

Bodies as the battle fields of Nationalism and Hegemonic Masculinities: The Sarris Case

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Abstract

This thesis aims to analyse the transformation of Cypriots from ‘subjects’ to ‘citizens’. It discusses the process of how ethnic symbols have affected the national ‘belongingness’. It focuses on ‘Cyprioturkish’ national identity which stands within the margins of the ‘Turk’ and the ‘Cypriot’. Cyprioturkish identity has been discussed as an alternative discourse to proclaim ‘politics of difference and equality’. The media representations of the Sarris court case have been used as empirical data in order to discuss the interrelation of nationalism, sexuality and hegemonic masculinity. The thesis aims to analyse the ways in which Turkish and Greek nationalism declares bodies of the individuals as battlefields of nationalisms and hegemonic masculinities.

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Introduction

The Sarris Case has enabled the Turkish Cypriot community to discuss the existence of the ‘Sodomy Laws’ in-depth. Even so, with the establishment of the LGBT organization in 2007 and feminist or pro-feminist organisations in 2008, discussions related to LGBT rights had already started. However, the discussions on LGBT rights have remained on agenda of only a limited number of people. Nevertheless, in 2011 the Sarris Case brought a different perspective to the discussion. For the first time, a majority of the Turkish Cypriot community had the opportunity to take part in discussions on ‘homosexuality’. During the period, Cyprus northern was the only entity within Council of Europe which criminalised ‘same-sex’ acts through archaic British Colonial laws. Therefore, the Sarris Case was an important corner stone in the decriminalisation of homosexuality which took place in 2014.

Sarris Case was different from any other court cases which were opened based on the Sodomy Laws. In the Sarris Case, discussions were based on creation of an ‘erotic other’ to the Turkish Cypriot community. The existence of an ‘erotic other’ to national self has brought discussions on nationalism, national belonging, hegemonic masculinity and thus, power relations into the discussion.

In the Sarris Case, I question how the Sarris Case is different? Why has the media shown such interest in this case? How is the national identity of Michael Sarris important? How have the bodies of the suspects become battlefields of nationalism and hegemonic masculinities?

In the first chapter, I begin the discussion with a brief introduction of Cyprus history. My main concern is to analyse the transformation of identities of Cypriots from ‘subjects’ of different empires to ‘citizens’ of the Republic of Cyprus. I focus on the Cyprus dispute and

aim to originate a formation of national identification/national belongingness through ethnic ties in modern periods. On the other hand, I have analysed the interrelation of national belonging with the Cyprus dispute.

In the second chapter, I focus on ‘Cyprioturkish’ identity which is on the margins of the ‘Turk’ and the ‘Cypriot. I discuss theories on nation, nationalism and belonging, together with collective memory. I trace back the formation process of Cyprioturkish identity and the ways in which the Turkish Cypriot community has sought alternatives in politics of difference and equality through creation of a Cyprioturkish identity.

In the third chapter, I reason the interrelation of nationalism and sexuality and offer theoretical discussions on nationalism and how it uses sexuality as a method of control. The relationship between nationalism and heterosexism, and thus, the exclusion of alternative sexualities are discussed. Consequently, through medicalization discourse, I trace back the roots of Sodomy Laws and try to analyse how and why they were enacted in Cyprus during the British Colonial Administration. I aim to relate nationalism with political homophobia and try to form the theoretical aspects of the discussion of the Sarris Case through the reaction of political homophobia.

In the fourth chapter, I analyse the Sarris Case through the news published in October 2011. I observe how the intersection of national and sexual ‘other’ creates the possibility of a power struggle. I analyse the ways in which representation of subordinated masculinities in the media has an effect in a reflection of political tensions between the two communities of Cyprus. In other words, I analyse how bodies have become battlefields of hegemonic masculinities and nationalism in the Sarris Case.

Chapter 1 : A Brief Introduction to History of Cyprus: Alternation of Communities

Cyprus is situated in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and throughout its history it has hosted many cultures. It is possible to say that Ancient Greek, Egyptian, Phoenician, Mesopotamian and Anatolian Civilisations have left their mark on Cypriot culture and life style. It can be assumed that each of these historical periods have their own continuous effect on the each subsequent period. However, due to the limitations of this thesis, I would prefer to touch only upon those moments in which elements of the periods, with the rise of modernism, have created a significant role in understanding the effects of religion and ethnicity on a construction of belonging and citizenship. In this regard, I would focus on periods related to the Ottoman and British administrations and aim to analyse how religion and ethnicity has developed and affected the formation of a national identity. The establishment of an independent state, the Republic of Cyprus, will also be analysed due to its effect on the re-escalation of bi-communal conflict and the rise of Turkish and Greek nationalism on the island. By analysing these periods, my main aim is to find the ways in which historical developments have relations with the construction of *Cyprioturkish* identity and it's 'other'. Thus, I would hope to shed a light on the ways in which nationalism and hegemonic masculinities have had an effect on the *Sarris Case* which will be analysed later, based on *Cyprioturkish* identity and it's 'other'.

