was not only looking at the number of political parties shaping the party systems, but also at the relationship and connectedness between them. Therefore he identified four main types of these systems.

Sartori's typology of party systems:[15]

1. *Two-party systems*, in which each of two parties aims for an absolute majority of seats in parliament, in which one of them wins sufficient seats to enable it to govern alone, and in which the prospect of spending alternate periods in power remains a realistic one for both parties.

2. *Systems exhibiting extreme and polarized pluralism,* in which, briefly, a centre party or a group of centre parties is placed between two mutually antagonistic oppositions, including anti-system parties; in which the ideological differences between the units at either extreme are relative wide; and in which competition tends to be centrifugal rather than centripetal.

3. *Systems characterized by moderate pluralism*, in which there are three, four or five parties and in which the basic pattern is one of government by coalition with the prospect of alternative coalitions.

4. *Predominant party systems,* in which one party obtains an absolute majority of the seats in parliament and stays in power for at least three consecutive elections.

Each of these systems can be assigned to some country. For example, the first case, two-

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[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid. 51
[13] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework Analysis,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 44 in Ibid. 52
[14] Ibid.
[15] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework Analysis,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), vol 1. in B. Graham, *"Theories of Party Systems"* In *Representation and Party Politics: A Comparative Perspective,* Bruce Desmond Graham, *(*Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993). 24-27.

party systems are institutionalized in the USA or Britain or the third case, system of moderate pluralism, is established in Ireland or Belgium.[16] Sartori's typology of party systems is precise; however, it can also be argued that we can classify party systems from other (more modern) perspectives as well. As an example of a rather modern typology of party systems is Mair's division. Mair (1996, 2002) argues that the competition for government within a party system might either be an open alteration or closed alteration. Open alteration means that except for stable parties competing in the political arena there is also space for new parties. This can be called a circulation of parties.[17] Closed alteration simply is an opposite of the open one and it means that "access to government is typically restricted to only a few parties."[18] Mair is not looking at the number of political parties competing within the system but rather at the accessibility to the government or chances of the party to have an access to competition for power.

Mainwaring and Torcal are focused in their working paper on the institutionalization of party systems in advanced democracies and in democracies of "less developed countries."[19] In this respect they say that "the number of relevant parties and the degree of ideological polarization" are important elements of all party systems.[20] Later they argue that the institutionalization of party system is important especially because it gives a pattern to political

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[16] Bruce Desmond Graham, *Theories of Party Systems.* In *Representation and Party Politics: A Comparative Perspective,* ed. B. Graham, *(*Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), pp. 18-41.

[17] Peter Mair, *Party Systems and structures of competition,* In *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Prespective,* ed. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G Niemi, Pippa Norris (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996) 49-82 and Peter Mair, *Comparing party systems,* In *Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting,* ed. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G Niemi, Pippa Norris (London: Sage, 2002), 88-107. in Steven B. Wolinetz, "*Party systems and party system types.*" In *Handbook of Party Politic,* Richard S. Katz, & William Crotty, *s* (CA, London, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2006). 57-58

[18] Ibid.

[19] Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal. *Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization.* Notre Dame, Ind.: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 2005. p.1

[20] Ibid. p. 4

processes. There are four aspects of party-system institutionalization: first, institutionalized systems are stable; "patterns of party competition manifest regularity."[21] The second is that in institutionalized party systems "parties have strong roots in society, and most voters, conversely, have strong attachments to parties. Most voters identify with a party and vote for it most of the time, and some interest associations are closely linked to parties."[22] The third aspect is that political parties gain legitimacy within the system and the fourth one says that political party is not a tool of a single leader or few of them, but they "acquire an independent status and value on their own."[23] Therefore, party system and its institutionalization require certain patterns and rules within which political parties cooperate and work.[24]

Each political party gained and holds identity within the state's party system. On the one hand, it is the identity gained from historical experience and on the other hand, what shapes its identity is what the party promotes when it comes to competition.[25] There is also an internal and external party identity; the former identifies what holds the party together, for example, traditions and organizations and the latter determines how the party differs from others.[26] Political parties do not exist and compete for the power only within a political system, but they also need to be systematized in order to compete for power. There have to be set certain rules and procedures to keep the connection between the leaders, offices and other members as well as they define the rights and duties of party members in order to keep coherence and cooperation of the party.[27]

Therefore on the one hand, identity of the party matters a lot, since it identifies its

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[21] Ibid. p.4
[22] Ibid. p.4
[23] Ibid. p.5
[24] Ibid.
[25] Mi chael Waller, *Party inheritance and party identities* In *Stabilising fragile democracies: Comparing new party systems in southern and eastern Europe,* ed. Geffrey Pridham, Paul G. Lewis, (pp. 23-43). (London, New York: Routledge, 1996). p.23
[26] Ibid. 23
[27] Ibid. 26

common values and goals and also shows how the party differs, for example, in its ideology and values, in relation to other parties working within the shared party system. On the other hand, the electorate, people identify themselves with political parties as well. According to Schmitt, there are three premises of how people identify themselves with the party.

First is called *Dutch proposition,* where people are identified with a certain ideology and the party system holds the number of parties with the same or similar ideology and therefore voters have multiple party identifications.[28] Secondly, tn the electoral system the proposition voter chooses a political party in the proportional model and a certain candidate in the plurality system and so in the proportional model people are identified with a party while the plurality model does not require that.[29] The third proposition implies the electoral experience of the voter and claims that young voters are not so strongly identified with a certain party unlike the experienced, older voters.[30]

There is number of elements that determine the voter's choice regarding party belonging. It is the electoral system itself, where the voter is either identified with a party or a candidate, then it is an ideological background of the party; and here people usually have multiple identifications; and the voter's age and electoral experience also play a role when it comes to party identification.

The important part of each election is political campaigns. Each election and each voter's choices might be influenced by political campaigns:

> The objective of a political campaign is to influence the process and outcome of governance. It consists of an organized communication effort, involving the role of one or more agencies (be they parties, candidates, government institutions, or special interest

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[28] Hermann Schmitt, *Multiple Party Identifications* in T*he Comparative Study of Electoral Systems,* ed. Hans Dieter Klingemann, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) p. 139

[29] Ibid. p. 140

[30] Ibid. p. 140

organizations) seeking to influence the outcome of processes of political decision-making by shaping public opinion. Political actors are campaigning because they hope that the support of the public, or relevant segments of the public, will help them to promote their political causes.[31]

Political campaigns might have different characters, use different tools, such as nationalism claims or hate speech that are very common within the Balkans (Macedonia, BiH). These negative campaigns are also the way to draw the attention of voters and discredit opponent(s).

Party systems and elections in divided societies

Because Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a divided society, with divided institutional setting under power-sharing arrangement, the theoretical framework suggested by A. Lijphart is needed to be analyzed in order to understand why BiH is a consociational model and how the party system is created in a divided society. First of all, "consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy."[32] Successful consociational democracy meets four elements: elites have a space to satisfy the interests of the group they belong to, these elites have to participate in "common effort", stable and cohesive system is a crucial element as well, and the last one is that elites should understand the danger of fragmentation.[33]

In order to foster cooperation among ethnic elites in divided societies, Lijphart suggests that there are certain principles must be met in order to foster it: *a grand coalition* that means that all ethnic and minority groups are involved in decision-making processes. The second is *a*

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[31] Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck and David M. Farrell, *Studying political campaigns and their effects.* In *Do Political Campaigns matter?: Campaign effects in elections and referendums,* ed. David M. Farrell, Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, (London, New York: Routledge, 2002). p. 3

[32] Arend Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2008), 31.

[33] Ibid. p.32

mutual veto system that guarantees that no group would be outvoted. The third is *the principle of proportional representation*, and the fourth is *a segmental autonomy*, which means that in certain issues an ethnic or another group decides for itself, self-governs itself. *Ethnic federalism* is a suggested division of the state, where there either are ethnically homogenous territories or in the case of heterogeneous ones *non-territorial federalism or functional autonomy* is established.[34]

Horovitz, unlike Lijphart, suggests the integrated model, where ethnicity does not play a defining factor. Horovitz suggests that there are rather other factors, interests and issues on which people should base their sympathies to elites and political actors, such as social class. Another suggestion of Horovitz is that not proportional representation should be established but rather the *preferential electoral system* that would encourage political parties to focus on cross-ethnic interests rather than on the interests of some particular ethnic group. As for the last point here, he proposes *heterogeneous federal units* rather than homogenous in order to foster cooperation and integration of the ethnic groups.[35]

When we compare Horovitz's and Ljiphart's models, Lijphart appears to be relying on the divided model so each of the group would be equally represented. However, Horovitz suggests integrated model where ethnic belonging does not play a crucial role therefore society is not divided in accordance with it.[36]

When it comes to electoral systems in consociational democracies, Norris states in the book *Driving Democracy: Do power-sharing institutions work?,* that the proportional

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[34]   Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977) 25-44 in Rannveig Cathrine Finsveen, *"Power-sharing after Civil War: an Analysis of Institutional Structures and Inter-ethnic Elite Cooperation in Mostar and Brčko"* (Mater Thesis, University of Oslo, 2008). 21-23

[35]   Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). In Rannveig Cathrine Finsveen, *"Power-sharing after Civil War: an Analysis of Institutional Structures and Inter-ethnic Elite Cooperation in Mostar and Brčko"* (Mater Thesis, University of Oslo, 2008). pp.24-26

[36]   Rannveig Cathrine Finsveen, *"Power-sharing after Civil War: an Analysis of Institutional Structures and Inter-ethnic Elite Cooperation in Mostar and Brčko"* (Master Thesis, University of Oslo, 2008).

representation model is the most suitable one, since all the groups have a chance and guarantee, at least to some extent, to represent and meet their interests.[37] This system and its institutions are supposed to ensure that the diversity of the society is preserved without discrimination of any ethnic, religious gender...group; by having multiple parties that represent the interests of certain groups, and all have the same chance to compete for power, tensions and mistrust should be mitigated and peace and cooperation are promoted.[38]

Theoretical framework to political parties in BiH

This sub-chapter clarifies the party system in BiH. First of all it provides the theoretical basis to the situation in BiH and later it briefly goes over the development of political parties and the party system after Dayton in December 1995 in order to understand situation in Brčko and Mostar.

In general, Bose argues that the function of party system is "intended to provide an institutionalized channel for the expression of conflicts in society, through open competition" while on the other hand it is also supposed to mediate these conflicts.[39] As Lipset and Rokkan argue, there are the number of conflicts within the society that party systems might mediate such as class, religion, cleavages between rural and urban parts of the country or ethnic-cultural cleavages. Political parties usually put an emphasis on one of the conflicts and that is how the electorate might identify with one party or another.[40] Bose therefore argues that "in multiethnic democracy, there will surely be some parties based upon stressing the 'ethnic-cultural' dimension

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[37] Pippa Norris, *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2008), 106.

[38] Ibid. p. 103

[39] Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention* (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), p. 207

[40] Ibid. 207

of cleavage."[41] Here, she is suggesting an important distinction: parties that have a cross-national base and parties that have cross-national orientation.[42] In the case of BiH, there is no political party that would have a cross-national base; however we can find parties that have a cross-national orientation, meaning that such a party represents the interests of all citizens regardless of their national belonging. Such a party in BiH is the social-democratic party- SDP-BiH. This party is however mainly supported by the Bosniac community.[43]

The character of the party system in BiH is also influenced by the ethnic division of the state and its institutions. Even if we can see little progress in party pluralization, this progress is happening within the electorate of the particular ethnic group. Nationalist parties of certain group are weakened by less nationalist parties of the same group rather than by the party of no national orientation. Therefore the party politics and competition is a matter within the national groups first and foremost.[44]

Other important factors that have an effect on the electorate are the level of education, occupation, location (whether they live in the urban or rural areas), class and religion. People living in the rural places with only elementary education tend to support nationalist parties more than people living in the urban area, especially those who obtained higher level of education.[45] Even if all of these factors affect the voter; "but they do so not in the context of a single, coherent country-wide electorate and party systems, but rather within the confines of what are essentially three separate electorates and three distinct (sub)systems of party competition."[46] Not only party pluralization is a case within the constituent groups, but party competition is a matter

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[41] Ibid. 208
[42] Ibid. 209
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid. 210
[46] Ibid. 210

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of it as well. National parties have a guaranteed position among their electorate; the only question is which one. To give an example, SDA (Bosniak National Party) competes for power with SDP (cross-national party), SDS (Serb nation party) competes for power with smaller Serb parties; the only exception is HZD (Croat nation party) that does not have, or has only a negligible competition among other Croat parties.[47]

A brief introduction to the situation after Dayton

The fall of communism in former Yugoslavia had the greater impact on the region than anyone could possibly imagine at that time. It was followed by the violent conflict(s). The character of the region has changed and so has the state of BiH. The first elections that were held after the fall of communism were a clear victory of nationalist parties- SDA, SDS and HZD.[48] Several peace plans were introduced and suggested during the war in order to meet the interests of each of the involved groups and end the conflict as soon as possible. None of the plans was successful but the last one- the Dayton Peace Agreement. After the conflict, one of the most important things for the international community to deal with was that BiH was "not just a society divided but a society polarized on the most basic issues- the question of legitimacy of the state, its common institutions and its borders."[49]

It is argued that the *Dayton compromise* "invented a most centralized state in the world."[50] The institutional structure of the state is very complex. The state itself is divided into two entities- the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska (RS), and the Brčko District which

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[47] Ibid. 211

[48] Florian Bieber, *Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

[49] Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention* (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), 3.

[50] Ibid. 23

is a separate political and institutional unit.[51] The institutional setup is divided into several levels as well- the tripartite presidency is on the top along with other state institutions, then each of the entities has its own entity-level institutions, cantonal level (in federation) and municipal level institutions.[52]

When it comes to the party system, Bieber argues that parties of BiH can be divided into several groups- nationalist- radical parties, moderate parties and parties that exclude the question of national belonging completely from their programs.[53] The Dominance of the nationalist, radical parties is still significant, and even if other parties also gained support in past elections (2002, 2006, and 2010), the influence of SDS, SDA and HZD is essential.[54] Hulsey argues, by using the 2006 elections in BiH as an example that people tend to vote for parties devoted to the interests of a certain ethnic group when there are also other parties representing the interests of other ethnic groups and therefore use nationalist rhetoric.[55] The Dayton peace agreement prescribes the competitive multi-party system, since it is "the primary mechanism for both representation of citizens and mediation of differences between citizens, and groups of citizens."[56] BiH is a consociational model, as the Dayton Peace Agreement prescribes, and therefore party competition is one of the key factors of working democratic institutions. Seats in governments on every level of institutions are divided proportionally according to the certain

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[51] Florian Bieber, *Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] John W. Hulsey, *'Why did they vote for those guys again?' Challenges and contradictions in the promotion of political moderation in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.* In *Promoting Party Politics in Emerging Democracies.* ed. Peter Burnell and Andre W.M. Gerrits, (London, New York: Routledge, 2012).
[56] Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention* (London: Hurst & Company, 2002). 206

ratio.[57]

Free and fair elections, party competition and multi-party system are preserved by Dayton and also in practice. However, participation in elections is decreasing. The reasons for that are: there is a big number of political parties, most of them ethnically oriented, "lack of trust in institutions/ political systems, and political parties; continuous political blockage...."[58] These authors later argue that other reasons are that local leaders influence the electorate and election process[59]. Sahadžić states that not only political leaders influence the election process and are involved in pre-election campaigns, but also religious leaders play a big role.[60] Each of the constituent groups is not only identified with their ethnic belonging but also religious one- Bosniaks-Islamic, Croats- Catholic and Serbs- Orthodox. Even if the constitution of BiH and the Dayton Peace Agreement promote multi-party system and party competition, the influence of nationalist parties was and still is significant within the state of BiH.

