STRUGGLE FOR HEGEMONY AFTER MAIDAN:
THE ROLE OF UNIVERSITY FACULTY IN UKRAINIAN EDUCATION REFORM

By

Roksolana Mashkova

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisors: prof Don Kalb

prof Prem Kumar Rajaram

Budapest, Hungary

2015

Abstract

Education reform in Ukraine provides an opportunity to investigate the role of university faculty in a highly controversial reform, which tries, but mostly fails, to go against the current of general austerity. The present research finds that the faculty members tend to resist the changes, especially those which threaten their interests. It also demonstrates that their resistance is the more strong, the more their position is threatened, and the more their well-being depends on maintaining the status quo. However, this research does not treat those who resist as rational actors, who act solely to maximize their benefits and minimize costs; instead, it investigates how the actions and attitudes of faculty members are influenced by the ideologies which they support and use to make their claims. It finds that, due to the lack of alternatives to the hegemonic modernist discourse of pro-Europeanism, used by the government to justify austerity cuts and by the professors to oppose them, the resistance to the reform remains conservative, and only redefines the keywords of the existing ideology, without transcending it.

Keywords: *hegemony, education, policy, bureaucracy, university*

Contents

Introduction

Education reform in Ukraine is a unique case of an attempt to implement a social-democratic and culturally liberal reform at the time when every other reform is the country is oriented towards austerity measures. The situation in the country (war, austerity, onset of cultural conservatism), as well as the general trends in world education ("audit culture" — see Shore 2008; "neoliberal subjectivity" — see Gill 2009), distort the original reform project, which was itself a compromise between different groups of active stakeholders. As a result, its outcomes at the stage of implementation are contested and mostly unpredicted by the administrators of the reform.

My thesis will focus on the ideological struggle surrounding the reform, which reflects the conflict between the ideas of all the groups who participated in developing the project of the reform, of the reformers in the government, of the proponents of austerity, and of the university faculty. The analysis of the discourse and ideology of the first three groups is based on the public statements by their representatives, and the beliefs of the latter group based on observation and interviews during my field research. The latter group, the faculty members of Ukrainian universities, play a key role in shaping the outcomes of reform implementation, since it is the aggregated effect of their actions that will *be* the reform in practice (Lipsky 1980, Chapter 2). As my research demonstrates, the professors contest the ideas of the reform according to their group interests by struggling to redefine the key concepts which are used to support the reform.

The analysis of the struggles for hegemony around Ukrainian education reform, which simultaneously is shaped by and themselves shape the "practical activity", as Kate Crehan puts it (2002, 174), and justifies social inequalities, can shed light at the contemporary conflict between neoliberalism and the left, particularly in post-socialist countries after such social upheavals as

Maidan. My interest in the education reform, however, originates not only in its particularity as a social-democratic project, implemented in neoliberal environment, but also in my participation in a student campaign for education reform (see section 1.2) as a student union member. As a part of creating the reform project, in the pre-Maidan times of relative welfare state, which, at least on legislative level, hardly changed since Soviet times (Gorbach 2013), I saw it as progressive, and foresaw the resistance to it in the conservative bureaucratic forces. As a result, when I approached the reform as a researcher on the stage of its implementation, my assumption was that, in order to explain the failures of its implementation, my focus must be on bureaucratic hierarchy of the universities; the assumption, indeed, shared by the reformers themselves until now. My findings confirmed that the role of the faculty in the conflict is rather conservative, and that, to some extent, this conservatism is caused by the structural position of the informants, as demonstrated by the uniformity of opinions of those in the same structural position about the problems which impact them directly. However, what I observed countered my assumption about the primacy of structural determinations, and led me to the conclusion that the resistance of university employees to the reform is shaped to a great extent by their ideological, rather than structural, positions. I conclude that their resistance remains conservative, because their claims contest the hegemonic discourse of the reformers on its own terms, by redefining the hegemonic keywords, for lack of significant counter-hegemonic projects. Thus, the original sociological explanation, although not completely refuted, is proven by the evidence to be in need of "political" augmentation, in Gramsci's terms (Gramsci 1957, 181-182).

The paper consists of the Introduction, three chapters and the Conclusion. In the introduction, I introduce the research problem and its significance. The first chapter is dedicated to the historical context of the case and is divided into two sections. In section 1.1, the history of

mass higher education in Ukraine from 1920s to 1990s is narrated briefly; this background provides a starting point for developing the case. In section 1.2, the student protest campaign of 2011-14 is described, a left-leaning social movement which produced the project of current reform. The second chapter concerns the events in education during Maidan and after it, putting education in the wider context of change in Ukrainian society. Section 2.1 covers the events of the period from February 2014 to spring 2015, when the current officials of the Ministry of Education came to office and started implementing the reform project; the section highlights the key terms of the discourse produced by the promoters of reform, which feature "Europeanization" and "modernization". In section 2.2, the post-Maidan context of austerity is outlined and the way it influenced the discourse around higher education is explained. The third chapter presents the ethnographic data. Section 3.1 describes the site, the data collection design, and the methodological orientation. Section 2.4 extensively presents the findings of the fieldwork, and is divided into four subsections, according to the aspects of the data. In the conclusion, the findings are summarized, and the theoretical and practical implications of the present research are indicated.

Chapter 1. Prehistory of the Education Reform in Ukraine

1.1. Education in Ukraine between 1920s and 1990s

This section aims to narrate the history of Ukrainian mass higher education briefly, to indicate the specificity of it compared to the Humboldtian model of university. It demonstrates that, historically, most Ukrainian universities originated as bodies of the state, and for this reason not only served the state's needs in producing professionals, but also were structured as bureaucratic state agencies, designed primarily around rationing (admission) mechanisms and providing social support for students, rather than research.

Mass higher education in Ukraine was established in 1920s by Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The aim of higher education institutions in this period was to provide the rapidly industrializing society with specialists, as well as to provide teachers to implement the goal of universal literacy; for this reason, it was oriented primarily to practical skills. The admission to Soviet institutes in the period until 1937 was carried out according to quotas, with preference to candidates of proletarian background; the admission examination was not strict, and sometimes the candidates were admitted who did not meet the criteria of preparation for taking the course (Ryabchenko 2012, 45). It was only in 1937 when the examination of the candidates knowledge was admitted to be the key criterion for admission, regardless of class background, upon requests of the professors who complained that the low preparedness of the freshmen disrupted the study process (Ryabchenko 2012, 47). Moreover, the primary concern of education policies at this time were about stipends, food rations, and accommodation for students, rather than the content of education. Thus, the access to higher education was the primary concern for education commissariat, and the "quality" of it was not an issue at the time; the faculty of the Institutes were seen as public servants serving the state, similarly to school teachers.

During the Soviet period, the access to higher education was rapidly expanding. The number of people with full or unfinished higher education in USSR rose from 1.2 to 8.3 million between 1939 and 1959; and by 1989, it was already 23 million people, or 125 per 1000 people older than 15, who had some higher education (Lane 2015, 59). At the same time, there was a large-scale inflation of higher education diplomas, which can be seen from the following numbers: by 1974, there were six times more people with diplomas of engineers than in the USA; at the same time, between 1965 and 1978 the number of innovations per one engineer fell by two times, and the number of new technologies fell by more than three times (Tkachenko 2015, 86).

Doing science was not a task of Soviet educational institutes; instead, the Academy of Science was established for this goal. Ukrainian Academy of Science exists until now and is seen as the primary scientific institution, despite the catastrophic deterioration of its material basis due to lack of funding, and the deterioration of research quality for the reason that its staff is paid so little that positions in the Academy of Science are not usually seen for prospective scientists as a way to implement their scientific ideas (Samokhin 2015). Still, in Ukraine today, teaching is considered the primary function of the university faculty, and their salaries are calculated primarily based on teaching hours. Some of my informants, for example, occupied a position in the Academy of Science parallel to their university position, to have time and resources dedicated specifically for research.

Contrary to the stereotypes about transition, the access to higher education in independent Ukraine after 1990 continued to expand: while in 1990 there were 0.9 million students in Ukraine, by 2008 there were already 2.4 million; and the expansion happened in the period when the population decreased by 10 percent and significantly aged (Tkachenko 2015: 88). The expansion happened to large extent for the reason that private universities started to emerge, as well as

because access to education in public universities by paying tuition increased the chances of those candidates who could not pass the exam to get a free state-funded place in a public university. The similar process in Russia also led to devaluing higher education (Morgan and Kulikova 2007). In addition, in 1990s, many of the institutions that previously provided education only in limited fields, started turning into "universities", since the institutions with "university" status were better funded by the state and got more state-funded places for students; this bred numerous institutions with names like National University of Food Technology, National University of Aviation, or National University of Management and Administration. The university where I was doing my fieldwork was called simply Kyiv Polytechnic Institute \until 1994; it changed its name to National Technical University of Ukraine "Kyiv Polytechnic Institute" solely to fit the state's requirements, because it was too proud of its tradition to see the name change as prestigious (NTUU "KPI" 2013); other institutions eagerly included the title of university in their names to raise their standing.

Moreover, the devaluing of diplomas and deteriorating quality of higher education, commonsensically acknowledged by Ukrainian society, contributed to the fact that by 2011, when the campaign *Against Degradation of Education* started (see section 1.2), education reform was considered long overdue. Even now, when the reform has been launched and met the resistance which I am investigating in this paper, the need for *some kind* of reform is admitted even by those who oppose *this particular* reform. The overwhelming majority of my informants (all but one of the interviewed, and all but two of those who replied to questionnaires) said that the reform in Ukrainian higher education is urgent and cannot be postponed, despite the economic situation, underfunding and war.

1.2. Protest campaign *Against the Degradation of Education* in 2011-14

In this section, I will describe the origin of the education reform from the student protest movement in the period between 2011 and early 2014. The movement formed as an opposition to the new Higher Education Bill proposed by the former Yanukovych's government, and eventually led to the creation of another, "progressive" education bill, which was, in effect, supported by the movement and promoted to become a state policy document right after Maidan. This same bill is the document regulating the reform which is the subject of my research.

Three groups were the motors of the campaign around the education law in Ukraine since January 2011: *Priama Diya* ("Direct Action")*, Vidsich* ("Fight Back")*,* and *Foundation of Regional Initiatives (FRI).* Each of them had a different claim-making strategy, which reflected their vision of the future of education, and they competed to impose their own vision and sideline those of other groups. As a participant of the movement, I base the outline of the three groups' positions on my observation, as well as on re-reading of the bulk of the articles which they published in 2011-2013.

