The Politics of Representation:
Social Memory Re-Imagined in Palestinian Hip-Hop and Its Role in Nationalism

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Submitted to Central European University
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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Budapest, Hungary
2015

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Abstract

For over half a century, issues of authenticity and ownership have fueled the Israel-Palestine polemic. The Palestinian community is one that is territorially fragmented into categories of refugees, urban, diasporic, exiled, immobilized, among others. The isolation and separation of these communities obstructs the development of a collective identity while popular culture easily disseminated through technological networks provides a way for a continued, cohesive social identity. An in-depth look at one particular contemporary musical genre, Palestinian hip-hop, reveals a powerful narrative of Palestinian identity as it exists within its specific political situation. A cross-comparative analysis with previous folk literature and music understands a subtle re-writing of the Palestinian social imaginary and follows the progression that absorbs, remembers, and re-imagines the social consciousness. The research also acknowledges this medium in conjunction with the global mediascape as an ambitious tool of national aspirations. I propose that existing theoretical frames of nation and music are not adequate for the existing dialectics of power relations and identity negotiations and provide useful direction for future studies.

Acknowledgements

beyond horizons this past year, and a thank-you to Central European University that gave me the means to pursue my academic interests. Finally, while the members of DAM do not know the extent of this project beyond a few short emails in which an interview did not come to fruition, I would like to acknowledge them for the powerful music and voice they give to their communities and the world. They have truly contributed a great service.

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 A Brief Foreword on Palestine and Israel

While this thesis explores the narrative of identity in Palestinian hip-hop, the narratives found in the lyrics are inextricable from the political situation existing between Palestine and Israel. Consequently, an account of the historical events that culminated in the present-day "Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" is necessary in order to contextualize the material. The highly nuanced and political issue grounds itself upon broader theoretical issues of nation and state, and so it is from this logical vantage point that I launch my introduction.

Contemporary society normalizes the idea of nation-state. Physical borders such as fences and walls (famously, the Berlin Wall, and also between countries such as the U.S. and Mexico) embody the symbolic border of not only land, but of ideology and culture. In the course of history however, the concept of nation-states is a relatively modern idea. In fact, we are living in an exception of a long history where nation-states did not exist. As particularly emphasized in ethnomusicologist Ted Levin's book, *The Hundred Thousand Fools of God*, rather than using the politically recognized names of "Tajikistan" and "Uzbekistan" in his ethnography, Levin uses the term "Transoxania" because "[it] stressed the region's underlying geographical and social coherence rather than its more recent ethnic and political divisiveness– divisiveness... attributed to the machinations of Soviet politics" (Levin 1996: XIII). Political boundaries do not constitute social boundaries: culture bleeds across borders. The bloody history of creating stark political divisions is ironic in the face of shared

traditions that bleed across any arbitrarily drawn political lines attempting to isolate cultures and history.

With this understanding of modern nation-states, the conflict between Israel and Palestine can be better understood. For the sake of brevity, I give only a skeletal history of Israel and Palestine. From 1923 to 1948, the British held a Mandate over Palestine. This colonial grasp granted Britain the position of protectorate over the land region of "Palestine," which was seen as unfit to rule itself after the defunct Ottoman Empire (Finkelstein 1995). One of the responsibilities accorded to the British Mandate was to create a national home for Jews. Pressure to establish a homeland for the Jews escalated in the late nineteenth century with the Zionist movement, which called for immigration to Palestine, eventually viewed less as immigration by the Jews and more as a return to their homeland (Glock 1999). Mounting tensions between the Arab nationalist movement and Zionism boiled quietly until the expiration of the British Mandate in 1948, resulting in the declaration of the independent state of Israel (Finkelstein 1995) or what Palestinians now observe as *Nakba:* the Day of Catastrophe. Palestinians were expelled to two small flaps of land: West Bank and the Gaza Strip. After the 1967 War, Palestinians were forced to live in subjugation and threat of violence in their increasingly shrinking territories and alarming living conditions. It is with this basic historical chronology that locates the narratives in Palestinian hip-hop in the wider discourse of identity formation and social memory.

1.2 The Politics of Ethics

This is the seemingly uncompromisable social situation we arrive at today: two groups of people vying for the same land, each with a historical claim and indigeneity to the land. Yet only one group, Israel, is a recognized nation, while the

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other, Palestine, has a recognized name and territory (albeit small and oppressed), but no recognized statehood. Our understanding of single national identities undermines the reality of shared histories and traditions. However, in order to operate in a state-driven world, these arbitrary lines are nonetheless drawn and demand recognition and respect.

I was, for the longest time during the writing period, unwilling to meaningfully engage with the politics of my research. It was with an amateur fear that I refused to locate my personal political beliefs in my research and with a naive optimism that I believed such explicit confrontation unnecessary. Those more experienced than I gently challenged these hopeful wishes.

My intent is not to reduce the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict to a black-and-white dichotomy between the Jew and the Arab, nor to take a side as to who has more claims to authentic indigeneity. To do so would be to answer the questions of what power has the authority to give one people land, sovereignty, and identity while taking those very same privileges away from the other. What makes one claim for indigeneity greater than the other? I do not believe it is the anthropologist's role to get twisted in these ethical stalemates. Rather, understanding that these complexities exist and how they compete is fundamental to the researcher's framework and directs how they should operate within the existing political tensions. However, removing the role of the academic completely from human empathy within a necessarily human field is problematic. The academic should use prudent judgment to determine their course of action and how they choose to frame their research in relation to the context. I look at Palestinian hip-hop with the question of how this genre both creates and reifies a Palestinian identity that has been inarguably scarred by a denial to homeland and subjected to unwanted violence.

1.3 Methodology

The fieldwork that informs the bulk of this research was conducted between April and May and was informed by intensive media-driven research. The transnational nature of my project that tracks narratives within Palestinian hip-hop and its dispersion on technological networks relates more closely to the idea of a "multi-sited ethnography" as argued by Falzon (Falzon 2009). My research is similarly multi-sited in nature because the Palestinian community is a multi-sited phenomenon starting with the fracture of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These two physical localities do not include diasporic communities and the mobile nature of popular culture itself. Using Lefebvre as a way to argue the relativity of a socially constructed space and place in light of ethnography heavily influenced by the Malinowskian tradition, Falzon argues that a multi-sited ethnography does not result in a less rich ethnography. I myself use Lefebvre's conception of spatialization to purport that the space I observe is not bound to one physical space, but a space bound virtually by narratives of a social identity.

The bulk of my research is media and data intensive. The historical research provides a basis of Palestinian social life and tracks successions of nationalist movements. It pinpoints these movements as crucial to the Palestinian social imaginary. The historical research also explores folk traditions and imagery in Palestinian culture. With this survey, a literature-based review of folk essays and poems written for and by Palestinians, I categorized a collection of recurrent and common themes and images. As I study contemporary music, I used a comparative framework to analyze how the "traditional" is preserved and embedded within the modern as well as tracking how nationalist narratives imbue themselves throughout

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the music. These folk sources are chronologically from pre-*Nakba,* or the Day of

Catastrophe when Israel declared themselves a nation resulting in the exile of the

Palestinians, to post-*Nakba*, where the framing of their lives and identity dramatically

shift. The recognition of the shift, while readily conspicuous and by no means a subtle

interpretation of Palestinian identity provides a more forceful understanding of what

was an integral part of their culture before the narrative of loss and disinheritance.

While the folk narratives do not change, the acts of performing the narratives carry

different meanings.

The second and core part of my methodology takes the aforementioned and

understands how it is reified in contemporary hip-hop culture. I drew from a media

database of Palestinian hip-hop, accessible via the performer's formal pages, as well

as subsidiary websites such as Facebook and Twitter and YouTube channels. Analysis

of the hip-hop music itself (of which I focused exclusively on one band, DAM, and of

this band, three songs in particular) focused first on melodic aspects and then lyrical

content to trace nationalist identity.

Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Historical Sociology

The project is necessarily historical in nature as it explores how the current

situation in Palestine came to be and thus how the particularities of its history shape

the course of social memory and political aspirations as represented in Palestinian

hip-hop.

Historical sociology looks at a chronological progression of society that yields

social structures into complex social processes influenced by historical events. It

gives power to historical events as recognizing them as capable of transforming social

structures and in some cases, even necessary to transform social structures. However, I will preface the presentation of historical sociology with an emphasis on the notion of "pure" history itself. Of course, there is no such thing as "pure" history. History is, above all, a socially constructed narrative of events that are also driven by social structures. An attempt at purified history is not dissimilar to a quest for absolute truth; an objective reality beyond any biases. No human is capable of providing such a perspective. Despite this, history cannot be removed from social inquiry. Charles Tilly presents a number of reasons of why history matters in an aptly named chapter *Why and How History Matters* in the *Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*. The crux of Tilly's arguments comes to this: "every significant political phenomenon lives in history, and requires historically grounded analysis for its explanation" (Tilly 2005: 20). Replacing "political" with "social" is not unthinkable. Social movements and processes are entrenched firmly within its historical limitations and thus also require a historically grounded analysis.

Theory incorporating history (i.e. historical sociology) is separate from history itself whose corpus is much bulkier than the finesse of theory. As stated previously, historical sociology recognizes the influence of history upon the transformation of social structures and accordingly examines the progression of society in a chronological fashion. Sociologists of this branch are akin to architects who first examine foundations and work their way up to the pinnacle of the building. Such a methodology is cognizant that a structure builds upon previous blocks and that a micro-examination of one particular part of the structure does not give adequate explanation to the whole. In this sense, history is a prescient force in determining the progression of a society. Abbott, however, warns us from theorizing from a "general linear reality" that is indicative of "a set of deep assumptions about how and why

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social events occur" which "prevent the analysis of many problems interesting to theorists and empiricists alike" (Abbott 2001: 38). Perhaps such assumptions are the result of "northern theory" (Connell 2006) in which social theories are another form of a northern hegemonic discourse. My use of historical sociology then moves cautiously forward, without using history as a way to search for a unilinear development but as a causal-relational tool to explain particularities of a situation.

The historical section of my thesis is based on this understanding of historical sociology that first views history as inextricable from sociology and anthropology, and second, that views historical events as a theoretical category if understood as catalysts for social movements. Rather than using an exogenous understanding of history as part of a greater sociological process, I argue for an endogenous historical sociology that argues for a historical perspective of the particularities of my field. There are several key aspects of my research that renders it best studied from a historically heavy theory. Understanding the current situation of Palestine is only done through a careful chronological deconstruction. The progression of the Palestinian nation and identity is so densely tangled within the grasp of political history that it will be difficult to work to excavate the main "historical events" that acted as catalysts for social change as Sewell would qualify (Sewell 1996). Another difficulty lies in the fact that there is no way to encompass all elements of social reality and imaginary into one historical narrative. Researchers can at least be reassured that the importance lies in a holistic attempt.