Methodology

This thesis is going to use three methodological approaches in order to analyze party competition in BiH: institutionalism, comparative method and critical discourse analysis. Analysis of institutional design and comparison of the analyzed institutions are crucial parts of this thesis. This analysis will mainly examine how institutions of BiH work with specific focus on the governmental setups in Brčko and Mostar. The second step that goes along with this analysis is to compare the ethnically divided system introduced in Mostar and the model that

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[57] Ibid.
[58] Saša Gavrić, Damir Banović, and Marina Barreiro, *The Political System of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Institutions- Actors- Processes*. Sarajevo: Sarajevo Open Center, 2013. 71
[59] Ibid.
[60] Maja Sahadžić, "*The Electoral Systems of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Short Review of Political Matter and/or Technical Perplexion*" CONTEMPORARY issues, 2 (1) (2009, August 27). 61-78.

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strongly promotes inter-ethnic cooperation established in Brčko.

Critical discourse analysis is an essential methodological approach for this thesis in the second part of the analysis. Discourse, political speeches, is a key aspect when it comes to party competition, because it is the easiest way to introduce candidate's visions and ideas to the voter. In order to answer question(s) this thesis asks I have to identify the language political representatives use in Mostar and Brčko for winning seats in the city governments. By analyzing the rhetoric of political candidates or parties themselves, I will see what tools they use to persuade voters to support them in the elections.

R. Goodin in the introductory chapter of the book "The Theory of Institutional Design" provides a detailed overview on the theory of new institutionalism that I use as a central approach for the institutional analysis. He is looking at institutionalism from different perspectives: historical, sociological and economic, but for the purposes of this thesis, the political perspective is the most interesting one. Author states that when it comes to political science, new institutionalism goes back to the old one and therefore its main focus is "studying the state in its institutional form: organization charts, agencies and bureaux, public administration quite broadly conceived, and what has subsequently come to be called 'state apparatus'."[61]

Another chapter of the same book written by K. Shepsle discusses political deals within institutional design. Making political deals is everyday part of the politician's lives. Coming to an actual deal, however, is sometimes problematic and a lot of deals get stuck.[62] The political deal is also government formation, which many times requires agreement between numbers of

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[61] Robert E. Goodin, *Institutions and Their Design*. In *The Theory of Institutional Design,* ed. Robert E. Goodin, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 12.

[62] Keneth A. Shepsle, Political *Deals in Institutional Settings*. In *The Theory of Institutional Design,* ed. Robert E. Goodin, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996).

political actors in order to create coalition. The author argues that "in most parliamentary democracies, for example, the occasion of the formation of a new multiparty government is often accompanied by coalition agreement or statement of the new government's program."[63] Political deals and decisions are made within certain institutional design that is the reason why it is important for my analysis to look at the former also within the framework of the institutional theory.

After I analyze the institutional framework of Mostar and Brčko in the background chapter, I will focus on the analysis of political campaigns in the analytical part of the thesis. For that I will use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) formulated in the edition on the Discursive Construction of National Identity.[64]

CDA is looking at the "authentic everyday communication in institutional, media, political or other locations rather than on sample sentences or sample texts constructed in linguistic minds."[65] However, it is not looking only at the spoken word but also the written one. Because in my thesis I analyze the campaigns and rhetoric of political actors that went with it mainly from newspapers and written speeches, this methodological framework and its combination of written and spoken approach helps me to understand the language of politicians more deeply. I will need to be especially careful about understanding the creation of relations between the groups chosen and the use of the category of ethnicity in the discourse.[66]

To approach how political elites build local identities and to see to what extent they use nationalistic language I use two strategies to identify it: constructive strategy and strategy of

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[63] Ibid. 230

[64] Ruth Wodak., Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, Karin Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

[65] Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, *Critical Discourse Analysis.* In *Discourse as Social Interaction,* ed. Van Dijk, Teun A. (London, Thousand Oaks, New Dehli, 1997), 258-84. In Ibid. 8

[66] Ibid.

justification. The former helps me to analyze how political leaders and parties "attempt to construct and to establish a certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation."[67] The latter is used to analyze "a societal *status quo ante* by emphasizing the legitimacy of past acts of the 'own' national 'we'-group."[68] Here I am looking at who is identified as 'we' in the rhetoric of local political elites.

I have chosen the combination of these three approaches- institutional, comparative and discourse analysis, because they interact with one another, they shape, construct and change each other. In the final part of the thesis I am focusing on the causality between the institutional designs in Mostar and Brčko and the character of party competition through campaigning. This methodological approach will help to see how and to what extent the two form each other in analyzed   towns   analyzed.

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[67] Ruth Wodak., Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, Karin Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2009), 33.
[68] Ibid.

Chapter 2- Background to the institutional designs of the City of Mostar and the Brčko District

The following chapter of the thesis is devoted to the analysis of the institutional designs of the City of Mostar and the Brčko District. The relevant parts of institutional setup of these two cities are the structure of municipal governments and the process of elections, more specifically, the electoral rules that have an impact on government formation after the polls. Both cities went through the rebuilding processes in a sense that structures of governments as well as electoral processes and rules that were imposed after the war have changed due to the international intervention that also takes a significant place in both cities considering governance and administrative bodies. Nevertheless, the development of the two cities went in different directions, on the one hand Brčko's model that highly promotes inter-party competition, achieved moderate political climate, while on the other hand Mostar's model that is built upon diversity causes a tense political situation and therefore it needs to be reformed.

In order to provide the comprehensive background to the systems in the analyzed cities and to emphasize changes and differences of the established designs of municipal governance and electoral rules and procedures, I firstly analyze the impact of the Dayton Peace Agreement on the categorization of people within the state-level institutions, where as an example I take the Presidency of the BiH and entity level institutions; governments of the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation in the concrete. By analyzing these three governmental bodies I show what impact Deaton Peace Agreement (DPA) has on the ethnic polarization of people.

Ethnic polarization in this respect is considered as a separation of people into groups based on their ethnic belonging within institutions in order to achieve proportional representation

of all groups. Therefore the people of BiH are not considered by the DPA as one nation, but as three nations, together with others, who form the government(s) of BiH and its entities, cantons and municipalities, and electoral rules are regulated in a way to ensure that all constituent groups get their seats in the governments according to prescribed ratio. Due to identifying citizens of BiH by the ethnic and also territorial keys, that is stated below as well, belonging to one of the groups or to the of or the other entity is an exclusive role the citizen of BiH 'plays' and it prevents the individual from being a part of the other group at the same time.[69]

The main aim of this chapter therefore is to determine the development and changes within the institutional frameworks of Mostar's and Brčko's municipal government structures and electoral rules while also looking at the state and its institutional setup as such by considering the Presidency, and entity governments and their ethnic structures and electoral rules as crucial institutional features to be analyzed for the purposes of this thesis in order to properly understand the current situation in both cities.

Categorization of people in Dayton Peace Agreement

The Dayton Peace Accords were for a long time considered as a great success of the international community (IC) in terms of achieving peace in the country that suffered the most during the break-up of former Yugoslavia, especially after the failure of a number of peace plans that were introduced during the conflict. However, now we can see that in the long run the complicated governmental, administrative or legal systems it established in BiH do not work as was envisaged. The introduced system of power-sharing causes deadlocks and it seems that country is not moving forward but remains frozen in its post-conflict period.

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[69] Murat Somer, "*Cascades of Ethnic Polarization: Lessons from Yugoslavia*," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, January 2001, Sage Publications, 128. Accessed May 10, 2015 http://portal.ku.edu.tr/~musomer/research_files/Murat%20Somer%20ANNALS%20AAPSS%2001.pdf

In this respect, the following section of the chapter is looking at the sphere of categorization of people in DPA by looking at the ethnic distribution of seats in Presidency and entity level governments as well as by referring to the electoral rules that need to be met in order to fulfil the required ethnic quotas.

First of all, it is important to point out that Dayton Constitution determines "Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with others)."[70] Belonging to the constituent nation *(narod)* means that these people enjoy certain rights people belonging to the category of others (national minorities) do not and even are deprived of, as for example to become a member of the Presidency. DPA explicitly states that the Presidency "shall consist of three Members: one Bosnian, one Serb and one Croat."[71] Therefore the seats in the Presidency are reserved and distributed according to ethnic belonging. As for the electoral rules, Bosniak and Croat members of the Presidency are "directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska."[72]

This system, as it is stated in the previous chapter, caused that ethnic voting legitimized the power of radical parties in the first democratic elections held right after the war, since people identified themselves with them, while ethnic belonging became a main tool that had been manipulated by three nationalistic parties in order to gain power. This trend was continuous also in the following elections held in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014, even if in some cases representatives of "less" radical parties won the seat. For example, in 2006 Silajdžič Haris from Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu) that "is a moderate

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[70] "Dayton Peace Agreement: Annex 4. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Office of the High Representative, 1995.* Accessed May 2, 2015, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=372
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.

nationalistic centrist Bosniak party"[73] won the elections as the Bosniak representative or Željko Komšič from moderate SDP won the seat in presidency as a Croat representative. In the following period, however, there was a return to radical parties' representatives from SDA and HZD.[74]

Another cause of polarization of people is the territorial division. Citizens of BiH are divided according to the entity they live in regarding the Presidency elections. As it is stated in the Constitution, Bosniak and Croat members are elected from the Federation and the Serb member from the RS. Therefore citizens of BiH have also ties to the entity in order to participate in the general elections. This fact emphasizes not the only ethnic "otherness" of people, but it also stress the entity they live in, since the Federation is rather a Bosniak-Croat dominated entity, while RS is almost exclusively the Serb entity.

Regardless of the domination of certain group(s) within the one entity or the other, all constituent nations are equally represented not only in the state level institutions, but also in the RS and the Federation. Thus none of the entities is under the total control of the predominant constituent group but rather each ethnic group has a say (at least on the paper) in the entity where it stands in a minority position. For example, the Constitution of the Federation of BiH dictates that in the entity level government (the Cabinet), that is formed by sixteen ministers, eight ministers are represented from the Bosniak constituent nation, five ministers are from the Croat constituent nation, and three ministers are from the Serb constituent nation.[75] The ministers are

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[73] European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, *"Bosnia and Herzegovina,"* last update March 3, 2015. Accessed May 10, 2015 http://www.europeanforum.net/country/bosnia_herzegovina

[74] For the results see: www.izbori.ba

[75] "Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Legislationonline*, 1994 (amended 2003). Accessed May 1, 2015.
http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1577/file/cf85ae3b01c1adcd1b6eed4a3b84.htm/preview

appointed by the President and Vice presidents of the Federation who "who shall come from different constituent peoples."[76] The ethnic key is preserved in both the governmental structure of the Federation as well as the electoral rules require that President and Vice presidents would choose the representatives according to ethnic key.

The same principle is adopted in RS and hence the Constitution of the Republika Srpska states that eight ministers of the sixteen are from the Serb constituent group, five are from the Bosniak constituent group and three are from the Croat constituent group.[77] The power sharing arrangement guarantees that all of the constituent groups are to some extent represented in all institutions of BiH, but it also classifies people into one of the constituent groups, since their representatives are elected on the basis of ethnic belonging. From the other perspective, RS is still an entity primarily controlled by the Serbs and FBIH is primarily controlled by the Bosniaks and Croats, because their groups have a majority representation in their entities and therefore it provides their representatives with "ultra-nationalist projects of building separate nations on all sides."[78]

The following part of the chapter examines more closely the development of the local institutions in Mostar and Brčko. Here we see how micro case-studies differ in the nature of their government structure and electoral rules. In order to look at these issues more closely, I firstly highlight the main events that had an impact on the development of local municipal governments in both cities and I stress the role of IC that introduced the administrative systems of both cities.

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[76]   Ibid. Article 1(49)
[77]   "Constitution of the Republika Srpska," *Legislationonline*, 1992 (amended 2003). Accessed May 1, 2015. http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1580/file/c8ea79bc0db11c11f49f19525f43.htm/preview
[78]   Bedrudin Brljavac, "Bosnia and Herzegovina and Europeanization: between ethnic-national and European identities," *Open Democracy,* April 25, 2012, Accessed May 2,2015 https://www.opendemocracy.net/bedrudin-brljavac/bosnia-and-herzegovina-and-europeanization-between-ethnic-national-and-european-id

By looking at the development of local governments, their structures and considering the main features of electoral rules, I see how people in the two cities interact with one another from the perspective of ethnic polarization.

The city of Mostar: partition and administration of Mostar after the war

Mostar, before the war, was one of the most ethnically mixed regions of the country where the Bosniaks, the Croats, and the Serbs lived together on the shared territory. According to the 1991 census 34, 6% of Mostar's society was constituted by Bosniaks, another 34% was constituted by Croats, and Serbs formed almost 19% of the society; the rest belonged to the others or Yugoslavs.[79] The Bosniak-Croat war lasted from 1992 until 1994 and it changed the composition of the society as well as its territorial division. After the fightings started between HVO and BiH Army the western part of the city became the Croat-dominated territory and the eastern part has been since then a Bosniak dominated side of Mostar. The Serbs were gradually displaced from the region and became a marginal group. The conflict was ended by the Washington Agreement in 1994. International supervision took place in the city after the war and so it was administered under the EUAM (European Union Administration of Mostar) in years 1994-1997.[80]

Hans Koschnik, who was the head of EUAM, was authorized under the Memorandum of Understanding to set up "multi ethnic, unified city administration."[81] That involved also the reconstruction and the "normalization" of the city meaning that freedom of movement or return

[79] Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar, "Recommendations of the Commission, Report of the Chairman," *Office of the High Representative,* 15 December 2003. 14. Accessed May 2, 2015
http://www.ohr.int/archive/report-mostar/pdf/Reforming%20Mostar-Report%20%28EN%29.pdf
[80] Larissa Vetters, "The Power of Administrative Categories: Emerging Notions of Citizenship in the Divided City of Mostar," *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics* (2007)
[81] ICG Balkan report No.90, *Reunifying Mostar, Opportunities for Progress,* Sarajevo/Washington/Brussels, 2000, p.i. Quoted in Jelena Mitrovic, *"Bridging the divides-'unifications' of Mostar"* (Mater Thesis, Central European University, 2008), 28

of refugees are to be ensured.[82] However relationships between Koschnik and local political elites, especially with HZD were not ideal, and therefore the creation of the unified administrative body was hard to agree on with all political elites. The Madrid Agreement, 1995 stated that the *Memorandum* of Understanding must be implemented and again emphasized the unified city administration. The few months after this agreement was signed, Koschnik came up with the administrative setup of Mostar.

This setup divided the city into seven parts- three of them were Bosniak dominated, another three were Croat dominated and the last was the neutral central zone. However, the size of the central zone was almost impossible to negotiate with Croat political elites who wanted it as small as possible, unlike the Bosniaks. Thus the conference in Rome was organized in order to solve the issue. The few days after, February 16, 1996 the Rome Agreement was signed and the Interim Statute of the City of Mostar was declared.[83]

The Interim Statute was supposed to help the city to establish new institutional and administrative frameworks, however, it worked differently on paper and in practice. The city was divided into six municipalities- three Bosniaks ones and three Croat ones. The negative effect of this division was that all municipalities acted as single administrative and electoral units and there was almost no cooperation between municipalities of different ethnic groups; that means that Bosniak municipalities communicated among each other and so did Croat municipalities.[84] The central zone that was under the control of the City Council was also a target of ethnic division since it was composed of 30 members of which ten members were Bosniaks, ten Croats

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[82]   Ibid. 28
[83]   Ibid. 28-29
[84]   Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar, "Recommendations of the Commission, Report of the Chairman," *Office of the High Representative,* 15 December 2003. Accessed May 2, 2015 http://www.ohr.int/archive/report-mostar/pdf/Reforming%20Mostar-Report%20%28EN%29.pdf

and the rest were others.[85] The members of the council were elected equally according to the municipalities; 18 members were elected from municipalities- each municipality elected three members and 12 were elected from the open list.

