

**When and how do ethnic-groups influence the foreign policy of a host country  
towards their homeland?**

**Cuban-American lobbying heritage: forging an inflexible U.S. foreign policy  
towards Cuba**

by  
Edi Sara

*Submitted to  
Central European University  
Department of Public Policy*

*in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Public Policy*

Supervisor: Philip Edward Howard

*Budapest, Hungary*

June 10<sup>th</sup>, 2015

## Author's Declaration

I, the undersigned **Edi Sara** hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis.

To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

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Date: June 10<sup>th</sup>, 2015

Name: EDI SARA

Signature: .....

## *Abstract*

Interest groups have always been considered as a creative-destructive force in democratic systems. Ethnic-communities have displayed the dynamics of this force particularly during the last two decades. The purpose of this thesis is to understand better when and how ethnic-groups influence the foreign policy of a host country towards their homeland? The Cuban American National Foundation has been selected as a pivotal case study that has forged an inflexible U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba through the issuing of the 1992 and 1996 Acts. The work makes use of primary and secondary sources, and employs a synthesis of social-constructivist approach in foreign policy with lobbying strategies and tactics as a theoretical framework. Anti-communist ideology is challenged and protectionist interests are proposed instead after analyzing both acts. Three outcomes are delivered from this work, explaining how ethnic-groups gain access and influence by following a congruent policy with the government; when foreign-policy is traded for domestic political gains during elections; and when ethnic-group makes use of effective strategies and tactics in pressuring the legislators. In the end, two lessons derive that find applicability also in Europe besides U.S.

***Key words:*** lobbying, foreign policy, interest-groups, Cuban-American, ideology

## *Acknowledgments*

The author would like to thank his supervisor, Professor Phillip Edward Howard. A special thank goes to Professor Sara Svensson who helped and supported with fruitful suggestions, comments and critique throughout this research.

Eternally indebted and forever grateful to my family which has provided the opportunity and support in pursuing my wisdom and knowledge.

Very grateful to the Russian sites for providing knowledge without price.

Lastly,

“I am thankful to all those who said no to me. It’s because of them, I did it myself.”

~ Albert Einstein

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## *List of Abbreviations*

CANF- Cuban American National Foundation

CLC- Cuban Liberty Council

Cuban Democracy Act- CDA

Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act- Libertad

CRI-FIU- Cuban Research Institute- Florida International University

GOP- Grand Old Party, as often referred to the Republican Party in U.S.

FC PAC- Free Cuba PAC

FIU- Florida International University

NCSL- National Conference of State Legislators

PAC- Political Action Committee

US-CD PAC- US Cuba Democracy PAC

## Introduction

“I have no hesitation in saying that in the control of society’s foreign affairs, democratic governments do appear decidedly inferior to others... In politics, the tendency of a democracy to obey its feelings rather than its calculations and to abandon a long-matured plan to satisfy a momentary passion.”

Tocqueville, 1931: 228

The U.S. was born as a nation by liberal Europeans who fledged from their respective autocratic monarchies. Consequently, they chose to design a pluralist system of democracy, allowing collective participation and freedom of rights and expressions.<sup>1</sup> Simultaneously, there was the risk that one group which formed the majority in society could impose its tyranny over the interests of minor groups. The founding fathers, like Madison, knew this deficiency in democracy since the beginning and that’s why suggested how to control this byproduct of democracy in the *Federalists no. 10* (1787): to set one “faction<sup>2</sup>” against the other to maintain a balance between them and avoid any tyrannical rule rising from the majority.

Madison’s concept might have worked well in the domestic sphere of the federation by keeping in balance the interests groups pressuring the legislators. In order to avoid the preferences of minorities from shaping the agenda of U.S. foreign policy, the Founding Fathers decided to concentrate it on the hands of presidency (executive) rather than on the congress (legislative) (Smith, 2000:85-86). In the last two decades an increase in the role of congress on foreign affairs can be witnessed. Pluralist democracies seem to face a serious challenge in this

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<sup>1</sup> For a detailed definition of pluralist democracy, “The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science” by Frank Bealey, 1999. For a detailed account on the evolution of pluralist ideas of democracy, see David Held “Models of Democracy” Ch. 6 who provides a general history of the main contributors and their principal ideas.

<sup>2</sup> With faction Madison thought of “... a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” (The Federalist, 1787: no. 10/paragraph 2) So the term ethnic-group also fits in what Madison refers as faction.

aspect, because under multicultural societies like America, one ethnic group (or faction- using Madison's language) might claim it has the right to define the foreign policy towards their original homeland. But, is this approach legitimate even when the preferences of the minority might be contradicting the interests of the whole state?

The activities by interest groups trying to pressure legislators have been always seen as, borrowing the Schumpeterian term, a "creative-destructive" element to democracy (Shane et al. 2014: 526; Fouloy, 2011: 190). Those who have praised the creative value that interests groups bring to democracies by bringing issues in legislator's attention are giants in pluralist democratic theory like Robert Dahl (1961) and David Truman (1951). The risk of destructive effect is argued by Mancur Olson through his analysis in the "The rise and Decline of Nations" (1982). Olson's main point is that different groups will have incentives to form lobby groups and influence legislator in their favor. This resulting in detrimental effects on economic growth as the nature of their interests is protectionist, self-interest leading to self-benefits. However, because costs are low and diffused in the entire population, there will be no opposition to the proposed policies by the general public. Although his focus was on economic growth, his theory and conclusions can be applied also in other cases of interest groups including ethnic ones.

Perhaps the most salient ethnic case that has resulted in the current cramp of America's foreign policy is the dilemma to re-open the diplomatic relations with Havana. Since 1961, Washington has started a long and devastating policy of economic sanctions towards the island to force out the communist government of Castro. Moreover, this hardline policy was supported by the Cubans who had just fled the island after the communists came in power, seeking political asylum in America. These Cubans formed the old aristocracy under Batista's dictatorship, or were part of the regime bureaucracy. The majority settled in Florida, where they embarked due to

geographical proximity to Cuba and, there, many received US citizenship. Up to this point, as long as U.S. followed this hardline policy, there was no incentive for the Cubans to mobilize and create any interest group as their interests were already merged (Ziegler, 2007: 21).

In 1981, the “Cuban-Americans decided” to mobilize politically and influence the U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. Thus, the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) was founded with the goal of ending Castro’s rule and establishing democracy in Cuba. Those two primary goals of CANF were congruent in line of the foreign policy followed so far by the White House. Following the dismemberment of U.S.S.R. in 1991, the lobbying efforts of CANF were intensified and reached its peak in 1992 and 1996. In those years, two Acts were passed in Congress consolidating the hardline stance of U.S. foreign policy and establishing a monolithic and permanent economic embargo towards Cuba.

The resulting effects of these Acts are felt today more than ever. In 2014, Barack Obama and Fidel Castro’s brother, Raul, took a historical step in declaring that soon, both countries would restore full diplomatic relations. In spite of these efforts, 2015 has arrived but still none of the promises have been fulfilled. The main factor undermining the flexibility of the White House is the Helms-Burton Act; requiring Congress approval to be lifted.

Here lies one of the paradoxes in the way how democratic systems function: to understand better the ways how interest groups pressure legislators, and under what circumstances their efforts are successful. The primary research questions that arise from this are: **When and how ethnic-groups influence the foreign policy of a country?** The analysis of the Cuban-American lobbying from 1981 until 2014 will indicate when interest groups are empowered politically and how a minority can forge the foreign policy (at the national level).

The three theoretical expectations from this case-study: a) When an ethnic-group follows a congruent policy in foreign affairs in line with that of the executive government, the group is expected in turn to gain support from the government in financial or political terms. b) When domestic politics targets an ethnic-group, foreign politics risk becoming more dependable upon local interest groups. This means that domestic politics can become intermingled with and channeled through foreign-policy. Hence, there is a high risk that this opportunity can be captured by small elite interests. c) When lobbying strategies and tactics might be very effective in pressuring legislators over an issue for which there is either a lack of interest from the general public or when manipulation takes effect through the use of media.