Priama Diya, of which I was a member until I graduated in 2013, is an anarcho-syndicalist student union, and their points of dissatisfaction about the draft law proposed by the former government in 2011 reflect their political position. As a union, they were most concerned with the prospect of cuts in state-funded (that is, free for the end user) places in universities, and the possibility that the tuition fees for those students who were not accepted for free places will constantly increase. As a syndicalist movement, they were indignant of the centralization of state control over education. As anarchists, they were the only of the three groups who had at least some idea about the education system they want in the future—the idea of "libertarian education" (see Shmatko 2011). In short, their claims were framed with a socialist project in mind. However, it is

remarkable that they felt most comfortable with economic and "labor conditions" demands, and rarely made their wider ideological framework explicit in public. Consequently, they managed to impose the emphasis on the accessibility of education on the whole campaign, but failed to make their wider claims stick. It is also worth noting that *Priama Diya* were the only of the three groups who managed to engage university professors into the struggle, most of them left-leaning humanities professors of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy; one of these was Inna Sovsun, who later became the First Deputy Minister of Education.

The *Foundation of Regional Initiatives* (*FRI*) are a left-liberal human rights NGO, and their strategy was to scrupulously analyse the proposed legislation, and to appeal to the governmental bodies and to some powerful actors personally—from the head of the Communist Party (FRI 2011a) to the then-president Viktor Yanukovych (FRI 2011b). This strategy was the most elitist of all three, appealing to those in power and not so concerned about the inaccessibility of their formalist legal analyses, but it was the most successful in getting the members of FRI closer to the sources of decision-making. The air of legal expertise let them gain trust as representatives of the public, who can speak the language of power, and, as such, participate in the official deliberations of the law draft in governmental offices. However, their elitism and disregard for engagement with the public, as well as the lack of wider idea of future education, prevented them from gaining popular support and be accepted as legitimate representatives of the movement in policy-making.

Vidsich are a youth organization with an inclination for a blend of "national democratism" particular for Ukraine—nationalist as any other representatives of this political trend, but at the same time westward-oriented, progressist, and utilizing "anti-colonialist" rhetoric against Russia. What distinguished them from other groups of actors was their concern with the fact that the then-Minister of Education was pro-Russian, and his reform "neglected the role of Ukrainian language

in education process" (Vidsich 2013). *Vidsich* most eagerly announced their ideological presuppositions, because they felt the resonance with the views of the majority of their young educated target audience. At the same time, *Vidsich* adopted a reactive position—they were the ones who came up with the title "Against the Degradation of Education" and imposed it on the whole campaign of 2011-13. The other two groups at first disliked the title, pointing at the fact that Ukrainian education was not so good to begin with, so there was not much to degrade from. However, despite this acknowledgement, the campaign was, in fact, almost purely reactive, because the groups that led the campaign could only agree on what they were fighting *against*, but not what they were fighting *for*. Their positive visions of the future of education were fundamentally different.

All these three projects can be called modernist in different senses of the term, proposed by different theoreticians of modernity. The socialist project of *Priama Diya* is modernist in the way it emphasises the social role of mass education (in the spirit of Enlightenment), and in its radical democratic pathos as such—it is modernist in a sense that it strives for "a set of attributes (good ones)" (Cooper 2005, 120) associated with modernity. The legalist project of FRI falls in line with what the Comaroffs describe in their section about the "judicialization of politics" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, 34). Finally, the nation-building project of *Vidsich* is an example of classic "modernity package", as theorized, e.g., by Beck, Bonss and Lau in their description of "first modernity" (Beck, Bonss and Lau 2003, 4-6). However, the fact is that, even though all these strategies can fit into this or that theory of modernity, none of the groups explicitly used modernist ideology to make their claims. Instead, they used more or less context-specific terminology to voice rather mundane reactive claims. Fitting their aspirations neatly into the abstract idea about a modernist social movement not only would not add anything to our understanding of their actions

and words, but would actually prevent us from explaining why not any of these groups but a seemingly less active one eventually won the policy contest. It is precisely the explicit use of modernist "Europeanization" rhetoric to "make their claims stick" (Cooper 2005, 149) that distinguishes the current leadership of the Ministry of Education from the three groups above.

Chapter 2. Education Reform and the Aspirations of Maidan

2.1. How protesters became policy makers

Maidan protest in winter 2013/14 changed the rules of the political field, at least on the ideological level, allowing the issue of education reform, which has been a center of a heated debate for four years, to be finally resolved in favor of change. In this section, I try to explain the success of the group that eventually took up the leadership of the Ministry of Education, became the key policy makers in the field, and started to embody the proponents of the reform, eclipsing the other groups and their visions. The chapter provides evidence to the argument that this group won in the policy contestation due to their use of rhetoric of modernist "Europeanization" to support their claims, which resonated with major aspects of the public discourse of Maidan. At the same time, in the context of neoliberal assault currently carried out by Ukrainian government (which I describe in what follows), as well as the ascent of neo-nationalism, the new leadership of the Ministry of Education, in order to be able to impose their agenda, was forced to make the alliances which shifted their allegiances and distorted the reform project.

On February 21, 2014, a group of students, led by the "strike committee" of National Pedagogic University and including members of *Priama Diya* and *Vidsich*, occupied the premises of the Ministry of Education. After a heated debate between more or less liberal, socialist, and nationalist factions, the occupiers produced *The Roadmap for Development of Ukrainian Education*, which included all kinds of proactive, innovative demands (not just reactive statements "against" something)—from online publication of raw accounting data of the Ministry, to raising the academic stipends to the level of the official subsistence cost, to limiting the teachers' workload

to 600 hours per year (MON 2014). Significantly, however, the *Roadmap* was not backed by a single appeal to modernization or comparison to Europe. Which cannot be said about the argumentation of the most public proponents of the education reform, a group of education experts from a think tank called Center for Society Research. The latter based most of their claims on modernization rhetoric and examples of how education works in Europe.

The new leadership of the Ministry of Education was *de facto* elected in a direct democratic way, under revolutionary legitimacy, by the occupiers of the Ministry premises in the last days of February 2014. They were granted the power directly by "the people", under a strict condition that they will implement *The Roadmap for Development of Ukrainian Education*. The new Minister Serhiy Kvit signed his first decree which ordered all the education actors to implement the *Roadmap*. However, in practice the control over its implementation was passed down to his First Deputy, who was from now on in charge of higher education. The statements by the deputy minister Inna Sovsun and the texts on education by the experts of Center for Society Research (CSR) — a think tank of which Sovsun had been a director while she was still a protester in the *Against the Degradation of Education* campaign and not yet a deputy minister, and which, although independent from the Ministry, explicitly provides information and research support for the reform — serve as the empirical basis of this section.

Although not everyone was satisfied by the appointment of Serhiy Kvit, who was renowned for his nationalist affiliations, all the participants of the higher education campaign wholeheartedly accepted the leadership of Inna Sovsun, a former professor of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and a representative of teachers' interests among the activists of the campaign of 2011-14. In fact, *The Roadmap* was largely based on the research by CSR, despite not repeating their pro-European ideological markers. The final project of the Higher Education Law was also elaborated by a group

of experts which originated in the movement, and CSR provided information support and expertise for it. The project included the norms which presuppose increased investment in education, such as increasing stipends and decreasing teachers' workload, as well as norms aimed at democratization of education institutions by assigning the right to make the most important decisions in a particular institution to the general assembly of its workers and students.

In June 2014, a smaller group of students, led by members of CSR among others, rallied in front of the Parliament again—this time not against but *for* a law project (see Stadny 2014a). The great majority of student activists, including members of the most radical group *Priama Diya*, rejoiced in the adoption of the Law and set out to monitor its implementation and suppress the expected resistance by supposedly conservative educational bureaucracy. The union, especially its older members who participated in the campaign since 2011, was completely on the side of the reformers up until May 2015, when on demand by the students of Institute of International Relations they engaged in the campaign against the threat of restructuring of the institute.

2.2. The modernist discourse of Europeanization as the key to legitimacy

The question of what lent so much credibility to the new Law and its proponents was hardly ever asked among the activists. The first and obvious answer would be that it was legitimated by the direct democratic adopting procedure and its grassroots origins. But then, in the times when the campaign *Against the Degradation of Education* was blooming, and even during the occupation of the Ministry, the vision of the future of Ukrainian education was highly contested. Moreover, such groups as *Priama Diya* were dissatisfied with the way the official council, organized by the government for the deliberations over the education reform, seized the representation of oppositional forces and *de facto* excluded from legitimate decision-making most of the protesters, who lacked the social and symbolic capital to equally participate in the high-level

discussion, framed in legalistic terms. Given these contestations, what made everybody agree that the current version of Education Law is generally acceptable and should be promoted, and resistance to it legitimately suppressed?

The analysis of the texts and speeches by Inna Sovsun and CSR researchers allows to suggest that the trust in their reform project is based on modernist appeals to to the education arrangements in developed countries. Importantly, modern education in this framework is spatially localized in the West, mostly in Europe. The need to integrate Ukrainian education with Europe is constantly underlined—e.g., facilitating international student mobility via unification of credit and academic degree systems is a primary goal, because "internationalization of higher education is one of the priorities of the EU" (Svityashchuk 2013a). Integration into the educational network of "developed countries" is presented as absolute and primary necessity: "Ukrainian professors have to not only research more, but to present their results on international arena better" (Stadny 2014b). Moreover, European experts are treated as higher authority to decide whether the path chosen by Ukrainian education is the proper one—e.g., Inna Sovsun finds it necessary to underline in one of her weekly Facebook reports that the "experts from European Council" expressed support for the reform. Finally, comparisons to "European" system of education and aspirations to rise Ukrainian education to "European" level are the most powerful arguments in favor of various aspects of the reform.

"European" education in this rhetoric is often treated as a mythical unity, with examples of arrangements in different countries in different decades brought in as equally representative and interchangeable parts of this unity. It functions as Stuart Hall's division between "the West" and "the Rest", "represents what are in fact very differentiated (the different European cultures) as homogenous (the West). And it asserts that these different cultures are united by one thing: the

fact that *they are all different from the Rest*" (Hall 1993, 280; emphasis in the original). Only, in this dichotomy, Ukrainians put themselves into the category of "the Rest" in an occidentalizing move, and strive to catch up with "the West."

