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Intervention & Security Policy in Democratic Republic of Congo

Neutralizing or fueling the conflict?

Thesis submitted by

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Author's Declaration

I, the undersigned (Taylor Helene Matevich), hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person, except where due acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material that has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

This is a true copy of the thesis, including final revisions.

Date: 1st July 2015

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List of Acronyms & Abbreviations

ASM	Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda; *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* [French]
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
IES	Institute for Environmental Security
IPI	International Peace Institute
IPIS	International Peace Information Service
Landsat ETM+	Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus
M23	March 23 Movement; *Mouvement du 23-Mars* [French]
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo; *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo* [French]

MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo* [French]
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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Abstract

This thesis will serve to evaluate and analyze the United Nations Security Council resolution 2098, mandating an "offensive" force intervention brigade in DRC. In a country that is host to rampant political and environmental security, where endangered species, natural resources, and civilians are under significant duress, with no clear indication of immediate alleviation, effective international security policy is urgent. This thesis will operate under the theories of the "natural resource curse" as well as neorealist international relations theory. In this context, these theories work to assert the hypothesis that the Security Council-mandated force, as a newly active combatant in the conflict, will not generate the long-term objectives of the MONUSCO mandate, but rather fuel the conflict. A general overview of the conflict context will be presented, in addition to outlining the conflict motives and significant factors that sustain violence. Following, an analysis of arms trade data and satellite imaging technology, which monitors mine sites and natural resources in the region, will be evaluated and compared with conflict mapping and armed rebel group locations to determine the effectiveness of MONUSCO's policy, as mineral resource exploitation is a major source of funding for armed rebel groups in the eastern provinces in the country and continue to stimulate the conflict. The thesis will conclude with findings and potential policy proposals, as well as further research recommendations.

Keywords: Democratic Republic of Congo; DRC; peacekeeping; peace enforcement; United Nations; MONUSCO; intervention brigade; M23; artisanal mining; natural resources.

1. Introduction

This chapter will introduce the geopolitical situation of the selected case in DRC, as well as the policy introduced by the United Nations Security Council, to which this thesis contributes. I will provide a general overview of the conflict history and the new mandate implemented in DRC, which has informed this research. I will then provide an overview of the study, including the research problem and question and my intended contribution, and will conclude this chapter with an outline of the thesis.

1.1 Conflict Overview of Democratic Republic of Congo



Figure 1: General Map of DRC *source*: CIA (2015)

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is host to one of the most environmentally rich and diverse landscapes in the world. Additionally, it is one of the largest countries on the African continent, not only in population size but also second largest in landmass after Algeria, making it the largest in Sub-Saharan African and nearly one-fourth the size of the United States, sharing borders with ten other states (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2015). Despite these impressive features, DRC is host to a prolonged period of political instability, and continues to be plagued by seemingly endemic violence long after gaining independence from Belgium in 1960, in spite of the fact that 2003 brought about the official end to the international conflict[1] and a fragile peace and post-conflict reconstruction and development process. The country's immense physical size and population, as well as its location in the center of the continent – bordering other states with comparable security situations – make the DRC's stability a key factor in initiating peace and stability in the region. However, immense difficulty in achieving peace and stability in this country is due to other geographical factors as well, which will be discussed at length in the next chapter of this thesis.

[1] Prunier, 2009.

1.2 United Nations & MONUC

The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo or MONUC) is one of the oldest and largest funded UN missions in the organization's history. The MONUC mission was established in 1999 with UNSC resolution 1258 in response to the violent conflict affecting the entire Central African region. Since then, nearly 8.73 billion USD has been used toward the UN peacekeeping effort in the country (United Nations, 2015). By June 2010, UN peacekeeping troop numbers had exceeded more than 20,000 in total, with contributing troops from more than 30 nations worldwide, making is the largest peacekeeping mission to date (*ibid*). It is also widely recognized by the international community to be one of the UN's most significant failures.

1.2.1 Resolution 2098 & MONUSCO

The March 23 Movement (Mouvement du 23-Mars or M23) rose to prominence in 2012, particularly after capturing the city of Goma in the far east, bordering with Uganda and Rwanda. While this occurred under the watch of the UN mission to DRC, who offered little to no resistance, regional actors called for the need of a new intervention brigade in eastern DRC. By early 2013, 11 regional actors had come together to agree upon a Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for DRC and suggested the implementation of a "brigade-strength Neutral Intervention Force" with the support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Karlsrud, 2015).

However, due to SADC's inability to fund the mission, UNSC offered a counter-proposal of a Force Intervention Brigade that would be comprised of SADC troops, likely in the interest of (i) working to meet their objectives in the region and (ii) attempt to recover and improve their reputation in the region.

In March of 2013, a landmark resolution was passed by UNSC authorizing the first-ever force intervention brigade (FIB) in DRC, which had developed MONUC into United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo*) what is now referred to MONUSCO. This signified the intention of the UN mission to stabilize the country (given the addition of this term to the mission name). Though DRC has had previous experiences, particularly since the end of the Second Congo War, of disarmament, demo-bilization, and reintegration policy in eastern DRC, the current intervention has evolved from a

seemingly ineffective peacekeeping mission to that of peace enforcement (Small Arms Survey, Issue Brief, 2013). This is uncharted territory in the field of UN assertive impartiality, and is perhaps a territory it should not want to enter, as the MONUSCO mission, as mandated by UNSC, is a sanctioned "intervention brigade to neutralise and disarm the M23 rebels as well as other Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups in strife-riven eastern DRC" (UNSC/RES/2098, 2013).