Each municipality was under the management of its own municipal council. Each council has 25 members and Bosniaks, Croats and Others must be represented in all municipalities proportionally.[86]

The three Bosniak municipalities of Mostar are Mostar-North, Mostar-Old Town (Stari Grad), Mostar- South-East and the three Croat ones are Mostar South, Mostar South-West, and Mostar West. The following tables indicated what the ethnic representation of the municipal councils looked like and in what portions was each of the ethnic groups represented[87].

Table 1: "Composition of the six City-Municipalities Councils"88

Municipality	Croats	Bosniacs	Others
Mostar-North	4	11	10
Mostar-Old Town	4	12	9
Mostar-South-East	3	19	3
Mostar-South	12	6	7
Mostar South-West	12	6	7
Mostar West	10	6	9

(Source: Interim Statute, art 56 (3))

As it can be seen, the governmental system of Mostar as such was very complex as it seeked to ensure representation of all ethnic groups on the city level and within its districts as

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[85] Rannveig Cathrine Finsveen, *"Power-sharing after Civil War: an Analysis of Institutional Structures and Inter-ethnic Elite Cooperation in Mostar and Brčko"* (Mater Thesis, University of Oslo, 2008)

[86] Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: nationalist partition and international intervention* (London: Hurst, 2002), 120,

[87] Rannveig Cathrine Finsveen*, "Power-sharing after Civil War: an Analysis of Institutional Structures and Inter-ethnic Elite Cooperation in Mostar and Brčko"* (Mater Thesis, University of Oslo, 2008). 34

[88] Table retreived from Rannveig Cathrine Finsveen*, "Power-sharing after Civil War: an Analysis of Institutional Structures and Inter-ethnic Elite Cooperation in Mostar and Brčko"* (Mater Thesis, University of Oslo, 2008). 34

well. Such a deep fragmentation however caused that the expected cooperation among districts never took a place. The structure of the City Council and its elective rules in practice established two entities of Mostar; a Croat one and a Bosniak one. The consociational model that seeks to promote cooperation had totally opposite effect on the city and therefore it never worked as a unified entity under the Interim Statute. It functioned as a city divided along ethnic lines on all spheres- political, territorial, social, cultural... Even the infrastructure and institutions such as child care, schools on all levels or health care systems operated as two units.[89]

Because of these deep cleavages of the city and its society, and because of no or only very little progress of the city, the High Representative Paddy Ashdown declared that the reformation of the city was needed in order to integrate the city administration and so he nominated the Commission for Reporting the City of Mostar in 2003.[90] The commission was composed of the chairman- Norbert Winterstein, representatives of political parties- SDU, SDA, HDZ, SBiH, SDP, and NSRzB, and the Returnees' Association representative together with commission of advisers.[91] The return of refugees and displaced people was an especially important issue. Because of the ethnic division of the city the number of refugees did not get their property and they also could not return.[92] Distrust, hater, and fear between dominant ethnic groups did not give space for the unification and normalization of the city and thus a New Statute for Mostar was formulated.

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[89] Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar, "Recommendations of the Commission, Report of the Chairman," *Office of the High Representative,* 15 December 2003. Accessed May 2, 2015 http://www.ohr.int/archive/report-mostar/pdf/Reforming%20Mostar-Report%20%28EN%29.pdf

[90] Jelena Mitrovic, *"Bridging the divides-'unifications' of Mostar"* (Mater Thesis, Central European University, 2008), 36.

[91] Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar, "Recommendations of the Commission, Report of the Chairman," *Office of the High Representative,* 15 December 2003. Accessed May 2, 2015 http://www.ohr.int/archive/report-mostar/pdf/Reforming%20Mostar-Report%20%28EN%29.pdf

[92] Ibid.

Reformation and integration of Mostar's administration by the New Statute in 2004

A divided administration that was formerly prescribed by the Interim Statute was abolished by the New Statute thus all duplicate offices were closed in order to impose an integrated administrative system. The New Statute states that "The City shall be a unit of local administration."[93] The executive body of the City of Mostar is the City Council that consists of 35 councilors and is led by the President and Vice Presidents. The city itself is represented by the Mayor. 18 councilors of the city council are elected from the six city areas, former municipalities that are now used as an electoral districts. Each district elects three councilors. The remaining 17 are elected in the city wide list. To prevent overrepresentation of one of the ethnic groups, the New Statute imposes a limitation so that no constituent group can gain more than 15 seats in the council.[94]

The president and two Vice presidents of the City Council are at the head of the city council. The New Statute imposes a restriction over the ethnic belonging of presidents, and states that each constituent group can be represented only by one member, meaning that none of the constituent people can gain Presidency or the position of the Vice president. The president and the vice president are elected by the City Council and so is the Mayor of the city, who is a representative of the residents of Mostar and is "responsible for the proper functioning of the City Administration.[95]

Even if the New Statute canceled the formerly existing six administrative municipalities of the city, nevertheless in each municipality "branch offices of the City Administration shall be

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[93]   Paddy Ashdown, "Statute of the City of Mostar," *Grad Mostar,* Sarajevo 2004. Article 6.Accessed May 1, 2015   http://www.mostar.ba/statut-181.html
[94]   Paddy Ashdown, "Statute of the City of Mostar," *Grad Mostar,* Sarajevo 2004. Articles 14-17.Accessed May 1, 2015   http://www.mostar.ba/statut-181.html
[95]   Paddy Ashdown, "Statute of the City of Mostar," *Grad Mostar,* Sarajevo 2004. Articles 25, 26, 55.Accessed May 1, 2015   http://www.mostar.ba/statut-181.html

established in the City areas"[96] in order to provide as many services to the residents of Mostar as possible. Political elites of Mostar, HZD and SDA were not happy about the new administration structure and the limitations the New Statute imposed. Yet, both political parties and their representatives had to accept the new setup this statute introduces. On the one hand, the statute was a step toward the unification of the City of Mostar and its residents, and toward the potential complete integration of the city in the future. The city however needed to reestablish and fix the 'damage' the Interim statute caused.[97]

Now, after the new statute has been implemented for more than ten years we can see its shortcomings. The electoral system and its rules, as they frame the city right now, as it can be seen in the following chapter, promote almost no inter-party competition in a sense that Bosniak and Croat parties are encouraged to compete for the seats in *intra-ethnic* party competition instead of competing in democratic inter-party competition. This is especially due to the electoral rules as 18 seats in the council are represented by the candidates who compete for them within an either Bosniak or a Croat ethnically dominated unit. The city areas that are prescribed by the new statute function in almost the same way they did as six municipalities. Moore argues that this statute is once again a failure because the main political elites are still not willing to accept the new system and therefore the political scene in Mostar is dominated by nationalist groups and by the interests of political elites, because the city remains divided.[98]

The main cause of the deadlock situation in Mostar is that the political parties were unable to agree on the change of electoral system, because the system as it is right now is

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[96] Ibid. Article 7.
[97]   Jelena Mitrovic, *"Bridging the divides-'unifications' of Mostar"* (Mater Thesis, Central European University, 2008). 37-38.
[98] Adam Moore, Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 66.

unconstitutional, more specifically, the Constitutional Court of BiH made a decision that "the use

of the former city municipalities as electoral districts was unconstitutional because of the large

differences in population across the six units."[99] That is the reason why the last local elections

Mostar held were in 2008, when councilors could not reach a consensus on the Mayor. The

government that rules in Mostar nowadays is the same government elected in 2008.[100]

The institutional setup introduced in the City of Mostar after the war and then by the New

Statute has not achieved much progress since the conflict. The city is still divided, even if there

was the number of attempts by IC to reform it and to establish a unified administrative structure

of the city together with integrated institutions. Most of the attempts failed and the institutional

and administrative setups of the city are under the power-sharing arrangement that does not call

for cooperation among ethnic groups but divides them and causes the deadlock.

The Brčko District: development of the District and its institutions after the war

Development of institutions in the District of Brčko might be identified in two phases:

before and after the Final Award for City of Brčko came into force. Brčko, as well as Mostar,

was the hometown of diverse ethnic and religious groups. Unforeseen war resulted in a

significant reduction of the local inhabitants and the formerly diverse community was isolated in

accordance with the ethnic belonging of citizens.[101] The last census shows that the city of Brčko

was inhabited by "41 406 residents, of which 55.5% were Bosniak, 19.9% were Serb, 7.0%

Croat, 12.6% declared themselves Yugoslav and 5.0% others."[102] In the remaining parts of

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[99]   Ibid. 66
[100] Ibid.
[101] "The   Story   of   Brčko"   *Brčko   Supervision*.   Accessed   April   30,   2015
      http://www.brckosupervizija.ba/web/?page_id=11
[102] J. Kadric, "Brčko:Genocide and testimony" *Institute for the Research of Crimes Against Humanity and International Law* (Sarajevo, 1998).21-quoted in Alex Jeffery, "Building state capacity in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina: The case of Brčko District." *Political Geography* 25 (2006). 204

municipality, the majority of the population were Croats (42%), the second largest group were the Bosniaks (34%), and the rest of the population were the Serbs (21%).[103]

Neither in the city of Brčko nor in the municipality was the Serb community represented as the majority or as the largest group. Brčko's location gained a great importance to them however during the conflict, because it divide the territory of RS into two parts. After the conflict over Brčko started in 1992, the Serb army started the occupation of Brčko and in six days it gained "control of the city and the area extending several kilometers south and west of the town."[104] The armies of the Bosniaks and Croats were safeguarding remaining parts of the municipality together. By the time the war ended and the Dayton Peace Agreement that stopped the conflict was signed, the territory of "Brčko municipality was divided by a frontline."[105] Due to the gradual displacement of the Bosniak and Croat residents from Brčko, they, in order to preserve the former communities of Brčko instituted local communities (mjestne zajednice). The outcome was, as stated before, the division of Brčko in three parts: Brčko Grad dominated by the Serbs, Ravne Brčko a Croat part, and Brčko Rahić mostly inhabited by the Bosniaks.[106]

As it is indicated in 1991 census, the munucipality of Brčko consisted of 87 627 residents: 44.1% Bosniaks, 20.7% Serbs, 25.4% Croats, 6.5 Yugoslavs, 3.3% Others Ibid.

[103] *1991 Census* in Carl Dahlmn and Tuathail 2004 quoted. in Rannveig Cathrine Finsveen, *"Power-sharing after Civil War: an Analysis of Institutional Structures and Inter-ethnic Elite Cooperation in Mostar and Brčko"* (Mater Thesis, University of Oslo, 2008).15

[104] Sarah Reichel, "Transitional Administration if former Yugoslavia: a Repetition of Failures or a Necessary Learning Process towards a Universal Peace-building Tool after Ethno-political War?" *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforchung,* Working group international politics. quoted in Rannveig Cathrine Finsveen*, "Power-sharing after Civil War: an Analysis of Institutional Structures and Inter-ethnic Elite Cooperation in Mostar and Brčko"* (Mater Thesis, University of Oslo, 2008).16

[105] Rannveig Cathrine Finsveen*, "Power-sharing after Civil War: an Analysis of Institutional Structures and Inter-ethnic Elite Cooperation in Mostar and Brčko"* (Mater Thesis, University of Oslo, 2008).15

[106] Alex Jeffery, "Building state capacity in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina: The case of Brčko District." *Political Geography* 25 (2006). 205-206

The First and Supplementary Awards for Brčko, 1997-1998

After the conflict was ended by the Dayton Peace Accords, main actors could not decide about the future of the Brčko municipality. Both entities had an interest in gaining control over it. Because the dispute was not resolvable, the international community decided to place Brčko under the supervision of the Arbitral Tribunal of three members- Robert Owen who was also a head of the tribunal, representative of the federation Čazim Sadiković and representative of RS Vitomir Popović.[107] The main task the tribunal was deliberating about with the entities was the position Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL). This was not an easy negotiation, especially due to the constant obstacles RS authorities (SDS) imposed on solving the situation. The essential issue in this respect was the return of refugees who were not allowed to repossess homes they had lost during the conflict.[108]

Composing a solution over IEBL and the return of refugees was one of the obligations DPA imposed. Because the situation in Brčko had not been progressing, and tensions between entities were deepening, the Rome negotiations started in January 1997 and ended in February. Here the chief arbitrator granted the First Award. It nominated the Office of the High Representative to take control over Brčko for at least one year.[109] The OHR instituted the office of Deputy High Representative for Brčko and his main tasks are "(a) to supervise Dayton implementation throughout the Brčko area for a period of not less than one year, and (b) to strengthen local democratic institutions in the same area."[110]

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[107] Ibid. 209

[108] Adam Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 67.

[109] Adam Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 67

[110] "Brcko Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over the Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area" *Office of the High*

The first Brčko Supervisor was Robert Farrad. In March 1998 the Supplementary Award for Brčko was issued, on the one hand because of continuous problems and tensions between the entities as well as because of the lasting violence of the freedom of movement within the area. On the other hand, the leverage of SDS was significantly weakened by the newly established SNS that appointed Milorad Dodik as Prime Minister of the RS entity. Dodik had a moderate rhetoric regarding the situation in Brčko and even sympathized with the idea of multi-ethnic society.[111] Because it seemed that the position of RS changed, the IC community decided to prolong the supervision for another year in order to see whether or not there was progress and agreement between the entities.

The only elections the District (only RS Brčko) had during the conflict over IEBL were the first municipal elections held in BiH in 1997. These elections are analyzed in the next chapter of the thesis. For this part of the thesis on the institutional background of Brčko it is important to outline the composition of its main administrative bodies-Municipal Assembly and Executive Board. The Municipal Assembly is compiled by the President, Vice President and Secretary, each of them represented by a different national group. The Executive Board is represented by the Mayor and two Deputies, each of them coming from a different national group.[112]

The Board itself consisted of five municipal departments, and in each department all constituent people are represented by one head. The seats in the new departments were

Representative, February 14, 1997. Accesed May 2, 2015
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/arbitration/default.asp?content_id=5327
[111] "Brcko Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over the Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area," *Office of the High Representative,* March 15,1998. Accessed May 3, 2015
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/arbitration/default.asp?content_id=5345
[112] "OHR Brcko Arbitration, Order on Multi-Ethnic Administration in the RS Municipality of Brcko" O*ffice of the High Representative,* October 10,1997. Accessed May 3, 2015
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/default.asp?content_id=5337,
The Assembly consisted of 56 seats: see more on
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Bosnia%20144.pdf

distributed by the agreement between local political elites.[113] The arranged system guaranteed the representation of all groups in the chief positions. The ethnic key was preserved in the post-war administration of Brčko in key positions, however, Farrad wanted to establish a multi-ethnic administration of the city and therefore he used the results of these elections as a main indicator of its ethnic composition, since Croats and Bosniaks living in the region also participated in the RS Brčko elections. Nevertheless, because of the manipulation of voters' registration, the elections were a clear win of the Serb parties, therefore multi-ethnic administration as it was proposed practically never functioned.[114]

The tense situation and ongoing tensions in the region proved that the parties cannot agree on the future of Brčko and IEBL. To some extent the moderate rhetoric of RS entity imposed by Milorad Dodik was not reliable as well, because the *"ultra-nationalist"* Nikola Poplašen won the presidential chair in RS, who did not support the politics of Dodik's government.[115] These issues together caused that the DPA could not be fully implemented. The IC therefore decided to grant a Final Award for Brčko in 1999.

