

**A Study of Civil Mobilization Capacity in Russian Federation:  
Definition of Social Movements in Russia & Individual &  
Group Mobilization Capacity**

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## Author's Declaration

I, the undersigned **Illya Kletskovskyy** hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

This is a true copy of the thesis, including final revisions.

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## **Abstract**

This thesis looks to contribute to sociological analysis on mobilizations in Russia by incorporating social movements and national identity inter-disciplines with their specific structure, analysis and findings. The direct aim of the research is to explain the complications of mobilization in Russia and to propose improvements to the Individual and Group Mobilization Indexes that do not evaluate: the complexity of Russian society, propaganda trends and existing laws.

The thesis recommends the definition to social movements in Russia, and with additional filters, it should capture only the needed mobilizations to study the mobilization capacities in Russian Federation.

The extraordinary mass mobilizations and hidden causes for it are captured through the theories and information in relation to Russian intelligentsia and rock music, and are reinforced through the interviews with notable Russian Rock musicians that chose to oppose the authorities and the system.

Key words: protests, mobilization, mobilization capacity, Russian Federation, Russian Intelligentsia, national identity, discriminative laws in Russia, Class Struggle Theory, social movement

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‘Social Movements Today Conference’ organized by the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences (Smolny College), St. Petersburg State University, selected me as one of the participants, and I am very thankful for the opportunity to meet leading researchers on social movements. Furthermore, the conference organizers provided me with personal contacts that contributed towards the research and opened many new themes and topics that I will continue to explore.

I would like to acknowledge Alexey Rotmistrov, the Associate Professor of Faculty of Social Sciences of National Research University and Higher School of Economics in Moscow for the data on protests and surveys assistance that he provided to me, saving many days of the research.

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“A social movement that only moves people is merely a revolt. A movement that changes both people and institutions is a revolution.”

— Martin Luther King Jr., *Why We Can't Wait*

## Introduction

The mass protest movements of 2011-2012 in the major Russian cities<sup>1</sup> came as a surprise to many experts on Russian politics, as it emerged in a climate of a profound depoliticization that lasted for about 18 years since the Constitutional Crisis of 1993 (Young 2014). Russian government was quick to react to the protests, accusing international actors and international NGOs present in Russia in funding and supporting the mobilization (Matthews 2015). Further, the government response transformed into a more precise study of civil mobilization capacities and putting the pro-government mobilizations and propaganda on the top of the list in Putin's administration. This new domestic mobilization defense shift, in a period of a few years, also converted into a set of laws limiting protests and marches, controlling overseas money inflows, think tanks' new surveys to measure public opinions and protest potentials, and newly created departments to monitor NGOs' activities (Kotkin 2015). With Euromaidan<sup>2</sup> and Ukrainian crisis<sup>3</sup>, the grip of the present Russian régime on potential treats expended even further...

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<sup>1</sup> Referred by media as the Snow Revolution, protest against parliamentary and presidential elections fraud in Russia began in 2012 and continued into 2012 and 2013, protest and marches sizes ranged from 10,000 to 160,000.

<sup>2</sup> Euromaidan – a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Kiev, Ukraine due to the police brutality, government corruption and unpopular choices by the government of not signing the EU agreements. Protests started on November 21, 2013 and grew nationwide, resulting in successful revolution and power change.

<sup>3</sup> A set of events that include Euromaidan, economic crisis, annexation of Crimea and military conflicts that emerged in the Eastern Ukraine, partitioning the territory with the two self-proclaimed republics.



It is exceptionally hard to understand the true mobilization capacity of Russian citizens today, and requires a careful process of peeling off the layers of Russian government's efforts to block any sort of oppositional activities. What is a Social Movement in Russia is practically unknown, despite the enormous amount of scholarly works written, majority of them fail to define it for their specific study and thus, provide just an outlook on certain events and reasons behind it. The surveys made by Russian and international think tanks in Russia are very illustrative, but how close can they be in measuring real mobilization capacities relying just on surveys, without looking at the specifics of the country?

This thesis is set to broaden up many sociological surveys' findings and understandings of social mobilization based on the raw data<sup>4</sup> in Russia, and thus, disprove many current analyses on Russian Federation investigating either Individual Mobilization Capacity or Group Mobilization Capacity. In order to proceed with the set goal, Social Movement definition will be searched for and selected to specifically fit Russian Federation, and it will serve as the basis of the thesis, and will be one of the significant findings of this work. Next step will include legal, historical and theoretical researches that will provide additional filters for the definition that might miss cultural and legal trends that are present, and, in one way or another, do not let the proposed definition to absorb the needed data to measure the mentioned capacities and protest potential. The filters find their support in related theories and data, however some of them, when used for a broader research, need further exploration and a careful incorporation.

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<sup>4</sup> Basic survey data incorporation into indexes; measuring protests sizes and frequencies, in comparison to other countries

Reasons for the 'definition + filters' approach selection are many, and, as it was mentioned previously, both together are trying to capture: political climate, national identity specifics, laws and current propaganda trends, in order to isolate needed data to see a more pure mobilization potential of Russian citizens. For example: Russian authorities themselves organize marches and protests through the public sector workers mobilization that also includes pensioners and students (Miryasova 2014); the existing legislative opposition in Duma<sup>5</sup> mobilizes civil population, however, it does not necessary is set to bring serious institutional changes (White 2013); group behavior of Russian civil population might be different due to the collective action inheritance from Soviet Union and socialist past; there are a number of specific laws and legislations that limit Russian citizens to protest freely, etc. Furthermore, the ideas that Russia has a hybrid social movements landscape (government is using propaganda to mobilize its citizens to control power) are voiced more and more often (Robertson 2011; Schedler 2013; Desrues 2013; White 2013), and that is the barrier that the definition with additional layers try to bypass.

After establishing the 'definition + filters,' the thesis is aiming to support the findings one more time, but at this stage through National Identity studies. Major findings of national identity theory and its discourses in Russian Federation are providing general patterns of collective and individual behavior. Furthermore, Russian national identity research provides, what the thesis defines as the 'hidden channels of mobilization'- the ability of specific individuals to mobilize large groups of people through great public authority (in this case). Derived from historically influential Russian Intelligentsia, Russian Rock musicians today, as seen in Chapter 2, are defined as such channel. Virtually the only

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<sup>5</sup> The State Duma is the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia.

ones, they are able to freely voice their opinions and are able to mobilize large groups of people without funding, and lead from the apolitical sector (There are certain specifics to these Russian Rock musicians, meaning that they are not just individuals that are playing the rock music, but rather have a different, well established style/ genre deeply rooted in Russian poetry and social identity lyrics (see Chapter 2, sub-section 2.3.2)). The thesis provides interviews with three very notable Russian Rock musicians, to see if they are really being viewed as a threat to the administration, and since the majority of them take a strong stance and lead the opposing views of public to the Russian position on the conflict in Ukraine (marshes, songs, public speeches, international mass media interviews), questions related mobilization capacity will also be asked.

Lastly, the thesis, will look at the indexes and surveys done by WCIOM<sup>6</sup>, in order to see the depth of the mobilization capacity analysis that the company makes. Furthermore, the same survey data by WCIOM will be used to support the statements made throughout the thesis and more (quantitative analysis).