Additionally, two sub-questions arise: Who is actually backing the Cuban-American lobbying? And, what is the real nature of the Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts?

From the studies previously conducted, scholars have come to conclusion that behind the powerful Cuban lobbying lie the convergence of interests between the executive government and the conservative Cuban-American community. Those interests are explained on the basis of anti-communist mainstream ideology and anti-Castro feelings. When analyzed, the anti-communist and pro-democratic arguments are only camouflage to hide real protectionist interest lobbied by the elite Cuban-Americans through CANF.

The contribution of this work is twofold: it contributes to the critical literature on pluralist-democracies; analyzing how minor interest groups pressure and influence the legislators; additionally, it enriches the political lobbying field, exploring strategies and tactics used by an ethnic interest group.

From this work, two lessons are identified in the form of future recommendations:

First, future implications for the U.S. migration offices to follow more careful approaches in settling immigrants and providing citizenship. Second, lobbying disclosure acts need a review by including another amendment of creating an observatory committee whose function will be to check and examine the background and connections of the legislators who propose the bills in front of Congress.

The theoretical framework consists of a synthesis between the social-constructivist approach in international relations, to explain sub-national actors and agencies in playing active role in foreign policy, with the ethnic lobbying tactics that rise in multicultural societies with the purpose to affect and shape the foreign policy.

The structure of this work will be divided into five chapters. The first chapter will explain definitions and terminology. The second chapter will give account of the literature. The third chapter will provide account on Cuban-American ethnic diaspora. Fourth chapter will introduce and analyze the CANF. The last chapter summarizes the findings and addresses further implications for policy makers.

## *Methodology*

The work follows the method described by Baumgartner & Leech as “one case study at the time” (1998: 146). The analysis part is based on two primary sources, the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA -1992) and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad- 1996), which also came to be known after their legislator sponsors as the Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act. Additionally, a wide range of secondary sources has been reviewed and incorporated to substantiate arguments and analysis. Historical examination is used to understand even closer the relationship between different events and actors, also the reasons and motives behind certain key outcomes that are relevant to our study.

The CANF was chosen because it is a perfect case to illustrate how temporary interests in domestic politics might empower politically minor elite ethnic-groups. Through the lens of political lobbying, CANF’ strategies and tactics will be examined, which ultimately leads to answer when and how they managed to capture and design the U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba.

Finally, there are still limits in the outcomes of this work, due to some characteristics of the Cuban-American ethnic-group being unique. For example, the distinction on immigrant waves between those who are political exiles (pre-revolutionary immigrant) and economically-driven, as well as the initial support by the state on creating the CANF lobby organization, are peculiar aspects that cannot be generalized on every ethnic group around the world. Also, the political system of U.S. as a pluralist form of democracy with a high level of check and balances can only be compared only with a few other countries worldwide. However, although the outcomes are drawn from a lobbying case in America, the lessons that are derived in this work may find applicability also in Europe due to similar problems regarding lobbying legislation and mechanisms.

## 1 Chapter I- Definitions: Lobbying in U.S., ethnic groups and diaspora

The first chapter will define the terminology that will follow throughout this work. This chapter will deal with a wide range of theoretical concepts from various scholars, who come from different fields; thus, clarification of terms is necessary.

### 1.1 Ethnic-groups (hyphanated) vs. diaspora and the loyalties fear

Since the creation of first civilizations around the world, lobbying has been present in one way or another. It is in the human nature to have interests, and those interests often have individual preferences, but in other cases they can converge to create larger interest groups. Such is the case also for ethnic-groups or diaspora, which constitute a group of people which have a sense of belonging to a common homeland, as they share the same culture, language, myths and history (Cohen, 2008: 6).

At turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, diaspora took other dimensions as travelling flourished from people seeking better life opportunities. As the well-known academic Gabriel Sheffer in diaspora and ethnicity refers to this new feature, this was the beginning of trans-state migration (2014: 31). The latter soon created multicultural societies in the host countries.

In this work the term ethnic-groups is used in reference to the Cuban-American community by adopting Thomas Ambrosio's definition, which says that they are "politically relevant social divisions based on shared sense of cultural distinctiveness." (2002: 1) The reason why diaspora is avoided in this work is due to the challenges that it faces with the rise of trans-national immigration, and regarding the status in their homelands as well as their age (Sheffer, 2014: 73).

Immigrants, conversely, are usually referred individuals who temporarily settle in a host country but do not apply for citizenship or plan to be assimilated in the host country (Sheffer, 2014: 252).

Both terms are needed to describe the Cuban-American community composition over time, but ethnic group is more simplistic and acceptable for this work. More on this is in the section 3.2, where the migration waves of Cubans will be examined.

Lastly, the concept of loyalties of ethnic groups, which question their allegiance, needs to be explained in relation with the notion of patriotism According to Sheffer (2014: 225-226), there are three loyalty patterns of ethnic-national diasporas: ambiguous, dual or divided. Ambiguous loyalties can be traced in the new emerging diasporas composed by the recent waves of migrations, where the members have difficulties in identifying themselves, thus claim a loyalty to either the host country, or their homeland. Dual loyalties are manifested by those members who feel they belong to both host and home countries. Lastly, divided loyalties (or conflicted loyalties according to Smith, 2000: 133) is the more complex one, as members of the diaspora community might show loyalty to the host country regarding its domestic sphere by accepting and respecting the laws, norms and principles, but in foreign affairs matters or solidarity activities like money contribution, they will position themselves closer to their homeland. All loyalty patterns are conceptualized in the Cuban case to explore the Cuban migration waves and identify the matching loyalty pattern. The term hyphenated with no particular reference to any of those loyalty divisions (Smith, 2000: 136- 143), thus Cuban-American in this work is used simply to display dual citizenship not in a negative connotation.

## 1.2 Definition of lobbying and lobbyist in U.S.

Nowadays, the term lobbying recognizes a myriad of various definitions, which differ mainly by the approach and context based on either U.S or Europe. In this work, a classical definition offered by Fouloy's international recognized dictionary on the lobbying field. Thus, lobbying activity in the U.S. "includes any research, preparation, strategizing, supervising and communications that at the time they are being done, are specifically intended to facilitate a lobbying contact" (2011: 189-190).

A lobbyist is "a person, or firm, that is employed by a particular interest to advocate a specific policy, measure, or point of view to an elected lawmaker or governmental body." (Fouloy, 2011: 230)

The NCSL, which is an organization composed by legal experts who observe and provide support and expertise for each state to increase the quality and effectiveness of its legislature, summarizes lobbying practices in the U.S. as any written and oral communication which attempt to influence government action.. Activities that account for lobbying include committee hearings, casual conversations, meetings, written letters and conversations (NCSL, 2015).

## 1.3 Interest Groups

Interests groups are "a collection of people with similar concerns who join together for the purpose of influencing government policy" (Fouloy 2011: 162). In general, they seek to influence either domestic or foreign policy (Ambrosio, 2002: 1). Interests groups are divided in many categories such as private vs. public interest, organizational degree as peak associations vs. membership associations, or according to their goal, like economic, religious, ideological etc

(Fouloy 2011: 165). The respective Political Action Committees basically constitute the tool of interest groups to get organized and elect political candidates, finance campaigns or advance the outcome of a political issue or legislation. (Fouloy 2011: 165).

#### 1.4 Access and influence

According to Wright (1996: 76) and Fouloy (2011: 230) access can be defined as establishing contacts with members of the Congress (legislative) or a staff person. Some scholars closely use the term access with influence, as for them establishing access is always in relation to gain influence. Influence, on the other hand, is seen as the process that follows after establishing access with a legislator, and a lobbyist attempts to alter the beliefs of the legislator by providing credible information (Wright, 1996: 80-81; Fouloy, 2011: 233).