Religion played a significant role both before and during the Ottoman Period. The Greek Cypriot community which traces its roots to the Mycenaean and Byzantine Empires were suppressed during the period of Venetian Rule. When Assyrians (709 BCE), Egyptians (569 BCE) and Persians (545 BCE) conquered parts of the island, even then Cypriot Kingdoms continued their independent presence. During the Roman period, when Governor Sergius Paulus adopted Christianity, Cyprus became the first territory to be ruled by a Christian. In

395 when the Roman Empire was divided upon the death of Theodosius the Great, Cyprus became a part of the Byzantine Empire. Even during the attacks of Muslim Arabs on Cyprus between 649 and 806, Orthodox Christianity maintained its existence in Cyprus. However, after King Richard the Lionheart passed control of the island to the Knights Templar who then sold the island to Guy de Lusignan, the Frankish Era began (1191) and when the new administration then attempted to introduce Catholicism new difficulties were created¹. In 1260 Pope Alexander issued the *Bulla Cypria* which limited the autocephalous status of the independent church of Cyprus and declared the Latin Church as the only religious authority in Cyprus. Between 1324 and 1359, Hugh IV became the King of Cyprus in Nicosia and King of Jerusalem in Famagusta. However, in 1373-1374 a war between Genoa and Cyprus began which weakened the power of the Franks. The Kingdom of Cyprus was officially transferred to the Venetians in 1489 by Queen Caterina and the Frankish Era ended. After attacking Limassol in 1539 the Ottoman Empire concluded a treaty agreement with the Venetians².

Even when he was governor of Kütahya province, Sultan Selim II had shown an interest in the island. His father, Kanuni Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent, the ‘Law Giver’, who had succeeded in ruling vast swathes of the Mediterranean Sea area, had not managed to conquer the island³. Venetian rule in the island had been viewed as a threat by the Ottomans. Due to the island’s geostrategic location, it had prevented Ottoman sovereignty over the Mediterranean area. Venetian attacks on the Ottoman Navy thus created an urgent need for the Ottomans to conquer the island. The Ottoman Navy started the battle on May 15th, 1570 and until fall of Famagusta Castle on August 1st 1571 war with the Venetians continued. After the fall of Famagusta, the Venetians put up no more resistance. However, under the

¹ Kızılyürek, Niyazi. *Kıbrıs Sorununda İç ve Dış Etkenler* (Internal and External Factors in the Cyprus Problem), Nicosia: Işık, 2001, pp. 13-15

² Mirbagheri, Farid. *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus*, Toronto: Scarecrow Press, 2010, pp. xxi-xxvi

³ Lukach, Harry C. and Jardine Douglas J. *The Handbook of Cyprus*, Nicosia: Galeri Kültür, 2007, pp. 27-31

leadership of Pope Pius V, a Holy League was formed against the Ottomans leading to the Battle of Lepanto. In 1573, the Venetians recognised Ottoman Rule in Cyprus⁴.

The hegemony of the Catholic Church over the Cyprus Orthodox Church ended when the Ottomans conquered the island. Upon the annexation, 20,000 Muslims emigrated from Anatolia to the island. Serfdom was abolished and the indigenous Cypriots were allowed to own lands⁵. Nonetheless they were heavily taxed by the Ottoman rule. İlber Ortaylı states that under the *millet* concept, people were categorised into their millet based on their religious affiliations rather than their ethnic origins⁶. Under the Ottoman millet system, religious authorities were able to rule over their communities and were responsible for tax collection. In 1660, the Ottomans recognised the archbishop of Cyprus, “as the protectors of people and as the population’s representatives to the sultan”⁷. Archbishop Kyprianos was awarded the right of access to the Sultan’s Palace directly and in 1754 he was made responsible for the collection of taxes in the name of Ottoman rule⁸. The tasks carried out through the millet system, such as collection of the taxes and ensuring stability, brought a great deal of power to the religious authorities. Therefore, the Ottoman conqueror was initially accepted as a ‘liberator’ by the local population, especially when the Orthodox Church regained its status and they were freed from Catholic hegemony. During the Ottoman period, Cypriots paid various taxes, in other words, non-Muslims had to pay heavier taxes compared to Muslims. It has been argued that religious conversions took place during the period. However, some people, known as *Linovamvaki*, who converted to Islam secretly continued to practice

⁴ Lukach, 2007, p. 27-31

⁵ Kızılyürek, 2001, p.16

⁶ Ortaylı, İlber. *Son İmparatorluk Osmanlı* (The Last Empire: Ottoman Empire), Istanbul: Timaş Press, 2006, pp.87-89

⁷ Mirbagheri, 2010, p. xxvi

⁸ Kızılyürek, 2001, p.27

Christianity. Linovamvakis concealed their ‘true’ faith in order to avoid slavery during earlier periods of the Ottoman rule, and secondly, to avoid heavier taxes⁹.

The heterogeneous structure of the Ottoman millet system was altered during the 19th century by the rise of nationalism within the Ottoman Empire. Firstly, by Greece in 1821 and thereafter in the Balkans, nationalist ideologies changed the perception of the millet concept. The establishment of *Philiki Etaireia* (Φιλική Εταιρεία - Friendly Brotherhood) in Greece in 1818 created certain problems between Ottoman Rule and the Orthodox Church. The aim of the organisation was to establish an independent state by freeing Greek-speaking provinces of Ottoman rule¹⁰. The Ottoman Governor in Cyprus executed 470 people in Cyprus who were believed to have taken part in the Greek War of Independence. Among those who were killed included the bishops of Paphos, Kition and Kyrenia. Archbishop Kyprianos was hanged even though he had not actively participated in the War of Independence but had only promised financial and material support to the cause of *Philiki Etaireia*. In 1830, the Ottomans attempted to reorganise the administration, and taxes which were initially collected by community leaders (religious leaders) began to be collected directly by the governor¹¹.