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<sup>6</sup> WCIOM - Russian Public Opinion Research Center, the oldest and the most famous leading marketing and opinion research think tank in the post-Soviet space headquartering in Moscow that is also one of the subcontractors of the Russian government

## ***Methodology***

The selection of the topic is related to this thesis author's personal ability to speak Ukrainian and Russian, knowledge of the culture and history of the post-Soviet space, current events in Ukraine and heavy propaganda that comes from both sides (Ukraine and Russia), and unfortunately leads to many victims of the political games. Therefore, the research on public opinion and evolution of the current political trends in the former Soviet Union is crucial to understand in order to see what moves people and what can be done to keep them inactive.

Many doubtful opinions are voiced regarding Russia these days, many polls that show approval ratings in Russia are just surprising, and many scholarly debates are a bit off if they involve individuals not knowledgeable on the region. Research with and usage of the databases on Russia provided by the think tanks that newly incorporate studies on individual and group mobilization capacities also does not provide the whole picture of cultural attributes that are very important in measuring mobilization. Therefore, the thesis asks few main questions:

*RQ) what is the mobilization capacity of Russian civil population today, what are the specifics of it, what major factors should be included when measuring it, what cannot be measured through surveys and protest numbers and what can be improved?*

The thesis is divided into three chapters, and will have both qualitative and quantitative analyses. First, the theoretical framework is planning to isolate Russia from other countries through the *desk search* for case working definition of social movements that

later will incorporate additions (filters) that the definition misses: socialist past and class-struggle, single picket legislation, and propaganda towards 'national values.'

CEU's professor Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick that specializes in social movements and human rights, recommended few books on collective behavior and social movements for this research that clearly gave the understanding that first and foremost, prior any exploration in this topic, the definition for the social movements should be either adopted or proposed.

Professor Jan Pakulski, the author and co-author of 11 books and 120 scholarly articles on social inequality, elites, social movements, post-communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and social change,<sup>7</sup> came up with the social movement definition that he in his book "The Death of Class", co-written with Malcolm Waters, uses for the 90's Poland. "Social movements are recurrent of collective activities which are partially institutionalized or look to be institutionalized, value orientated and anti-systemic in their form and symbolism (1995)." The author of this thesis believes for many reasons that this is the ideal definition for his research (see Chapter 1).

One of the thesis supervisors, Andrey Demidov provided the author with the first contacts. Those had researchers, activists and scholars that are active in Russian Federation and are directly or indirectly associate their activities with social mobilization. The mentioned first contacts led the research to the second chapter of the thesis that uses national identity theoretical approach to support the *filters* attached to the definition. Furthermore, the literature on national identity led to explore special cases that the definition and the *filters* cannot grasp, special reasons why people can mobilize based on their identity.

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<sup>7</sup> Official page of Jan Pakulski at Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia ASSA, updated in 2013

Eyerman and Jamison's definition of music as a central element in the constriction of social movements and organization of a collective identity (1998) clues the thesis analysis to specifically look into the Russian Rock music and Russian Rock musicians as one of the hidden channels of mobilization that carried oppositional messages since 1960's and is extremely popular aspect of anti-government mobilizations in Russia. It was a part of 2011 Russian legislative election protests, 2012 Anti-Putin protests, and is a part of marches carrying pro-peace with Ukraine messages since 2014.

The thesis author reached out to 11 Russian Rock musicians through their management via both email and phone, and received conformation for two interviews, and one more artist agreed to be interviewed through professional contacts established during the research. Purpose of the interviews is to see if the musicians are really being viewed as the threat to the Russian government, hence, confirming the theory presented behind the 'hidden channel of mobilization' (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.), and hear their opinions on group mobilization capacity in Russia as a part of the public opposition side. Names of the musicians are following: Yuriy Shevchuk, Mikhail Novitskiy and Aleksey Kortnev. Interviews with Yuriy Shevchuk and Mikhail Novitsky were conducted face-to-face, and the interview with Aleksey Kornev via Skype.

Chapter 3 of the thesis aims to disprove the existing indexes of individual and group mobilization capacities proposed by think tanks in Russia, such as: WCIOM, Carnegie Center in Moscow and by Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation. Even though the thesis shows through the theoretically supported analyses that there are many complications that indexes on basis of the *raw data* cannot calculate, a desire to look for the data behind the indexes, to support the arguments, remained.

Professor of Faculty of Social Sciences of National Research University and Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Alexey Rotmistrov provided the thesis with the \*sav file named *polit-panel3* containing WCIOM surveys of four years that are behind individual and group mobilization capacity indexes and not only<sup>8</sup>. That data is used to analyze the made indexes and see their relation with other related survey variables contained in the file. For that analysis the SPSS software will be used.

Lastly, the thesis proposes the improvements, relying on the thesis statements and definition, to the WCIOM and other think tanks in Russia in regards to the mobilization capacity indexes, and illustrates what survey variables are to be taken into the account when measuring the mentioned.

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<sup>8</sup> The received \*sav file *polit-panel3* has over 2.5 thousand variables that are derived from questions. Surveys were collected between years 2011-2014.

### ***Limitations of the research***

There are two main problems with the research:

- a) The thesis argues that the mobilization capacity study is something new in Russia, such statements cannot be supported by scholarly sources, since there is no specific research that concentrates on that, however, the feedback that was received from multiple researchers in the field, confirms that not only in the case of Russia, but also worldwide there is a trend in calculating mobilization capacities and in the case of Russia, these studies became prominent in 2011.
- b) Time limitations and limited wording of the thesis, pushed to exclude many theoretical and quantitative aspects that can serve as the support of the argument thesis makes. Furthermore, the logical aim of the thesis should be to introduce the new complete indexes to measure mobilization capacities in Russia through implementations of data and surveys, however, due to the mentioned limits, the thesis is not able to derive the index.



# Chapter 1: Theoretical Background and Working Definition for Social Movements in Russia

Chapter one aims to introduce social movement definition that will be useful in analyzing mobilization capacity in Russian Federation. The selection will exclude many movements and leave only those that are targeting institutional changes or look to be institutionalized. Unlike any other public participations, these do not go away in a short period of time and therefore, the mobilization capacity of those pointed by the definition remains relevant for many years or even becomes historical. Furthermore, the *filters* to the definition on the basis of Russian specificity will be introduced in order to fully understand the mobilization trends there, and the *filters* should be adopted and used in both quantitative and qualitative measurements of the mobilization capacity in Russia.