If a legislator dismisses the lobbyist's point, which in this case remains not influenced, or reconsider his/her own beliefs in light of the new information which case is influenced. The distinction between access and influence is illustrated by Wright as a continuum, starting with access and ending with influence (Wright, 1996: 78).

## 2 Chapter II- Literature review

Studies on the Cuban-American lobbying influence on the foreign policy of US have been conducted by many scholars. Most of them can be divided according to the main research interest of their work. On one side, scholars in American Latin studies or historians. Amongst them the perhaps best known accounts selected are those of Janet Franklin (1993), Arboleya (2000), Guillermo (2006), Susan Eckstein (2010; 2002 co-authoring with Barbara), Ziegler (2007) and Andy Garcia (2012). They have analyzed the Cuban lobbying case as a function of foreign policy being driven by interests in the domestic politics of a country.

Their studies primarily aimed at measuring and analyzing the Cuban-American patterns and motives that make their vote distinct from the other Hispanic ethnic-groups. The authors have based their results and hypothesis also on the results of polls conducted by the Cuban Research Institute of Florida International University, Pew Research Center and Gallup. The most plausible argument from these scholars that seems to explain the puzzle of Cuban voting is anti-communist ideology and anti-Castro hatred of the old Cuban cohorts who came in America before the revolution. This work will challenge this conclusion arising from the analysis of migration waves, by focusing at the concept of dual-loyalties and questioning the patriotic attachments between different Cuban generations.

It is important to link and incorporate the terminology explained in the definitions chapter by borrowing literature from the ethnic-study scholars as Robin Cohen (2008) and Gabriel Sheffer (2014). Following the migration history and analysis by those scholars, leads to the assumption that the initial stage and core of Cuban diaspora in America was formed by the first wave of Cuban elite or *batistianos*, during 1959-1962 (Ziegler, 2007: 22). The latter waves, can be called

emigrants as the majority did not apply or receive American citizenship immediately after entering in U.S. The concept of loyalty will be conceptualized more in detail in the next chapter.

Despite the vast literature that takes the Cuban-American lobbying efforts as a successful case of influencing the foreign policy of U.S., what is left unexplored is the highly active participatory role of the Cuban-American community. Although most of the Cuban-Americans in U.S. had already received the American citizenship, they still showed interest in matters of U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. This leads to the concept of dual-loyalties, and the rising of multiculturalism anxiety in foreign policy.

The second groups of authors have offered another perspective seen from the foreign policy perspective; how it is influenced by ethnic groups. This is done by introducing and operationalizing the concept of loyalty as a problematic factor. The leading examples in this approach are Abdul Said (1981), Mohammed Ahrari (1987), Damian Fernandez (1987), Samuel Huntington (1997), Thomas Ambrosio (2002) and Tony Smith (2000). They establish a link between the pluralist systems of democracies with the multicultural patterns that began to be rise during the late 70s and 80s. This was caused by the rise of ethnic identities which tried to influence and shape foreign affairs.

In summary, their findings were the convergence of interests between the executive and the ethnic group that resulted in the effective influence on the foreign policy. In the Cuban case it was the electoral game for rallying votes, and the ultimate trade was the passage of the 1992 and 1996 Acts. But foreign policy perspective literature is divided between the supporters of the claim from ethnic groups that they have legitimacy to have access and influence the foreign policy; and the rest who believe it is an accident of mechanisms in pluralist democracies facing multiculturalism on rise.

A third group of scholars have followed a historical review and analysis of the Cuban-American relations and of the embargo policy starting from 1960. Amongst the most well-known authors can be mentioned Jane Franklin (1997), Bert Hoffman (1998), Donna R. Kaplowitz (1998), Jesus Arboleya (2000) and Melanie M. Ziegler (2007). According to those credible historical accounts, the inception of CANF is generally accepted and attributed to the national security advisor of Reagan, Richard Allen and CIA director William Casey (Ziegler, 2007: 27; Arboleya, 2000: 222; Franklin, 1993; Smith, 2000: 100). But none of these authors provide a full answer to the question why CANF was created at this time. Nonetheless, no study before has paid particular attention to the lobbying techniques (strategy and tactics) of CANF. Lobbying is crucial to explain how two acts that tightened the embargo against Cuba were pushed in Congress in a time when containment and anti-communist ideology was no longer the main vector in U.S. foreign policy.

Lastly, from the extensive literature written on the lobbying field, Deanna R. Gelak (2008), Stuart Thomson & Steve John (2007) and John R. Wright (1996) have been selected to explore a detailed categorization of strategies and tactics utilized by interests groups. From the scholarly point of view, Frank R. Baumgartner (2007), Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech (1998), and Fouloy's Explanatory Dictionary for Lobbying has been used to explain the terms, methodology and comparison between the US and European practices in lobbying.

## 2.1 Functions, strategies and tactics of interest groups

There are different strategies and techniques which are followed by interest groups to influence at the outcome of a political establishment. First, clarification at the distinction that exists between strategies and tactics. As Baumgartner & Leech (1998: 162) summarize, tactics

are a set of external activities applied by individuals to engage the lobbying group. Tactics are divided as inside and outside. Main inside tactics include meetings with the legislators, litigation engineering elections etc. Amongst the outside tactics are grass roots mobilization and advertising campaigns. Strategies on the other hand, are a combination of tactics depending on the context and function of the interest group, and try to arrange them in a way that influence is believed to be achieved. Depending on the tactics that a strategy uses, it might be labeled as outside or inside, but most of the studies have shown that successful interest groups usually make use of a mix of tactics (Gelak, 2008; Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). The desirable ultimate outcome from any strategy is a win/win situation (Fouloy 2011: 216). In the literature, there is too much controversy of where media should be placed, as a strategy or as a tactic.

According to Smith, three general ways are mostly followed by interests groups: votes, campaign financing contributions and what he calls organizational body. The latter formulates specific strategies to pass legislation acts, builds alliances with other social forces to support the cause and monitors decision-making before and after the act is passed in order to reward sponsors and receive constant feedback through time (Smith, 2000: 94). Leadership establishment is also included within the organizational body as a key determinant. In this work, it will be argued that leadership is as important as the three divisions that Smith does, so it should be added as a fourth important factor for the success of any strategy. The death of Canosa and the tumble in political power of CANF leading to the creation of two other PAC, will show the importance in role of the leadership establishment.

## 2.2 Crafting Foreign Policy through domestic politics: the rise of multiculturalism and the ethnic-factor

The analysis shall begin with one scholar of the first who observed the changing patterns in the international arena, the decline of containment policy and the rise in power of a new factor: ethnic identity groups. Abdul Said, writing in the early 80s, was amongst the first scholars noting the decline of geopolitics and Kenan's containment policy as the main driver of foreign policy (Said, 1981: 6-9; Ambrosio, 2002: 7), and identified ethnic groups which were gaining prominence as new shining stars in Washington's foreign affairs' observatory room.

The multicultural aspect of American society started to rise in the '70s and '80s, and this emphasized the perceived multiple identity by ethnic groups. The American bureaucracy accepted them without questioning the loyalty of these ethnic groups at the time; moreover, it them with the opportunity to mobilize politically and have a direct voice in U.S. policies at home and abroad (Ambrosio, 2002: 3). Before this period of time, the lobby influence of the ethnic groups was low due to the inflexible nature of Cold War geopolitics shaped by the containment policy (Said, 1987: 8; Ambrosio, 2002: 8).