The Final Award, 1999

The last award that was formulated by Owen established a unified District of Brčko and none of the entities had legal or administrative power over it. Both entities were also awarded the Final Award, at least to some extent, because the territory of the District belongs to both entities at the same time.[116] The District as such is therefore directly under the level of state level

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[113] Adam Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 114

[114] Ibid. 69

[115] Alex Jeffery, "Building state capacity in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina: The case of Brčko District." *Political Geography* 25 (2006). 214

[116] Adam Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns* (Ithaca: Cornell University

institutions. The role of the international community was not terminated by the Award. Owen delegated the supervision of Brčko by IC which will continue till the Final Award would not be fully implemented.[117]

After the Final Award was issued, the government of the district was formed by the canceled sub-municipalities-Brčko Grad, Ravne Brčko and Brčko Rahić that were unified into the executive and legislative body represented by Municipal Assembly.[118] According to the Statute of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the government of the District is composed of the Mayor, Vice Mayor and heads of departments. The mayor is elected by the municipal assembly and heads of the departments are named by him. The position of the Vice Mayor is taken by the head of the Administrative Support Department.[119]

The Municipal Assembly is elected for the period of four years, and consists of 29 members (councilors), President and Vice President. As the Statute prescribes, "councilors are elected in general, free, fair, and direct elections by secret ballot."[120] President and Vice President are elected by the Assembly, and the candidates for these positions are from the councilors. The candidate that receives three-fifth majority of votes is declared President.[121]

As it can be seen in the Statute, there are no ethnic guarantees stated in the document regarding position granted in either Assembly or Government. The Assembly is elected through proportional system and instead of *veto right,* principle of three-fifth majority was introduced

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Press, 2013), 70.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Alex Jeffery, "Building state capacity in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina: The case of Brčko District." Political Geography 25 (2006). 215
[119] "Statute of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina- 7 December 1999," *Office of the High Representative,* December 12, 1999. Accessed May 2, 2015
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/default.asp?content_id=5367
Section C-The Brčko District Government. To see other department and their responsibilities, as well of other branches visit: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/default.asp?content_id=5367
[120] Ibid. Section B: The Brčko District Assembly
[121] Ibid.

over controversial questions and so the position of one constituent group over certain issues has to be, at least partially, backed up by the two remaining constituent groups as well. Later, *mild veto* was introduced meaning that one third of votes are needed from the councilors of all constituent groups over issues such as culture, religion or monuments.[122]

No elections were however held on the municipal level in the Brčko District till 2004 and therefore the Brčko Supervisor, R. Farrad, named the members of the Government, Assembly, as well as the Mayor and the Vice Mayor. He nominated them according to the ethnic key and therefore the government that consists of ten heads was composed of four Bosniak representatives, four Serb representatives and two Croat representative. The Assembly was formed by 13 Serb councilors, nine Bosniak councilors, and seven Croat councilors.[123]

As it is stated above, Garry Matthews and Henry Clarke, who were nominated as supervisors, after Farrad's administration terminated, postponed the elections till 2004 because they wanted to ensure moderate political climate that in the end proved to be a right decision, because moderate SDP with multi-national orientation won the election and formed officially the first Government of the Brčko District.[124] The 2008 elections also evidence that Brčko keeps its progressive track and the same has been proven in the last municipal elections in 2012 that are analyzed in the following chapter, when the municipal assembly elected a Croat representative as Mayor of the District, considering that the Croats are in a minority position in comparison to

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[122] Adam Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 76.

[123] Supervisory Order on the Appointment of members of the Interim Government of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2000b quoted in Rannveig Cathrine Finsveen, *"Power-sharing after Civil War: an Analysis of Institutional Structures and Inter-ethnic Elite Cooperation in Mostar and Brčko"* (Mater Thesis, University of Oslo, 2008), 44,45.

[124] Adam Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013)

other constituent groups.[125]

Based on these results it can be implicated that, even if the first official government of the district was created in accordance with the ethnic key, the system itself is blind to ethnicity. It does not prescribe ethnic voting, but strongly promotes inter-party competition[126] rather than competition between ethnic parties within their constituent group as it is institutionalized in Mostar. When it comes to the decision-making process, ethnic guarantees are also not institutionalized, but consent of all ethnic groups, or better to say of the National Assembly as such, is required for passing laws and amendments. Even if it took several years of negotiations between IC and local elites, the National Assembly was established and works as an institution of cooperation and calmness rather than an ethnic battlefield.

The involvement of the international community in Brčko had the different character than in Mostar. The district went through a long journey before it was finally administered by the functioning government. The most important part on the background to Brčko is to emphasize progress toward its current governmental setup and electoral rules that are significantly different from the rest of Bosnia. The structure of government as well as the electoral rules were mostly results of negotiations between IC and local political elites before the Final Award was granted. After the Award was introduced, the multi-ethnic government took control over the administration of Brčko and no direct electoral rules regarding ethnic voting were introduced. The main issue that needed to be solved before the administration of Brčko resulted in the cooperation of local elites was the dispute over IEBL that for a long period prevented Brčko from elections as well as from the single municipal government.

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[125] Ibid.
[126] No seats in the assembly are assigned in respect to ethnic belonging, unlike in Mostar, therefore it is argued that inter-party competition is promoted because parties that compete for seats are in an equal position.

Conclusion to the chapter

This chapter has looked at the institutional design of the City of Mostar and the Brčko District. The parts of the institutional design that are crucial for this thesis are the ethnic structure of analyzed governmental bodies and the electoral rules that go along with it. The reason why this thesis is looking at these two institutions is that the municipal government is the closest executive body to the citizens of a state and the state itself transfers or shares certain powers with the municipal governments in order to ensure that needs and interests of all people within the state are met. Residents of the cities give legitimacy to the local government through the elections in return. In order to do that, however, electoral rules are set to regulate the election processes and outcomes. Hunt and Powell argue that electoral rules "determine whether relevant perspectives are included in decision making, the nature of government that emerges, and the ways in which the public can hold this government accountable."[127]

In all the examined cases of the state level institutions and as it has been demonstrated on the government statuses of the City of Mostar and the Brčko District, electoral rules that have been analyzed above meet all of these factors. All constituent people are proportionally represented in state and entity level governments and so each group has a space to follow its interests and needs, and the electoral rules regulate ethnically divided governmental bodies, and people elect these governments in accordance with ethnic formulas used in composing the executive bodies. People are therefore by nature of governments and electoral rules polarized within state level institutions as well as in the entities.

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[127] Mala Htun and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "*Between Science and Engineering: Political Science, Electoral Rules, and Democratic Governance,*" in *"Political Science, Electoral Rules, and Democratic Governance,"* Report of the Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance, edited by Mala Htun and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., 1. American Political Science Association, September, 2013

Mostar is an embodiment of the BiH as such when it comes to the ethnic division of people within government and by the rules used in the polling. As it is stated above, Mostar went from a complicated system of governmental sector to the system that uses ethnic quotas to the same extent even if the New Statute prescribes a unified city administration. Each ethnic group however has a guarantee over the certain ratio of seats and electoral rules work in a way that citizens of Mostar decide in accordance to the ethnic belonging of the candidates. Therefore ethnic polarization is encouraged within the institutional framework of the city of Mostar.

Quite opposite case to state and entity levels executive bodies as well as in contrast to the institutional setup of Mostar is the Brčko District. Before the Final Award was issued by the IC, Brčko's administration rests upon the negotiations between IC and local political elites, and so there was a tendency to assign seats in administration and governmental bodies according to ethnic key. However, after the Award was introduced, IC established multi-ethnic administrative bodies within the state, and electoral rules are also blind towards ethnicity. There are no ethnic guarantees introduced in the analyzed institutional spheres as they are in the rest of the country and therefore people are not polarized within the municipal administration as they are within the entity levels and the state. Nevertheless the first National Assembly was nominated by IC in accordance to the ethnic key before the elections in 2004 were held and they were a victory of moderate SDP.

The number of scholars argue that the successful integration of Brčko was a result of the international intervention. It can be however argued that the international intervention was imposed on the city of Mostar as well, and even right after the war, unlike in Brčko where it took place in 1997 and the amount of money given to Mostar was much higher than in the case of

Brčko.[128] Therefore this argument is not completely accurate. Even if the intervention of IC is a significant part in both cities, ethnic polarization is rather a matter of different institutional setups that have been introduced in the regions as have been proved in this chapter.

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[128] Adam Moore, *Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 5-6.

Chapter 3- Analytical part: analysis of election results in 2010 and 2012: impact of the rhetoric used by political elites

This chapter aims to provide an empirical evidence to the main question of the thesis and to its main arguments stated in the introduction. In order to do so, analytical part is divided into two parts. First part of the chapter examines the results of general elections held in 2010 so as to evaluate to what extent radical parties have a power in Mostar and Brčko and to see which parties residents of these two cities support when it comes to the state level elections. The second part of the thesis is devoted to the analysis of the local elections held in 2012. In order to see how (and if) the situation have changed since the first local elections held after the war, when radical nationalist parties dominated political scene in BiH, I also briefly analyze electoral campaigns held in 1997 in general. Current institutional designs in both cities differ from the setups introduced right after the war, therefore it is interesting to compare the two elections and to see to what extent people's identification with the nationalist parties have changed.

The evaluation of the rhetoric used by the political elites, especially representatives from SDA, HDZ, and SNSD, before the elections is the crucial part of the thesis. In order to provide a convicting evidence, all sources I use for the analysis of the rhetoric are in Serbo-Croatian or Bosniak languages for examining the connotation and the choice of words representatives bring into play. There are two central issues for the analysis of the sources; first, what audience political elites target while campaigning. Even if the radical parties mostly build their pre-election rhetoric on the issues related to ethnicity, they also need to focus on the different themes especially in integrated region such as Brčko, or in the regions where their ethnic group does not stand in a majority. This is connected to the second issue I look at and that concerns the themes

candidates talk about to attract voters across nations.

Analysis of general elections results held in 2010

This part of the thesis firstly examines the results of the 2010 general elections by primarily looking at the results of the election of the Presidency. As it is stated in the previous chapter, Presidency consists of three members while two members are directly elected from the territory of the Federation and one (Serb) member is elected from the territory of the RS. The participation of voters in Presidential elections turned almost 56, 5%.[129] Large number of eligible voters did not therefore participate in the elections. The political scene was once again divided along ethnic lines and OSCE identified this as a major issue when it comes to the elections and electoral campaigns. The central competition for the vote of the electorate took place mainly between the parties within the ethnic group they represent, while inter-ethnic competition was much weaker.[130] Political elites therefore relied on the votes from the members of their ethnic group. Ethnicity-based voting is however institutionalized in the case of Presidency, since competing for the seat and wining the seat automatically mean that the candidate identifies himself with the ethnic group he or she seeks to represent. He or she is recognized as either Bosniak, Croat or Serb member, which automatically preclude the possibility of being the representative of all people of BiH.

The results of the presidency elections in the country as a whole was a victory of radical parties in the case of the Bosniak and the Serb representatives and victory of the moderate representative in the case of the Croats. In numbers, Bosniak representative from nationalist

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[129] International IDEA: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, "Voter turnout data for Bosnia and Herzegovina," IDEA, last update: May 19, 2011. Accessed May 16, 2015 http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=18

[130] OSCE/ODIHR Report, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: General elections, October 3, 2010," OSCE, ODIHR (Warsaw July 27, 2010). 5. Accessed May 16, 2015 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/70940?download=true

SDA, Bakir Izetbegović won 34, 86% of the votes.[131] He was followed by Fahrudin Radončić from the Party of Better Future *(Savez za bolju budućnost- SBB),* that is mainly oriented toward the Bosniak group.[132] Haris Silajdžić from the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stranka za BiH) that is identified as a "moderate nationalistic"[133] party ended up on the third place with 25,1% of the total votes. As it can be seen in the results on the first three cases, people in Federation of BiH gave support to the radical nationalist party- SDA. Competition, as it was stated, took place mainly between the parties that are oriented toward the interests of the Bosniaks and the parties that are not promoting the Bosniak interests gained much less votes.

Croat representative that won the elections did not come from the nationalist parties. Željko Komšić, who is from the multi-ethnic SDP, gained support in the total portion of 60, 61% of the votes. Following candidate from the Croat nationalist party HDZ BiH, Borjana Krišto, obtained only 19, 74% of the total votes. The second branch of HDZ-1990 and their representative barely won 11% of the votes.[134] In the case of the Croatian party competition, the contest for the seat took place among the Croat parties as well, however they did not gain enough support within the Federation. Because SDP is a party of multi-ethnic orientation, it can be concluded that the members of both constituent groups supported the Croat candidate, as well as it can be argued that citizens coming from national minorities would rather support candidate who is not ethnically oriented.[135] From the other perspective, he stands in the office as a Croat

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[131] Source: Izbori 2010 www.izbori.ba accessed May 16, 2015

[132] OHR, "Thirty-eight report of the High Representative for implementation of the peace agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations," OHR, May 1, 2010- October 15, 2015. 3. Accessed May 16, 2015 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/pdf/38th_report.pdf

[133] European Forum, "Bosnia Herzegovina," *European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity,* last update March 3, 2015. Accessed May 16, 2015 http://www.europeanforum.net/country/bosnia_herzegovina

[134] Source: Izbori 2010 www.izbori.ba accessed May 16, 2015

[135] Considering that Komšić won 337 065 votes and Izetbegović only 162 831 out of 1 023150, it can be concluded that a significant portion of the Federation electorate voted for SDP representative and so it proves that Bosniaks also voted for this candidate.

representative, that throws him into the category of Croat, but that should be seen as a shortcoming of the institutional setup that imposes ethnically-based membership of Presidency.

Nebojša Radmanovič from SNSD that was promoting inter-ethnic cooperation during the war, however in the past ten years the party radicalized itself and in these days it is considered as a Serb nationalist party, won the seat as a Serb member of the Presidency. SNSD is social-democratic party that happened to be an alternative to the war-time radical party SDS and now it promotes the interests of the Serbs within the country. Radmanovič won 48, 92% of the votes and was followed by Mladen Ivanić from PDP (Party for Democratic Progress), that was a representative of the Serb Coalition- *Koalicija Zajedno za Srpsku,* won 47, 31% of the votes. Candidate from SDS, Rajko Papović gained less that 4% of the votes.[136] Again, even if party competition took place among the Serb parties, PDP that on the one hand is a moderate Serb nationalist party that promotes interests of the Serbs, but on the other hand it also promotes integrity of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina[137], also gained significant support in RS in comparison to the SNSD that promotes the dissolution of the state[138]. Party competition for the Presidency member in RS was primarily contest between radical SNSD and moderate PDP. The citizens of RS still tend to incline toward the radical party, however the difference of less than 2% between the parties is the sign of the division of RS residents into two groups, the supporters of radical politics and the voters who favor moderate representative.

In the country as such, nationalist parties gained significant support except for the Croat

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(see: http://izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/PredsjednistvoBiH/Default.aspx)
[136] Ibid.
[137] European Forum, "Bosnia Herzegovina," *European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity,* last update March 3, 2015. Accessed May 16, 2015 http://www.europeanforum.net/country/bosnia_herzegovina
[138] OHR, "Thirty- ninth Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary- General of the United Nations," OHR, October 16, 2010- April 20, 2011. Accessed May 16, 2015 http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=46009

representative. Following part of the sub-chapter analyzes the results of the general elections in Mostar and Brčko. Here I am looking at the extent to which final country results correspond with the results in the two cities. Because Mostar is located in the Federation, the citizens were electing only Bosniak and Croat representatives. In Brčko, residents have an opportunity to choose if they want to vote for the Serb representative or if they want to vote as the residents of Federation and so to cast a voice to Bosniak and Croat members. Therefore, in Mostar I consider only competition between the Bosniak and the Croat candidates for membership while in Brčko I examine all of the three positions.