As suggested by UNSC, the new MONUSCO mission included troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, who all actively supported the mission. Later that same year, the world saw the collapse of M23. After this success, MONUSCO obtained further capabilities such as gunship helicopters that were then used when fighting the Allied Democratic Forces at the start of 2014 and then mandate was extended for another year to continue its work (on a continued provisional basis) (*ibid*).

While the language of the mandate passed is rather ambiguous, it is certainly clear that, by identifying specific targets in the resolution, the UN has now made itself a party to the ongoing conflict. This decisive and controversial security approach has undoubtedly raised many questions in the international community and among scholars, however this thesis will primarily focus on the issue of, what happens when the UN wages war?[2]

1.3 Research Overview

This thesis will assess and evaluate the progress of the UNSC-mandated MONUSCO FIB in eastern DRC. More specifically, this thesis will aim to answer whether or not this new mandate and security policy approach will serve the UN's long-term objectives in eastern DRC. Will joining the fight bring peace to the lawless eastern region of DRC, or will increased troops thwart peace efforts? To properly answers this question, the assessment will be in regard to the long-term objectives of the UN in DRC that outlined in UN resolution 2098 (2013),

> " [MONUSCO is] in support of the authorities of the DRC, on the basis of information collation and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade referred to in paragraph 9 and paragraph 10 above, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern

[2] Karlsrud, 2015.

DRC and to make space for stabilization activities."

This thesis consists of five chapters. The next chapter will introduce literature that is relevant to the context of eastern DRC, to the field of international security policy, and this study. It will also offer a theoretical framework in which we can apply the research findings and formulate an informed hypothesis. After this, I will briefly explain the construction of the research and the limitations of the study. The fourth chapter will explain the relevant information regarding indicators of progress, in relations to MONUSCO's mission, in eastern DRC and evaluate how they have responded to the FIB's mandate. The final chapter will highlight pertinent findings and offer recommendations for policy makers and further research in this case study.

2. Literature Review

This literature review will address the most significant factors affecting conflict motives in eastern DRC. While this thesis' aim is to address the political security policy approach to the conflict in DRC, the nature of this conflict is undoubtedly tied to the environmental security context in the east of the country and its influence on trade in the region as well. Its aim is to provide a comprehensive overview of the political security and environmental security situations in the country, as well as emphasize the urgency of generating positive results, by developing effective policy and implementing informed and inclusive intervention strategies.

2.1 Political Security

There are countless factors that contribute to the political insecurity of the state in DRC, some of which include poor governance standards, a culture and eventual acceptance of political corruption and impunity, and overall weak state institutions (Bulzomi et al., 2014). These combined factors have created an environment that has only helped to facilitate the conflict and given ample opportunity for armed rebel groups to challenge the state.

2.1.1 Armed Rebel Groups in the East

While the numbers are constantly fluctuating, there is estimated to be more than forty armed rebel groups operating throughout the political borders of DRC.[3] It is for such reasons that this thesis questions the approach of MONUSCO; will targeting one armed rebel group at a time effectively work to obtain long-term UN objectives in DRC? Furthermore, the large number of

[3] IRINnews, 2015

rebel groups is partly due to the fact that many members will defect from one to create another. An Usalama Project report explains this phenomenon, asserting that armed groups inherently produce more armed groups through means of networking with former combatants, arms dealers, smugglers, and miners.[4] Just as M23's founder defected from the national government forces, who had previously defected from the pro-Tutsi Congrès national our la défense du peuple (CNDP) (Koko, 2012). Cammaert (2013) also emphasizes that the behavior of these rebel groups in the eastern part of DRC is erratic and unpredictable, there are no distinct patterns…"the perpetrators of violence form constantly shifting and internecine alliances, merging in different locations or under the new leadership of individuals, only to fracture into new and rebranded groups as events dictate."

2.1.2 Arms Trade & Transport Corridors

Another factor that continues to fuel the violence in the east and support the rebel groups in the arms trade and the available transport corridors, despite the otherwise poor roads and infrastructure in the region. The Port of Dar es Salaam on the Tanzanian coast connects to markets throughout the Central African region, including Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and DRC. DRC also has connections to the port in Mombasa, Kenya (Teravaninthom & Raballand, 2009). "It connects the entire East Africa Community to a major regional port for overseas trade and connects the EAC partner states and DRC for intra-regional trade and personal mobility…Several road sections have just been paved within the last four years, making it a recent option for competitive cross border trade using the Port of Dar es Salaam." (Nathan Associates, Inc., 2011). These trade routes allow for accessibility to "minerals for arms" trade in DRC, particularly because most Congo mineral deposits share a border with Rwanda or Uganda, and once the minerals have crossed the border out of DRC, are difficult to trace. This location on the border also creates opportunity for rebel groups to impose illegal taxes on outgoing minerals (*ibid*).

2.1.3 Arms Embargo

Dating back more than a decade, an arms embargo has been active in DRC as a result of the internal violence. In July of 2003, UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1493 in response to continued conflict particularly in the east (most notably Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces) in an effort to impede violence and reduce the illegal exploitation of natural resources

[4] *ibid*.