Post collapse of the U.S.S.R., containment policy was no longer relevant for U.S. Instead, Washington began a series of efforts that Ziegler call "confidence building measures" (CBM). (2007: 136). There was rapprochement with the majority of the East-bloc socialist countries, including communists ones like China, Vietnam or North Korea. Although the U.S. had criticized fiercely their human rights score just like Cuba, in the latter case no sign of amelioration was shown. The dissolution of Soviet Union was felt even more by Cuba which lost its main ideological ally and aid donor as it provided the island with oil under the world price, offered financial aid and a market for the Cuban sugar-plantation industry which is the main exporting

good for Cuba (Kaplowitz, 1998: 74-75; Perez, 1990: 242-243). In the end, Cuba was no longer perceived as a threat to U.S.

Despite the “fall of red dominos” around the world, in U.S. the presidential elections were coming soon. In 1992, George Bush was facing Bill Clinton in presidential campaign, and the topic of Cuba was blurred in the minds of the general American public, but not for CANF. For the Cuban lobbying group, the lack of interest from the majority of Americans meant that this was the right time to lobby for the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA).

### 2.2.1 Does ideology matter? Anti-communism or protectionism?

To date, the most undisputed argument about the success of CANF on influencing the U.S. foreign policy is the ideology argument. The creation of CANF as was explained above, was highly supported by the Reagan administration (Perez 1990). In order to rally more votes on its side and to support the anti-communist ideology, the GOP used the opportunity of giving Cuban-Americans instruments to voice themselves in crafting the foreign policy towards their homeland.

In this work, the role of ideology in mobilizing the Cuban-Americans around CANF is not challenged but is questioned whether it was anti-communist ideology and anti-Castro stance, or perhaps was patriotism as the elite Cuban-Americans claim? Because the leader of CANF is regarded as a patriot nowadays by his followers, and this is engraved even in his monument (Elfrink, 2009).

The hypothesis is that ideology definitely was a factor, but not anti-communism as the majority of scholars claimed, neither patriotism. Instead, will be shown and argued that anti-communism was followed only as a camouflage by CANF for gaining access in Washington

through making use of the vote from the first wave of Cubans who were largely anti-Castro. Under the disguise of human rights rhetoric, the CDA and Libertad bills were proposed and passed in Congress using a well-designed lobbying campaign. CANF secured political support in Washington in a symbiotic relationship, and at the same time political representation and financial support from tax payers' money was guaranteed by the government (Ahrari, 1987: 116). As will be shown, the nature of the acts is more protectionist in nature to the interests of Cuban-Americans elite who left the island immediately after the fall of Batista.

### 3 Chapter III- Cuban-American community in U.S.

The Cuban-American case of lobbying is a success story of how an ethnic group managed to mobilize and play its cards well in the domestic politics of the hosting-country.

#### 3.1 U.S. Embargo towards Cuba: Success or failure? (Political & economic approach)

The embargo policy initiated in 1960, had two primary goals: the overthrow of Castro and the retaliation of U.S. nationalizes assets during 1959-1960 (Kaplowitz, 1998: 3-4). If we address this policy politically, it has definitely failed as Castro still remains in power. In fact, Cuba was pushed towards seeking other allies like the Soviet Union and China.

Economically, sanction theories predict that if unilateral embargo policies are not supported by other allies, they are doomed to fail (Kaplowitz, 1998: 162). Unsurprisingly, this is what

happened to Cuba after the CDA act was issued in 1992. All U.S. allies declared their disagreement in the U.N. and continued to trade with Cuba. Despite plunging into recession many times, the economy has witnessed growth; due to international trade with other countries. Economically, the overall result is ambiguous and scholars still dispute on measuring the effectiveness.

### 3.2 Cuban migration waves

Over the course of time, there have been four main waves of migration from Cuba to U.S. Professor Guillermo, Franklin etc. have done an extensive historical review on this subject. They divide the Cuban-Americans by two main periods: The first are the pre-revolutionary or *batistianos*, who left the country during 1959-1961, after Fidel Castro and the communist party came in power by overthrowing the junta of Fulgencio Batista. Those are usually referred to as the “exile-community.” The rest of the Cubans came during the second wave freedom flights 1965-1973; third wave of “Mariel Boat Lift” agreement during 1974-1984 and which peaked during Carter administration in an incident that would cause the President the second term in office; and lastly those that benefit from the “wet foot/dry foot” policy of 1990-1994.<sup>3</sup> Until the end of 1980s, the Cuban registered in U.S. had reached 1 million (Perez, 1990: 253).

The first wave Cuban immigrants came to constitute the Cuban-American community in U.S. holding a dual-citizenship. After Castro re-nationalized foreign assets in Cuba, including U.S. capital, Washington claimed the first reparations of those assets, and the new Cuban-

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<sup>3</sup> For a complete history in the Cuban Migration waves, look at Kaplowitz (1998) p.104. or Ziegler (2007) pp. 38-54; or Grenier (2006).

American community was now a new weapon to claim those rights under the protection of U.S. constitution. These cast represented nearly \$1 billion assets worth in Florida (Perez, 1990: 255).

As we explained in the definition section, the diaspora has begun to be attached more with long established ethnic-minorities which have either been assimilated or integrated in the host country society. In the Cuban case, the term diaspora might be more suitable to the first wave forming the conservative elite cohort of Cuban-Americans, who regarded themselves as politically-exiled by force, whereas the Cuban government's view is that they left their country on their own behalf as they were against the revolutionary spirit. The latest waves can be classified initially as immigrants, and is said "initially" because it was explained by Sheffer, no agreement on the time when immigrants become diaspora has been reached.

Considering the theoretical framework of loyalties and placing them into the Cuban waves of migration, arguably the elite Cubans may have initially manifested dual-loyalties, as they praised the democratic freedoms and values of U.S. and wanted their homeland island much alike. The rest of the migration waves, manifest ambiguous loyalty at least until the fall of communism. The argument that follows here is that second most of them were driven out of Cuba for economic reasons, and their primary interest was protectionist or materialistic rather than political. When it comes to domestic affairs, those Cubans respected the U.S. laws, worked and lived in harmony with American values, and whenever possible, they sent remittances back in their relatives in Cuba.

### 3.3 The Cuban-American vote distinction and significance in elections

There is a big distinction noted by Guillermo and Eckstein in their studies on Cuban migration. The first wave of elite Cubans tend to vote highly Republican, due to the ideological traits that seem to converge regarding the hardline policy on the island. Thus they constitute the political exile Cuban-community. Whereas the rest of the Cubans who migrated thereafter, have shown different stances throughout the years, but in general held a more moderate view on Castro. Most of the Cubans that entered U.S. preferred to reside in Miami, and by 1990, the Cubans registered legally in Florida was around 600.000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1990), turning this state in a hot-zone for electoral results.

## 4 Chapter IV- When ethnic-groups form interest groups: The Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF)

The chapter will provide a wide analysis on the nature of the organization by cross-examining some of the main stakeholders, strategies and tactics and the two acts.

### 4.1 Background and stakeholder analysis

As Dent starts his analysis in one of the first attempts to understand the role of interest group in foreign policy, by classifying them according to what they represent. In case of representing other organizations, it is said that they have an institutional nature, otherwise it

remains on the basis of membership (1995: 131). CANF is a case of membership interest group numbering 54, 000 members. Dent classifies CANF as an interest group based on ideology; this is later disputed by analysis and findings.

According to Fernandez the interest of the wealthy Cubans to influence US foreign policy, arose due to four reasons: the political nature of the immigrants, the US perceptions over the immigrants, socio-economic background and convergence of interests with that of the government (1987: 132). But Fernandez has not looked deeply at the main stakeholders of CANF, the wealthy and business Cuban *batistianos* class. Moreover, his study marks the year 1987, but if the author would knew the nature of the CDA and later Libertad, he would probably come to the same conclusion that: the main reason of CANF was to secure and express the interests of the Cuban elite community, which as Kaplowitz and many other accounts show, never represented the majority of neither the Cuban-American community or that of the whole American population. This claim was supported by a Gallup survey in 1988 which reported that 47% of Cuban Americans favored restoring diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba (2007: 8; Arboleya, 2000: 240).