This mythical unity of "Europe" allows for manipulations with the concept to make it fit to support one's own claims. For example, the modernist rhetoric in the version of Ukrainian education reformers often appeals to the arrangements which are being or have been replaced by neoliberal reforms in many countries of Europe itself. In an article advocating the financial autonomy of universities *in combination* with government funding, a member of CSR underlines that "in 12 education systems of Europe, there is no education fee for students of this country and EU member states" (Svityashchuk 2014); but there are currently 28 states in the EU, which means the majority of them counter the author's claim for free education. Thus, the European examples of modern education which we should aspire for are handpicked to prove that the social-democratic model, and not the neoliberal innovations, defines progressive European education. In fact, it is acknowledged by the same author in another article, where she admits that "international data [on education funding] is available only until 2010, which, unfortunately, does not presently allow to analyse the consequences of world financial crisis for educational sector in the world" (Svityashchuk 2013b). The reformers' use of the term "modernization" to frame their claims—which, according to Cooper (2005, 117-118), is a word from 1950s-70s—instead of "modernity", which became trendy in 1990s, itself demonstrates that the discourse tries to catch up with the Europe in the welfare state times, not the Europe of austerity cuts.

2.3. The shift towards "competitiveness" and "efficiency" in Europeanization rhetoric

However, in present context of sweeping austerity in Ukraine, such social-democratic aspirations turn into their opposite, even if against the reformers' will. The context must be outlined in some detail, in order to explain the shift of the reformers' rhetoric. On April 2, 2014, Ukrainian state budget was sequestered the first time, and the public spending was cut by 5.6 percent (ZN.UA 2014). In 2015, the planned spendings from state budget in real terms, that is, indexed by 21 percent inflation, fell by another 9 percent (Samokhin 2014), and the budget of the Ministry of Education even in nominal terms fell by 23 percent. Prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk at the meeting of Ukraine—EU Association in December 2014 assured the creditors that

> In the last nine months, we made a number of steps to stabilize the country: we adopted two austerity packages, revised the benefit system completely, cut a number of social benefit programs, reduced the number of state officials by ten percent, in order to reduce public spending. We introduced new taxes, changed the regulatory policy, cut a number of controlling bodies and reduced their powers… We created National Guard from scratch and allocate around UAH 95 million to military needs every day. It is a very heavy burden for the state budget.

Meanwhile, in February 2015, Ukrainian currency was let to float freely on the market, without protection by the National Bank (UNIAN 2015a), and on February 26, 2015, its rate peaked at UAH 33.725 per US dollar, compared to UAH 9.985 per dollar on February 27, 2014. On March 13, Ukraine received a transfer of $5 billion from the IMF as a first part of $17.5 billion loan; the transfer was accompanied by a memorandum, in which Ukrainian government committed to severely reduce government spendings, including reducing spendings in education by UAH 300 million by the end of the year (ZIK 2015). Just before that, on March 5, the Parliament, upon IMF demand, raised the age of pension eligibility for special categories of population (those who, before

16

this ruling, could retire earlier) and reduced the pensions of working pensioners by 15 percent (Ukrayinska pravda 2015). As a part of these innovations, the elderly professors of Ukrainian universities who still taught and had not retired, were deprived of their "scientific pensions" (which were barely enough for more or less dignified living in the first place, reaching at most a couple of thousand hryvnias). Following this legislation, the professors *en masse* hastily retired right in the middle of the term—at a faculty meeting, the dean of the department which was the focus of my research admitted with a sigh that the week before he had to sign eight resignations. Not long after, on April 1, the tariffs for communal utilities soared: the price of electricity rose by 50 percent, heating by 72 percent, and gas by incredible 280 percent in one day (UNIAN 2015b). Finally, as I write, the Parliament is considering the project of the new Labor Code, which labor activists have managed to hold back since 2011, and which includes numerous anti-labor measures, such as simplification of firing procedure, replacing of collective agreements by one-sided documents by the employer, allowing the employer not to pay overtime and the like.

By now it is clear that the economic situation of Ukrainians is disastrous, and not simply because of objective crisis, but because of conscious government policies, which have been dubbed "shock without therapy" in Ukraine. and if two years ago it was credible to argue that there is no trace of neoliberalism in Ukraine, supporting the claim with low Gini index, high human development index and high level of redistribution in favor of the poor (Gorbach 2013), now it is clear that the government is determined to finally implement a full-fledged IMF SAP. Contrarily to this tendency, the higher education law, as was explicated in sections 1.2 and 1.3, not only does not have a clear neoliberal intention, but was developed by a left-liberal coalition which included

a political spectrum from anarchists to social democrats, and therefore includes numerous norms which require investment and aim to increase access to education[1].

In this context, however, in order to be able to implement at least some of the reforms, the Ministry of Education had to forge alliances with more powerful groups in Ukrainian politics. During Maidan itself, the hegemony drifted from the pro-European intellectual groups of youth, who started the protest under the name Euromaidan, to the nationalists, who won popular support thanks to the militant groups, who presented themselves as defendants from police violence. By the end of Maidan protests, "pro-European", "democratic" strand on the one hand, and nationalist, "patriotic" strand on the other still had more or less equal standing; immediately after Maidan, with Crimea annexation and the start of the war in the East, the patriotic defensive discourse became dominant, and the pro-European discourse transformed into, on the one hand, "anti-colonialist" — anti-Soviet and anti-Russian — rhetoric, and, on the other hand, a discourse of second wave of post-Soviet transition, aimed to justify the austerity measures taken to satisfy IMF's demand and receive their loan. Thus, the Ministry of Education, in order to be able frame its claims, had to adjust their discourse, so that it is more in tune with the official discourse of the state in general, and enter an alliance with patriots and neoliberals.

In this context, the Ministry's rhetoric based on Westernization turned to a different choice of examples and ideologues, other than examples drawn from the remnants of Keynesian welfare state in Europe. In this version, it can easily be used to legitimize the innovations which can be harmful for some of the stakeholders. For example, the re-licensing of all the universities and

---

[1] The situation in question presents a case opposite to what Collier described in his book on "second wave reforms" in Russia (Collier 2011) — in Collier's case, neoliberal reforms, instead of marketization and deregulation, ended up attending to substantial needs and providing social welfare; in this case, the reforms which were designed to increase investment in education ended up justifying cuts.

colleges, implied in the new Law and legitimized by the claim that the wide network of universities in Ukraine is "outdated" and that "developed countries" have much fewer universities, will cause some higher education institutions either to change their status and switch to the field of professional education, or to merge into some more successful institutions, or to shut down completely. While this move will in fact benefit many — students will not be misled about the quality of education these institutions provide, and the society will not have to deal with fake diplomas — at the same time, many employees may be laid off in the time of economic crisis, when it will be very difficult for them to find a new job. The Minister of Education, instead of, for example, offering the laid-off workers a safety package, just dismissed the problem with a couple of words: "[Closing some higher education institutions] does not mean that any social tension will be caused… the professors can find work in other higher education institutions" (Kvit 2014).

Another example of such rhetoric is a widespread use of the term "competitiveness" as a criterion of education quality; quite expectedly, many sacrifices are made in its name, as well as in the name of "efficiency" — from the abovementioned restructurings to reshuffling of funding and financial aid for students (see Stadny, Solodko i Svityahschuk 2014). References to "experts" are abundant in nearly every publication by the proponents of the reform (cf. Bonneuil and Levidow 2012), while references to popular legitimacy are becoming fewer, indicating a turn to post-political technocracy. At the same time, the faculty and university administrators were labelled as ignorant or unwilling to learn in the rhetoric of the reform proponents (Kvit 2015; Stadny 2014a; Sovsun and Stadny 2015). Thus, as Bourdieu wrote (1991, 655), technocrats (who "pretend to use science") in bureaucracies successfully contested the intellectuals' "monopoly over intelligence". In effect, as the analysis of their texts below demonstrates, technocrats "aspire to

reduce politics to management problems to be solved by competence and expertise" (Bourdieu 1991, 666).

For example, although the reform is praised for its innovative deliberative democracy (e.g., creating new governing bodies such as National Agency for Ensuring the Quality of Higher Education, which will include representatives of various groups of stakeholders), the recurrent emphasis on "competitiveness" and "efficiency" as supposedly uncontested common values reveals that the reform is structured to ignore the "agonistic" aspect of politics (cf. Mouffe 2000, 80-107). The modernist pathos, combined with economizing zeal because of the war — both shared and supported by post-Maidan public opinion — silences any possible dissent, sometimes even on the level of self-censorship. The advocates of the reform do not see a problem in the exclusion of those who do not want to "modernize": "The key to success will be constant monitoring of implementation and compliance with the reforms. Those who are ready for the changes will start to live by the new rules more quickly and easily while those who aren't will be left behind" (Stadny 2014a).

One particularly illustrative piece of such rhetoric, associating "Europe" and "modernization" with "competition", is an article by the Minister of Education Serhiy Kvit, entitled *We Need Change: Content and Tasks of Education Reform* (Kvit 2015); it demonstrates how the appeal to Europe or "abroad" can justify the so-called "unpopular measures". In this article, the references to international practice are combined with asserting the values of "competition" and "market", as opposed to "postcolonial" and "post-Soviet" (these two epithets are synonymous for Kvit) "leveling" (*zrivnyalivka*). Competition must become fiercer, insists the minister: "The situation at the market of education services will leave universities no chance to avoid solving urgent problems, how to better organize the study process. Low-quality university

is doomed to disappear from Ukrainian education field." There must also be competition among students for stipends, which are now provided to everyone with an average grade from B and higher, but should be provided only for the excellent students with straight A's, just as they do abroad: "The basic condition must be excellent GPA. The competition for this stipend must be more like competition for stipends to study abroad, when a committee chooses the winners by evaluating not only their academic success." The financial autonomy of the universities, which in the Higher Education Law means that the universities can manage their revenues as they wish (while leaving it to the state to decide how they should use the state funding), according to Kvit, "forces us to move even further. We have to reject the post-Soviet attitude to education as the field which 'does not grow or produce anything, and therefore only draws financing from the public budget and does not contribute to it." That is, instead of remaining non-profit, as in Soviet Union, education institutions must become profitable — obviously, as in Europe. Thus, in this article, Serhiy Kvit defines "Europe", as opposed to post-Soviet Ukraine, as a space of beneficial competition, which guarantees higher quality education. This indicates a striking shift in comparison of the rhetoric by Inna Sovsun and Serhiy Kvit himself in the times when they were not the key policy makers in education, and were among those who they now call to compete. In those times, "Europe" for them and their supporters indicated academic freedom and high funding of universities (see analysis of Svityashchuk 2013b, 2014 above); now, "Europe" is associated with efficiency and competition.

