Cold War all over again? Analysis of NATO's discourse regarding Russia before and after the start of the Ukrainian crisis

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Abstract

After start of the Ukrainian crisis, various media outlets began comparing NATO-Russia relations to the Cold War. This thesis did not analyze the Cold War rhetoric, but sought to answer how NATO's discourse regarding Russia changed one year before and after the start of the Ukrainian crisis. When trying to explain the different aspects of the official NATO discourse this work drew both on realist and constructivist theories. In the first part of the research the official NATO texts were analyzed using a mixed methods approach, comprising of descriptive statistics, as well as thematic, and discourse analyses. The quantitative part of the research showed that Russia was mentioned substantially more often after the conflict in Ukraine started. Qualitative analysis showed that NATO's discourse about Russia mostly stayed diplomatically neutral: even though Russia has been opposed by NATO, it has not been referred to in an openly hostile manner. In addition, Russia has been referred to mostly as a fundamental security challenge, whereas the situation in the Middle East and North Africa has been referred to as a threat. In the second part of this research two interviews with NATO officials were obtained, and analyzed using a method critical frame analysis. Both respondents provided an avid disagreement with the New Cold War idea. Even though the current situation might have similar implications to the Cold War in terms of economic and military reality, it seems that Western officials are avoiding the *creation* of this concept and are thus careful with their discourse regarding Russia.

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Keywords: NATO, Russia, Ukraine, Cold War, discourse, nuclear deterrence

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List of Abbreviations

CSTO.....Collective Security Treaty Organization

EU.....European Union

IR.....International Relations

IS.....Islamic State

ISIL.....Islamic state of Iraq and Levant

OSCE.....Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

NAC.....North Atlantic Council

NATO.....North Atlantic Treaty Organization

U.S. .....United States of America

WP.....Weighted percentage

WWII.....World War II

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Introduction

The idea to analyze the Western rhetoric regarding Russia emerged after the crisis in Ukraine started. Various media outlets began mentioning the Cold War and comparing the current situation between the so-called West and Russia with that between 1947-1991 between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The second wave of the Cold War was already being mentioned before the crisis in Ukraine began. For example, in his book "The New Cold War" Lucas (2009, p. 22) stated that "the West is losing the New Cold War, while having barely noticed that it has started" (p. 22), after that scrutinizing the Russian side of this "New Cold War", and looking into Kremlin's internal politics, Putin's leadership, and Russia's foreign policy. However, the collocation "Cold War" seems to have emerged in the Western media only after the crisis in Ukraine started. For example, an online political cartoon website *PoliticalCartoons.com,* – perhaps one of the most popular sites of editorial cartoons on the internet – which has a database with over 40,000 images, provided 8 search results with the query "Cold War" for the time between 2013 March and March 2014 (one year before the events in Ukraine had begun), and 67 image results for the time between March 2014 and 2015 March (one year after). Another example could be major Western news outlets, like "The Guardian", "The New York Times", and "The Daily Mail", which published articles about West-Russia relations that had the collocation "Cold War" in the very headlines (e.g. Baker, 2014; Brown, 2015; McGreal, 2015). In addition, for instance, the Centre for Research on Globalization – an independent research and media organization – in 2014-2015 published several articles that named the current situation between NATO and Russia as the "Cold War 2.0" (e.g. Kozin, 2014, 2015; Blum, 2015). An entry in "Wikipedia" – one of the most popular internet reference sites – named "Cold War II" was also been created in 2014. These are only a few examples of the emerging "Cold War happening again" discourse in the Western media. This shows an increased parallel

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between the Cold War and the current West-Russia relations.

A question arises, therefore: is this discourse a true depiction of world after the events in Eastern Ukraine started? Is it true that the current situation between the two powers, namely - the West and Russia, is similar to that of the Cold War? This question might not seem puzzling at first. But a claim that the world is yet again divided into two, and is facing another Cold War, is a strong statement, as any kind of war usually has tremendous consequences on states and individuals' lives. Because of the complex nature of the Cold War, which did not even have exact beginning and ending, it can be difficult to scrutinize every aspect of it in this thesis. Cold War was not only a clash of the needs of two powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union; it was also an ideology, portrayed as a battle between "good" and "evil", ideals of free world versus repressions of communism (Denton, in Hinds & Windt, 1991; also Westad, 2000). As Westad (2000, p. 1) put it, more and more historians and international relations experts believe that the data on the Cold War suggests that it was "more about ideas and beliefs than about anything else". This constructivist point of view differs from the realist stance, which focuses more on the arms race, and other types of military, political, and economic rivalry that happened between the U.S. and the Soviet Union after WWII. In my work, however, I look into the discursive side of this purported "Cold War II" that supposedly started after the crisis in Ukraine began, and do not analyze the actual military action taken by the two sides. I do not seek to cling to one theory and instead take an open approach, explaining the themes and patterns of the analyzed discourse in both constructivist and realist terms.

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With this research I hope to answer the question whether the world is facing another Cold War again. However this question was too broad for a research, thus it was narrowed down. Instead of "the world", NATO and Russia were selected, because during the Cold War

the two opposing sides were specifically NATO, and the Soviet Union along with the Warsaw pact states. Thus Russia, being the largest successor of the Soviet Union, seemed to represent the second major player in the assumed Cold War II well. Moreover, such events like the EU and the U.S. sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation supported such a choice. As for the time frame, "current" was too obscure as well. Therefore it was narrowed by down selecting the Ukrainian crisis as my reference point. I chose to analyze the discourse produced one year before and after the start of the Ukrainian crisis for the sole reason that it was only a year after the events in Ukraine began when I started this research. In addition, I selected Ukraine as a reference point because the aforementioned Western sanctions were imposed precisely because of the Ukrainian issue (e.g. White House, 2014). As for the concept of the Cold War, this thesis does not analyze the rhetoric produced during the period after the WWII until the collapse of the Soviet Union, which is needed in order to compare both discourses. Therefore the primary research question of this thesis is as follows: how did the discourse produced by NATO regarding Russia one year before and after the crisis in Ukraine started changed?

The scope of this thesis includes an analysis of the discursive side of the situation that is happening between the West and Russia. I analyzed the official diplomatic discourse produced by NATO before and after the crisis in Ukraine started and compared these discourses to outline the differences. This was done in order to see, if the post-Ukrainian crisis NATO discourse regarding Russia indeed became colder than before. The scope of this work, however, does not involve an explanation as to why the media started producing "Cold War" related headlines, nor what kind of discourse the media generated on this matter in general. Furthermore, I do not seek to evaluate the rhetoric coming from the Russian side, and I did not try to look at what kind of effects the Western discourse had on Russia's actions. For this research I chose NATO's official documents, which are both their public statements issued one

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year before and after the start of the Ukrainian crisis, and statements made by diplomats in public. In addition, I also interviewed two NATO officials and looked for the difference between the statements in their interviews and the findings from the discourse analysis of the official texts.

I chose to analyze public discourse, because, firstly, it reveals "how ideologies are discussed and negotiated, how power relations are asserted, and how political differences on difficult issues are discussed and communicated" (Bhatia, 2006, p. 174). Conceptually this is also important, because the Cold War was not only an arms race but also a clash of ideologies, with public discourse as a central instrument in creating and communicating these ideas and, thus, maintaining an "ideational war". Secondly, I decided to analyze the public discourse of a military entity, and NATO, as a collective security organization, uniting 22 EU countries, and 6 more, including the U.S., meaningfully representing the idea of the "West". Finally, even though the sanctions imposed on Russia were approved by the U.S. and the EU, I selected to analyze NATO's discourse because of its military profile that differs from the policy instruments and discourses of the political-economic alliance that the EU is.

The present work is structured as follows. *Chapter 1* deals with the theoretical framework behind the choice to focus on NATO's official discourse, and highlights the previous research done in the field. The research part of this thesis has two parts. The first part deals with the text analysis, the second part presents the field research done for this thesis. *Chapter 2* presents the methodology used for the first part of the data analysis, covering the logic behind the choice of the research design, describing the primary data, and the analytical approach used in the analysis. *Chapter 3* presents the data analysis and its results, focusing on the main findings of the first part of the data analysis about the official NATO stance regarding

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Russia. *Chapter 4* deals with the field research done for this thesis, presenting the purpose, method and the data. *Chapter 5* discusses the main findings from this second part of the research. Finally, in the last section I formulate the final conclusions of this thesis, connecting the findings from both data analysis parts to the research question, and introduce the scope of further research and discussion.

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Chapter 1: Problematization

In this chapter I present the theoretical framework, drawing on realism and constructivism. I problematize the research question of this thesis by describing the key points of international power and alliances (section *1.1 Power and alliances*), collective security and non-state actors (section *1.2 Security and actors*), as well as the importance of public discourse (section *1.3 Communication and discourse*). I finish this chapter with presenting the previous studies done in the field that are similar to this research (section *1.4 Previous studies*).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War IR specialists had problems in trying to explain the Cold War as an international system. This was both because nobody foresaw these rapid world changes, and because of the theoretical crisis. The latter pertained to the lack of IR theories that carried a substantial explanatory value in terms of understanding the Cold War and the reasons why it ended. Westad (2000) claimed that both classical realism and the neo-realism seem to be of little help in understanding the processes that led to the end of the Cold War or the war itself. Furthermore, realism seemed to be tailored specifically to analyze the Cold War, and failed to adjust to reality when the world started to change in the late 1980's and the Cold War ended.

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This, Westad (2000) wrote, marked a substantial shift within IR theoretical framework, the shift that steered the scholars from realism to constructivism. The latter emphasizes the social and cultural context in which the international relations appear. In this work I drew both on realist and constructivist theories, when trying to explain different aspects of the official NATO discourse produced in the light of the Ukrainian crisis with regards to Russia. I chose such path because, as it will be presented more in depth in the following chapters, while most

of NATO's discourse can be backed by the constructivist theory, some aspects of this discourse are better understood when drawing on realism arguments. Therefore I will start this chapter by discussing both theories, realism and constructivism, and will follow with a more in depth review of the Cold War as a rhetoric, along with a short overview of what has been researched in this field so far.

In this work I prioritized an eclectic theorizing, therefore this thesis is written in a problem- rather than approach-driven style. This way of explanation was chosen because the complexity of the political processes analyzed in this thesis is high, and one approach alone – be it realism or constructivism – cannot offer compelling insights into the puzzle that was the focus of this thesis. As Hemmer & Katzenstein (2002, p. 600) put it, an eclectic, problem-driven approach has an advantage of allowing to step from "repetitive, occasionally bitter, and inherently inconclusive paradigmatic debates". However such an approach did not allow to make conclusions about causalities, only allowing to assume the relevance of the findings.

1.1 Power and alliances

1.1.1 Balance of power and international alliances

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International arena is constructed out of difference sized actors of uneven military power. In realist theory, the term "balance of power" refers to an equal distribution of political power in the international arena. Policies are designed in a way that precludes one actor from international preponderance. Assuming that all international actors construe their policies in accordance to this principle, the international arena then can be taken as a general system of the balance, where all states have a certain role. This political equilibrium – which rarely exists

– might be consisted of two or more power blocs, and might have a "balancer" – a state with big power willing to throw its weight on either side in order to bring about a diplomatic or military victory (Haas, 1953). However, such an actor is more capable than others, and this in turn brings about a division of labor. In an anarchic international arena actors might become worried about possible gains from such a help, as the gains are not certain. Therefore, according to realists, international cooperation – even if created for security reasons – is limited, and alliances are unstable (Waltz, 1986).

The number of international players also matters. Two theorems of conventional wisdom (as in Waltz, 2008) deal with international alliances and the size of international actors. According to the first theorem, which lately has been disregarded by the West, an international alliance is defective if some members are disproportionally stronger than the others. In such an alliance the partnership is not real, as an honest one is only possible between actors with a similar power. Furthermore, those members of the international alliance which are weaker might become dissatisfied with the situation, making such an alliance unstable (Waltz, 2008). NATO, being one of the biggest international organizations, with a very unequal economic and military power balance between its member states, might be considered a real-life contradiction to the first theorem, as it seems to function well and continues to grow.

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The second theorem deals with the number of the international players, and is widely accepted. It states that a world is more stable with many smaller powers rather than with two superpowers. Stability is measured by the peacefulness of the international system and by the permanence of that system. According to Waltz (2008), the Cold War era world stirred the pessimism about a bipolar system being peaceful, yet the international arena was surprisingly stable. Such a stability stems from three factors. Firstly, with two superpowers there are no

peripheries, as a success of one power automatically evokes the interest of the other. Reviewing the Cold War history, Waltz (2008, p. 100) stated that "[a]ny possibility of maintaining a general peace required a willingness to fight small wars" (2008, p. 100). Secondly, in a bipolar system there is high tension generated by competition, which continues to intensify. Even small territorial losses are difficult to accept. Thirdly, bipolar world is marked with reoccurring crises, which occur when one of the superpowers tries to make a change, and another decides to resist (Walz, 2008).