Mostar still divided into six electoral units, therefore the elections took the place in each of them separately. In the first electoral area *(Izborna jedinica)*, Bakir Izetbegović from SDA won the election. In numbers he persuaded 1709 voters out of 5054. He was not, however, followed by the candidate from the other Bosniak nationalist party, but by Željko Komšić from SDP. The candidate from moderate SBB gained the third place and Haris Silajdžić the fourth one. In the second electoral area, third and fourth places resulted in the same scores however, here Željko Komšić won the support of 4315 residents out of 9849 and the SDA candidate ended up on the second place with 1777 votes. In the third electoral area, that also is the last Bosniak dominated one, results of the polling are the same as in the first electoral area.[139] 1339 residents from 4045 gave their votes to the SDA candidate. Even if in all of the three district Bosniak nationalist parties competed between each other, there was also SDP as an alternative to them that obtained significant number of votes therefore, as the election results suggest, the SDA's , as the Bosniak nationalistic centrist, party main competitor was multi-ethnic SDP in all Bosniak electoral areas of Mostar.

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[139] Source: Izbori 2010: www.izbori.ba accessed May 16, 2015

In the electoral areas that are former Croat administrative units of Mostar, in the fourth area two branches of HDZ won the elections. Borjana Krišto from HDZ- BiH won the election in this electoral unit by obtaining support from 1705 voters from the total number of 3867, and she was followed by the representative from HDZ-1990. Interestingly, Bakir Izetbegović ended up on the third place while SDP representative was not supported to the extent he was in the Bosniak-dominated areas of the city. In the fifth area, Borjana Krišto was a clear winner by gaining votes from the 6375 residents from the 13871 voters in total. She was followed by the representative from HDZ- 1990, who gained little over a half of the votes Krišto did. Here again SDP did not gain that significant number of votes comparing to the Croat-oriented parties. The results of it the last sixth area were the same as in the fifth one- 3768 residents from 8167 voted for Krišto.[140] The Croat nationalist centered parties won in all Croat electoral units of Mostar.

Comparing the election results in the whole Federation with the results of the polling in Mostar, it can be concluded that the SDA winner corresponds with the will of majority of Bosniaks living in Mostar. However, the SPD candidate gained more support within Bosniak dominated parts of Mostar than he did in the Federation in general. On the other hand, final results do not coincide with local results in the Croat electoral areas of the city, where the candidate of nationalistic HDZ-BiH won in all areas. As the comparison proves, Croats living in Mostar incline rather to the party that promotes and protects their interests while the citizens of Federation in general rather incline to the moderate, multi-ethnic party.

As it is stated above, in the Brčko district two members of the Presidency were elected. One from the residents who decided to vote as a citizens of Federation and the other one from the residents that voted as the citizens of RS. In the first group, SDP won the elections with almost

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[140] Ibid.

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twice as many votes as the following HDZ-BiH candidate. The total number of the eligible voters was 11553, from which 4106 people voted for Komšić and only 2475 voters were persuaded by Krišto. The Bosniak candidate from SDA ended up as a third one with much less support in comparison to SDP, and he was followed by the Bosniak SbiH candidate and SBB candidate.[141] The Bosniak voters split their votes between the leading Bosniak political parties in bigger ratio than the supporters of the Croat parties whose candidate won in the district.

The election of the Serb member was a victory of moderate PDP candidate, who won more than 50% of total votes in the district (9563 of 17351) and was followed by the candidate from SNSD.[142] Unlike in the case of final results, residents of Brčko rather supported moderate Serb candidate. On the other hand, final results of the Presidency members elected from the Federation do correspond with the local results in Brčko and so the SDP candidate gained much bigger portion of votes than his competitors.

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[141] Source: Izbori 2010: www.izbori.ba accessed May 16, 2015
[142] Ibid.

Local election results in Mostar and Brčko District

The following part of the chapter outlines the results of the local elections held in 1997 in Mostar and Brčko as well as it summarizes results of the local elections held in 2008 in Mostar and results of the local elections in Brčko from 2012. There were no local elections held in Mostar since 2008 and so the government elected in that year extended its mandate until the next local elections will be carried out in Mostar. Nevertheless, the results of the analyzed elections serves as an orientation for the further analysis of the rhetoric political elites use before the elections, so as to see how effective the campaigning as such was. Even if I primarily look at the rhetoric of SDA, HDZ and SDP leaders, outlined results help me to see the raking of the parties and especially to explore in which order the analyzed parties were placed and which parties defeated them or the opposite, which parties were defeated by them. Despite of the fact that there were no elections held in Mostar in 2012, political elites expressed their ideas about the situation therefore the sources for the analysis of rhetoric used by SDA, HDZ and SDP representatives are available.

Table 2: Results of local elections held in 1997: Mostar

Mostar Jug (South)	HDZ-BiH	94,5%
Mostar Jugoistok (Southeast)	Koalicija za cjelovitu i demokratsku Bosnu I Herzegovinu (SDA led coalition)	95,4%
Mostar Jugozapad (Southwest)	HZD BiH	82,8%
Mostar Sjever (North)	Koalicija za cjelovitu i demokratsku Bosnu I Herzegovinu (SDA led coalition)	92,0%
Mostar Stari Grad (Old Town)	Koalicija za cjelovitu i demokratsku Bosnu i Herzegovinu (SDA led coalition)	88,0%
Mostar Zapad (West)	HDZ-BiH	80,9%

(Source: 1997 Municipal Elections Final Results, p. 249- 258, accessed May 17, 2015 https://www.izbori.ba/Documents/Documents/Rezultati%20izbora%2096-2002/97results/results97.PDF)

Table 3: Results of local elections held in 1997: Brčko RS

Srpska demokratska stranka	42.00%
Koalicija za cjelovitu i demokratsku Bosnu i Herzegovinu (SDA led coalition)	54,2% * votes turnout outside of municipality 10,1% * votes turnout in municipality

(Source: 1997 Municipal Elections Final Results, p. 249- 258, accessed May 17, 2015 https://www.izbori.ba/Documents/Documents/Rezultati%20izbora%2096-2002/97results/results97.PDF)

Table 4: Results of the local elections held in 2008: Mostar

Izborna jedinica gradskog područja 1 (Electoral area 1)	*SDA*	*63,03%*	*mandates:3*
Izborna jedinica gradskog područja 2 (Electoral area 2)	*SDA*	*42,10%*	*mandates: 2*
	SDP	*20,38%*	*mandates: 1*
Izborna jedinica gradskog područja 3 (Electoral area 3)	*SDA*	*61,28%*	*mandates:2*
	SBiH	*13,42%*	*mandates:1*
Izborna jedinica gradskog područja 4 (Electoral area 4)	*HDZ-BiH*	*28,74%*	*mandates:1*
	Narodna stranka radom za boljitak	*20,05%*	*mandates:1*
	SDA	*16,39%*	*mandates:1*
Izborna jedinica gradskog područja 5 (Electoral area 5)	*HDZ -BIH*	*30,11%*	*mandates:1*
	Narodna stranka radom za boljitak	*26,30%*	*mandates:1*
	HZD 1990	*13,72%*	*mandates: 1*
Izborna jedinica gradskog područja 6 (Electoral area 6)	*HDZ- BiH*	*28,10%*	*mandates:1*
	Narodna stranka radom za boljitak	*25,95%*	*mandates:1*
	HZD 1990	*12,22%*	*mandates: 1*

(Source:Lokalni Izbori 2008. Accessed May 17, 2015
http://www.izbori.ba/mandati27102008/index.asp)

In the City Council, together with the votes from the open list, SDA gained 12 seats, HDZ BiH won six seats, Narodna stranka radom za boljitak gained three seats and so did SDP, while HDZ 1990 won only one seat and SBiH two seats. The remaining eight seats are represented by the independent candidates.[143]

Table 5: Results of the local elections held in 2012: Brčko District

SDP	15,41%	mandates: 5
SNSD-DNS	*12,87%*	*mandates: 4*
SDS	*11,53%*	*mandates:3*
SBB BiH- Savez za bolju budućnost Bosne i Herzegovine	*11,09%*	*mandates:3*
SDA	*9,83%*	*mandates:3*
SP-PUP-DP	*8,66%*	*mandates:3*
HZD-BiH	*7,39%*	*mandates:2*
HSS- Hrvatska seljačka stranka	*5,94%*	*mandates:2*
SBiH-Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu	*5,37%*	*mandates:2*
PDP-SNS	*5,09%*	*mandates:2*

(Source: Lokalni Izbori 2012. Accessed May 17, 2015
http://www.izbori.ba/Rezultati/RezultatiFinalni/files/Glavni_report_trka_9_opstina_200.html)

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[143] Gradsko Vijeće Grada Mostara, "Gradsko vijeće", 2008-2012, Accessed May 17,2015 http://www.vijece.mostar.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=249&Itemid=132

Comparison of post-war party competition in local elections

There are different strategies political parties may adopt in order to win competition in the elections. In each electoral campaign, there are issues the political party needs to emphasize for attracting voters. In regional elections, these issues are most likely to be related to the problems that need to be solved within the region or have an impact on the region to which political parties articulate solutions. Campaigning, therefore is one way of approaching a voter and identifying party competition. Another issue related to affecting voter choices and preferences is associated with the party's identity and behavior before the poll.[144] A party's identity is an important key voters decide upon, because the way it identifies itself tells people how they approach problem-solving. As it is noted in the first chapter, the first general elections of BiH held after the war were the clear victory of nationalist war-time parties and people identified themselves with these parties. The campaign as such in the nation-wide context in these elections was a nationalist propaganda of these parties. Even they mostly competed within their ethnic group, attacking the other constituent people was one of the favorite tools of their performances.[145]

The impact of the power-sharing arrangement is visible in the election campaigns. The competition of the parties had been mainly a matter of three ethnic units[146], and the party's reputation constructed during the war continued to be an advantageous feature considering preferences of the electorate who gave legitimacy to the radical parties in the first elections. As

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[144] Anwen Elias, "Party Competition in Regional Elections. A Framework for Analysis," (Barcelona: Institut de Ciéncies Polítiques I Socials, 2011), 5.

[145] "Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina," International Crisis Group, September 22, 1996. Accessed May 24, 2015 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/Bosnia%202.pdf

[146] Considering the polling for the Presidency, separate campaigns were conducted within each ethnic group. For more information visit: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/Bosnia%202.pdf

noted in first part of the chapter, radical parties form(ed) their identities in relation to the integrity of BiH as such, meaning that the Serb radical party strongly promoted secession, the Croat radical party HDZ seeks for a third entity within the state, and the Bosniak party SDA pursues the idea of an integrated state of BiH.

The reason why it is important to briefly emphasize the character of the first general elections held in 1996 is that the first local elections were held one year after the general ones and the same parties competed on the regional level as well. Therefore, it can be assumed that once people gave support to these parties, they would also limit their voting choices to the identifications they already had created on the state level. As it can be seen in the overview of the election results, the proportion with which nationalist parties won the elections in both cities proves that they had monopolized local political scenes.

The most problematic issue in respect to the local election campaign was that local media were controlled by radical parties SDA and HDZ. The result of this was that in the case of Mostar's HTV, the campaign did not serve as an informative tool of the parties for presenting their programs, but again as a party propaganda in a negative sense, making people deprived of "informed choices."[147] As the results of the elections show, in the Croat dominated areas HDZ clearly won with a high percentage and the same applies to SDA and Bosniak dominated areas. Therefore, residents of Mostar legitimized the campaign of local leaders, which often contained radical rhetoric and even hate speech in order to discredit the opponent.[148]

The tense political climate in pre-election period in Mostar was mainly caused by the way

[147] OSCE, ODIHR, "Bosnia and Herzegovina-Municipal Elections," *Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,* September 13-14, 1997. 16. Accessed May 19, 2015 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/bih/14025?download=true
[148] OSCE,ODIHR, "Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska National Assembly Elections," Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, November 22-23, 1997. Accessed May 19, 2015 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/bih/14048?download=true

the local Croat TV influenced the competition in order to gain the sympathies of the Croat electorate and to stigmatize the Bosniaks. This had a bad effect on the voters directly, because as it was identified by the HTV's employees themselves; "we have intentionally sought to divide the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to cause distrust between them."[149] Nevertheless, Mostar's residents chose to vote for the radical parties that after the war were limited to approach only the electorate from their ethnic group.

The situation in Brčko did not differ much from the situation that emerged in Mostar. However, the 1997 local elections were held only in the part of Brčko that was under the administration of RS.[150] The Serb radical party had an interest in winning the elections in this region and to defeat the Croat and Bosniak candidates whose electorates had a right to participate in the elections as well. Therefore the problem that parties on the local level faced regarding these elections was registration of the voters, and so it became a central issue of political machinations, as it is noted in the previous chapter. The SRT (Serb TV) even reported that those people who were not registered are considered as traitors of "the interests of their own people."[151] The sense of belonging to the community (constituent group) was in number of situation emphasized in a way to make a voter feel responsible for the needs and interests of people he or she identified with. Tense party competition resulted in a victory of radical SDS. People registered for voting in the region therefore accepted the party whose radical reputation is constructed upon the idea of the state dissolution. The strategy that radical parties tend to use in general stressed the importance of ethnic belonging. People reacted positively to this strategy and

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[149] Ibid. p. 8.

[150] Composition of Brčko have changed after the war and as it is noted in previous chapter, there were three parts of Brčko, however, in the Croat and Bosniak ones election did not take a place. Residents coming from Brčko had right to register to vote in RS Brčko.

[151] Chairman of the Local Election Commission on SRT 22/6/1997, in "Bosnia and Herzegovina Municipal Elections: 13-14 September, 1997, OSCE Report

the outcome was the victory of these parties on both state and local levels.

Discursive analysis of party competition in Mostar in 2012

The system of proportional representation enables that multiple parties are involved in party competition. Electoral rules that are set in Mostar in respect to the City Council elections are based on this system, and therefore the number of political parties from different platforms compete for the seats in it. However, as the results from last elections show, the domination of nationalist parties is still visible. Electorate of Mostar is divided along ethno-territorial lines and party competition within the established electoral districts is primarily a subject of inter-ethnic rivalry that is at least to some extent balanced by the ethnically blind SDP party. The following section of the chapter analyzes the character of party competition of the city. It is primarily focused on the discursive analysis of the statements given by the nationalist parties. Because there have been no elections conducted in Mostar since 2008, and considering that political elites as well as the international community are moving toward the solution of this *status quo*, all actions that local elites undergo in this respect have an impact on decision-making processes of the electorate who suffers the most from the stagnation of the city.

Therefore, it is important to analyze what strategies political parties decided to follow in order to figure out the current state of affairs and to convince voters that they do the best for the city's development and progress. To do so, I primarily use the local media as the main source that covers the issue, especially official web-pages of local SDA and HDZ, as well as the newspaper portals *Vijesti, Herzegovina.info, Vecernji, Avaz, Dnevni List and Nova Sloboda.* The analysis itself is structured around three components: analysis of key words- use of words related to the

identity of party[152] and identification of the other; examination of strategies competing parties use, especially from the perspective of identification of issues they bring into play in order to attract voters and to discredit the rival party; and the last issue I look at is the behavior of the party in the competition; especially focusing on the ways elites of ethnic groups react on each other and on the way ethnically blind party behaves within the given political arena. I firstly analyze the discourse constructed by HDZ-BiH in Mostar, as the most successful Croat party in the last elections, then the analysis proceeds to SDA as the most supported Bosniak party by the electorate in Bosniak dominated areas, and the last part of the analysis on Mostar is devoted to the rhetoric given by SDP as a multi-ethnic party, while also referring to the moderate-ethnic party that won the mandate in the last elections, namely Narodna stranka radom za boljitak (People's Party Work for Progress).

