Collusion between Enemies in Civil Wars: Why it Occurs and How it Contributes to Conflict Resolution

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Abstract

Why do warring parties in civil wars engage in collusion involving mutual dependence and intertwined structures with their enemies, if these cannot provide credible commitments that they will not defect? An analysis of factors affecting the occurrence of collusion suggests that credible threats of retaliation can substitute credible commitments, and previous experience with the elements of the collusive operation can help reduce costs of defection, thus reducing the risks of becoming mutually dependent with an enemy. An absence of research on the consequences of collusion prompts the second question in this thesis: Does a once initiated cooperative dynamic between enemies perpetuate itself, leading to an increased likelihood of conflict resolution attempts? A dataset on collusion and conflict resolution was created, and crosstab analyses conducted. Results show that collusion makes conflict resolution attempts more likely, though these results are not generalizable. The implications of the thesis are that further research into cooperative dynamics between enemies could improve the understanding of processes during civil wars, and that mediators in armed conflict could target their efforts towards parties and individuals previously engaged in collusion for improved success rates.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Puzzle and first aim of the research

Sri Lanka, an island of 20 million located at the southern tip of the Indian subcontinent, witnessed three civil wars between 1983 and 2009, with the ethnically Tamil armed militia "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (LTTE) fighting for secession from the ethnically Sinhalese Sri Lankan state. Following the departure of Indian peacekeeping forces in 1990, the LTTE for the first time found itself in control of large amounts of territory in the North and East of Sri Lanka, a region with a majority Tamil population. Taking over from the Indian peacekeepers, the LTTE was confronted by a significant challenge. It needed to establish military and administrative control over sweeping swaths of territory, and provide public services to a large population. With its ambitions of secession and the expectations of a Tamil population accustomed to substantial levels of public services, the LTTE was left with no other choice than to assume responsibility. Rather than shouldering the load of setting up a system of civilian administration by themselves, however, the LTTE paired with its enemy, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), to set up a hybrid governance system – i.e. a bureaucratic administration consisting of both GoSL and LTTE institutions and personnel. Between 1990 and 2002, a period in which the LTTE fought two civil wars with the GoSL, in which massacres were committed by both sides and many thousand soldiers and civilians died violent deaths, the same two warring parties worked together to set up joint governance institutions in disputed territory, cooperating to provide Tamil citizens with government services (Mampilly, 2009, p. 310).

Cooperation between enemies is a phenomenon that is far from limited to only the Sri Lankan Civil War. The national Myanmar military *(tatmadaw)* and rebellious ethnic armed militias established formalized sovereignty sharing mechanisms over Myanmar territory (Smith, 1991; Staniland, 2012). Further, the *tatmadaw* colluded with rebel leaders in opium and

timber production and export (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2003, pp. 11–12). In the Sierra Leone Civil War, the two warring parties, the Revolutionary United Front rebels and the National Provisional Ruling Council-led national army, jointly extorted and slaughtered the civilian population, mined and smuggled diamonds, and trafficked and exchanged arms (Gberie, 2007, p. 66; Keen, 2000, pp. 35–36, 2005, pp. 107–131). In the Angolan Civil War similarly, the rebel movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and elements of the national military colluded in diamond mining and smuggling ("Angola - Diamonds, no way to stifle UNITA," 1998; Keen, 2000, p. 57). Similar acts of cooperation between warring parties have been reported between the *mujahedeen* and Afghan security forces during the Anti-Soviet War (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1982), in the Afghan Civil War between 1989 and 1996, and since US-American invasion of 2001 (Dorronsoro, 2005; Staniland, 2012, p. 249), in the violent political conflicts of Karachi, Pakistan (Gayer, 2014), in the Yugoslav Wars, particularly the Bosnian War (see Appendix 1), and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before 1996 (idem). Cooperation between enemies has thus occurred in the contexts of civil wars and internationalized civil wars, and involved countries from Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

What is remarkable about these cases is not merely that parties at war with each other are ready to engage in action that also benefits their enemies, but that this action should rely on active coordination and be marked by mutual dependence. This goes so far that some acts of cooperation even consist of joint missions, with soldiers and personnel operating in intertwined structures, sharing arms, equipment and facilities (Idler, 2012, p. 68ff; Keen, 2005, pp. 107–132; Staniland, 2012, p. 249, 2015, p. 12). It is puzzling that warring parties engage in action that makes them dependent on their very enemies. What is puzzling about this is that these enemies are inherently unreliable. In the anarchy of civil war, no powerful and interested third-party guarantor or mechanism of mutual control is available for making a

commitment by a warring party reliable. This lack of reliability leads to a trust gap: No trust is possible given a lack of reliability of commitments, yet warring parties still engage in closely coordinated cooperative activities entailing mutual dependence that would require trust. Why do warring parties then engage in such mutual dependence if their enemies are unreliable? How can this frequent and wide-spread phenomenon be explained?

This mutually dependent type of cooperation is called "collusion" in the literature, and is to be distinguished from another type of cooperation called "restraint" (Kanet & Kolodziej, 1991; Legro, 1995; Staniland, 2012). Collusion, drawing on definitions by Kanet & Kolodziej (1991) and Staniland (2012), denotes enemy warring parties engaging in actively coordinated and mutually dependent joint action towards a shared objective, typically with mutual, if not equal benefit. The other type of cooperation, restraint, denotes enemies keeping violence below a maximum threshold, not using specific arms such as chemical weapons, or not attacking certain positions, all in order to avoid an escalation of violence. While under collusion, enemies cooperate to gain a mutual advantage, enemies under restraint cooperate to avoid a mutual disadvantage. The significant difference between the two manifestations of cooperation, however, is the degree of active coordination that collusion requires and the mutually dependent and integrated operation it represents, as compared to cases of restraint. It is thus the cooperation of collusion that is at the root of this puzzle.

The first aim of this thesis is to develop the concept of collusion and resolve the puzzle. Resolving the puzzle sheds light on the factors affecting the occurrence of collusion, explaining why it occurs. In order to do this, I in the following examine the assumptions underlying the puzzle.

The puzzle rests on four assumptions. The first assumption is that warring parties are rational, meaning that they want to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs. The second assumption underlying the puzzle is that enemies in civil war do not trust each other. If

enemies did trust each other it would not be surprising that they engaged in collusion. The third is that collusive partners (i.e. enemies that are engaging in collusion) always benefit from cheating each other, making the breaking of commitments a likely scenario. If there were no such incentives for cheating or defection, it would not matter whether partners are reliable or not, as their untrustworthiness would not come into play. The fourth assumption is that parties have no capacity of control over whether their collusive partners defect or not, or mitigation capacities regarding the costs that being cheated would cause them. If they had such control over defection or mitigation capacities regarding its costs, then the reliability of a partner would again become irrelevant, as the partners' defection would not be cost-inducing.

As I show in more detail in chapter 3, in which I specify factors that affect collusion, the puzzle can be resolved by showing that some of the assumptions are not always valid. I do not challenge the first assumption that warring parties want to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs. The second assumption, however, that enemy warring parties in civil wars do not trust each other, does not hold for all cases, as shown by Staniland (2015) and Idler (2012). Warring parties with corresponding ideologies and previous positive encounters can be trustful towards each other, despite the fact that they are at war. Cases where there is trust between warring parties are not "puzzling" – if warring parties trust one another, it is after all not surprising that they would allow themselves to become mutually dependent in an operation. Such cases in which the trust assumption is invalidated are thus simply not within the scope of the puzzle. The third assumption, that there are always incentives for defection, also does not hold for all cases. This is because incentives to defect can be reduced if the collusive partner that is under the threat of being cheated offers a credible threat of retaliation for such an act. A credible threat of retaliation would thus be a substitute for trust or for credible commitment. The fourth assumption also does not always hold: Parties, depending on their expertise with the territory, its population, the type of collusive activity and the

collusive partner, might have different skills at reacting and mitigating the costs of defection. If parties are able to mitigate such costs, it is not puzzling that the threat of defection is no hindrance for collusion.

In conclusion, the puzzle of warring parties in civil wars engaging in operations in which they are dependent on enemies whom they do not trust and who can offer no credible commitments is resolved because credible threats of retaliation and cost-mitigation skills can bridge the otherwise present trust gap. Consequently, it becomes understandable why cooperation between warring parties in civil wars can be established despite an absence of trust or credible commitments.

1.2. Research question and second aim of the thesis

Now that we have seen that cooperative interactions marked by mutual dependence can arise in situations of mistrust and anarchy, could this cooperation, when successful, lead to an increase in trust between parties? Is it possible that this cooperation lead to even more cooperative interactions? In short, could it be that the pattern of cooperation arising from a context of mistrust extend itself into the future, leading to cooperation being further perpetuated by increasing levels of trust?

There is evidence that suggests that this might be the case, and that a once-established cooperative dynamic extends itself to the future. Evidence from the institutional level (understanding a warring party as an institution) suggests that the high degree of coordination necessary for collusion, and its oft extended duration, offer fertile ground for so-called "institutional routines" of cooperation to develop. By institutional routine, I refer to recurrent interaction patterns that cause a productive balance between divergent intra-institutional interests, cognitive short-cuts, and reduced uncertainty, all working towards perpetuating a routine – in this case, cooperation with the enemy (Becker, 2004; Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009). Evidence from the individual level suggests that collaborative action towards a

mutual goal during collusion could lead to the formation of a bond, or a shared identity, between the individual actors involved, as specified by the contact hypothesis of the Common In-group Identity Model (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994). Both of these processes could lead to a perpetuation of the cooperative dynamic between the warring parties beyond the collusive agreement. Finally, empirical evidence from the Sri Lankan Civil War and the Myanmar civil wars lend support to such a hypothesis. In the Sri Lankan Civil War, the joint governance institutions set up by the insurgent LTTE and the GoSL phased out as the 2002 peace process set in, the most significant conflict resolution attempt up to that point. In Myanmar, deals offering the leaders of armed ethnic militias lucrative business deals in opium and timber production and export in return for ceasefires in 1988 deepened into a *de facto* integration of rebel and government structures (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2003). These pieces of evidence give reason to assume that collusion between warring parties could lead to a perpetuation of its cooperative dynamic.

The resulting research question then is: Do collusive operations that are perceived as successful by a pair of enemy collusive partners increase the likelihood of further cooperative interaction between them? This cooperative interaction could take a number of forms, such as renewed collusion, reductions in violence, the establishment of communication channels which prevent an inadvertent escalation of violence or increase the likelihood of peace talks. This question does not preclude that collusion might indeed turn out badly, with defection or another type of collapse even possibly increasing the violence between the enemies. Such a negative outcome is simply not the focus of the research, however.

The second aim of this thesis is hence to investigate the hypothesis that successful collusion between a pair of enemy warring parties in civil wars increases the likelihood that they will engage in peace talks. The investigation consists of a quantitative study of the relationship of collusion and peace talks in civil wars, the methodology of which is presented in chapter 5.

For the purpose of the analysis, an own dataset was developed. Collusion was measured via AFP and Reuters news reports of cooperative activities between enemies in active civil war, while any type of negotiations on reducing violence or ending the war, collected from a number of databases and academic literature, were counted as peace talks. Cases included are all civil wars in the Levant region from 1979 to 2011, the Gulf region from 1979 to 1999, Central Asia from 1989 to 1999 and the Balkans from 1989 to 2003. The results, as presented in chapter 6, indicate that collusion indeed leads to an increased occurrence of peace talks.

1.3. Overview of existing literature

This thesis covers a heretofore uninvestigated research question, as existing research has not investigated the consequences collusion might have going forward, but only the processes shaping its occurrence and its outcome. Viewed on a temporal continuum, the findings of existing literature concern the time period leading up to collusion, and the period during its occurrence. No research within the extensive scope of literature reviewed for this thesis has focused on the consequences that collusion might have, or the processes it might trigger and effects it might unleash.

A very brief synthesis of existing research on collusion helps to illustrate this point. Research on the reasons why collusion occurs shows that collusion potentially involves high economic or military benefits, for example through profit maximization by specialization or through a spreading of associated risk (Idler, 2012; Staniland, 2012), and that warring parties are strongly driven by rational assessments and decision-making when deciding on collusion (Christia, 2012; Staniland, 2015). While collusion can be highly beneficial for the parties involved, research shows that the commitment problem inherent in civil wars makes collusion a risky venture (Christia, 2012; Idler, 2012). Even parties to successful collusive agreements face risks, such as for example states and militias upon colluding, where states face the risk of letting militias become too powerful, while militias can become co-opted into a patronage

system run by the state (Staniland, 2015). A literature review in chapter 2 presents all of these findings in detail.