## 1.1 Working Definition for Social Movements in Russia

Social Movements, what does it mean, what do we include in this definition and what do we exclude? MSMs<sup>9</sup>, unconventional political participation, revolutions, religious gatherings, parades and even flash mobs and similar topic blogs on the web can be classified, in one way or another, to be a social movement. In order to move forward from this broad and inclusive word, we need to narrow the scope down to proceed with any type of the analysis, and thus, divide the field by causes and targets of the civic mobilization. Professor Jan Pakulski in his book “The Death of Class” (1995) proposes an interesting definition to the social movements that he coined for 90’s Poland in order to describe mass events and collective rise that was there at that time, and thus, toss

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<sup>9</sup> MSM – widely used abbreviation for Mass Social Movement

away some public participations that were extra: “Social movements are recurrent of collective activities which are partially institutionalized or look to be institutionalized or look for an institutional change, value orientated and anti-systemic in their form and symbolism (1995).” Interestingly this definition and framework provides a chance to analyze and includes the most important protest and mobilizations of the century, such as: revolutions, far left, far right, gay, feminist and environmental.<sup>10</sup> Majority of just mentioned led to political changes, national identity changes, anthropological and epistemological discourses. There is a more than heuristic assumption present that the qualified by the definition public participations have something in common and therefore can be drawn into the analysis together. The definition however, can and should be implemented in a shorter period of time and for a specific country case to get a more precise results. In the example of Russian Federation this selective categorization can be an important tool for understanding the mobilization capacity that is looking for institutional changes or to be institutionalized. All other mass activities, unfortunately, require a much broader definition that will automatically include completely apolitical marshes and gatherings which are not suitable for a long run mobilization capacity measurements. Moreover, despite the usefulness of the definition to collect the particular data on protests and investigate them, country specifics of Russian Federation are needed to be taken into account, and further extension to the definition is needed.

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<sup>10</sup> The list of mobilization qualified under the definition can be expanded

## 1.2 Filter 1: Paradox of Social Movement Paradox

Environmental movements do not erupt in the most ecologically hurt regions on this planet. They are non-existent in India, weak in Japan and France, and insignificant in industrial parts of Eastern Europe. We can argue on behalf of developing countries, by saying that they, as of yet, do not have enough funding to allocate resources towards protection of the eco systems, however, according to the social movement scholars (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) it would be a weak argument if you are familiar with the Social Movement Paradox Theory. The concept suggest to look at both sides of the coin, as it was just done, and see a familiar pattern: the feminist movements cannot be linked with the highest degree of sex discrimination, peace mobilizations do not correlate positively with military and *free press* states have a stronger possibility to expand their right to exercise more freedom in that sector. Hilgartner and Bosk first began to claim that the more freedom degrees a group receives the bigger is a desire to have more (1988).

The Russian case is even more interesting, since it includes mobilizations to further limit freedoms. Sure, similar patterns can be seen elsewhere, but not as strong as in Russian Federation. In a period between 2012 and 2015, Russian citizens went on the streets for anti-gay marshes, anti-free press marshes, protested for more censorship in the cultural sector and remarkably, it all fell in the lines of passed legislations, meaning that voiced concerns were institutionalized: Russian LGBT propaganda law<sup>11</sup>, protection of religious

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<sup>11</sup> Federal Law of Russian Federation from June 30, 2013. N 135-F3, Moscow 'For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values'- Russian Newspaper (Motivated by a goal to protect children from being exposed to content that promotes homosexuality as being a norm in society)  
<http://www.rg.ru/2013/06/30/deti-site-dok.html>

feelings law<sup>12</sup>, etc. Most recent example was the protest against avant-garde performance of Wagner's Tannhauser opera in March of 2015. Remarkable civic pressure led to a sort of a show trial that was contested to the public craving of having a greater censorship to preserve cultural traditions and values (The Guardian 2015). Moreover, Orthodox Church played a role in mobilizing towards the mentioned cultural preservation, and as Zubarevich argues, Orthodox Church in Russia is a key player in framing public freedoms and its limits (Zubarevich 2011). If we look at Social Movement Paradox theory and Russian Federation where the majority of recent movements are targeting further limitation of the freedoms through the scope of traditional, cultural and religious prisms, the similarities can be still found, however, the Russians desire to isolate themselves from the western society and trends of limiting long fought for freedoms are even more paradoxical.

Such paradoxical movements should be analyzed separately in the case of Russian Federation and should not be included in the definition of social movements that is looking to measure mobilization capacity, even though these *paradox mobilizations* are a part of it, origins and goals of such participation are different and can be traced to government propaganda and newly imposed national ideas, meaning that the mentioned movements follow the lines of the government that unanimously passes and sings the legislations regarding the limitations (see footnotes' links 11, 12, 13).

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<sup>12</sup> Federal Law of the Russian Federation on June 29, 2013 N 136 -FZ Moscow "On Amendments to Article 148 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in order to counter the insult of religious beliefs and feelings of citizens"  
<http://www.rg.ru/2013/06/30/zashita-site-dok.html>

For further implications regarding data sets, indexes and variables of social mobilization capacity, it is possible to identify areas that experience the trends of limiting freedoms and if there is a repetitive backlash towards the mentioned promoted limitations in a shape of protests and/or other movements, such liberties should be assigned a higher value for statistical representation.

### **1.3 Filter 2: Single Man Protest**

*Single picket* or *single man protest* is a very important variable that is not considered by social movements inter-discipline in regards to Russia as of yet, and despite the thesis's definition categorization, it is suitable for Russian mobilization capacity investigation. Marches, protests, demonstrations and rallies need approval by the host city's city council in Russia long time prior the planned event. Unsanctioned cause gatherings are banned by the federal law that allows only one person to participate in the stated actions without the permission.<sup>13</sup> It is extremely compulsory to observe and look closer at the small scale recurrent responses and their messages, even though they are bypassing the definition, the value of a repetitive *single picket*, as a variable, should be much higher due to the legal punishment these protests often face, and further, de facto it is a pure expression that is unfunded and unsupported by influential personas. The mentioned law resulted in civic protests around few big Russian cities called Strategy 31. The Strategy 31 comprises of a set of protests in support of the right to peaceful assembly in Russian Federation which should be guaranteed by the Constitution, more specifically, by Article 31<sup>14</sup>. If we

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<sup>13</sup> Federal Law of Russian Federation from June 8 2012. N 65-F3, Moscow 'About Amendments in the Codex of Russian Federation for Administrative Rights Violations' and Federal Law 'About Gatherings, Meetings, Demonstrations, Protests, Marches' – Russian Newspaper  
<http://www.rg.ru/2012/06/09/mitingi-dok.html>.

<sup>14</sup> <http://strategy-31.ru>

are to look at the data base recorded for *single man* protests, number one reason for mobilization is related to Article 31, and second most popular cause is LGBTQ rights<sup>15</sup>.

#### **1.4 Filter 3: Class Struggle and Socialist Past relation to Mass Protests in Russia**

The last *filter* suggested to the definition considers Russian socialist heritage and believes that collective behavior in Russian mobilization is playing an important role. Strange as it might sound, Adam Pzeworski when writing about Russian/Soviet society voiced an opinion that the Rational Choice Theory is interlinked with Marxism in Russia (1986). Well, if we are to look closer, maybe it does make sense after all. The Rational Choice Theory speculates about personal behavior to obtain maximum personal gain in terms of income, security, prestige, etc., and accepts the idea that the market dictates the egocentric actions of the players. Marx's theory of political behavior falls somewhere along the mentioned in the previous sentence lines, but rather speculates and elaborates on the class struggle and class interest (1992), something similar to how John Nash criticized the rational choice through the Nash Equilibrium (1950). Adam's work suggests that the civil society in Russia, before acting, is evaluating positions of other players and critic that they might receive and results that they might obtain, plus, desire to remain a majority, even inactive majority is present (1986).