For a deeper analysis of the purpose of CANF, one should focus on the stakeholder level. Categorized by Thomson and John, there are many stakeholders which are divided as direct, financial, public, representative, media etc. (2007: 107-108). Since the establishment of CANF in 1981, the three founders Canosa, Masvidal and Salman were all businessmen. All of whom were the main fundraisers and sponsors for the foundation; Canosa becoming the undisputed leader. Among them, they had aggregated a large number of other businesses' support, e.g. the Latin Builder's Association, sugar corporation La Romana and many more. (Arboleya, 2000: 240-243). On public and political level of stakeholders, Republican Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart who

was at the same time a nephew of Mirta Balart, Castro's first wife, was amongst the first and most important players later who would design the Helms-Burton act (Ziegler, 2007: 34). Later representatives such as Republican congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Democratic representative Robert Menendez and Marco Rubio, Democratic senator Robert Torricelli (who billed the first Act in 1992), and later Republican representatives Jesse Helms and Dan Burton (who billed the second Act in 1996).

From the media side of view, Canosa built up an extensive and efficient network. With its own Radio station and later TV Marti, CANF was able to pursue very aggressive advertising campaigns, and if it faced opposition it would declare them as communist or Castro sympathizers for being too soft. But who was Jorge Mas Canosa? Where he came from, and what was his background?

#### 4.1.1 Jorge Mas Canosa: The prominent figure and his legacy after death

The creation and success of the CANF is deeply linked also with the charismatic figure and talent of Jorge Mas Canosa. It is important to shed some historical light on the leader of CANF, as this will help understand more the nature and interests behind CANF.

Although, initially, he admired Castro soon the feeling faded away and he became involved with resistance movement centered on right wing Catholic groups. He was discovered, charged and convicted in 1960, but managed to escape and go in U.S. with "a one-way ticket" this time (Landau n.d.). However, his efforts and plots against the Castro rule would continue for long, first by taking part as a decoy in the "Bay of Pigs" fiasco, and then as a broadcaster for CIA sponsored propaganda-radio "Swan" (Ziegler, 2007: 27). Shortly after, he entered in 1969 in the

business field and become administrator of a small Florida based construction company named “Church & Tower”. This was a company that he bought back later in 1971 and expanded it further in 1994 by merging it with “Burnup & Sims” to create MasTec (MasTec, 2015). This merge gave to Canosa a nationwide public, and increased the value of the company from \$10 million to \$80 million. (Arboleya, 2000: 230).

There is no surprise then that the founders, the main contributors and donators to the CANF belonged to the high class and wealthy Cuban-American business families. Through MasTec the intention of Canosa was to build a financial world empire, and his investments in El Salvador and Argentina, he tried to establish contracts even with China (Arboleya, 2000: 230), the other communist country which scores poorly like Cuba on human rights, proves our hypothesis that it wasn’t anti-communist ideology which formed the core interests of CANF stakeholders. On contrary, it were materialist aims or in other words “a way to make business” by using the CANF platform as a voice for the oppressed people in communist countries, trying to force regime change through economic sanctions and in case if it would have succeeded, the wealthy Cubans would have soon became the new patrons of Cuba.

However, Canosa’s dream was never to become true as he died of cancer in 1997. He left behind a very weak legacy as CANF proved to be a leadership establishment organization rather than an organized and institutionalized unity body (Smith, 2000: 110).

#### 4.1.2 Inception & creation of CANF

The reason behind the genesis of CANF, is linked with the changing patterns of Cuban American community demographics. The old pro-Republican and anti-Castro cohorts that formed the core and major part of community before the 1980s, was being replenished by new Cuban cohorts arriving during this time. The first were political exiles, whereas the new-comers were driven by economic reasons, thus the term immigrant can better fit in the latter's case (Arboleya, 2000: 178; Guillermo, 2006: 6; Eckstein, 2010: 6-8; Garcia, 2012: 22). Facing a losing ground by the hardline supporters of GOP's foreign policy, and overseeing the new coming Cubans whose opinion regarding the embargo was predominantly against, the Republican administration sought an opportunity to give a spark at their Cuban supporters by providing them the means to directly participate and make their voice heard in the Congress.

Another interesting fact is that CANF was created one year after the inauguration of President Reagan in office. Reagan entered the White House by criticizing the Carter administration particularly on the soft foreign policy and amelioration efforts with Cuba, policies which granted Carter the Presidency four years before (Ahrari, 1987: 128). Following his term, Carter sought to allow the Cuban immigrants some level of remittances and travelling toward the island. Also the coming of 120,000 Cubans by the "Mariel boat lift" was another criticism towards Carter (Kaplowitz, 1998: 104).

In face of those events, we draw the first outcome for this work: the old Cuban elite, facing new large waves of compatriots who did not share their conservative views and hardline policy towards the island, were incentivized and mobilized to create soon an interest group (also with the help of the government, as was said previously it was the idea of national security advisor Richard Allen and CIA director William Casey). Thus, by following a congruent policy

in foreign affairs with that of the government, the ethnic-group is expected to gain support in turn by the government, be it in financial terms, like providing funds from the federal budget for different activities, or empower them politically by recruiting representatives in the Senate or Congress.

#### 4.2 Lobbying function, strategies and tactics of CANF

The function of CANF was to allocate and secure ethnic Cuban vote to rally around the Republican Party and give a second term to the Reagan Administration. Although it started as a state-led inception, the CANF evolved and took a nature of its own and can be fully said that it became an important factor in designing and playing the “house of cards” in electoral campaigns. Following a mixed way of strategies and tactics, CANF became empowered politically at the level of voicing their interests in the Congress.

Following Smith’s analysis, CANF has made use first of the Cuban-American vote especially in the swing state of Florida, where most of the Cuban-American population live in Miami-Dade county. In 1990, the Hispanic vote of Miami was comprised 46% by the Cuban community (Pew Research Center, Garcia 2012). From 1980 until 2008, Florida has been a Republican swing state. To show the importance in vote that the Cuban-American community represented to the American politicians, there is one event that can best describe this power: in 1992 Bill Clinton visited Miami as part of his electoral campaign. Clinton said in public that he supported the recent CDA proposed by Torricelli and that the Bush administration had missed a good point to tackle down Castro. Within three weeks, President Bush decided to reconsider his decision and sign the act (Smith, 2000: 107).

The financial donations done during elections times, was another favorite strategy for CANF. The tactic that they followed was targeting representatives from both parties which manifested a neutral or soft behavior regarding the Cuban embargo. But not always, the case of Torricelli is unique as the young senator was a promoter for rapprochement with China and favored trade, thus was displaying liberal views and support for opening negotiations with communist countries. However, CANF convinced him for the Cuban vote in Miami, and in turn he criticized harshly Cuba for the low human rights and proposed the CDA. Was China better than Cuba? This shows the hypocrisy and dual-standards of politicians when they see re-election. Through FC PAC, CANF has generated \$1, 7 million and donated \$1, 3 million in political campaigns from 1981 until 2004 (Center for Responsive Politics: Free Cuba PAC; Eckstein, 2010: 8; Smith, 2000: 88). The foundation did not concentrate the political contributions only in Florida, actually their favorite target was the Congress.

The tactics that CANF used depended always upon the time and other domestic or foreign political factors. By using a perfect timing frame for proposing issues (like the Helms-Burton Act immediately after the “Brothers to the Rescue” incident), a wise agenda setting for pushing bills in proper time in the house, an effective grassroots mobilization through the use of media advertising (newspapers, pamphlets, and of course, the Radio and TV Marti), continuous Congressional hearings (which explain also the well detailed information about the salience of issues going on in U.S. politics from CANF lobbyists) and later monitoring of Congressional bills (to protect the CDA and later Libertad), think-tank foundations that supported the conservative views (which were used to provide scholarly replies to analysts criticizing the effectiveness and role of the embargo), and lastly but not least, an immense body of lawyers expert in economic and foreign relations which were ready at any time to respond to any CANF call. Above all,

direct contact with the legislators through the wide circle of political connections that Canosa had built, was the most preferred way for transmitting a message. On one occasion, Canosa made an excellent PR campaign for CANF when President Reagan appeared in a foundation's event in 1985. After that, the status and recognition of CANF became undisputed (Kaplowitz, 1998: 134).