None of the findings relate to the consequences that collusion might have going forward. Given the fact that there is ample evidence indicating that successful collusion might in fact affect the dynamic of the relationships between enemies, this seems a relevant gap to fill. This holds especially true given that the effect indicated, a perpetuation of a cooperative dynamic between enemies, is one that might fundamentally alter the dynamic of a civil war.

1.4. Research outline

In the following chapter, I offer a review of literature on collusion. The chapter provides the reader with an overview of all research that has contributed to the current state of knowledge on collusion. Its goal is to introduce factors that explain the occurrence of collusion, and which thus also contribute a basis for understanding how consequences of collusion can arise.

Chapter 3 presents factors that affect the decision-making processes of warring party leaders on whether to engage in an opportunity for collusion. The presented factors are drawn from the findings of research presented in the literature review chapter. The presented factors are then linked to the assumptions of the puzzle, outlining the challenges to the assumptions in more detail than was possible in the introduction. By showing how cooperation can develop between parties that lack trust or credible commitments, the factors outline the procedures beneath the initiation of a cooperative dynamic that leads all the way from armed violence to peace talks. Chapters 2 and 3 seek to fulfill the first aim of the thesis, to resolve the puzzle and by doing so explain why collusion occurs.

Chapter 4 presents the full theoretic development of the hypothesis, stating that successful collusion increases the likelihood of further cooperative interactions. The chapter fleshes out all the available theoretical and empirical evidence that was mentioned in the above section

that sketched the development of the research question. In the chapter, I also state that the perpetuation of cooperation between enemies in civil wars is not treated as a necessarily normatively positive outcome, given the possibilities that civilians might suffer under its consequences.

Next, in chapter 5, the methodology of the empirical investigation of the hypothesis is presented. Thus, the remaining chapters starting with chapter 5 focus on the second aim of the thesis, investigating the consequences of collusion. Here, only one possible consequence, an increase in the occurrence of peace talks, is investigated. The chapter *inter alia* outlines the operationalization of the concept of "perpetuation of cooperative dynamic" as the occurrence of peace talks, the selection of other variables for testing their interactions with both collusion and peace talk occurrence, the data collection efforts and the choice of statistical methodology.

The sixth chapter presents the results, showing that cases that experience collusion indeed are more likely to witness peace talks – and that this relationship is as strong as is the relationship between peace talks and other established predictors of peace talks. A second finding presented is that collusion seems to moderate the relationship between the established predictors and peace talks, lending support to the notion that collusion facilitates the initiation of peace talks once warring parties have an interest in them. A final chapter closes the thesis with a conclusion.

2. Literature review

This chapter presents a review of existing literature on collusion. The chapter synthesizes all available research with contributions towards the state of knowledge on collusion. Its goal is to introduce factors that explain the occurrence of collusion, which will be drawn on in an explicit development of these factors in the next chapter. By showing how collusion develops in a scenario of mistrust, the introduction of these explanatory factors contributes to explaining the consequences of collusion, which will be discussed in chapters 4 to 6.

Contributions to the state of knowledge on collusion come from cooperation theory research in game theory, from research on alliance formation in civil wars, and from research on political orders during civil wars. The literature review is structured by the field of research the presented studies pertain to. The first field presented is research on wartime political orders, which classifies collusion between enemies in civil wars as being a type of wartime political order (Staniland, 2012). The review begins with a presentation of this research field because wartime political orders are what collusion can be best classified as. Collusion can also be classified as a form of alliance formation during civil war, which is why literature on alliance formation follows second. Third, results from modeling of cooperation in game theory are introduced.

2.1. Political orders during civil wars

The only relevant study looking at collusion in the context of political orders, i.e. "interactions […] that construct political authority and control" (Staniland, 2012, p. 243), is a 2012 journal article by Paul Staniland. Based on his field research and empirical knowledge of South Asia, he creates a typology of wartime political orders arising out of the interaction between armed group and state forces in civil wars. In Staniland's view, research as well as policy has been informed by the implicit assumption that only a strong centralized state can lead to lasting stability and peace. What this often ignores, however, is the cost associated

with such an approach: A statist monopoly on violence has to be enforced violently, triggering violent counter-reactions from armed groups. Civilians on the periphery of states also often do not welcome centralized state control. The assumption that only a centralized state can offer a solution to instability can therefore perpetuate violence rather than end it. Rather than following such a blunt assumption, scholars and political actors should take a more differentiated look at political orders during wartime. Such a view should take into account at least two factors, namely the dichotomous distribution of territorial control (clearly delineated borders vs. overlapping or fragmented spheres of influence), and the three degrees of cooperation between the warring parties (non existing state-insurgent cooperation, restraint to avoid an escalation of violence, and active cooperation). Out of these two factors arises Staniland's hexagonal typology.

Under the first of the three degrees of cooperation falls non existing state-insurgent cooperation. Here, political order is constituted either by clashing monopolies (given clearly demarcated borders), the first of the six categories of the typology, or guerilla disorder (given fragmented areas of control), the second. Under the second degree of cooperation falls restraint, which includes categories three and four of the typology. Here, each party either respects the others' sphere of influence, or both parties tacitly coexist in overlapping territory. Under the third degree of cooperation, named active cooperation, fall the fifth category of "shared sovereignty", given clearly delineated territorial control, and the sixth category, "collusion", under fragmented territorial control. It is the last two categories, under active cooperation, that are relevant for this thesis. Shared sovereignty, the fifth category, entails negotiated coexistence between armed groups and the state, a state which is marked by autonomous armed groups, a balance of power with neither side dominating the other, while both achieving mutually beneficial outcomes. Collusion, the sixth category, for Staniland means "the coordinated pursuit of a shared goal" (249) between state and armed group forces,

with an entwining of non-state armed group and state operations, often in the form of so-called shadow states: Armed groups and state forces share facilities, arms and equipment, as the clear boundaries between the two sides are diluted. Staniland thus also differentiates between restraint and collusion as two distinct types, and intensities, of cooperation between warring parties. Staniland's collusion is a subtype of collusion as treated in this thesis. It denotes the same concept, but applies it only to the relationships between states and insurgents. Notably, the author details the benefits of collusion for both parties: "States provide logistics and protection, while insurgents offer intelligence and deniability" (249).

2.2. Alliance formation

The following section presents three studies on alliance formation in civil wars: Fotini Christia's book "Alliance Formation in Civil Wars" (2012), investigating alliance formation in Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Annette Idler's study on drug cartels in Colombia (2012), and Paul Staniland's typology of state-militia relations based on a comparison of militia politics in India and Pakistan (2015). Again, these studies do not contribute to the research question, but to a presentation of the state of knowledge on collusion. Christia, though looking at alliance formation and not collusion, contributes insights into the decision-making processes of warring parties on establishing cooperative relationships. Though the groups investigated by Idler are not always engaged in violent combat, her research nevertheless contributes information on collusive practices between armed groups, and their reasons for engaging in such ventures. Staniland contributes factors from states' decision-making processes on engaging in collusion with armed groups.

According to Christia (2012), there are two competing theoretic explanations for alliance formation in civil war. The first theory explaining alliances in civil wars centers on the role of shared identities between warring parties. The second explains alliance formation by concerns of armed groups and their factions with a good position within the overall power balance of a

theatre of war. Christia's argument about alliance formation in civil wars is that leaders of armed groups make tactical choices based on their group's relative power both within and between alliances. Their goal is to be the stronger party in a willing coalition. Both being in a losing coalition, and being the weaker party in a winning coalition is to be avoided. The first, because the goal is to emerge victorious from a conflict, the second, because commitment problems make it possible that a stronger party might cheat a weaker party out of the spoils of war following victory. Alliance formation is thus explained by strategic, rational choices of leaders. Armed conflicts in which warring parties have similar levels of power will consequently witness more changes in alliance structures than conflicts with stronger differences in the level of power of warring parties. Christia operationalizes "power" as the demographic size and territorial control of a warring party.

The author's findings show that commitment remains highly problematic not only in collusion with enemies, but even in the more institutionalized cooperative structures of alliances between warring parties. Trust does not grow to a sufficient level to provide a guarantee to a warring party that it will not be exploited by a stronger alliance partner after victory. In the anarchy of war, no one is sufficiently reliable, not even an ally.

Annette Idler (2012) investigates the relationship between various Colombian armed groups, most prominently drug producing and trafficking cartels. She develops a typology to describe types of arrangements between non-state armed groups in armed conflict or otherwise. The typology is constituted by two continuous variables, trust and temporal durability. Trust between armed groups is viewed as a precondition for the deeper integration of operations between groups. It can however be replaced by hegemony, understood as the advantage of power of one organization over another, since hegemonic organizations can force weaker ones to comply, without needing to fear defection. Temporal durability refers to the duration of an agreement. Agreements are clustered along a line of both increasing trust (and thus

lower requirement for hegemonic control), and increasing duration. The first three categories of the typology are short-term agreements, while the last three are long-term agreements.

The absence of any cooperative arrangement between warring parties often, though not always, leads to the base "stage" of the typology, violent combat. The first level of cooperative agreement are spot sales and barter agreements, i.e. on the spot exchanges of goods for money, or barter exchanges such as swapping arms for drugs. The required level of trust is low, as is the temporal scope and institutionalization of the agreement. The next level is that of a tactical alliance, i.e. a short-term partnership for a specific operation, such as using the same smuggling route. A third level of trust and durability is a subcontract relationship, in which a group pays another group to perform a certain function for them. This is the last of the three short-term arrangements, now followed by three long-term agreements. The fourth level of cooperation is the transactional supply chain relationship, in which each group involved in a cooperative network controls one stage of drug production and trafficking, working together along the supply chain. This requires a high degree of cooperation, and due to production cycles alone tends to have a longer durability. Groups benefit from such an arrangement first as each group can specialize in its part of the chain, and second because individual groups are less exposed as risk is spread between them. These types of transactional supply chain relationships rely on brokers, individuals who have contacts in different groups and can facilitate such high-risk agreements between a number of non-state armed groups. The fifth level of cooperation envisioned in Idler's typology are strategic alliances between groups. With a high degree of institutionalization, such alliances witness the sharing of intelligence, revenue, and even expenses, as well as pacts to jointly attack common enemies. The final level of arrangement is pacific coexistence, with groups sharing territory but neither group encroaching on another's business. It is the final level for being the most durable, and requiring the highest degree of trust.

Idler outlines several factors driving armed group leaders' choices to engage in cooperative agreements. The most generic factor that drove armed group leaders in the Colombian borderlands to engage in cooperative arrangements was the derived economic benefit, for example in maximizing comparative advantages in transactional supply chain relationships. Other factors are the level of trust with the potential cooperative partner, the local context, ideological closeness, the role of the third parties and the state, and the organizational structure of the group. The level of trust determines whether a group is sufficiently trustworthy for one of the "deeper" cooperative arrangements – replaceable by coercion however, as we have seen. Having a local stronghold gives a group the intelligence and the certainty to know "how to do business", leading to longer-term arrangements. Ideological closeness was found to make long-term arrangements more likely, as it positively affects the trust that groups develop. Third parties can negatively affect the durability of an agreement, as Idler found that an alliance of a cooperation partner with an enemy of the group lead to the end of cooperative agreements. A stronger state presence lead to less violence, thus making a "violent action"-type relationship less likely. Finally, a more strongly centralized command structure within a group will make more long-lasting arrangements possible, given that it supports the stronger institutionalization and stability of an arrangement.

Paul Staniland (2015) presents a typology of state strategies *vis-à-vis* armed groups, based on case studies of the India and Pakistani state's policies towards armed groups. Then, he develops factors, equally based on his case studies, that predict which strategy a government will deploy. In the following, I treat the terms "state" and "government" in the same undifferentiating conceptualization of Staniland. The typology with which he attempts to encapsulate state-armed group relations is structured by two dimensions. The first is whether the government wishes to eliminate a given armed group, and the second is the degree of conflictivity vs. cooperativity of its strategy. According to Staniland, governments have a

choice of two strategies regarding armed groups they wish to destroy. The first is to attack the armed group outright. The second strategy is to contain the group, i.e. to attack it only whenever it's activities surpass a certain level of violence and thus political salience, but not to engage with it otherwise. The latter of these two strategies is considered the more cooperative. For groups that the government does not wish to eliminate, it equally faces two strategies. The first, and less cooperative one, is its integration or absorption into the state's security services and/or its political system. The second, more cooperative strategy, is collusion between state and armed group. Collusion is defined as "a strategy of active, sustained cooperation between a state and an organized armed actor" (3), which "broadly hinges on mutual policy adjustments between a state and armed group in force deployment and targeting" (4). Staniland's (2015) use of collusion however includes not only "collusion" as used in this thesis, but also includes "restraint" as defined in section 1.1.. It is thus akin to this thesis' use of cooperation. Additionally, Staniland's (2015) collusion explicitly also includes cooperation between the state and non-insurgent armed militias, i.e. armed groups that are not actively engaged in violence against the state, as compared to this thesis.