Alliances are a response to threats, where international actors chose to ally with the most threatening power, or go against it. However, states have shown to be inclined to balance against the threat instead of joining it, when facing an external threat. This is explained by the fact that balancing usually offers more state's freedom as compared to subordinating under a threatening power (Walt, 1985). Regional hegemons, being states so powerful that they dominate other actors in a particular region, cannot always act offensively and are not mindless aggressors. On the contrary, great powers think about the balance of power, about how other actors will react to their moves, and about the benefits of acting offensively. Furthermore, regional hegemons seek to prevent other great powers from dominating in their space (Mearsheimer, 2001). This was the case with the U.S. after the WWII when it sought to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining supremacy, and in turn creating NATO to counterbalance the communist threat in the North Atlantic region. This realist argument is important when denoting the NATO-Russia relations after the start of the Ukrainian crisis.

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1.1.2 Social construction of power politics

Wendt (1992) questions the realist stance and asks whether the absence of one world power

steers states to play competitively in the international game. He claims that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992, p. 395), and that structure of international arena does not necessarily *cause* anything. According to him, the realist explanation of anarchy being a self-help system, where central authority is absent and actors are only self-interested, is flawed. He disputes it, claiming that self-interested nature of states is not a constitutive characteristic of anarchy, and that competitive power relations might be a consequence of the process of interaction between international actors in which anarchy plays only a secondary role. With his constructivist argument Wendt seeks to build a bridge between modern and post-modern constructivist traditions, by arguing against the absence of collective security – and NATO is precisely a collective security organization – in the international arena which, according to realists, originates externally of process.

The first principle of constructivist social theory is that agents act on the basis of the meanings that the objects they act towards have for them. Agents acquire their identities by participating in collective meanings, which constitute the structure upon our actions are organized. Identities, according to Wendt (1992, p. 397), are "relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self", and are the basis of interests. Consequently, institutions are relatively stable sets of identities and interests, and are "fundamentally cognitive entities" (Wendt 1992, p. 399). Self-help, according to him, is an institution which is only one of many structures that might exist under anarchy. He suggests that the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power depends upon cognitive variation within concepts of security. Wendt (1992) also adds that such self property like organizational apparatus of governance is also created by domestic society. Another property of self – desire to survive – is also based on how the actors view the meaning of survival, and "therefore depends on the processes by which conceptions of self evolve" (Wendt 1992, p. 402).

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The second principle of constructivism, according to Wendt, is that the meanings arise out of interaction. Conceptions of self and interest change over time according to those of other significant actors (as Wendt himself calls it – mirror theory of identity-formation). This process completes a social act through signaling, interpreting, and responding, and allows to create inter-subjective meanings. Social acts – including public rhetoric – create expectations about another actor's future behavior, which can be mistaken and uncertain. Based on this uncertain information, actors send out signals (messages), thus signifying the basis on which they will make a move in response to another actor's move. Another actor responds as well, and thus the pool of knowledge is created, containing information about each other. According to Wendt (1992, p. 405), this process goes by reinforcement, as "interaction rewards actors for holding certain ideas about each other and discourages them from holding others". Over time these reciprocal information exchanges create concepts that are relatively stable, of actors themselves and others regarding the issue the information was exchanged about.

1.2 Security and actors

1.2.1 Collective identities and collective security

According to Wendt (1992), constructivism bases the analysis cooperation on cognitive rather than behavioral grounds, because cognitive reasons hold the inter-subjective knowledge that defines the structure of the game as coming from the interaction between the actors. Constructivist analysis of the problem of the future of collective security in the West, according to him, suggests that decades of cooperation might have created a collective "European identity", or "Western identity". Even if the starting point for the establishment of a collective

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organization were egoistic, the process of cooperation can redefine those reasons. If collective identities become embedded, they may be as persistent as egoistic ones (Wendt, 1992), thus stressing the weight of the collective security organizations, as they have an impact on how the state perceives itself and other actors.

Hemmer & Katzenstein (2002) argue that perceptions of collective identity played an important role of the creation and organization of NATO. According to them, in 1949 the U.S. saw Western European states as relatively equal member of the Western community. In the beginning of the Cold War this proved to be "of critical importance in defining the interests and shaping the choices of U.S. decision makers in Europe" (Hemmer & Katzenstein 2002, p. 575). International cooperation requires a strong sense of collective identity, which these states shared, as affected by racial, historical, cultural, and political factors. Therefore in constructivism terms such an organization like NATO seems grounded and with a potential to persist. However, realists oversaw the importance and efficacy of this non-state actor, basing their stance on the principals of anarchically international arena and the security dilemma. Moreover, realists failed to explain why the U.S., being so militarily powerful, favored multilateral cooperation in Europe after the WWII; military capabilities alone did not provide substantial reasons why NATO persisted, and even expanded (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002).

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1.2.2 State-centrism and non-state actors

State-centrism is one of the key approaches in classical realism, which is based on the notion that state is a political authority structure that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in the international arena. However, the new research that came after the rise of theories of economic interdependence, the new research in realism acknowledged the importance of the

non-state actors, such as transnational organizations like NATO. State-centrism seemed dated and was widely critiqued, mostly because of the realism's failure to take into consideration the role of the non-state actors in the international arena, and explain such problems like international terrorism (Elman & Jensen, 2014).

However, because of the struggles the states had over the centuries in order to maintain that monopoly, they can be regarded as "projects" – ongoing political programs designed to upkeep the monopoly on the usage of force. In constructivism state has also been regarded as a primary unit of analysis. Wendt (1999, p. 9) supports this idea by arguing that "states are the dominant form of subjectivity in contemporary world politics" and argues that states are decision making agents. It is important to note here that individual state power is not disregarded in this work: member states of NATO hold the power on deciding such aspects as the size of military expenditure, and have the right to withdraw from the Alliance. The decisions in NATO are unanimous and taken by a common accord – there is no voting or decision by majority. Each nation represented at the NAC table or on any of its subordinate committees retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions[1].

Nevertheless, Wendt (1999) agrees that non-state actors should not be disregarded as well, as they have important influence on deciding whether states should use force in the international arena, and may be increasingly significant. My unit of analysis is NATO's official texts. Yet NATO is precisely a non-state actor. It a *collective* security organization, where decisions are made collectively, and defense objectives have the same power in all member states. NAC is the principal political decision-making body within NATO, which encompasses high-ranking representatives of each member state, and supervises the political and military

[1] Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49763.htm

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security processes relating to issues that affect the whole Alliance[2]. The NATO defense planning process influences national defense plans of member states and puts priority on NATO's capability requirements, assigns those requirements to each member as reference points, facilitates their implementation, and regularly evaluates progress[3]. This makes NATO a powerful non-state actor in terms of military and security questions, making it a stable unitary entity in the international game.

1.3 Communication and discourse

Realists assume that the information exchange between international actors about their intentions is relevant but usually is poorly communicated. Therefore states must assume the worst and be defensive. Furthermore, realists argue that actors cannot improve the conditions in which they exchange information, therefore states constantly have to be in preparedness to meet worst-case scenarios (as in Fearon & Wendt, 2002). In this international environment states are concerned about their security from being attacked, thus they are driven to acquire more power to escape the impact of the power of other actors. This creates the vicious circle of security and power accumulation, known as the security dilemma (Herz, 1950). In this dilemma, communication and reassurance about the intended moves is of high importance (Montgomery, 2006). As Glasser (1994, p. 67) put it:

> A state seeking security should be concerned about whether its adversary understands /.../ its motivations. Uncertainty about the state's motives /.../ or /.../ incorrect belief /.../ will increase the adversary's insecurity, which in turn will reduce the state's own security. Thus, structural realism suggests that states should be very interested in demonstrating /.../ their motives /.../.

[2] Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49763.htm
[3] Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm

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In order to reflect, interpret, and thus form their identities, actors need to be able to use language. Zehfuss (2002) in her critique of constructivism points out that language *is* action in itself, and does not just mirror actions of actors in the international game, like constructivists argue. According to her, language is not systematically conceptualized in the literature that Wendt draws arguments on. It leaves Wendt's statements not clear enough, because the role of language can only be assumed in his argument: when speaking about the development of relations between international actors, he relies on gestures, and fails to talk about declarations, threats, and assertions (Zehfuss, 2002), which are common means of international communication, and, as presented in the later chapters of this thesis, are regular in NATO's discourse regarding Russia.

According to Zehfuss (2002), Wendt's (1992) approach towards international communication is somewhat similar to a game theory approach towards an exchange of moves between players. As in Wendt's (1992) described process of international communication or an exchange of moves, one actor responds to another actor's gestures by interpreting those gestures based on own experience. The meaning of the gesture that another actor puts on is unrelated to what the responding actor perceives of it. According to Zehfuss (2002, p. 49), the "linguistic exchange in which these judgments and interpretations and the experiences on which they are based could be at issue does not take place". Reaching the same interpretation of the international game, if that is even possible, is based on trial and error, which makes it impossible to analyze the meaning of communication between international actors, which do not communicate *about* the behavior, as they communicate *through* their behavior. Therefore constructivist analysis of international communication must focus on the behavior of the actors that can be apprehended only without a linguistic context (Zehfuss, 2002). However, in this

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work exactly the linguistic side of the NATO-Russia relations is analyzed. One of the reasons for choosing an open approach when explaining the findings was these ambiguities and disputes between realism and constructivism.

1.4 Previous studies

Previous studies on NATO discourse are rather scarce. In this section I shortly present previously done research on NATO's discourse that has similar implications to this thesis. Most of the analyses done on similar topics used the method of discourse analysis, and looked into NATO's role in various areas (e.g. Gheciu, 2005; Græger, 2010). Article by Gheciu (2005) examines the dynamics and practices of socialization enacted by NATO in post–Cold War Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on constructivists, she argues that NATO mostly used mechanisms of teaching and persuasion to convey certain liberal-democratic norms of security into the former Warsaw pact countries like Czech Republic and Romania. She did a discourse analysis of relevant public and semi-confidential documents, which was also one of the methods used in this thesis. According to Gheciu, discourse analysis helped her to reveal background inter-subjective assumptions regarding the nature of the world, the identity of subjects inhabiting that world, and relations among them. Article by Græger (2010) addresses security and defense discourse in Norway after the end of the Cold War, focusing on the impact of the transformation of NATO and the transatlantic tensions in the War on Terror. She concluded that changes in security policies are a result of the discursive battle between various power constellations, which force different understandings of reality on each other. However, in her article she does not use a research method, and approaches the discourse rather descriptively, focusing on meta-frames in Norwegian policy making discourse.

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One overarching similarity to the previous research done on NATO's discourse is that the scholars mostly drew from constructivism and liberalism, disregarding the realist stance as being outdated (e.g. Flockhart, 2011, 2012; Orford; 1999). Therefore this thesis could add to the body of research by incorporating realist arguments when explaining NATO's stance regarding the Ukrainian crisis. Moreover, this work might contribute to the field because it analyzes NATO's stance in terms of Russia, which was not extensively analyzed before. An article by Flockhart (2011) questions assumptions that characterize NATO as being set on 'hard security' and the EU being proponents of 'soft security'. The study uses recent empirical evidence that compares the EU and NATO in terms of partnerships and operations, and shows that in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the EU has been constructing a hard narrative, whereas NATO's negative experience in Afghanistan has driven the organization towards a narrative of avoiding failure, emphasizing a soft narrative about partnerships. However, he adds that the narrative might be facing a change after NATO's robust intervention in Libya. Another article by Flockhart (2012) addresses the puzzle that NATO has been very busy in the late 2000s, but has not managed to construct a powerful narrative and maintain ontological security. In his article Flockhart analyzes NATO's current and past narratives, practices, and action patterns, and shows that NATO's recent crisis does not stem only from difficulties in Afghanistan, but rather is the result of changes in NATO's established practices and new fundamentally different forms of action.

As for the general discourse regarding Russia, there are even less research done, especially on Russia in terms of Ukrainian crisis. Again, the studies analyzing discourse on Russia mostly draw on constructivist and highlight the social identity formation aspect in European discourses. Furthermore, European take on Russia analysis mostly focuses on policy research and is analyzes geopolitical subjectivity (e.g. Browning, 2010; Aalto, 2010).

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Arguments in the article by Browning (2010) emphasize the socially constructed nature of European regions as "imagined communities". According to him, European builders of the 1990s signed with the postmodern understanding of the constructed nature of social reality, yet the representational practices they used to promote change were often re-inscribing to the very world they have wanted to change. He concludes that the new region building does not resonate well with a Western European legacy constituting Europe as a unified civilized empire. Most importantly, this gives Russia options either of having imperialist stance or to remain marginalized and peripheral in terms of Europe. Similarly, Aalto's (2010) article deals with the recent studies that have approached the EU geopolitically, as an empire interested in enlargement. The article introduces the meta-concept of geopolitical subjectivity, which is used to study the EU–Russian relations on the topic of Kaliningrad region, which is Russian dominion within the EU. The article concludes that the EU's geopolitical subjectivity on this issue is constituted more strongly by Russia's recognition of Kaliningrad's status, than by the EU's own identity and interest projects.