Russian public sector has shortages of work unions, professional organizations, however, what it has is a collectivist legacy, and today it is still very much relevant to the fact the

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<sup>15</sup> Presented data by Alexandrina Vanke (*State Academic University for the Humanities*), during her *presentation* 'Political Emotions: Protest and Pro-government Rallies in Russia in 2011–2013' at the 'Social Movements Today' conference in St. Petersburg, June 4, 2015.  
<http://socialmovementstoday.wordpress.com/>

biggest fragment of Russian population was born in Soviet Union. The *filter* utilizes the theoretical base of Russian collective and socialist heritage and thinks that there are specific tendencies and reactions of one group of mobilized towards another. There is an opinion that different society groups that mobilize for various different causes have a bigger chance to support each other in former Soviet states than in the countries of Western Europe (Lankina and Getachew 2008). This declaration suggest that for example: LGBTQ has a lesser chance to unite protesting forces with freedom of press movement or equal employment movement or immigration movement in Western Europe than in Russia. Such argument should be supported with data and not just theory, but nevertheless the statement is made in relation to Marx's Class Struggle Theory, where a class of oppressed has sympathy towards other oppressed by the government classes, and together they form a class struggle against a politically dominant group (1992). Hence, thesis arrives towards a hypothesis that if there is a mass protest in Russia for the freedom of press there is a big chance that it will get even bigger due to the support of other classes that will use their opportunity to voice the struggled class collective voice of the disagreement.

Mark R. Beissinger, has a very interesting finding that is usable to support the *filter* and the hypothesis. In his study on cycles of protest and nationalist violence in a period between 1987 and 1992 in Soviet Union and Russia, he suggested that MSMs in the mentioned locations become ethnic communal conflicts rather than terrorism or an opening to revenge the government. "The rise of violence in USSR in significant part was associated with the decline of nonviolent mobilization contesting interrepublican borders (2002). In Beissinger's analysis we can trace how 'bundles' of different society groups in

Russia came together for the common cause of loosening up and transforming the regime (Ibid: 1).

It is extremely hard to transform the *filter into* measurements, however the mobilization capacity studies should account that one issue protest can expand quick if there is a strong mobilization capacity of a different group that seeks to negotiate their terms with the Russian government (associated with the *filter 3* quantitative study will be done in Chapter 3, section 3.1)



## Chapter 2: Russian National Identity & Hidden Channels of Mobilization

Of course, the thesis cannot perform the whole broad analysis of national identity of any country, not to even mention the multinational and diverse case of Russian Federation, simply because it is too complicated and it is not the aim of the research. However, certain parts of national identity theories and Russian national identity findings are taken into the consideration and are analyzed to support the claims made previously in Chapter 1. Furthermore, this is done to see if there was something missed regarding mobilization specifics in Russia, and to allocate the triggers or hidden channels of mobilization that can activate masses towards participation in, specified by the definition, protest/movement. There are quite a few of such channels, such as Orthodox Church, but the selections is made according to the *filters* that isolate mobilizations related to propaganda and government influences

Russian Rock musicians are one of the hidden channels of mobilization, both historically and present. Interviews with notable Russian Rock musician will provide outlook on current mobilization capacity situation in Russia, and will document the musicians and government interaction to see if the first do pose a threat leading the apolitical sector.

### ***2.1 National Identity Theory Influences and Its Construction in Russian Federation (in support of proposed filters in Chapter 1)***

The concept of national identity is analyzed quite often and in many disciplines. What is evident from those analyses is that national identity is strongly related to one's feeling of belonging to a nation in a broad social way (Best 2011). Further, national identity is composed of individualism and collective identity, the feelings of "I" and "We" (Snow

2001). The road of individual's identity formation lies through many social categorizations, both of his own and of a society around him (Lane 2011). Constructivists also argue that "collective national identity flows naturally from some underlying set of characteristics, often reduced to a single determinative attribute regarded as the collectivity's 'defining essence'" (Snow 2001). Such basic revelations of national identity theory correlate and provide support for the mentioned in the Chapter I's *filter* 3, class struggle theory by Karl Marx and its implication towards the Russian case by the thesis (collective voice of a united opposition seems to be more socially accepted and legitimate phenomenon in Russia, due to the long socialism past and national collective identity).

Hobsbawn, in his long-life research on nationalism, came to an agreement that neither language, nor ethnicity are able to sustain the evolution of a nation, and it is rather a memory of belonging to a lasting political community that, in majority of cases, leads to a strong national identity. Furthermore, the concept of 'invented traditions,' developed by Hobsbawn, conceives "a set of practices, normally governed by tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual of symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past" (Hobsbawn 1983).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian government had to invent its own propaganda and collective identity to have social support on political and economic agenda of the ruling. As noted by Melvin (1995), it was possible through the creation of a set of collective and individual identities which linked the population to the newly independent state. Historical books, TV channels, cinematography, and other cultural spheres were endorsed and obliged to resurrect past symbols of Russian glory and pride such as Tsarist past and Christian Orthodoxy. Furthermore, such word combinations

“Holy Russia,” “Great Rus” and “Russian Seoul” became the new slogans for new Russian propaganda (Melvin 1995). Vladimir Putin referred to the newly incorporated territories of Crimea and city with a special status Sevastopol as a “spiritual reunification, not just territorial”, further naming Sevastopol ‘Russia’s Jerusalem’<sup>16</sup>. Heuristic assumption that such allegations are derived from the Kievan Rus when the Prince Vladimir, the founder of Rus was baptized to Orthodox Christianity, rather than glory of the Black Sea’s naval outpost. Cohen (1999), describes such notions of countries to create a new national identification as “organized forgetting.” These newly promoted national ideas and identifications find their support in *filter 1 paradox mobilization*.

It is also important to mention that national values and tendencies have several byproduct implications besides the current popular trends to limit certain freedoms. Propaganda led to an extremely dramatic and significant number of ethnic tensions and racist violence. Slogans like “Russia for Russians,” “Migrants today, occupiers tomorrow” as well as anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic insults could be seen and heard, and they often incorporate black, yellow and white flags celebrating imperial Russia and its Slavic and Orthodox foundation (Associated Press 2011). Interestingly, Golova, Kusche, Weinmann attribute a central role to the media and authorities in fomenting hate violence against these migrants and influencing public debate with negative images. In their view, the media and authorities tend to contextualize the presence of foreigners in the country only in problematic terms, portraying them as a threat and as a danger for Russia (Golova, Kusche, Weinmann, 2011).

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<sup>16</sup> <http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/54802718cbb20f542fbb597f>

## **2.2 Important Additions from the theory: Historical National Identity Spilt in Russia**

Despite the mentioned core concepts of Russian national identity that support the *filters*, there are a few very important attributes of Russia that should not be missed. First one is related to Russian Orthodox Christianity and centralization of power, correlations that unfortunately are skipped by the thesis due to the specificity of mobilization directions that are not analyzed (*filter 3*). Second concept that views the historical divide between Slavophiles and Westernizers is of bigger importance to the research.