2.2 Identity Formation: Narratives of Disinheritance, Loss, and Violence

The particular case study of my research project uses Palestinian hip-hop group DAM as an inquiry into the use of popular culture as a way of building a national discourse for a dispossessed and fragmented community. The Palestinian community is geographically fragmented trifold– the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and diasporic communities both in and outside of Israel– that disrupts the "development of linear cultural processes and consciousness" (Said 1986 in Abufarha: 2008). This fragmentation is the result of an antagonistic historical process addressed above. It is also the cause for the common narrative of loss and tragedy in Palestinian hip-hop and on a broader scale, Palestinian identity. The narrative of loss and tragedy legitimizes a national identity in two ways: first, is the content of the narrative itself. Loss implies the original existence of a Palestinian homeland while the tragedy surrounds not only the loss itself but also the inhumane way in which it was taken away. Their declaration of loss is a reminder that they were and are vitally connected to the land. Second lies in the fact that this existing narrative remains in an intangible, immovable dimension that reifies a sense of abstract nationhood. Thus, my research focuses on the nationalist themes present in Palestinian hip-hop that provides a way to create a collective discourse for an otherwise unwilling divided people. As my research attempts in an introductory way to brush upon notions of state-formation as a part of Palestinian national aspirations, this thesis will also allude to state-formation theory but will not rely heavily upon it.

Chapter 3. A Poetic Memory

The complications of history in this context lie in the interconnectedness of the politicized region. To speak of Palestinian history is to also delve into the political context of its surrounding nations: Palestine's identity as "Arab" implicates it in the wider happenings within the Arab world. In an example that is fleshed out in the following section, Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN), a Palestinian nationalist group, was so closely linked with Egyptian politics such that understanding MAN and its successes and failures is only possible by a delineation of Egyptian history as well. In addition, Palestinian history and nationalism is one that is continuously restructured from within and without. As providing a comprehensive history is not possible for the scope of this thesis, I will present a "genealogy of time" as suggested by Professor Prem Rajaram that delineates the most characterizing moments of Palestinian history.

The first section comprises an overview of the "pre-1948 Palestine" that many Palestinians identify as their "original" Palestine. This section integrates the actual state of Palestinian communities with a social narrative of how it is ingrained in contemporary social memory. This serves as the foundation for narratives of the "lost" Palestine that is analyzed in the following chapter. The second section provides an overview of Palestine between 1948 and 2000. Specifically, it is angled from the perspective of the three predominant Palestinian national movements that were created in successions of twenty years. This section in particular emphasizes contemporary Palestinian identities and the success of each politically propagated identity. The third section focuses specifically on the 1990s during the Oslo peace processes to specifically contextualize the conditions in which Palestinian hip-hop arose. In the final section, I present a brief statement of the present situation in which

Palestinian hip-hop is produced, disseminated, and consumed. Palestinian hip-hop

refers to names, events, and places, and it is within this historical section that I situate

these references.

3.1 Pre-Nakba and the Three Phases of Palestinian Nationalism and Identity

3.1a The "Original" Palestine: A Social Memory of Pre-Nakba

The pre-*Nakba* period extends as far back as the imagination of human

civilization allows. The land of Palestine spreads from the eastern crescent of the

Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River and is surrounded by the modern nations of

Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. The annals of ancient civilization records control from a

wide variety of people with ties to biblical traditions such as the land of Canaan

(Glock 1999). However, I start my timeline of Palestine in a much more

contemporary stage of history, relatively, so as to focus on the narratives of the

contemporary people and how they remember their lives to be prior to the Israeli

Occupation. In continuation of the tradition of multiple powers seizing control over

Palestine, for centuries the area was under the rule of foreign powers. The Ottoman

Empire peacefully ruled Palestine from the sixteenth century until 1832 when there

was a brief lapse into Egyptian rule under Muhammad Ali. However, this time was

short-lived as the British forced the Egyptians to relinquish the land back to the

Ottoman Empire by whom Palestine continued to be ruled until World War I. This

latter period of the nineteenth century saw the influx of Zionist sentiment and the

immigration of Jews into Palestine (Glock 1999). The Ottoman Empire proved to be

one of the Central Powers that lost World War I and subsequently much of its

political clout and territories. The history of Turkey then takes it own route somewhat

separately from Palestine, as Palestinian territories were then given to the control of

the British by the League of Nations in 1922. As is already summarized in chapter one, the British government supported the idea of the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine despite the Arabs' hostility and in 1948 the Independent State of Israel was declared.

How then is the "original" Palestine captured? A brief glimpse into quantitative numbers provides some insight. In accordance with a survey commissioned by the British Government in August of 1936, "statistical data relating to land ownership in Palestine as between Jews and non-Jews" was collected to determine the cause of incidents between the Arabs and Jews (as they were characterized as such during that time by the British Government) as tensions heightened between the two communities (Hadawi 1970: 11). The table for the Village Statistics of 1945 showed a proportion of approximately 1.2 million Arabs to half a million Jews living in all of Palestine. In areas designated as "cultivable," Arabs were recorded to constantly own more land than the Jews by a significant amount (refer to Table 1 in Appendix). Land areas assigned to the "built-up areas and non-cultivable" denomination were still more likely to be populated by Arabs than Jews, though there were two sub-districts out of a recorded sixteen where Jews owned most of the land. These regions are as follows: Haifa and Jaffa.

In order to determine how the land mass was distributed specifically, I divided the Total Land Areas for Arabs and Jews in each Sub-District by their respective population. I then took the average of land per citizen for the Arab and Jew in all the Sub-Districts to determine which population had more access to land.[1] In doing so, I

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[1] This method of taking the mean is more representative than simply dividing Total Land Mass owned by Jews in all the sub-districts by the total population of Jews (the numbers found in the very last row), which would represent Arabs as having ten *dunum* per Arab and Jews as having two. By calculating first the *dunum* per individual by district and taking the average of all the districts, the number more accurately reflects the living stratification.

found that on average,[2] each Arab theoretically owned approximately eleven and a half *dunum*, the traditional Ottoman measurement of land equaling approximately a thousand square meters. Each Jew theoretically were entitled to forty-eight *dunum* despite the two following caveats: first, that I did not include three "Jew to Land Mass" calculations in the final average that would have greatly skewed the number to a much higher figure than it already it is.[3] Secondly, it is also in light of the fact that Arabs constituted sixty-eight percent of the population while Jews constituted thirty-two. Thus, it is possible to see the unequal distribution of land from at least 1945. I include these numbers in order to paint a picture of reality of the lived communities during this time. Arabs far out-numbered the Jewish population yet were subject to less land and were stratified throughout the Palestinian territories. Jewish populations, however, were concentrated in key cities and areas rather than a general dispersion.

Prior to the War of 1948, otherwise known as *al-nakba* to Palestinians, the Palestinian community was comprised of hundreds of small *qarya,* or villages. They were not particularly wealthy communities: most were rural while even urban communities depended on agrarian livelihoods. These villages were agrarian, producing crops such as wheat, corn, and perhaps most famously, oranges and olives. The Palestinians' ties to the land were powerfully embedded in ideas of identity and notions of inherent relationships with a physical land and the crops produced from it. The loss of land was then not simply about the reduction of territory but the loss of

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[2] Of course, this number is not literally representative of the amount of land each individual Arab and Jew owned.

[3] I did not include the calculations for Jenin, Nablus, and Ramallah because they were each instances where land was owned by Jews but there were no recorded populations of Jews. If I withdraw calculations where the Jewish population was less than one percent as was the case in Beersheba, the average land to Jew total is 15 *dunum*.

livelihoods and the appropriation of identity. However, Palestine is remembered through practices such as oral traditions and dance performances and relived as a way to preserve Palestine at least in social memory: "active remembrance is seen as a guarantee of cultural survival" (Slyomovics 1993: 28). Physical objects such as memory books preserve the intangible "[Palestinian] relationship to landscape, architecture, and sociological description" (Slyomovics 1993: 28) while providing the sorely lacking presence of materiality. Thus, the social memory of Palestinian pre-*Nakba* does not feature the political history of the pre-*Nakba* times as I outlined above. Rather, it is a social memory of those folklore and livelihoods that are indistinguishable from a sense of "Palestinian-ness." Palestine is not remembered as a continuously occupied land by foreign powers, but as a land that holds in its very soil the meaning of what it is to be a Palestinian.

However, the Palestinian identity is also closely linked to its nationalist identity: Palestinians' harassment and constant denial to a peaceful homeland has made the people's identity inextricable from their political circumstance.[4] That is, their pursuit for statehood and freedom from occupation. Nationalist movements that provide a unifying space for Palestinians to rally spearhead these efforts. Rather than categorizing Palestinian identity as a separate unit from nationalism, I theorize that nationalist movements in Palestine are accurate identifiers of the Palestinian identity. Nationalism is not simply a "political movement" as David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first

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[4] This "inextricability" was a concept with which I struggled seriously in framing my research. I wanted to give credence to the fact that Palestinians had and still have a history with traditions that predate the circumstances they find themselves in today. To not focus on these histories and traditions, I believed, was taking more away from an already disenfranchised community. It framed them as a population whose existence and identity was solely dependent upon the inflicted violence and political quandary rather than as possessors of a rich heritage. Ultimately, as evidenced in the direction of my thesis, I found it too naive and optimistic to not address the situation as an imparter of social meaning. It is, unfortunately, a very real and serious part of their lives and is therefore necessary to include in a real and serious way in my analysis.

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prime minister, claimed was happening at a Zionist meeting in 1929 (Ben-Gurion in Christison 1987: 110). While nationalism does often manifest itself within the political arena, it is a sentiment experienced by a group of people as having a common identity. Nationhood is popularly theorized by intellectuals such as Ernest Gellner to be a top-down initiative to incorporate the subaltern into a homogenous narrative in order to legitimize an organized political unit–that is, the state (Gellner 1983). I contest that in the case of Palestine, nationalism is a sentiment to establish legitimacy to land and rule. There is still the case of a power dynamic (that is, Israel over Palestine) though in this case it is an exogenous dominant power over a resisting force. Therefore, an assertion of nationalism in the Palestinian case is an assertion of an identity and of a community that demands its rights to liberty and sovereignty.