If one tries to bring up the issue of how effective CANF's donations were, the answer can be tracked to the FC PAC donations and the receiver in their electoral campaigns. Moreover, all the members who proposed the bills were recipients of FC PAC. Starting with Rep. of New Jersey Robert Torricelli who pushed the CDA and received more than \$120,000 since 1989 to 2000, and later with the most influential people in Congress which pushed the Rep. Dan Burton (\$12,150), Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (\$127,565) etc. (Kaplowitz, 1998: 182). After the split of CANF and creation of CLC by the supporters of hardline policy, the donations continued by the US-CD PAC.

The first success of CANF was registered in 1992, as it seized the moment when the Cuban issue was not very salient to the general American public, thus Olson's theory about the salience and progression of interests group finds applicability. Following, the second outcome of this thesis: once domestic politics empowers politically an ethnic group, there is a high risk that the foreign policy might get penetrated by local interest groups, which possess the information and resources at the time to lobby their interests.

#### 4.2.1 Utilization of media: strategy or tactic?

In the categorization of tactics and strategies, scholars from the lobbying field are divided in their views where media should be placed. For example, Baumgartner includes media as a tactic for grassroots mobilization (Baumgartner et al. 2009: 154-156), whereas Gelak as a strategy (2008).

In the case of CANF, the conclusion that can be reached is that media was and continues to be a main strategy. Only two years after its creation, Canosa had made several requests for funds by the Congress to open a broadcasting channel for spreading democratic messages towards the island, the Congress approved to create Radio Marti (Kaplowitz, 1998: 132; Franklin, 1993). The radio began broadcasting starting from 1985, and its goal was to destabilize the Cuban government. The annual cost that it causes to the Federal Budget is estimated to be \$20 million (Arbolea, 2000: 236; Ahrari, 1987: 127). Moreover, in 1987 CANF requested the expansion of the project by creating also TV Marti, which actually began transmission in 1990. This shows how much important was media to CANF. Canosa knew that public image guaranteed the longevity of CANF's, and if media was not properly used or manipulated it could turn against them and cause lost in votes and confidence in Washington. Perhaps the "Elian affair" of 1999 bestly explains the detrimental effect of bad-media image if not properly handled.

Elian Gonzalez was a child who survived after all his family except from his father, was drowned in 1999 trying to cross the Florida strait. The problem was, should the child be sent to his relatives that were already in U.S. or shipped back to Cuba? The court decided ultimately that the child should return to his father, as he was the parent of the child and had the right to speak in his name. The decision of the court did not satisfy CANF which by that time was under the leadership of Canosa's son, Mas Santos. Mas sought an opportunity to utilize the boy's tragedy in

a massive advertising campaign by publishing posters with the face of the boy as a victim of Castro. Through protests and messages through both radio and TV Marti, CANF thought to appeal to the broad American public for opposing the court's decision. But this method turned the general public against them, as the Americans were disgusted by the politization of this tragedy and supported the father's right (Ziegler, 2007: 32-33). The mishandling of the Elia's case, proved to be a major blow to CANF that irritated and aggravated even more the emerging divisions between those who believed it was time for being more soft in their foreign policy, and those who still supported the hard line.

In an interview for Frontline, professor Lissandro Perez from FIU said for Elian case, that whatever the court's decision would have been, it was a "win/win" situation for Castro. If the child was returned (as it occurred) it was a victory for Castro and *La Revolucion*, if it would have remained in U.S. then it was another American injustice caused by the Miami Mafia, as Castro refers to the Cuban exiles (FrontLine n.d.).

#### 4.3 Successive ends: Trying to spread democracy through undemocratic means

The culmination and heritage that CANF has left behind nowadays can be traced in the famous Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, and later the Helms-Burton. Below will be examined the nature of the acts to substantiate our conclusion that it was materialist ideology instead of anti-communism to promote human rights the main basis of the acts.

The acts have been regarded also as illegitimate by UN and condemned from other countries (Kaplowitz, 1998: 156), and the reason surrounds around two legal concepts: extraterritoriality of U.S. jurisdiction, trying to impose it's laws in another sovereign country; and retroactive scope of the amendments which seek retaliation for U.S. citizens (Cuban-Americans)

for their confiscated or lost properties prior and after Castro took power, although those nationals were not American citizens in that time and the Helms-Burton law was enacted in 1996.

#### 4.3.1 First seal on U.S. Foreign policy: the Cuban Democracy Act 1992 (a.k.a. Torricelli Act)

The CDA is the first imprint by the Cuban lobbying, as despite the massive protests in Florida where people held placards “Torricelli, do you have family in Cuba?” (Franklin, 1993). The purpose of the act as it is stated in section 6001, is to bring down Fidel Castro and put an end to the last communist country in the Western hemisphere. The criticism is addressed on the basis of universal human rights and democratic values the Cuban people were restricted for. Although the act called for the cooperation of European allies to assist in the embargo at point 8/6001, the events that followed showed that U.S. allies were against the bill (Kaplowitz, 1998: 153).

Moreover, the Act was promoting to protect human values by imposing inhumane restrictions to the island, through the inclusion of food, medicine and medical supplies under the prohibition list of items, ironically under section 6004 labeled as “Support for the Cuban people,” and remittances in section 6005/c (U. S. Congress 1992). The most controversial point was section 1706, as it prohibited all foreign subsidiaries of American companies to trade with Cuba, infringing so the economic interests of other countries to regulate their trade (Hoffmann, 1998: 3-4). Actually most of the criticism came from America’s biggest allies, U.K. and Canada which took measures to cut the extraterritorial effect of the CDA upon their own territory (Wong, 1994: 12).

In the end, the act prohibited U.S. companies to conduct any trade with Cuba, hurting the domestic economy and interests of American companies who lost huge amount of potential revenues, which were harvested in turn by other countries (Kaplowitz, 1998: 155; Wong, 1994:

27). The only services and facilities that the act permitted were the telecommunications (U. S. Congress, 1992: 6004/e). Now let us recall who was the magnant and biggest owner of telecommunications and infrastructure constructions in Florida, which has the closest geographical proximity with Cuba in case of possible investments or trade: MasTec- owned by Jorge Mas Canosa, leader of CANF. And this was not yet enough, sub-point (5) under the same section, prohibits even future telecommunications services to be invested in Cuba, keeping it a virgin market for the CANF family.

#### 4.3.2 Second seal: Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act 1996 (a.k.a. Helms-Burton Act)

The second imprint and seal on U.S. foreign policy by the Cuban lobbying came in the form of extending and consolidating the previous CDA. Libertad calls for strengthening even more the sanctions predicted by CDA under Title I (in the same time when all U.S. allies had already opposed it) for the same reason: violation of human rights by Castro. The most controversial is Title III: Protection of Property Rights of United States Nationals. Under section 302, the Cuban lobbying managed to preserve and secure their declared wealth in Cuba before and after the Revolution in 1959. Moreover, the terms “confiscated” and “traffics,” predicts and allows a U.S. citizen (even if the individual was not American at the time, say 1959- thus being retroactive) to sue not only the Cuban government or Cuban citizens, but also foreign companies that might have invested in his/her property (thus seeking extraterritorial jurisdiction) for reparations (U. S. Congress, 1996: 302).