(Fruchart, 2007). The Resolution necessitated "that all States and in particular those in the region, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ensure that no direct or indirect assistance, especially military or financial assistance, is given to the movements and armed groups present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" (SIPRI, 2015). At the moment, the embargo does allow for arms for transfers to the government of DRC. (*ibid*).

2.2 Environmental Security

DRC hosts undoubtedly some of the richest mineral deposits in the world, including cassiterite, niobium, coltan, tantalum, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, uranium, coal, copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, and wolframite (CIA, 2015). In addition to these resources, DRC is also rich in timber, oil, hydropower, and a large number of threatened animals and endangered species, including its flagship species, the mountain gorilla (Bulzomi et al., 2014). This appears to be an expansive list, but does not quite emulate the true scope of DRC's resource wealth. In this one African country, there is an estimated 24 trillion USD worth of untapped deposits and raw minerals (which is the equivalent of the combined gross domestic product of the United State and Europe), and includes some of the largest reserves of diamonds, gold, and coltan in the world (Morgan, 2009). This is of particular interest in today's economy as minerals such as tantalum and niobium are extracted from coltan ores, which are used widely in modern electronic products (most commonly in mobile phones, cameras, and laptops, see Appendix B) (Sutherland, 2011). The mineral supply chain in eastern DRC is a complex network, but traditionally incorporates several main actors, starting with artisanal miners, who then sell to local mineral traders or other "middlemen" (sometimes armed rebel groups), who then deliver to trading houses, which are located in major export hubs, which in the case of Central Africa is usually a port in Kenya or Tanzania (Bulzomi et al., 2014).



Figure 2: Mineral Resources Map *source*: IES, 2008 "tin belt, coltan belt, gold belt, National Parks, hunting areas"

2.2.1 Natural Resource Exploitation

For more than a decade, the exploitation of mineral resources has sustained a violent conflict (responsible for more than 5 million deaths) in DRC, with no end in the foreseeable future, as the global demand for the minerals available in the region continues to rise (Ma, 2009). The longstanding exploitation of natural resources in this region has had adverse effects on the local fauna and floral, as poaching (for food as well as sale on the black market) continues threatens wildlife populations, artisanal mining has increased water pollution and soil erosion, and large-scale migration of miners and refugees (particularly in the national parks) cause widespread deforestation (Luethje, Kranz, & Schoepfer, 2014). The Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has publicly criticized the international community's hesitation in response to the link between the "shameless looting of Congolese natural wealth" and the conflict in the country, as the damage the region has experienced so far has been debilitating and perhaps irreversible (UNSC, 2001).

The resources mine have been highly militarized so as to increase the wealth and finance of rebel groups operating there, including groups such as FDLR, CNDP, and even divisions of the national Congolese army (FARDC), who is supported by MONUSCO (Ma, 2009). While there has been some international attention in this area, it has not been enough, thus far, to instigate change. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ruled the extraction of coltan minerals by any foreign occupying army in the region to be considered "looting", and therefore a war crime (Sutherland, 2011). The United State has also passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, requiring that American manufacturers certify that any and all purchases by their company are free of "conflict minerals" and "and the metals smelted from them do not come from sources involved in funding war crimes and human rights abuses in the DRC" (Bulzomi et al., 2014). However, little else has been done on the international stage and regulation weak.

As the Congolese government has minimal regulation over a large part of the country, especially in the east due to geographic location and poor infrastructure, smuggling of significant minerals across "porous borders" has run rampant in the eastern provinces (*ibid*). As recently as 2010, government forces were unable to physically control activity in the mining sector during the mining ban ordered by President Kabila. "Concerning demilitarization, it has been reported that soldiers themselves started to dig and refused orders to leave the mines after President Kabila

ordered a mining ban in 2010. No action was in fact taken against the so-called mafia-like military and civil elements the ban set out to dismantle. The military became miners themselves and forced civilians to assist them in exploiting the minerals—a form of forced labour known as 'salongo.' Both the UN Group of Experts and Congolese human rights groups reported of the widespread use of forced labor at mines…" (Luethje, 2014).

2.2.2 Artisanal & Small-Scale mining

The economy is DRC is still slowly recovering from decades of civil war, systemic corruption, and economic decline, as the conflict during the 1990s significantly diminished national output and government revenue and increased external debt (CIA, 2015). Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is one of the largest sources of income for a large proportion of the Congolese population, as the World Bank estimated that nearly two million people in the country were employed (formally and informally) as diggers in the mining sector (World Bank, 2015). With these statistics, estimates conclude that approximately 18% of the population is (directly or indirectly) dependent upon the artisanal mining sector in DRC (*ibid*). The commencement of work in the eastern mining sector, which provides most of the nation's export revenue, has regenerated and increased the capital's economic standing and GDP growth in the past several years (CIA 2015). Such trends in DRC would be especially welcome as the country has remained for many years at the bottom of UN Development's Human Development Index rankings, in which low GDP and a poor economy are major contributors (among many other factors) (United Nations Development Programme, 2014).

However, because artisanal mining operations require little capital they are unregulated and occur primarily within protected areas, around endangered or threatened species. Uncertain legal framework, corruption, and a lack of transparency in government policy are long-term problems for the large mining sector and for the economy as a whole. Much economic activity still occurs in the informal sector and is not included in country's official GDP data (CIA 2015). In September of 2010, the national government banned mining in the eastern region, in an attempt to thwart corruption surrounding the mining sector, such as illegal taxation (De Koning, 2011). Throughout conflict periods, it is typical for diggers and miners to be robber of the resources and minerals they collect by soldiers and rebels, sometimes even civilians as well, if they have not already been extracted by these groups (*ibid*).