3.1b Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN): The Pan-Arabic Pandemic

Helga Baumgarten, Professor of Political Science at Birzeit University, writes extensively on the three forms of Palestinian nationalism since *al-Nakba* in 1948: "the Movement of Arab Nationalists, embodying its pan-Arab phase; Fatah, its specifically Palestinian form; and Hamas, its religious (Islamic) variant" (Baumgarten 2005: 25). Though these three movements still co-exist today, each movement began as an effort on the Palestinian behalf and "each arose as a consequence of its immediate predecessor's perceived failure to achieve Palestinian goals" (Baumgarten 2005: 25). In accordance with the aforementioned conceptualizations of nationalism in the Palestinian case, the three nationalist movements not only embody a push to nationhood but also signify forms of Palestinian identity.[5]

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[5] Rema Hammami and Salimi Tamari write an interesting meta-review on the three phases of Palestinian Sociology in their article *Populist Paradigm*. In this piece, they characterize the three phases of Palestinian Sociology and how Palestinians are conceptualized by sociologists. In sum: Palestinians as peasants, populism and mass movements, and state

The Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN) encompassed the Arab assertion by Palestinians. The movement was inspired by the work of intellectual Constantine Zureiq, whose *The Meaning of the Disaster*, developed a theory as to why *al-Nakba* occurred and how it could be reversed. To the first question, Zureiq concluded that the *nakba* "resulted from Arab backwardness vis-a-vis the modern industrialized West" and "only through radical self-criticism would the Arabs be able to address the root causes of the catastrophe" (Baumgarten 2005: 27-8). Students of Zureiq were the founding members of MAN and followed the logics of his argument when creating their nationalist group. That is to say, their own ideological grounds followed the paths of Zureiq's in arguing for the Arab cause (from the personalized perspective of "Palestinian"): MAN sought to reorganize Palestinian society to mimic Israel, who was both their enemy and their model (Baumgarten 2005), in adapting to the modern organization of society in a democratic sense while retaining strong ties to their Arab identity. During this time, Palestinians found solidarity in their identity as Arabs and their inclusion in their broader Arab context. *Al-nakba* was not a catastrophe experienced by Palestinians but a tragic event that reverberated throughout the Arabic community. This sense of cohesion gave strength to the movement that sought to bind a forcefully fragmented community.

To the second question of how *al-nakba* could be reversed, the answer lay in *al-Tha'r*, or revenge. MAN relied heavily upon the strategy of *al-Tha'r* as the vehicle with which to drive through the oppressive camp of Zionism and Western hegemony and into the success of the Arab civilization and freedom for Palestinians. As MAN fought for not only the liberation of Palestine but for the wider Arab cause (and in

formation and civil society (Hammami and Tamari 1997). However, I do not include these conceptualizations of Palestinian communities as they are not self-ascribed identities.

fact, the agenda of the Arab nationalist movement was prioritized over the Palestinian national movement), they allied with Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser in the mid-1950s (Baumgarten 2005). Nasser was seen as "the only leader capable of uniting the Arab nation in the struggle against colonialism and Western attempts to impose peace with Israel" (Baumgarten 2005: 28). It was with this decisive, political move that sealed MAN's fate and splintered it into factions that could not gain enough momentum to make any significant changes on the political front.

3.1c Fatah: Reasserting the Palestinian Identity

Fatah, the nationalist group characterized by its specifically Palestinian identity, rose to power in the 1960s after MAN "increasingly seemed a largely irrelevant group subservient to and instrumentalized by Nasser" (Baumgarten 2005: 29). The 1967 War, otherwise known as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, was the catalyst for Fatah's imminent arrival. The conspicuous failures of MAN in their lack of accomplishments set the stage for a new nationalist group with a clearly Palestinian agenda. While MAN sought to liberate Palestine after the unification of Arabs, Fatah sought to unify the Arabs after the liberation of Palestine. Ideologically, the goals for a pan-Arab state were still the keystones. Strategically, a unified Arab identity was implicit and second to the necessity of the creation of a Palestinian nation-state in Fatah's eyes. Thus, The Movement for the Liberation of Palestine, or *harakat al-tahrir al-filastini*, or *Fatah* (the acronym of the Arabic reverse) found its footing at the end of the 1950s and sprung into the forefront after the 1967 War.

At this time, the Palestinian Liberation Organization or PLO already existed as it was founded in 1964 under Egyptian leader Nasser. While it remains a viable political organization today, at the time it was rejected by Fatah as being the pet project of Egyptians and thus dependent upon their politics. Fatah "proposed a

Palestinian nationalist ideology in which Palestine would be liberated by *Palestinian* action, with Palestinian refugees taking matters into their own hands" (Baumgarten 2005: 32). A part of this conscious distancing from the Arab collectiveness was due to the "the humiliations and insults to which refugees were subjected in the Arab world" (Baumgarten 2005: 33). Palestinians did not feel a reciprocated support from their Arab brothers and sisters and consequently withdrew from that particular narrative to focus more intensely on their own dire situation.

How Fatah chose to construct their Palestinian narrative, however, was that of a revolutionary nature, in the literal sense. Rather than a cohesive Palestinian identity in a traditional "ethnic" sense, the "Palestinian" was the maligned refugee of the 1948 *nakba* who were reclaiming their agency by revolting against the Israelis. For Fatah, "revolution… became synonymous with national liberation, itself interchangeable with armed struggle" (Baumgarten 2005: 34). Palestine had an identity beyond that of the refugee and a shared history beyond that of an oppressed people. The strong ties to the land and the ways of cultivating the land are alone testament to that hidden history (Slyomovics 1993). However, the horrors of their day-to-day lives overwhelmed these histories and coated them in the slick oil of unjust persecution; immiscible with tears and volatile to revolution. While ideological revenge drove MAN, revolution and armed struggle was the vehicle of Fatah's endeavors. Guerilla warfare against the Israelis gained popularity at the time, proving successful in other areas of the world such as the Vietnamese (Baumgarten 2005). After a Palestinian victory in the battle of Karameh in February 1968, Fatah was "hailed as the first Arab force to put up a fight against the Israeli enemy and force it to withdraw with material and human losses" (Baumgarten 2005: 34) and garnered a mass following, a following MAN never managed to amass. Unfortunately, the sudden victory was also

the beginning of a long defeat for Fatah. Their relentless vision of Palestinians as a revolutionary unit of people, continuously and honorably fighting until the end without concession towards politics or diplomacy which they saw as "the suspect domain of corrupt Arab regimes" (Baumgarten 2005: 36) refused possibility of cease-fire and of a future of resolution. When at last Fatah begin to renegotiate their stance on armed struggle and the liberation of all of historical Palestine for a two-state solution per the Oslo Negotiations, the third and thus far, final, movement of Hamas rose up in Palestinian nationalist movements.

3.1d Hamas: The (Political) Muslim Brotherhood

Just as Fatah is the reverse acronym for *harakat al-tahrir al-filastini*, Hamas is the acronym of *harakat al-muqawama al-islamiyya*, or the Movement of Islamic Resistance. As is clearly outlined in the name, the movement's ideological stance is rooted in the Islamic religion as the solution for Palestinian liberation. The First Intifada in 1987 was the foundational event for Hamas, and this, Baumgarten claims, is the key reason for Hamas' grounding in "resistance" rather than liberation. While *al-nakba* and the 1967 War were events that called for liberation and thus guided MAN and Fatah, the *intifada* was one of resistance against the occupation. Hamas came about politically after the 1987 *intifada* but its origins began with the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was established in the late 1940s (Baumgarten 2005). This Islamic group was mainly involved in social and cultural activities aimed to inspire change. Hamas was established as its political wing. Its ideology, aside from its overt religious roots, is "firmly rooted in the anti-colonialist, anti-Zionist, anti-American, and anti-Soviet tradition of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood" (Baumgarten 2005: 38) and does not concern itself with the subtleties of social infrastructure but concentrates its efforts in nationally driven resistance goals

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and struggle, or *jihad*. The Hamas nationalist movement is similar to MAN in that its domain extends beyond the reaches of Palestine and umbrellas over a wider group of people joined together by one belief. In this case, pan-Arabism is replaced with pan-Islamism. However, Hamas focuses solely on the Palestinian efforts in the name of Islam without placing the Palestinian agenda on-hold. Hamas' means of resistance, which saw a dramatic transformation from peaceful demonstrations and strikes to the more disturbingly violent suicide bombings, are crucial because of the negative backlash they received from media coverage and the resulting Islamophobia.

3.2 The Peace Process: From the 1990s and Onward

The 1990s to the present-day situation in Palestine is one marked by the inclusion of many foreign political powers either in the form of warfare or peace processes. Formal peace processes between Israel and Palestine began as early as 1949, just a year after the exilation of Palestinians, with the Lausanne Conference. Following this attempt, the next took place almost a full thirty years later in 1978 with the Camp David Accords. A more serious initiative for the peace process started in 1991 with the Madrid Conference, followed by the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995. Thus, the 1990s are characterized as a time that pushed for peace although it was also paradoxically one of the bloodiest times that characterized Palestinian politics against Israel, and in general the "Arab" world. Rather than providing a detailed account of the legal proceedings and rulings of each peace accord and deeply contextualizing the warfare that erupted throughout the Middle East, I give here a sketch of the general political and social conditions that pervaded the atmosphere.

There were several extraneous situations outside of Palestine that affected the trajectory of Palestinian politics. The Gulf War from August of 1990 to February of 1991 in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel was a war led by the U.S. with other

coalition powers against Iraq for Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and eventually merged with the 2003 Iraq War. While these conflicts did not deal directly with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they contributed to the tension in the area and the animosity that rose against Arabs in Western media. The Iraqi annexation of Kuwait also forced hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living in Kuwait to flee, aggravating the Palestinian refugee condition. In 2001, the fateful "9/11" attack by al-Qaeda militant Islamic group to the U.S. dramatically darkened the political climate, heightening anti-Arabic sentiment in particularly American media.

The peace conferences of Madrid and Oslo in 1991 and 1993 respectively pushed forward negotiations to establish the final borders of Israel and Palestine, to create a governmental body for Palestine, to resolve the issue of Palestinian refugees, and to eliminate or reduce the political violence expressed by both sides as the forefront of their issues. The Oslo Accords between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization created the Palestinian Authority, or Palestinian National Authority, as the first self-governmental body of the territories of Palestine and appeared to be making progress in negotiation processes. However, the failure of Camp David Summit between U.S. President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and PA chairman Yasser Arafat in 2000 and the outbreak of the Second *Intifada* unfortunately returned the political and social conditions to the characteristic violence and poor social infrastructure. It is these turbulent times that characterized the period in which DAM found their inspiration to begin their musical career (McDonald 2013). The political instability, the lack of fruition of any agreements, the continued aggressions of Israeli soldiers on Palestinian citizens and the subsequent attacks of Palestinians to Israelis provided the backdrop for a frustrated generation. These frustrations found their voice in Palestinian hip-hop and continue to be a major

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force in reshaping how Israelis and Palestinians alike understand Palestine. The rising violence against Palestinian communities in Israel were particularly forceful in shaping DAM's identity as they are, as will be further fleshed out in the following section, Palestinian citizens of Israel. Therefore, the violence Palestinians in Israel incurred was not only a violence inflicted upon Palestinians but also one incurred as Israeli residents.