An important aspect is the attention that CANF paid to the media, and this can be tracked even at this act under section 107. Because Radio and TV Marti was being intercepted by the Cubans, and the taxpayer’s money were going in vain, the lobbyist included in the form of

“assistance to the Cubans” by proposing the conversion of from VHF (very high frequency) into UHF (ultra high frequency) under the justification that is more difficult to be blocked.

Indisputably, the most dramatic point of the act that President Clinton left as a burden to the White House and the effects of which are still felt today by the Obama Administration, is section 204. This section which was added in the end by Rep. Diaz-Balart, codifies the embargo law by ending the presidential prerogative to lift the embargo in the future without Congress approval (U. S. Congress, 1996: 204). However, section 306 was added in the last minute to save the President by allowing him to suspend the entire Title III for 6 months if this is necessary to U.S. national interests.

#### *4.3.2.1 The “Brothers to the Rescue” incident: A catalyst effect for getting the green light in Congress?*

In the history of US-Cuban relations, darkness still surrounds the famous incident occurred in February 1996. “Hermanos al Rescate” (Brother to the Rescue) was founded 1991 with the honorable idea to rescue Cubans who attempted to leave the island and reach Florida by sea. The founder of organization was Jose Basulto, another veteran of the Bay of Pigs who had known Canosa since then. The organization shared the same views like CANF, and did not agree with the signing of migration accords by President Clinton with Castro in 1995. For that reason, they started to intensify their flights, and besides that, intrude into Cuban air space and dropping propaganda pamphlets (Ziegler, 2007: 57).

In another interview with one pilot from the organization, the direct connection becomes clear between CANF and “Brothers to the Rescue,” as the latter was created in the offices of CANF (Ansara 1996). This leads to a justified assumption that the incident it was intentional.

After several warnings from Cuban authorities, the illegal flights over Cuban air space continued. No wonder that the incident occurred shortly after Helms-Burton Act was turned down by Clinton. Two planes from the organization were shot down in February 26, 1996, three weeks after Clinton decided to sign the Act and imprint the second seal in U.S. foreign policy from the Cuban lobbying (Ziegler, 2007: 113).

With that, we reach our third outcome of this work: that well-thought lobbying strategies and tactics might be very effective in pressuring legislators over an issue for which there is a lack of interest from the general public at the time or mass manipulation like the plane's incident.

## 5 New generations voting trends: 2008-2014

During 1998-2002, U.S. ameliorated and opened negotiations with China, Vietnam and even with North Korea which was provided further with financial and food aid. In the meantime, the Cuban embargo was still effective and would continue to remain so. The following chapter will emphasize the efforts of the new Cuban lobbying CLC until 2008. The coming of Obama and his recent drift in U.S. foreign policy attitude toward Cuba will be analyzed by exploring the factors and strategies used.

### 5.1 Year 2008: The breakdown and the reshuffling of demographics

In 2001, divisions within CANF led to the split of hardliners founded the Cuban Liberty Council (CLC). In 2003, CLC copied the CANF' scheme for making strategic contributions in the domestic politics, and formed the US-Cuba Democracy PAC (US-CD PAC). CANF under Mas Santos (son of Canosa) continued the moderate stance after looking through the recent changes in the U.S. foreign policy.

The US-CD PAC has been constantly sponsoring Cuban-American representatives, to name a few amongst them like Marco Rubio, Mario Diaz-Balart, Bob Menendez etc. Not surprisingly, are at the same time the outmost criticizers of Obama's administration rapprochement efforts with Cuba. About \$10 million have been spent on funding 337 federal candidates from 2004-2010 by the US-CD PAC (Garcia, 2012: 19), with 2008 reaching the peak with almost \$1 million (CRP, 2008). The reason can be explained following the demographic changes going on in Florida and the shift of the Republican Cuban vote.

By 2008, the old Cuban elite was dying off, whereas many other Cubans had entered the country during the 1990s. Apart from that, other Hispanic groups such as the Porto Ricans had arrived in Florida in huge numbers (Garcia, 2012: 4). According to Pew Research Center, by 2008 only 34% of the entire Hispanic vote in Miami was Cuban compared with 46% that it was in 1990 (PRC, 2008). Facing those trends, Obama decided to run without accepting contributions from any Cuban lobbying PAC such as the US-CD PAC, and managed to win Florida with 1/3 of the Cuban-American vote and 2/3 of the entire Hispanic one (Eckstein, 2010: 20). Those statistics show the beginning of the fracture in the Cuban-American bloc of voting.

## 5.2 Year 2014: Demographic changes and the rise in role of the digital media

In 2014, the CRI-FIU conducted a poll to measure how much of Cuban-Americans opposed or supported the lifting of the embargo. Their findings reported that 52% of the Cuban-Americans actually supported to end the embargo-policy, and 68% of Miami-based Cubans favored re-establishing relations with Cuba (CRI-FIU: 2014; PRC, 2014). Two main reasons seem to explain this major shift:

First the generations changes within the Cuban-American community, with the increase in numbers of young Cubans that came during the 90s. This generation displays more liberal views on lessening the embargo and open diplomatic relations with the island. Second, Florida is not being a Republican bastion anymore, as the Cubans are being squeezed by other Hispanic populations like Porto Ricans.

Besides the demographic changes, young social movements like the “Roots of Hope” founded in 2003, have played a pivotal role in supporting the re-opening with Cuba policy followed by the Obama administration. Founded by young Cuban students from Harvard and Georgetown University, the organization managed to gather 1 million participants in a peaceful manifestation in 2009 (Regenovich, 2005). An important aspect of the movement is the role the attention and focus on digital media. As the organization states its mission in the official page, they tend to improve human rights in the island by distributing USB, mobile-phones, and other high-tech devices to Cubans (Roots of Hope). In contrast with CANF and CLC which base their resources from their stakeholders, “Roots of Hope” has a down-top organizations structure focused at grassroots mobilization at street level with individual donations.

The reason which explains the focus in digital media devices by the organization, is actually explained by the high activity of Cuban opposition expressed in numerous blogs. One of the first investigations and most recent studies on the use of digital media in helping democratization processes in authoritarian regimes, is by Emily Parker (2015). Dissidents around Cuba like the well-known Yoani Sanchez (who became part of “Roots of Hope” shortly after her arrival in U.S.), are using Twitter and personal blogs to express their ideas, unleash breaking-news to the world in case of riots or violation of human rights, and even attack state policies. However, as Parker notes out, due to the high cost of internet and censorship by the Cuban

government, it is difficult for majority of Cubans to make use of this opportunity (2015, 127). For that reason, “Roots of Hope” has focused in providing the means to the Cubans to get more in touch with the world, express their views, and perhaps induce a revolution.

### 5.3 New strategies in sight

In December 2014, a surprise declaration came soon in the press by the leaders of both countries, President Obama and President Raul Castro. They thanked his Holiness Pope Francis for mediating and bringing on peaceful accords both countries after 18 months of exhaustive talks between Washington and Havana (Robertz & Carroll, 2015). The deal resulted in the release and exchange of agents from both sides and a number of dissidents from Havana, whereas President Obama promised to restore soon full diplomatic relations and to establish a permanent embassy in Havana.

Four month after, in April 2015, both leaders met and shook hands in Panama, attending the Summit of the Americas event. In this occasion, Obama declared that the normalization process between the two countries is taking progress. Despite these serious efforts and shift in foreign policy attitude by the Obama Administration, the lifting of the embargo, which is a *sine qua non* for Havana, and for the right reasons, needs Congressional approval, and as reporters and political analysts in U.S. assert, is not going to come soon (CFR, 2015; Roberts & Carroll, 2014).