The factors Staniland identifies in Pakistan and India to have determined the government's response towards armed groups were first the armed group's ideological compatibility with the government, and second the operational utility of the armed group. Ideologically fitting and operationally valuable armed groups are targeted for collusion, while ideologically fitting but operationally useless groups are incorporated into state structures. Groups with no particular ideological fit or misfit are colluded with if operationally valuable, and contained if operationally useless. Groups with opposing ideologies can still however become "strange bedfellows" if operationally valuable: They are often responded to with a fragile and oftentimes short-lived "thin" collusion. If they are operationally not valuable and ideologically unsavory, armed groups are targeted for suppression.

Staniland's research shows that a state's decision of engaging in collusion, even with antagonistic armed groups, is highly strategic and benefit-maximizing. He also shows that shared ideology can create a relationship of something akin to trust, even with groups that are antagonistic in principle.

2.3. Game theory

In the following section, two works on cooperative game theory are presented briefly, Thomas Schelling's "The Strategy of Conflict" (1981) and Robert Axelrod & Robert Keohane's "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions" (1985). These works do not of course empirically investigate cooperation between warring parties. They do however offer valuable theory on the processes of cooperation, and thus the factors affecting decisions to engage in collusion or defect from it. This theory can then be applied to a large number of empiric scenarios, among them collusion, after testing its transposability. These two studies are heavily drawn on in the next chapter which outlines factors affecting collusion and defection.

Thomas Schelling, in his book "The Strategy of Conflict", strips away much of the formalized aspects of game theory, replacing them by humanized, real-world illustration (Kecskemeti, 1960; Myerson, 2009). He shows that most situations of conflict are in fact bargaining scenarios. Rather than being zero-sum games, however, with each party in total antagonism, parties in conflict frequently have a mixed relationship of mutual dependence and mutual antagonism. This mutual dependence occurs whenever players can avoid outcomes that are detrimental to both, and achieve others instead that are relatively better for each. This mixture opens doors to a strategy which the author illustrates and expands in numerous examples throughout the book. A player can set up a scenario in which a response to a certain undesired action by the other player is pre-determined and outside of its control, triggering the worst outcome for both players. Nuclear deterrence, to Schelling, works according to such a

principle: A nuclear war would be the worst outcome for both players, and the automaticity of nuclear retaliation credibly convinces the player who attacks first that any attack would automatically incur its own destruction. Thus, by giving certain options out of its hands, a player can gain leverage in a conflict situation. In all scenarios in which there is such a mutually dependent constellation, players, if successful at instituting powerlessness given certain actions of the other player, can exert leverage over the other player to act in a certain way. By thus introducing the concept of cooperation to game theory, Schelling extended its purely antagonistic zero-sum analyses introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (Kecskemeti, 1960).

Axelrod & Keohane, in their 1985 article on cooperation between states under the anarchy of the international system, apply factors game theory developed to predict cooperation to a number of cases of economic and military cooperation between states. The three investigated factors are payoff structures, the "shadow of the future", i.e. game iteration and future payoffs, and the ability to sanction defection. The logic of the first factor is fairly simple: The more payoff structures are perceived to create incentives for cooperation over defection, the more likely cooperation will be to arise and to persist. For the second factor, a higher number of game iterations and higher potential future payoffs create incentives to engage and remain committed to cooperation. Elements that play a role in this context are the players perception of long time horizons, the regularity of stakes and the reliability with which information about others' actions are received. The third factor, the ability to sanction, reduces the risk of the other players defecting. Important elements are the ability to identify defections, the ability to target sanctions towards defectors, and the existence of incentives to impose sanctions. The scenarios where these factors are expected to play out in are mixed mutually dependent though conflicting non-zero sum games, clearly drawing on Schelling.

3. Factors affecting decision-making on engaging in an opportunity for collusion

In the following chapter, factors on the decision-making of high- or low-level warring party leaders to *engage* in an opportunity of collusion are presented. These factors are drawn from the findings of empirical research and the postulations of game theory, as presented in the literature review chapter. None of the literature makes statements directly on the context of collusion between enemies in civil wars, but instead on related but different contexts, such as cooperation between antagonistic actors in general or the relations between armed groups in civil wars or failed states. Also, many of the factors presented are drawn from game theory, where they are not investigated empirically at all. Henceforth, each finding or postulation from the literature needs to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, to assess whether it is applicable to the context of collusion between enemies in armed conflict. Given that existing research only covers adjacent fields, each application has to be made on currently untested though informed assumptions about processes within and between warring parties during collusion. Not all, but some of the findings are found to be applicable to the context of collusion. Decisions on in- or exclusion of relevant findings are discussed individually.

In the following, "warring party leaders", or "leaders" are used as a short form for high- and low-level warring party leaders. The factors outlined say nothing about the emergence of opportunities of collusion, or about the factors that determine how and when opportunities for collusion might arise. Instead, they relate only to the decision-making of leaders when they are already faced with an existing opportunity of collusion, and assume that the necessary other warring party or warring parties are already committed.

This synthesis derives four factors shaping choices for or against collusion from the literature, each of which is subdivided into several elements. The four factors can be separated into two groups: The first factor focuses on predictable costs and benefits of collusion, while the latter

three focus on mitigating the commitment problem inherent in any joint endeavor with one's enemy during armed conflict.

In the introduction, I referred the reader to this section for a more detailed presentation of my analysis of the assumptions underlying the puzzle. At the end of each of the four factors, I therefore link the description of the factor to my arguments on the assumptions of the puzzle. In order for the reader to be able to follow these explanations, let me briefly rehash the argument presented in the introduction. It is surprising at first glance that warring parties should engage in collusion with their enemies, when such activities rely on mutual dependence, yet the enemy is untrustworthy for its impossibility to offer credible commitments in contexts of civil wars. Challenging this puzzle's four assumptions, that parties are rational, do not trust each other, always benefit from defection, and have no capacities to mitigate costs from the other party's defection, resolves the puzzle and shows that there are alternatives to trust for establishing cooperation based on mutual dependence in the context of anarchic civil wars.

3.1. First factor: Cost-benefit analysis

The first factor, cost-benefit analysis, consists of a calculus of the total payoff that would be derived from collusion, subtracting the total costs from the total benefit. The reasons for not challenging the first assumption of the puzzle, that warring parties are rational, is substantiated by arguments offered in this first factor on cost-benefit analysis. Both Schelling (1981) and Axelrod & Keohane (1985) place this cost-benefit calculus at the core of their predictions on the factors determining cooperation. This basic assessment of the advantages of the strategic interaction of collusion is expected to play a similarly important role in the general calculus behind engaging in collusion, as in the modeling of cooperation at large in game theory – if warring party leaders act in a self-interested way, it is sensible to assume that deriving a payoff will be an important motivation for enemies to engage in collusive practice.

Also, Idler reports that the payoff derived from cooperation is central to its occurrence between armed actors in Colombia's borderlands. While it could be that possible payoffs from cooperation play a more important role for armed actors that are not fighting each other, such as in most of Idler's cases, it seems unlikely to assume that enemies in armed conflict should disregard completely any calculus on potential payoff from cooperation, only because their enemies would also be engaged in the operation. While they might still refrain from cooperation because of their enemies' engagement, it would be sensible to assume that even in such a decision-making process with such an outcome, a cost-benefit calculus would play a role.

Drawing on Axelrod & Keohane, elements that play a role in the cost-benefit analysis are both the size of costs and benefits, and the time horizon of costs and benefits. The time horizons of costs and benefits are of course dependent on the details of the collusive operation. More fundamentally, they depend on the expectations of both sides as to the stability of the current state of affairs in the conflict: For example, for how much longer does a party expect the current situation of territorial control in which the collusion takes place to hold? From these two variables, the size of costs and benefits, and the time horizons of costs and benefits, a total payoff arises, which is stipulated to be the first factor shaping decision-making on collusion between enemies in armed conflict.

These arguments substantiate the claim that warring parties do behave rationally in the sense of seeking a maximization of benefit and a minimization of costs. This therefore lends support to the first assumption underlying the puzzle, which claims that parties seek to maximize benefits and minimize costs.

3.2. Second factor: Control over defection

The second factor, control over defection, relates to aspects which enable a party to the collusive agreement to dissuade the other party from defecting, or to be alerted if it does.

Defection is any action that involves a breach of the agreement to the detriment of the other party. If collusion is economic, that is, if the payoff from the collusion are material goods that have economic value, then defection might entail the unilateral appropriation of the spoils. For example, if collusion consists of shared diamond mining and smuggling, defection might entail the diversion of a part of the diamonds and their subsequent sale without benefitting the other party. In military collusion, that is, the conducting joint military operations, defection could entail disrespecting the original military tactic to expose the collusive partner to greater harm than oneself.

Armed conflicts are "anarchic" in the sense that there is no world government, no unified political order with the power to arbitrate between parties in an armed conflict exists. Naturally, there are institutions that organize certain fields of interaction, much like local political orders develop during armed conflict which provide political structure (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). These do not however solve the issue of a lack of guaranteed enforcement of the collusive agreement. No guarantor is available, and no guarantees are possible that a partner in a collusive agreement will not run away with the spoils or double-cross one in an operation. This commitment problem is unresolvable, as such guarantees are unavailable. There is however a mechanism by which to alleviate the commitment problem: Deterrence through the credible threat of retaliation (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). Retaliation for defection can drive up the costs of defection, making this avenue less profitable, and its occurrence hence less likely. Whether retaliation is a credible threat in a given scenario is therefore likely to play an important role in the decision by a warring party leader on engaging in collusion.

The credibility of the threat of retaliation hinges on three prerequisites, which are drawn from Axelrod & Keohane's modeling of cooperation in the international system and applied to the context of this set of factors. The first of the three requirements of a credible retaliatory threat is the ability to identify defection, the second the ability to target retaliation directly at

defectors, and the third the existence of incentives to follow up on defection through retaliation.

The first requirement, the ability to identify defection, is central, as without any such ability defection would *a priori* prevent retaliation and thus costs for the perpetrator, making defection a rational choice for all involved warring parties. In such a hypothetical scenario, all warring parties would defect from the agreement, likely leading to a prompt collapse of collusion. As warring party leaders would likely be aware in advance of the possible consequences of an absence of control over defection, they would be less likely to engage in a collusive agreement with no possibility to identify defection. Viewing identifiability as a continuous rather than a categorical variable, a decrease in identifiability is hypothesized to reduce leaders' willingness to engage. In collusive agreements with more than two parties, a further difficulty arises by the difficulty to identify which of the warring parties defected. Thus, with a higher number of prospective participants, the ability to retaliate is reduced, thus also reducing the likelihood that a collusive operation is agreed to in the first place. An exception to this logic would be presented by clearly separated fields of responsibility in collusive networks, such as in the supply-chain networks of Colombian drug production. Here, given separate and clear fields of responsibility for each party, defection by a party might be detected more easily, together with the identity of the defecting party.

The second requirement affecting control over defection is the ability to target retaliation towards defectors. This requirement is only relevant for collusive agreements that have more than two parties to them. The logic underlying this requirement is simple: When retaliation cannot be targeted specifically towards defecting parties, i.e. when retaliating would harm other non-defecting warring parties together with the defector, parties have lower incentives to retaliate. This is because non-defecting parties that have been co-sanctioned might strike back against unilaterally conducted retaliation they are affected by and which they perceive as

unfair, while multilateral retaliation against a defecting warring party is unlikely to find any consensus if non-defecting warring parties have to bear the costs arising from retaliation.