This "genealogy of time" focuses on delivering historical events as faithful representations of "historical events" as such, but also focuses on using them as markers of social identity. It is the bulk of what I use as a comparative base to track Palestinian nationalism and identity in DAM's lyrical content. In addition to Baumgarten's own assertion that Palestinian "identity and liberation were inextricably intertwined" (Baumgarten 2005: 33), I posit that the overwhelming, revolutionary nature of the nationalist movements makes the process of extracting "Palestinian identity" from their national identity impossible. A look at the wider historical context on an international scale gives credence to why and how each nationalist movement took place. Thus, each establishment of a nationalist movement group not only represented political movements but also pointed at shifts in the wider Palestinian identity. I look at the ways these nationalist movements resurface and manifest themselves in the Palestinian hip-hop and the new discourses of identity.

Chapter 4. The Musical World and its Implications for Theory

4.1 Ethnomusicology and Literature Review: Why Palestinian Hip-Hop? A Case for Popular Culture

During my research, one conspicuous fact stood out: the lack of literature in regards to Palestinian popular culture. On the other hand, there is an abundance of resource for Arabic music in the classical or folk tradition, outlining the *maqams*

used, or melodic modes typical to the region similar to the Western notion of "keys",

and the highly stylized modes of playing different Middle Eastern instruments and the

tensions that surround this shared culture of music. Rebecca Stein and Ted

Swedenburg suggest that this limitation is not indicative of the lack of rich material

but rather the lack of a formal conceptualization in breaching the topic (Stein and

Swedenburg 2004). Stein and Swedenburg eloquently argue for the case of popular

culture in the case of Palestine, which they cite as taking a backseat to more "serious"

academic pursuits. Especially, they claim, for those scholars "wedded to classical

Marxist analytics" who presume that "mass production and commodification… render

the cultural form 'inauthentic' " (Stein and Swedenburg 2004: 5). However, lack of

scholarship in this area while an abundance of attention in other categories regarding

Palestine and Israel is not only a debate of inauthenticity and authenticity or high and

low culture. It is the severity of the conflict that causes academics to hesitate, out of

respect for the situation. Surely knowledge is better broadened and disseminated upon

issues of nationalism or marginalization rather than the frivolous topic of popular

culture.

Within U.S. academics, Stein and Swedenburg generalize the prevailing

studies of Palestine and Israel into two camps: one that follows a "national paradigm"

while the other follows a "Marxist historiographical and/or political economic

paradigm" (Stein and Swedenburg 2004: 6). They criticize the former paradigm as

focusing on an exclusive population of Palestinians (and in doing so, excluding

people such as Palestinians in Israel, Palestinians of the diaspora, and so on and so

forth) and as a determinative logic that sees a unilinear progression of nation. On the

other hand, the Marxist historiographical paradigm works to reinforce the binary of

the Palestine and the Israel, though reconfigured as a struggle of means of production

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and class, and ultimately supports the national paradigm (Stein and Swedenburg 2004). Neither of these "hegemonic paradigms", they argue, is flexible enough to account for different modalities of power and political action. It is here that they turn to popular culture as an alternative form of narrating politics and history and in turn shaping politics and culture. Such an example they cite is the Israeli film industry in the 1990s that went through a process of radicalization and intense self-criticism. New films and documentaries seriously questioned the veracity of Zionism and the Israeli identity, "spawning political support for, and resistance to, the ambiguous trajectory of post-Oslo 'peace' developments" (Stein and Swedenburg 2004: 12). Ignoring these developments would be to ignore a radical shift in Israeli thought and the turning of tides in ties among the local populations of Israeli-Palestinians. Similarly, a need for attention in Palestinian popular culture is growing among academics.

  While much of this thesis heeds Stein and Swedenburg's call for a more extensive exploration of Palestinian popular culture, it also questions their dismissal of nationalism. It is a vital experience of the Palestinian identity. I argue for nationalism in a different sense, finding it not necessarily only a "determinative" framework but one that is explicit and indicative of the types of identities Palestinian's assume. A part of my project's intent, then, is to add, in some small way, to the dearth of literature in this gaping field. Another is to mitigate Stein and Swedenburg's aversion to nationalist paradigms in Palestinian studies by incorporating nationalist studies with popular culture as a locus of power and meaning giving. The Palestinian hip-hop genre as specifically generated by the group DAM undeniably speaks for a Palestinian national homeland. They create an identity of the Palestinian as the dispossessed refugee, longing for peace but driven to violence; a deeply inscribed violence that now overwhelms and surges beyond their control.

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These nationalistic endeavors speak intimately with the Palestinian refugee audience who see their plight emotionally and vividly articulated through DAM's music. However, the musicians of DAM also speak to an audience wider than the Palestinian refugees, engaging with Israeli society persistently. This dialogue breaks through the borders and "demonstrates the place of Palestinians within the Israeli state even as it suggests ways in which Israeli-Jewish culture and linguistic idioms can be repossessed by Palestinian-Israeli culture, thereby fracturing and heterogenizing Israeliness from within" (Stein and Swedenburg 2004: 15).

However, the lack of representation makes any one voice stand out fiercely. There comes a time in a researcher's period where he or she realizes that their work is not as original as they would have liked it to be. For ethnomusicologist David McDonald, it was when he went to the folklore expert Abu Hani's office in Palestine to begin background research on his topic: performativity in Palestinian resistance music. For me, it was when I discovered McDonald's 2013 ethnography *My Voice is My Weapon*. I was previously introduced to McDonald's work in my undergraduate experience, which in fact greatly fostered my curiosity in this particular music genre of subaltern resistance to political oppression. One professor I am particularly indebted to, who introduced me to the world of classical Turkish and Arabic music, encouraged me to read McDonald's *Carrying Words Like Weapons: Hip-Hop and the Poetics of Palestinian Identities in Israel* and his other works.[6]

McDonald focuses on DAM as his main informants in his 2010 article, *Carrying Words Like Weapons*, which looks at DAM's work as hip-hop artists whose

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[6] 2010. "Geographies of the Body: Violence and Manhood in Palestine." Ethnomusicology Forum 19/2: 191- 214.
2009. "Poetics and the Performance of Violence in Israel/Palestine." Ethnomusicology 53/1: 58- 85.
2006. "Performing Palestine: Resisting the Occupation and Reviving Jerusalem's Social and Cultural Identity through the Arts." Jerusalem Quarterly 25/1: 5- 19.

identities as Palestinian citizens within Israel allow them to assume an amorphous voice that can speak to multiple communities. This succinct paper delves into how Palestinian identity is opened into new discourses when produced and performed in the space of hip-hop. When produced specifically by DAM, whose members are of an "Israel-Palestine" community, the conversation re-emerges as one that engages with the idea of "relational history" rather than a "dual society model" (McDonald 2010: 119) in which Israel and Palestine's histories develop in tandem rather than on separate, parallel tracks. In McDonald's subsequent academic articles, he deepens his analytic argument into an argument of performativity that constitutes identity and power dynamics. These explorations of performativity, power, and identity culminate into the aforementioned ethnography *My Voice is My Weapon*. McDonald's choice of performativity of Palestinian resistance music is apt as it also mirrors the performative nature of nationalist pedagogy (Gellner 1983).

Influenced greatly by the theory of performativity propagated by Judith Butler in gender theory, Foucauldian notions of power informing the process of identity formation, and other giants in sociological theory, McDonald rests heavily upon the poetics of performativity in Palestinian resistance music to introduce discussions of power structure and to locate the Palestinian identity. His ethnography incorporates the voice of three Palestinian informants who each frame a unique Palestinian identity and conceptualization of nation in their narrative: one that emphasized the "shared experiences of forced exile and the struggle for return," another that "defined the nation through the preservation of seemingly authentic Palestinian lifeways and practices" and the final in Palestinian hip-hop as an "[exploration of] the Palestinian condition via transnational discourses of youth culture and racial injustice" (McDonald 2013: 23). These notions of self, according to McDonald, are distinct

faces of Palestine, yet form a total narrative of Palestine in the unifying nature of the performative act: "For them Palestine exists, comes to exist, and continues to exist as performative" (McDonald 2013: 24). It is a fluid narrative, contested at every point, though its amenable nature is key for its ability to flow throughout the different Palestinian communities. These communities, forcibly separated geographically, disrupt the "development of linear cultural processes and consciousness" (Said 1986 in Abufarha: 2008). This mobile nature of the Palestinian identity, both in terms of dissemination and its constant reconfiguration, is what McDonald finds integral to his question. He seeks not for the essential Palestinian identity, but looking at their need *to identify*. It is in this active tense that his ethnography deconstructs the Palestinian identity.

In conjunction with his analysis of performativity as a pivotal point in structuring Palestinian identity, McDonald also examines structures of power that direct the dissemination of nationalistic themes. While he beautifully integrates the frameworks of performativity and Palestinian identity construction and how they are reproduced in a nationalistic dialogue, I find his categorization of Palestinian identities problematic. Above, his three analyses of Palestinian nation are deemed to be "[defining] the nation in radically different terms" (McDonald 2013: 23). Instead, I understand that these are different forms of expressing and emphasizing different identities in the sake of a shared idea of nation. Palestinian endeavors for nation centralize their identity but should not be confused with their expression of identity. Conversely, varied expressions of identity are greatly influenced by nationalist endeavors but should not erase the shared solidarity they find in pursuing one nation-state. If for DAM, the Palestinian identity is beyond "geography, history or culture" but rests on a state of being, that is, "one who resists oppression" (McDonald 2013:

22), it follows that nationalism in this sense transcends ethnic boundaries. However, a brief glance at their repertoire immediately showcases elements of "folk identity" and Arabic melodies: the "ethnic" is not something that is so easily escaped. It is a too simplistic to dissolve Palestinian folklorish culture or other elements of Palestinian identity from the contemporary hip-hop genre just because DAM asserts Palestinian-ness to be a part of a resistance movement against a politicized oppression. It is both, and surely it is evident from the conscious manipulation of the content of their songs as well. In this sense, my own work takes a departure from McDonald's, to explore how Palestine in past and present is represented in DAM's music.

4.2 The Sound of Music: Efforts for Peace and Music as Nationalist Tool

Music, while a form of cultural heritage, is also often manipulated as a tool to foster nationalistic sentiments.[7] It is not an unfamiliar tool for national revitalism within and without of the Palestinian context. Though there is not a well-known concerted effort for research in this field, state powers are noted throughout history as using local music practices to exemplify their national culture.