The progressist and European-integration pathos of Maidan brought to the fore of Ukrainian political discourse the liberal forces that had been in opposition under the conservative government of Yanukovych. This change allowed the most consistent and dedicated liberals to use the fact that their modernist rhetoric of "Europeanization" now resonated with the hegemonic

ideology, and to finally push for the innovations in the quintessentially modernist field of education. The fact that their program became so appealing to a wider public demonstrates that in the moment of social turmoil, a consistent vision of progressive change is most required, and whoever can provide it becomes a leader of popular opinion. The other actors, who might have invested no less effort in the struggle for Ukrainian education, failed to carry out their agenda, among other reasons, because they either did not have a clear vision of the future of education (as *FRI* and *Vidsich*), or did not have the resources to impose the vision they had (as *Priama Diya*), first, for lack of symbolic and cultural capital necessary to enter the policy-making field, and second, because they largely rejected the state politics altogether in favor of grassroots politics.

Chapter 3. The Role of Faculty in Reform Implementation: Resistance and Contestation

Since December 2014, when the new Ministry of Education had finished with managing the problems with the internally displaced students, professors and whole universities, and finally got down to what they saw as their mission — that is, the implementation of the new Higher Education Law — nearly every new move in education was accompanied by a scandal. First there was canceling of mandatory teaching of philosophy, Ukrainian history, English, political science and other formerly mandatory subjects at BA level; then, there were new demands for candidates for "academic titles" such as docent and professor, which now included publications in journals indexed by Scopus or Web of science, working abroad and passing a foreign language exam; later, there was the deprivation of the elderly working professors of their academic pensions; finally, as I write these lines, students of the International Relations Institute of Kyiv National University in cooperation with *Priama Diya* student syndicate are staging a public debate with the representatives of the reformers on the topic of the reductions in the list of academic branches, that is, fields of study for which diplomas can be issued. All these loud conflicts were caused by vocal resistance by academic community; however, the resistance is quite peculiar, since it never led to any action beyond indignant publications in mass media or comments in social media (depending on the status of the writers). In this section, based on my field research, I will argue that this reaction of the academic community is caused and shaped by two factors: first, their group

structural position and conditions of work; second, their involvement in the struggle for ideological hegemony, both as subjects and as recipients of ideology.

3.1. Case design and methodology

As a case for investigating the attitudes towards implementation of reform among faculty members, I chose National Technical University of Ukraine "Kyiv Polytechnic Institute", the largest university of Ukraine, with student population of approximately 30 thousand (Osvita.ua 2009). The sheer size of the institution appealed to my initial hypothesis that it will be very inert and its structure will resist change. Moreover, Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (heretofore related by abbreviation KPI, as it is usually called in everyday language) proved to be an advantageous site in many other respects. Its workers and students see KPI as a rival to Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, from which the reformers in the Ministry come, and therefore are inclined to be critical of the Ministry. Then, it is a polytechnic, and all the social sciences and humanities in it are compressed into one faculty[2]; it turned out to be very useful, since, exactly when I started my fieldwork, the humanities were in the midst of a major conflict, which was all the more serious in a technical university, where the professors of philosophy and history felt that their position is more threatened than anywhere else (see details below). Taking advantage of the moment, I focused my attention on the faculty which was at the middle of turmoil at the time, namely the Faculty of Sociology and Law,

---

[2] In Ukraine, Universities are divided into faculties or institutes (both types can exist within one university), which are in turn divided into departments (*kafedra*).

and, in particular, its departments of Philosophy, History, Sociology and Political Science, and of Theory and Practice of Administration.

In the course of the fieldwork, I carried out 23 in-depth semi-structured interviews, each from 40 minutes to one and a half hour long, 19 of which were audio recorded and 4 not recorded upon request by the interviewees; I also attended and observed three monthly faculty meetings of various purposes (a "conference of employee collective" and a meeting of academic collective of the Sociology faculty, a meeting of the department of Theory and Practice of Administration), and had some informal conversations with my key informants and with random faculty members in professors' rooms and outside the university. 10 of the interviews were with a younger generation of professors (less than 35 years old, most without any "academic titles"), 8 with docents of middle age, 3 with elderly professors; one was with the chair of the Sociology Department, and one with the dean of Sociology Faculty. Accordingly, after the quotes in the further text, the department affiliation and the generation ("younger", "middle" and "older") are indicated, in order to demonstrate the correlation of opinions and the position of the interviewee within the department or their stakes in a particular problem. No other information is provided about the interviewees, since they were promised anonymity and, indeed, have reasons to ask for it, because some of their opinions may adversely affect them.

Three of the interviews were with professors from a different university, also quite large, but situated in a provincial city; I also distributed questionnaires in another one of top-3 Ukrainian

universities, the Kyiv National University, and received 20 replies (8 from science departments, 6 from humanities, and 6 from social science departments). I used these 3 interviews and the questionnaire responses to check whether some of the patterns I observed were due to the specificities of KPI — whether its profile, location or status — and found that the distribution of attitudes in these other universities was similar as in the case I investigated. I will use these sources as data for analysis equally with the interviews carried out in KPI, however, with a special focus on KPI, since I have a comprehensive understanding of this case, having been present there during all the three months of my fieldwork.

The complexity of interpreting these interviews lies in the fact that some of the informants were highly reflexive (especially those trained in social sciences), and themselves provided interpretations rather than descriptions or narrations. In some cases, I tended to accept their interpretations, because the rest of my data confirmed them, and in other cases they made me question my own premises. The choice of a single case for thorough investigation, while also explicating the specific historical context which shapes it, allows to employ the extended case method (Burawoy 1998) in order to put the theory of street-level bureaucracy to test, and to enhance and improve it with the findings of the case.

3.2. Initial assumptions

My assumption while I was starting my fieldwork was that the university structure, as a public bureaucracy, will have inertia and be biased in favor of status quo. This assumption was

formed in pre-Maidan times, when the Ministry was allied with university administrations to maintain the stagnation of Ukrainian education in vested interest of all levels of this bureaucracy. The reform project, which emerged from the *Against the Degradation of Education* campaign, was, in effect, also opposed by all levels of educational bureaucracy as a law draft.

In this situation, universities could be conceptualized within the theory of street-level bureaucracy, introduced by Michael Lipsky in his 1980 book *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services* and briefly defined as "agencies whose workers interact and have wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the allocation of public sanctions", a definition clarified by simply providing a list of examples (Lipsky 1980: xi). Lipsky himself mentions public universities only twice in his whole book, although focusing mostly on schools, police, housing and welfare services. Universities share a number of defining features which Lipsky attributes to street-level bureaucracies, and their behaviour can be explained by these features. Among these features are (a) wide discretion, within limits defined by voluminous state regulations; (b) the immanent and insuperable tension between limited public resources and unlimited demand for them, and resulting tensions between quality and availability of service; (c) the development of mechanisms of coping with ever-increasing workload, and resistance to any attempts to disturb these routines. These aspects, especially the problem of workload in bureaucracies and the coping mechanisms which the professionals within them develop, do indeed shed light on the mechanisms of resistance to reform implementation, described in the next section.

In particular, in explaining such mechanisms of keeping back the reform as reliance on hierarchies and workarounds by university administration, it is particularly useful to employ the stream of street-level bureaucracy literature which emphasizes not worker-client relationships, but worker-administrator relationship in the institutions which employ professionals. Important

27

representative of such literature is the book *Professional Discretion in Welfare Services* (2010) by Tony Evans. Evans, who bases his work on Lipsky's theory, tackles the issue of relations between managers and street-level workers and makes an observation particularly important for my research — that the local managers largely come from the professional background, share the professional ethic and worldview, and therefore their affiliations lie with the front-line workers rather than state-level managers (Evans 2011).

However, although some of my observations demonstrated that structural position determined the choice of opinion (see subsection 3.3.1), and that bureaucratic mechanisms were employed to resist the reform (see subsection 3.3.2 and 3.3.3), I found that, contrary to my assumptions, in the new post-Maidan context the resistance to the education reform cannot be explained solely by structural determinations within bureaucracies. The theory of street-level bureaucracy does not take into account the ideological motivations of the actors. Despite the subtitle, *Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services,* Lipsky himself pays little attention to the conscious motivations and worldviews which govern the workers' decisions beyond acknowledging that public service staff share the biases of the general population (Lipsky 1980, Chapter 10). Mostly, he implicitly treats them as rational actors, whose routines and practices are directed to maximizing their benefits (including personal job satisfaction) and minimizing costs; "individual" here relates rather to the use of interactionist perspective. Evans (2010; 2011) highlights the professional and service ethic shared by street-level workers and local administrators, but also fails to recognize that the ideological conflicts or hegemonic ideology in a particular society can be reflected in the worldview of street-level bureaucrats and influence their actions. On the contrary, my data demonstrated that in post-revolutionary context, ideological motivations and explanations, as well as the struggle for hegemony, can be more important factors

28

to determine the behavior of the research subjects. In this situation, the wider political struggles come to the fore, and more particular group vested interest becomes subordinate to these struggles.

In the following section, I present my findings. In the first subsection, the situation is described in which the attitudes split depending on the material interest of different subgroups, demonstrating that the structural position influences the choice within a range of available attitudes. In the second subsection, bureaucratic mechanisms are described, which were employed by an alliance of university faculty and administrators to resist the reform. In the third section, these structural determinations and coping mechanisms are put back into the wider post-Maidan context, and the importance of the struggle for hegemony for the conflict around the education reform is demonstrated.