HDZ-BiH- Mostar: the city as a single electoral unit

For HDZ-BiH, that won the elections in Croat-dominated areas of the city, the current state of affairs prevents them to dominate Mostar's political scene. Solving the political crisis of the city regarding elections rests upon the consensus between the leading political parties that are supposed to propose the electoral arrangement of the city that would be acceptable for both sides. For the HDZ-BiH, the proposed compromise would give each voter one vote and there would be no electoral units.

The local leader of HDZ-BiH in Mostar, S. Bevanda clearly stated that the Bosniaks are the problem in coming to a solution. He specifically said that what they actually do is that "blackmailing" everyone involved in the solution process in a way that SDA brought a condition

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[152] Ways of how party promotes itself, how it builds its reputation

that Bosniak-dominated areas would pay their loans only if the current electoral establishment of the city would be preserved[153]. He builds upon this statement, and continues by saying that for interest groups it is profitable that Mostar is a "Problem City" since it stays separated from other cities and the rest of BiH and the Bosniaks are one of the interest groups as well.[154]

It can be seen that in the first the set of arguments given by HDZ-BiH and its representative, the key words he uses emphasize that the Bosniaks are responsible for the deadlock and stagnation of Mostar. He also points out that the strategy the Bosniaks use is based on blackmailing and they profit from the separation of the city. However, what he is actually also doing here is that he tried to persuade people that HDZ is the only party than can solve the problem in Mostar and achieve its normalization.[155] Therefore he is blaming the Bosniaks that the city suffers because of their resolution to preserve the setup established by the New Statute.

The other set of arguments given by HDZ contains the citizens of Mostar themselves. Bevanda argues that "procrastination and sweeping the problem under the carpet is not good for the city of Mostar and its citizens.[156] He is therefore looking at the city as a whole and does not emphasize here the idea of we-ness in respect to the needs and interests of the Croats only. Moreover, the leader of HDZ-BiH Dragan Čović claims that "the coexistence of the Bosniak, Serb and Croat people, as well as of all others who live here, is inevitable."[157] It appears that he

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[153] Bevanda " Vijećnici SDA javno s govornice Gradskog vijeća poručuju kako su oni spremni vratiti kredit ako se Mostar podijeli na šest općina" in Karačić, Marko. "Bošnjaci Ucjenama žele Ishoditi Podjelu Mostara Na šest Općina." Www.vecernji.ba. July 15, 2012. Accessed May 29, 2015. http://www.vecernji.ba/bosnjaci-ucjenama-zele-ishoditi-podjelu-mostara-na-sest-opcina-431024.

[154] Ibid.

[155] "Hrvatski prijedlog omogućava normalno funkcioniranje grada Mostara, kao I svih jedinica lokalne samouprave u BiH." in. Ibid.

[156] "Mi u HDZ-BiH Mi smatramo da bilo kakvo odugovlačenje i guranje problema pod tepih nije dobro za grad Mostar i njegove gradane." in Ibid.

[157] "Suživot bošnjačkog, srpskog i hrvatskog naroda, kao I svih drugih koji ovdje žive, je neizbježan." in Čović: "Uvjeren Sam Da ćemo Za Manje Od Tri Mjeseca Imati Izbore U Mostaru" October 3, 2012. Accessed May 29, 2015.http://www.vijesti.ba/izbori2012/108450-Covic-Uvjeren-sam-cemo-manje-tri-mjeseca-imati-izbore-

promotes the idea of the city as such- a multi-ethnic city, however later he elaborates on this idea and states that Mostar is the capital of the Croats. Nevertheless, he stresses that he does not advocate a vision of Mostar as a Croat city.[158]

The strategy the party uses toward the people is much less radical than the one used on the political level toward the SDA. Here the idea of the integrated city is emphasized, however it can also be argued that it is in the interest of the Croats to establish the city as a one electoral unit, where each voter would have one vote, since the majority of Croats live in the region. As it can be seen in the rhetoric the party uses, they have strong ties Mostar, since they take it is the hometown of the Croats living in BiH.

Two strategies HDZ-BiH uses can be identified in order to get sympathies from the people, citizens of Mostar; the first is that the party identifies SDA as the trouble-maker, that profits from the crisis of the city, while in number of cases the word Bosniak as a reference to the party, that might be considered as an attempt to point out the 'otherness' of the group. The second strategy is that the party promotes the idea of the unified city of Mostar. This is not done only by the local representative of the party, but this ideas is supported from the top-leadership of the party. Because the party as such promotes the idea of the importance of Mostar, and identifies it as a Croat hometown of BiH, it can also be argued that Mostar is a unifying symbol for them.

Therefore the party's behavior on Mostar's political scene is twofold: on the one hand it has adopted rivalry policy toward SDA that prevents Mostar's development, on the other hand, it has adopted friendly and calm rhetoric towards all residents of Mostar in order to win their sympathies. HDZ also identified itself as a problem-solver, or as the only party that came up with

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Mostaru.html
[158] "Mostar neće postati 'Hrvatski stolni grad.'" in Ibid.

the solution of the crisis that also corresponds with the conditions set by Constitutional Court and identify SDA as the responsible party for the crises and suffering of the local citizens.

SDA- Mostar: city of six electoral units

The general idea of SDA regarding the proposal to the solution of the electoral setup of the city is that it should stay divided along ethnic lines, and therefore six electoral units should be preserved. Representatives of the party see unity within this division. On the one hand, the party argues that in order to ensure that the city stays democratic, none of the groups can be discriminated and the city cannot begin to exist as a city of one nation.[159] The picture that SDA promotes regarding the crisis is that they stay on the weaker side because in order to prevent discrimination the city has to stay divided and the rhetoric of SDA and its representatives is built upon this argument.

Local SDA leader Zijad Hadžiomerović states that "Mostar is becoming a city of the Croats."[160] With these words he reacted to the proposal of the Croats. It can be argued that SDA, which represents the Bosniaks of the city, tries to invoke the idea that they are the victims in this situation and not the trouble-makers or blackmailers. They go even further and compare the Croat solution to the "accomplishing the Bosniak genocide."[161] Therefore the strategy that SDA uses on the political scene in this issue goes back to the war and it can be argued that the party

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[159] "Ubjedljivom Pobjedom Na Izborima, Dokazaćemo Da Je SDA Najjača Stranka U BiH." Novasloboda. October 7, 2014. Accessed May 29, 2015. http://novasloboda.ba/ubjedljivom-pobjedom-na-izborima-dokazacemo-da-je-sda-najjaca-stranka-u-bih/.

[160] "Mostar postaje hrvatski grad." in Anadolija, Agencija. "Zijad Hadžiomerović: : Mostar Postaje Hrvatski Grad!" - Mostar Hercegovina. August 6, 2012. Accessed May 29, 2015. http://www.hercegovina.info/vijesti/hercegovina/mostar-hercegovina/zijad-hadziomerovic-mostar-postaje-hrvatski-grad.

[161] Mostar SDA webpage posted the interview with SDA representative and the interviewer specifically asked on what basis SDA claims that introducing the Croat model would mean the completion of the genocide. In "SDA Mostar - Jedinstven Grad Mostar Sa Multietničkim Općinama." SDA Mostar - Jedinstven Grad Mostar Sa Multietničkim Općinama. August 12, 2012. Accessed May 29, 2015. http://sdamostar.ba/jedinstven-grad-mostar-sa-multietnickim-opcinama.aspx.

uses this war narrative to paralyze the HDZ-BiH in a sense that it pictures it as an aggressor. Going back to such a sensitive issue as genocide means that the party tries to manipulate the local political scene to find the different solution than the Croat one.

On the other hand, SDA representatives do not distinguish in their rhetoric between HDZ and the Croat citizens of the city and they tend to see their enemy in both. The party's behavior on the political level appears to be passive-aggressive. They primarily build their profile on the idea of victimhood, while this strategic step is rather aggressive and causes a negative atmosphere within Mostar's political arena.

In relation to the residents of Mostar, SDA pursues more moderate rhetoric than in the case of discourse used toward the Croat political party HDZ. The representatives claim that the preservation of the six electoral units achieves that the city itself develops evenly that in the end enriches all citizens of Mostar. This settlement also guarantees that "rights of all people are protected."[162] Therefore, SDA argues that in order to protect and meet the interests of all ethnic groups living in the region, six electoral units should have been maintained. Even if the party tries to raise the concept of unity of the city, encouraging the division of the city also indicates that they see the 'otherness' in the people who do not come from the ethnic group they represent, while at the same time they profoundly advocate the message of 'we-ness'.

The last elections Mostar had in 2008 were the victory of SDA that won 12 seats out of 35. Consequently, it can be argued that this is one of the reasons why the party is not that keen to come up with the solution of the crisis, since its representatives have administered the city for almost 7 years now without the elections. Furthermore, in case the city were established as one electoral unit, HDZ-BiH would most like be the winning party. The key words SDA politicians

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[162] "Tako bi bila zaštićena prava svih naroda." in. Ibid.

use in respect to the crisis and its potential solution are associated with discrimination or genocide. These words might be connected with the party's identity that is constructed upon the interests of the Bosniak people, or better to say that protects the rights and interests of the Bosniaks, who experienced ethnic cleansing during the war.

Therefore bringing back the memory of the war is the strategy that the party uses in order to provoke nostalgia of the local citizens and to explain the reason why the two leading parties have not come to a consensus yet. The main logic behind this is to avoid underrepresentation of the Bosniaks in the City Council. It appears that SDA, as well as HDZ, follow the same strategies- on the one hand SDA draws the picture of HDZ as an aggressor, while it seeks to persuade local citizens that the arrangement of six electoral units serves best each groups living in the city.

The behavior of the party can be in this respect compared to the behavior of HDZ-BiH. They both try to look like the problem-solvers, while identifying the other as a trouble-maker; or in the case of SDA as a blackmailer and in the case of HDZ as a discriminator. Both also have the tendency to behave as a protector and representative of all people residing in Mostar, however SDA seeks to preserve the difference among people in relation to preservation of six units while HDZ is the proposing single unit and appears to look at the city as one entity. The competition between them when it comes to solving the issue is tense, and so is the political climate in Mostar.

SDP and Narodna Stranka Radom za Boljitak (NSRB): Crisis of Mostar as a cause of tensions between HDZ and SDA

SDP and NSRB are among the strongest parties that represent the counterpart to the nationalist parties SDA and HDZ-BiH in the region. Therefore this section of the chapter briefly illustrates their position and statements regarding the political deadlock caused by the two war-time parties. Neither of the parties profit from the existing state of affairs and consequently they react to the situation that is a result of the rigidity of the two parties that together hold the majority of the seats in the City Council.

SDP characterizes the situation as "a synchronized game of HDZ and SDA."[163] SDP characterizes both parties as trouble-makers within the region. Because the party competition is now frozen in the region, the parties that are not involved in the decision-making process in regard to overcoming the crisis and normalizing the city can only wait till the whole situation comes to an end. The only way they can participate in problem solving is to push the two accountable parties towards consensus.

Narodna Stranka Radom za boljitak states that the situation in Mostar has to be solved in a way that "none of the nations can be suppressed."[164] What is meant by this statement is that none of the national groups should feel oppressed in the city and that each nation should have enough space to meet their interests. This argument is followed by the statement that the deadlock situation that is preserved in the city plays in favor of nationalist parties because they

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[163] "Sada je jasne da je ovo sinkronizira utakmica HDZ-a i SDA".Aner Žuljević, head of the Herzegvina-Neretva Canton, SDP in Šagovnović, Sanja. "MOSTAR BEZNADEŽAN SLUČAJ Uzaludan Trud Međunarodne Zajednice, SDA I HDZ 'furaju' Po Svom." Dnevni List. Accessed May 29, 2015. http://dnevni-list.ba/web1/mostar-beznadezan-slucaj-uzaludan-trud-medunarodne-zajednice-sda-i-hdz-furaju-po-svom/.

[164] "...nijednom narodu ne smije biti tijesno …" in "Radom Za Boljitak: Nećemo Pristati Na Podjelu U Mostaru." Klix.ba. April 2, 2012. Accessed May 29, 2015. http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/radom-za-boljitak-necemo-pristati-na-podjelu-u-mostaru/120402113.

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are losing support among the local electorate. That is the reason why they rather "promote the thesis about national divisions."[165]   Instead of providing a solution to the crisis itself, leading nationalist elites attempt to distract voters and other political elites and administrators with other issues in order to continue to govern the city.[166]

Both parties claim that the main problem of Mostar and of its political situation is that the two nationalist groups, HDZ and SDA, do not progress toward a solution because the situation as it is right now serves them to keep power. The strategy they use in the media regarding discourse is that they stress the incompetence of SDA and HDZ and put emphasis on their inability to solve the issue. In doing so, they use the words such as *game* of HDZ and SDA to point out that these parties together do not seek to solve the issue. However because the whole crisis rests upon the agreement between HDZ and SDA, other political parties do not have a real power to push the situation toward the solution, that means, next local elections.

Discursive analysis of party competition in Brčko District in 2012

The electoral rules that are implemented in the Brčko District guarantee equal access to all political parties in election process. When it comes to the distribution of seats in the City Council, there are no ethnic quotas introduced, therefore nationalist parties cannot rely on ethnically granted seats. As a consequence, nationalist political parties appear to minimize their rhetoric related to the national belonging and identify the real problems Brčko faces instead. Political campaigns are also on a high level of professionalism. In general, campaigning in Brčko

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[165] "... ali su nacionalne stranke ovu temu vješto iskoristile za promociju teza o nacionalnim podjelama..." in Ibid.
[166]   One of the example SDP gave is the case of Finci and Sejdic in Šagovnović, Sanja. "MOSTAR BEZNADEŽAN SLUČAJ Uzaludan Trud Međunarodne Zajednice, SDA I HDZ 'furaju' Po Svom." Dnevni List. Accessed May 29, 2015. http://dnevni-list.ba/web1/mostar-beznadezan-slucaj-uzaludan-trud-medunarodne-zajednice-sda-i-hdz-furaju-po-svom/.

is identified as tolerant.[167] Mirsad Đapo, who was a mayor of the district, stated that unlike in the rest of BiH, the nationalist rhetoric is used much less and the District itself is described by him as having "multiethnic environment, European standards when it comes to reforms we carry out, standard that is better than in the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina."[168] According to him Brčko is on the right track from the perspective of development and by using the term multi-ethnic he refers to Brčko as to the hometown of the different ethnic groups.

The electorate itself is not divided in this city in accordance with either ethnic or territorial lines, but according to the electoral rules installed in Brčko, residents of Brčko represent a single electoral unit. Therefore, following part of the thesis analyses the discourse political parties use in order to approach citizens of BiH and examines it in the contrast to the divided city of Mostar. The methodological framework that is applied in this section is the same one as the method applied in the case of Mostar and therefore there are three aspects I look at- the key words party uses in relation to its identity, strategies it uses in order to attract voters and strategies it applies in respect to the rival policies. The last aspect that is to be examined is the behavior of the party within political arena.

Here I analyze, as well as in the case of Mostar, the rhetoric of the HDZ-BiH representatives, the SDA representatives and contrast it with the rhetoric used by Mostar's local representatives, as well as I use SDP as the illustration of the multi-ethnic party that is blind to ethnicity in general. Because in Brčko SNSD is also supported by the Serbs, I also take a look at the rhetoric used by Milorad Dodik. The sources I use are the web-pages of parties and their

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[167] "Tolerantna Izborna Kampanja U Brčkom." Al Jazeera Balkans. September 27, 2012. Accessed May 30, 2015. http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/tolerantna-izborna-kampanja-u-brckom.
[168] "Čvrsto vjerujem da će Brčko nastaviti onim putem koji je jasno trasiran. Multietnički ambijent, evropski standardi u reformama koje provodimo, standard koji je bolji nego u ostatku Bosne i Hercegovine, a ovdje je i manje nacionalne retorike." Mirsad Đapo in Ibid.

local agencies and the official local page of the Brčko District *Brčko Info, nezavisne.com,* and *republika.info.*

HDZ-BiH- Campaign in local elections, 2012

The campaign conducted by the local branch of HDZ-BiH in Brčko can be identified as calm. In general, there are two aspects that need to be analyzed at this point- how the party acts in relation to other parties, and how the party targets the citizens of Brčko in order to attract them. According to the last official census[169] numbers BiH has, the Croats constituted the smallest group in relation to the other two constituent nations in the region. Therefore it is interesting to identify what strategies the local candidates use, and what issues they bring into play to persuade voters belonging to the different national group to vote for them, and to what extent are they keen on convincing them.