Furthermore, the most prominent issues that develop from mining practices include mining-related illnesses, significant environmental damage, disruption of families and child labor exploitation, as well as the abuse of women, sometimes resulting in prostitution and rape (Stratton et al., 2015). Workers from the mining industries and refugees fleeing from neighboring countries will often relocate to these mining areas in a desperate search for minerals (as a means of income), many of which are hosted in national parks and protected areas. This mass relocation negatively and dramatically affects the wildlife and delicate ecosystems; an estimated 14,000 people have relocated into protected wildlife reserves, which undoubtedly increases pressure on wildlife and forests (as an excessive amount of timber is cut down for cooking fuel and animals are poached as a source of food or used to trade in the illegal markets in the region) (*ibid*).

2.3 Challenges to United Nations Security Council Mandate

In addition to the many challenges presented to this UN mission by DRC itself, the nature of the mandate has been met with several challenges from the international community.

2.3.1 Peace-keeping vs. Peace Enforcing

The term 'peacekeeping' denotes the use of national, and oftentimes multinational, forces for the resolution of controlling or settling current or possible armed conflict among or within states (Berdal & Ucko, 2015, & Fasulo, 2004). Peacekeeping forces are most usually organized with the permission of the parties involved in the conflict and who also agree to a ceasefire or some other peace agreement… "Peacekeeping forces are therefore usually unarmed or only lightly armed and use the minimum of force necessary and then only exceptionally" (Caplan, 2015).
In contrast, peace enforcement is a term that denotes the use of military resources to enforce peace "against the will of the parties" (*ibid*). This usually happens, for example, when a ceasefire or previous peace agreement has failed.
This is an important distinction, as the current MONUSCO mission, for the purpose of this thesis, is considered under the "peace enforcement" definition. Two key concerns, therefore, should be highlighted regarding the development of the mission in DRC. As the sanctioning of an offensive mandate compromises the neutrality and impartiality of the UN operation, it may also jeopardize the security of the peacekeepers as well as the citizens they aim to protect. As the UN can now be considered a party to the conflict, the chance of attacks against UN workers and civilians has increased (Karlsrud, 2015).

2.3.2 Legal Challenges

While the principal obligation of the UNSC is to maintain, or in this case create, peace and security, there are certain limitations that the Security Council is supposed to abide by in order to achieve this. One of the foundations of UN policy is its stance of impartiality in conflicts around the world. "In peacekeeping operations the objective is not to defeat an aggressor but to prevent fighting, act as a buffer, keep order, or maintain a cease-fire. Peacekeeping forces are generally instructed to use their weapons only in self-defense…to be effective, they must maintain an attitude of neutrality and impartiality regarding the adversaries" (Bennett 1980).

The legal basis of an overtly offensive mandate sanctioned by the UN is at the core of the criticisms surrounding MONUSCO. It is also a concern that it is not something that has been tested in the field before now. It has been suggested, however, that an approach such as this signifies progress toward the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)[5], as this gives the international community the right and responsibility to intervene in countries that are failing to provide their own citizens with security (Sheeran & Case, 2014). For these reasons, it is important to closely monitor and regularly evaluate the situation.

With the approval of this mandate in 2013, there was some skepticism among several UNSC members. In this case, China was clear of its reservations as well as Russia, who was outspoken about its concerns, emphasizing "what was once the exception now threatens to become unacknowledged standard practice" (Karlsrud, 2015). Although the original mandate states that it is in no way meant to set a precedent for other UN missions, clearly asserting that the FIB's survival was "on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping", its renewal and extension in 2014 suggests otherwise, and its mere existence will certainly have a significant impact on the current mission (Lamont & Skeppström 2013).

2.4 Theoretical Summary

Given the complex nature of the conflict in DRC, it is important to not only define the research problem and question that this thesis will address, but also I would like to take the opportunity to assert how I have developed my hypothesis. Research regarding intrastate conflict and civil wars has increased drastically in recent years, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Researchers in the field of international relations have applied these same theories of conflict between nations to conflicts within nations.

[5] This in usually enacted in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and genocide (Iqbal, 2010).

In reference to the civil conflict in DRC, it is perhaps most suitable to assess the UN offensive mandate through the lens of neorealist international relations theory. This theory asserts that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," a theory that has also been applied in the case of the Second Congo War, in which this theory in practice fostered an insecure regional environment (Williams, 2013).

Figure 3: Paradox of Abundance *source*; Luethje, et al. (2014)

During the "African World War", states that had mutual enemies formed alliances in order to increase their chances of surviving an attack. "This tit-for-tat strategy of escalation created a destabilizing network of competing alliances, including both states and rebels, throughout much of the continent" (*ibid*). However, rather than providing each other with security, the nature of these alliances were under foreboding as they were created under threat of attack, and only drove insecurity throughout the region. Rwanda's invasion of eastern DRC caused a chain reaction among insecure actors operating under the neorealist theory and rushed into war (*ibid*). Therefore, this thesis will operate under this neorealist theory, based on this history of DRC, which occurred not yet two decades ago.