3.3. Findings

3.3.1. The case of canceling mandatory subjects

When I was just starting my fieldwork, the first heated debate, which brought education reform into national news and was present in the media for some time, was unfolding. The controversy was the following: the Ministry of Education issued a Decree to cancel another Decree by the previous Minister, which provided a list of subjects mandatory for all the students in every Ukrainian university, regardless of their specialization. The justification for canceling mandatory subjects was that the new Higher Education Law does not give the Ministry the power to impose any mandatory subjects, and that from now on universities should exercise their autonomy in deciding whether certain subjects should be taught and to whom. However, this step caused vocal opposition among some faculty members, in particular from Philosophy and History departments. The interviews which I carried out in this period were largely about this controversy and those

29

aspects of reform which were associated with it—the extent to which universities should have autonomy and discretion, the financial limitations, and the formalism, ignorance and disregard on the part of the reformers. It proved to be advantageous for investigation of attitudes towards the reform.

The opinions on the subject of the members of departments which were not directly influenced (*i.e.* those who did not teach any mandatories anyway) varied depending on their age and ideological stance, which mostly correlated with age. Those younger and those with more liberal worldview were open to the possibility of providing the non-specialized subjects in humanities on elective basis, and believed this will help get rid of low-quality courses, regardless of human cost:

> I take this rather easy. [...] Maybe it's my emotional feeling about it largely, and maybe I am no better than the majority, but I think that the majority of professors and scientists in Ukraine are spongers (*darmoyidy*). [...] I probably have a bit liberal views in this sense. (*Department of Sociology, younger generation*)

Those older and more conservative believed that the subjects which transmit worldview should be unconditionally mandatory, for one of two reasons — either because the mission of the university is to produce what could be called *intelligentsia* (although the informants did not use this word from Soviet vocabulary and substituted it with "comprehensively developed personality"), and not single-minded specialists; or because the mission of universities is to produce patriots in these difficult times for the country. In fact, these two explanations were often used interchangeably by the same person, indicating that patriotic ideology overlapped with the remnants of the idea of *intelligentsia.*

What is important, however, is that among those who did not directly have stakes in the issue, the problem was sometimes posed not in idealist, but in purely materialist terms. Some younger professors opposed the measure explicitly on the grounds that it will lead to severe reduction in teaching hours allocated to corresponding departments, which will, in turn, lead to layoffs. This led one sociology professor to conclude:

> It seems to me that maybe now the Ministry just, in general, aims not to improve the system, but tries to optimize it, taking into account the lack of budget money. And that is why I think that this law — in fact, a very good law — it will be grinded by a certain practical necessity. The ministry was put in front of the problem that the spendings for higher education have to be reduced… The Ministry, supposedly according to this law, does everything within the frame of these budget cuts. It seems to me that the key problem here, as I see it, is exactly this. That the Ministry, unfortunately, is using this law now to justify the social cuts in higher education. (*Department of Sociology, younger generation*)

Another sociology professor, on the contrary, while acknowledging the dangers of layoffs and sympathizing with those affected, agreed with the necessity to cancel mandatory subjects in the name of the quality of education:

> I understand that they need to talk about "competitive advantage"[3] and so on, that you should commercialize, enroll more students, but this is not a question of one-day reforms, we need more competitive employees for that, and it is also not easy to find them, not easy to hire them, to hire someone you have to fire someone, and it is also not easy. [...] [They tell us,] we deprive you, and you have to survive somehow. Because let us face the truth, these [mandatory] humanities are a kind of social insurance for our departments. I cannot say that everyone is talented to retell to medical or cybernetic students the essence of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and then they fall deeply in love with philosophy and read Hobbes in bed before going to sleep. Obviously, it's not true. But beware not to throw the

---

[3] This informant used a lot of English terms in his speech, which are marked by quotation marks in the translations of quotes by him.

baby out with the bathwater, because in order to have these growth points, "pockets of efficiency", we also need the general background. (*Department of Sociology, younger generation*)

Contrarily, among the members of those departments whose central subjects — Philosophy and History of Ukraine — were deprived of mandatory status, the response was unanimous: all of them but one young left-leaning historian were strongly opposed to the new Decree. However, less predictably, none of them put the reasons for this opposition explicitly in terms of fear to lose their jobs. Even when I tried to stress the material aspect of the problem, to focus on the dangers of losing their job, the interviewees, although admitting the danger, were reluctant to talk about it and quickly changed the subject to ethical aspects of the problem. Both the older and the younger generation in these departments explained their opposition in terms of their mission to teach students humanitarian subjects to raise *intelligentsia* and patriots, and avoided talking about their material interest in preserving the mandatory status of their subject. The unanimity of all the members of departments affected by the new Decree, both young and old, as opposed to variety of opinions in other departments, suggests that their opinions were caused by the objectively endangered position of their group. Members of other groups could afford to either support or oppose the Ministry's move, because their situation and self-esteem does not depend on the issue; the philosophers and historians necessarily took the oppositional stance.

This is not to suggest that their justifications were false — they indeed honestly believed in their mission as professors of history or philosophy, and their opposition was, in fact, directly caused rather by this belief than by their fear of losing their jobs. Instead, two implications of this distribution of opinions can be outlined. On the one hand, the ideological stance which an informant chose in relation to certain problem depended on their structural position, and the opinions of those who have stakes in the problem are more strongly determined by this position

than the opinions of those who speculate from distance (the latter's opinions rather correlate with their broader background). On the other hand, their opposition to change, is not directly and consciously based on their interest in preserving their status; the faculty members, as my research demonstrates, do not act as purely rational actors, who calculate their interest and act accordingly, to maximize their benefits and minimize costs. Instead, their attitude is mediated by their self-concept and worldview, in which they see what they do as important. Lipsky made the same observation about street-level bureaucrats when he insisted that personal job satisfaction of a public employee, not only their comfort in terms of workload and security, is important in their adjustment to their work conditions (Lipsky 1980). However, he assigned similar ideology of "altruism" and helping people to all the street-level bureaucrats, and did not go further to investigate how their attitude is shaped by wider ideological field. This suggests that looking at the structural determinations within certain type of institutions is not sufficient to explain the conflicts in implementation, at least in the times of social turmoil like in today's Ukraine.

3.3.2. Communication Failure and Reliance on Hierarchies as Both Causes and Mechanisms of Resistance

The issue of mandatory subjects was for many informants a turning point in their attitude towards reform. One of the informants (*Department of Philosophy, middle generation*) told me a story of how she used to cooperate with the first deputy minister in establishing gender studies course in her university, and now she gave up on that, because she does not trust the people in the ministry anymore. She developed a strong opinion that the reformers are intentionally malicious and aim to destroy Ukrainian education and harm Ukrainian society in times of war, by depriving students of the ability to think (that is, canceling Philosophy and History). Another young informant from sociology department, whose opinion was cited above, came to conclusion that the

whole reform was but a justification for austerity measures in education. Others, realizing the danger of cuts, became suspicious of any innovation in education; an opinion was widespread that this reform is absolutely nothing new, just another group came to power and trying to justify their existence by complicating the professors' lives. In Kyiv National University, among those who responded to the questionnaire, this attitude was particularly popular: "Constant reforms are not beneficial. You only got used to something, and now you have to get used to something new… Education must be left alone for at least 5 years" (*Math Department, middle generation*); "We just turn from one minister's view 'how it has to be' to another's" (*Psychology Department, older generation*). Many saw continuity between reforms carried out in the name of adjustment to Bologna agreement in early 2000s, and the present reform.

Such a view demonstrates distance from the reform and reformers. The reason for this distance is not only the unwillingness to invest effort and hostility towards any change; the responsibility also lies on the state administrators of the reform. Indeed, most of the informants claimed that the Ministry is disrespectful, unresponsive to professors' needs and addresses, lacks the awareness of the situation on the ground, and poorly communicates its rulings to people on the ground. The informants often said that the Ministry resigned from its responsibility to develop implementation mechanisms, and universities are left on their own and confused: "We really have this problem that we have to pull ourselves up by our bootstraps, and it is not clear how to do that" (*Department of Sociology, middle generation*).

On their part, the propagandists of the reform in their texts recurringly claim that their opponents completely misunderstood the implications of a particular policy and did not invest enough effort to figure it out. Indeed, the the ministry does try hard to communicate their policies to the universities in novel ways, such as policy officials' engagement in Facebook discussions,

articles in Internet media, or such websites as http://osvita.gov.ua/. However, their efforts reach only those (mostly the youngest faculty members) who are enthusiastic enough about the reform to search and follow the information about it independently. These enthusiasts themselves acknowledge that the mechanisms of communication are flawed:

> It seems to me that, in our department, the message which comes down from the Ministry is only one: "Sanctions, sanctions, sanctions!" Cuts, reducing wage-rates, we don't need you, go away. I do not think that this is in fact the Ministry's message, but that's how it is perceived at our department. [...] There is a subconscious will to change something, but what to change, how to change, in what direction, the professors here don't know. [...] Personally I draw information from different articles, interviews with Inna Sovsun, with Yegor Stadny, I read Stadny's [Facebook] timeline, and it seems to me that he also does not have an understanding how everything should be modernized. I think that the Ministry is very bad at its public relations, at its work with the faculty. (*Department of History, younger generation)*

The opponents of the reform, on their part, simply stated that they do not expect change in the habitual arrangement, that decisions will continue to be made by higher administrators, and influence of the "rank and file" on the institutional organization will never be established.

In effect, the middle and the older generation, who are suspicious of the reform and do not expect anything new or good from it (the suspicions only confirmed by such Decrees as the one canceling mandatories), do not receive the information from the source; instead, they know only those aspects which are communicated to them through the habitual channels — from the rector to the deans, from the deans to the department chairs, and only then to the "rank and file" (as one of my informants put it, using the English expression) faculty members. One informant acknowledged that what seems to the Ministry officials to be direct communication with people on the ground, in effect is simply communication to rectors, and from that level down "it happens

anyway the same way as it was always happening, which means that we are herded to some faculty meeting, where nothing is really discussed, they only give us directives, which, ideally, we must vote for unanimously" (*Department of History, younger generation*).