The third requirement consists of the incentives to retaliate against a defecting group. Given that there is no institution that presides over a collusive agreement and is capable of responding to defection through institutionalized sanctions, warring parties themselves are responsible for sanctioning defection. With a higher number of warring parties, a collective action problem might appear which hinders the group of non-defecting warring parties to act together to retaliate against the defector – particularly in the context of being enemies in an armed conflict. Individual incentives for a warring party to retaliate against a defector depend on the cost of retaliation, and the number of warring parties involved in collusion. If retaliation is military, costs are shaped by the comparative military strength, and by the likelihood of escalation in response to the retaliation by the defector. When the incentive level of sanctioning is foreseeably low, warring party leaders will be less likely to engage in collusion, given that the costs of defection are lower, and its likelihood therefore higher.

All of these methods of deterring defection through creating a credible threat of retaliation were developed by game theoretic modeling for the context of international cooperation in the international system. They are included in this set of factors because they are also applicable to the context of collusion between enemies in armed conflict. Due to Axelrod & Keohane's theory's abstract formulation, it is transposable to both interstate wars and civil wars. Its concept and logic are applicable: Defection can occur during collusion as it carries benefits for the defector, parties will want to prevent the other party from defecting as it harms them, and a credible threat of retaliation can serve as deterrence from defection if severe enough compared to the benefits. The identifiability of defection, the targetability of the defector and the existence of incentives for retaliation must all be present to create a credible threat of defection in the context of collusion.

Next, one might argue that a further factor, the capacity to retaliate, should be included in the set. It is not necessary that a warring party have military superiority over a defector it wants to retaliate against, however, given that retaliation can take other forms than a direct military attack. Even unsophisticated military forces have relatively undemanding methods at their disposal, such as guerilla-type attacks, attacks using improvised explosive devices, or suicide attacks. It is not a question of having the capacity to retaliate, but a question of the existence of sufficient incentives to do so. If a weak warring party retaliating against a stronger defector would incur an escalation of violence the weak warring party would be unable to sustain, for example, it would likely not retaliate. The reason why it would not however retaliate is not because it would not have the means to do so, but because the incentives would not be strong enough due to the costs of retaliation. Retaliation in the context of collusion during armed conflict is therefore a question of incentives, and not capacities, even for retaliating parties that are comparatively weaker than the defector.

The second factor, control over defection, is strongly linked to the second set of factors presented under 3.2., which outlines the factors contributing to high- and low-level warring party leaders decision-making processes on whether to *defect* from the collusive agreement. It is thus a more detailed elaboration of this factor from the opposing perspective.

The possibility to increase trust by creating credible threats of commitment challenges the third assumption of the puzzle, which states that warring parties always have incentives to defect on each other. Given the threat of retaliation, this is no longer always the case, since retaliation reduces incentives to defect. The control this gives warring parties can replace trust.

3.3. Third factor: Inter-party relationship

The third factor, the inter-party relationship, covers all the variables that impact the quality of the relationship between parties. Three such variables derived from existing research are

applicable to this factor, namely trust levels, ideological proximity and the respective comparative coercive capacity between warring parties.

Idler reports trust between armed groups to increase the likelihood that they will engage in cooperative operations (2012). Idler's empirical analysis relies on a context in which warring parties are not necessarily fighting each other during cooperation, as mentioned above. Given that trust alleviates a commitment problem that is also, if not more, present in armed conflict in which the warring parties are actually fighting each other, it is sensible to assume that a higher degree of trust between enemies in armed conflict will increase the likelihood of collusion. Though enemies in an armed conflict will likely not have markedly high levels of trust, trust levels will *inter alia* differ in the extent to which their relationships are driven by hatred additionally to conflicts of interest, and in the degree to which the enemy is viewed as a potential partner, for being predictable, or even just personally acquainted.

As a second variable, Idler reports that ideological proximity between groups increased the prevalence of long-term cooperative agreements. She speculates that this has to do with an increase in trust due to being ideologically proximal. While parties with shared ideologies are less likely to be enemies in an armed conflict in the first place, ideological proximity can increase trust in anarchic environments.

Staniland (2015) and Idler both find that one party's capacity to coerce another to participate in cooperation increases the likelihood of collusion. For Idler, coercive capacity is able to replace the role of trust in facilitating collusion – a party can simply force another to participate, rather than needing trust to help overcome the lack of guarantees of commitment. While coercive capacity is a warring party-level feature, it is cited here as an aspect of inter-party relations given that a party's coercive capacity in a situation is dependent on its comparative coercive capacity to the to-be-coerced. Again, this factor is taken over from the contexts of Staniland's and Idler's research. The power of coercive capacity to pressure a

weaker party into cooperation is universal, there is no reason to believe that the threat of violence would not be able to coerce parties into collusion if they were enemies in an armed conflict, as compared to being a state and a non-insurgent armed group, or two competing but not actively fighting criminal cartels.

This third factor corresponds to the second assumption of the puzzle, which states that warring parties do not trust each other. This factor shows that this is not always the case, and that trust can be a part of warring parties relationship. Such cases are then simply not a part of the puzzle – when two warring parties trust each other, it is not surprising that they should collude, despite a lack of guarantees.

3.4. Fourth factor: Risk assessment and management capacity

The fourth factor contributing to warring party leader decision-making on engaging in collusion is the degree of experience with the region, the activities involved in collusion and the collusive partner. This factor draws on Idler's findings that armed groups are more likely to engage in deeper cooperation if they are acquainted with the region in which the cooperative relationship is established. When armed groups in Colombia are operating in territory they are not familiar with, they tend to engage only in superficial and short-term cooperative acts, like spot sales and barter agreements, or brief tactical alliances. Idler attributes this to the lack of experience with other armed groups operating in the territory, and their interrelations. Only when an armed group has sufficient knowledge of the situation within a certain territory does it engage in the risk of deeper cooperation. The cases of collusion in armed conflict investigated in this thesis may or may not witness such a multiplicity of groups as Idler found in Colombia, nor the consequent insecurity regarding the statuses of different groups, and their interrelations. This type of insecurity due to a lack of experience with the operative context can however be meaningfully applied to the present context: If armed groups have previous experience in the activity involved in the collusive

operation, the collusive partner, with the territory that the collusion operates in, as well as its inhabitants, they are better placed to assess the risks involved in collusion, and additionally better able to respond to them. A better risk assessment and management capacity in turn increases the likelihood of success of the operation. This expectation is postulated to increase the likelihood that warring party leaders will engage in collusion. Previous experience with the collusive partner is related but not equal to the element of trust of the inter-party relationship, captured in the third factor. Previous experience with another warring party can lead to an increased risk management capacity by knowing what the risks associated with a certain group's behavior are. While this knowledge could even decrease trust levels, a confident assessment of the risks associated with colluding with a certain group could theoretically compensate for the lower levels of trust. This example is not meant to say that such a strong compensatory effect is likely if trust levels are very low, but to show how risk assessment and management capacity on the one hand, and inter-party trust on the other are distinct if related concepts.

This factor corresponds to the fourth assumption, that parties have no way to mitigate the costs of defection by another party. When they are able to, as they are by being better placed to respond to such scenarios through previous experience, the risk of defection does not way so heavily. Thus, the commitment problem simply matter less for them, easing the puzzle.

In summary, this chapter outlines four factors that are hypothesized to influence the decision-making processes of warring party leaders on whether to engage in an opportunity for collusion. These four factors contribute to a resolution of the puzzle why warring parties engage in collusion which involves mutual dependence, when the enemies they collude with are unreliable and no credible commitments are possible. The resolution of this puzzle, as suggested by the factors of this chapter, is that trust or credible commitments can be replaced by a credible threat of retaliation as this lowers incentives for defection, and that the need for

trust or credible commitments can be reduced if the parties have risk- and cost-mitigation skills which lower the costs of defection once it occurs. The chapter also shows that some cases do not encounter this puzzle at all, as enemies can be connected by some level of trust. By resolving the puzzle and outlining explanatory factors, this thesis contributes to explaining why collusion occurs.

4. Hypothesis on the perpetuation of the cooperative dynamic between collusive partners

As shown in the literature review in chapter 2, studies on collusion have focused on the factors that facilitate the occurrence of collusion, and on factors that impact its duration and outcome. Viewed on a temporal continuum, then, these two sets of factors play out before collusion begins, and during its course. There is little research, however, that investigates the processes that might be triggered by collusion. This is not necessarily a trivial omission: Collusion, after all, requires a high degree of coordination and interaction between organizations in a highly volatile context, and these interactions are likely to have consequences on the individuals and the organizations that engage in them.

One of these possible consequences might be a perpetuation of the cooperative dynamic that undergirds collusion, given that warring parties interpret the outcome of the joint venture as being successful. What is considered successful would likely depend on the context. The height of the payoffs, and an absence of defection by the other party would however likely be two factors contributing to a positive assessment. There are several pieces of evidence, theoretical and empirical, that indicate that a perpetuation of cooperation might be a realistic outcome from successful collusion.

On an institutional level, the deep level of coordination necessary for collusion, and its oft extended duration, offer fertile ground for so-called organizational routines of cooperation to develop. By organizational routine, I refer to recurrent collective interaction patterns, i.e. patterns of behavior between individuals within organizations that are marked by repetition, stability, but also adaptability to changing circumstances (Becker, 2004). Research on the phenomenon of organizational routines stems from research conducted mostly in business firms, but also in government institutions from developed countries. Warring parties as organizations do not necessarily have the same features as the organizations which the

research on organizational routines was conducted in. Research on organizational routines stresses, however, not only the institutional, but also the cognitive basis of organizational routines. Since these cognitive processes are by definition near-universal (Eysenck & Keane, 2010), they should hold for members of warring parties as much as for members of a business company. While these changes to cognitive processes are individual-level, they only have an effect when put into relation with the other individuals' cognitive processes, as organizational routines are by definition dispersed throughout an organization. This is why this element of routines is also treated on an organization-level. Additionally to the argument that cognitive elements of routines are universally relevant, the findings on the institutional basis can still serve as indications of possible processes within the organizations of warring parties, even if untested in this new context.

Following Becker's overview of literature on organizational routines, routines offer a number of benefits that lead to their perpetuation within an organization. Through a systematization of procedures, they coordinate and control activities between different actors within an organization. Routines establish a self-perpetuating point of balance, called truce, between diverging inter-institutional interests. By providing standard operating procedures, routines economize on cognitive resources and improve time efficiency. Further, routines are an efficient way of storing knowledge, and of reducing uncertainty about best practices and about the activities of others within the same organization. Whenever a routine leads to positive outcomes, no efforts to replace the routine are made: This is either done in order to save resources, or because no search procedure is triggered for a lack of need for new routines. Routines can be remarkably stable due to their repetitiveness, and are context-specific. They do however have the capacity to be adopted to new contexts. This is due to the fact that they are necessarily incompletely specified upon establishment in order to maintain adaptability to new circumstances even within the original context of operation. Whenever

coordinative behavior of one warring party with a specific other party occurs over a prolonged period of time, meaning that it is repeated, it is possible that an organizational routine of cooperation with the specific other warring party becomes established. If collusion then has positive results, this cooperative organizational routine could persist, and be drawn upon in future, adapted to new contexts.

On an individual level, three consequences leading to a perpetuation of the cooperative dynamic are stipulated: The forming a shared identity through cooperative action, an increase in trust levels and cognitive changes in the perception of the enemy. The first possible consequence is derived from the contact hypothesis as employed in the framework of the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner et al., 1994). The contact hypothesis states that individuals who engage in cooperative problem solving with a common objective, with an equal status and in a process organized by mutually accepted norms, develop a limited common identity pertaining to the cooperative process. Through sharing this element of identity, members of one's out-group become a part of one's in-group for the scope of the cooperation, even if these individuals are not a part of the in-group the rest of the time (an in-group is a group of individuals one belongs to, while an out-group is a group distinct to one's in-group). Applied to collusion between warring parties, the contact hypothesis would predict that the individuals that are active in the joint operations, and the individuals who are the contact points of each party in coordinating collusion, would develop a shared identity through cooperative action. This shared identity is fairly stable given that identity elements form a part of individuals' self-images, and could be called on in the future to facilitate further cooperation. Applying the conditions the hypothesis formulates, this shared identity could only develop if parties joined voluntarily and not through coercion – given the requirement of an equal status and an agreement on the norms of interaction.

The second possible individual-level consequence of successful collusion is an increase in levels of trust towards the enemy warring party and the individuals pertaining to it (Idler, 2012; Staniland, 2015; Zaheer, Mcevily, Perrone, & Barney, 1998). If a collusive partner proved to adhere to a collusive agreement without defection, it might diminish fears that it might defect, when a leader of its former collusive partner considers engaging in further cooperation in the future. A reduced assessment of the risk of defection would increase the likelihood of further collusion. Even more generally, if a warring party proves its ability to adhere to agreements, it will likely be assessed as being more reliable – an important precondition for the perpetuation of any type of cooperative dynamic. Borrowing a distinction made by Zaheer et al. (1998), trust by an individual from a warring party towards another warring party should be conceptualized as consisting of trust towards single individuals within that other party, and trust towards the other warring party overall.