A recent work by Mearsheimer's (2014), while not being a research *per se*, offers interesting insights into the NATO-Russian-Ukrainian issue. In his realism influenced work Mearsheimer claims that the U.S. and its European allies are mostly responsible for the Ukrainian crisis, and puts NATO enlargement as the pivotal reason as to why Russia decided to expand into Ukraine. He makes a considerable point that the two sides – Russia and NATO – have been operating according to different approaches: Russian side have been thinking and acting according to realist principles, whereas their NATO "counterparts have been adhering to liberal ideas about international politics" (Mearsheimer 2014, p. 8). In result U.S. and its allies unknowingly provoked Russian military insurgence into Ukraine thus escalating a major international crisis.

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Part I: Text analysis

The first part of this work deals with the official NATO texts' analysis. It contains the research methodology and the results.

Chapter 2: Methodology I

In this chapter I present the research methodology used for the first part of the data analysis. I cover the logic behind the chosen method (section *2.1 Logic*), and describe the materials – the official NATO texts selected for this part of the research (section *2.2 Primary data*). I also present the approach used in the analysis, namely, mixed methods, describing both quantitative and qualitative methods that I used (section *2.3 Analysis*). This chapter also specifies the software package used in the analysis. It is important to note here that the methodology regarding the interview analysis can be found in *Chapter 4: Methodology II*.

2.1 Logic

I chose the following methods because they help to analyze the language, and public discourse analysis connects politics and linguistics (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997). As for the methods used, constructivism approves large variety of methods, including quantitative, qualitative, and their combinations. Interpretive methods include discourse analysis, variations of which is mostly used throughout this thesis. This method and its conjunction to quantitative approaches proved to be useful identifying "background inter-subjective meanings and social structures and the agents involved in social processes" (Adler, 2002, p. 101). Furthermore, they helped to identify

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the reasons as to why some but not other discourses have emerged. When analyzing data, constructivists hold on to notion that explanations for causal processes requires interpretation along with uncovering inter-subjective meanings. In addition, constructivists draw their descriptive inferences by means of traditional methods of analysis, but make their constitutive inferences by drawing on historical narratives; constructivist explanations often include reconstructed narratives. However, it is important to note here, that not all statements or variables have the same weight when interpreting the data, and methods are used to reveal social structures, mechanisms and regularities (Adler, 2002). In this thesis I take the same approach, and describe my findings from quantitative and qualitative analyses at first, and then I connect them to the historic perspective, leading to main conclusions. It is important to note here that realist arguments are also used throughout the analysis, as some aspects of the discourse are better understood when drawing on realism.

2.2 Primary data

The official NATO texts, provided by their website, were analyzed in this research. The items were found on *www.nato.int*, under the section "E-library" - "Official texts (Chronological)"[4]. Such texts included official statements issued by the NATO officers, progress reports, public reports, programmes, and declarations (23 texts in total). After the initial view, one text (namely, "Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan /.../") was disregarded as being not applicable for the analysis due to its nature and language, which were very different from the researched topic and the other texts. This was done in order to run a more focused analysis and not to distort the possible results. The

[4] Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts.htm?query=&keywordquery=*&date_from=01.03.2013&date_to=01.03.2015

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agreement did not convey a discursive opinion explicitly, and while an agreement itself can be understood as a form of expressing an opinion, it was not in the scope of this study to measure such acts. The items were divided into two chronological categories or subsets. The first category included the statements issued one year before March 2014 (5 texts), the second one – the statements released during one year after March 2014 (17 texts). March was chosen as a threshold because of the military and geopolitical events that took place that month, namely, Crimea's annexation, administered by Russia, and the start of the War in Eastern Ukraine. The latter officially is dated as starting on April 6th 2014, however, on March 6th, the same year, Donetsk Regional State Administration Building was occupied by pro-Russian protesters, which marked the start of rallies in that region.

It should be noted here that all the texts were included in the analysis, regardless of them addressing Russia directly or not. This means that the items were selected chronologically, not by keyword search. Such an approach was chosen in order to analyze the quantitative aspect of the data and to look, whether NATO's discourse about Russia was carried out indirectly as well. To be more precise, this research aimed to look at whether Russia has been mentioned in other documents as well, not only the ones that addressed NATO-Russia relationship directly, and to look, what kind of contexts Russia had been mentioned in (if mentioned) indirectly. This research was limited to the official texts only - NATO press releases were omitted because the scope of this study covered diplomatic rather than public relations. It was determined that there have been as much as 341 NATO press releases from March 2013 to March 2015[5]. In addition, after the initial overview of the NATO press releases it was concluded that the content of more explicit press releases match that of the official texts, and

[5] Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/press_releases.htm?query=&date_from=01.03.2013&date_to=01.03.2015

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the short press releases were mostly the announcements of meetings, visits, and summits of NATO officials, thus deeming their content qualitatively irrelevant to the research.

2.3 Analysis

I analyzed the data by using a mixed methods approach comprising of quantitative and qualitative methods. Such approach was chosen, because the research question was set to study both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of NATO's discourse about Russia, namely, the frequency of addressing Russia (quantitative part), and the context it had been mentioned in (qualitative part). Both methods sought to possibly answer what might be the reasons for such a discourse. Quantitative methods, specifically – descriptive statistics, were used in the beginning of the analysis to possibly guide the further selection of themes and items in the qualitative part, which generated the explanatory arguments for the assumptions. Qualitative methods, namely – thematic and discourse analysis, were used to analyze the context regarding Russia. Mixed methods serve as a compensation for the overlapping weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative approaches; it also enlightens different aspects of the researched political phenomena (Kelle, 2006).

Descriptive statistics included the frequencies and the weighted percentages (the frequency of the word relative to the total number of words counted) of the most frequent words in both "before" and "after" sets, as well as the word count in the texts. Qualitatively, the items were analyzed using both thematic and discourse approaches. Such methods were chosen primarily in order to explore the factual patterns that Russia had been depicted in before and after the events in Ukraine started, and to look into power relations, in sake of getting a deeper understanding, how and why such NATO's discourse had been conveyed. For the data

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categorization, both deductive and inductive techniques were used. This was done with the purpose of grasping both the predicted patterns, and those which emerged in the process of analysis. The bottom-up coding was carried out after the initial overview of the texts. The top-down coding was then run in order to test the assumptions straightforwardly. Then a discourse analysis was carried out, focusing on seven texts that were dealing with Russia more directly. The data was interpreted by one individual.

I assumed that the themes and the patterns that Russia is depicted in differ both quantitatively and qualitatively in NATO's discourse. To be more specific, I assumed that, before the events in Ukraine, Russia had not been opposed to NATO (by NATO themselves), and has not been addressed as frequently, and that has changed starting with March 2014. Furthermore, it was assumed that after the crisis in Ukraine started, Russia is being depicted as a threat and being addressed more often.

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A computer software package for qualitative analysis NVivo® 10 (2012), produced by QSR International (30 day free trial version) was used to work with the items. This program assisted in analyzing the data by identifying the frequently used words, and providing the visuals.

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Chapter 3: Results I

In this chapter I introduce the results of the first part of the research, namely the thematic discourse analysis, focusing on the official NATO stance regarding Russia before and after the Ukrainian crisis which started on March 2014. At first I explain how I obtained the results. Then I describe and explain the quantitative analysis, reporting on relevant descriptive statistics (section *3.1 Heightened attention*). I follow up with inductive and deductive thematic analysis results (sections *3.2 Cold stance* and *3.3 Fundamental challenge*). Finally, in section *3.4 Nuclear deterrence* I present and explain the discourse analysis findings.

In the beginning, the whole data set was read in order to get the general idea about the nature and the manner of the official NATO's language and discourse. The items then were uploaded to the software program NVivo, and divided into two categories, namely statements issued before, and after March 2014. To be more precise, they were coded by right-clicking on the uploaded text name and selecting "Code Sources" – "Code Sources at Existing Nodes", and then selecting either "Before" or "After" nodes.

3.1 Heightened attention

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At first, 50 most frequently occurring words were identified in both "before" and "after" sets. This was done in the program NVivo by going to "Query" - "Query Wizard" - "Identify frequently occurring terms in content", and then selecting the option to include words with the same stem (e.g. "*security*" and "*secure*"). The word grouping was done in order to reduce the noise, yet some of the words were still separated by the program, like "*allies*" and "*alliance.*" The weighted percentages (WP) with their corresponding words can be seen in *Table 1*, as well

as their position on the list of 50 most frequently appearing words. Such statistics were chosen with the purpose of looking at how much of actual verbal attention NATO was paying to certain keywords. It is important to note here that, because the set sizes were different (5 texts in the "before", and 17 in the "after" sets), the "before" set was more sensitive to the word frequency count, because it was smaller.

Table 1

Frequently occurring words, their weighted percentages and the position in the list

Word	Weighted percentage		Position (out of 50)	
	Before	After	Before	After
Russia	-	0.63	-	18th
Ukraine	0.45	0.88	42nd	7th
Defense	0.51	0.97	29th	5th
Support	0.57	0.71	24th	13th
Partnership	0.51	0.71	34th	24th
Partners	-	0.71	-	12th
Allies	-	1.03	-	3rd
Alliance	-	0.83	-	11th
Integrity	-	0.37	-	39th
Threats	-	0.37	-	42nd
Cooperation	1.53	0.71	3rd	14th
Peace	1.4	0.62	4th	19th

Note. The full list of 50 most frequent words can be found in the *Appendix A.*

As *Table 1* shows, the word "*Russia*" did not appear in the 50 most frequent words in the "before" set at all, but was 18th on the word frequency list in the "after" set. This proves the assumption that before the conflict in Ukraine started, Russia had not been addressed by NATO as frequently, as after, and got bigger attention after the events began. The word "*Ukraine*" was

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mentioned almost twice as much in the "after" set, as compared to "before." From the position change on the word frequency list, it can be seen that "Ukraine" had a substantial rise in NATO's attention, jumping from the end of the list to the top. This is congruent with the previously mentioned NATO's attention to Russia, which clearly had risen. The word "*defense*" had almost double the frequency in the "after" set, as compared to the "before" one; its position in the word frequency list had a substantial jump as well. Such frequency change might signal about heightened NATO's attention to the defense after the events in Ukraine started. The word "*support*" also had a visible frequency change. Without the context it is difficult to say, whether this support was sought after or suggested by NATO, but such numbers show that the importance of support had become bigger after the events in Ukraine. From *Table 1* it can also be seen that the word "*partnership*" along with the word "*partners*" were mentioned more frequently in the "after" set, as compared to the "before" one. Again, without the context it is rather obscure, what kind of partnerships were stressed by NATO, but it might suggest that the attention paid to this issue had risen after the conflict in Ukraine started. After running a quick search for the words "*partners*" and "*partnership*" in the "after" set, it can be seen, that Russia indeed appeared in the context with these keywords. In fact, NATO-Russia's partnership was one of the main themes of NATO's discourse regarding Russia[6], which ties in with the fact that NATO's attention to the Russian Federation has heightened after the crisis in Ukraine started.

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Furthermore, the word "*allies*" popped up in the "after" set as well as the word "*alliance*", both landing in top positions in the word frequency list. This signals that NATO started addressing its allies after the events in Ukraine, or at least started doing that more often than one year before March 2014. Words "*integrity*" and "*threats*" appeared in the "after" set as well, being absent prior to the commencement of the Ukrainian conflict. Again, it is difficult

[6] More on the NATO-Russia partnership issue can be found in section *3.2 Cold stance.*

to say, what such frequencies mean without the context, however it might suggest that NATO had paid attention to integrity and some threats more often, than before March 2014. After running a quick search for the word "*integrity*" in the "after" set, it can be seen, that this keyword almost exclusively appeared in a collocation with a word "*territorial*", both pertaining to the context of Ukraine. In almost all of these instances NATO was calling upon Russia to respect "Ukrainian sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity". This ties in with the fact that NATO's attention to Ukraine and Russia has heightened after the crisis in Ukraine started. As for the word "*threat*", after a keyword search it appears that this word contextually mostly pertained to the Middle Eastern and North African states[7]. Such an attention jump, even though not that high, can be explained by the deteriorating situation in the aforementioned territories as of 2014: IS growth (e.g. "Al Jazeera," 2014), worsening Syrian civil war (e.g. United Nations, 2014), and aggravated post-revolution situation in Libya (e.g. Murray, 2015).

Finally, words like "*cooperation*" and "*peace*" had a substantial frequency decline, which might signal not only about the NATO's decreased attention paid to these phenomena, but also about the overall decline of peace and cooperation in the international arena: according to the Global Peace Index, the world had become less peaceful in 2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), 2014).