I have seen the unanimous voting she mentioned, when the hands raised were not even counted, at the faculty meetings which I attended. I also saw that information is distorted on its way from the Ministry officials to the faculty — in some cases by direct negative evaluation by the person who communicates it (along the lines of, "We are struggling to solve this out, but everything will be OK, I promise"); in other cases but slightly, only by the tone of the dean's voice when he announces the news, which seems to say, "I know it is annoying, but you know that I'm on your side". However, in fact, the Ministry simply cannot use any other ways of informing the university staff but through media publications and down through the university hierarchy. It also suffered the IMF-imposed cuts on government spending, and now the staff of Department of Higher Education in the Ministry has only 20 (!) people (Sovsun and Stadny 2015). Obviously, it cannot afford to process every request and deliver information to everyone personally, even if this might be the only way to implement the reform in its full, as the creators of the law imagined it (cf. Niesz and Krishnamurthy 2013).

Nevertheless, the reliance on bureaucratic hierarchies for communication with the grassroots backfires; not only most of the street-level university workers receive (sometimes unintentionally) distorted information, but also the university hierarchy is empowered in new ways to pursue its interests. In the interviews, I heard numerous stories of workarounds by the university administration to overcome the innovations and preserve the status quo. One of the interviewee told me that their department's administration overcomes the cap on wages in public sector, temporarily imposed by the government in January 2015, by increasing on paper the pay to those

36

who earn little (my interviewee being one of them) and making them give the money in cash to those who used to officially earn more than the cap allows. Another interviewee told me the story of negotiations between their department and other departments to trade teaching hours formerly dedicated to mandatory subjects, in order to maximize the benefits of all departments (i.e. letting everyone have as many hours as possible). Such negotiations, technically, are not against the new Law, but, obviously, legislators expected completely different outcome of cancelling mandatories, namely the free choice of subjects for students.

The latter example of negotiations, which were discussed at department meetings with all the faculty, also demonstrates that the faculty members side with their superiors in the attempts to use the reform to their advantage — either to preserve the status quo, or even improve their own job situation. In fact, faculty members themselves rely heavily on hierarchies. As an illustration, during interviews, docents told me to address their department chairs, because they know better; moreover, three people simply refused to talk to me, on the basis that they are not competent, and told me that I should talk to their department chair; one department chair, in turn, advised me to talk to the dean.

Only the young teachers in precarious status, without academic titles and having not much to lose side with the reformers for ideological reasons. Many younger faculty members do not depend on their academic jobs to make a living, because the salaries in academia are too low. For this reason, they have other jobs outside academia to actually earn money, and work as teachers out of enthusiasm. Since personal self-esteem and not money is their primary stake in their university jobs, they believe that Ukrainian education desperately needs to be reformed and see the current movement as an opportunity. Other professors, the majority, who have stakes in the status quo, side with the university administration and feel contempt for the reformers.

37

The administrators, on their part, are also affiliated with their subordinates rather the state officials; their interest is not so much in efficient allocation of resources (which hardly depends on them anyway), as in case of the Ministry, but in maintaining their and their subordinates' job satisfaction, security, status and self-respect (Lipsky 1980). Moreover, the university ranks — the deans, the department chairs, and even the rector — also teach, and most of them will become ordinary professors at some point, when their period in office expires; therefore they partially share the position of their subordinates, since in street-level bureaucracies, there gap between local managers and front-line workers is narrow (Evans 2011). As a result, the bureaucratic mechanisms that are used to slow down the reform — distorting information on its way down, coming up with workarounds which do not explicitly break the rules and so on — are approved by the majority of faculty, except for those who are disadvantaged in the current situation and expect to benefit from its changing.

3.3.3. Deregulation or Re-Regulation: Autonomy, Paperwork, and Audit Culture

After all, faculty members have substantial reasons to resign their right to decide their own fate and to exercise "autonomy", and to trust the power to make decisions into the hands of local administrators who supposedly share their values and understand their needs. As nearly every of my informants complained, their workload hardly allows to manage preparation for lectures, not to mention doing research of any significance. This is one urgent problem which the reform actually addresses: one of the most celebrated norms of the new education law is the reduction of maximum teaching workload from 900 to 600 hours per year (including supervisorship, evaluation, preparation for courses). However, on the one hand, many faculty members, given that they are poorly informed, still expect that this will worsen their situation — for example, that only the class time will be counted into these 600 hours, and thesis supervision and other similar

activities will not. On the other hand, even those who believe that their workload will actually be reduced, say that this will just allow them to breathe, and still will not leave enough time to do research.

One reason why it will not is that the faculty members, as virtually all of them complained, have too much paperwork to do; and this is not reducing but, on the contrary, in some cases increasing with the requirements of the new law. Paperwork, according to the 2013 research by CSR (Tsentr doslidzhennya suspilstva 2013), was stated among the most important problems by 45 percent of university professors Ukraine-wide. However, this problem is not being treated by the reformers, at least as of now. Other problems which are most important for faculty members, as the CSR survey shows, include low wages (69 percent indicated as most important) and bad material and technical supply (49 percent). These two problems are simply not addressed at all in the current discourse around the reform. As I observed, even in KPI, the largest and one of the most prestigious Ukrainian universities, the material conditions of work are degrading. For example, in winter, the buildings were not heated, and the staff had to wear coats inside; there were also smelly toilets, leaky ceilings and buggy elevators, which moved up only from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. These problems are silenced because of the hegemonic convention that nowadays money must go to fight the intervention in the East, and conscious citizens must not be greedy and demand investment in their fields; the Ministry seems to follow this convention, and even some faculty members agree with it. Instead, the problem which is most discussed is university autonomy, despite the fact that only 15 percent of Ukrainian professors listed the problem of access to decision-making among three most important (Tsentr doslidzhen suspilstva 2013). The situation with workload, paperwork, low wages and degrading conditions, leaves faculty members little time and energy to invest into participation in decision-making and reform implementation, even

if they believe that this participation would help solve their central problems in the long run. As a result, they keep delegating their decision-making power to the people who are responsible and get paid for decisions.

Meanwhile, the Ministry's reliance on hierarchies maintains in the faculty members the impression that everything is simply going on in old ways. As a result of misinformation and a habit to be wary of the innovations of the Ministry of Education, even the supposedly beneficial innovations, such as decreasing the upper limit to mandatory workload from 900 to 600 hours per year, rise suspicions in many that they will result in layoffs or other complications. Even those who recognize the need for reform, argue that it is too formalistic, superficial, only imposes more external and quantitative control measures, and does not relate to things that really matter to faculty members: "If you simply change the name from 'aspirants' and 'candidates' to 'PhD', it won't turn our aspirants and candidates into PhD students from Harvard" (*Department of Sociology, middle generation*). Many argued that the methods of control offered by the reformers can not evaluate the substance of their work: "The control must be not according to formal criteria, but according to concrete results. Not the administrators [should be] asked about all this, but, just like you are doing now, [the Ministry should ask the faculty]" (*Department of Telecommunications, younger generation*). Others explicitly referred to such control mechanisms as citation indexes and rankings:

> Orientation to formal quantitative criteria in evaluation of the quality of faculty members, although it resembles Western analogues, is of little use in the conditions of high opportunism and lack of anti-plagiarism control and independent expert environment. So it is the latter that has to be changed (the plagiarism and the independent expert environment), and not the former (chasing the rankings). (*Department of Sociology, middle generation*)

The last quote hints that the processes in Ukrainian academia in their own ways resemble the processes in the west, labelled as "audit culture" (Shore 2008; Strathern 2000). The administrators' primary focus is on maximum efficiency in resource allocation; it is premised on the idea that maintaining and increasing the quality of education should be left to the discretion of university staff within a framework of "university autonomy", but must be controlled by rather formal mechanisms to avoid waste of resources[4]. The academic staff perceive this control as formalism, the efficiency as deprivation, and passing the quality assurance down to the universities as neglect. The reformers claim that Ukraine must follow the "audit culture" tendencies to impose remote control according to formal criteria such as publications indexed in Scopus or Web of Science in the name of accountability and efficiency of public funding allocation, and to rely on enthusiastic "neoliberal subjects" (Gill 2009), who do not expect reward for their efforts and can manage themselves. And, indeed, some of my informants were ready to become these subjects, stating that reform in fact does not require increased funding, because "true professors" must be so enthusiastic about their jobs that should invest effort in reforming education without expecting pay for it; and those who expect pay are, supposedly, somehow not so respectable.

Ukrainian academia has always been regulated by extensive universal standards, imposed by the state, so constant audit by authorities is not something new in this field. On the contrary, the reformers claim that the new Education Law grants universities autonomy and deregulates the field, transferring many responsibilities to the faculty councils. Indeed, some of the informants admitted that deregulation is in fact expected to happen, and even wished that the state preserved some of the universal standards. On the other hand, according to the new law, a new controlling

---

[4] Cf. Savi 2014, who found similar dialectic of increased centralization of making decision regarding funding, but, at the same time, decentralization of decisions regarding working with clients in her research of Estonian reforms during fiscal crisis.

body was created, *National Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education,* consisting of the representatives of all stakeholder groups (such as professors, students and, notably, employers) and formally independent of the Ministry — a body which strongly resembles the Quality Assurance Agency under New Public Management in Britain, analyzed by Cris Shore and Susan Wright (Shore and Wright 2000)[5]. Judging from the current state of affairs, when universities are extensively audited and re-licensed, and the Ministry officials claim that many are not expected to meet the criteria and must lose "on the market" (Kvit 2015), the deregulation in this case might mean a re-regulation, "changing the regulatory structure in a way that I [in our case, the reformers] like", as David Graeber wittily formulated it in his most recent book on bureaucracy (Graeber 2015, 16).

3.3.4. Quality and Europeanization: Contested Terms and Claim-Making Devices

At the same time, the claim that the quality of Ukrainian higher education leaves a lot to be desired was supported by virtually every one of my informants. While the value of university autonomy is at least somewhat contested, the appeal to quality for an overwhelming majority of my completely justifies, for example, the closures of small universities which have long been perceived as "diploma factories" (e.g. Semkiv 2013), providing very low quality education. Again, all of the informants in this study come from major universities which will certainly meet all the requirements, so, as they are not affected, they can feel free to take a stance in this matter according to their values.

---

[5] After I wrote this section, I had a chance to see a forthcoming article by a young CSR researcher (to be published at their website, but not yet up as of June 4, 2015), praising the QAA and the RAE as examples for Ukraine to follow, and never mentioning the New Public Management background of these institutions or the discontent they met among British faculty.