Even prior the French Revolution, Decembrist movement, October Revolution, and other socialist ideas and transformations that participated in construction of the collectivist behavior, Russian identity experienced, what some call, Westernization. In 1840's division between two groups: Westernizers and Slavophiles became evident. The first were the backers of the Peter the Great politics and of *western values* integration, the second insisted on centric self-determination (Figes 2002). There is also an argument that the same divisions remain today; divisions between westernization and centralization, between hating own society for not being "European" to loving it for the same exact reason, and surprisingly between cities like St. Petersburg and Moscow (Efremenko and Evseeva 2012).

The idea of the division will be analyzed quantitatively in Chapter 3, section 3.1

## **2.3 Hidden Channels of Mobilization in Russia: Russian Rock Musicians**

In this chapter section interviews are conducted with:

Mikhail Novitsky - singer and leader of the rock group SP Babai founder of the St. Petersburg-based NGO “Green Wave”<sup>17</sup>. He recently gained a lot of popularity on social media for his songs and skims that are aimed against Russian Authorities.

Yuriy Shevchuk - Soviet and Russian singer/songwriter leader of the rock band DDT He is very popular and is widely known in Russia and post-Soviet space<sup>18</sup>. Participated in the 2011-2012 protests as one of their leaders.

Aleksey Kortnev - Russian Rock musician, actor, singer-songwriter, lead singer and band leader “Unfortunate Accident”<sup>19</sup>."

### **2.3.1 Russian Intelligentsia**

Hobsbawn highlights that ‘invented traditions’ are the product of elites, government and intellectuals that are able to spread mass messages (Hobsbawn 1983). In the case of modern Russia and its historical, more than 70 yearlong, Soviet past, roles of the elites and the government are being played by the ‘one party actor’ and intellectuals are scientists, classical and rock musicians, poets and writers. It is easy to support previous claim of the identified categories of intelligentsia, since the last mentioned personas’ opposition and importance of the message capacity can be seen in a simple statistics of

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.rock-n-roll.ru/show.php?file=encyclopedia%2F%D1%2F%D1%CF+%C1%C0%C1%C0%C9>

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.rock-n-roll.ru/show.php?file=encyclopedia/%C4/DDT>

<sup>19</sup> Aleksey Kortnev description during the conducted interview (Kortnev 2015)

imprisoned, prosecuted, detained and *gulaged*. The book 'The Russian Intelligentsia,' by Andrei Sinyavsky, heavily bases on archives and tries to give a list on all oppressed intellectuals in Soviet Union: "Writers as Anna Akhmatova, Boris Pasternak, and Mikhail Zoshchenko, who were labeled "anti-Soviet" underminers of socialist realism, and, improperly pessimistic, they were expelled from the Union of Writers, and offending periodicals were either abolished or brought under direct party control. The noted filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein and great composers such as Sergei Prokofiev and Dmitrii Shostakovich were denounced for "neglect of ideology and subservience to Western influence (1997)." The attacks extended to scientists and philosophers, rock musicians, and unfortunately didn't stop today in modern Russia. For an example: in 2014 in Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), proposed a legislation to ban Anti-Russian singers from TV stations and radio rotations for not supporting Russia's stance in the conflict in Ukraine<sup>20</sup>. The communists did not publicly called out the names of the artists that they were referring to, but the Russian newspaper *Izvestiya* reported, citing its sources, that Russian Rock musician Andrei Makarevich, Noize MC and Yuriy Shevchuk were labeled to be the main reason for such decision (2014).

Why these mentioned categories of people are so important for Russian national Identity formations? Hall (1996) argues that national histories, literatures, the media and popular culture together provide a set of stories, images landscapes scenarios, historical events, national symbols and rituals, and that is how national identity is conceptualized. As explained by Simon and Widdis (2004), the question of Russian national identity has always been central to Russian writers, artists, musicians, and philosophers.

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<sup>20</sup> <http://ni.kprf.ru/n/2646/>

Furthermore, Soviet Union spent many years erasing ethnical, cultural, historical, religious identity, especially when it comes to Russian nationality in comparison to other nationalities lived in the USSR (Stoler, McGranahan and Perdue 2007). Newly imposed vacant national value slots, were taken by propaganda, collective and educational achievements, and for people that were not satisfied with everything completely, slots were also filled with literature, classic, rock and bard music, because the last mentioned, due to their art forms and complexity, managed to bypass the Party's censorship and get outside.

### 2.3.2 Russian Rock Music Specificity and Government Control

Following Figes (2002), communism (Soviet authorities) was countering artists through the construction of *homo sovieticus*<sup>21</sup> and pro-Soviet propaganda orders were given to musicians and artists. Joseph Stalin once said: "Engineers of a human soul (artists) should defend the frontiers of the communism<sup>22</sup>." During the Soviet period, Russian music was adapted to the prescription of Socialist Realism; remarkably, according to Slonimsky, the modalities and extent to which music was instrumentalized by the Soviet Union to disseminate its ideology and reinforce its propaganda was not only complex but also incredible (Slonimsky 1950). In particular, the Russian Association of Proletarian Musicians, founded in 1922, was involved in a music production, was able to foster political agitation and to reach "human energy with the aim of utilizing it for the needs of Soviet Construction" (Edmunds 2000). Many artists had to work for the party and the ones

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<sup>21</sup> The term coined by well-known Soviet writer and sociologist Aleksandr Zinovyev, describing raised by propaganda person with high socialist values

<sup>22</sup> SparkNotes Editors. "SparkNote on Joseph Stalin." SparkNotes LLC. 2005.  
<http://www.sparknotes.com/biography/stalin/>

who did not, ended up being either oppressed or constantly spied on. Despite the communism being everywhere where the popular art would go, and create socialist equivalent of art genres, some popular subcultures in Soviet Union remained untouched, since the essence of those was a protest against the authority and the imposed way of life.

“Russian Rock was oppressed, however, it was different to any other music or art genre. It was impossible to limit and project socialism or capitalism or anything synthetic through it, people would sense it right away and stop listening. The performers would verbally support the regime, but people knew the truth through their lyrics and music. The only way to control something that was able to sustain itself without concert halls and authorized publicity, was through personal treats.”

(Shevchuk 2015).

What is very interesting is that Russia, since its independence, let go of the totalitarian art control, but it is slowly trying to bring it back, especially following the Euromaidan events in 2013-2014. Based on the interviews with Russian Rock musicians that are either criticizing current Kremlin political line or taking pro-peace with Ukraine stance only, it is evident that the Russian authorities are blocking their professional activities.

“The concerts activities are blocked, some of them are canceled on the day of the show due to ridiculous reasons like gas leak call or sanitary standard violations that popped in the venues in the last moment. As the result, artist and promoters have to refund tickets and face expenses that were made prior the performance. In the case of pro-government musicians that wave Russian flags and yell out nationalistic words or those that do not take political side and rather choose to sing about regular themes of love and etc., the government is trying its best to assist them with popularity gains by feeling the seating places with government workers, pensioners, students.”

(Novitski 2015).