Additionally, I would like to make clear my intention to conduct this analysis under the theory that the "natural resources curse" does, in fact, affect DRC. While it is a commonly understood theory (that countries rich in natural resources are more likely to suffer from civil conflict, see Figure 3), there are also scholars who contest this theory (Fearon, 2004). Some scholars who have openly contested the theory have, however, listed DRC as an exception to their rule that natural resources are not correlated with conflict (Ross, 2004).

3. Methodology

3.1 Case Selection

For this thesis, I have chosen to narrow my research and analysis of UN peace enforcement mandates to a case study of only DRC, as opposed to also including Mali (MINUSMA) and

Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in my research. I have chosen DRC over the other two possible cases for several reasons. After careful consideration, I chose DRC as my case due to the nature of the mandates; while the MINUSMA mission in Mali and MINUSCA mission in Central African Republic are also peace enforcement missions, they have been categorized as stabilization missions. While the new mission in DRC (MONUSCO) does also include "stabilization" in its revised name, it is the case in which specific armed groups have been identified and targeted (Karlsrud, 2015).

An analysis of mineral deposit maps as well as maps of identified mines and environmental degradation in eastern DRC will be used in addition to conflict mapping of known armed rebel groups in these areas. An assessment of this data will provide a clearer picture of the necessity for MONUSCO's offensive approach, and its effectiveness thus far.

3.2 Validity

Much of the data assessed in this thesis is subject to poor validity, as satellite-imaging data can be dependent upon ideal weather conditions over the land area being assessed, and therefore accuracy can be called into question. Additionally, much of the information provided by institutions was difficult to obtain, as much of the imports, exports, and trade in the region is not formalized, and therefore is unreported, particularly when analyzing rebel group activities in the east. Furthermore, the movement of rebel groups throughout the east contributes to poor validity, as locations of these groups change regularly.

3.3 Reliability

Given the violent nature of the conflict in DRC, particularly in the eastern part of the country, which hosts the largest concentration of resource mines, it is not possible from the data available from DRC to be comprehensive or complete. It is difficult to quantify the environmental degradation of the country, due to political instability that makes it difficult for researchers to access. Additionally, quantifying a "loss of biodiversity" as animals are mobile and the poor infrastructure of roads can also make access in this region of DRC difficult.

Aside from the illegal or unformalized nature of the variables that are being assessed, the many regions in DRC, particularly the eastern region, are difficult to access due to violence in certain regions and lack of adequate infrastructure to allow for transport also contributes to inconsistent assessment and data accessibility.

3.4 Limitations

Prior to presenting the analysis, I would like to address some limitations of this thesis. Due to the fact that the nature of the research problem presented is recent, obtaining concrete data that was recent enough to be relevant to the research problem (2013-2014) was difficult. Additionally, due to the program schedule, which did now allow for independent research or a distinctive thesis-writing period, I have conducted the analysis with publicly available, time-relevant data and have informed this analysis with data exhibiting trends prior to the MONUSCO implementation.

4. Analysis

Using data that is available to the public through several organizations including Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Peace Information Service (IPIS), etc. and institutions with data collected using Landsat Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus (Landsat ETM+) as well as Optical Satellite Imagery and GIS such as Institute for Environmental Security (IES)[6], I will use this chapter to outline a comprehensive analysis addressing the main factors of insecurity in eastern DRC, namely natural resource exploitation and ASM, the limited statistics regarding arms imports to the country, as well as armed rebel group movements. With this information, I will form an analysis based on the data in relation the neorealist theory proposed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, that the UN-mandated FIB operating in DRC will not generate the long-term objectives of the MONUSCO mission of peace and security in eastern DRC. The following chapter will then conclude the thesis, and assert findings regarding the effectiveness of the UNSC offensive mandate in this context. Mapping data shows little to no effect upon the mining sites present in eastern provinces of DRC. Satellite images detect an unchanging presence of mines and deforestation in the region, despite the neutralization of M23 and other armed rebel groups resulting from the efforts of MONUSCO.

While the transfer of major conventional weapons is mostly limited to suppliers in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Ukraine provided by SIPRI data (2014) (see Appendix A), CIA (2015) data provides that China is DRC's most prominent export trading partner (at 43.7% total dollar value). CIA data does not account for illegal arms trade, and especially does not account for "minerals for

[6] The most recent available data using these techniques is too dated to use in a current analysis for changes in environment post-M23 neutralization (being that, while published recently, the data itself was from 2008 and 2011). However, the data provided from earlier years in these studies did help to inform this thesis, asserting the ecological effects that resource mines and their militarization by rebel groups have had in the past.

arms trade", however, this is consistent with data provided by IPIS and TransArms Research (2014), which details arms imports and exports and ranks China as the largest arms supplier to Sub-Saharan Africa as well as DRC.[7] (see Appendix B). Due to the continued increase in demand for minerals used in electronic manufacturing and the global shortage of these minerals[8], this data affirms the notion that conflict in this country has not significantly subsided with the neutralization of M23. However, a closer look at mapping data also reveals a puzzling aspect of the MONUSCO mandate, with M23 as the primary target of the FIB. Leading up to the approval of the mandate in March 2013, according to the data, M23 did not control any significant mining areas in DRC or the eastern region (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2012) (see Figure 4). Additionally, the group had not attacked any mines in the area and, based on available data, did not have any agenda to maximize their profits from the profitable and illegal mineral trade in the east. This is inconsistent with UNSC's policy to target M23 as a group to "disarm" and "neutralize" with force. Although the M23 has been successfully neutralized in DRC, as well as several other armed groups including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (Forces de resistance patriotiques en Ituri or FRPI), and Allied Patriots for a Free and Sovereign



Figure 4: Area occupied by M23 and location of mining sites, 2012 *source*: IPIS

[7] Due to data access limitations, the most recent available data provided by IPIS and TransArms Research regarding global arms imports and exports is from the years 2006-2010. It cannot be confirmed that these rankings still hold true, however, I believed it was an important dataset to highlight, as it is consistent with China's role in the context of DRC.