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3.2 Cold stance

Secondly in the data analysis, the context in which most frequent words appeared was thematically analyzed by using an inductive approach. Since Russia did not appear in the first

[7] More on NATO's discourse regarding the Middle East and North Africa can be found in section *3.3 Fundamental challenge.*

subset of texts, the so-called word tree was made out of the second set (*Appendix B*). A word tree displays the results as a "tree" with branches representing the different contexts in which the searched keyword occurs. The branch is a five-word (by default) sentence piece that is connected to the searched keyword: five words go before, and five words go after the keyword, with the keyword presented in the middle. Word tree enables to find recurring themes or phrases that surround the keyword. This procedure was done in the program NVivo by going to "Query" - "Query Wizard" - "See where particular terms occur in content." The branch order in the word tree with the term "*Russia*" (along with the words of the same root) was chosen to appear in accordance with the number of matches (the frequency in which the branch occurs), with 5 contextual words on each branch. The latter options do not affect the search process in the program, they only pertain to the representation of the results[8].

Russia had quite a few contextual branches, because it was mentioned 87 times. Themes of condemnation (appeared 7 times), violation of international law (5 times), violation of sovereignty and security of other states (5 times), and address of NATO-Russia's partnership (6 times) appeared to be the most frequent ones in the context, where Russia was mentioned directly. Another theme of Russia's actions being called illegal and aggressive was also quite prominent (mentioned as much as 12 times). It should be noted here that several words from the quantitative stage of the analysis were prominent in this step of the thematic analysis, namely, "Ukraine", "integrity", and "partnership." This suggests that, when speaking about Russia, NATO often addressed Ukraine and/or Crimea at the same time, making the situation in Ukraine a pivotal "umbrella" theme regarding discourse about Russia. These themes with the examples of their corresponding quotes can be seen in *Table 2*. In addition, similar themes

[8] More on how to run a word search in the program NVivo can be found on http://help-nv10.qsrinternational.com/desktop/procedures/run_a_text_search_query.htm

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were evident in the answers provided by NATO officials analyzed in the second part of this study (see section *5.2 Bipolarity question*).

Table 2

The examples of themes of NATO's discourse regarding Russia

Theme	Example (Text date)
Condemnation	"We strongly condemn Russia's continued and deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine /.../" (2014q, December 2)
Illegality, aggressiveness	"/.../ Russia's illegal self-declared annexation of Crimea and Russia's continued aggressive acts in other parts of Ukraine /.../" (2014l, September 5)
Violation of: International law	"/.../ Russia's /.../ destabilization of eastern Ukraine in violation of international law /.../" (2014j, September 4)
Violation of: sovereignty and security	"/.../ Russia continues to violate Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity /.../" (2014c, March 4)
NATO-Russia's partnership	"We continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia /.../ would be of strategic value" (2014m, September 5)

Note. The full list of the quotes pertaining to the themes can be found in the *Appendix C.*

Besides the meta-theme of Ukraine, pertaining to the majority of the NATO's discourse about Russia, other two themes, namely the ones about condemnation and the aggressiveness of Russia's actions were partially overlapping. The majority (five out of seven) of the statements, condemning Russia's actions, name them as being "illegal", "illegitimate", and even "deliberate." The referred actions are the ones made by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, Crimea, and Georgia. The annexation of Crimea is repeatedly called "self-declared", which not only stresses the illegitimate side of such action, but also is indirectly derogatory, as it implies that the action was done without any reason or proof that would cause others to agree with such action (Merriam-Webster, 2004). Russia's actions against Ukraine are mostly called "intervention", which in itself suggests that that action is sought to have an influence (Merriam-

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Webster, 2004). Therefore it seems that NATO and Russia relationship was marked mostly by the situation in Ukraine, making the stance between NATO and Russia cold, but not openly conflictual.

Another overarching theme was NATO's reaction to Russia's violation of international law and the sovereignty of other states. With regards to international law, Russia was addressed because of its actions both in Ukraine and Georgia, yet Ukraine was mentioned more often. The majority of such statements presented Russia's violation of international law as a fact, with no implications as to what such a situation means to NATO itself. One instance, however, was not as neutral, as it expressed an open demand:

> We demand that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from aggressive actions against Ukraine; withdraw its troops; halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border. Russia must use its influence with the separatists to deescalate the situation and take concrete steps to allow for a political and a diplomatic solution which respects Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internationally recognized borders" (2014m, section 16).

The previous passage contains a modal verb "*must*", which is used to assert power and communicate influence, as it directly seeks to steer agents' actions in a certain direction (Bhatia, 2006). After running a search on the occurrences of modal verbs in the "after" set, I found that the modal verb "*must*" was used almost exclusively with regards to Russia; for example: "Russia must respect its obligations under the United Nations Charter and the spirit and principles of the OSCE, on which peace and stability in Europe rest" (2014b); "Russia must end its support for militants in eastern Ukraine, withdraw its troops and stop its military activities /.../, respect the rights of the local population /.../, and refrain from further aggressive actions /.../" (2014j), "Russia must use its influence with the separatists to deescalate the

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situation and take concrete steps to allow for a /.../ solution /.../" (2014m). Modal verbs can be useful indicators of ideological differences, and are useful in identifying suspicion between agents, but importantly, they assist to display power and make influence, or even manipulation (Bhatia, 2006). Because all the instances of the modal verb use regarding Russia are related to the Ukrainian issue, it shows that indeed the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine was a pivotal moment in NATO-Russia relations, which afterwards became seemingly cold.

In addition, the previous passage from the "Wales Summit Declaration" also refers both to Russia's violation of international law, and Ukraine's sovereignty. The latter issue is being referred to as a continuous action done by Russia that infringes on the safety of Ukraine. The infringement of the sovereignty of Georgia is mentioned only once, and not as directly (see *Appendix C*). This suggests that the issue of Ukraine gave NATO a room to address Russia in a more hostile manner, yet not as much as to openly call Russia a threat. Because Ukraine is not a member of NATO, the insurgence of Russian troops in its Eastern territories does not violate the borders of NATO itself. Yet Ukraine borders Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and is across the Black Sea from Turkey, which are all NATO member states. This means that, after the events in Ukraine began, a conflict appeared close to the actual border of NATO, which, in turn, posed a danger to the security of NATO itself. It is important to note here that Georgia does not border any NATO states. Taking into consideration that conflict in Ukraine is still geographically quite far from the physical borders of NATO, and NATO has no open conflicts with Russia itself, NATO's discourse regarding Russia is cautious, yet – again – cold; and, because Georgia is not bordering any NATO member states, it has been mentioned not as frequently, as Ukraine.

Another emerging theme pertaining to the actual relations between NATO and Russia

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suggested, however that NATO is seeking to counterbalance such coldness by "aspiring for partnership" with the Russian Federation. Such a stance might seem as a default discourse in the diplomatic relations. Yet, because NATO-Russia's partnership was a recurring topic, it might suggest that NATO is actually seeking to break the newly emerged coldness and not to ruin the relationship that had been built before the crisis in Ukraine started. After looking at the dates of such statements (see *Appendix C*), it occurs that NATO was still seeking such a partnership six months after the conflict in Ukraine began. This ties in with the previous findings that, regardless of NATO's discourse being cold, it is not openly hostile (assuming that an openly hostile stance would create a point of no return in the NATO-Russia relations).

3.3 Fundamental challenge

Third step of the data analysis was to carry out a non-data driven or deductive thematic analysis. This was done in order to test the assumptions straightforwardly. The data was analyzed after the assumption that NATO started referring to Russia as a threat after the crisis in Ukraine began. Therefore words, semantically related to "*threat*" were searched in the "after" set (as mentioned before, the word "Russia" did not appear in the "before" set at all). Such words and those similar to them were both generated by the program itself[9], or chosen by the author. The synonyms were generated in accordance with the dictionary definition of a "threat", and selected from a thesaurus synonym list. Threat is defined as a statement saying one will be harmed, or indicating something that could cause trouble, harm, violence, etc. Threat is also defined as an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage or do other hostile action (Merriam-Webster, 2004). Most common synonyms of threat are "hazard", "menace", "peril",

[9] More on how the program NVivo selects word synonyms can be found on http://help-nv10.qsrinternational.com/desktop/deep_concepts/understand_text_match_settings.htm

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"pitfall", "risk", "danger", "trouble", and "intimidation"[10]. The words that appeared in the texts and gave some results were as follows: "*threat(s)*", "*terrorism*", "*risk(s)*" and "*insecurity*." Again, with the help of NVivo software I formed and investigated the word trees, in order to see whether those words were contextually related to Russia. This procedure was done in NVivo by going to "Query" - "Query Wizard" - "See where particular terms occur in content." Note here that in this instance tree branches were constructed from 10 contextual words (presented in alphabetical order). Again, the latter options had no impact on the search process in the program, as they only pertain to the representation of the results.

After looking at the word trees with the aforementioned keywords (*not presented here*), it was concluded that almost none of the branches referred to Russia, but were contextually mostly related with the Middle East and Northern African regions - states like Syria, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Mali, and the Islamic State (ISIL) movement; for example:

> The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses a grave threat to the Iraqi people, to the Syrian people, to the wider region, and to our nations. /.../ ISIL has, with its recent advance into Iraq, become a transnational threat. /.../ ISIL's presence in both Syria and Iraq is a threat to regional stability. It has become a key obstacle to political settlement in Syria and a serious risk to the stability and territorial integrity of Iraq. The people of Syria and Iraq and elsewhere in the region need the support of the international community to counter this threat (2014m, section 33).

or

> We are deeply concerned by the ongoing violence and the deteriorating security situation in Libya, which threaten to undermine the goals for which the Libyan people have suffered so much and which pose a threat to the wider region. We urge all parties to cease all violence /.../ (2014m, section 38).

[10] Retrieved from http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/threat

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These findings contradict the assumption that NATO started referring to Russia as a threat after the crisis in Ukraine began. It seems that the discourse used by NATO is more explicit and even quite dramatic when it refers to the Middle Eastern or North African states when compared to that regarding the Russian Federation. From the given examples it can be seen that the argumentation used to call ISIL or the Libyan regime a threat could as well be generalized to the Russian insurgence in Ukraine or Georgia: advancing into the territory of another state, regional destabilization, and infringement of (territorial) integrity of another state. These arguments were used by NATO, when indicating Russia's actions in Ukraine and Georgia as well (see section *3.2 Cold stance*). However, NATO condemned illegitimate and aggressive Russia's actions, at the same time expressing aspirations for future partnership with Russia. The situation is the Middle East and Northern Africa, on the other hand, was called "a threat to regional stability" and "to the wider region", as well as a "key obstacle", "serious risk", and even a "grave threat", with the following request for the support from the international community, and the "urge [to] all parties to cease all violence." Such an explicit language could be explained by the fact that the U.S., being the superstate and one of the biggest and most powerful NATO members declared an open war against terrorism after the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks. The aforementioned Middle Eastern and North African countries are the major hosts for the biggest and most active world terrorism groups, such as Al Qaeda (al-Qa'ida), Taliban, and Al-Nusrah Front (Miller & Warrick, 2013; also IEP, 2014), and thus are targets of this war. That might be one of the reasons why IS has been addressed in a very explicit language while Russia has not: after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has become 'an ally' of the free world rather than 'an enemy' with whom the U.S. might be 'at war' with.

One instance did mention Russia in a context, which was similar in terms of vocabulary to the discourse used to address Middle Eastern or North African states, with an open statement

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that the situation in Eastern Ukraine is caused by Russia:

> We are deeply concerned that the violence and insecurity in the region caused by Russia and the Russian-backed separatists are resulting in a deteriorating humanitarian situation and material destruction in eastern Ukraine. /.../ This violence and insecurity also led to the tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines passenger flight /.../ (2014m, section 17).

Nonetheless, such formulation, while being similar to that in relation to Libya, is not as explicit, considering the frequency with which Russia has been addressed after the conflict in Ukraine started: the violence and insecurity here are not called a threat. Going back to the descriptive statistics (*Table 1*, section *3.1 Heightened attention*, as well as *Appendix A*), it is important to note here that North African or Middle Eastern states were mentioned less frequently in NATO's discourse than Russia or Ukraine (or Georgia for that matter). For instance the word "Syria(n)" did not appear in the "after" set at all (it was one of the least frequent words in the "before" set), as well as other aforementioned North African or Middle Eastern states. In fact, Afghanistan – one of the major hosting states for terrorist groups – was in the 17th position amongst the 50 most frequent words in NATO's official texts one year before the events in Ukraine, and was only in the 43rd position after the crisis started. This discrepancy between the frequency and the language used by NATO to name certain states could be partially explained by the border length and conflict proximity. NATO shares 1,215 kilometers of land border with Russia, and 1,295 kilometers of land border with problematic Middle Eastern states, such as Syria and Iraq (both seized by the IS close to the borders of Turkey), and no land border with North Africa. However, both Afghanistan, and even Georgia are further from the actual NATO borders, thus having a less pivotal role.