Music has been a factor in many major movements, such as the labor movements, the Civil Rights movements, the oppositional movement in the dictatorship in Argentina, and various ethno-nationalist movements as, for example, the Estonian national movement against the Soviets, which is also known as the “singing revolution.” And if we look at the notable people at the anti-government protests from the apolitical sector in Russia we arrive to Russian Rock musicians that, in their majority, chose either to remain quite or oppose the government and fight against oligarchy, imperial ambitions and military conflicts that the government was involved in. But how is the Russian Rock different from any other Rock music and why is it written Russian Rock and not just ‘rock’ music?

Rock music arrived in Russia in the mid-1960s with the Beatles mania, when the first Russian rock-bands played cover versions of Beatles songs on hand-made instruments, singing in English as best as they could. Despite the technical improvement registered in the following years, the scarce knowledge of the English language together with the narrowness of the repertoires led several music bands to write songs in their native language: this marked the birth of Russian rock (Steinholt, 2003). The phenomenon consisted of a number of bands following the do-it-yourself ideals, which saw Russian rock as a way for self-expression and as the sole escape from the repressive policies and measures of the Soviet authorities (Steinholt, 2003). Remarkably, compared to ‘western rock’, Russian rock completely lacks marketing and commercial distribution networks (Ibid: 1). As noted by Steinholt, the centrality of the lyrics was one of the main features of Russian rock music for, at least, two reasons: on the one hand, Russian rock bands were lacking the technical virtuosity and equipment typical of the Western tradition; on the other hand, due to the Soviet ban of dancing at concerts, Russian rock was not primarily made

to dance to. The combination of these two factors contributed in conferring a pivotal role to the lyrics in the Russian rock phenomenon and their “all-important function in communicating with the audience (Ibid: 2). According to Troitskiy, Russian rock songs had a direct tie to the Russian poetic tradition and reflected its lexical and stylistic heritage (1987). Their origins can be traced back to the Russian pre-revolutionary *gorodskoi romanz* (“city ballad”) and *blatnaya pesnya* (“underworld song”), which belonged to an urban genre together with the *bardovskaya pesnya* (“bard song”) dealing with religious faith and love for Motherland (Ibid: 3). In the 1990s, Russian Rock music remained an underground phenomenon relegated to unconventional channels which preserved the centrality, deepness and enlightenment mission of this music style whose lyrics were deeply associated with religion, spirituality, and civic awakening (Ibid: 4).

“Russian Rock is a part of Russian true national identity reflections and is comprised of our countrymen’s feelings, and not necessary negative reactions towards government or any kind of political system. The beauty the music is that is able to portrait the truth: beautiful truth or extremely harsh one.”

(Yuriy Shevchuk 2015)

What is also remarkable is that many revolutions, militia rebellions, nationalistic movements involve poetry and poets as their symbol. During Ukrainian Euromaidan, images of Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, Lesya Ukrainka were commemorated in graffiti and posters on buildings around Kiev. Romanticism of the French revolution hosted many poets that led the uprising, and even African militia groups today are using Arabic and French poetry to unite and keep the fighting spirits high. Nearly 175 years ago Percy Bysshe Shelley said, in his *Defence of Poetry*, that “poets are the unacknowledged

legislators of the world<sup>23</sup>—and in the upcoming years since many poets participated in revolutions and movements that changed discourses of different societies.

### 2.3.3 Interviews

The following questions and answers to them regarding mobilization capacity in Russia and related arguments that were presented by the thesis:

*What is the current mobilization situation in Russia, and what are the current trends of it?*

“In 2011 everyone mobilized, you name it: nationalists, liberals, anarchists. Today, due to the war in Ukraine, society is split, everyone is split even the Green Party<sup>24</sup>. There are those who trust Russian TV and those who do not. And unfortunately the government knows where to push people to build its ratings.”

(Novitskiy 2015)

“I would like to say what was said by my colleague, Andrey Makarevich, - People used to live in Soviet Union and had propaganda every day on TV, nevertheless, no one blindly believed in it [...], today people are blinder. Of course not everyone, but majority of social movements today, at least the ones that people see on TV, are nationalism related with Soviet touch to it.”

(Yuriy Shevchuk)

“There are many trends, I guess, however, what we see on TV is one thing and reality is different. There are many ways to look at things too. What I see, is that we are applauding the civil war in Ukraine, and we are willing to forget all other problem to do it. Hopefully it will pass soon, I think it will be quite soon.”

(Aleksey Kortnev)

*Are you being criticized or threatened by the government in one way or another for your oppositional views and publicity related to it?*

“I think they know about it, I personally have yet to experience the backlash since I’m not that vocal, plus, I haven’t tried to put my music in rotations on radio or TV

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<sup>23</sup> SparkNotes Editors. “SparkNote on Shelley’s Poetry.” SparkNotes LLC. 2002.

<http://www.sparknotes.com/poetry/shelley/>

<sup>24</sup> <http://greenparty.ru/>

for a long time now, thus, it is hard to say. However, I'm sure that they (authorities) know and can do something at will."

(Kortnev 2015)

"I just want to be clear, I do not want anything bad for Russia, or a revolution or something. I just see that the country is going in a wrong direction and I should have an ability to publically express it as a citizen. Of course, not a single TV station will let me speak, accept maybe cable Dozhd, and local St. Petersburg station [...]. There are so called 'Stop Lists' that prevent many venue directors and sometimes local authorities to allow certain musicians to play in their city. The lists are updated quite often, depends on what you do and say."

(Novitskiy 2015)

"I've received many treats. I do not know if all that is coming from the government or people. But what bad do I do for people?"

(Shevchuk 2015)

*Mikhail you were present at the Strategy 31 protests in St. Petersburg almost every day and you know a lot about the 'single picket' law. What is your view on single man protests today and how important it is?*

"At Gastini Dvor, during Strategy 31 they were beating people down, not all of course but those who got taken by police, including me [...], and we do not represent any political opposition. One man pickets are important, that shows that people still are in need to be heard and there are topics that do need attention. Unfortunately in order for a 'one man protest' to get attention, he/she needs to be vocal and even do something stupid."

(Novitsky 2015)

To the question: *"Please name other musicians that openly criticize the government despite possible consequences?"* All of the named were Russian Rock Musicians (Novitsky 2015; Shevchuk 2015; Kortnev 2015)

*Is there a possibility of repeated 2011-2012 protests and joined apolitical opposition in Russia today?*

"Everything is possible. There are many people that do not support current evolutions in Russia. However taking into the account complications of the situation and radicalism of pro-government layers of society, it is not a good time."

(Shevchuk 2015)

## Chapter 3: The New Way of Calculating Social Movement Capacity vs Old One

Practically all surveys in Russia that are done through WCIOM (the source that is used for the thesis) or any other notable think tank or research center in Russia are using simple analyses for their reports: pie charts, one variable regressions and bar charts, and rarely are a source for a statistical analysis that engages with the full capacities of the software like STATA or SPSS<sup>25</sup>.

This chapter will use the collected by WCIOM survey data regarding politicization and protests for the year of 2014, to analyze indexes of individual and group mobilization capacities proposed (see Table 1) and to support previous findings and statement in Chapters 1 and 2.