Benjamin Curtis' *Music Makes the Nation* examines the modes of nation building through three composers: Wagner, Smetana, and Grieg. With a brief introductory statement on the relatively unexplored space of nation and music, Curtis sets a foundation for his work by defining the nation as "the central, most legitimate form of large-scale sociopolitical organization" in which nationalism is the "ideology that inculcates a person's and a people's belief in their shared nationhood" (Curtis

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[7] There are other musical endeavors in the Palestinian context such as the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra founded by Edward Said and Daniel Barenboim to use music and the youth as a facilitator of the peace process. However, I do not include these in my thesis as they are beyond the parameters of my theoretical framework. They provide compelling cases for the direction of future studies.

2008: 21). In Benedict Anderson's terms, it is an imagined community rather than an inherent, natural entity. By applying this theoretical base to music, Curtis, as do I, understands musical producers as inseminators of national values to the wider public. National music and its producers are then not simply forms of art or culture but "essential social products created with both artistic and political goals" (Curtis 2008: 22). Curtis' work understands national music as a hyper-aware medium used, in his case study, by Western composers with the conscious goal of spreading national sentiments with a particular emphasis on high culture. In this case, high culture eschews folk elements as being seen as a "lower form" of heritage though this is not always the case in nationalistic music.

Hauke Dorsch's study on Tanzania's first president Julius Nyerere's attempt to "re-Africanize" Tanzanian music is another such example of a state-imposed project using "culturally authentic" music, or that of the folk that Curtis asserts to not be a part of Western nationalist music, to kindle nationalistic sentiments. In these inchoate times of newly developing African nations, Dorsch focused on how they "used musical styles and musicians to support their nation-building projects" (Dorsch 2010: 131). In this particular example, the state-organized attempt failed to revert the overwhelming transnational nature of Tanzanian music to a purified version for a variety of reasons. The most striking, at least for the purposes of my own research, is this: the undertone of Cuban and Latin American rhythms in Tanzanian music was appreciated by the Tanzanians because they identified with the people of these regions as being fellow, unwilling compatriots of the 'Global South' (Dorsch 2010). This sense of global solidarity overruled the nationalistic solidarity that Nyerere tried to instill speaking volumes to music as an identity facilitator though not necessarily through top-down efforts.

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Dorsch's work also creates a point of disjuncture between existing literature on music and nation in which nationalist music is conceptualized using the same theoretical framework but with separate interpretations of the "forms" of culture that are acceptable to represent the nation. In Curtis' case, folk culture is synonymous to "low culture" and is not an acceptable as an integral part of the national heritage. For Dorsch, the state found these elements of "folk" or "authentic" culture to be inherent to the people's identity. These distinct reactions to forms of desirable culture are arguably because of the geopolitical region from which they came: in the Western world during the nineteenth century, great scores of symphonic music were sources of national pride and received as elite cultural capital. Conversely, in the context of Tanzania during their formation as a newly independent state, Western and global influences were seen as a hegemonizing process that continued to infiltrate the post-colonial context. Thus, they were rejected in the name of "authentic" Tanzanian culture: that is, those cultural heritages preserved before colonialism imposed its cultural elitism. Asserting these so-called authentic forms of culture was, in this sense, both a nationalistic attempt and one that broadcasted an image of a nation unshackled from the reign of the West with its own culture still in tact. These differences in representation are cautionary tales to remember that the particularities of a nation in its political and geographical sense play a crucial role in the realization of nationalistic music. However, similarly to Curtis, Dorsch also mentions the lack of academic literature that addresses music and nationhood.

Peter Wade argues that this limitation exists because of "underlying assumptions… connected to some influential ideas on nationalism and long-standing ideas about the relation between music and identity" (Wade 1998: 1). The first limitation, Wade states, is that of the synonymy of nationalism and homogeneity as

propagated by Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner. For Gellner, homogeneity is a necessary component of modern nation-states. It is one of the only viable ways of asserting political control over a group of people as he claims is the purpose of nationalism: "to make congruent the political and national unit so as to have political legitimacy" (Gellner 1983). National legitimacy begets political legitimacy, which begets a formal state. Therefore, nationalism is a tool the state uses in order to maintain the continuation of their power; nationalism is exerted by asserting homogeneity. Homogeneity, Gellner argues, is a necessary tool of cultural standardization in this busy, industrialized world. This supposed homogeneity conducting the nation's anthem is not necessarily reproduced in the study of music and nationalism and is thus criticized in Wade's study. The dialectics of music, especially nationalistic music, constantly reinforces and challenges these notions of homogeneity.

Similarly, notions of social identity are presented in apparently static or prescribed forms that music then expresses (Wade 1998). This assumption of identity foregoes more fluid notions of identity: identity is not a singular formation that stands untouched. It is constantly reshaping itself to contemporary discourses and ideas of self. Moreover, that music, which is a flexible medium of narration, is not credited as its own entity in which forces beyond that which it "expresses" are not critically examined, is problematic in and of itself. Expression of a social identity is not the sole goal of a musician, because of course, music cannot be estranged from its producer. Musicians work within their own microcosms that are in flux and that engage with larger systems such as those of the state. Thus, to look at national music while primarily focusing on the state agenda rather than the musician is a parochial understanding of national music but one that dominates much of the existing

discourse. Particularly, Wade finds problematic the proposition of a Marxist power struggle between elite classes and subaltern classes as the only relevant and documented example of contention in the national music field. In cases Wade cites in which diversity is subsumed into the national narrative by the state's official recognition of "multiculturalism," he claims it to be a method of pacification by the state.

Thus, national music is seen as the "homogenizing imposition of a nation building (musical and intellectual) elite" in these interpretations rather than "as a means of imagining communities– and thereby constituting them" (Wade 1998: 4 and 16). Music is both an impetus in reconstructing culture just as much as it is in deconstructing culture and works with and against class theory. In order to broaden the discussion of nation and music in synchrony, theory surrounding nation and music individually must also be broadened and less resistant to external theories.

What I observe in the Palestinian context is a removal from these conditions of homogenization and top-down efforts. Thus, using the notions of nation and music are both at once fitting and jarring. The efforts to spread a narrative of the "Palestinian identity" are less about the state and more about the people and their identity beyond a government. While statehood was surely a political goal, years of violence and struggle have reduced statehood to a representation of the end of bloodshed and the deliverance from Israeli subjugation. There is no strong push from above forcing traditional music upon Palestinian citizens: if solidarity is what the government seeks, they need look no further for a more compelling cohesive of the violence. With this "us against them" mindset, there is no need for a prescribed cultural set of traditions and folklore. Solidarity of the Palestinian identity is rooted strongly in the narrative of the exiled, the disinherited, and the attacked. Memories of folklore are similarly

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preserved as precious relics of their once material heritage that was taken away. In essence, there is no strong impetus for the government to foster a sense of nationalism: at a grassroots level, Palestinians want their story of nation and people to overwhelm. If this is the case, it also disrupts the tale of "homogenization... and the construction of difference" (Wade 1998:1) that Wade writes. Nationalism does, of course, implicate homogeneity to a certain extent as it does authentic culture. However, clinging to these singular notions of nationalism also presupposes an inflexibility that narrows analytical potential. If the nationalist tool of music is not only written in terms of high culture and low culture nor of one that actively seeks to only reassert elements of "authentic" culture, then it becomes much more of Anderson's imagined communities with greater plasticity.

4.3 Hip-Hop as Transmitter of Revolution: Palestinian Hip-Hop, DAM, and Hip-Hop Culture

4.3a An Overview of the Palestinian Hip-Hop scene

The Palestinian hip-hop scene emerged in the late 1990s after the Middle Eastern Peace Processes in general and the Oslo Peace process of the early 1990s as outlined in the previous chapter. Hip-hop is commonly understood as a transmitter of revolution: a music genre utilized by the subaltern to voice their discontent. Along with genres such as punk and rock, it is seen as well suited to conveying the message of the impassioned.

The music form of Palestinian hip-hop has been cited as emerging "from poor and working-class communities that [suffered] a history of underdevelopment and state-sponsored neglect" (Stein and Swedenburg 2004: 14) and is also attributed to DAM, the group that is the focus of this thesis. Since then, a surge of Palestinian hip-hop artists have filled the scene: Most notably, DAM, Palestinian Rapperz, MRW,

Arapyat, and MC Gaza are examples of Palestinian hip-hop artists located in Palestine. Palestinian-American hip-hop artists such as the Philistines, Iron Sheik, Ragtop, and Hammer Brothers are based in the U.S. and rap about their racially tinged experiences as Arabs in America and express solidarity with Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Other Palestinian hip-hop artists include those such as Damascus-based Refugees of Rap and U.K.-based Shadia Mansour. They are the forefront of contemporary music in these communities and are especially popular to younger generations as the voice of the angry Palestinian youths.

Each group has unique experiences of what it means to be Palestinian: a Palestinian citizen in Israel; a Palestinian living in one of the Palestinian territories; Palestinian refugees of Syria, Jordan, or other countries; or diasporic communities based elsewhere in the world such as the U.S. or the U.K. For each of these communities, there are unique and individual experiences and challenges. For Israeli-based, female duo Arapyat, this means that their music is boycotted from Israeli radio stations for being Arabic while Arabic radio stations paradoxically ban their music for being Israeli (Shalev 2013). In addition to this catch twenty-two, the two artists are limited socially by their sex. Their provenance follows from this restriction. One of the performers, Safaa Hathot, was banned from cooperating with other established male rappers by her conservative parents and thus turned to female friend Nahwa Abed Al'Al to create Arapyat (Moore 2015). Each group utilizes different forms of institutional support. DAM, the musical group that I use as the core of my work in this thesis, boycotts most institutional support in order to retain integrity to their political strategy.

4.3b DAM: Eternity, Blood, and Da Arabian MCs

DAM is reputedly Palestine's first hip-hop ensemble founded in 1999. The group features three members: brothers Tamer Nafar and Suhell Nafar and Mahmoud Jreri. The name of the group takes on several meanings that Nafar brothers and Jreri cite in several interviews as well as on their website: it is the Arabic verb for "eternity," the Hebrew word for "blood," and on a lighter note, is an acronym for "Da Arabian MCs" which the members jokingly refer to as themselves. The darker translation of their band's name encapsulates the content of their music, which primarily explores the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the resulting social catastrophe manifest in the abject poverty and dire living situation of Palestinians. The relentless violence inflicted on them by Israelis is a normalized part of their daily experience; truly, blood seems to be the eternal lot of the Palestinians. In addition to content depicting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the trio writes about problematic social issues within Palestine and their fellow Arab community as a part of their "broader political strategy" (Tamar and Suhell Nafar and Mahmood Jreri 2012) that appears to engage with the theory of purification from within (Zureiq 1939). For followers of this thought, Arab nationalism is not a question of identity but that of civilization.[8]

In 2008, DAM was catapulted into the forefront of social activist music with the documentary *Slingshot Hip Hop* and as a result, their mission to dispel Islamophobia and the dismissal of the Palestinian plight gained significant traction. They are Palestinian citizens of Israel from the town of Lyd. It is a municipality McDonald describes as "one of the most dangerous, drug-addicted and crime-infested cities in the Middle East" (McDonald 2013: 231). While they are still based in Lyd

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[8] Premature analysis is cut short here and resumed in the more analytically-heavy section 4.2 *A Cross-Comparative Look at Palestinian Folk History, Contemporary Hip-Hop Lyrical Content, and Nationalism*

because of their commitment to their community– particularly the youth– and their desire to provide programs and workshops for Palestinian citizens of Israel, they have gone on several transcontinental tours in the U.S. and Europe. Most recently, they toured through Europe in the early months of 2015, and for the month of June, have three more concerts available on their website: two in Israel and one in Paris.[9] Their story and work have been featured in Vibe, National Geographic, Rolling Stone, Q, Basement, Reuters, and The New York Times.[10] Tamer Nafar attributes African-American hip-hop artist Tupac Shakur with his love and interest in the genre. Tupac rapped on behalf of his racialized black community in America and his "repertory of politically charged rap" granted him the status of "shahid, memorialized as a fallen hero for Palestinian liberation" (McDonald 2013: 22). Consequently, DAM's music reflects styles similar to the American hip-hop genre. However, their songs draw extensively from Arabic melodies and melodic styles of singing.