The Greek War of Independence and execution of Cypriots due to the war also concerned Russian Empire which, with the Treaty of Kuchuk Kianardji in 1774, had obtained the right to be the protector of the Orthodox Christians within the Ottoman Empire¹². The emerging nationalism in the Balkans, led the Ottoman and Russian Empires into war in 1877. The Russian Empire, with support of Eastern Orthodox coalitions, defeated the Ottomans. In 1878, after the Congress of Berlin, the British Empire lent its support to the Ottoman Empire.

⁹ Bryant, Rebecca. *Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*, London: I.B Tauris, 2004 p.66

¹⁰ Frangos, George. The *Philiki Etairia*: a premature national coalition. Ed.) Richard Clogg, *The Struggle For Greek Independence*, London: The Macmillan Pres Ltd, pp. 87-103

¹¹ Mirbagheri, 2010, pp. 124-125

¹² Fowler, George. *Turkey, or, a history of the origin, progress and decline of the Ottoman Empire*, London:TH Rees, Hope & Company, 1854, p.113

It is argued that Britain aimed to halt the ever-expanding Russian Empire and to protect its vital sea routes to India. On June 4th 1878, a secret convention was signed between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire. According to which, Cyprus was to be transferred to British administration in exchange for British support and protection of the Ottoman Empire in its disputes with the Russian Empire. Although the transfer was meant for administrative purposes only, the island continued to be sovereign territory of the Ottoman Empire¹³. The convention signed between the Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire ended Ottoman Rule in the island which had lasted for three centuries.

The Ottoman millet system was challenged during the 19th century. However, in contrast to the Balkan region, it is possible to argue that the belongingness of Cypriots continued to be religious ties instead of ethnic. In that sense, I would argue that national identification based on ethnic ties was shaped during the British Colonial Period through the effects of colonialism. According to Rebecca Bryant, “the identity of the citizen was not an easy one to acquire, and that its rights and responsibilities were not transparent but problematic.”¹⁴ Bryant states that “[t]he struggle to define citizenship was also – if not primarily – a struggle to define that authority to which one owed one’s allegiance. Because religion and politics had previously been entwined, the crisis of political authority was also, by definition, a crisis of religious authority, and of the role of religion as a form of representation.”¹⁵ Upon its arrival in 1878, Great Britain changed the legal system in Cyprus. In 1882 a constitution was introduced for the people of Cyprus by the British Administration. The new tax system introduced by the British was fairer than that during the Ottoman Period and was equitable to all subjects. Compared to the Ottoman Period, there was no forced donation to the administration. Hence, compared to the tax system in Great Britain, it was more concerned

¹³ Mirbagheri, 2010, pp. 124-125

¹⁴ Bryant, 2004, p.22

¹⁵ Bryant, 2004, p.22

with of Cypriot standards and demanded less from locals. On September 14th, Great Britain established its legal system in Cyprus and a Legislative Council was formed. Cypriots had the opportunity to participate in the council. However, the final word belonged to the British Authorities.¹⁶ During the British Rule, while, religious authorities tried to adjust to the absence of Ottoman Rule which had created a certain level of stability for them, education began to gain an increasingly important place in the daily life of Cypriots. Newspaper publications during the period established the ability of being part of ‘something/identity’. People who were only Muslims and Christians in earlier periods of the British Rule, now started to be Greek speaking Christians and Turkish speaking Muslims. According to Bryant, “[i]n prenationalist terms, the fundamental goodness of education was inextricably intertwined with the roles that educated persons played¹⁷”. She argues that for the Greek speaking community it was being a priest and for Turkish speaking community it was being an *imam* or a *kadi* (judge). In short, education offered the possibility to be part of the ruling class for Cypriots. Bryant states that what Benedict Anderson had defined with print capitalism could define the reasons how bourgeois communities - in our case religious leaders – defined imagined communities which would become the basis for nationalist imaginings or belongings¹⁸.

Meanwhile, due to the rise of nationalism in the region, the first attempts to foster an uprising took place. On July 1903, for the first time, Greek speaking members of the Legislative Council voted for the unification of Cyprus with Greece at a meeting where Turkish speaking members of the Council abstained. On May 1912, during a demonstration, a small clash between two communities occurred. However, internal disputes were silenced because

¹⁶ Lukach, 2007, pp. 31-39

¹⁷ Bryant, 2004, p.127

¹⁸ Bryant, 2004, pp.145-146

Cyprus had moved into a different political situation in the international arena¹⁹. On November 5th 1914 the Ottoman Empire formed an alliance with Germans in World War I, upon which the British Empire declared the convention with The Ottoman Empire as *null and void* and consequently annexed the island²⁰. Greece had received an offer from the British Empire under which Britain agreed to transfer Cyprus to Greece on the *proviso* that Greece ceased its neutrality and immediately declared war on the *Triple Entente*. However, the Greek government rejected the offer. In the face of this decision of the Greek government, a delegation of Greek speaking Cypriots paid a visit to London to ask the British government for unification with Greece. In response to this action, Turkish speaking Cypriots sent a memorandum to the minister responsible for the colonies requesting the continuation of British administration in the island²¹. The Treaty of Lausanne had clarified the situation of Cyprus. The newly formed Republic of Turkey ceded all its rights over the island to Great Britain²². In 1925, Great Britain declared Cyprus as a Crown colony²³ and in 1928 replaced Ottoman Penal Code²⁴. In 1931, the British Administration attempted to balance the budget by raising customs duties. Members of both communities voted against. However, on September 1931, the governor enacted the law by executive order. On October 21st, the first riot against the British took place and this uprising by Greek Cypriots was suppressed by the imposition of severe measures and restrictions for all Cypriots²⁵. Between 1938-1948 large strikes against the British administration were organised by Greek and Turkish Cypriots demanding “an eight-hour working day, cost-of-living benefits, improved working conditions, labour legislation, social insurance, improvement of wages, etc.”^{26,27} In 1946, the