On the other hand, faculty members also appeal to quality of education in cases when they *oppose* the Ministry — for example, to support their statement that philosophy or history of Ukraine must be taught mandatorily, claiming that otherwise education without humanities will be one-sided; or to oppose the Ministry's formalism and to insist that other measures than those employed by the Ministry:

> So when we implement these freedoms, new norms, we have to somehow specify, first of all, the aim which we need to reach, I mean not to declare that we must do this, this, this, so that it is like in Europe. I mean, our main goal must be not to form some kind of shape, some exterior as in Europe, but to reach the goal which is reached in Europe... For example, we are talking about higher education in general, but I have not found a single document which would specify the criteria for higher education, everyone has their own criteria, and, as a result, people here mostly do not receive higher education, they only receive diplomas about higher education. (*Department of Telecommunications, younger generation*)

Some informants also mentioned that increasing quality of education requires more investment in it, that quality is impossible to assure without investment, while the proponents of the reform often use "quality" in association with "efficiency" to justify cuts — moreover, on their part it is, again, not a deception, but rather sincere belief that efficient, targeted and thoughtful spending can allow to improve education without increasing the total resources in it. The adepts of the reform in this case resemble Polish politicians from Solidarność in 1989, who were so immersed in developing democracy and ensuring the triumph of liberal values that they completely forgot about economy, and, as a result, overlooked the neoliberal project which was implemented at the same time (Kalb 2014). To sum up, the professors redefine the keyword "quality", assign their own meaning to it and use it to use it as a claim-making device to compete for hegemony.

The last quote above also links to another keyword, which is strongly associated with "quality" by both the proponents and the opponents of the reform — namely, "Europe" (as well as "USA", "West" and "abroad", which are used interchangeably with "Europe" to convey the same meanings). Just as "quality", "Europe" is used constantly by both sides of the conflict around education issues, and is attributed different shades of meaning depending on what a speaker or a writer wants to claim. Moreover, "Europe" has much stronger claim-making power than "quality", because "quality" belongs rather to a narrower professional discourse, while "Europe" comes from universal ideology, shared by wider population and backed by the shadow of Euromaidan; in other words, it allows one to support their argument not only in front of their colleagues, but in front of mass audience.

I have demonstrated in Chapter 1 how the modernist appeal to "Europe" allowed the current reformers to become legitimate in the eyes of the participants of the campaign around the new education bill, as well as in the eyes of the general public after Maidan. It is most significant, however, that the attempts to redefine what "Europe" means (but never to reject the value of joining "Europe") can also be found in nearly all of the public statements of the opponents of the reform. To take a random example, let us have a look at a recent article by Yuriy Tereshchenko, titled *Ministry of Education Functionaries Promised but Did Not Keep the Promise* (Tereshchenko 2015). In this article, the author uses examples from "Europe" to support the claim that History of Ukraine should be a mandatory subject. Moreover, he straightforwardly argues that "Europe" has been depicted wrongly by the reformers:

> It would seem that, according to the foundations of European integrational process in higher education, taking into account the specificities of functioning of educational systems of Europe and the USA, as well as Ukrainian nation- and state-building, the leaders of the Ministry of Education had to start a systemic reform of higher education in Ukraine.

However, unfortunately, one gets an impression that they do not have a complex vision of internal political specificity of the state, neither the proper knowledge about European (American) educational model, as well as the thorough strategy of reform.

Some of my informants used the concept of "Europe" for the similar purpose as Tereshchenko, to defend their discipline in its mandatory status:

> Under what sign they do this reform? Towards European requirements? I'm sorry, but there they have 20 to 25 percent of humanities, in Sweden, in Lithuania, in Germany, I asked people, they have 20 to 25 percent. And for us it is limited to 10. To say that these are European requirements, well, it is the same as if you said that we must have 10 percent of gay marriages here and it is an EU requirement. These things shouldn't be done, they discredit European values and European direction, if you say this to the scientists. (*Department of Philosophy, middle generation*)

Others used it to oppose the proponents of the reform in other aspects, such as ideas about financing, using the example of such institutions as Cambridge to argue that universities should receive public funding. Finally, one of the informants shared their understanding of misuse and mythologization of "Europe" in the discourse around the reform:

> Many of the people who I talked to think that in Europe, in the EU, there is some kind of fixed standardized system. For example, in Germany it is the same as in Poland, in Poland the same as in Hungary, and so on. In reality, this is a mistake. But I see that many of my colleagues have this opinion, and they see the Higher Education Law through this lens. I mean, they think that this law must bring us to some kind of common denominator which supposedly exists in Europe. But in reality it is an imaginary thing. [...] Because these decisions, like we cancel this Decree, or make cuts and that's it, [the reformers say that] it is us adjusting to the new law, to European practice. [...] Everything is justified by good intentions, that we are moving towards Europe. (*Department of Sociology, younger generation*)

These examples demonstrate that the opponents of the reform support their arguments within the hegemonic ideology and employ the keywords which have nearly uncontested value in the north and the west of Ukraine, such as "Europe" ("West" / "US" / "abroad"), not only in cases when they support the reform, but also when they oppose it. To do this, they assign their own meanings to these keywords, but mostly do it implicitly and do not transcend the hegemonic discourse. The same approach guides their choices of stance in discussions around specific issues, as in the case with cancelling mandatory subjects which I analyzed in the beginning of this section. In general, those who oppose the reform, hardly ever transcend the discourse and values of those who promote it; the outcome of this is that resistance within the dominant paradigm, uses the same tools (university hierarchy, media publications), and does not allow for any alternative paradigm. However, as Raymond Williams put it, "all or nearly all initiatives and contributions… are in practice tied to the hegemonic" (Williams 1977, 114); counter-hegemony and hegemony are not simply polar, but there is a continuum between them. The contestation in terms of the keywords of hegemony itself can also be successful, and the distance from it to transcending hegemonic discourse may be not so long.

Conclusion

> Once one highlights systemic forces and the way they create and sustain patterns of domination in the micro situation, the application of social theory turns to building social movements.

> Michael Burawoy (1998, 283)

As the analysis of my empirical data demonstrates, two aspects shape the attitudes of the faculty of Ukrainian universities towards the reform in higher education. First is their structural position, which leads them to defend against the attempts to disturb their usual routines and against threats to their self-regard and job satisfaction, as well as against the danger of losing their job. For this reason, faculty members side with local administrators to design workarounds to preserve the *status quo*. Second, at the same time, the actions of faculty members are in most cases not directly and consciously directed by their interests, but mediated through their worldviews. These worldviews also depend on their structural position — the more strongly, the bigger are the stakes of a person in a particular issue. However, the range of choices for these ideological views lie within a range of various aspects of hegemonic ideology: patriotism, pro-Europeanism, in some cases liberalism. Only two of the informants stepped outside this framework — one towards leftist critique of neoliberalism, and one towards pro-Soviet nostalgia; the rest stayed within the dominant discourse.

This situation can be explained by the fact that the choices of ideologies present in Ukrainian public discourse is limited to plain nationalism (as a reaction to war) and pro-European and anti-Soviet (neo)liberalism. Even moderate social-democratic voices are scarce, although represented by such important figures for our case as the deputy minister of education Inna Sovsun

and her native CSR think tank; not to mention explicitly left alternatives, which are almost completely marginalized[6]. This situation is caused by the developments of Maidan and after Maidan, during which the initial pro-European modernist aspirations were transformed twice: first, when right-wing groups gained legitimacy as militants against police violence and then against Russian interventions in Crimea and in the East, pro-Europeanism became intertwined with anti-Russian and anti-Soviet patriotism; second, the post-Maidan crisis government turned pro-Europeanism into a legitimation for cooperation with international institutions such as IMF and implementing austerity.

This transformation was accepted by the leadership of the Ministry of Education, who changed their rhetoric over time accordingly. It was also accepted by educational community, who tended to justify their claims within the same framework, as the case of canceling mandatory subjects demonstrates. The fact that the struggle around such controversial issues as the education reform is waged within the hegemonic discourse by means of redefining keywords can explain why, despite all the controversy, the resistance of the opponents of reform never goes further than publishing texts; such limitation of struggle within liberalism and conservatism, in absence of counter-hegemonic public discourses, precludes any form of collective action, as well as formulation of alternative visions of reform.

The education reform in Ukraine was just launched 10 months ago. So far, only the emergency measures, mostly connected to budget economy, were implemented. The active phase of the reform will start from the next academic year, when such norms as 25 percent of elective

---

[6] The critique of the education reform from an anti-austerity perspective is basically represented solely by Commons: Journal of Social Criticism (http://commons.com.ua). However, this electronic journal, with at most a couple of thousand readers for its most popular articles, is also marginal and cannot compete with any of the mainstream media in which the reformers and their non-left opponents publish their texts.

subjects, gradual reducing of the workload, application of the new requirements for PhD, docent and professor candidates, and others will be implemented. The developments of recent weeks (in May 2015), with one of the groups who were originally a part of the *Against the Degradation of Education* campaign, namely the *Pryama Diya* student syndicate, starting to critically oppose some of the innovations in education and return to their emphasis on accessibility and student rights, show that the hegemony is weakening and that the emergence of counter-hegemonic movements is possible. It is up to further research to investigate not only the discursive battles around the reform, but also the real-life contingencies of its implementation. This further research should be based on immersion and participant observation, in order to understand the relations between opinions and ideological claims, analyzed in this paper, and actual practices of the actors.

This research suggests that the lack of counter-hegemonic ideology in Ukraine, the total dominance of pro-European progressivism with a patriotic tint, which is successfully used as a veil for justifying austerity, causes the opposition to government's actions to be reactive and get trapped in a circle of redefining the keywords of hegemonic ideology. The condition of transcending the reactive resistance, as implied by the present research, seems to be the promotion of alternatives to the hegemonic ideology — and not only in education, but in the society as a whole.

Bibliography

Beck, Ulrich, Bonss, Wolfgang, and Christoph Lau. 2003. "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme". *Theory, Culture and Society,* 20(2): 1-33.

Bonneuil, Christophe, and Les Levidow. 2012. "How Does the World Trade Organization Know? The mobilization and staging of scientific expertise in the GMO trade dispute." *Social Studies of Science*, 42(1): 75-100.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. "Universal Corporatism: The Role of Intellectuals in the Modern World." Poetics Today 12(4): 655-669.

Burawoy, Michael. 1998. "The Extended Case Method." *Sociological Theory* 16(1): 4-33.