In addition, when investigating the word trees for the synonyms of "*threat*" I noticed that Russia appeared in a context with a word "*challenge*" a few times. Therefore I decided to

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run a word search for this word by forming a word tree again, with a keyword "*challenge*" in the middle (*Appendix D*). Russia turned out to be addressed by NATO as a challenge seven times, both directly and indirectly (see *Appendix E*). From the context that Russia had appeared in, it seems that Russia's actions had been called "fundamentally" challenging when referring to the whole Alliance or Euro-Atlantic region, and called a "security" challenge when referring to Ukraine or Georgia (the latter instance had an indirect reference). Thus it seems that NATO is addressing Russia frequently, but in a diplomatically cold manner, while the more verbally intense reference to the Middle Eastern or Northern African states is less frequent. This discrepancy, drawing on the realism theory, could be explained by not only geopolitical factors, such as border proximity, but also by military factors, such as military strength. Conflict in Ukraine and IS expansion in the Middle East are both near NATO borders. However Russia is a nuclear state[11], with one of the world's top five armies according to its size and strength (Freedom House, 2014), whereas IS military resembles a guerrilla army with a haphazard and limited weaponry. This is one of the explanations as to why NATO had referred to Russia in a more moderate manner, as compared to North African or Middle Eastern states.

3.4 Nuclear deterrence

The fourth and final stage of the official texts' analysis was to more thoroughly analyze the discourse in which Russia has been depicted. Discourse analysis was done in order to look over the data and possibly find what had been missed out by the quantitative or thematic analyses, and to look for "significant silences", as power relations often work through absences. The discourse parts that have not been covered by the inductive or deductive thematic analysis were focused on, aiming to get a deeper understanding of NATO's stance, and to try to explain the

[11] More on the nuclear issue can be found in section *3.4 Nuclear deterrence*.

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motives behind such discourse. Seven texts from the "after [conflict in Ukraine]" data set were chosen for this step, specifically the ones that addressed Russia directly. The names of the seven texts along with their approximate length in words can be seen in *Table 3*.

Table 3

Names, release dates and approximate length in words of the NATO documents picked for the discourse analysis

Name	Date	Approx. length (words)
"North Atlantic Council statement on the situation in Ukraine"	March 2nd, 2014	300
"Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the so-called referendum in Crimea"	March 17th, 2014	210
"Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission"	April 1st, 2014	340
"Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers"	April 1st, 2014	460
"Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission"	September 4th, 2014	840
"Wales Summit Declaration /.../"	September 5th, 2014	13 010
"Joint statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission"	December 2nd 2014	800

From the word length of the selected documents, it can be seen that NATO's attention to Russia had progressively expanded. This can be partially linked to the downing of Malaysia Airlines passenger flight MH17 on the 17 July, 2014 which happened in Eastern Ukraine, and which was carried out, presumably, by Russian supported Ukrainian separatists. This lethal accident affected NATO directly because the plane was carrying civil citizens mostly from the NATO member states. The accident had led vast media coverage as well as ardent reactions from civil society in NATO member states as the separatists did not allow to investigate the crash site and gather the remains. However, the MH17 crash was mentioned only once in the official NATO documents, more specifically in the "Wales Summit Declaration":

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> We are deeply concerned /.../ the violence and insecurity in the region caused by Russia /.../ led to the tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines passenger flight /.../ Allies call upon all states and actors in the region to ensure immediate, safe, and unrestricted access to the crash site of MH17 /.../ Those directly and indirectly responsible for the downing of MH17 should be held accountable and brought to justice as soon as possible (2014m, section 17).

It is important to note here that, instead of using a stronger modal verb "*must*", NATO used a verb "*should*" when addressing the downing of the plane. Again, as mentioned in section *3.2 Cold stance*, modal verbs help to assert power and make influence (Bhatia, 2006). Yet in this instance the modal verb softened what could have been a more determined and instructive statement - if conveyed with a modal verb "*must*". This signals a more hesitant NATO regarding the MH17 crash, with less obligation and expectation attached. This lack of authority and control, and a general absence of discussion regarding the MH17 accident might stem from the nature of the accident itself. The passenger plane was most likely downed by a surface-to-air missile ("Reuters," 2015) that could reach high commercial airliner altitude, and this proved that the opposing forces that border NATO have powerful weaponry. NATO had addressed this issue of weaponry and military activities more; for example: "The North Atlantic Council condemns the Russian Federation's military escalation in Crimea" (2014b); "We urge the Russian Federation to de-escalate the situation, including by ceasing all military activities against Ukraine" (2014d), "We call on Russia to de-escalate by reducing its troops in Crimea to pre-crisis levels and withdrawing them to their bases; to reduce its military activities along the Ukrainian border" (2014h), "We condemn Russia's military build-up in Crimea" (2014q), "We are also concerned with Russia's stated plans for further military build-up on the Black Sea, which will potentially have further implications on the stability of the region" (2014q).

Firstly, it can be seen that the naming of Russian military actions changed over time in

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NATO official texts: from military "escalation" (since March 2nd, 2014) it changed to "build-up" (since December 2nd, 2014). This change might be explained by such military aspects as intensified military exercised conducted by Russians. Between September 19th and 26th, 2014, after the Russian military actions were called "activities" by NATO for the last time, Russian military forces had, according to the president Putin himself, "the largest exercises of this kind /.../ ever held" in Russia (Kremlin, 2014). In addition, on March, 2015, Russia held another massive military exercise, described in the press as the "biggest shows of force since its ties with the West plunged to Cold War-lows" (Grove, 2015). Amongst the military forces that were participating in the exercises were units responsible for strategic nuclear arsenal ("Reuters," 2014). Therefore, such a discourse shift might also signal a changed NATO perspective about the Russian military power in general.

Secondly, the last quote from the "Wales Summit Declaration", section 17, carries a more explicit massage: it might be understood as a warning to Russia not to use the arms stationed in the Sevastopol military base in annexed Crimea to threaten NATO as NATO might retaliate in the Black Sea region ("further implications"). It is important to note here that it is not Crimea that is mentioned – it is the Black Sea. This can be tied in with the security dilemma: after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia lost its military base in Sevastopol, which fell into the possession of Ukraine. Because Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria are NATO members, the Black Sea has become a place of the collision of the two major players (NATO and Russia). After the European expansion of NATO in 2004 when seven East and Center European states joined the Allies, NATO forces pushed forward, thus creating a dilemma for Russia. Annexation of Crimea, not being a bloody conflict, might be viewed as an outcome of such a dilemma.

To add, in the Wales Summit Declaration, section 64, NATO states that it "needs, now

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more than ever, modern, robust, and capable forces at high readiness, in the air, on land and at sea, in order to meet current and future challenges." Given that the word "challenge" was almost exclusively related to Russia, such discourse might be regarded as an implicit, but clear message – NATO needs to be alert at all times in order to defend itself from Russia if need be. Before the section 64, sections 49, 50 and 52 speak about nuclear weapons, stating that as long as they exist, "NATO will remain a nuclear alliance" (section 50), and that a "[m]issile defense can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. The capability is purely defensive", thus delivering several messages: firstly, it acknowledges the existence of nuclear weaponry outside of NATO (Russian Federation is precisely such a state, having almost as much nuclear warheads as the U.S., which, again, is one of the biggest and most powerful states within NATO); secondly, it conveys the message that NATO has no plans in dissembling it's nuclear weapons; and thirdly that it does not plan to use them, if there is no need. In addition, this is similar to the "attack-defend" contrast evident in the answer by NATO official Brauss (see section 5.*2 Bipolarity question*).

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Part II: Field research

The second part of this work deals with the analysis of the interviews obtained during the field research conducted for this thesis. It contains the research methodology and the results.

Chapter 4: Methodology II

In this chapter I discuss the field research done for this thesis, by presenting the purpose of this field study, the data obtained, and the method used to analyze it. I shortly introduce NATO event that I attended, along with the data obtained and the expectations that I had for the results (section *4.1 Purpose*). I also present the method chosen for this research part, namely, critical frame analysis, and give the reasoning as to why it was selected (section *4.2 Method*). Finally, this chapter deals with data concerns and implications that have to be taken into account when analyzing the obtained interviews (section *4.3 Concerns*). It is important to note here that the methodology regarding the official texts' analysis can be found in *Chapter 2: Methodology I*.

4.1 Purpose

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After analyzing the official NATO documents, it was decided to interview officials about their opinion on the idea that the world is facing another Cold war again. In order to attain such data, the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting was attended (henceforth – the meeting). The meeting took place in Antalya, Turkey, on 13-14th May, 2015. I attended the meeting as a journalist, representing a Lithuanian private media company "Lithuania's Morning" and Lithuanian National Radio. I obtained two interviews, which I recorded, transcribed and analyzed using

critical frame analysis. The aim of this field research was to obtain answers on the Cold War II topic from NATO officials, to analyze the framing that they used in the interviews, and to see what this adds to the results of the official NATO texts' analysis. The logic behind this aim was to see how accurate to the actual NATO-Russia relations the official NATO discourse is. It was assumed that, if the answers provided by the NATO officials went along with the patterns in the official texts, it would support the idea that, even though NATO's stance became colder after the start of the Ukrainian crisis (see *Chapter 3: Results*), NATO-Russia relations are not facing another Col War. If the answers provided different information than that in the official NATO texts, it would provide support to the Cold War II idea that has been suggested by the media. It was expected NATO officials' answers to be negative in terms of the question about NATO-Russia relations facing another Cold War. On the other hand, I expected NATO officials to frame their answers in way that would suggest the NATO-Russia relations being in fact cold. These assumptions draw on both constructivist (Wendt, 1992) and realist arguments (as in Zehfuss, 2002) (see *Chapter 1* for more in depth explanation).

4.2 Method

I chose the method of critical frame analysis, as a form of discourse analysis, because it takes into account the voice and the roles of the political actors, as well as details like personal features of the interviewees, their audience, as well as the perspective and references in their discourse. As Verloo (2005, p. 19) put it, a frame is an "interpretation scheme that structures the meaning of reality". According to her, frames do not describe the reality, but rather help to shape the understanding of it. Similarly, Kuypers (2009) defined frames as rhetorical entities, making us alter our perceptions about the reality in a way that makes some aspects of the world more prominent; in other words, frames make some information more salient. This form of

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qualitative analysis draws on constructivist social theory, where discourse is regarded as having important physical and non-physical effects, through its role in truth construction (Verloo, 2005). Kuypers (2009) described framing as a process where political actors try to construct a point of view that encourages the facts to be interpreted by the audience in a particular manner. This framing can be either conscious or unconscious, and is done in order to define problems, examine causes, make moral judgments, and propose solutions. Frame analysis deals with the construction of reality by political actors "through the use of symbolic tools" (Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998, as in Verloo, 2005, p. 20). Additionally, the method of frame analysis allows to grasp and describe multiple frames that might be contradictory, thus helping to detect shifts of discourse frames (Verloo, 2005). Therefore frame analysis was selected as the most appropriate method to analyze the interviews.

The obtained interviews were both semi-structured, involving probing and giving space for the interviewees to lead the discussion. It consisted of one question with an additional inquiry to provide personal commentary on the issue. Both respondents were high ranking NATO officials. The first interviewee was Heinrich Brauss, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning (since 2013). The second interviewee was Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General (since 2014)[12]. Both of them were asked separately the same question: did they think that the current situation between NATO and Russia is similar to that of the Cold War? The question itself also carried additional information about the geopolitical and military events between the two powers. To be more precise, the question "Do you think NATO-Russia relations are facing the Cold War situation again?", requiring only a dichotomous "Yes" or "No" answer, mentioned such facts like the extensive military drills

[12] More detailed dossiers of both of the respondents can be found in the *Appendix F*, along with the full transcripts of the interviews.

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happening alongside of the NATO-Russia borders (Barrabi, 2014), as well as an increased military activity all over the word, which has been the most intense ever since the Cold War ended (NATO, 2014n). I constructed the question in this way so that it would make it difficult for the respondents to contradict the presented facts. This was done so as to make them argue their answer more, this way obtaining more information and reaching further than the official discourse patterns provided by the NATO official texts. It is important to note here that because I was asking questions as a media representative, the answers provided by the respondents might be considered official, as the interviewees knew that their answers were to be published. Therefore I argue that the information obtained in the Meeting can be considered comparable to the one in the NATO official texts so as to add to the previous results, as it was provided by NATO officials, and it was supposed to be public.

4.3 Concerns

This field research has had its limitations. The situation of how and where the interviews were obtained must be taken into consideration, as well as the context of the meeting, the circumstances, and the length of the interviews. The professional background of the respondents should also be considered. The situations in which both interviews were conducted differed in a way that the one made with Brauss was obtained on a press briefing session with no cameras and approximately 15 media representatives in the room, and the one with Stoltenberg was obtained in the official press room, during a press conference, which was recorded by the media representatives from all over the world, Russia included. My question was pre-selected.