The third possible individual-level consequence of collusion might be a change to the mental representation of the enemy, from being viewed exclusively as a source of costs and suffering, to being seen a potential source of benefit. This change of representation could make deeper cooperative action, such as establishing joint political orders reducing or ending armed violence between the parties, more likely.

The developments following collusion in the Myanmar and the Sri Lankan civil wars lend some support to the hypothesis of perpetuated cooperation starting from successful collusion. In Myanmar, the military regime following its takeover in 1988 offered leaders of several armed ethnic armed groups of the country's decade-old armed conflict lucrative business deals in opium and timber production and export in return for ceasefire agreements. Out of these business deals patronage networks developed which tied the formed armed group leaders to the state in a "symbiotic" way (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2003; Jones, 2014, p. 10). Here, collusion between warring parties in armed conflict, though already marking the end of

violence, lead to a further increase and deepening of cooperation. In the Sri Lankan Civil War, the joint governance institutions set up by the insurgent LTTE and the GoSL phased out as the 2002 peace process set in, the most significant conflict resolution attempt up to that point. While proposing a relationship between the two events is speculative, the establishment and running of efficient joint governance institutions might have set up channels of communication and patterns of cooperation that contributed to the peace talks.

In consequence, it seems reasonable to assume that successful collusion between enemies in civil wars might indeed lead to a perpetuation of a cooperative dynamic. A perpetuation of the cooperative dynamic could make future collusion or other cooperative political orders more likely, reduce violence between warring parties, simply open communication channels which might prevent an inadvertent escalation of violence or make peace talks more likely. This is not to say that all collusion ends successfully – it most likely often does not. For example, defection from collusion could lead to a spiral of violence between enemies. Also, this is not to say that successful collusion necessarily has a positive outcome for civilians. While an increase in the incidence of peace talks, or the prevention of inadvertent escalation of violence through establishing communication channels would be positive outcomes for civilians, the conversion of armed groups into paramilitary forces of the state through collusion would, for example, most often have negative consequences for civilians. This thesis therefore does not claim collusion to be a normatively positive or negative phenomenon, as perpetuated cooperation need not spell out peace.

5. Methodology

5.1. Goals of the research and choice of methodology

What are the goals of the research, and how can an empirical analysis contribute towards them? The first goal of the research is to answer the question how collusion can occur under the commitment problem of civil wars. This contributes to the second goal of the research, which is to investigate whether it is true that successful collusion in civil wars increases the incidence of further cooperation. This first goal is addressed in the literature review chapter and in the chapter developing factors affecting the decision-making processes of warring parties' leaders when faced with an opportunity for collusion. The second goal is addressed in the remaining sections of this thesis. This second goal is addressed by empirically investigating whether successful collusion in civil wars contributes to further cooperation.

As the overarching empirical strategy, a quantitative analysis of a large number of civil wars is chosen. This allows for an investigation of the strength of the relationship between collusion and further cooperation in civil wars. Such an investigation of the strength of the relationship permits an examination of the hypothesis that successful collusion can lead to perpetuated cooperation.

Ideally, a qualitative case study would have been chosen as the empirical strategy, including expert interviews in the field with persons who were personally acquainted with the internal processes of warring parties in civil wars. This would have permitted an in-depth investigation of the mechanisms leading to the occurrence of collusion, and of the mechanisms leading to a perpetuation of the cooperative dynamic, while also probing the plausibility of the hypothesis of perpetuated cooperation. Such sensitive interviews would have however required a duration of time spent on field research that was not available for this thesis. Data can be collected sufficiently easily for the large-N quantitative study that was chosen instead. While the chosen quantitative approach does not allow for an investigation of

underlying mechanisms, it does allow for an investigation of the hypothesis with a somewhat higher degree of generalizability than a case study.

5.2. Data source for collusion

The data source of collusion is presented separately from the data sources of other variables to enable the understanding of the following section on the operationalization of perpetuated cooperation. These other variables first need to be introduced, in section 5.4., which is why their data sources cannot not be presented meaningfully in this section. The presentation of their data sources follows in section 5.5.

Data on collusive events is drawn from datasets which teams around Philip Schrodt developed at University of Kansas and later at Pennsylvania State University. The resulting event datasets are now distributed via Schrodt's Parus Analytics and are publicly accessible via the URLs specified in the reference list (Gerner, Schrodt, Abu-Jabr, & Yilmaz, 2002; Gerner, Schrodt, Francisco, & Weddle, 1994). Parus Analytics' event datasets are the only source found that codes for collusive events between enemies in civil wars. The event datasets consist of a computerized categorization of news stories from AFP and Reuters. Data on collusion is available for the Levant region from 1979 to 2011 (Parus Analytics, 2011), the Gulf region from 1979 to 1999 (Parus Analytics, 1999b), Central Asia from 1989 to 1999 (Parus Analytics, 1999a) and the Balkans from 1989 to 2003 (Parus Analytics, 2003). The limited geographic and temporal scope of the data is due to available data from Parus Analytics having been limited to this scope at the time of data collection for this research.

The original data sources these resulting event data are based on are either full news articles or lead sentences from Reuters and AFP news agencies. Parus Analytics used these two news services alternatingly as sources at different time points within the same region, depending on data availability and depth of coverage (Parus Analytics, 2002, pt. "How are you getting Reuters?"). Parus Analytics' decision on whether to code data from the full news story or

from the lead sentence depended on the style of article a news agency would publish in a region: In certain regions, single stories were broken down into one article per component, in which case coding from lead sentences is more precise. In others, articles consisted of summaries of several stories, in which case the full article were coded (Parus Analytics, 2002, pt. "Can KEDS code full stories in addition to lead sentences?").

The automatized categorization by which these news sources were coded was done through dedicated computer programs, KEDS, and for the Levant dataset through the more advanced TABARI. These programs coded based on either WEIS (Parus Analytics, n.d.-b) or, for the Levant, the more refined CAMEO (Schrodt, 2012) coding schemes. Both coding schemes include lists of actors and events, as well as corresponding possibilities of how these might be phrased in the articles. The resulting event datasets provide information on what type of events happens on which day and between which two specific actors.

Given that the sources of data on collusion provide information only on individual events and not on collusive frameworks, it is not possible to capture the success rate of collusion. Therefore, instead of investigating whether *successful* collusion leads to perpetuated cooperation, I will investigate whether collusion in general leads to perpetuated cooperation.

5.3. Operationalizing "perpetuation of the cooperative dynamic"

As mentioned when outlining the hypothesis in chapter 4, the perpetuation of the cooperative dynamic between collusive partners could take a number of manifestations. A list of such cooperative interactions includes further collusive agreements, reductions in the level of violence and the establishment of continuous communication channels which prevent inadvertent escalation of violence or make peace talks more likely. As this list shows, the concept of cooperation perpetuation is fairly broad.

Cooperation perpetuation then needs to be specified more concretely in order to be measurable, while taking account of the availability of data. No data is available for future collusive agreements following the original collusion that serves as the starting point of the cooperative dynamic. This is because data on collusion in civil wars lists single collusive events, but does not provide information on the framework agreement of these collusive events, making a distinction between different collusive agreements impossible. Renewed collusion is unavailable as a measure of the effects of an earlier collusion if the two cannot be distinguished. No data sources could be found that contained information on the establishment of communication channels between warring parties. What there is available data on is the occurrence of peace talks, and on changes in the levels of violence of the armed conflict over time. Changes in the levels of violence on such a macro-level are more likely to occur through informal or formal agreements than through some automatic process. Such large-scale reductions then, plus any failed attempts at establishing them, would be captured already by looking only at the occurrence of peace talks, if understood by the broad definition of talks aimed at reducing or ending violence. This is because any formal or informal agreement reducing violence would have had to have been discussed previously, and any such discussion would constitute a peace talk by the broad definition. Peace talks, then, are defined as any informal or formal communication between warring parties aimed at reducing or ending violence, or resolving the sources of the armed conflict, regardless of its success. Cooperation perpetuation will thus be operationalized as the occurrence of such peace talks.

5.4. Inclusion of other relevant variables

Including other variables beyond collusion and peace talks permits a more differentiated assessment of the effect of collusion on peace talks by showing how other important variables mediate the effect of collusion. Also, including other variables permits a better assessment of the strength of the effect of collusion on the likelihood of peace talks.

The literature on civil war termination lists a number of variables that are found to affect the likelihood that parties will want to engage in negotiations rather than continue fighting. The most prominently repeated variables are the gap in military capacity between warring parties, the costs that the violence imposes on the warring parties and the presence of a so-called mutually hurting stalemate, which can be measured by a composite of the military capacity gap and the costs of violence.

A larger gap in military capacity leads to an increased likelihood of victory for the stronger party, reducing its incentives to negotiate. Similarly, the weaker party is more inclined to continue fighting in the hope of gaining leverage through violence, instead of engaging in a negotiation in which it will have a very weak position (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Idean, 2009, pp. 5–6; Greig, 2005, p. 5). Thus, the larger the gap in military capacity between warring parties, the less likely they are to engage in peace talks.

The higher the costs of ongoing fighting are for warring parties, the higher their incentives to seek ways out of the conflict rather than to sustain the costs. This is thought to increase the incidence of peace talks (Greig, 2005, pp. 4–5; Mitchell, 1995). A proxy for measuring the costs for parties is the cumulative death toll of an armed conflict. The cumulative death toll does not differentiate between civilians and soldiers, or between parties. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently related to the costs that a party has to bear, since the intensity of violence will in almost all cases be felt by both sides, even if not equally. An alternative to the proxy of the cumulative death toll is the duration of an armed conflict. The longer an armed conflict has lasted, the higher the cumulative costs for a party.

The third variable to be included is the "mutually hurting stalemate", which denotes a situation in which costs are high for both parties and in which neither side is set to win. This can be measured as a composite of the proxies of cumulative death toll and the gap in military capacity. With a low gap in military capacity, it is more likely that neither party is able to win,

leading to a stalemate. When additionally the conflict witnesses a high death toll, the stalemate becomes mutually hurting (Greig & Diehl, 2006, pp. 360–361; Zartman, 2000, p. 228ff).

A summary of the relationships between the variables discussed in this section and the incidence of peace talks can be found in Figure 1.



Figure 1. The relationships between additional variables and the incidence of peace talks.

5.5. Data sources for peace talks and additional variables

Data for this research were collected from nine datasets and further literature research. Four of these datasets stem from Parus Analytics and contain data on collusive events, as outlined previously. Three of the datasets stem from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, a widely used and comprehensive resource for data on armed conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Program & Peace Research Institute Oslo, n.d., pt. "Further Information"). The list of conflicts and data on conflict durations, cumulative death tolls, the gaps in military capacity and part of the data on peace talk occurrence were drawn from UCDP datasets. The remaining two datasets which were drawn on, for information on the occurrence of peace talks, are the Civil War Mediation

dataset, the first dataset exclusively dedicated to civil war mediation (DeRouen, Bercovitch, & Pospieszna, 2011; DeRouen & Bercovitch, 2012), and the SHERFACS International Conflict Management Dataset, a dataset on international conflict management efforts developed by a team of researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Sherman, 1987, 1994). Literature research was conducted on the occurrence of peace talks, if the datasets offered insufficient information on a case. All of the datasets used in this thesis were publicly available at the time of data collection. Information on the location from which they were retrieved can be found in the reference list under the corresponding citation.

Datasets from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program that were drawn on, and the variables that were used, are listed the following. A list of civil wars that corresponds to the adopted definition was drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, & Strand, 2002; Themnér & Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014; Themnér & Wallensteen, 2014). This was possible given that the definition of a civil war adopted for this research was taken from the UCDP. Therefore, the cases included in UCDP data correspond to the universe of cases for this research. A list of all cases of civil wars that were included in the empirical analysis can be found in Appendix 1. Further data drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset includes the start and end dates of each conflict episode, for calculating conflict duration, and the identity of the warring parties. From the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset Version 2010 (Kreutz, 2010), information on the occurrence of successful peace talks was drawn. Data drawn from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, which is a collection of all the data collected in the context of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program but not necessarily published in a dedicated dataset (Uppsala Conflict Data Program at Uppsala University, 2014), includes annual civilian and military battle-related deaths and the troop size of each warring party in the year of the peace talks or the final year of conflict.