Collier, Stephen J. 2011. *Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Comaroff, Jean, and John L. Comaroff. 2012. *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa*. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield.

Cooper, Fredric. 2005. *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*. Berkeley: UCP.

Evans, Tony. 2010. *Professional Discretion in Welfare Services.* Farnham, Burlington: Ashgate.

Evans, Tony. 2011. "Professional, Managers and Discretion: Critiquing Street-Level Bureaucracy." *British Journal of Social Work* 41: 368-386.

FRI. 2011a. "Vidkrytyy lyst molodi do lidera KPU shchodo zakonoproektu 'Pro vyshchu osvity'." Accessed on May 23, 2015. http://fri.com.ua/2011/02/vidkrytyj-lyst-molodi-do-lidera-kpu-schodo-zakonoproektu-pro-vyschu-osvitu/.

FRI, 2011b. "Vidkrytyy lyst Molodizhnoyi hromadskoyi rady pry Zhytomyrskomu vykonkomi shchodo proektu Zakonu Ukrayiny 'Pro vyshchu osvitu'." Accessed on May 23, 2015. http://fri.com.ua/2011/06/vidkrytyj-lyst-molodizhnoji-hromadskoji-rady-pry-zhytomyrskomu-vykonkomi-schodo-proektu-zakonu-ukrajiny-pro-vyschu-osvitu/.

Gill, Rosalind. 2009. "Breaking the silence: The hidden injuries of neo-liberal academia." In *Secrecy and Silence in the Research Process: Feminist Reflections,* edited by Roisin Ryan-Flood and Rosaling Gill. London: Routledge.

Gorbach, Denys. 2013. "Ukrayinska spetsyfika: bez neoliberalizmu." *Spilne,* May 13. http://commons.com.ua/ukrayinska-spetsifika-bez-neoliberal/.

Graeber, David. 2015. *The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy.* Brooklyn: Melville House. Kindle edition.

Hall, Stuart. 1993. "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power." In *Formations of Modernity,* edited by Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben, 275-320. Cambridge: Polity press.

Kalb, Don. 2014. "'Worthless Poles' and Other Dispossessions: Toward an Anthropology of Labor in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe." In *Blood and Fire: Toward a Global*

Anthropology of Labor, edited by Sharryn Kasmir and August Carbonella, 250-288. New York: Berghahn Books.

Kvit, Serhiy. 2014. "Do kintsya roku skorotyat shche blyzko 70 vyshiv." *Radio Svoboda*. Accessed May 23, 2015. http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/26746660.html.

Kvit, Serhiy. 2015. "Potribni zminy: zmist i zavdannya osvitnikh reform." *Ukrayinska Pravda.* Accessed May 23, 2015. http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2015/01/27/7056516/.

Lane, David. 2015. "Sotsialni peredumovy ekonomichnykh i politychnykh zmin." In *20 rokiv kapitalizmu v Ukrayini: Istoriya odniyeyi ilyuziyi,* edited by Kyrylo Tkachenko, 55-79. Kyiv.

MON. 2014. "Dorozhnya karta rozvytku ukrayinskoyi osvity, pohodzhena studentamy, shcho zaynyaly prymishchennya MON, 2014. Dodatok do nakazy Ministerstva osvity i nauky vid 28.02.2014 #174." Accessed on May 23, 2015. http://www.univer.kharkov.ua/images/redactor/news/2014-03-18/dorozhnya_karta.pdf.

Morgan, Anthony W., and Nadezhda V. Kulikova. 2007. "Reform and Adaptation in Russian Higher Education: An Institutional Perspective." *European Education* 39(3): 39-61.

Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. *The Democratic Paradox.* London: Verso.

Niesz, Tricia, and Ramchandar Krishnamurthy. 2013. "Bureaucratic Activism and Radical School Change in Tamil Nadu, India." *Journal of Educational Change,* 14(1): 29-50.

NTUU "KPI". 2013. "Istoritya KPI." Last modified November 17, 2014. http://kpi.ua/almamater.

Osvita.ua. 2009. "Natsionalnyy tekhnichnyy universytet Ukrayiny 'Kyyivskyy politekhnichnyy instytut' (NTUU KPI)." *Osvita.ua.* Last updated June 24. http://osvita.ua/vnz/guide/17/79/.

Ryabchenko, Olena. 2012. *Studenty radyanskoyi Ukrayiny 1920-1930-kh rokiv: praktyky povsyakdennosti ta konflikty identyfikatsiyi.* Kharkiv: KhNAMG.

Samokhin, Ihor. 2014. "Shcho nam hotuyut u byudzheti-2015." *Politychna krytyka,* December 16. http://ukraine.politicalcritique.org/2014/12/budget-2015/.

Samokhin, Ihor. 2015. "Vtrata naukovoho potentsialu." In *20 rokiv kapitalizmu v Ukrayini: Istoriya odniyeyi ilyuziyi,* edited by Kyrylo Tkachenko, 114-132. Kyiv.

Savi, Riin. 2014. "Public Policy-Making in a Time of Cutbacks: The Role of Street-Level Bureaucrats in Estonia." *Administrative Culture* 15(1), 100-119.

Semkiv, Rostyslav. 2013. "Chomu zh ne yde apostol pravdy i nauky?" *Ukrayinskyy tyzhden,* September 1, 2013. http://tyzhden.ua/Columns/50/88084.

Shmatko, Ivan. 2011. "Vilna pedahohika: chomy, yak i dlya choho." *Spilne* 3: 130-132.

Shore, Cris. 2008. "Audit Culture and Illiberal Governance: Universities and the Politics of Accountability." *Anthropological Theory* 8(3):278-298.

Shore, Cris, and Susan Wright. 2000. "Coercive accountability: The rise of audit culture in higher education." In *Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the Academy,* edited by Marylin Strathern, 57-89. London and New York: Routlege.

Sovsun, Inna, and Yegor Stadny. 2015. "Persha studiya. Shcho dast vysham avtonomiya." *Youtube.* Accessed May 23, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VdTidKkf_i8.

Stadny, Yegor. 2014a. "From higher education legislation to implementation." *University World News.* Accessed May 23, 2015. http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20140709080332408.

Stadny, Yegor. 2014b. "Pokazhit svoho Hirsha, shanovni vykladachi." *Center for Society Research.* Accessed May 23, 2015. http://www.cedos.org.ua/uk/osvita/pokazhit-svoho-hirsha-shanovni-vykladachi.

Stadny, Yegor, Solodko, Andriy, and Iryna Svityyashchuk. 2014. "Derzhavne finansuvannya pidhotovky kadriv u vyshchiy osviti: dosvid ta vyklyky." *Center for Society Research.* Accessed May 23, 2015. http://www.cedos.org.ua/uk/osvita/derzhavne-finansuvannia-pidhotovky-kadriv-u-vyshchii-osviti-dosvid-ta-vyklyky.

Strathern, Marilyn (editor). 2000. *Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the Academy.* London and New York: Routlege.

Svityashchuk, Iryna. 2013a. "Vyshcha osvita z obmezhenoyu mobilnistyu." *Center for Society Research.* Accessed May 23, 2015. http://www.cedos.org.ua/uk/osvita/vyshcha-osvita-z-obmezhenoiu-mobilnistiu.

Svityashchuk, Iryna. 2013b. "Pro deyaki problemy finansuvannya ukrayinskoyi osvity v mizhnarodnomu konteksti." *Center for Society Research.* Accessed May 23, 2015. http://www.cedos.org.ua/uk/osvita/pro-deiaki-problemy-finansuvannia-ukrainskoi-osvity-v-mizhnarodnomu-konteksti.

Svityashchuk, Iryna. 2014. "Vid prozorosti do avtonomiyi." *Center for Society Research.* Accessed May 23, 2015. http://www.cedos.org.ua/uk/osvita/vid-prozorosti-do-avtonomii.

Tereshchenko, Yuriy. 2015. "Funktsionery MON poobitsyaly, ale ne vykonaly." *Ukrayinskyy tyzhden,* April 20, 2015. http://tyzhden.ua/Society/134399.

Tkachenko, Kyrylo. 2015. "Istoritya odniyeyi dyvnoyi peremohy, abo Khto vyhrav unaslidok rynkovykh peretvoren?" In *20 rokiv kapitalizmu v Ukrayini: Istoriya odniyeyi ilyuziyi,* edited by Kyrylo Tkachenko, 82-113. Kyiv.

Tsentr doslidzhen suspilstva. 2013. *Zvit za rezultatamy sotsiolohichnoho opytuvannya "Sotsialno-ekonomichnyy ta profesiynyy portret ukrayinskoho vykladacha."* Accessed May 23, 2015. http://www.cedos.org.ua/system/attachments/files/000/000/002/original/csr_-_teachers_-_report_-_final.pdf?1386338539.

Ukrayinska pravda. 2015. "Rada pryynyala zminy do pensiynoho zakonodavstva." *Ukrayinska pravda,* March 2. http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/03/2/7060261/.

UNIAN. 2015a. "Hontareva pidtverdyla perekhid na yedynyy rynkovyy kurs valyut." *UNIAN,* February 2. http://economics.unian.ua/finance/1039391-gontareva-pidtverdila-perehid-na-ediniy-rinkoviy-kurs-valyut.html.

UNIAN. 2015b. "Vidsyohodni v Ukrayini rizko zrosly komunalni taryfy." *UNIAN,* April 1. http://economics.unian.ua/realestate/1062231-vidsogodni-v-ukrajini-rizko-zrosli-komunalni-tarifi.html.

Vidsich. 2013. "Proty degradatsiyi osvity. Istoriya kampaniyi." Accessed on May 23, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Z2xO8Ezzms.

Williams, Raymond. 1997. *Marxism and Literature.* New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ZIK. 2015. "Reformy v osviti peredbachayut znyzhennya vytrat na 300 mln hrn, — memorandum MVF." *ZIK,* March 12. http://zik.ua/ua/news/2015/03/12/reformy_u_sferi_osvity_peredbachayut_znyzhennya_vytrat_na _300_mln_grn__memorandum_mvf_571752.

ZN.UA. 2014. "Opublikovan zakon o sekvestre byudzheta na 2014 god." *Zerkalo nedeli,* April 2. http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/opublikovan-zakon-o-sekvestre-gosbyudzheta-na-2014-god-142455_.html.