In light of the recent events and efforts by President Obama in restoring diplomatic ties and follow a détente foreign policy towards Cuba, there can be distinguished a new promising strategy by the White House experts and advisors to the president. The strategy is based in the religious affiliation of Cubans with Catholicism. The strategy hits in two fronts: first benefits the Obama administration and the Democratic Party to gain prominence by enlisting a future

achievement in the 2016 electoral campaign; second it might prove an effective way of response to the still powerful Cuban hardliners to decrease their influence in Congress. Targeting the Cuban hardliners by trying to split them under the “divide and rule” principle, might have a successive outcome in getting both houses to vote in favor of lifting the embargo. Also, this will affect the swing state of Florida by rallying the Cuban-American vote again on the Democrat’s side like in 2012, the first time that the Republicans lost the majority of Cuban-American vote since 1980 (CFR, 2015; Lopez, 2010).

Time will prove the worthiness of this strategy, but so far the omens has shown good signs. The Catholic Church is a powerful institution in Cuba, and the visit of Raul Castro in Vatican in May 2015 followed by his cheerful and exciting comments after the meetings shows premises for improving confidence and trust in the Cuban population both in the island and abroad. The expected visit from Pope Francis in Havana in September, will provide further clues in this regard.

#### 5.4 Future Implications for foreign policy-makers

Scholars from the fields of political science, lobbying or public policy, have only recently agreed that have been a convergence of perspectives on research for interests groups in America and Europe. (Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2010: 153; Baumgartner 2007: 151).

From this vast literature, the main issues discussed are on the matter of advocacy groups disparities between U.S. and EU level rising from the federalist distinction of the former and multi-level organization of the latter. In U.S. the structural way how the political environment is build, permits high degree of access to social groups as candidates of public offices are nominated through primaries, the results of which depend upon local elections (Smith, 2000: 88).

In European states, nominations are done on the basis of party-systems, like two-round vote or proportional representation. In conclusion, one might say that it is impossible to apply any outcome from the Cuban-American lobbying in the European context. However, if we look at the European Union (EU), many problems in the lobbying sphere might find the same solution from the lessons drawn from this American case-study.

Amongst some European problems that interest group scholars are recently dealing with are the same like in U.S.: the call for more transparency and regulatory lobbying framework. The venue-shopping is one peculiar feature in the European context where interest groups push issues towards the venues with the greatest receptivity according to the advocacy's point of view.

Apparently, the scholars in the lobbying field has been focused too much in the micro-scale by studying institutional and practices in the two continents and have forgot to look at the macro-scale. The pluralist-democratic institutions' system followed by the rise of multiculturalism as a recent democratic value in multi-ethnic societies, are two main pillars that hold a bridge connecting the American federal system with the European multi-level organizational structure. So, the problems experienced in U.S. by the penetration of interest groups as far as influencing the foreign policy, can occur as well in Europe, at the national level of states or supra-national like the EU. The ethnic-group lobbying should be studied as part of the broader field of interest groups in lobbying field.

First implication requires further attention by scholars and policy makers in the sphere of migratory policies. Officials need to re-evaluate their current practices when it comes to the point of residency permit and citizenship. In both levels, national and supra-national, the analysis of CANF as a successful ethnic lobby group shows and confirms previous studies done before, the demographics play a crucial role in multicultural societies when it comes at constituency matters.

This addresses particularly those country in Europe that attracts large waves of migration every year, like U.K., France, Germany, Brussels etc. To those states, the issue of demographics comes at first place when a state considers to accept and grant citizenship to non-nationals.

The same logic applies also at the supra-national level although the EU Parliament and Commission have proposed and enacted more protective measures making non-EU member residents very difficult to reside and work in EU. In both levels, closer attention should be paid to the migratory legislation regarding the issue of residence and settlement. The aim is to avoid any accidental political empowerment of a minority that shows future premises for seeking access in influencing the foreign relations. This does not mean that those migrants or new citizens in the respective states, should not be granted equal opportunity or access to express and protect their rights to express freely their interests. Those belong to the domestic sphere of politics of each country and the EU regulatory framework does not contradict the proposition.

By following a careful approach of granting residence to immigrants by avoiding settling them in the same area, policy-makers can avoid the creation of electoral game constituencies. High concentration in same urban areas might provide an ethnic group the channel to start trading the community's vote through the local politicians in exchange for foreign policy demands. At the same time, this recommendation does not prohibit the immigrants to benefit from the citizen rights that each state provides to them, including full participation in the domestic politics of the host country.

Second lesson comes from the lobbying legislation framework. As Smith summons, the last Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995) in U.S. needs another amendment. The new amendment aim should require more transparency in relation with PACs and how they distribute money in election years. His view is supported and encouraged to be carried on ASAP. The existing Act

has faced many criticism from various academic and lawyer circles for not mitigating the lack of transparency in U.S. practices of lobbying. Another option is the creation of a new committee to observe the activity of interest groups particularly in election's time, and to check the background and connections of legislators who propose bills particularly in foreign policy area. These proposed regulations in lobbying legislation to increase transparency and autonomy of the state body from minor interest groups, serve Europe as well. Perhaps a joint US-EU effort to establish an international committee of lawyers, scholars and professional lobbyist can accelerate the pace of progress in this regard, and save extensive time and efforts if research continues to be carried separately on each continent.

## Conclusion

“If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.”

George Orwell, 1945

This work started with a quote from Tocqueville, and is ending again with another from Orwell. This first quote strikes directly to one of the weakest points of democracy: the possibility that a minor group might impose its own interest in the name of the majority, although the former's interest might contradict those of the latter. Lobbying is and will continue to be present on every political system in the world, be it evident or not. The purpose of this humble work was to provide a detailed account on one type of interests groups, ethnic ones. The methodology that was used by this work was based on desk-research, and this included two Congress Acts as primary sources, and a wide range of secondary sources.

The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) represents a perfect case to explore when and how do ethnic groups get to successfully mobilize and influence the foreign policy of the host country towards their homeland. Three outcomes are provided to answer to the primary and secondary questions: First, the easiest way for an ethnic-group to get access in the government is by following a congruent policy with the executive, in return the group expects support from the government, be it in financial or political terms. Second, when an ethnic-group becomes a target of electoral game, foreign policy might be bridged by local interest groups that do not necessarily represent the national interests of the country. Lastly, ethnic-groups might utilize certain strategies and tactics to pressure legislators, either when the topic is not salient to the public or by manipulating the public through media.

The contribution of this work resides in the value added to the lobbying field in political sciences, by trying to explore more behind the argument of convergence of group interests with that of the state. It also challenges one of the main conclusion derived from previous studies done on CANF. In the light of examining the stakeholders, the strategies and tactics, and above all both Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) and Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad), anti-communist ideology no longer seems a reliable explanation to justify the hardline approach lobbied by CANF. Instead, materialistic and economic gains lie beneath the human rights camouflage in the beginnings of each act.

In the end, two lessons were drawn and are addressed to future policy makers in U.S. and EU. First, it puts in focus the accidental or intentional political empowerment of ethnic groups by allowing them to concentrate on same urban areas. Future migratory policies should design appropriate policies before granting them citizenship. The case of Cuban migration waves concentrating in Miami, Florida, illustrates the fact how an ethnic-group made proper use of its vote due through a good lobbying group. Second lesson suggest a review on the lobbying legislation by amending more transparent laws regarding PACs and contributions in electoral times, or the creation of an observatory committee to monitor and check the legislators who propose bills in particularly in matters of foreign policy, which usually are sensitive and of interest to the whole nation. It was argued that those lessons find applicability also in Europe as the same problems persist in European multicultural societies and lobbying legislation.

However, given the nature of American political system and institutions, and multicultural aspect of U.S. the outcomes of this work may find similarity only in a few other democratic countries. Also the Cuban-American community has unique traits like the distinction between political exiles and economic-driven migrants.

In the end, the quote by Orwell is given to show that lobbying and manipulation at certain times may not be visible to the public, therefore is first the duty of scholars to examine and deliver the real context of interests behind what the public eyes are used to see usually over the surface, even if the findings may be not pleasant.

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