The trio's unique voice is partly because of their own identities: Palestinian citizens of Israel from the town of Lyd, or '48s as they like to call themselves. "'48s" represent those Palestinian citizens living in Israel, the claimed land of Palestine before the 1948 War, or the "indigenous" residents of Israel. They represent one facet of the Palestinian community, fragmented from other Palestinians living different realities. Because of their '48 identity, DAM also performs in Hebrew to resonate with a Hebrew crowd: it is a useful characterization that allows a more fluid identity and a wider audience base (McDonald and Stein and Swedenburg). Songs in Hebrew "work radically to rewrite hegemonic notions of Israeliness (mapped, as they are, on Euro-Jewish culture and ideology)" (Stein and Swedenburg 2004: 15). Instead of

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[9] See www.damprap.com/tours
[10] See www.damprap.com/about

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being perceived as only Palestinian, their identity is re-written into many social identities such that it challenges what it means to be Israeli. While the Nafar brothers and Jreri are Palestinian and identify with Arabness, their identity is also informed to a certain extent by Israeliness. This fluidity translates into their music form such that the meanings of their songs are constantly in flux with their audiences and the context of their performance (Stein and Swedenburg 2004). As such, DAM'S presence in the Palestinian hip-hop world is an especially compelling case to study for the purposes of my thesis. They are an exemplary case of a Palestinian hip-hop group seriously devoted to their mission and their craft, not only through their music but also via extensive involvement in Palestinian cultural programs. DAM's popularity with Palestinians in particular and their audiences in general make them suitable ambassadors to the world of Palestinian hip-hop.

In addition to their repertoire of music dealing with the political conflict, they also rap about the general social problems permeating the Palestinian community, such as their recent song "If I Could Go Back in Time". The group worked with UN Women who supports the empowerment of women to produce a song to create a conversation about violence directed toward women in the Arab community. The song and music video features a young Palestinian woman being shot by her brother and father because of her unwillingness to submit to their will. While it was directed by the same talent who directed the much-acclaimed *Slingshot Hip Hop*, Jackie Salloum, the song generated backlash, most notably from scholars such as Lila Abu-Lughod. Abu-Lughod and Maya Mikdashi criticize the song for being devoid of the smartness and nuance that is present in DAM's other songs in an article published on the website *Jadaliyya* entitled *Tradition and the Anti-Politics Machine: DAM Seduced by the "Honor Crime"*. To them, "the very thickness of Palestinian lives disappears"

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(Abu-Lughod and Mikdashi 2012) and is replaced with the generality of patriarchal violence that erases the contextuality of structural violence. It is a piece they find disappointing for the lack of critical voice working in a seeming historical and political vacuum that reinforces negative stereotypes of Arabs (Abu-Lughod and Mikdashi 2012).

DAM responded forcefully with their own article on *Jadaliyya* that defended their work as one in a series of many whose greater whole should provide contextualization for the song. Rightly positioning themselves as actors that are "close and engaged" with the Palestinian context, the Nafar brothers and Mahmood Jreri also justify their work as one that is a part of a greater Arab movement. They see their mission as not only defined by the Israeli Occupation but as one that also focuses inwards towards their "own" social issues, in which "own" is identified by the broader Arab community. Their addressing of these issues is admirable as it creates an honest dialogue in which Palestinians are not the characters of a hagiography, victims of a foreign tormenter, but as a society that also struggles with its own issues. DAM asserts that they do not write for an American or Israeli audience but for their own community and in particular reference to the song in question, that they "address an Arab audience in Arabic… without being worried about how others will abuse it" (Tamer and Suhell Nafar, and Mahmood Jreri 2012). DAM is hyper-aware of the social movements they inspire and the direction of dialogue in Palestine.

4.4 A Cross-Comparative Look a Palestinian Folk History, Contemporary Hip-Hop Lyrical Content, and Nationalism

As mentioned in the Methodology section, I drew from a variety of media platforms to research the performers. The purpose of using these sources was three-fold. The first was as a way to look at the songs themselves. In terms of understanding

songs, I analyze them in a three-tiered mode: First, I am interested in lyrical content. When analyzing and interpreting the symbols that are used lyrically, I used the preliminary research to determine the extent of usage of symbols used to represent the Palestinian cultural imaginary. Secondly, I briefly draw attention to the use of Arabic melodic modes in the songs, as a way to explore how contemporary music is neither ignorant nor disregarding of traditional melodies. Finally, songs were interpreted independently of the traditional to determine new interpretations of identity in relation to the current political climate. This final mode of interpretation allows for identity to be fluid and constantly reinterpreted by a living community as identities as a self-ascribed practice rather than prescribed. Finally, the purpose of using these sources was to track the movement of Palestinian hip-hop groups and to understand the scale of awareness and support they garner. This last ambition was not successful. The following three songs I have chosen to analyze are the following (in chronological order of their release): from the 2007 album, *Ihda2 Dedication* "Stranger in my Own Country"; from 2008 documentary *Slingshot Hip Hop* "Born Here"; and the 2014 released single "God of Revolution."[11]

Within these songs in particular and their albums in general, DAM utilizes two forms of identity to subtly work within a contentious space of narration. The first is through that of their politicized situation. It speaks strongly to the transition of the Palestinian community from a rural agrarian community and that lifestyle's accompanying motifs to contemporary representation of the urban Palestinian communities. These Palestinian communities live in the reality of overcrowded urban spaces and under the constant threat of violence from Israeli police authorities. In an interview with David Mcdonald, Tamer Nafar is prompted by the statement that their

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[11] See Appendix Figures 1-3 for full lyrical content of each song

music is not Palestinian music to say "What are you talking about, *sha'bi* [Palestinian indigenous music]? So for me to be Palestinian I have to sing wedding songs about olive trees or farming or goats? What does that have to do with my life here and now?" (McDonald 2013: 247). Instead, the narrative that DAM puts together is a contemporary retelling of a people placed in an uncompromising power trap in which they are the inferior. These contemporary interpretations of culture coincide with the three phases of nationalism discussed in the previous chapter.

While Nafar rejects the idea that traditional Palestinian markers of identity as found represented in folk repertoire, their music also greatly utilizes Arabic melodies as well as many folk motifs and styles of performance. These include characterizations such as opening a song with a brief introductory solo known as the *dulab* in the Arab music tradition, the inclusion of a refrain section that mimics the call-and-response performative aspect greatly typical of Arabic music and performance, and the ballad-like formation of some of their lyrical form. The inclusion of these markers resonates strongly with their Palestinian audiences and indexes their positionality as true Palestinians. It is undoubtedly a conscious move to open new spaces as artists in which they can: assert their Palestinian identity naturally, re-write their Palestinian identity in conjunction to new formulations of what constitutes the Palestinian, and create relationships between audiences within these spaces. It is this reformulation of Palestine, the seamless synchronization of past and present that jars the audience and challenges existing theories of nation and music. The many forces that shape meaning are in constant conversation in this genre of music, never quite settling long enough to allow a satisfactory mode of interpretation to take place.

"Stranger in My Own Country" released with the 2007 album *Ihda2*

Dedication reads as a despairing ballad tinged with bouts of frustration and anger.

One of the most poetic aspects of the song is that "stranger" in the song title does not

refer to the Israelis in their own country but in fact is in reference to their own

position as strangers. The song begins with a solitary message in Arabic with a

sampling of a recording by Tawfiq Ziad, the Mayor of Nazarath and an Israeli-Arab

politician, speaking poetically on behalf of Palestinians "Because the calamity which

I live in is only/My share of your calamities" ("Stranger in My Own Country" 2007).

A *ney*, or reed flute, plays in the background with typical melismatic ornamentations.

The pluckings of an *oud*-like instrument joins the melody as well as accents from a

string orchestra in the minor key before DAM begins rapping.

Each rapped segment is long and lyrical, reminiscent of long traditional

Arabic ballads. Mahmood Jreri starts the song with a metaphor of sailing ships that

leave behind sadness because "[Palestinians] are unwanted guests in our home"

("Stranger in My Own Country" 2007). With this assertion, they place their

indigeneity at the forefront while assuming the position of those who have been

unjustly treated. They continue to level accusations at the Israeli government by

stating that the Zionist democratic government is "denying [their] existence/still blind

to [their] colors, [their] history and [their] people" so that "[their] children grow up in

a reality that doesn't represent them" ("Stranger in My Own Country 2007). Rejecting

the political olive branch offered to them, the "blue card" or the identity card of

Israeli citizens and permanent residents, as being a misleading offer of inclusion,

DAM speaks specifically of their experience as Palestinian citizens of Israel. The

"blue card" is nothing more than a cheap token that does not erase the existing

hostility and makes them "feel like strangers… a stranger in [their] own country"

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("Stranger in My Own Country" 2007). The phrase is one of disbelief of the situation and places the Israeli government in ridicule. The chorus resumes the narrative of the hopeless and desperate: they are a disinherited people who own people (their Arab brothers) have abandoned them. Yet, "the soul told me no matter what, keep walking with your head held up high" ("Stranger in My Own Country 2007). Despite the unforgiving socio-political situation, the chorus demands respect and declares the resilience and independence of the Palestinian spirit.