¹⁹ Mirbagheri, 2010, p. xxviii

²⁰ Kızılyürek, 2001, p.37

²¹ Mirbagheri, 2010, pp. xxviii -xxix

²² Kızılyürek, 2001, p.37

²³ Mirbagheri, 2010, p.25

²⁴ Mirbagheri, 2010, p. xxix

²⁵ Mirbagheri, 2010 p. xxxi

²⁶ Mirbagheri, 2010, p. xxxi

²⁷ Kızılyürek, 2001, pp.46-47

law on immovable property was introduced and the last traces of Ottoman Rule were abolished²⁸.

On January 15th 1950, Greek Cypriots organised a plebiscite for *enosis* (union with Greece). The British Administration did not recognise the results even though the majority of the Greek Cypriots voted in favour. This action of Greek Cypriots negatively affected labour relations in which common ground was reached with Turkish Cypriots. According to Mirbagheri, *enosis* (Ενωσις, union with Greece) had gathered momentum since the beginning of the 19th century; however it was not possible under Ottoman Rule. It gained strength under the British Administration. Enosis was against British interests, due to the fact that Cyprus had gained strategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Mirbagheri argues that Cypriots even took part in World War II and fought alongside Britain, hoping that this would improve their prospects of having enosis granted²⁹. When, on April 1st 1955, the *National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters* (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών - EOKA) initiated an anticolonial struggle demanding not independence but enosis, the disputes between two communities intensified³⁰. On November 15th 1957, the Turkish Cypriot community created the *Turkish Resistance Organisation* (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı - TMT) which fought EOKA and instead of *enosis* demanded *taksim* (partition of the island and unification of its Turkish Cypriot populated territory with Turkey)³¹. In 1956, after nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the Anglo-French expedition against Egypt, Cyprus became the largest British Military base in the region. When, in 1958, bi-communal disputes occurred, Greece, Turkey and Britain began to discuss the Cyprus question at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) meeting. On February 19th 1959, Britain, Greece and Turkey with representatives of the two communities in Cyprus organised a meeting in

²⁸ Mirbagheri, 2010, p. xxxi

²⁹ Mirbagheri, 2010, p.25

³⁰ Drusiotis, Makarios. Cyprus 1974: Greek Coup and Turkish Invasion, Nicosia: Galeri Kültür, 2006, p.20

³¹ Drusiotis, 2006, p.28

London and signed the constitution of Cyprus on the basis of the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee which were signed on February 11th in Zurich³². These treaties declared three countries; Britain, Turkey and Greece as guarantors of the sovereignty and integrity of an independent Cyprus. On August 16th 1960, the Republic of Cyprus led by President Archbishop Makarios and vice president Dr. Fazıl Küçük was declared. Although Cyprus had gained its independence, the establishment of the republic satisfied the guarantor states Britain, Greece and Turkey more than the Cypriots themselves. Three states were given permission to unilaterally intervene in Cyprus³³. On the other hand, Greece and Turkey were both allowed a military contingent of 950 and 650 soldiers respectively. In addition, the Treaty of Establishment allowed Britain to maintain two sovereign military bases in Akrotiri and Dhekelia³⁴. The guarantor states had achieved what they desired during the period although the two ethnic communities who were in conflict were decidedly less satisfied with the outcome. Glafcos Clerides states that “[t]he flag of the Republic of Cyprus is the best in the world because it’s the only one that no one would die for.”³⁵³⁶ The newly established state was bi-communal, based on ethnicity, with a division of power based on the respective populations of the communities. In all aspects of government, 70:30 ratios of power divisions were applied. However, certain positions in government were to be held by certain ethnic community members. For example, the president would always be a Greek Cypriot while the vice-president was to be a Turkish Cypriot. Once we consider the position of the parliament where 35 Greek Cypriot and 15 Turkish Cypriots were represented and both the President and Vice-President enjoyed veto rights³⁷, it is not hard to estimate the consequences. After 1961,

³² Kızılyürek, 2001, pp.59-60

³³ Kızılyürek, 2001, p.61

³⁴ Mirbagheri, 2010, p.41

³⁵ Bryant, Rebecca. Of Lemons and Laws: Property and the (Trans) national Order in Cyprus, In Barbara Rose Johnston & Susan Slyomovics (eds.), *Waging War, Making Peace: Reparations and Human Rights*, California:Left Coast Press, 2009, pp: 207-222, p. 212

³⁶ President of Republic of Cyprus 1993-2003, Speaker of the House of Representatives in 1960.