The campaign itself was focused on the number of problems Brčko faces, such as the bad infrastructure, corruption or even environmental issues that were primarily focused on the clean water, river and "untouched nature in the regions of the District where the Croats live."[170] HDZ therefore appears to put an emphasis on the exclusivity of the Croats. This can be identified in number of cases during the examination of the electoral campaign.

Delfa Dejanović, who was one of the candidates of HDZ-BiH, built her campaign on the issues related to culture and education and stated that the youth of HDZ-BiH has focused on the preservation of the Croat (our) "religion, language, traditions and culture as so *we* never forget

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[169] BiH conducted census in 2013 also, however the official numbers are still not available. Therefore the last numbers that are available come from the pre-war census conducted in 1991.

[170] "Bogatstvo krajeva u kojima žive Hrvati u Brčko distriktu su posebno netaknuta priroda i čista voda, mnoštvo potoka, rijeka i rječica, a malo po malo ti potoci postaju kanalizacija, što trebamo što prije zaustaviti." in "Održan Prvi Predizborni Skup HDZ BiH Za Brčko Distrikt." Republika. September 17, 2012. Accessed May 30, 2015. http://www.republikainfo.com/index.php/vijesti/5634-odrzan-prvi-predizborni-skup-hdz-bih-za-brcko-distrikt.

who we are and what we are."[171] All of the named features form the identity of the Croat in BiH because all of them differ from the other constituent people. She brought into play issues that indicate the sense of 'we-ness' in people while at the same this approach also identifies the *other-*people, residents of Brčko, that speak different language, people that are of the different faith and follow different traditions.

The main strategy in this type of campaign is to attract the voter from the group HDZ represents, the Croats. In this respect, HDZ candidate for local mayor, A. Domić, gave a speech at the party's election meeting and he fostered the idea of instituting "full equality of the Croat people in BiH and Brčko District."[172] Moreover, he claimed in his speech, that HDZ has been trying for 22 years to look for a solution regarding the position of the Croat people and their needs.

However, he did not identify as the main obstacle in this respect the parties that are of other ethnic group platform, but political parties from the Croat platform that attack HDZ on the political scene.[173] Subsequently, he gave a message that the other Croat parties prevent HDZ from ensuring the equal position of the Croats in the region. Therefore, he articulated the party's identity not only in contrast to the parties (by orienting its program on the Croat people and their needs and interests) belonging to the other ethnic group, but in contrast to the (all) parties within the Croat group as well. The strategy that he used aimed to gather and unify the Croat electorate

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[171] "Mladež HDZ BiH, kao najbolje organizirana mladež, od svoga osnutka u Brčko distriktu najveći dio svoga rada upravo je usmjerila na očuvanje naše vjere, jezika, tradicije i kulture, kako nikada ne bi zaboravili tko smo i što smo." Delfa Dejanović. In this respect she also states that in the program HDZ is devoted to preservation of the language, especially through education, since in Brčko district every child has a right to be educated in his or her mother tongue. In Ibid.

[172] "...uspostavljanja pune konstitutivnosti i ravnopravnosti hrvatskoga naroda u BiH i Brčko distriktu!" A Domić in. Ibid.

[173] "Međutim, što smo bili uporniji u traženju rješenja za poziciju i potrebu Hrvata, sve više smo bezrazložno napadani, kritizirani i omalovažavani od drugih političkih stranaka, nažalost, iz reda hrvatskog naroda" A. Domić in Ibid.

within the region toward the HDZ and they are also the target group for HDZ in the campaign.

The whole campaign, even if oriented towards the Croat people living in Brčko, is calm and is not aimed against the other ethnic group. Therefore it can be argued that the behavior of the political party in this region is moderate when it comes to the other parties, however by identifying other Croat political parties as the criticizers and defamers, Domić points out that HDZ is distinguished from them and that is a cause of the competition within group. The behavior of the party might be qualified as provocative. This can be argued on the basis of the candidate's choice of the key words that were used in order to point out the behavior of these parties toward HDZ (*attacked, criticized* and *defamed)* which have negative connotation and imply that party has different views than the other Croat parties.

When it comes to the electorate, party strongly advocated the needs and interests of the Croats, however it also identified the other issues that Brčko faces, such as corruption or bad infrastructure, that are the concerns of all residents of the city. Therefore campaign itself is not solely aimed towards the Croat, but to all citizens as well, at least to some extent.

SDA-campaign in local elections 2012

The rhetoric used by the local branch of SDA in Brčko, as well as in the case of HDZ, is moderate towards the other ethnic groups. Before the war, the Bosniaks represented a majority in terms of the number of the population living in the region, however the composition of the city has changed since then. Therefore it is important to analyze how the party acts and behaves in the new settlement of Brčko and what strategies it uses in order to persuade the locale electorate to vote for them.

There can be identified two target groups in the case of the speeches delivered by the

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local leader of SDA Esed Kadrić in Brčko: the citizens of Brčko as such, and the Bosniaks living in the region. He clearly stated in his speech that SDA's list of candidates is a "national list" and its candidates "share their destiny, problems, and life with common people."[174] In this respect he also claimed that the list of SDA represented the variety of the District's population coming from the different categories and backgrounds, including veterans, businessmen, professors or students.[175] In this respect, he put emphasis on the residents of the District in general because he stressed that the list of candidate was chosen for the people of District and was represented by the people who could meet their interests and needs, because these people face the same life problems as the residents of the District do.

The second sphere of SDA's campaign was oriented on naming problems Brčko faces, such as horrible economic situation, bad infrastructure, need to improve social policy and need to solve the issues related to the employment.[176] SDA candidates therefore identified problems residents of Brčko face in everyday life. This is the typical strategy of political parties at local level; to identify the problems people are confronted with, and at the same time candidates identify themselves with these people and their lives to gain their sympathy. Here SDA identified issues that each citizen of Brčko faces, what subsequently suggests that it oriented its campaign toward the all residents of Brčko.

On the other hand, however, the party and its local candidate also stressed the position of the Bosniaks living in the area. This strategy of the party was used in order to emphasize that the

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[174] "Naša izborna lista je narodna lista. Naši kandidati najviše liće na svoj narod, u smislu ponašanja, dijeljenja sudbine, problema, života sa običnim svijetom. Ova lista je lista koja zastupa najšire ili gotovo sve kategorije građana Distrikta." Esed Kadrić in "SDA Brčko- Naša Izborna Lista Je Narodna Lista." InfoBrcko.com. July 19, 2012. Accessed May 30, 2015. http://www.infobrcko.com/vijesti-bih/izbori-2012/1028-sda-brčko-naša-izborna-lista-je-narodna-lista.html.

[175] Ibid.

[176] "Izborna Kampanja SDA, Predizborni Skup U MZ Broduša." InfoBrcko.com. September 27, 2012. Accessed May 30, 2015. http://www.infobrcko.com/vijesti-bih/izbori-2012/1673-izborna-kampanja-sda-predizborni-skup-mz-brodusa.html.

needs of the Bosniaks have to be met in the region. Kadrić associated the position of the Bosniaks in Brčko with the message that was given by the war-time leader of SDA Alija Izetbegovič "we do not give Brčko."[177] He further argued in the relation to this statement that SDA (and that only SDA is able to do it) will improve all areas of life in the District in respect to the Bosniak nation. Here he stated that they (SDA representatives) do not seek anything that belongs to the Serbs or the Croats, or to anybody else, they just demand what belongs to the Bosniaks living in the Brčko District.[178]

At the same he advocated that the *enemy* on the political level of the Bosniaks in the regions is the SDP.[179] SDP, as it is going to be elaborated in the next section of the chapter, is the most successful party in the region in terms of the electoral outcomes, and therefore SDA, in order to diminish its success, also articulated issues that were supposed to weaken SDP. SDA pointed out that the candidates of SDP "lied, cheated, deceived and adopted double policy" towards the people and the Bosniaks living in Brčko[180].

In this respect, two strategies can be deduced; first strategy is directed towards the Bosniaks and second is directed against the rival parties. Association of SDA with the Bosniaks is obvious in their campaign. Its devotion to the Bosniaks is however not constructed against the other ethnic groups, but it is formed moderately and in respectful way. As it is pointed above, the

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[177] "MI BRČKO NE DAMO", the idea of this statement is that the Bosniaks will not give up on Brčko. In "Izborna Kampanja SDA, Predizborni Skup U MZ Brka." InfoBrcko.com. September 26, 2012. Accessed May 30, 2015. http://www.infobrcko.com/vijesti-bih/izbori-2012/1658-izborna-kampanja-brčanske-sda,-predizborni-skup-u-mz-brka.html.

[178] "...samo SDA Brčko distrikta je spremna da opravda velike istorijske i proročanke riječi našeg rahmetli Predsjednika Alije Izetbegovića „MI BRČKO NE DAMO" i da u Distriktu napravi pomake u svim segmentima i oblastima života.Mi ne tražimo ništa srpsko, ništa hrvatsko, niti tuđe, mi iz SDA samo tražimo ono što pripada nama Bošnjacima u Brčko distriktu" in Ibid.

[179] He identified also SBB, the Bosniak oriented party, as as a party that lied and cheated, and "thought only about themselves and at least about the Bosniaks" in Ibid.

[180] "Oni koji su nas lagali, varali, obmanjivali i vodili jednu dvostruku politiku, u kojoj su najviše mislili na sebe a najmanje na bošnjački narod u proteklom periodu, a to je SDP, moraju da siđu sa političke scene..." Kadrić in Ibid.

campaign as such was concentrated on the residents of Brčko in general as well. Therefore it can be concluded that behavior of the party toward the other ethnic groups was quite amicable, even though the campaign emphasized the role the Bosniaks. On the other hand, its behavior toward other parties (not ethnic parties necessarily), such as SDP, was rival in negative sense, however inflammatory words related to ethnicity were not used in mentioned statements, SDA rather put emphasis on the problems related to policy-making. Therefore, the used strategy was supposed to discredit the SDP to attract their voters.

SNSD- Gavrić's and Dodik's statements

The former Serb mayor of the District, M. Gavrić stated that the party and people from SNSD "want Brčko to be a city of equal opportunities for all."[181] At the same time, the leader of SNSD, Milorad Dodik said that the Serb people should be respected in the region because they respect the others as well[182]. The strategy that had been adopted by the party towards the other parties and the people can be identified as moderate, because it is considered citizens of the District in general. On the other hand, reference to the Serb people, people that SNSD represents is used as well. Nevertheless, based on these two examples, it can be argued that behavior of the party in the region is also moderate.

The above stated references to Dodik and Gavrić were used only as an illustration of the SNSD behavior and of the use of strategies they pursue in the region in order to compare them with other two war-times parties HDZ and SDA. Therefore, it can be concluded that the most vulnerable group of the three in terms of the size of the population living in the area, the Croats,

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[181] "Hoćemo da Brčko bude grad jednakih šansi za sve." Gavrić in "Dodik: Okupiti Se Oko Onih Koji Mogu Načiniti Promjene." Nezavisne Novine. September 25, 2012. Accessed May 30, 2015. http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/izbori/Dodik-Okupiti-se-oko-onih-koji-mogu-naciniti-promjene-160192.html.
[182] "Ima da se poštuju Srbi, jer i mi poštujemo druge." M. Dodik in Ibid.

and the radical party that is identified with them, HDZ used the nationalist language the most considering analyzed materials. However, the rhetoric it used was not radical or nationalist in the usual sense, but in a sense HDZ emphasized the need to meet interests of the Croats living in the region, as well as it insisted on the need to guarantee them equal status as the Bosniaks and the Serbs have. Other two parties did the same in their campaigns, but referring to the analyzed materials, the ethnic or national references were less common than in the case of the Croats.

None of the strategies that parties used were directed against the ethnic groups, but rather the competition was focused on the issues related to policy making, such as concentration on the issues related to bad economic situation of the region, infrastructure or corruption. Both HDZ and SDA put emphasis on their groups, as it stated, and they used the key words such as Croats, Bosniaks or nation. They identified addressed problems with the people, residents of the District in general and then with the constituent people they represent separately. Therefore, in each case they built the rhetoric in accordance with the patterns of 'we-ness'[183] strategy, but at the same time they applied the strategy of 'otherness'.

SDP- key elements of the electoral campaign in 2012

The electoral campaign conducted by SDP in 2012 local elections serves for this thesis as an illustration of the ethnically-blind campaign. SDP is the most successful party in the region and in these elections it won the highest number of mandates to the City Council. This part of the chapter will briefly illustrate and analyze three key statements of the SDP's election campaign and issues it brought into play.

Esad Atić, leader of the local branch of SDP in Brčko named the key issues SDP aims to

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[183] Two types of we-ness strategy might be identified in cases of HDZ and SDA- *we-* the residents of Brčko, and *we-* the members of the ethnic group.

focus and solve on in the region: "economic development, employment, fight against criminality and corruption"[184] and to ensure that Brčko will "return back on the path of progress and prosperity."[185] Moreover, he stated that SDP will "return smile on the faces of citizens and it will be a guarantor of peace and security in the District."[186]

The strategy that the party used is clear. It identified issues that need to be solved in the region and promised better life to the all residents of Brčko. At the same time, it identifies itself as the competent party that is able to solve the current problems of the District. In one of the statements it even said that it will take "responsibility over the Brčko"[187] that means that it is confident regarding its success in the region. The reputation of the party proved to be positive considering the electoral outcomes, and therefore it can be concluded that the local electorate rather support the party that is ethnically blind than the parties that emphasize ethnic belonging, to any extent.

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[184] "U svom obraćanju, Esad Atić, predsjednik SDP-a Brčko i nosilac liste istakao je da su ciljevi SDP-a jasni a, prije svega, to su ekonomski razvoj i zapošljavanje, te borba protiv kriminala i korupcije, kako bi se Brčko distrikt vratio na put napretka i prosperiteta." in "Skup Na Klancu: „SDP Je Više Od Politike"" SDP. October 1, 2012. Accessed May 30, 2015. http://sdp-brcko.org/?p=657.

[185] Ibid.

[186] "Još je dodao da će SDP građanima vratiti osmijeh na lice, te biti garant mira i bezbjednosti u Distriktu." in "Ograđenovac: "SDP Je Spreman Preuzeti Odgovornost Za Brčko I Vratiti Ga Na Staze Prosperiteta"." SDP. September 29, 2012. Accessed May 30, 2015.

[187] Ibid.

Conclusion

Causality between institutional designs and the use of discourse in the two cities

This thesis aimed to prove the causality between the differences in institutional design of the cities and the difference in the local electoral turnout. More specifically, it was devoted to explain the phenomenon why in Mostar radical parties tend to win the local party competition while in Brčko rather moderate parties are successful in the elections. This concluding part of the thesis is committed to the explanation of the causal relationship between the intuitional designs of the two cities and the character of party competition in them. The methodology that was used in the thesis was twofold; firstly I analyzed the institutional setup of the two cities and secondly I used discourse analysis in order to examine the party competition in the given cities. Therefore, the following part of the thesis uses the results of analyses while it is firstly looking at the case of Mostar, then at the case of Brčko and in the last part is compares the two case studies.