It is important to conceptualize the meeting here, because it happened three months

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after the end date of the official texts covered in the previous analysis, so it happened not in the same time frame. After February 5th, 2015 (the issue date of the latest official text available in the start of this research), the most substantial event in the Ukrainian crisis was the signing of the second Minsk agreement (henceforth – Protocol) on February 12th, 2015. The Protocol essentially calls for ceasefire, withdrawal of arms, with a more specific mentioning of "pullout of all foreign armed formations", allowance of international monitoring, and social and economic restorations in eastern Ukraine ("The Telegraph," 2015). The Protocol was signed by the he leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany ("BBC," 2015), and entered into force on February 15th, 2015. Even though Ukrainian forces at first withdrew from the Eastern regions, Russia continued to back the separatists, thus breaching the commitment. On February 27th NATO Supreme Allied Commander Philip Breedlove called the situation in Ukraine as worsening every day. Shortly after, the next day, Russian a prominent opposition personality Boris Nemtsov was killed in front of the Kremlin, spurring vast international media attention. On March 9th Putin openly confirmed that Russia "had made plans to annex Crimea in advance of the peninsula's occupation by unidentified gunmen in March 2014". Subsequently, on March 13th he was declared missing for one week, also generating worldwide media attention. The fighting in Eastern Ukraine continued, and on April 9th U.S. troops started training Ukrainian soldiers, thus strengthening NATO-Ukrainian military cooperation. On April 27th EU extended sanctions for Russia[13].

Furthermore, the Meeting had a high security level and a strict schedule, which made the access to the officials challenging. Therefore it was difficult to obtain more lengthy and in depth interviews. These circumstances had an effect on the duration and the length of the interviews as well: the time spent with Brauss was approximately 25 minutes, out of which

[13] A more detailed timeline of the Ukrainian crisis can be found on http://csis.org/ukraine/index.htm

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around 800 words were recorded. The interview with Stoltenberg was not personal and lasted for approximately 3 minutes, which yielded around 220 word-length response. However, it was decided to include the Secretary General's answer to the analysis due to the rank of the interviewee and because the answer itself contained substantial information. Finally, when analyzing their answers it must be taken into consideration, that Brauss is a military official, and his position in NATO is more related with defense planning and strategy development. Stoltenberg, while being the head of the Alliance, is not a military officer and was never involved with the creation of military strategy. This might have had an effect on the answers: Brauss' narrative might have been more focused on the military aspects of NATO-Russia relations, and Stoltenberg's answer might have been framed in a more diplomatic manner. In addition, because of the difference of the situations in which the information was obtained, Stoltenberg's answer might have been less explicit, than Brauss' answer.

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Chapter 5: Results II

In this chapter I present and explain the main findings from the second part of the data analysis. At first I explain how I obtained the results. Then I analyze the initial answer provided by the respondents (section *5.1 Different situation*). I follow up by presenting the critical frame analysis results, describing and explaining the voice and the diagnosis of the frames in the interviewees' answers as well as presenting and explaining the prognosis of the researched frames (section *5.2 Bipolarity question*). In section *5.3 No avoidance* I present the analysis of the situation in which the answers were obtained. I finish up with connecting the results from both parts of the study (section *5.4 Connecting the results*).

In the beginning I analyzed the straightforward Brauss and Stoltenberg's answers. Then I ran a critical frame analysis: I looked into the voice, diagnosis of the frames, and attribution of the roles in the diagnosis. The perspectives, actors, problems, and mechanisms mentioned by both respondents were analyzed. I also looked for causalities, perceived responsibilities, and roles in the provided frames. Then the prognosis, and the attribution of roles in the prognosis in the answers of Brauss and Stoltenberg was analyzed. I looked for hierarchy of goals, and their suggested suitable course of action. I also checked for normativity and balance of the frames, looking for what is perceived as good or bad, and the emphasis put on different elements, as well as contradictions within those elements (as in Verloo, 2005, pp. 30-31).

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5.1 Different situation

Firstly, I looked into how the interviewees answered my initial question "Do you think NATO-Russia relations are facing the Cold War situation again?" requiring a dichotomous "Yes" or

"No" answer. Both Brauss and Stoltenberg responded with a "No". The assumption that both respondents would provide negative answers was confirmed. Brauss elaborated on his answer, repeating the disagreement several times, and expressing a strict attitude, for instance, by saying "By no means". Stoltenberg, on the other hand, was more discreet and diplomatic: "I think it's not a right thing to characterize the present situation as Cold War". Such a formulation expresses disagreement as well, yet is more toned down, as compared to Brauss' "By no means". Stoltenberg's answer is also more personal, conveyed with a repeated collocation "I think". Such a position can be either understood as a detachment from the general NATO stance, or can be also seen as an avoidance of speaking for the whole organization. Furthermore, the difference between Brauss and Stoltenberg's answers can be partially explained by their professional background, as mentioned in section *4.3 Concerns*: Brauss is a militarily officer, a Lieutenant General and a Commander, previously involved with operations and exercises, as well as NATO's strategy planning. Stoltenberg, on the other hand, is a politician, previously serving as a Minister in various areas, but not Defense (see *Appendix F*). Therefore Brauss might have been less diplomatic and stricter, than Stoltenberg.

Respondents' disagreement with the concept of the Cold War II was supported by several iterations of the same word collocation "situation [is] completely different". In fact, such a collocation was repeated six times by Brauss and few times by Stoltenberg in almost the same form; for instance, "this is completely different today" (Brauss), and "there are clear differences between now and the Cold War" (Stoltenberg). One of the main purposes of repetition is to make the interviews seem smooth and uncontroversial (Bhatia, 2006), and to avoid saying more than planned or allowed (Grice, 1975). Repetition also enables political leaders to demonstrate a diplomatic picture, and in some instances it also helps to reinforce the idea (Bhatia, 2006). Furthermore, due to the importance of the public discourse, stressed by

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realism and constructivism (see *Chapter 1* for more in depth explanation), high ranking international military officials could not provide a positive answer to a question if their organization is facing a war with another international nuclear actor, as it might have tremendous consequences. In terms of diplomatic communication a positive answer might mean not just an affirmation that a war is happening, but could have actually escalated one. After all, Stalin's response to Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech was to accuse the West of calling the Soviet Union for a war (Hinds & Windt, 1991).

5.2 Bipolarity question

Secondly, I looked into how the respondents framed their negative answers to the initial question. The assumption that the respondents would frame their answers in way that suggested the NATO-Russia relations being in fact cold, was confirmed. The frames of both interviewees can be seen in *Table 4*. Brauss provided more information, therefore his frames are more explicit than those of Stoltenberg. This can be due to the difference of the duration and the length of the interviews themselves, and due to the difference of the situations in which the interviews were obtained: Stoltenberg had time constraints when answering my question, and was more exposed than Brauss. From the frame diagnostics it can be seen that the perspectives, problems, actors, and mechanisms mentioned by both Brauss and Stoltenberg are similar. Both respondents based their answers on military and ideological perspectives, Brauss introducing strategic and fundamental perspectives as well. Both interviewees framed the problem of the Cold War as bipolarity, a division between two blocs or systems, both sides being "skewed". Brauss also called both sides "antipodes", thus highlighting their opposing nature. As for the actors, both Brauss and Stoltenberg named NATO and Warsaw pact as two main players of the Cold War, Brauss also distinguishing his own country Germany, with its former Eastern and

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Western sides, and the Soviets. He also mentioned other actors such as Denmark, Brits, Dutch, Belgians, and even Swiss German. It is important to note here, that Brauss named Western Germany as "my country" a couple of times. Such an indication might signal a strong commitment or patriotic identification, as well as belonging to a certain *side*. This might mean a high personal importance to the topic. Stoltenberg pointed out "the whole world" being an actor during the Cold War, which might be a sign of his perception of the size and pervasiveness of the War itself. However, he mentioned the whole world being an actor when speaking about "ideological fight" thus hinting at how important and pervasive ideologies were during the Cold War.

Table 4

Frames in NATO officials Heinrich Brauss and Jens Stoltenberg's answers

Frames	Respondent	
	Brauss	Stoltenberg
Perspectives	Political, strategic, military; ideological and fundamental	Military, ideological
Problem	Antipodes, two systems, skewed; divided	Two blocks
Actors	NATO, Warsaw pact; "my country" (Germany), Soviets, Easter German, West of my country; "from Denmark, to Brits, Dutch, Belgians, Swiss German"	NATO, Warsaw pact; whole world
Mechanisms	*They*: armies; highly armed, highly equipped, ready to attack within hours, training everyday *We*: twelve army chords; standing, training, exercising every day, ready to defend	Standing against each other; fighting

In addition, both interviewees mentioned similar mechanisms when speaking about the Cold War: the fighting between two sides. Brauss, again, was more explicit about it, talking separately about the mechanisms aggravating the problem on both sides. He described the Soviet army as being "highly armed, highly equipped, ready to attack within hours, training everyday", and the Western German army as "standing, training, exercising every day, ready

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to defend". Similarly, Stoltenberg described both sides as "standing against each other". When compared, both mechanisms in Brauss' answer essentially differ by one aspect: Soviet armies were "ready to attack", and Allies were "ready to defend", thus framing the latter as a target group, and Soviets as possible perpetrators. It is important to note here, that Allies being framed as a target group does not equal to them being depicted as victims: the vocabulary used to indicate the mechanisms used by NATO is very similar to that of Soviets' (e.g. NATO army "exercising every day" and Soviet army "training everyday", or "huge [Soviet] armies" and "twelve [NATO] army corps"[14]), suggesting both sides are perceived as being equal in terms of military power. Furthermore, this "attack-defend" contrast is congruent with NATO's discourse described in section *3.4 Nuclear deterrence*.

When attributing the roles of diagnosis, it can be seen that even though causality is not clear in Brauss' answer, Soviet side is seen as responsible for the problem of the world being divided into two, as it was them who were "ready to attack". In Stoltenberg's answer, however, responsibility is not as clear, but there is a hint of causality: the Cold War period, according to him, lasted "until the fall of the Berlin Wall". Therefore it seems that "the whole world" was divided by something that was made by the Communist side, at the same time showing that this problem of world division was a problem to the West, not the Communist side. With regards to normativity, such dichotomy between the NATO and Communist side creates a contrast and sets a tone as to who is perceived as good and bad, Soviets pertaining to the latter concept. Even though this work does not seek to analyze the Cold War discourse, it is important to note here, that this dichotomy is congruent with the traditional Western anti-communist rhetoric, prevalent throughout the Cold War. Similarly to Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in

[14] A corps is a military unit composed of two or more divisions, and consists of approximately twenty to forty thousand soldiers (Kreidberg & Henry, 1955).

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early 1946, the Soviet-Communist side of the Cold War is still portrayed as "growing challenge and peril" to the West (Hinds & Windt, 1991, p. 93) by both interviewees, and can be shortly described as being the "evil" side. The main role of the "good" side – the West – according to the Truman Doctrine was to *defend* not only itself, but the whole world from the communist threat (Hinds & Windt, 1991). According to Hinds and Windt, "[i]n this ideological dichotomy there was no middle ground. The sharp division was a paradigm in which European nations were already either on one side of an iron curtain or the other /.../" (1991, p. 93), and this dichotomy and division can be seen in both Brauss and Stoltenberg's answers when speaking about the Cold War, showing that their *own* perspective is still framed by the one that had been construed after WWII.

As for prognosis, both interviewees framed their answers from the current perspective. When speaking about the current Russia, Brauss went back to the same themes evident in the official texts (see *Table 2* in section *3.2 Cold stanc*e), namely, the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and international law: "We have now reason to call upon Russia /.../ to withdraw from Ukraine and /.../ to respect the international law, to reestablish all the triggers they have breached". Brauss mentioned Minsk agreements as an explanation as to why there is "no indication of further escalating to a big war", and then immediately agreed that Russia has breached the Protocol: "There are many violations, yes /.../."At the end of his answer Brauss introduced a concept of hope, which can be understood as an emotional trigger presented at the end of the message: "So there is a reason to hope /.../", "Hopefully". Such an ending to an answer might be supposed to sell the bright message, that the world is not divided. Yet the diagnosis of the content before this message in fact gives out that there is little difference between the perspectives, problems, actors, and mechanisms in the post-Ukrainian crisis world and during the Cold War. This emotional trigger might be understood as an attempt to influence

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the audience. “Emo-political” language is often used for the pre-determination of behavior, in order to influence a person to behave in a certain manner (Bhatia, 2006). Stoltenberg, while giving the same negative answer like Brauss, worded it out differently. Instead of sending a positive message along with giving hope like Brauss, he introduced a new idea, and idea of a situation that is not similar to that of the Cold War but also not similar to that which was before: “/.../ we are neither in the strategic partnership we have tried to develop nor in a Cold War situation. We are in something which is different“. He framed his message in historic terms, speaking about the same defensive mission of the Western world like in Truman’s Doctrine (Hinds & Windt, 1991), and stressing the defensive nature of the Alliance; for instance: “/.../ we had to adapt our Alliance to a new security environment /.../ by increasing the readiness and the preparedness of our forces; and partly by working with the partners”, “/.../ we are responding”, “everything we do is /.../ defensive”. Such a discourse is similar to that in the official NATO texts analyzed in the first part of this thesis (see section *3.4 Nuclear deterrence*), where the defensive nature of the Alliance is reiterated and stressed repeatedly.