³⁷ Mirbagheri, 2010, p.41

veto rights enjoyed by the President and Vice-president created blockages in constitutional affairs³⁸. Each party could easily block the propositions offered by the ‘other’ party. However, the municipal division of the communities formed the core of most bi-communal disputes in the first three year period of the republic³⁹. The Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios proposed a constitutional amendment in December 1963, which according to him would solve the problem of the constitutional blockage. However, the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected the amendment arguing that it would weaken the power-sharing arrangements created by the 1960 constitution⁴⁰. In the meantime, tensions created by these constitutional amendments, led to an intensification of bi-communal disputes.

EOKA and TMT which had been active since 1961-1962 began to smuggle weapons from Greece and Turkey⁴¹. During this period, some areas inhabited by Turkish Cypriots were attacked by EOKA resulting in casualties. Thus, these events resulted in a withdrawal of Turkish Cypriot community members from all the organs of the state⁴². In March 1964, the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (Resolution 186)⁴³. However, the presence of the UNFICYP did little to change matters on the ground and disputes intensified which ultimately led to the consequence that almost the majority of Turkish Cypriots became refugees and, for safety reasons, started to establish enclaves. Turkey as a guarantor state was eager to intervene militarily. However, with the involvement of USA President, Lyndon Johnson⁴⁴ military intervention was prevented. However, Turkey had sent its fighter jets which raided villages in Tylliria, Paphos⁴⁵. On September 16th, The United Nations Secretary-General appointed Galo

³⁸ Kızılyürek, 2001, p.71

³⁹ Mirbagheri, 2010, pp.35-37

⁴⁰ Kızılyürek, 2001, pp.73-74

⁴¹ Mirbagheri, 2010, p.xxxi

⁴² Mirbagheri, 2010, pp.41-42

⁴³ *Resolution 186 (S/5575)*, New York: United Nations, 1964.

⁴⁴ Mirbagheri, 2010, pp.41-42

⁴⁵ Mirbagheri, 2010, p.xxxii

Plaza as the United Nations Mediator for Cyprus. Plaza submitted a report on June 23rd 1965 to the effect that in order to achieve a peaceful settlement to the disputes there was a necessity to maintain contact and have an arrangement of regular meetings between the communities. In 1967, following the *coup d'état* in Greece, tensions again rose between the communities in Cyprus. Some leaders within EOKA began to have closer relations with the junta regime in Greece. The main aim was to organise a coup d'état in Cyprus and remove Makarios from the presidency. EOKA B under the leadership of Giorgos Grivas aimed to establish an organisation with the spirit of *Philiki Etaireia* and to awaken Hellenistic soul again. According to Grivas, Makarios had abandoned the aim of *enosis* and had instead accepted the republic as a final solution⁴⁶. On June 24th 1968, under the good mission initiative of the United Nations, bi-communal talks started. Up until 1974, four sessions of bi-communal talks were held. However, the communities were unable to reach an agreement⁴⁷.

On July 15th 1974, the Greek junta supported a coup d'état in Cyprus and Makarios was overthrown. With British help President Makarios was able to escape from the island unharmed. However, the violence within the Greek Cypriot community was intense. The same day, a former EOKA fighter, Nicos Sampson was announced as the new President⁴⁸. Turkey organised military action in Cyprus on July 20th 1974, in a response to the coup which was justified by the Treaty of Guarantee⁴⁹. On July 22nd, the military governments in Greece and Cyprus collapsed. However, Turkey undertook a second phase of military operations when the Geneva talks between Greece, Turkey and Great Britain were unable to reach a solution between August 8-14. On August 14th, Turkey moved its military forces further and obtained a military advantage⁵⁰. The military action resulted in UN General Assembly

⁴⁶ Drusiotis, 2006, pp.63-65

⁴⁷ Mirbagheri, 2010, pp.41-42

⁴⁸ Drusiotis, 2006, pp.363-369

⁴⁹ Drusiotis, 2006, p.413

⁵⁰ Mirbagheri, 2010, pp.41-44

Resolution 3212, which reinforced the UNFICYP control of the *green line*⁵¹ which still separates the island today. It could be argued that Turkey's second operation created a *fait accompli*⁵² which could categorize its military action as an invasion. Today, with the presence of the Turkish Military Forces on the island, the Turkish Cypriot Community controls approximately 37 percent of the island. The Turkish Cypriot Community withdrew from the offices of the Republic of Cyprus and established its own administration which resulted in the unilateral declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. I will discuss this issue further in subsequent chapters together with *Cyprioturkish* identity.

The results of the bi-communal disputes were catastrophic for Cypriots. The coup d'état of the Greek Junta and the Turkish military operation in 1974 resulted in a massive movement of the Cypriot population. Military operations have created a *de facto* geographical division of the island. One quarter of the Greek Cypriot population moved to the south and almost half of the Turkish Cypriot population moved to the north and became refugees in their own country. During the bi-communal disputes thousands of people went missing. Today, The Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus aims to find denouements or the location of the remaining missing persons⁵³.

Upon the return of President Makarios to power on December 7th 1974, the UN attempted several times to achieve a settlement to the Cyprus issue⁵⁴. Two High-Level Agreements have been reached by the community leaders in 1977 and 1979. Even though the agreements were not implemented by the parties, they have formed basis for reconciliation. According to the agreements, the parties have agreed on the condition of the new state as an independent, non-aligned and bi-communal federal republic. In addition, it has been promised by the parties

⁵¹ Resolution 3212 adopted by UN General Assembly, (1974, November 1st).