[8] Ma (2009) detail two occurrences in the international market, more specifically the supply chain, that have shifted the focus of tantalum production and availability to Central Africa. The United States Defense Logistics Agency, in 2007, depleted its stockpile from the Cold War, after having spent the last years releasing millions of pounds of the mineral annually. Not long after this, in 2008, the Australian mineral company Talison cancelled its operations in one of their mines that had been supplying more than 20% of the world market's tantalum. "The loss of two major suppliers is likely to lead to greater procurement from the DRC, particularly as tantalum prices increase in reaction to the decrease in global supply."

Congo (Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain or APCLS), few other security changes have occurred in the east. Mining areas mapped in this region show no improvement, as armed rebel groups who held mining territories previous to the MONUSCO mandate implementation have remained unaffected by their presence. As indicated by the data available through IPIS (2014), a large amount of armed rebel groups remain active in the mining sector, particularly in North and South Kivu provinces (see Figures 5 & 6).



Figure 5: Interactive Map of North Kivu, 2012 *source*: IPIS



Figure 6: Interactive Map of South Kivu, 2012 *source*: IPIS

This information reveals that while there have been UN "victories" in disarming and disbanding specific armed rebel groups deemed threatening to state power, these results do not affect the factors that continue to fuel conflict. The data presented shows that there is no significant correlation between the disarmament and neutralization of M23 and progress toward MONUSCO's long-term objectives. Therefore, UNSC's offensive targeting approach to the security situation in eastern DRC is, thus far, ineffective. As Karlsrud (2015) suggested, the UN may have won the battle in eastern DRC, but they may likely not win the war.

Furthermore, data provided by IPIS and TransArms Research (2014) offers information regarding arms supply to DRC, indicating that China is still one of the largest suppliers of weapons to the country (Bulzomi et al., 2014). While this data cannot confirm the "mineral for arms" trade continuation out of the eastern region (as the arms trade this is not documented in official and legal trade statistics), the data can suggest that it is still a likely possibility, as the technology industry in China is the largest importer of coltan from DRC for the manufacturing of laptops, mobile devices, and other electronic materials that are mostly sold to markets in Europe and the United States (Bulzomi et al., 2014 & Ma, 2009).

5. Conclusion

To conclude, what results when the UN engages in war, and is it possible that this new approach could lead to a UN victory?

Based on the research that has informed this thesis, short-term objectives of MONUSCO can be achieved with this approach, as we have seen with the disarmament and neutralization of M23 and other rebel groups operating in the region. However, in terms of the long-term goals of the UN mission, it is unlikely that this strategy can lead to the organization's intended outcomes. This research cannot confidently argue that the political and environmental situation will never improve through these means, however the current progress since the fall of M23 has not indicated that security will come to the eastern provinces via FIB. World Bank Mining Specialists also support this notion, stressing that "simply disarming rebel groups will not end abuses in the mining sector, since civilian power structures are some of the most exploitative" (World Bank, 2015). The data available suggests that the removal of one rebel group will not affect the others' ability to operate in the region, and a declaration of war by an international organization will not cause the violence to subside but, according to neorealist theory, will create alliances among these groups who will continue to create insecurity in the region.

As research provided by Mason and Fett (1996) indicates, the length and extent of internal conflict is the single, most significant indicator affecting the outcome of said conflict, whether it be a victory on one side or the other or a negotiated settlement. Put more simply, "the longer a war lasts, the less likely it is to end in victory for either side" (Brandt et al., 2008). This theory of conflict outcome also asserts that UNSC policy and objectives should not only depend on the victory of the government forces, as research indicated the unlikelihood of this outcome.

After decades of seemingly endless internal strife in a nation surrounded by fluctuating, but rather constant, violent conflict, research indicates that the DRC's brightest future will end with negotiated settlement. This, hopefully, will be initiated by improved and comprehensive international political and environmental security.

While traditional peacekeeping is important, the complexity and urgency of the situation in DRC has called for new approaches, which might help to finally alleviate this fragile country from the widespread and pervasive violence that has afflicted it for so many years. While developing the original MONUC mission from traditional peacekeeping to the MONUSCO mission it is today is a new approach in this context, becoming a new party to the ongoing conflict will more than likely not produce the desired results, and instead will put a target on MONUSCO's back.

> "For peace-keeping to remain effective in a changing world, its credibility must not be jeopardized by the application of peace-keeping to inappropriate situations, by the issuance of mandates unsupported by doctrinal consistency or military means, or by the undermining of its authority by attempts to reconcile peace-keeping with war-making under the rubric of peace-enforcement" (Tharoor, 1995).

