CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2015
| Author | Popa, Elena |
|---|---|
| Title | Causation as Manipulability and Temporal Direction |
| Summary | This dissertation is an inquiry into some problems related to manipulability as an approach to causation. Chapter 1 discusses realist and projectivist versions of manipulability, as well as related theories of causation. Concerning the debate over the aims Woodward manipulability approach, I argue for investigating manipulability from a metaphysical perspective. I further focus on arguments for connecting manipulability to causal realism, namely a version of the ‘No Miracle’ argument and an argument from objectivity. Finally, I discuss a potential objection against causal realism by Price. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of the causal asymmetry from a manipulationist perspective and argues that Woodward’s particular version of manipulability does not provide a satisfactory account of the asymmetry. After examining several accounts of the causal asymmetry, I propose connecting the causal asymmetry to temporal direction. As a metaphysical claim, I hold that the temporal features grounding the asymmetry are among the more fundamental constituents of causal relations that ground manipulability. A weaker claim connecting manipulability to temporal direction holds that the understanding of the causal asymmetry springs from the understanding of the temporal direction, which is further used in claims about causation and manipulability. I answer the main objections against such proposal. Finally, I use this view to answer Price’s objection discussed in chapter 1. Chapter 3 examines manipulability from a functional perspective. Through psychological data on causal and diagnostic reasoning, I explain why the asymmetry of causation is a problem in functional context as well. I also single out three features of Woodward’s account that can be classified as metaphysical assumptions that limit the extent to which manipulability works in functional contexts. Chapter 4 exemplifies how the previously identified constraints come into place. First, I argue that in developmental context there are several ways of inferring causally, and temporal cues are unaccounted for from the manipulability perspective. Secondly, I argue that it is difficult to use Woodward’s interventionist counterfactuals in cognitive development cases due to the subjects’ difficulty of working with counterfactuals. Thirdly, contra the non-backtracking interpretation of counterfactuals inherent to Woodward’s theory, I show that there are cases that can be accounted for through causal models that allow backtracking. I argue that some of these issues could be solved through connecting manipulability to causal direction or through employing the agency concept of causation. |
| Supervisor | Huoranszki, Ferenc |
| Department | Philosophy PhD |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2015/popa_elena.pdf |
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