⁵² Mirbagheri, 2010, p.42

⁵³ For more information on the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, please visit <http://www.cmp-cyprus.org/en/>

⁵⁴ Mirbagheri, 2010, p.42

that any action which might jeopardise talks would be avoided⁵⁵. In 1980, an Interim Agreement was proposed and in 1983, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar launched an initiative. Between 1984-1987, a draft peace agreement which has not lead to any actual solution has been shared by the parties⁵⁷. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali proposed his Set of Ideas in 1992 which was followed by confidence building measures. However, by 2004 no serious results had been achieved. In 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed earlier drafts of what became known as *The Annan Plan* to the parties. In 2004, the final version of the plan was put to referenda on both sides of the island⁵⁸. On April 24th Greek Cypriots rejected the plan while Turkish Cypriots voted in favour. The plan was regarded as the final opportunity for a solution. Because, the timing of the referendum was adjust to the accession to European Union membership of the Republic of Cyprus. Thus it created the possibility of a united island within the EU just after establishment of the united federal state⁵⁹. Due to the fact that the Greek Cypriot controlled republic had been member of the European Economic Community since 1972 and by 1987 had entered into the second stage of the Association Agreement, the process of European integration was already well under way. On June 1992, the European Commission accepted the application for European Union membership of the Republic of Cyprus for the whole island. In 2002, the European Commission recommended membership of Cyprus to the EU Council for May 1st 2004⁶⁰. The Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union on May 1st, 2004. However, the results of the referenda were unable to bring the expected solution. Since, negotiations have been ongoing since 1968 and yet a comprehensive solution has not been reached.

⁵⁵ High-Level Agreement, (1977, February 12th)

⁵⁶ The 10-point Agreement (1979, May 9th)

⁵⁷ Mirbagheri, 2010, p.xxxiii

⁵⁸ Mirbagheri, 2010, p.43

⁵⁹ Kızılyürek, Niyazi. *Doğmamış Bir Devletin Tarihi, Birleşik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti* (United Republic of Cyprus: History of an unborn state), İstanbul:İletişim, 2005, pp.271-272

⁶⁰ Mirbagheri, 2010, p.43

In this chapter, the suppression of Orthodox Christians before the Ottoman Period and the regaining of authority by Orthodox clergy during Ottoman Rule have been discussed. Hence, after the independence of Greece, we have observed how religious ties strengthened Greek Cypriots sense of belongingness with Greece through their religious ties and language. On the other hand, we have discussed how colonialism and modernity strengthened national identity formation in Cyprus through the respective 'motherlands' and the creation of belongingness through ethnic origins. Hence, we have observed that Cypriots have preferred to be organic parts of existing nationalisms instead of adopting the independent state when the Republic of Cyprus was established. Finally, it is ironic to observe how Greece and Turkey have attained an interest in Cyprus through the Cypriots acceptance of nationalist ties with their 'motherlands'. We have mentioned the UN involvement in the Cyprus dispute which has established the dimensions of a possible solution as a bi-communal federated state.

Chapter 2 : ‘Cyprioturkish’ Identity

In the previous chapter, a brief historical introduction to Cyprus was discussed. Even though it was stated that the Turkish Cypriot community left or was forced to leave the organs of the Republic of Cyprus, information about Administrations of the Turkish Cypriot community have not been presented. Although the negotiations which took place have been briefly touched upon, the history of Turkish Cypriot political actions has not been discussed. In this chapter, along with the Cyprioturkish identity, the political actions of the Turkish Cypriots will be discussed and the effects of these actions on the formation of national identity will be provided. My intention is to analyse the ways in which Cyprioturkish identity has offered a voice for Turkish Cypriots to express their subordination to Turkish Nationalism and the Cypriotism of Greek Cypriots. Perhaps, it would shed some light on the process in which Turkish Cypriots seek alternative politics of difference and equality.

2.1. Collective Memory, Nation and National Identity

In this section, I will start with the concepts of nation and national identity/belongingness and analyse collective memory. I will focus more on the interrelations of the concepts on conceptualisation of Cyprioturkish identity.

The concept of nationhood can be analysed in two notions: civic and ethnic nation. According to French rationalist school “the nation is the product of a set of conscious choices made by individuals who believe it is in their best interest to participate in a larger political community”⁶¹. Jan Germen Janmaat states that in views of French rationalists, a nation is “a

⁶¹ Janmaat, Jan Germen. Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of the Nation in Ukraine`s History Textbooks, *European Education*, Vol.37 (3), 2005, pp.20-37, p.21

modern political community that could not be seen separately from the state institutions”⁶². Therefore, belongingness to a nation is open, voluntary and planned which offers its citizens mixture of benefits and obligations⁶³. In this regard, in views of French rationalists, a nation is “a dynamic, heterogeneous political community with porous borders, a product of deliberate human agency”⁶⁴ which is completely opposed by German romanticists. German romanticist saw the nation “as a natural entity with deep roots in the past”⁶⁵. Hence, being member of a nation is not based on rational calculations but more on emotional need of an individual to feel belongingness to a wider cultural entity. Consequently, the ties of the individuals to a nation are seen as permanent in nature due to commonly shared binds such as ancestry, native language, traditions and religion. In this regard, a nation should be closed, homogeneous and permanent entity which is fixed and highly resistant to the social pressures of the day and unaffected by conscious human actions⁶⁶.