The second verse rapped by Suhell Nafar contains content that refocuses their attention on their Arab identity. The content of the lyrics allude to nationalist sentiments shared by "Fatah" or nationalism that is characterized by a singular expression of Palestinian identity. They acknowledge that "our hearts are still beating and our Arabian roots are still strong" but then ask "But still our Arabian brothers are calling us renegades?" ("Stranger in My Own Country" 2007). The abandonment of their Arab allies is a further source of aggravation: DAM paints a picture of a Palestinian island, their supposed allies unwilling to send lifeboats. So, while they identify as Arabs, their political concerns does not concern those of the broader Arabic strategy. In the final stanza, Tamer Nafer raps using Arabic themes: he invokes the popular image of the *shahid* or martryr. Their fight and their resistance is that of the *shahid*, though they are "fighting the sword of those who think [their] blood is worthless" ("Stranger in My Own Country" 2007). This image of the *shahid* compromises interpretations of the Palestinian and Arabic as it is a part of both. It allows DAM to transcend local and earthly identities for a time and assume the iconic figure of the martyred, a representative of all those who refuse to yield in the face of discrimination. The verse alludes to Christ's and Muhamed's cheeks, maintaining their transcendent identity as greater than religion as well, before returning to their

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Palestinian narrative of being "a stranger in [their] own country" but that "[they'll] keep the roots of Palestine until the end of time" ("Stranger in My Own Country" 2007). These sentiments once again echo the nationalist sentiments of Fatah whose vision saw Palestine as a revolutionary unit with an relentless fighter's spirit.

In the following lyrics of "Born Here" featured prominently in the 2008 documentary *Slingshot Hip Hop*, I note the same use of Arabic melodic modes and depiction of their socio-political situation. The song begins with strings in syncopated ascensions of discordant thirds whose melody sets the tone for a threatening presence. Indeed, in their music video, the introductory scene is of Israeli police officers interrogating Palestinians.

The politics of identity in this song is once again featured similarly to that of "Stranger in My own Country' in which DAM references their positions as being residents of Israel. In "Born Here" however, they explicitly name the town they are from, Lyd, and describe it as a town that has "all kind of unlocked criminals" ("Born Here" 2008). Yet these criminals are wrongly indicted as "the only thing people here did wrong was living on their land" ("Born Here" 2008). In these two short lines, DAM places three layers of identity on these actors: first that they are Palestinian citizens living in Israel, or the unwanted. Second is that these citizens are featured as being criminals, although, and this is their third layer, the only thing that was wrong about the situation was that they were unwanted. All these layers of identity frame the position of DAM as performers and the story the message they are trying to disseminate.

In this song, DAM invokes the folk image of a bride in the chorus, in which "a bride without a veil standing, waiting, longing for her beauty" is forgotten. Palestine is the bride in this metaphor, waiting for the fragrant taste of freedom and instead

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passed over. Yet, in true form of the Palestinian resistance spirit, this bride does not stand in shame but "like a bird that will break out of the cage/she will spread out her wings and fly" ("Born Here" 2008). The image of the bride and the bird are common in Palestinian folk literature, as determined by Palestinian author Ibrahim Muhawi and professor of sociology and anthropology Sharif Kanaana. Their compilation of Palestinian folk tales in the volume *Speak, Bird, Speak Again*, published in English in 1989 identifies several common motifs of bride in Palestinian folk tales. The faithful bride that Palestine is represented as will be rewarded for her patience. Her fidelity to her groom, liberty, is demonstrated by the metaphor of the bird breaking out of its cage and flying away. This powerful folk tale imagery is followed with an angry rant on the political situation performed by Tamer and Suhell. There are no attempts at poetics of identity but a stark, honest lyrical rap about the dire social situation. It stands well next to the folk-inspired chorus as the chorus reminds the audience first of the identity of Palestinian and secondly that this identity is largely determined by a strong spirit, while the meat of the song depicts the social reality. By contrasting these elements of reality against aspirational images of the folk, "Born Here" is a more subdued piece that does not engage forcefully in themes of nationalism but more of simple identity.

The final song I analyze in this thesis is DAM's single "God of Revolution" (Single 2014). This song is one of the most symbolically engaging pieces they have. Inspired by the poet Marwan Makhoul, the piece features both him and Terez Suleiman, who sings the introduction and hook. She sings a prayer to *ilahi*, or God, to "return me to the wilderness/erase the borders that have boxed me in and defaced the horizon" ("God of Revolution" 2014) and using vocal ornamentations such as melisma that were used in "Stranger in My Own Land" to accentuate the melody

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while a repetitive bass note creates a total until the percussion entrance with the start of Tamer's first verse.

Its form is not that of the traditional hip-hop repertoire that characterizes most of their songs but is very much of the call-and-response form between performer and audience. In the first verse that Tamer raps, he speculates what would happen if he went out into the wilderness: "Do you think the world will notice we are gone?" ("God of Revolution" 2014). After each verse, Terez Suleiman responds with "Lord, return me to the wilderness." The removal of his presence from the contemporary, being out in the wilderness where he belongs without the hindrance of his "iPhone" that receives constant texts about Fadel Shaker[12] evokes a rejection of the contemporary. There is a striving for the noble idea of paradise and this paradise is one that is a removal from the urban context. It is a departure from the two previous songs that locate Palestinian identity firmly within the urban and as a crucial element of their identity. The narrative of the story is neither one that identifies strictly as Arabic or Palestinian. There is a disappointment in Palestinian government as being unmoving and devoid of any action and a sterile removal from anger as "[they] will not blame the leader: he is just a dress [they] take off [to] wear another one, but [their] body is still rotten" ("God of Revolution" 2014). Palestine is indicted alongside Iraq, Egypt, in Syria when they rap about "another baby burned in the hands of her father" ("God of Revolution" 2014). It is a song that is about the total failure of the Palestinian state and the idea of Arab-hood and one that petitions God to "shut the mouths of the fake nationalists" ("God of Revolution" 2014).

It features a type of nationalism that rejects all three imaginations of

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[12] Fadel Shaker is a popular musician who was signed onto a prominent label in 2003. He retired from his music career for religious grounds and allegedly killed two Lebanese soldiers in an air attack supported by Sheikh Ahmed Al-Assir. His location is currently unknown and there is a warrant for his arrest.

nationalism as I previously outlined but one that also embraces aspects of each. In accordance with MAN whose ideology encouraged followers to seek change from within or to identify causes of weakness in the Palestinian state as a result of their own structural inefficiencies, DAM points out social problems within the Palestinian community that hinder its success. Leaders are no more than dresses and figureheads that do nothing except to collect the feces of bird and there is no social movement for change because Palestinians' are socially discriminatory, classifying gays, whores, marital status, and so on and so forth. However, they reject pan-Arabism, which disqualifies them from that particular national movement and aligns them with the national thought of Fatah. However, this national thought is also paradoxical because of the aforementioned apathy towards the Palestinian. The religious content of the piece is an obvious marker of a religious nationalism as expressed by Hamas. The lyrics hark back to the legacy of the biblical Cain and Abel and the motif of the song is to reach out in supplication to a God for deliverance, though its final line divorces it from fully identifying it with this movement either: "Dear Lord, if it is really your voice as the religious people claims/then give me an AC and throw me to hell with the rest of the good people" ("God of Revolution" 2014).

DAM's final song asks for deliverance from the hopelessness of the situation and from the "fake nationalists" and so thus clearly believes that there is a true sense of nationalism in Palestine. Perhaps their song is one such representation of this new national movement that the people are seeking: one uncorrupted by government yet one that paradoxically seeks to establish a functioning one. Following DAM's songs chronicles a progression of Palestinian national identity and offers a new mode of Palestinian nationalism. The narration did not come in the typical form of how nation

and music construct themselves in other case studies and thus requires that a closer inquiry into nationhood, music, and music and nationhood be established.

Conclusion

Music and nationhood is not a theoretical partnership that is widely studied. The lack of engagement in this field is only at the detriment to the richness of sociological and anthropological theory as it forecloses the opportunity to analyze how modes of identity are created in this medium. My understanding of Palestinian hip-hop and nationalism challenges typical conventions of power dynamics within nationhood.

Ethnomusicology also suggests that the politics of popular culture is a useful platform in which to engage dialectics such as nationalism and resistance because its fluid nature constantly challenges modes of analysis and interpretation. The seriousness of popular culture is often devalued because of its removal from "high culture" but in fact popular culture can accurately reflect the sentiment of the general public and thus be useful tools of understanding, even changing public opinion. Palestinian hip-hop is a genre that gains more traction as it engages with the many nationalist opinions of different movements and times. It captures Palestine in past, present, and future: Palestine becomes suspended in time, remembered, practiced and predicted.

Appendix

SUMMARY FOR PALESTINE (Land Areas in Dunums)

Sub-District	Population (Table I)			Cultivable Land (Table II)				Built-up Areas & Non-cultivable (Table III)				Total Land Areas (Table I)			
	Arabs	Jews	Total	Arabs	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs	Jews	Public	Total	Arabs	Jews	Public	Total
Acre	65,380	2,950	68,330	353,420	9,431	368	363,219	344,331	15,566	76,547	436,444	697,751	24,997	76,915	799,663
Beersheba	53,550	150	53,700	1,934,849	65,151		2,000,000	1,531	80	2,279	3,890	1,936,380	65,231	2,279	2,003,890
Beisan	16,590	7,000	23,590	156,942	119,211	16,355	292,508	8,006	5,544	61,029	74,579	164,948	124,755	77,384	367,087
Gaza	134,290	2,890	137,180	798,627	47,112	71,066	916,805	43,177	2,148	149,371	194,696	841,804	49,260	220,437	1,111,501
Haifa	120,120	104,510	224,630	345,646	246,620	10,623	602,889	114,145	117,656	197,065	428,866	459,791	364,276	207,688	1,031,755
Hebron	89,570	80	89,650	647,043	4,760	6,062	657,865	1,338,870	1,372	78,078	1,418,320	1,985,913	6,132	84,140	2,076,185
Jaffa	109,700	264,100	373,800	157,857	86,990	3,131	247,978	19,497	42,449	25,442	87,388	177,354	129,439	28,573	335,366
Jenin	56,880		56,880	471,140	4,173	11,829	487,142	230,953	78	117,041	348,072	702,093	4,251	128,870	835,214
Jerusalem	147,750	100,200	247,950	321,820	13,518	10,059	345,397	1,067,034	19,883	138,471	1,225,388	1,388,854	33,401	148,530	1,570,785
Nablus	89,200		89,200	638,491		69,406	707,897	768,178	15	115,628	883,821	1,406,669	15	185,034	1,591,718
Nazareth	38,500	7,600	46,100	208,975	124,619	3,249	336,843	54,113	12,763	93,814	160,690	263,088	137,382	97,063	497,533
Ramallah	47,280		47,280	369,164	67	161	369,392	313,340	79	3,753	317,172	682,504	146	3,914	686,564
Ramle	97,850	29,420	127,270	485,717	100,389	12,691	598,797	200,339	21,770	49,286	271,395	686,056	122,159	61,977	870,192
Safad	46,920	6,700	53,620	269,935	92,094	7,018	369,047	220,928	29,394	76,762	327,084	490,863	121,488	83,780	696,131
Tiberias	26,100	13,100	39,200	163,984	136,739	3,177	303,900	67,777	30,667	38,625	137,069	231,761	167,406	41,802	440,969
Tulkarm	71,240	14,900	86,140	473,519	125,871	6,469	605,859	177,176	15,490	36,835	229,501	650,695	141,361	43,304	835,360
Totals	1,210,920	553,600	1,764,520	7,797,129	1,176,745	231,664	9,205,538	4,969,395	314,954	1,260,026	17,117,485*	12,766,524	1,491,699	1,491,690	26,323,023*

*These totals include an area of 10,573,110 dunums which appear in the 'Village Statistics 1945' in respect of the Beersheba sub-district under the column *Uncultivable land* without ownership being assigned to either the bedouin tribes inhabiting the region or as state domain since title thereto had not been settled.