The Civil War Mediation Dataset and SHERFACS International Conflict Management Dataset were drawn on if the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset did not state that conflict ended with some form of ceasefire or peace agreement, i.e. a successful peace talk. In these cases, the Civil War Mediation Dataset offered information on whether a mediation event occurred. When this was not the case, i.e. there were no successful peace talks, and neither successful nor unsuccessful, third-party mediations, SHERFACS was drawn on. SHERFACS provided information whether warring parties had held any resolution-oriented discussions with each other. To add an extra layer of security, in case all datasets missed a peace talk, academic literature on the respective conflict was examined for any mentions of peace talks.

5.6. Case selection

Before case selection is possible at all, the level of analysis must be defined. For this, one must first consider within which level and time frame the hypothesized effect would occur. Doing so for the present case, the hypothesized effect of cooperation perpetuation would occur in the time period from a collusive event to a peace talk. Both collusive events and peace talks can by definition only occur during active armed conflict. Further, if armed conflict ceases in between collusion and peace talks, it is unsure whether they can still be linked with each other in the same way as when the armed conflict continues unabated in between the two events. Consequently, the level of analysis is a *period of sustained active armed conflict during a civil war*. Such a period of active armed conflict is called a conflict episode. The level of analysis will therefore be the conflict episode.

The next step required for case selection is the definition of the universe of cases. The universe of cases is first delimited by the definition of armed conflicts, taken from the Uppsala University's Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which is a very widely used dataset on armed conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Program & Peace Research Institute Oslo, n.d., pt. "Further Information"):

"[Armed conflict is] a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths." (Themnér & Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014)

Additionally, the universe of cases is delimited from armed conflicts overall to civil wars, which includes both non-internationalized and internationalized civil wars. UCDP defines non-internationalized civil wars by the following:

"A conflict between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries." (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, n.d.)

UCDP defines internationalized civil wars, in turn, as follows:

"An armed conflict between a government and a non-government party where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive troop support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict." (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, n.d.)

Civil wars overall, including both internationalized and non-internationalized civil wars, can thus be defined as an armed conflict between a government and a non-government party. Adding this definition of civil wars to the more general definition of armed conflict cited above, civil wars will be formally defined as follows: *Civil wars are a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which one is the government of a state, and one is a non-government party, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.*

The reasons for drawing on UCDP for the definition of civil wars used in the empirical part of this study are laid out in the following. The UCDP definition and the definition of civil war by the Correlates of War Project are the most commonly used definition of civil wars in quantitative empirical research on armed conflict. Given such broad usage, I limited my choice to these two definitions, in order to permit complementarity of my findings with those of the majority of conflict research. This complementarity of research would be threatened if every researcher would use an entirely own definition for civil war. The reason for choosing the UCDP's definition over the Correlates of War Projects' definition is that the latter

employs a threshold of 1000 battle-related combatant deaths within a 12 month period for an episode of violence to count as an armed conflict, as compared to the UCDP's 25 battle-related deaths. The Correlates of War Project's threshold is very high, particularly when investigating civil wars, excluding all but major civil wars. This limitation is not necessary for this research, since there is no theoretical reason to assume that the investigated hypothesis would only be relevant for major civil wars. Further, the Correlates of War Projects' definition is limited to combatant deaths, whereas the UCDP definition includes civilian deaths. Counting civilian deaths is a particularly important feature of a definition for civil wars, since civil wars are even more than interstate wars marked by a particularly high ratio of civilian casualties.[1]

Levant	**Gulf**	**Central Asia**	**Balkans**
Cyprus	Saudi Arabia	Afghanistan	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Israel	Iran	Armenia	Croatia
Syria	Iraq	Azerbaijan	Serbia
Jordan	Kuwait	Kazakhstan	Montenegro
Lebanon	Bahrain	Kyrgizstan	Slovenia
Palestine	Qatar	Tajikistan	Macedonia
Turkey	United Arab Emirates	Uzbekistan	Kosovo
	Oman	Turkmenistan	
	Yemen		
April 1979 - November 2011	**April 1979 - March 1999**	**May 1989 - July 1999**	**April 1989 - July 2003**

Table 1. Temporal and regional availability of data on collusion (Parus Analytics, n.d.-a)

After defining the universe of cases follows the actual case selection process. Ideally, this would be a random selection of all cases from the universe of cases. A random selection is

[1] See Sambanis (2004) for an in-depth discussion of available definitions of civil wars.

however not possible, given the fact that data on collusion is temporally and regionally limited in a non-random manner. Table 1 shows the scope of available data on collusion.

The scope of the data is related to procedural choices made by the research team who collected the data on collusion. The selection is therefore not random. This is not trivial, given that for non-random case selection generalizing from the sample to the universe of cases is not possible.

5.7. Coding and dataset construction

A new dataset was constructed out of the data from the sources specified above, in sections 5.2. and 5.5. The data collection and coding procedure occurred in several steps, which are now presented.

The universe of cases included in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset was used as the starting point of the dataset construction. All civil wars that occurred in the regions and during the time that collusion data is available were selected and included. Collusion data is available for the Levant region from 1979 to 2011, for the Gulf region from 1979 to 1999, for Central Asia from 1989 to 1999 and for the Balkans from 1989 to 2003, as shown in Table 1. Civil wars were separated from interstate wars by the variable "Conflict type", including both "internal" and "internationalized internal" wars. Conflicts that occurred outside of the countries and time periods listed in Table 1 were excluded. Next, the remaining cases were recoded from the conflict year case structure they were presented in within the original UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, to a conflict episode case structure. This was necessary in order to run analyses at the correct level of analysis. The correct level of analysis was specified as conflict episode-level, since cooperation perpetuation is hypothesized to develop within one period of active armed conflict. This step resulted in 30 civil war episodes, or cases, being included in the dataset, two from the Gulf region, seven from Central Asia, nine from the Balkans and 12 from the Levant. A list of all included civil war episodes can be

found in Appendix 1. In the next step, all conflict dyads, i.e. names of the warring parties that constituted enemy blocks in a specific conflict episode, were extracted. This was necessary for the next step, as data for the variables were often at the conflict-dyad level. These conflict dyads thus formed the basis of the collection of data for the variables.

5.7.1. Constructing the variable for collusion

The first variable whose extraction will be presented is *collusion*. For each conflict dyad, the number of collusive events in one conflict episode was counted on a continuous scale. For each conflict dyad, the respective regional dataset was drawn on. Collusive events were operationalized based on the respective WEIS or CAMEO coding schemes. In datasets using the WEIS coding scheme, collusive events were identified which fit the relevant WEIS event types[2] and which occurred between the specified conflict actor dyads during periods of active armed conflict. Additionally, text searches were conducted in some of the datasets which included direct citations from the news stories. These text searches consisted of different forms, including all relevant verb forms, of the words "cooperation" and "collusion". While WEIS codes covered three of the four datasets, Levant countries were coded by the CAMEO coding scheme. In datasets using the CAMEO coding scheme, again collusive events between specified conflict actor dyads during civil war episodes were identified based on the relevant CAMEO event types[3]. Additionally, text searches for all relevant forms and verb forms of the words "cooperation" and "collusion" were conducted. Beyond the operationalization of events, actors needed to be operationalized as well in order to be able to correctly identify collusive events in conflict dyads. This was done by finding a correspondence between the name of the warring party from the original dataset, and the name used in the event dataset.

[2] In the WEIS coding scheme (Parus Analytics, n.d.-b), the codes "070/Reward", "071/Extend economic aid", "072/Extend military aid, and "073/Give other assistance" operationalize collusion.

[3] In the CAMEO coding scheme (Schrodt, 2012), the codes "060/Engage in material cooperation, unspecified", "061/Cooperate economically", "062/Cooperate militarily", "063/Engage in judicial cooperation", "064/Share intelligence or information", "070/Provide aid, not specified below", "071/Provide economic aid", "072/Provide military aid", "073/Provide humanitarian aid", "074/Provide military protection or peacekeeping" and "075/Grant asylum" operationalize collusion.

Such correspondence was established via a list of actor codes which is included with each dataset. Frequently, the specificity of actor identification was lower in the event dataset than in the original UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. For example, the PKK became "Kurdish Rebels", while Egypt's *Jamaia Islamiya* became "Egypt Rebels". Whenever a collusive event was found including an unspecific actor, literature and internet research was conducted. I investigated whether at the time point of the collusive event there were any other actors that would have been included under the vaguer name, and whether any such other actors were not fighting on the same side of the conflict dyad as the originally searched warring party. If there were any other actors that could have been included, and these were not part of the same side of the same conflict dyad as the originally searched warring party, the collusive event was ignored. Since the event datasets sometimes include coding errors, several collusive events of the same type between the same actors on the same day were only counted once. With these steps, it was possible to identify many of the collusive events that occurred between enemies in the civil war episodes that are included in this research's dataset, making it possible to measure collusion quantitatively.

5.7.2. Constructing the variable for peace talks

The second variable whose extraction will be presented is *peace talks*. For data collection on peace talks, a multi-layer procedure was used given the absence of a dataset dedicated to the occurrence of peace talks between warring parties. Available datasets offer data on the termination of conflict episodes through ceasefires or peace agreements – i.e. offering data on the occurrence of what might be coined *successful* peace talks – or on the occurrence of third-party mediation negotiations. The first layer in data collection was the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset. Here, any conflict episode that ended either with a "Peace agreement", "Ceasefire agreement", or a "Ceasefire agreement with conflict regulation", as specified in the "Outcome" variable, was coded as having experienced peace talks. If a conflict episode did

not end in either of these outcomes, then the next layer, the Civil War Mediation Dataset, was drawn on. Here, the dummy variable "medyes_no" specifies whether a given conflict episode experienced mediation. Again, if this was the case, the conflict episode was coded as having experienced peace talks, whereas if this was not the case, the next layer of data was drawn on. This next layer is the SHERFACS International Conflict Management Dataset. It includes a dummy variable, called "Discuss", which specifies whether warring parties "discuss[ed] differences, consult[ed] or negotiate[d]" (Sherman, 1992, p. 23) with each other. Again, a "discussion" between warring parties lead to a conflict episode being coded as having experienced a peace talk. If even at this third layer no data was found on any peace talks, a final literature research followed. This literature research was aimed at finding any mentions of peace talks between any of the enemy warring parties in the given conflict episode. If this final layer of data reported peace talks between any of the conflict dyads' enemy warring parties, the conflict episode was coded as having experienced peace talks. If no new data on peace talks emerged, the conflict episode was finally coded as having experienced no peace talks. With these steps, it was possible to quantitatively assign for each civil war episode whether it had witnessed a formal or informal negotiation between its warring parties with the intent of reducing the levels of violence, or ending either the armed violence or even the armed conflict.

5.7.3. Constructing the variable for conflict duration, death toll and military power gap

For calculating the variable of *conflict duration*, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset provided sufficiently precise information. It includes data on the first day on which a so-called incompatibility reaches the 25 battle-related deaths threshold, which is the first day that an incompatibility technically becomes an armed conflict, and thus the first day of a conflict episode. The dataset also includes data on which the conflict episode ends, either through a formal conflict resolution agreement, through victory, or by the incompatibility dropping

beneath 25 battle-related deaths in a given year. The amount of days between the two dates, calculated with Mac Numbers, version 3.5.3. (2150), serves as the variable for conflict duration. In this manner, the duration of a conflict episode, and thus a proxy for the costs of war for the warring parties, was calculated.

The variable for the *cumulative civilian and military death toll* was drawn from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia. The dataset offers data on battle-related deaths, which includes both civilian and military personnel deaths, for any given year of an active conflict. Manually, a cumulative death toll was calculated from the death tolls of all years that a conflict episode lasted. By calculating the cumulative death toll for a civil war episode, a proxy for the cost of war for the warring parties was established.