Heiko Pääbo states that there are four main approaches of nation. According to him, primordialist approach claims that

“the nation is a natural organism that exists in the background until the moment of its rebirth. Therefore, nation is not constructed but it is an enduring community, which has its shared common past and culture, living in a historical homeland and having common economic, educational and judicial systems.”⁶⁷

Whereas Perennialist approach sees “nation as perennial collective actors [...] and dominates often in political use and it has been an important source for creating overwhelming national

⁶² Janmaat, 2005, p.21

⁶³ Janmaat, 2005, p.21

⁶⁴ Janmaat, 2005, p.21

⁶⁵ Janmaat, 2005, p.21

⁶⁶ Janmaat, 2005, p.21

⁶⁷ Pääbo, Heiko. *Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts in Post-Imperial Space*, Tartu: Tartu University, 2011, p.26

history narratives that define the origin of a nation in an ancient time.”⁶⁸ Modernist or Constructivist approach claims that “nations are not anything real, objective, or indispensable; they are only ‘constructs,’ contingent and artificial, deliberately created by various elites”⁶⁹. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about the process of ‘awakening’ nations to conscious life”⁷⁰.

Ethno-symbolic approach defines nations as “historical phenomena, not only ... that they are embedded in particular collective pasts and emerge, [...] through specific historical processes, but also because, by definition, they embody shared memories, traditions, and hopes of the populations designated as parts of the nation”⁷¹. According to Pääbo, a nation based on ethnic ties which is observed by the ethno symbolic approach formulates an important resource for nation-building process⁷². “For ethno-symbolists, what gives nationalism its power are the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias”⁷³. Anthony D. Smith argues that these elements are the ones which are “reconstituted in each generation, as the nation becomes more inclusive and as its members cope with new challenges”⁷⁴. Pääbo argues that the ethno-symbolic approach agrees that national identity is constructed but it does not deny that for its construction the earlier past of an ethnic group and its cultural elements are used⁷⁵. In that sense, nation-building could be seen as process of evoking national sentiments in order to construct national identity.

⁶⁸ Pääbo, 2011, p.26

⁶⁹ Walicki, Andrzej. *Ernest Gellner and the "Constructivist" Theory of Nation*, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 22, 1998, pp. 611-619, p.611

⁷⁰ Walicki, 1998, p.611

⁷¹ Smith, A. D. *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.10

⁷² Pääbo, 2011, p.27

⁷³ Smith, 1999, p.9

⁷⁴ Smith, 1999, p.9

⁷⁵ Pääbo, 2011, p.27

As cited in Pääbo, William Bloom defines nation-building as “the process whereby inhabitants of a state’s territory come to be loyal citizens of that state”⁷⁶. Heiko Pääbo states that association of the population with the state or identification of individuals with a social group formulates the institutionalized symbol of the group in which individuals are loyal to their group or state⁷⁷. Nation-building as has been stated before is a process of evoking national consciousness and combining people with the state through symbols which could establish a broader national solidarity and loyalty of members to the nation-state⁷⁸.

Jeff Spinner-Halev argues against

“the notion that nationality is a pre-political identity, an identity that is waiting to be incorporated into the state. Instead, national identity is a political identity, sustained by political institutions for political purposes, though this identity may contain some ethnic or abstract principles within it.”⁷⁹

Pääbo claims that the nation which is based on ethnic origin and institutionalisation with the state could form the roots of national identity where individuals feel nation-wide solidarity⁸⁰.

Duncan Bells adds that

“[t]o recognize oneself as a member of a particular nation – indeed to feel a powerful sense of belonging – and to be recognized by others as such, is a perquisite for the formation of the inside/outside, self/other, us/them boundaries that define the topography of nationalist sentiment and rhetoric.”⁸¹

Pääbo states that national identity could be seen as a political memory. He adds that “national memory gives meaning for the nation, defining its past existence, how the nation is related to

⁷⁶ Bloom, William. *Personal Identity, national identity and international relations*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.55 Cited in Pääbo, Heiko. *Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts in Post-Imperial Space*, Tartu: Tartu University, 2011, p.28

⁷⁷ Pääbo, 2011, p.28

⁷⁸ Pääbo, 2011, p.29

⁷⁹ Spinner-Halev, Jeff. Democracy, Solidarity and Post-Nationalism, *Political Studies*, Vol. 56 (3), 2008, pp.604-628, p.605

⁸⁰ Pääbo, 2011, p.29

⁸¹ Bell, Duncan S. A. Mythscapes: memory, mythology, and national identity, *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 54(1), 2003, pp.63-81, p.64

the surrounding world today and also prescribing its future developments.”⁸² And he states that the memories that are used to create national identification are influenced by nationalist ideologies of today which aims to create a stronger national identity. “Therefore national remembering is not a spontaneous process that occurs itself but it is evoked and forged according the present needs of the national elite. Thus, national memory and national identity are mutually constitutive phenomena.”⁸³ Consequently, Pääbo argues that the image of the self is always positive as much as the other is negative. As cited in Pääbo, “construction of national identity is a relational process where Self needs also Other that is the mirror-image of Self. The substance of the Other is constructed in the way that Other is something that Self is not”⁸⁴.

Discussion of the concept of collective memory starts with Maurice Halbwachs. He claims that “[n]o memory is possible outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections.”⁸⁵ According to Heiko Pääbo “Halbwachs does not see any possibility to analyse individual’s memory without the social one and therefore he claims that collective memory dominates over the individual one, the individual memory gets meaning only from the collective memory”⁸⁶.