Table 1. Summary for Palestine from *Village Statistics: 1945*

Tawfiq Ziad
I call upon you all,
And beseech you,
I kiss the ground you walk on,
And say to you, "I sacrifice myself for you."
I offer you the whites of my eyes,
And the warmth of my heart I give to you,
Because the calamity which I live in is only
My share of your calamities.

Mahmood:
All the ships are sailing, leaving behind them sadness
That's drowning our hearts, again we are unwanted guests in our home
But our destiny is to stay physically close to our lands
While being spiritually far away from our nation
Who cares about us? We are dying slowly
Controlled by a Zionist democratic government!
Ya', democratic to the Jewish soul and Zionist to the Arabic soul
That is to say, what is forbidden to him is forbidden to me
And what is allowed to him is forbidden to me
And what's allowed to me is unwanted by me
'Cause its denying my existence
Still blind to my colours, my history and my people
Brain-washing my children so that they grow up in a reality
That doesn't represent them.
The blue idea card worth nuthing to us
Let us believe we are apart of a nation
That does nothing but makes us feel like strangers
Me?? A stranger in my own country!!

Chorus:
Where can I go when my land is occupied??
The soul told me that only the love of my people can protect me
But where can I go when my people are abandoning me??
The soul told me no matter what, keep walking with your head held up high

Suhell:
We encounter faces that don't want us, looking at us full of disgust
Whispers full of swearing, wishing just to expel us
What?! Have you forgotten who laid the foundation of these buildings?!
Our people did that, look at the mosques and the churches
And now I find people from other parts of the world wishing to move us
Who can I complain to?! To unjustified laws that hush up our voices
It destroys our houses, unemployment is everywhere
Raised in a poverty that fills our every waking hour
But our hearts are still beating and our Arabian roots are still strong
But still our Arabian brothers are calling us renegades!!!!!!!??
Nooooooooooooooooooooooo
We never sold our country, the occupation has written our destiny
Which is, that the whole world till today is treating us as Israelis
And Israel till tomorrow will treat us as Palestinians; I'm a stranger in my own country

Tamer:
13 shaheeds, the death is close
When the stones are in the hand, 13 shaheeds
The ALA (highness) of our land, and the EMAD (base) of it

Black October proved that the EYAD (support) is in our blood
Everyone of them was WALID (born) under occupation
But still RAMY (throwing) himself like a sharp sword
Fighting the sword of those who think our blood is worthless
Killing the MUSLEH's (the Right One) voice with live ammo
And the mother tear screams I am ASSIL (I'm falling down)
On Christ's and MUHAMED's cheeks, we are like a mountain
That won't be shaken by any wind or storm
We'll stay RAMEZ (the symbol) of nationality
And the WISSAM (the symbol) of freedom
The light of our great grandparents will never fade away
I'm a stranger in my own country but I AHMAD (I thank) god
That I'm still sticking to my culture, all of you can call us
Renegades or the inner Arabs or the Arabs of 48
WHATEVER, we'll keep the roots of Palestine till the OMAR (till the end of time)

Tawfik Ziad:
I did not betray my homeland,
And my shoulders did not falter,
I stood in the face of my oppressors,
Orphaned, naked and barefoot.
I carried my blood upon my palm,
And did not let my flags lower,
And sustained the green grass
On my ancestors' graves

Figure 1. "Stranger in My Own Country" (*Ihda2 Dedication* 2007)

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Mahmood:
The first thing we must have is initiation
Listen, understand, take notes, you can call it a lecture
We're in a battle, which we were stabled in from a long time
And who is responsible for our situation?Its either conspiracy or unconsciousness
Let me introduce to ya'll myself, I'm from a town called Lyd
You can find here all kind of unlocked criminals.
The only thing people here did wrong was living on their land
And now their home is being destroyed only cuz they r not united
I will stand and take position where I'll start looking over
And ill manage your minds and ill start explaining
That power is achieved through integration not segregation
And if we do the opposite then we will fall one after the other
And when we said hand in hand we should stand
We didn't mean just a finger
Cuz in order to take, you must ask, and in order to achieve power
We should all be together.

(chorus)
Our neighborhood is embarrassed
Not dressed in a silk dress
(DAM – if the fear will continue to live in our hearts)
a bride without a veil standing, waiting, longing for her beauty
(DAM – the expulsion is knocking on our doors)

the time has passed over her, forgotten her
(DAM – that is why)
the separation wall has muted her hope like a bird that will break out of the cage she will spread out her wings and fly
(DAM – we will shout without fear)
Tamer:
Destroying homes is like whispers ,As long as we are still silent
we will keep hearing that whisper in my people's ears.
But if we will scream and shout, then that whisper will not be heard
And it will drown in the sea of justice.
And I can understand who cries a tear of sorrow.
But what I don't understand, is someone who doesn't wipe his tears out.
While he is drowning in the sea of his tears searching for his land
And he is wondering " why the hell they do this to us?"
Let me tell you why, it's because people like you who do nothing
To defend their land and just stay in "welcome" position to any destroying hand.
A week ago there was a demonstration against destroying houses
With 100 people in it and 90 from them were Jews
You should understand that if you look at your neighbor today while he is being taking out of his home and you do nothing about it, Then tomorrow they will come to you and you neighbor will look at you with the same look you gave him.

The chain of discrimination is long, and it has an end.
But you won't reach this end if you fail to use your power, the power which is aware and helpless but still is afraid of knowing if it's able
Our eyes watch as our children seeking
a future that in it "the sky are the limit"
a slogan that has been covered with the ruins dust
but' the light hasn't been turned off yet
Suhell Nafar:
a destroyed house and in the garden 8 railway tracks
and in the day at least 200 trains pass
and behind the ruins, a separation wall
that should be between the house and the railroad tracks
but it is built between Snir and Nir Tzvi
and the municipality says that everything there is illegal
so, just one second, one second what with all the legal neighborhoods that has
health care centers – surrounded with sewerage
kindergarten – surrounded with sewerage
for that there is no excuse it's just that the city didn't care for the Arabs
because the government has a wish:
maximum Jews – on maximum land
minimum Arabs – on minimum land
this house didn't get approved by the law
and you will not erase!

Figure 2. "Born Here" (*Slingshot Hip Hop* 2008)

Terez Suleiman: Dear Lord ... return me to the wilderness erase the borders that have boxed me in and defaced the horizon. *Tamer*: Lets set a tent, on 2 pegs in front of a lamentation Some herbs, and 2 rocks instead of a lighter Do you think that the world will notice we are gone? (Dear Lord ... return me to the wilderness) Without an IPhone, I will sit with my son around the fire I will sing to him Zeryab and tell him about our golden times Without receiving any Sms's about Fadel Shaker (Dear Lord ... return me to the wilderness) *Terez Suleiman (Hook)*: Dear Lord, can you stop The earth from spinning? I cannot take it anymore; I feel dizzy and I want to come down Dear Lord, can you stop The earth from spinning? I cannot take it anymore; I feel dizzy and I want to come down	*Marwan Makhoul*: It's not like we're living in the jungle Where the beasts never eat more than One beast when they're hungry. (Lord, lead me back to the wilderness, please) They have no guilt and live in peace As you can see, Or maybe you've seen A lion kill a gazelle to justify its faith, dear Lord? (Lord, lead me back to the wilderness, please) *Marwan Makhoul*: On the back of missiles, America exports its modern justice, daily Russia objects and plants black roses on the warships Along the coast of the East, so holy and so wholly Full of slaughter. Tamer Nafar (DAM): I cannot blame the foreigners, its not that I sympathize with them But the name of the game is politics, so let the best man win And we are still stock with "We are standing still" You know who also is standing still? The statute All the birds drop feces on it while he is passive, only collecting dust during times No, we will not blame the leader, he is just a dress we take off and wear another one, but our body is still rotten.	Another baby is burned in the hands of her father, And I can't tell if it is Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, or Syria. If I am in a similar situation where I failed to protect my own child, I can easily say, leave my children alone and take your Pan Arabism. Dear lord, shut the mouths of the fake nationalists and the clichés' merchants I must admit, I cannot feel proud as an Arab lately I am aware of the conspiracies, but even if we agreed That the west plant sedition AMONG US, lets try and plant it Among them and we will discover that only our minds are fertile When the paradise died in the eyes of the first humans it left in its will Only the genes of Kane & Able while the west took the apple and Turned it into APPLE, While we still divide, and classify, He is gay, he is girly, she is a whore, he is a "Muslim brotherhood", and he is atheist, How come this woman isn't married yet? He is a Salafi, he is Coptic, If in my religion there is the word sectarianism I want to be illiterate. Dear lord, if it is really your voice as the religious people claims Then give me an AC and throw me to hell with the rest of the good people *Marwan Makhoul*: In my country God's Sunnah are someone else's Shia; the crusaders are Jews who sit impartially when there's no being impartial about the good.

Figure 3. "God of Revolution" (Single 2014)

Glossary

dam – Arabic for blood, Hebrew for eternity
dunum – the traditional Ottoman measurement of land equaling approximately 1000 sq meters
dulab – melodic solo at the beginning of Arabic melodies
harakat al-muqawama al-islamiyya – movement of Islamic Resistance, or Hamas

harakat al-tahrir al-falistini – The Movement for the Liberation of Palestine, or Fatah

ilahi – "My God"

intifada – uprising

Jadaliyya – the domain name of an online magazine produced by Arab Studies Institute

jihad – struggle, or the war waged against unbelievers in Isalmic terms

maqam – Arabic melodic mode typical to Middle Eastern music traditions

oud – wooden lute characteristic of Middle Eastern music traditions

al-nakba – Catastrophe, the day of Catastrophe in reference to the War of 1948

ney – reed flute characteristic of Middle Eastern music traditions

al-qaeda – Islamic militant group; in this context, in reference to the 9/11 attack on September 11, 2001

qarya – villages

sha'bi – Palestinian indigenous music

shahid – martyr

al-Th'ar - revenge

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