5.3 No avoidance

Other aspects of the answers of both interviewees were analyzed as well. In his answer Brauss repeatedly used the imperative “Look” (see *Appendix F*). The first time he used it was before the introducing of the problem of the world being divided into two during the Cold War. The next time Brauss used the imperative before introducing the actors which were on the each side of that division, namely the Soviet Union and NATO. The imperative was used before the prognosis as well, that is, before mentioning Minsk agreements signed in 2015. As mentioned in section *5.1 Different situation*, repetition enables to reinforce the idea (Bhatia, 2006). Furthermore, Brauss himself made a conclusion for another person once, just before

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mentioning the nuclear issue: "You will agree, this is completely different". The use of the imperative and a suggested conclusion might signal the attempt to exercise power upon the interviewer or the audience in general, as well as an attempt to make influence, and to convince better. Influence is the exertion of power used to lead person's actions or even perceptions in a specific direction (Bhatia, 2006). It is important to note here, that Brauss' answer could have had the same content without the imperatives, repetitions, and open suggestions. Furthermore, as mentioned in section *5.1 Different situation*, Brauss expressed a strong commitment to and patriotic identification with his country Germany, and this might explain the high importance of the Cold War topic for him. In addition, this is also congruent with the level of elaboration that was provided in the answer, as compared to his other answers to other journalists.

As mentioned in section *4.3 Concerns*, Stoltenberg's answer was obtained during a press conference, with my question being pre-selected. The latter fact might not seem important at first, but, as Bhatia (2006) states, question pre-selection in political press conferences is a sign of power asymmetry between journalists the politicians. My question being pre-selected for the final press conference with NATO Secretary General brings us to one of the most important points of this part of the analysis. The leaders and their press offices are able to choose which questions are fitting, and who has the right to address them. Pre-selection also displays avoidance of certain topics and is useful in the deflection of political blame (Bhatia, 2006). When questions are not pre-selected, literature says that speakers tend to disregard the questions altogether, especially when the questions "accentuate such negative factors as sensitive subjects, revelations, credibility problems, or inconsistencies" (Manheim, 1979, p. 60). Minimization of negative aspects is often employed by speakers like political leaders for evasive purposes, so as to minimize negative reactions by the media and public, which might occur due to the ideological differences between the two sides. Control in question pre-

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selection is often exercised in order to preclude such contradictions and ideological contrasts (Bhatia, 2006). Because my question was chosen on the basis that it was already heard by the NATO press officers in the press briefing with Brauss before, it leads to thinking that NATO *did not* deflect from political blame in terms of Cold War II idea, and did not avoid to state their answer. The fact that NATO did not avoid the topic of the "New Cold War", and openly denied it supporting the answer by various power exerting techniques, might mean that the issue of Cold War is at stake and is important to NATO. The avid disagreement provided by both Brauss and Stoltenberg shows not the avoidance of the Cold War issue, but the avoidance of the *construction* of such an issue. Again, because the Cold War was not only an arms race but also an ideological clash conveyed through rhetoric, such an avoidance seems legitimate, as "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992, p. 395)

5.4 Connecting the results

How can the results of the two research parts of this thesis be connected? From the first part of the data analysis it can be concluded, that NATO's attention paid to Russia has heightened after the crisis in Ukraine started, and their discourse became rather cold. Russia started being described as a fundamental security challenge, but not as a threat to the Alliance or international security *per se*. The nuclear question is not forgotten; Russia being a nuclear state is taken into consideration by NATO and nuclear defense is openly declared. These results might seem to signal a situation that is indeed similar to that of the Cold War: two superpowers experiencing a crisis that has elicited from a peripheral territory – namely, Ukraine, – issue, sanctioning each other, communicating in a cold manner, and securing their nuclear warheads in case of another player made a move. These conclusions are primarily explained by realist terms.

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As for the field research results, NATO officials claimed that the world is facing a completely different situation than that of the Cold War, at the same time framing their answers in a way that signals the NATO stance being cold, which is congruent with the findings from the first part of the research. This contradiction between the rigidity of their stance, and the perspective of their answers, as well as the lack of an open declaration that Russia is a threat seem to indicate avoidance, and a particular concern. It is not the Cold War question that is avoided, but rather the War itself. After all, any kind of war is detrimental both economically and militarily. In a peace-war game a question of winning is still a question of losses and gains, and some amount of loss is almost always guaranteed. With losses comes the need to explain the value of gains, which is not always clear. Therefore it seems that the West, namely – NATO, is trying to avoid the *construction* of another Cold War idea, even though the current reality with its economic and military implications is indeed cold. This supports the notion that the Cold War was not only an arms race with an Iron Curtain hanging in between two antipodes, but also a clash of two opposing discourses.

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Conclusions

In this part I present the main conclusions of this thesis, connecting the findings from the both data analysis parts. I overview the results and from the first part of the research, namely, from the NATO official texts' analysis, and follow up with the overview of the findings obtained from the field research, specifically, the results from the interviews with NATO officials. I connect the two parts by explaining how the results fulfill each other, and finally introduce further discussion, pointing out the limitations of this study as well as future recommendations.

Cold War ended some 25 years ago. The tension between two superpowers – the U.S. and the Soviet Union seemed to have died of afterwards, both sides becoming "strategic partners." The post-soviet region remained tense, with Russian Federation being the largest successor of the Soviet empire, and a largest power in the region. The once existing tension translated into the new rivalry, namely, between Russia, and NATO, which was always the counter-power to the Soviet Union. As the tense atmosphere creates a constant threat of miscommunication leading to fatal results, it is of a pivotal importance for the international actors to communicate. Official discourse is precisely such a communication. Cold War showed game theory principles working for almost half of a decade, until one of the players, namely, the Soviet Union, disassembled. NATO was left standing as a player knowing the rules of the Cold War game well. Such knowledge seems to be translated into the current NATO discourse. It can be seen in the official NATO texts taken one year before and after Russian-driven military crisis in Ukraine started. In this research, the texts were analyzed by a number of techniques to test the assumptions as to whether Russia was addressed more frequently and more explicitly by NATO after the conflict in Ukraine began, and to look for the reasons for such a discourse.

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To sum up, the quantitative part of the analysis confirmed the assumption about the increased attention in NATO's discourse regarding Russia: the latter was mentioned substantially more often after the conflict in Ukraine started. Furthermore, after the crisis in Ukraine started NATO's attention to Ukraine, defense, support, partnership, integrity, threats, and allies had risen, whereas cooperation and peace received less NATO's attention. These findings had set path to further data analysis, as the context in which these words appeared had to be explored. The results from the bottom-up thematic analysis only partially went along with the assumption that, after the events in Ukraine started, Russia was being depicted as a threat in NATO discourse. Even though Russia has been opposed by NATO, it has not been referred to in an openly hostile manner, and NATO's discourse about Russia mostly stayed within borders of neutral diplomatic discourse. NATO had referred to Russia in several themes, most of which were related to the presumed Russia's insurgence to Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Russia had been addressed because of its violation of international law and violation of the sovereignty of other states. Russia's actions had been called illegal and aggressive, yet it received condemnation, but not more.

In addition, the deductive thematic analysis proved that the assumption about Russia being depicted as a threat after the events in Ukraine started is false. It seems that NATO's discourse regarding Russian Federation is diplomatically cold, but extensive – Russia received more attention after the crisis in Ukraine started, than other conflictual regions like the Middle East or North Africa, but the latter had been addressed in a more explicit manner. Russia had been referred to mostly as a fundamental security challenge, and the situation in the Middle East and North Africa had been referred to as a threat. Cold War was not an open tactile war, and, if nowadays situation between Russia and NATO is being regarded as resembling that of the Cold War, Russia cannot be addressed in the same language, like another state is (here the

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word state is being used loosely, as IS is only self-declared and not acknowledged internationally) that has been openly declared the war against. If Russia was addressed in a harsher manner, this would send a message to the Russian Federation that possible moves might be done against its safety. Such situation, again, goes back to realism and game theory – miscommunication between international players might lead to disastrous results.

As for the results from the second part of this thesis, the assumption that both respondents would provide negative answers was confirmed. Brauss elaborated on his answer, repeating the disagreement several times, and expressing a strict attitude. Stoltenberg, on the other hand, was more discreet and diplomatic. The assumption that the respondents would frame their answers in way that suggested the NATO-Russia relations being in fact cold, was confirmed. Frame diagnostics showed that problems, actors, and mechanisms mentioned by both Brauss and Stoltenberg were similar. Both respondents based their answers on military and ideological perspectives. Both interviewees framed the problem of the Cold War as bipolarity, a division between two blocs or systems. As for the actors, both Brauss and Stoltenberg named NATO and Warsaw pact as two main players of the Cold War. In addition, both interviewees mentioned similar mechanisms when speaking about the Cold War: the fighting between two sides. When compared, both mechanisms in Brauss' answer essentially differ by one aspect: Soviet armies being ready to attack, and Allies being ready to defend. Even though causality is not clear in Brauss' answer, Soviet side was seen as responsible for the problem of the world being divided into two, as it was them who were ready to attack. In Stoltenberg's answer, however, responsibility was not as clear, but there is a hint of causality: the whole world was divided by something that was made by the Communist side. Finally, the avid disagreement provided by both Brauss and Stoltenberg indicated not the avoidance of the Cold War issue, but the avoidance of the *construction* of such an issue.

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Finally, today's situation and that of the Cold War goes well with our theoretical framework: two international players arm themselves, when they do not know what the other player is planning, in order to secure themselves, but linger to attack, as it can lead to mutual assured destruction (Parrington, 1997). Because both NATO and Russia are players with nuclear weapons, not using a nuclear weapon means that there is a high chance that the other side will not use it as well. This balance requires open acknowledgment (open communication) of each nation's strengths and vulnerabilities. Thus, the main conclusion would be that even though the Cold War might already be happening in terms of the political economic, and military reality, Western officials are avoiding the *creation* of this concept and are thus careful with their discourse regarding Russia. Considering the Cold War II idea already has been stirring up in the media and thus in the society, the question is when it will "creep in" into the diplomatic discourse. Taking into account, the international reality is already resembling the Cold War, with its sanctions and military show offs, the construct of the Cold War has a potential of appearing in the public discourse again, as it is supported, fueled and aggravated by the actual reality.

This study is not without its limitations. Firstly, the scope of the first data analysis part is quite narrow, including only the official texts by NATO. Even though there is a certain amount of an overlap between other NATO texts like press releases, speeches, transcripts, and the official texts, more data could be included in order to analyze the official NATO discourse more in depth. Furthermore, the time frame could be expanded. Another limitation pertains to the second part of this research, namely - the field research. The analysis was done only with two interviews, so the future research could be focused on obtaining more interviews with NATO officials. Also, the interviews were analyzed using the frame analysis, and it would be

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interesting to analyze it with other qualitative methods. Furthermore, it would be useful to see what kind of implications the EU discourse has regarding the Russian-Ukrainian issue, as the EU is another important actor in the West-Russia relations in the post-Ukrainian crisis setting.