The variable for the *gap in military power* between the two sides of a civil war was calculated via the proxy of troop size. Data on respective troop sizes was again drawn from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: It includes the variables "Troop size" and "Comments on troop size", for all warring parties, for all years that a warring party is engaged active armed violence, though with missing data. The target year, i.e. the year from which troop sizes were collected, was always the final year of a conflict episode. It would have been substantially more meaningful to have the target year of the military power gap figure be the year that the peace talks occurred: After all, it is the effect of the gap in military power on the decision to engage in peace talks that I wish to investigate by this variable. Information on the year of the peace talks is however not consistently available. If the military power gap would sometimes refer to the power gap during peace talks, and sometimes to the power gap towards the end of a conflict episode, it would be impossible to compare the power gap between cases. This is why the target year was chosen to consistently be the last year of a conflict episode. Since the military power gap typically did not vary very widely over the years, the resulting imprecision is not grave. Whenever troop sizes were unavailable for a given year due to the scarcity of

data that UCDP faced, a closest estimate was used. Such a closest estimate consisted either in the troop size of closest year that data was available for, if within a range of three years, or in an estimate given by UCDP in the "Comments on troop size" variable. In cases that UCDP provided data on the number of troops deployed to a certain civil war, and data on the troop size overall, the latter was used. Whenever a range was given instead of a specific number, the arithmetic mean between the two extremes of the range was calculated and used. At the end of data collection, the troop sizes of all warring parties on a side of a conflict dyad were added up. Next, the difference in troop sizes was calculated. If the difference was a negative number due to the order of the subtraction, it was converted to a positive number. It was necessary to put this difference in troop sizes in relation to the number of the troops in the conflict, as they would not have been comparable otherwise: A difference of 2,000 soldiers, for example, is much more significant if the side with more soldiers has 5,000 troops than if it has 80,000. In order to set the troop sizes into relation, the absolute difference in troop sizes was divided by the number of troops of the larger side of the conflict dyad. This resulted in a military power gap ratio variable. This military power gap variable operationalizes the difference in military capacity between enemies.

5.8. Limitations of the data

The available data has a number of weaknesses which lead to limitations in the analysis and its interpretation. First, limitations of data on collusion will be presented, followed by the limitations of data on peace talks, death tolls and the military power gap.

5.8.1. Limitations of data on collusion

A first limitation is that despite the fact that AFP and Reuters include local news, their reporters are located in capital cities. This means that these news sources will report only cases of collusion that become known beyond the collusions' immediate region, or cases of collusion that were decided upon in the capital city. Consequently, AFP and Reuters will not

be able to report secret collusive agreements. Collusion that is widely known of, or which was decided upon in capital cities, is tendentially decided on at higher hierarchical levels than the local, smaller-scale collusive agreements. This bias towards reporting only higher-level collusion makes finding evidence for the hypothesized effect more likely, as it is rather higher-level leaders that will decide on engaging in peace talks (Templer, 2015). This consequence, however, places a limitation on the interpretation of results: Results are likely to be based more on large-scale collusion that is decided on by higher-level leaders, rather than local collusion engaged in by the foot soldiers or decided on by lower-level commanders.

Another limitation of data on collusion is that it has coding errors due to the automated coding procedures. Human coding, however, would also be fallible, particularly given the sheer amount of news stories that were coded. By some estimates, human and machine coding errors are comparable for this amount of data (Philip A. Schrodt & Gerner, 1996, pt. "Accuracy and Validity"). While these types of coding error are therefore not necessarily avoidable, they indicate that results do need to be treated with caution. Since there is no reason to expect that coding errors systematically bias in favor of either omission or false inclusion, though, they are unlikely to strongly distort the results on the aggregate level.

A further issue with data on collusion is that the specification of actors in the event datasets is sometimes too vague. Since the response to any case in which the actor operationalization was unclear was the exclusion of the case of collusion, I might have missed cases of collusion. Since this means that I am under-reporting on collusion rather than over-reporting on it, this should not pose a big limitation: If at all, it would lead to an underestimation of the effect, and not the more dangerous overestimation.

The final limitation of collusion data is that it does not offer information on the perceived success of a collusive operation, but only on its occurrence. Thus, instead of investigating whether *successful cooperation* increases the incidence of peace talks, I will investigate

whether *collusion in general* increases peace talk incidence. Since collusion perceived as having been successful by warring parties is more likely to lead to further cooperation than collusion in general, which includes both successful and unsuccessful collusion, this imprecision will only decrease an effect. This is not a grave issue however, as it does not make results less reliable.

5.8.3. Limitations of data on peace talks

The one limitation of data on peace talks is that despite the multi-layer approach to data collection, in which a number of data sources were drawn on to ensure a high precision in estimating the occurrence of peace talks, some incidences of secret and unsuccessful preliminary negotiations are likely not captured in the data. The first backchannel negotiations between warring parties are typically secret (Templer, 2015). When these secret negotiations do not lead to any further meetings, they might not be discovered by any outside parties, meaning that they would not find their way into my dataset. This might lead to peace talks being underreported. Again, this would not pose a significant limitation, as it would lead to an under-estimation of an effect, and not to a more dangerous over-estimation.

5.8.3. Limitations of data on conflict duration, death toll and military power gap

The limitation of data on *conflict duration* consists in the fact that the start and end dates of conflict episodes are not always specified precisely to the day. The main reason for imprecision is the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths needing to have been surpassed in order for an incompatibility to count as a conflict episode. Naturally, counts of death tolls are not always as precise as to specify the exact date on which this occurs. Since there is no reason to believe that levels of imprecision are linked to other relevant variables, this “noise” in the data likely does not contribute to a false effect.

Similarly, the limitation of *death toll figures* stems from their imprecision. The UCDP data drawn on for this thesis uses report-based death figures, which denotes a method by which reports on deaths in armed incidents are cumulated over time. Not only is this data imprecise due to the difficulty of accessing war zones, but also because it disregards deaths indirectly caused by war, such as deaths through disease or migration. Since report-based methodologies however tendentially under-report death tolls (Spagat, Mack, Cooper, & Kreutz, 2013), and the stipulated effect of death tolls increases with a higher death toll, this limitation is again not problematic. It likely leads to an under-estimated effect, and not an over-estimated one.

Military power gap figures are not entirely reliable either, due to the fact that troop size figures sometimes need to be estimated, as warring parties sometimes do not share this information and records are often not available. A further limitation is that the military power gap was as a rule computed for the last year of a conflict episode, and not for the year that peace talks actually occurred in. This was done since data on the year of peace talks was not always available, and comparability between cases was considered paramount. Mostly the military power gap did not vary much over the years, however, so that the imprecision this caused was mostly negligible. Furthermore the military power gap figures was converted to a dichotomous variable in the analysis, so that changes, unless very substantive, did not impact the results.

5.8.4. Overall quality of the data

Limitations of the data on individual variables, presented in above sub-sections, was found either to lead to an underestimation of effects, or to no systemic impact on effects as data errors were expected to be distributed randomly. These statements on the effects of limitations can however necessarily only be informed estimates. Results should therefore, as always with quantitative large-N cross-country analyses on armed conflict, be treated with care.

Nevertheless, given that none of the limitations appear to illegitimately increase effect size, the data can be viewed as reliable within its regional and temporal scope. An interpretative contribution of this section to be kept in mind is that results are expected to largely relate to collusion that was decided on at higher hierarchical levels.

5.9. Quantitative analysis

Given the fact that the sample is non-random, no inferential analysis is possible. Inferential analysis, i.e. analysis that tests whether the results from the sample can be generalized to the universe of cases, requires the sample to be representative of the universe of cases. When the sample is non-random it cannot be assumed that this is the case, since it cannot be excluded that there are some factors by which the cases found inclusion in the sample. Any such factors that differentiate the sample from the universe of cases make it non-representative by default.

A non-inferential analysis that would be ideal for the data would be log-linear analysis. It would be able to make statements about the strength of the effects of collusion in explaining the occurrence of peace talks even without hypothesis testing. Its real strength, however, would be the fact that it could do so while taking into account higher-order interactions between all of the included variables.

Applying log-linear analysis is however also not possible, since a requirement of the method is that none of the cells in the contingency table are empty, i.e. contain no observations, and that only maximally about 20% of the cells contain fewer than five observations. Given the relatively low number of cases in the database at N=30, this assumption is violated. This means that the power of the test drops to such a low degree as to make its results unreliable.

The only quantitative analysis available is cross tabulation, i.e. the analysis of contingency tables. Association coefficients, such as the Phi coefficient or Cramér's V, cannot be drawn on for analysis, as they rely on the chi squared statistic. This statistic has the same

requirement for the number of observations as the log-linear analysis. Therefore, the method of analysis will be simple comparisons between contingency tables. The limitations on the statements this method can provide are that no generalizations beyond the sample are possible, that maximally two variables, in addition to the response variable of peace talks, can be analyzed in a given table, that two-way interactions between the variables are the highest-order interactions that it is possible to analyze, and that all variables need to be dichotomous. These restrictions clearly limit the complexity and external validity of the results. The method, however, is honest, in that it respects the limits of the data. Accepting the limits of available data, the results can still point to the existence of formerly unknown effects, which can create incentives for investigations with more complex and generalizable results in the future.

Since continuous variables need to be converted to dichotomous variables in order to be analyzable, the results will also mention how the findings change when the cut-off thresholds, which were used to turn continuous variables into dichotomous variables, are altered.

6. Results

6.1. Effects of collusion on peace talks

The hypothesis on the relationship between collusion and peace talks states that successful collusion increases the likelihood of peace talks. Since no measure of the success of collusion is available, the hypothesis is reformulated to state that civil war episodes including collusive events having a higher incidence of peace talks than those without collusive events. Results from the analysis of the cell frequencies of the contingency table of collusion and peace talks lend support to this hypothesis. As can be seen in Table 2, an examination of the cell frequencies shows that 90% of civil war episodes with collusion experienced peace talks (9 out of 10 cases), as compared to only 60% of civil war episodes without collusion (12 out of 20 cases). This fairly large difference in peace talk occurrence between civil war episodes with and without collusion lends support to the hypothesis that collusion between warring parties in civil war increases the likelihood that they will engage in peace talks. The strength of the resulting relationship between collusion and peace talks is roughly similar to the strength of the relationship between peace talks and the other included variables in their respective bivariate contingency tables, as shown in the next section.

	No collusion	**Collusion**
No peace talks	40% (8)	10% (1)
Peace talks	60% (12)	90% (9)
Total	100% (20)	100% (10)

Table 2. Contingency table of collusion by peace talks. N = 30. Percentages are column percentages, numbers in brackets show the number of civil war episodes within a cell.

These results indicate that collusion often leads to a perpetuation of the cooperative dynamic. Thus, collusion not only establishes a cooperative interaction in a context of mistrust and lack of credible commitment, but also in many cases appears to lead to a perpetuation of the

cooperative dynamic, to the point of increasing the likelihood that the warring parties will hold talks to attempt to resolve the conflict or reduce the level of violence.

6.2. Effects of other included variables on peace talks

The hypothesis on the relationship between the *gap in military capacity* and peace talks states that civil war episodes in which enemies have a high gap in military capacity should have a lower incidence of peace talks than those with a low gap in military capacity. Results from the analysis of the cell frequencies of the contingency table of the military power gap and peace talks support this hypothesis. As shown in Table 3, 100% of cases with a low military power gap (9 out of 9 cases) witnessed some form of peace talks, as compared to 56,25% of cases with a high military power gap (9 out of 16 cases). These results can be explained by the hypothesis that warring parties with significantly stronger military capacity are unwilling to enter negotiations when they feel capable of outright victory, while clearly weaker forces prefer gaining leverage through asymmetric warfare over entering negotiations from a much weaker position. The pattern of these results do not change for different cut-off values of the military power gap variable.

	Low gap in military capacity	**High gap in military capacity**
No peace talks	0% (0)	43,75% (7)
Peace talks	100% (9)	56,25% (9)
Total	100% (9)	100% (16)

Table 3. Contingency table of the gap in military capacity by peace talks. N = 25. Percentages are column percentages, numbers in brackets show the number of civil war episodes within a cell. 5 cases were excluded because of missing data.

The hypothesis on the relationship between the *costs of war* and the incidence of peace talks states that higher costs of war reduce incentives for continued fighting, increasing the incidence of peace talks. The contingency tables of cumulative death tolls and of conflict duration with peace talk incidence lend support to this hypothesis. As Table 4 shows, 90% of

civil war episodes with a high cumulative death toll (9 out of 10 cases) experienced peace talks, as compared to only 60% of civil war episodes with a low cumulative death toll (12 out of 20 cases). No reliably different patterns emerge when altering the cut-off values.

	Below 3000 cumulative battle-related deaths	**Above 3000 cumulative battle-related deaths**
No peace talks	40% (8)	10% (1)
Peace talks	60% (12)	90% (9)
Total	100% (20)	100% (10)

Table 4. Contingency table of the cumulative death tolls by peace talks. N = 30. Percentages are column percentages, numbers in brackets show the number of civil war episodes within a cell.

