CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2015
| Author | Matula, Gabor |
|---|---|
| Title | Phenomenology, Intentionality and Cognition |
| Summary | Phenomenology and intentionality are two of the central notions of philosophy of mind. It is often told that not all of our mental states are phenomenally conscious. The most prominent view holds that sensory states, bodily sensations, emotions and moods have a distinctive phenomenal character, while cognitive states do not. One of my goals in this thesis is to defend the view of cognitive phenomenology according to which phenomenology cannot be restricted to perception, bodily sensations, emotions and moods, and cognitive states have a distinctive, essential and proprietary phenomenal character. After showing that there is indeed phenomenology in cognition my second goal is concerned with the relation between intentionality and phenomenology in cognition. Many philosopher considered these two features of the mind as metaphysically independent and separated. They held that some mental states possess phenomenal character and lack intentional content and vice versa. In the recent decades, however, the attention for the connection between intentionality and phenomenology remarkably increased. In this thesis I argue for the phenomenal intentionality of our cognitive states. According to phenomenal intentionality all intentionality is exhibited by phenomenally conscious states in virtue of their phenomenal character, i.e. intentionality has its source in phenomenology. My claim here is that cognitive states are intentional in virtue of their phenomenal character. Defending cognitive phenomenology in the first place makes phenomenal intentionality a plausible account of cognition. A great implication of this approach is that the phenomenal intentionality account of cognition could close the way for metaphysical separatism, since the separatist theories about intentionality and phenomenology rely on the fact that thoughts have no distinctive phenomenal character. By positing a plausible account of cognitive phenomenology and phenomenal intentionality of cognition we are one step closer to find the mark of the mental. |
| Supervisor | Howard Robinson |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2015/matula_gabor.pdf |
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