Following the WCIOM data analyses, the chapter, relying on the thesis's findings, will introduce suggestions to how should the indexes that measure mobilization capacities in Russia be calculated.

### **3.1 Most Curreant Protest Data, Mobilization Capacity Indexes and Findings**

The following are the indexes of individual and group mobilization capacities proposed by WCIOM:

**The index of Group Mobilization Capacity** - shows how Russian citizens consider the possibility of mass protests. The higher the index value, the more respondents believe in the possibility of mass protests in their hometown. Index It is based on the question: "*What is a possibility of a mass protests against falling living standards, unjust actions of the*

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<sup>25</sup> <http://www.wciom.ru/> <http://carnegie.ru/?lang=en>

*authorities and their failure to protect civil rights and freedoms, in our city / rural area?"*

The answer "quite possible" is assigned the coefficient of 0.9, the answer "unlikely" - 0.1, "not sure" - 0.5 (Rating from 1 to 10). The index is measured in points, and can range from 10 to 90.

**The index of Individual's Mobilization Capacity** - shows the willingness of Russian citizens to take part in mass protests. The higher the value the index, the more respondents declare willingness to take part in the protests. The index is based on the question: *"if in our city / rural area a mass protest/demonstration against falling living standards, unjust actions of the authorities and their unwillingness to protect constitutional freedoms and rights, would be held, would you personally participate in them or not?"* The answer "probably yes" is assigned the coefficient of 0.9, the answer "probably not" - 0.1, "uncertain" - 0.5 (Rating from 1 to 10). The index is measured in points, and can range from 10 to 90.




Table 1. Protest Potential by WCIOM

The indexes presented are measured by quartile surveys and the surveys are held in more than 100 Russian cities and villages. Besides WCIOM, similar indexes are produced by Carnegie Center in Moscow and by Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation.

The reality of such indexes is debatable and their ability to predict mass protest or the capacity is uncertain due to the formulations. Once again, it is just one question on the basis of which the indexes are drawn.

Thesis proposes future analyses of the same data collected by WCIOM in 2014 that was used in the mentioned above indexes graph<sup>26</sup>.

If the two surveys used for measuring individual and group mobilization capacity are to be compared together, it is evident that the more people think that there could be a mass protest, the higher is a chance of them to participate in it:

The two survey variables are drawn into crosstabulation (see Appendix A), the correlation is significant ( $p=.000^{***}$ )<sup>27</sup> and the relationship is strong (Cramer's  $V = .520$ )<sup>28</sup>.

Despite the weak Individual Mobilization Capacity Index (WCIOM), the trend to join protests, if there is one, is present. This could be accounted into the government's

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<sup>26</sup> WCIOM survey data provided by Alexey Rotmistrov, an Associate Professor of Faculty of Social Sciences of National Research University and Higher School of Economics in Moscow.

<sup>27</sup> p-value is significant at:  $p \leq .05$  level\*;  $p \leq .01$ \*\*;  $p \leq .001$ \*\*\*

<sup>28</sup> Cramer's  $V$  represents the strength of variables association:  $< 0.3$  – very weak relationship;  $0.3-0.5$  – some relationship;  $0.51-0.7$  – strong relationship ;  $> 0.7$ - very strong relationship.

legislations like 'single picket law' and other tendencies to limit mobilization activities, and to the *class struggle filter*.

To support the government agenda to limit the protest movements, mentioned above, another WCIOM survey variable is taken into the analysis. The crosstabulation is between the survey that was used for individual mobilization capacity index and *\*Are you interested in protests that are occurring in our country?*

ARE YOU INTERESTED IN PROTESTS THAT ARE OCCURING IN OUR COUNTRY?	IF IN OUR CITY / RURAL AREA A MASS PROTEST/DEMONSTRATION AGAINST FALLING LIVING STANDARDS, UNJUST ACTIONS OF THE AUTHORITIES AND THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO PROTECT CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS, WOULD BE HELD, WOULD YOU PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE IN THEM											Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	hard to answer	
YES Count	89 47.3%	18 9.6%	8 4.3%	7 3.7%	17 9.0%	8 4.3%	6 3.2%	7 3.7%	9 4.8%	12 6.4%	7 3.7%	188 100.0%
SOMEWHAT Count	186 55.7%	44 13.2%	31 9.3%	12 3.6%	21 6.3%	5 1.5%	5 1.5%	7 2.1%	2 .6%	10 3.0%	11 3.3%	334 100.0%
NO Count	358 70.5%	44 8.7%	16 3.1%	13 2.6%	22 4.3%	9 1.8%	9 1.8%	6 1.2%	2 .4%	7 1.4%	22 4.3%	508 100.0%
Total Count	633 61.5%	106 10.3%	55 5.3%	32 3.1%	60 5.8%	22 2.1%	20 1.9%	20 1.9%	13 1.3%	29 2.8%	40 3.9%	1030 100.0%

Table 2. Crosstabulation of WCIOM surveys behind Individual Mobilization Capacity and Protest Interest

Once again there is a significant relationship between the two. Listed in the Table 2, results show that the more people are interested in protests, the more likely they are to join them:



The correlation is significant ( $p=.001^{***}$ ) and the relationship is strong (Cramer's  $V=.513$ ).

This can be accounted towards the propaganda machine that limits the broadcast of oppositional actions and mobilizations.

Further statistical analysis is related to the federal law of the Russian Federation made in order to counter the insult of religious beliefs and feelings of citizens. The two survey variables analyzed here are: *\*Do you consider yourself to be a patriot of Russia \* Please state your view regarding the new law protecting the religious feelings in Russia* (Table 3).

The correlation is significant ( $p=.000^{***}$ ) and the relationship is strong (Cramer's  $V=.673$ ).

DO YOU COSIDER YOURSELF TO BE A PATRIOT OF RUSSIA	PLEASE STATE YOUR VIEW REGARDING THE NEW LAW PROTECTING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS			Total
	SUPPORT	DO NOT SUPPORT	HARD TO ANSWER	
ABSOLUTELY Count	310 83.3%	39 0.5%	23 6.2%	372 100.0%
MOST LIKELY Count	393 79.9%	43 8.7%	56 11.4%	492 100.0%
PROBABLY Count	101 72.7%	12 18.6%	26 18.7%	139 100.0%
NOT Count	18 60.0%	10 33.3%	2 6.7%	30 100.0%
HARD TO Count	32 84.2%	2 5.3%	4 10.5%	38 100.0%
ANSWER				
Total Count	854 79.7%	106 9.9%	111 10.4%	1071 100.0%

Table 3. Crosstabulation: Patriotism and Religious Feeling Protection Law surveys

Table 3 can be related to the new pro-government trends that are emphasizing the relations between nationalism and patriotism with the relations to the Orthodox Identity, with the support of another survey WCIOM survey where most respondents identified themselves as Christian Orthodox.