Using another proxy, conflict duration, leads to similar results, supporting the hypothesis: Civil war episodes lasting longer than 1500 days experienced peace talks in 85,71% of cases (6 out of 7 cases), whereas shorter civil war episodes experienced peace talks in 65,22% of cases (15 out of 23 cases). Again, changing the cut-off value does not reliably alter the pattern. These results are not presented in full due to the fact that conflict duration and death tolls are strongly confounded, as contingency tables of the two variables show consistently over all threshold values, thus making a presentation of both redundant in substance.

Taken together, the results of the additional variables lend support to the hypothesis of the mutually hurting stalemate, which states that a war scenario in which warring parties have high costs while no party has a clear advantage are more likely to experience peace talks.

6.3. Effects of collusion on the effects of the additional variables on peace talks

In order to identify the effect of collusion on the effects of the additional variables on peace talks, I will compare the resulting three-way tables with the original two-way tables presented in the previous section.

When combining the *military power gap* and collusion, the effect of the presence of collusion in a conflict episode seems to lead to the military power gap losing its effect. When a conflict episode however witnesses no collusive event, the effect of the military power gap variable seems to increase in the absence of collusion, as compared to the baseline. As Table 5 shows, 100% of civil war episodes experienced peace talks when collusion was present, irrespective of the military power gap (6 out of 6 cases with a low military power gap, and 2 out of 2 cases with a high military power gap). This finding stays constant over different cut-off values of the military power gap variable. The finding indicates that the size of the military power gap loses its explanatory power regarding the occurrence of peace talks when a collusive event occurs in a civil war episode. The second finding is that compared to the 56,25% of cases with a high military power gap in the bivariate Table 3 (9 out of 16 cases) that experienced peace talks, only 50% of cases with a high military power gap do so in the absence of collusion (7 out of 14). The change would be negligible if it were not for the fact that with higher cut-off values, i.e. with a higher military power gap, this ratio continually drops to the point of only 30% of cases with a high military power gap experiencing peace talks (3 out of 10 cases).

	No collusion		**Collusion**	
	Low military power gap	*High military power gap*	*Low military power gap*	*High military power gap*
No peace talks	0% (0)	50% (7)	0% (0)	0% (0)
Peace talks	100% (3)	50% (7)	100% (6)	100% (2)
Total	100% (3)	100% (14)	100% (6)	100% (2)

Table 5. Contingency table of the military power gap and peace talks, stratified by collusion. N = 25. Percentages are column percentages, numbers in brackets show the number of civil war episodes within a cell. 5 cases were excluded because of missing data.

It is not possible to meaningfully interpret these findings, given the lack of a clear pattern in the results and the absence of theory on the relationship between collusion and the military

power gap. The findings do suggest, however, that collusion moderates the effect of the military power gap on peace talks in an unspecific manner.

When combining the *cumulative death toll* with collusion, a slightly more consistent pattern of moderation by collusion emerges: In the absence of collusion, the effect of the death toll on peace talks is weaker than in the bivariate baseline, whereas in the presence of collusion, there are no changes sufficiently reliable to be interpretable. Compared to 60% of cases with lower death tolls (12 out of 20 cases), and 90% of cases (9 out of 10 cases) with higher death tolls experiencing peace talks in the bivariate Table 4, in the absence of collusion only 56,25% of conflicts with lower death tolls (9 out of 16 cases) and 75% of cases with higher death tolls (3 out of 4) experience peace talks in the multivariate Table 6. This points to a moderating effect of the variable of collusion, in the form of weakening the effect of the death toll on peace talk occurrence. In the presence of collusive events, both categories of death tolls experience an increase in peace talks. Cases with lower death tolls witness an increase by 15% to 75% of cases experiencing peace talks (3 out of 4), while cases with lower death tolls experience an increase by 10% to 100% of cases experiencing peace talks (6 out of 6 cases).

	No collusion		**Collusion**	
	Below 3000 cumulative battle-related deaths	*Above 3000 cumulative battle-related deaths*	*Below 3000 cumulative battle-related deaths*	*Above 3000 cumulative battle-related deaths*
No peace talks	43,75% (7)	25% (1)	25% (1)	0% (0)
Peace talks	56,25% (9)	75% (3)	75% (3)	100% (6)
Total	100% (16)	100% (4)	100% (4)	100% (6)

Table 6. Contingency table of the cumulative battle-related death toll and peace talks, stratified by collusion. N = 30. Percentages are column percentages, numbers in brackets show the number of civil war episodes within a cell.

These findings are consistent over different cut-off points, with the caveat that lower death toll conflicts episodes have fewer incidences of collusion. This can be explained by the fact

that death tolls and conflict duration are strongly confounded. A lower conflict duration makes the occurrence of collusion much less likely, as can be explained by shorter periods of time making opportunities for collusion less likely to arise.

These findings again point to a moderating role of collusion. Patterns, like those in the findings on the multivariate tables of the military power gap variable, are too inconsistent and dependent on too small changes in case numbers to allow reliability, however. It is thus not possible to say whether the patterns are due to an artifact of the data, or hinge on a real-world relationship between the additional variables and collusion.

The multivariate contingency tables of *conflict duration*, collusion and peace talks provide a clear pattern of moderation by collusion, in the form of an increase in peace talks when collusion is present, and a decrease in peace talks when collusion is not present. In contrast to 65,22% of cases (15 out of 23) of shorter civil war episodes experiencing peace talks in the bivariate contingency table, as cited towards the end of section 6.2., only 56,25% (9 out of 16) do so in the multivariate Table 7 in absence of collusion. In presence of collusion, this figure jumps to 85,71% (6 of 7 cases). For longer civil wars, the pattern is similar: In contrast to 85,71% of cases (6 out of 7) in the bivariate table, the figure drops to 75% (3 of 4 cases) in absence of collusion, and rises to 100% (3 of 3) in the presence of collusion.

	No collusion		**Collusion**	
	Conflict duration under 1500 days	*Conflict duration over 1500 days*	*Conflict duration under 1500 days*	*Conflict duration over 1500 days*
No peace talks	43,75% (7)	25% (1)	14,29% (1)	0% (0)
Peace talks	56,25% (9)	75% (3)	85,71% (6)	100% (3)
Total	100% (16)	100% (4)	100% (7)	100% (3)

Table 7. Contingency table of conflict duration and peace talks, stratified by collusion. N = 30. Percentages are column percentages, numbers in brackets show the number of civil war episodes within a cell.

A possible explanation for these findings might be a facilitating role that collusion plays, via improvements in trust and the establishment of communication channels, thus turning a willingness to talk into actual peace talks.

7. Conclusion

This thesis set out seeking to explain the puzzling phenomenon of enemies in civil wars colluding with one another in such a way as to make them mutually dependent. Warring parties jointly attack enemies, produce and smuggle drugs and minerals, extort civilians and even provide governance, often in structures that leaves their facilities, personnel and equipment highly intertwined and exposed to the enemy. In a context of war in which guarantees are not credible, and guarantors of commitments are not available, what motivates warring parties to engage in such risk? An extraction of factors affecting collusion from studies presented in a literature review provided an answer: Credible threats of retaliation can create substitute guarantees by reducing incentives to defect, and previous experience with the elements of the collusive venture can help reduce costs if a collusive partner defects nonetheless. Also, collusion rewards the risk taken with oft substantial benefits, highlighting the rational, rather than emotional or identity-based, decision-making processes underlying engagement in collusion. By fulfilling the first goal of the thesis, and resolving the puzzle, I also laid the foundation for the second goal of the thesis, an empirical investigation of the consequences of collusion on the dynamic of civil wars.

If it is possible to create cooperation in such a context of mistrust and anarchy, might this cooperative dynamic in cases of successful collusion also perpetuate itself to the future? Could successful cooperation make it more likely that warring parties hold talks to resolve the conflict or reduce levels of violence? Such a perpetuation of cooperative dynamic could occur via a number of allies, be it institutional routines, newly established shared identities with the enemy, simply a development of trust, or a change in perception of the enemy.

In order to investigate this hypothesis of perpetuated cooperation, I constructed a new dataset from a large number of other sources, including 30 civil war episodes from Central Asia, the Balkans, the Gulf region and the Levant. Additionally to investigating the relationship of

collusion with peace talks, I included other prominent variables from the literature on factors influencing war outcomes. These included the gap in military capacity between warring parties, and variables measuring the costs of war for the parties – the cumulative death toll and the duration of the conflict.

The results of this quantitative analysis showed that civil war episodes which experience collusive events have a much higher incidence of peace talks than those that do not witness collusion. This finding lends support to the hypothesis that wartime collusion between enemies in civil war does increase the likelihood of conflict resolution, possibly through a perpetuation of the cooperative dynamic established during collusion. Also, results substantiated the hypotheses of the other additionally included variables, summarized in the hypothesis of the so-called mutually hurting stalemate, showing that a lower gap in military capacity and higher costs of war, such as higher death tolls and longer conflict duration, increase the incidence of peace talks. Further, results pointed towards the possibility that collusion moderates the effects of the other variables, gap in military capacity between parties, cumulative death tolls and conflict duration, on the likelihood of peace talks. The pattern of this moderation, however, remained unclear. The results of the quantitative analysis cannot be generalized to other contexts than those included in the dataset, however, given the non-random nature of case selection.

The findings of this thesis have two broader implications. First, they contribute to a fresh perspective on civil wars, highlighting the possible insight that might be won by investigating the processes and consequences of cooperative interaction between warring parties. As civil war research often focuses on the factors affecting civil war outbreak and termination, this thesis hints towards the fruitful and as-of-yet largely unexplored dynamics underlying the course of civil wars, rather than just those at their beginning and their end. The second broader implication of this thesis hinges on its finding that enemies that had previously

engaged in collusion might be more willing to engage in conflict resolution attempts. Mediators looking to foster a conflict resolution dialogue could build on this finding, by focusing their initial mediation efforts on those individuals and sections of warring parties, or those warring parties within a conflict, that had engaged in collusion with each other. Though the findings are not generalizable and thus require further testing before become reliable enough for such a broad recommendation, the thesis' results could be a first step towards developing a more targeted approach to initiating conflict resolution efforts along these lines.

Appendix 1

List of civil war episodes included in the dataset, including information on the occurrence of collusion and peace talks, ordered by region. The full dataset is readily available from the author upon request.

Side A	Side B	Collusion	Peace Talks
Government of Serbia (Yugoslavia)	Republic of Slovenia	No	Yes
Government of Serbia (Yugoslavia)	Croatian irregulars, Republic of Croatia	Yes	Yes
Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbian irregulars, Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Yes	Yes
Government of Croatia	Serbian irregulars, Serbian Republic of Krajina	Yes	Yes
Government of Croatia	Serbian Republic of Krajina	Yes	Yes
Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia	Yes	No
Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croatian irregulars, Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Yes	Yes
Government of Serbia (Yugoslavia)	UCK	No	Yes
Government of Macedonia, FYR	UCK	No	Yes
Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	Republic of Armenia	No	No
Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	APF	No	No
Government of Azerbaijan	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	No	Yes
Government of Tajikistan	PFT, UTO, Forces of Khudoberdiyev	Yes	Yes
Government of Azerbaijan	Military faction (forces of Suret Husseinov)	No	Yes
Government of Azerbaijan	OPON Forces	No	No
Government of Uzbekistan	IMU	No	No
Government of South Yemen	Government of Yemen (North Yemen)	No	Yes
Government of Yemen (North Yemen)	Democratic Republic of Yemen	No	Yes
Government of Turkey	MKP	No	No
Government of Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	No	No
Government of Syria	Muslim Brotherhood	No	No
Government of Syria	Syrian Insurgents	No	Yes
Government of Turkey	PKK	Yes	Yes
Government of Turkey	Devrimci Sol	No	No
Government of Israel	Hezbollah	No	Yes
Government of Israel	Hezbollah	No	Yes
Government of Israel	PLO, Rejectionist Front, PFLP, PFLP-GC, Fatah, Hamas, PIJ, PNA, AMB, PRC	Yes	Yes
Government of Israel	Fatah, Hamas, PFLP, PIJ, PNA, AMB, PRC	No	Yes
Government of Lebanon	Amal, NSF, Lebanese Forces - Hobeika faction, NUF	No	Yes
Government of Lebanon	Forces of Michel Aoun, Lebanese Forces	Yes	Yes

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