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Appendix A

Table A1

50 most frequently occurring words in the "before" set, their position in the list, count, weighted percentages and their respective similar words

Position	Word	Count	WP	Similar Words
1.	security	53	3.38	secure, security
2.	NATO	46	2.93	NATO
3.	cooperation	24	1.53	cooperate, cooperation, cooperative
4.	peace	22	1.4	peace, peaceful
5.	mission	16	1.02	mission, missions
6.	commitment	15	0.96	commitment, commitments, committed
7.	international	15	0.96	international
8.	Japan	15	0.96	Japan
9.	operations	15	0.96	operational, operations, operative
10.	women	15	0.96	women
11.	gender	14	0.89	gender
12.	2013	13	0.83	2013
13.	UNSCR	13	0.83	UNSCR, UNSCRS
14.	council	12	0.76	council
15.	developments	11	0.7	developed, developing, development, developments
16.	nations	11	0.7	national, nations
17.	Afghanistan	10	0.64	Afghanistan
18.	weapons	10	0.64	weapons
19.	government	9	0.57	government
20.	joint	9	0.57	joint
21.	OPCW	9	0.57	OPCW
22.	political	9	0.57	political, politically
23.	resolutions	9	0.57	resolution, resolutions
24.	support	9	0.57	support, supporting
25.	training	9	0.57	train, training
26.	welcome	9	0.57	welcome, welcomes

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27.	areas	8	0.51	area, areas
28.	continue	8	0.51	continue, continued, continues
29.	defense	8	0.51	defense
30.	ensure	8	0.51	ensure, ensuring
31.	implementation	8	0.51	implementation, implementing
32.	including	8	0.51	included, including
33.	led	8	0.51	led
34.	partnership	8	0.51	partnership, partnerships
35.	practical	8	0.51	practical, practically
36.	united	8	0.51	united
37.	dialogue	7	0.45	dialogue
38.	issues	7	0.45	issue, issues
39.	mutual	7	0.45	mutual, mutually
40.	regions	7	0.45	region, regional, regions
41.	Syrian	7	0.45	Syrian
42.	Ukraine	7	0.45	Ukraine
43.	values	7	0.45	valued, values
44.	1325	6	0.38	1325
45.	2118	6	0.38	2118
46.	Afghan	6	0.38	Afghan
47.	chemical	6	0.38	chemical
48.	common	6	0.38	common, commonalities
49.	force	6	0.38	force, forces
50.	importance	6	0.38	importance, important

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Table A2

50 most frequently occurring words in the "after" set, their position in the list, count, weighted percentages and their respective similar words

Position	Word	Count	WP	Similar Words
1.	NATO	385	2.77	NATO
2.	security	272	1.96	secure, security
3.	allies	143	1.03	allied, allies, allies', ally
4.	continuing	141	1.01	continuation, continue, continued, continues, continuing, continuous, continuously
5.	defense	135	0.97	defense
6.	forces	126	0.91	force, forces
7.	Ukraine	123	0.88	Ukraine
8.	including	122	0.88	include, included, includes, including
9.	internationally	120	0.86	internal, internally, international, internationally
10.	nations	117	0.84	nation, national, nationality, nationally, nations, nations', nations'
11.	alliance	115	0.83	Alliance
12.	partners	99	0.71	partner, partners, partners'
13.	support	99	0.71	support, supported, supporting
14.	cooperative	99	0.71	cooperate, cooperation, cooperative
15.	operations	92	0.66	operate, operation, operational, operationally, operations
16.	committed	91	0.65	commit, commitment, commitments, committed
17.	capabilities	88	0.63	capabilities, capability, capable
18.	Russia	87	0.63	Russia
19.	peace	86	0.62	peace, peaceful
20.	contribute	79	0.57	contribute, contributed, contributes, contributing, contribution, contributions
21.	efforts	76	0.55	effort, efforts
22.	also	72	0.52	also
23.	development	71	0.51	develop, developed, developing, development, developments, develops
24.	partnership	68	0.49	partnership, partnerships
25.	women	65	0.47	women

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26.	implementation	63	0.45	implement, implementation, implemented, implementing
27.	plan	63	0.45	plan, planned, planning, plans
28.	enhance	62	0.45	enhance, enhanced, enhancement, enhancing
29.	military	62	0.45	military
30.	region	61	0.44	region, regional, regions
31.	political	57	0.41	political
32.	work	56	0.4	work, worked, working, works
33.	related	55	0.4	related, relating, relation, relations
34.	welcome	55	0.4	welcome, welcomed, welcomes, welcoming
35.	remain	54	0.39	remain, remaining, remains
36.	ensure	53	0.38	ensure, ensured, ensures, ensuring
37.	Georgia	53	0.38	Georgia
38.	strengthen	53	0.38	strengthen, strengthened, strengthening, strengthens
39.	integrity	52	0.37	integral, integrate, integrated, integrating, integration, integrity
40.	readiness	52	0.37	readiness, ready
41.	summit	52	0.37	summit, summits
42.	threats	52	0.37	threat, threats
43.	Afghanistan	50	0.36	Afghanistan
44.	Atlantic	50	0.36	Atlantic
45.	response	49	0.35	response, responses, responsibilities, responsibility, responsible, responsive, responsiveness
46.	law	48	0.35	law
47.	well	48	0.35	well
48.	territorial	48	0.35	territorial, territories, territory
49.	building	47	0.34	build, building, builds
50.	policy	46	0.33	policies, policy

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Appendix B

Figure B

Word-tree with a keyword "Russia" for the "after" set





(Figure B – continuation)

Appendix C

Table C

Themes of NATO's discourse regarding Russia with the examples

Theme	Examples (Text date)
Condemnation	"/.../ our condemnation of Russia's illegal military intervention in Ukraine /.../" (2014f, April 1) "We, the Foreign Ministers of NATO, are united in our condemnation of Russia's illegal military intervention in Ukraine /.../" (2014f, April 1) "We strongly condemn Russia's illegal and illegitimate self-declared "annexation" of Crimea /.../" (2014j, September 4) "We condemn in the strongest terms Russia's escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine /.../" (2014m, September 5) "We strongly condemn Russia's continued and deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine /.../" (2014q, December 2) "We condemn Russia's military build-up in Crimea /.../" (2014q, December 2) "We condemn steps taken by Russia in Georgia /.../ " (2015b, February 5)
Illegality, aggressiveness	"/.../ united in our condemnation of Russia's illegal military intervention in Ukraine /.../" (2014f, April 1) "We do not recognize Russia's illegal and illegitimate attempt to annex Crimea" (2014f, April 1) "We strongly condemn Russia's illegal and illegitimate self-declared "annexation" of Crimea and its continued and deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine /.../" (2014j, September 4) "We condemn in the strongest terms Russia's escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine /.../" (2014m, September 5) "/.../ Russia's illegal self-declared annexation of Crimea and Russia's continued aggressive acts in other parts of Ukraine /.../" (2014l, September 5) "Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine /.../" (2014m, September 5) "We do not and will not recognize Russia's illegal and illegitimate 'annexation' of Crimea" (2014m, September 5) "/.../ international rejection of Russia's illegal and illegitimate 'annexation' of Crimea" (2014m, September 5) "Russia's illegitimate occupation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine /.../" (2014m, September 5) "We strongly condemn Russia's continued and deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine /.../" (2014q, December 2)
Violation of: International law	"/.../ Russia has violated international law /.../" (2014f, April 1) "/.../ Russia's /.../ destabilization of eastern Ukraine in violation of international law" (2014j, September 4) "We demand that Russia comply with international law /.../" (2014m, September 5) "/.../ Russia's pattern of disregard for international law /.../" (2014m, September 5)

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	"/.../ steps taken by Russia in Georgia which are in breach of Russia's international obligations and commitments /.../" (2015b, February 5)
Violation of: sovereignty and security	"/.../ Russia continues to violate Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity /.../" (2014c, March 4) "/.../ Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity" (April 1st 2014) Indirect: "Our goal of a Euro-Atlantic region whole, free, and at peace has not changed, but has been fundamentally challenged by Russia. We support the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of all states within their internationally recognized borders. An independent, sovereign, and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and respect for human rights, minorities, and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security" (2014f, April 1) Indirect: "We reiterate our continued support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders. /.../ We welcome Georgia's commitment not to use force and call on Russia to reciprocate. We continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states and to withdraw its forces from Georgia" (2014m, September 5) "Russia's actions undermine the security of Ukraine /.../" (2014q, December 2)
NATO-Russia's partnership	"/.../ NATO has consistently worked for closer cooperation and trust with Russia" (2014f, April 1) "We continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia /.../ would be of strategic value" (2014m, September 5) "We continue to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with Russia /.../" (2014m, September 5) Indirect: "We regret that the conditions for that relationship do not currently exist. Political channels of communication /.../ remain open" (2014m, September 5) "/.../ NATO has strived to build a partnership with Russia /.../" (2014m, September 5) "The nature of the Alliance's relations with Russia and our aspiration for partnership /.../" (2014m, September 5)

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Appendix D

Figure D

Word-tree with a keyword "challenges" for the "after" set



Appendix E

Table E

Examples of Russia being named as a challenge directly and indirectly in NATO's discourse

	Example (Text date)
Direct	"We /.../ have gathered /.../ at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security. Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace" (2014m, September 5).
	"Our goal of a Euro-Atlantic region whole, free, and at peace has not changed, but has been fundamentally challenged by Russia" (2014f, April 1).
	"In order to ensure that our Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security challenges, today we have approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan. /.../ It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications" (2014m, September 5).
	"As demonstrated most recently by its activities in the framework of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) plays an important role in addressing the security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic area" (2014m, September 5).
Indirect	"Adaptation measures include the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might face. /.../ developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats. /.../ will be able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO's territory" (2014m, September 5).
	"/.../ NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) to discuss priorities for cooperation between Georgia and NATO and Georgia's security challenges /.../ " (2015b, February 5)

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Appendix F

This appendix contains transcripts from the two interviews personally conducted from NATO officials during the NATO Foreign Ministers Summit in Turkey, 2015, May 13-14, as well as their dossiers.

I. Heinrich Brauss' answer. Taken on the press briefing session about the Readiness Action plan, 2015, May 13.

Q: Would you consider that the current situation is similar to that of the Cold War? /…/
Heinrich Brauss: The clear answer is no, by no means. Neither politically, nor strategically, nor militarily. Look, in the Cold War we had this antipodes between two systems: NATO and the Warsaw pact. And it was ideologically and fundamentally skewed. Which is completely different from today. Even, I could understand that you and your compatriots have a similar feeling, because you are exposed, as you see it, in your perception, to a political and military threat. As you and your country may feel it. But the situation is completely different. Look. During the Cold War my country was divided. And in my country in the East there were huge armies, Soviet armies. Eastern German and Soviet, no coalition, no others; highly armed, highly equipped, ready to attack within hours. They were training every day, looking into each other's eyes over the border. The West of my country, where I was living, and as a young soldier, preparing the defense. We had twelve army corps. From the North to the south. Standing, training, exercising every day, ready to defend the western part of Germany. From Denmark, to Brits, Dutch, Belgians, Swiss German. You will agree, this is completely different today. The risk that this would have escalated, and there were nuclear forces deployed in our country, were to be ignored. Was completely different. So... Although we felt a different peace, in hindsight the situation was hugely dangerous. I don't think this is a case today. Although we have now reason to call upon Russia, to withdraw from Ukraine and to return to the table, metaphorically, negotiations, to respect the international law, to reestablish all the triggers they have breached. The situation is nevertheless different. Look, Minsk has been agreed. There are many violations, yes, but we have no indication of further escalating to a big war. So there is a reason to hope that in a not so distant future we might find a political solution overall. Hopefully. So, in short that is completely different, and cannot be compared neither politically, nor in general.

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Previously Brauss was a Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Policy and Planning (since 2007). Before joining NATO he served at the EU, first in the European Union Military Staff as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations & Exercises Division and then as the Director of the Civilian/Military Cell and the EU Operations Centre. He took command of an Armored Brigade in Potsdam/Germany in 2001. Brauss served as Chief of Staff in the Headquarters of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he deployed for operations. Other appointments included, among other things, Chief of Staff of a Mechanized Infantry Brigade and Commander of an Armored Artillery Battalion. Brauss gained international experience as a member of the Staff of the German Military Representative in the Military Committee of NATO and EU/WEU in Brussels, his responsibilities covering NATO's strategy, enlargement, command and force planning. In addition Brauss served as Branch Chief in the Planning and Advisory Staff to the former German Minister of Defense in Bonn/Germany. Brauss is a Lieutenant General in the German Armed Forces[15].

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[15] Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_104137.htm

II. Jens Stoltenberg's answer. Taken on the press conference by NATO Secretary General following the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, 2015, May 13.

> **Q**: Good evening, Liucija Lenkauskaite, *Lithuania's Morning* and *Lithuanian National Radio*. My question maybe will be different from others. But I'm just interested in your answer. I already asked the same question Heinrich Brauss, Assistant Secretary General of Defense Policy and Planning. Would you consider the current situation between NATO and Russia similar to that of Cold War between the U.S. and Russia, considering there are troops deployed across the borders, the Readiness Action Plan with its emphasis on the intelligence. I mean both sides are showing off their military power. What is your answer? And your comment on this? Thank you.
> **Jens Stoltenberg**: I think it's not a right thing to characterize the present situation as Cold War. We are not in the same situation as we were during the Cold War period after the WWI until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Because during the Cold War we had two military blocs: NATO and the Warsaw Pact standing against each other. And we also had... And there was ideological fight against two blocs. And it involved actually the whole world. So I think there are clear differences between now and the Cold War. But we are neither in the strategic partnership that we have tried to develop between NATO and Russia for many years after the end of the Cold War. So we are neither in the strategic partnership we have tried to develop nor in a Cold War situation. We are in something which is different. And therefore we had to adapt our Alliance to a new security environment. And that's exactly what we are doing, partly by increasing the readiness and the preparedness of our forces; and partly by working with the partners in our neighborhood, both in the East (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine) but also in the South. So we are responding in a firm way. But everything we do is proportionate and defensive and fully in line with our international obligations[16].

Before assuming the head position of NATO, Stoltenberg was the Prime Minister of Norway (2005-2013 and 2000-2001), Minister of Finance (1996-1997), Minister of Industry and Energy (1993-1996), and State Secretary at the Ministry of the Environment (1990-1991). He had been a Member of Norwegian Parliament since 1991 and the Leader of the Norwegian Labor Party since 2002[17].

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[16] Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_119430.htm
[17] Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_49999.htm