The Hypothesis regarding the different national Identity split between Moscow and St. Petersburg (see Chapter 2, section 2.2), also was supported by the nominal survey data through the crosstabulation analysis of survey variables: *\*How strongly do you consider yourself to be European* and *\*Survey Location points selection: Moscow and St. Petersburg*. ( $p=.005^{**}$ ) (Cramer's  $V = .457$ )

### **3.2 New Index**

The thesis believes that due to the complexity of the mobilization in Russia and its specifics, the capacity indexes should be drawn from multiple question related to the specifics and not just one question. The following survey questions should be considered when establishing the Individual Mobilization Capacity and Group Mobilization Capacity Indexes:

1. *if in our city / rural area a mass protest/demonstration advocating for the institutional change against falling living standards, unjust actions of the authorities and their unwillingness to protect constitutional freedoms and rights, would be held, would you personally participate in them or not?*
2. *Do you disprove the direction of the government or any stances of it, that you will be willing express in march, protest or any other public campaign?*

3. *if in our city / rural area a mass protest/demonstration advocating for the institutional change against falling living standards, unjust actions of the authorities and their unwillingness to protect constitutional freedoms and rights, would be held, would you join them to protest your personal issue unrelated to the protest?*
4. *If you see people marching or even protesting for pro-government agenda, do you consider it to not genuine or do they look to bring institutional changes?*
5. *Is there certain people from the apolitical sector that due to their personal authority can mobilize large groups of people? Who are they? Would you mobilize as well?*

The questions for proposed to measure the mobilization capacities through surveys include: the Social Movement definition, *filters*, from the Chapter 1, and *hidden channels of mobilization* aspects from the Chapter 3.

Due to the limitations of the thesis (see Introduction, section: Limitations of the Research) the protest data parts that should be added to the new indexes are not provided.

## Conclusion

The main purpose of the thesis was to explore and expose the essentials of the mobilization in Russia and answer the Research Questions: what is the mobilization capacity of Russian civil population today and what major aspects should be included when measuring it? The laws, propaganda trends, pro-government mobilizations, national identity, collective group behavior, all were taken into the consideration to answer the questions.

The thesis proposed and stayed with the definition of social movements that is based on a desire to make an institutional change in Russia. The definition narrowed down the scope of mobilizations to analyze, plus, additions (*filters*) were added to toss away some mobilizations like propaganda-driven ones, and include few extra that portrait the specifics and aspects of legal and cultural atmosphere in Russia. The additions were missed by the definition, but are valuable for the mobilization capacity analysis.

If the interpretations of the thesis are to be trusted, the quantitative analyses of the WCIOM data agreed with the proposed, supported by the theoretical framework, *filters'* statements.

Statistical analyses showed that:

- That there are significant tendencies to join protests if there are ones ongoing.
- If there is more interest in protest movements, then there are more people that are willing to engage in anti-government mobilizations
- That there is a positive correlation between religion and patriotism in Russia

- People in St. Petersburg are tend to associate themselves as Europeans more than the people in Moscow

Based on the quantitative and theoretical findings, thesis advises the improvement of the Individual and Group Mobilization capacities by incorporating supplementary survey variables into the indexes.

The qualitative analysis of the Interviews with notable Russian Rock musicians helped to describe the current mobilization situation in Russia, provided support for some theoretical findings of pro-government mobilizations, and confirmed to the hypothesis that Russian government is aware of the musician's potential to activate public and thus, control them in various ways.

Lastly, there is an encouragement and believe that the definition of social movements should be essential to any scholarly work that is situating itself in the sub-field.

## Appendix A

WHAT IS A POSSIBILITY OF A MASS PROTESTS AGAINST FALLING LIVING STANDARDS, UNJUST ACTIONS OF THE AUTHORITIES AND THEIR FAILURE TO PROTECT CIVIL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, IN OUR CITY / RURAL AREA?	IF IN OUR CITY / RURAL AREA A MASS PROTEST/DEMONSTRATION AGAINST FALLING LIVING STANDARDS, UNJUST ACTIONS OF THE AUTHORITIES AND THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO PROTECT CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS, WOULD BE HELD, WOULD YOU PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE IN THEM?											Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	uncertain	
1 Smallest possibility Count	470 84.50 %	24 4.30 %	15 2.70 %	4 0.70 %	15 2.70 %	1 0.20 %	2 0.40 %	4 0.70 %	3 0.50 %	10 1.80 %	8 1.40 %	556 100.00 %
2 Count	99 60.70 %	46 28.20 %	8 4.90 %	3 1.80 %	0 0.00 %	1 0.60 %	0 0.00 %	2 1.20 %	1 0.60 %	1 0.60 %	2 1.20 %	163 100.00 %
3 Count	136 57.90 %	31 13.20 %	30 12.80 %	9 3.80 %	6 2.60 %	7 3.00 %	1 0.40 %	5 2.10 %	2 0.90 %	3 1.30 %	5 2.10 %	235 100.00 %
4 Count	58 41.40 %	33 23.60 %	8 5.70 %	17 12.10 %	14 10.00 %	2 1.40 %	3 2.10 %	2 1.40 %	0 0.00 %	1 0.70 %	2 1.40 %	140 100.00 %
5 Count	72 45.60 %	17 10.80 %	9 5.70 %	6 3.80 %	26 16.50 %	2 1.30 %	5 3.20 %	2 1.30 %	2 1.30 %	9 5.70 %	8 5.10 %	158 100.00 %
6 Count	41 43.60 %	14 14.90 %	4 4.30 %	4 4.30 %	12 12.80 %	12 12.80 %	2 2.10 %	2 2.10 %	0 0.00 %	0 0.00 %	3 3.20 %	94 100.00 %
7 Count	28 44.40 %	3 4.80 %	6 9.50 %	7 11.10 %	7 11.10 %	1 1.60 %	5 7.90 %	0 0.00 %	2 3.20 %	3 4.80 %	1 1.60 %	63 100.00 %
8 Count	17 37.80 %	5 11.10 %	0 0.00 %	0 0.00 %	7 15.60 %	2 4.40 %	1 2.20 %	8 17.80 %	2 4.40 %	1 2.20 %	2 4.40 %	45 100.00 %
9 Count	11 36.70 %	6 20.00 %	1 3.30 %	0 0.00 %	2 6.70 %	1 3.30 %	0 0.00 %	2 6.70 %	4 13.30 %	3 10.00 %	0 0.00 %	30 100.00 %
10 highest possibility Count	9 28.10 %	2 6.30 %	0 0.00 %	2 6.30 %	0 0.00 %	1 3.10 %	4 12.50 %	0 0.00 %	3 9.40 %	10 31.30 %	1 3.10 %	32 100.00 %
Uncertain Count	50 54.30 %	3 3.30 %	3 3.30 %	2 2.20 %	1 1.10 %	1 1.10 %	1 1.10 %	0 0.00 %	0 0.00 %	2 2.20 %	29 31.50 %	92 100.00 %
Total Count	991 61.60 %	184 11.40 %	84 5.20 %	54 3.40 %	90 5.60 %	31 1.90 %	24 1.50 %	27 1.70 %	19 1.20 %	43 2.70 %	61 3.80 %	1608 100.00 %

Table 4. Crosstabulation of WCIOM surveys behind Individual and Group Mobilization Capacities

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### **Interviews**

Aleksey Kortnev, semi-structured interview, June 8, 2015

Mikhail Novitskiy, semi- structured interview, May 14, 2015

Yuriy Shevchuk, semi-structured interview, May 28, 2015