There are three conditions that need to be met in order to argue that there is a causal relationship between the two variable. Firstly, there has to be a "temporal precedence"[188] meaning that the cause, in this case differently established institutional design, appeared or was established before the effect that for this thesis is difference in party competition in the two cities. Secondly, there has to be correlation between the two, in a sense that when the cause changes, the effect changes as well[189]. There are more types of such relationships between the variables:

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[188] "Establishing Cause & Effect." Establishing Cause & Effect. October 20, 2006. Accessed June 2, 2015.
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/causeeff.php.
[189] Ibid.

$$\text{If X then Y}$$
$$\text{if not X then not Y}^{190}$$

From this pattern it can also be deducted that if there is less of X than there also is less of Y, while if there is more of X than there is more of Y. Thirdly, other possible explanation of the effect must be excluded[191] or I argue that other variables are less compelling that the others. In order to establish the causal relationship between the chosen variables, I firstly describe the situation and the relationship between the variables to later exclude or minimize other possible options.

In Mostar, as it is demonstrated in the previous parts of the thesis, the party competition is frozen. This is due to the disagreements between the two ruling parties that cannot consent over the possible electoral structure of the city. This dispute lasts for almost five years (since 2010), when the Constitutional Court made a decision that the way Mostar is divided violates the rights of the local people.[192] The city itself went through the series of institutional changes and each of the introduced setups divided the residents of the city. The Interim Statute issued in 1996 was proposed in a way that it technically separated the Croat-dominated areas and the Bosniak dominated areas and empower them to administrate themselves separately. The first elections that were held in 1997 were a clear victory of the radical war-time parties SDA and HDZ in the regions where the ethnic group they constituted was a majority. Therefore, the local electorate gave a legitimacy to these parties that rule the city ever since. Because of the deepening cleavages between the two parts of the city, the Office of High Representative imposed the need

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[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid.
[192] Elvira M. Jukic, "Bosnia High Representative Pushes Talks On Mostar.":: Balkan Insight. October 17, 2012. Accessed June 2, 2015. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/high-representative-pushes-talks-over-mostar. "This followed a complaint by Croats on the City Council who said their rights were being violated by an electoral system that gave Bosniaks the same number of councilors even though Croats are the majority group in the city." see in Ibid.

to reform the city.

The involvement of the international community (IC) was crucial in formulating the New Statute of the city, because the current design of institutions is an outcome of negotiations between the local representatives and the members of IC. When it comes to the elections, the system itself, as it is stated in the second chapter, is divided into six units, based on the ethnic dominancy in the area, and the central zone within which residents of Mostar used to vote. Local residents as well as the number of political actors are awaiting for a new setup to be installed to enable them having first elections after the seven years.

The analysis of the party competition from the perspective of discourse proved that the political parties in order to excuse their behavior use the language that on the one hand is rather radical towards the other ruling party, while in the case of the HDZ, the language that is directed toward the people is moderate and to a high extent inclusive toward the residents of Mostar in general, while the language of SDA when it comes to the citizens is primarily oriented on the needs, interests, and position of the Bosniaks living in the city. Considering party competition in relation to the institutional design, it firstly promoted the competition between ethnic parties considering that ethnic parties has an interest in being elected in the areas that are ethnically defined by the group they represents. Secondly, because the competition between the parties in general is reduced to the solution of the dispute between the ruling parties HDZ and SDA, that use in number of cases inflammatory language against each other and use the strategies in their discourse to make the other party incompetent and responsible for the current situation, it can concluded that there is a relationship between the two variables: set-up of institutions and the character of party competition in the city.

In the case of Brčko, current electoral establishment is totally different from the one

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established after the war. Brčko, as well as Mostar, was a problem zone after the war, when both entities fought over its administration. After the long process of negotiations between the IC and the representatives from RS and Federation, the local branch of IC issued the Final Award in 1999 for Brčko, prescribing that Brčko is not under the rule of the entities, but the completely new local institutions were established. However, it took five years for the city and its residents to have the first elections since the first post-war ones. The new institutions were designed in a way to promote ethnically unbiased party competition in the region, in a sense that there are not ethnic quotas installed in the system, as well as no seats in the City Council are guaranteed by the ethnic belonging. The only ethnic limitation in the system is the mild veto introduced to protect the vital interests of the citizens in terms of culture or religion. Based on these findings it can be concluded that the system promotes competition within multi-party systems.

The last local elections that were held in the District were a victory of the ethnically blind SDP, while the rest of the seats in the City Council were distributed between the nationalist as well as moderate parties. The discourse given in the local political campaigns was primarily analyzed in the cases of HDZ and SDA in order to provide the contrast in their use of rhetoric and behavior. After comparing the two cases, it can be concluded that these parties used less of the inflammatory language and focused their campaigns on the problems that Brčko faces, while in both cases they referred to the ethnic group they represent.

Local HDZ is more keen on the ethnic references, because the size of the Croat groups is the smallest considering the other two, and therefore it is fighting for its equal positions. In the case of Mostar, the party uses the radical language in greater extent toward the other ethnic party than in the case of Brčko, therefore it can be concluded that in this respect the party competition in Brčko is moderate. SDA's rhetoric and behavior in general is moderate as well. The

relationship between the character of the party competition and the institutional setup is visible, because as named factors proved and as it is indicated in the previous chapters, the local candidates are much more exposed to compete between ethnically and ideologically varied parties and therefore rather than promoting one ethnic group or the interest of one ethnic group exclusively parties tend to concentrate their campaigns on the local electorate in general that is also varied. Because no seats are granted by the ethnic belonging, parties need to choose the strategy that would include the city and its electorate as a whole. In the case of Mostar, however, the party competition is influenced by the ethnically divided institutional setup where primarily ethnically oriented parties compete within the ethnically defined areas, therefore party competition is less varied. On the other hand in Brčko, National Assembly is composed of variety of political parties from different ethnic and religious backgrounds.

The condition of the temporal precedence is met regarding the order in which institutional design was set and changed as a first aspect and after that there can be seen the shift from the support of radical parties to the support of ethnically blind and moderate parties in Brčko as well as radical language of the parties has been on decline since then. In this respect it can also be concluded that radical parties are less radical and it even can be argued that their rhetoric is moderate even if they are still oriented toward their national group.

In the case of Mostar, however, the setup that was introduced after the BiH gained independence and after the power-sharing arrangement was established in the country as such and in Mostar as well, the support of radical parties has not changed. There was no change in the system in relations to the electoral rules. Therefore because this variable was not affected anyhow, the other variable was not affected as well. These variables are valid also in relation to the results of the party competition on the state level in the case of elections of the members of

Presidency, where it can be seen that in Mostar HDZ and SDA won these polling. In contrary to that, the elections that were held in the 'Federation' part of the Brčko, the multi-ethnic SDP candidate won and in the 'RS' Brčko case, the moderate alternative to the Serb parties won. In the case of the post-war elections, radical parties won in both cases.

It might be argued that there are also other possible explanations of the analyzed phenomenon. Considering that the narratives from the war, the trauma that the cities when through, as well as the tense atmosphere that culminated in the case of the first elections had the same character in both cities, these factors did not have an impact of the difference in the election campaign. On the other hand, the main counter-argument against the impact of the different institutional designs on the different electoral outcomes and the different party competition is the involvement of the IC. Comparing the strategies IC adopted in the cities differ as well. In both cases the main aim of the IC was to established multi-ethnic cities in terms of administration. In Mostar, the unification of the city was viewed in the separate ethnic areas and the central zone that would cooperate together. However, the situation took a different direction and the areas were separated at all levels- political, social, cultural, economic...

Contrary to Mostar, Brčko's model that was adopted by IC is rather ethnically blind. As it is stated above, the National Assembly that was established by the Final Award, has no ethnic keys according to which residents vote and the governmental body of the city works as an integrated entity. Therefore in this respect the unification of the District was successfully established.

The involvement of the IC in respect to the successful implementation of Brčko's integrated character is crucial, however, it cannot be considered as an only cause of the moderate party competition in Brčko and mostly radical party competition in Mostar. As it is stated in the

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conclusion to the second chapter, much more money were spent on the supervisory of the Mostar as well as the supervision was introduced right after the war. Considering these factors, IC had a chance to take control over the first post-war elections in the city, nevertheless, radical parties won in Mostar at all levels. Therefore, strategies that were used in introducing the local institutions and electoral rules that, go along with them in the election processes, differed completely. Consequently, IC has not a direct impact on the party competition within the cities, but installed the institutions, rules and processes within which party competition take place. It can be therefore concluded that currently imposed institutions directly control the rules of the party competition and have an impact on the following electoral outcomes.

All of the three conditions imposed in order to argue that there is a causal relationship between the two variables were acknowledged. The current institutional design in Brčko, which was established in 1999, has an impact on the nature of the party competition and on the electoral outcomes. Its installment preceded the effect- visible multi-ethnic character of the local National Assembly and moderate party competition. In the case of Mostar no changes were made in this respect and therefore the character of the party competition has not changed either. Multi-ethnic character of the City Council is achieved through competition within ethnically divided areas and also each ethnic group has a reserved seats within it. Contrary to this, Brčko's Assembly and its multi-ethnic nature is preserved through the system that strongly promotes inter-party competition. This also proves the correlation between the institutional design and the party competition in given cities.

The third condition is the most difficult to prove in social research[193] because there are

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[193] "Establishing Cause and Effect." - Scientific Causality. Accessed June 4, 2015. https://explorable.com/cause-and-effect.

always numbers of aspects in the society that might cause certain effect or that at least might have a slight impact on the analyzed issue. The suggested causality between the institutional design and the party competition in Mostar and Brčko gives an explanation to the main question of the thesis. Even if there might exist other possible explanations and options of the causality, this thesis argued that the causal relationship between the two variables appears to be one of the decisive ones.

Summary of the findings

The main aim of this thesis was to explain why in Mostar radical parties are the supported ones while in Brčko, that is generally considered as a success in comparison to the other regions of the post-conflict Bosnia, moderate parties win the elections. The success might be understood in number of ways in post- war country, such as success regarding peace-building missions or reconciliation processes. This thesis, however defined success as the institutionalization of the system that encourages fair and moderate party competition.

The reason why this work devoted itself to this questions and research is that the use of radical rhetoric is a common feature when it comes to the Bosnia political scene. Even if it has been more than 20 years since the conflict ended, the political parties still have a tendency to go back to the topics related to the war, and to use the trauma people experienced in the war as a main tool of their campaign in order to convince voters. They still try to evoke the sentimental feeling in the population to make it believe that they are the protectors of the (one of the three) nation. The problems that country struggles from are hidden behind these issues, but somehow the popularity of the war-time parties is still significant. Therefore it is important to research why this is so and to identify the reasons of these phenomenon.

This work argued that there is a causality between the institutional design of the city and party competition and therefore institutional design, rather than something else, influences to what extent are the radical parties supported and how the party competition looks like. The second sphere of the argument was that in the case of Brčko, political campaigns are rather oriented on the problems that the District faces, while in Mostar political actors rather bring into play issues related to ethnicity than concentrating on the real problems the city faces.

The thesis itself was structured into three thematic chapters in order to give an answer to the explored question and to examine its argument: theoretical background, institutional background and the analytical part. The first part mainly look at the theories of party and electoral systems and the theories of the party systems in divided societies. The second part of the first chapter provided a framework and typology to the Bosnian political parties as well as it briefly introduced the situation of country after Dayton Peace Agreement was signed and new institutional and territorial character of the country were established.

The second chapter of the thesis firstly explained the way the people of BiH are categorized in the Dayton Accords and how are they represented within the state. Secondly, it provided the background to the development of the governmental design in Mostar. It analyzed the process of the adoption of the Interim Statute and its shortcomings that caused that the New Statute was introduced. The same logic was applied in the case of Brčko and therefore I described the way of Brčko from the First Award to the Final Award that were granted by the International Community.

The last, third, chapter of the thesis was devoted to the analysis of the discourse used by the local political actors, mainly HDZ, SDA, and SDP while I also used the examples of other parties as an illustration of the moderate/radical rhetoric. Before I came to the analysis itself, I

needed to provide a short overview of the election results in general elections conducted in 2010 and local elections conducted in 2012 in order to compare how the people voted on the state level and on the local level. The chapter also briefly analyzed the character of the party competition in local elections held in 1997. The most important part of the chapter however was the discourse analysis. Here I primarily analyzed the key words political parties used in the discourse, strategies they used in order to attract voters and the way they behaved in respect to the other competing parties and toward the local electorate. The important part of the analysis also was to identify what were the other issues than ethnicity party focused on in their campaigns.

The first part of conclusion then evaluated all of the analyzed data and draw the causality between the institutional design and the party competition in the two cities. In order to do that it followed three conditions that needed to be met to argue that the causal relationship exist between the two: temporal precedence, correlation between the variables and exclusion of other possible options.

This work used three methodological approaches: institutional analysis, comparative method and discourse analysis. In regard to the institutional analysis, this one helped the thesis to examine the local institutional apparatus and to narrow down what I actually needed to focused on in respect to institutional designs of the cities, because it would be too demanding to analyze the whole institutional setup of the cities. Therefore I was primarily focused on the governmental structures of the city and on the electoral turnouts. Comparative method was used in order to analyze the similarities and the differences of the two cases. The discourse analysis was used as a crucial methodological approach according to which I constructed the main features I was looking at in the political campaigns and in statements and speeches given by the political parties

and their representatives.

The key findings of the thesis are that the causal relationship between the institutional design and the party competition might be claimed. The rhetoric of the key political actors in Brčko is more focused on the issues that Brčko faces. Even if the parties refer to the ethnic belonging, they do not use inflammatory and radical language. The crucial finding in this respect is that the parties that are generally defined as nationalist, might be in the case of Brčko defined as moderate as well. In Mostar, the setup of institutional design caused that the party competition is for a long period frozen. The key political actors, SDA and HDZ blame each other for unwillingness to solve the issue and so they keep the power they gained in the last local elections held in 2008. Nevertheless, legitimacy of these parties under these circumstances might be questioned. Inflammatory and radical language was identified in both cases of SDA and HDZ. The party that is a multi-ethnic alternative to the ethnically oriented party, SDP, concentrated its campaign on the issues that need to be solved in the cities and addressed it to all people regardless to their ethnicity. The campaign of this party was analyzed in contrast to the radical parties in order to see what the preferences of people are and what attracts them except for ethnic belonging. This party won the elections at both local and state levels in Brčko while its success was limited in the case of Mostar.

The main limitation of this thesis is that it was challenging to prove causality between the certain variables. There is number of factors that might cause certain issue within the society and therefore it is hard to define the one that would automatically exclude other possible explanations and options. Analysis of the discourse of the political representatives would also need further elaboration in terms of the number of parties analyzed and the number of issues that were analyzed. This thesis provides the analysis of the main features of the party competition in the

two cities, and is looking at the most popular parties in BiH, however analysis of the discourse given by the other moderate parties might elaborate on the argument. In terms of the institutional analysis, institutional design of the cities is very complex. Even if the thesis narrowed the core of its analysis as much as possible, it would also be interesting to examine other institutional sphere such as education and police forces in order to see how party competition and rhetoric of the political parties influence these two as well.

One of the aims of the thesis was to provide a possible explanation of the phenomenon it researched, and to show what the possible ways of the analysis of party competition are. It did not aim to provide any indisputable deductions, its goal rather was to see how institutions influence the political arena of the country. The contribution of this thesis therefore was to show the ways according to which party competition might be analyzed in divided societies and to show what some of the features that have an impact on it are. Using Brčko and Mostar as case studies helped the study to approach the possible explanation of the differences in party competition in BiH by looking at the differences of local institutional designs.

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