Backing the government is typically viewed in such cases as the best option to achieve stability, however, openly supporting and fighting alongside a national government with a lack of political will and with a national army that is "staffed by war criminals" will likely only create enemies for the MONUSCO mission (Turner, 2007). The use of public resources for private gain is a trend that grew significantly during the Second Congo War during the time of Mobutu's regime, and still affects the country today (Adelman & Rao, 2004). As many economic actors in the state worked to avoid the effects of this economically parasitic regime, transfer into the informal sector, or "parallel economy", increased exponentially and significantly reduced the state resources (*ibid*). It is this policy history that must also be addressed in effective international security intervention and it is important that all stakeholders are engaged in dialogue concerning the intervention approach, as the exponential use of materials requiring the use of potential "conflict" minerals from DRC has continued, in part, due to the complexity of the global supply chain, which does not facilitate corporate social responsibility and accountability (Ma, 2009).

Being a state that perhaps has experienced one of the longest and most violent histories, and given its sheer size – both in population and land mass – DRC certainly requires a unique approach to its continued conflict. However, based on the developments in regard to UNSC's intervention brigade mandate thus far, I would argue that a robust and offensive security

approach in DRC will not provide support for the UN's long-term goals in DRC, and perhaps maintain tension and insecurity in the region.

5.1 Recommendations

While MONUSCO's purpose in DRC is to physically protect civilians – and the program undoubtedly would like to actively repair their reputation in this regard – declaring war against specific armed rebel groups operating in the east can be seen as not only ineffective, but also dangerous, as the UN's abandonment of neutrality and impartiality in DRC jeopardizes the safety of the organization's principles and its troops. The failure of the international community's unsuitable response to the First and Second Congo Wars in the 1990s stemmed from similar approaches, in which not all parties in the conflict were considered in the peace process. Adelman and Rao (2004) remind us of this, suggesting that the UN's course of action at that time should have been more inclusive –rather than targeting any group that is not associated directly with the government, protection for moderate parties and "parties of peace" should have been offered. A similar approach would do well in this context too.

It is for this reason, and based upon the data presented in the analysis, that I would recommend a supplementary approach to "neutralizing" armed groups in eastern DRC, namely by controlling their access to resources and, therefore, their leverage and funding. Poorly controlled minerals will remain a lure to conflict entrepreneurs of all types, which necessitates immediate policy action to control and formalize the mines in eastern DRC. Directly confront the problem of exploitation through the coordination of taxes is a promising solution to the development of trafficking and would also tackle national economic issues to bring in more revenue to the state (Bulzomi et al., 2014).

Mineral and Trade Certification Initiatives and Certified Trading Chains in the region are perhaps more effective approaches to conflict in the east, as they also attack the source of the rebels ability to operate. If the UN can work to align trade and security policies with their interventions, this approach has a more likely possibility of not only providing environmental security to this fragile ecosystem, but also limiting sources for armed rebel group exploitation, taxation, and funding. Additionally, action taken by consumers, importers of minerals, and manufacturers "may be the catalyst in generating the necessary momentum that will resonate down the supply chain" (Ma, 2009). If an international effort to reduce the use and demand for conflict minerals arises, this will necessitate transparency in the mineral supply chain and would

therefore put forth an end to the endless violence financed by mineral profits.

5.2 Future Research

As the conflict is still ongoing, there are endless possibilities for avenues of further research on this topic, particularly as the UN resolution and offensive mandate are still relatively new policy tools in DRC. As environmentally security in the region, particularly eastern DRC, is a significant and influential factor in the nature and duration of the conflict, further research should consult improved satellite imaging tools and techniques to assess environmental impacts in the mining and logging regions. Additionally, as this is a recent mandate, having only been implemented two years ago, access to valid and reliable data for this thesis was quite limited. However, this only asserts the necessity for further research on this topic.

A continuation of satellite monitoring in the region would be highly beneficial, particularly in the short term, as data can be difficult to collect in violent or politically volatile regions with poor infrastructure. However, this would require upgrading equipment for more accurate information. IES (2008) proposes investment in such technology not only by the Congolese national government, but also by organizations such as World Bank, IMF, conservations agencies, and NGOs, as they predict that this style of monitoring will "help to increase transparency, fight corruption, and advance good governance" throughout the mining sector in DRC. This non-invasive approach is a promising method for addressing many of the variables that contribute to the interconnected political and environmental security situations in DRC today.

Appendix A: Global Arms Trade Transfers

Table 1: Transfers of major conventional weapons

Note: The 'No. delivered/produced' and the 'Year(s) of deliveries' columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed separately. The 'Comments' column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Information generated: 26 May 2015

Supplier/ recipient (R) or licenser (L)	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/ licence	Year(s) of deliveries	No. delivered/ produced	Comments
Bulgaria							
R: DR Congo	(6)	D-20 152mm	Towed gun	(2013)	2013	6	Second-hand
Serbia							
R: DR Congo	(2)	G-2A Galeb	Trainer aircraft	(1996)	1997	(2)	Ex-Yugoslav; operated by Yugoslav mercenaries
	3	J-1 Jastreb	Ground attack ac	(1996)	1997	(3)	Second-hand; operated by mercenaries
	5	MiG-21PFM/Fishbed-F	Fighter aircraft	(1996)	1996	(5)	Second-hand; incl 1 MiG-21UM; flown by Serbian mercenaries
	(60)	M-75 120mm	Mortar	2012	2012	60	Second-hand
Ukraine							
R: DR Congo	1	Mi-24P/Hind-F	Combat helicopter	(1996)	1996	1	Second-hand
	3	Mi-24V/Hind-E	Combat helicopter	(1996)	1996	3	Second-hand; delivered via Poland and Egypt; operated by Russian or Ukrainian mercenaries; possibly lease
	6	2S1 122mm	Self-propelled gun	(2000)	2000	6	Second-hand
	30	BTR-60PB	APC	(2000)	2000	30	Second-hand
	4	Mi-24V/Hind-E	Combat helicopter	(2000)	2000	4	Second-hand; i ncl 2 Mi-24K version
	6	MT-LB	APC	(2000)	2000	6	Second-hand
	20	BMP-1	IFV	(2004)	2006	20	Second-hand
	20	T-55	Tank	(2004)	2006	20	Second-hand
	(12)	2S1 122mm	Self-propelled gun	2009	2010	12	Second-hand
	(12)	2S3 152mm	Self-propelled gun	2009	2010	12	Second-hand
	(12)	BM-21 Grad 122mm	Self-propelled MRL	(2009)	2010	(12)	Second-hand but modernized before delivery
	(36)	D-30 122mm	Towed gun	2009	2010	(36)	Second-hand
	(36)	M-43 120mm	Mortar	(2009)	2010	(36)	Second-hand; designation uncertain (reported as 120mm mortar)
	(4)	Mi-24V/Hind-E	Combat helicopter	(2009)	2010	4	Second-hand; possibly modernized before delivery
	(30)	T-55	Tank	2009	2010	30	Second-hand
	(100)	T-72M1	Tank	2009	2010	100	Second-hand
	2	Su-25/Frogfoot-A	Ground attack ac	2012	2012	2	Second-hand
	50	T-64A	Tank	(2013)			Second-hand but modernized to T-64B1M before delivery; $10 m deal; status uncertain
Unknown country							
R: DR Congo	1	C-212	Transport aircraft	(1990)	1992	(1)	Probably second-hand
	(10)	Strela-2/SA-7	Portable SAM	(1995)	1995	(10)	
	(1)	Mi-26/Halo	Helicopter	(2000)	2001	(1)	Probably second-hand
	(1)	An-26/Curl	Transport aircraft	(2001)	2001	(1)	Second-hand
	3	An-12/Cub	Transport aircraft	2008	2008-2009	3	Probably Second-handrainian; lease
	(1)	An-26/Curl	Transport aircraft	(2009)	2009	(1)	Second-hand

Note: sorted by supplier, deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 1990 to 2014

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers

Table 2: List of the top 10 suppliers and figures of major conventional arms to Sub-Saharan Africa[9], between the periods of 1996-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010.

	1996–2000		2001–2005		2006–10	
Rank	Exporter	Share	Exporter	Share	Exporter	Share
1	Russia	31	Russia	51	China	25
2	Belarus	12	China	9	Ukraine	20
3	Ukraine	8	Ukraine	7	Russia	11
4	China	6	Moldova	5	Italy	6
5	Slovakia	6	Bulgaria	5	South Africa	5
6	Bulgaria	5	Belarus	4	Belarus	4
7	Canada	4	Israel	2	Moldova	4
8	United States	3	United States	2	Jordan	3
9	Italy	2	Italy	1	United States	3
10	Spain	2	Slovakia	1	Singapore	3
	Others	21	Others	13	Others	16

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Databases; http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/

[9] excluding South Africa

Table 3: List of top suppliers of major conventional arms to Sub-Saharan Africa and their recipients, from 2006-2010

Rank	Supplier	Largest Recipient (share of exports)	Other recipients	No. of recipients
1	China	Nigeria (35%)	Benin, Chad, Congo, Rep. of, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe	16
2	Ukraine	Chad (28%)	Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe	9
3	Russia	Sudan (77%)	Chad, Niger, Senegal, Uganda	5
4	Italy	Nigeria (77%)	Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia	4
5	South Africa	Gabon (58%)	Burkina Faso, Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda	8
6	Belarus	Sudan (94%)	Eritrea	2
7	Jordan	Angola (100%)	-	1
8	Moldova	Kenya (100%)	-	1
9	United States	Congo, Dem. Rep. (56%)	Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ghana	6
10	Singapore	Nigeria (96%)	Chad	2
11	Spain	Botswana (44%)	Cape Verde, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal	5
12	Israel	Nigeria (46%)	Cameroon, Chad, Lesotho, Rwanda, Uganda	6
13	Iran	Sudan (100%)	-	1
14	Belgium	Chad (86%)	Benin	2
15	Bulgaria	Mali (86%)	Chad	2
16	Czech Republic	Equatorial Guinea (58%)	Angola	2
17	Brazil	Namibia (100%)	-	1
18	France	Senegal (50%)	Chad, Mauritania, Togo	4
19	Slovakia	Sudan (60%)	Angola, Central African Republic	3
20	Turkey	Nigeria (100%)	-	1
21	Canada	Zambia (80%)	Chad	2
22	Philippines	Burkina Faso (100%)	-	1
23	Libya	Chad (100%)	-	1
24	Austria	Uganda (100%)	-	1
25	Romania	Burkina Faso (100%)	-	1

26	Serbia	Sudan (100%)	-	1
27	Switzerland	Chad (100%)	-	1
28	United Arab Emirates	Tanzania (100%)	-	1

Note: One or more unidentified suppliers delivered major arms to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Guinea.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers

Appendix B: The Supply Chain of Tantalum Powder Production



s*ource*: Minor Metals Trade Association; http://www.mmta.co.uk/tantalum-market-overview

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