Amos Funkenstein argues that consciousness and memory are historically ascribed to human collectives such as family and tribe, nation and states. He reasons that continuation of a person’s memory is only possible once it is embed in the collective memory which only forgets failures and sins⁸⁷. Funkenstein says that “consciousness and memory can only be realized by an individual who acts, is aware, and remembers... Remembering is a mental act,

⁸² Pääbo, 2011, p.35

⁸³ Pääbo, 2011, p.35

⁸⁴ Neumann, Iver B. *Uses of the Other. ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, p.17. Cited in Pääbo, Heiko. *Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts in Post-Imperial Space*, Tartu: Tartu University, 2011, p.41

⁸⁵ Halbwachs, Maurice. *On Collective Memory*. Lewis A. Coser (ed). Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1992, p.43

⁸⁶ Pääbo, 2011, p.21.

⁸⁷ Funkenstein, Amos. *Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness, History and Memory*, Vol.1, 1989, pp.5-26, p.5.

and therefore it is absolutely and completely personal”⁸⁸. However, he adds that even though individuals experience a common event, their memories are not identical. Each individual’s memory creates different associations and feelings. Funkenstein indicates that “[r]emembering, whether of personal experiences or of events in the past of a society, is a mental activity of a subject who is conscious of performing it. Memory may even constitute self-consciousness, because self-identity presumes memory.”⁸⁹ On the same grounds, Heiko Pääbo states that collective memory therefore is not a social phenomenon but it is more like a meaning given to the past by a group⁹⁰.

Susan Sontag discusses that

“collective memory is not a remembering but a stipulating: that this is important, and this is the story about how it happened ... that lock the story in our minds. Ideologies create substantiating archives ... which encapsulate common ideas of significance and trigger predictable thoughts, feelings”.⁹¹

However, as cited in Pääbo, Rafael F, Narvaez adds that “[c]ollective memory is not only about remembering (the past) or about social order and action (the present) but, critically, it is about how social groups project themselves towards the future.”⁹²

Even though, I do not aim to define Cyprioturkish as a national identity formation process rather as a method for creation of alternative political discourse. It is possible to claim that all four approaches of nation are present within Cyprioturkish. However, mainly ethno-symbolic approach could enable us to offer clearer understanding how Cyprioturkish has emerged through national sentiments. Despite the fact that, it is not possible to claim that Turkish

⁸⁸ Funkenstein, 1989, p.6.

⁸⁹ Funkenstein, 1989, p.6.

⁹⁰ Pääbo, 2011, p.21.

⁹¹ Sontag, Susan. *Regarding the Pain of Others*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003, pp. 62-63.

⁹² Narvaez, Rafael F. Embodiment, Collective Memory and Time, *Body & Society*, Vol. 12(3), 2006, pp.51-73, p.67. Cited in Pääbo, Heiko. *Potential of Collective Memory Based International Identity Conflicts in Post-Imperial Space*, Tartu: Tartu University, 2011, p.22

Cypriots identify themselves through political entity in Cyprus northern. It is possible to say that; establishment of the political entity in Cyprus northern itself creates certain level of elements for political elites to evoke ethnic ties of belongingness with greater Turkish identity. In that sense, it could be argued that, there is no new identity creation process in Cyprus northern after 1974 but more awakening and remembering of already existing national identity ties with Turkish nationalism. In this regard, as awakening of Turkish nationalism served to the need of political elites to create ties with greater Turkish nationalism. Cyprioturkish could also be seen as a reactionary narrative to Turkish nationalism and Cypriotism discourses which suppresses Turkish Cypriots through their claims on the island.

2.2.Turkish Cypriot Administrations

In a previous chapter, the disputes of the nationalist organisations EOKA and TMT were presented. It was noted that on December 21st 1963, EOKA attacked Turkish Cypriot populated areas in several different parts of the island which caused a resumption of bi-communal conflict. The Turkish Cypriot political elite left or were forced to leave (?) their positions in the Republic of Cyprus and due to the clashes between the paramilitary organisations of the respective Cypriot communities; Turkish Cypriots began to live in enclaves surrounded by EOKA paramilitary forces. Turkish Cypriots continued to live in these enclaves for 11 years until the Turkish military intervention in 1974. During 1963, bi-communal conflict escalated into violence. The ideological differences among the communities turned into violence with armed forces. Even though the UN has had the UNFICYP in Cyprus since March 1964, the bi-communal conflict did not stop until 1974. From the Greek Cypriot perspective, Turkish Cypriots left the Republic of Cyprus organs willingly in order to create a Turkish Cypriot populated zone with the aim of achieving

taksim. On the other hand, from the Turkish Cypriots perspective, Greek Cypriots used violence against Turkish Cypriots as it had been stated in the *Akritas Plan* in order to achieve their final goal, Enosis. Therefore, Turkish Cypriots reject the argument that the Turkish Cypriots left the Republic of Cyprus. Instead they argue that Turkish Cypriots were removed from power and forced to live in enclaves.

After withdrawal from the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots established a temporary administrative authority in coordination with the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT). Until the 1974 Turkish military intervention, Turkish Cypriots continued to live in small enclaves surrounded by paramilitary organisations. After the Turkish military intervention of 1974, the island was *de facto* separated. In 1975, Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and following the talks in Vienna in August 1975, the parties agreed to conduct an exchange of populations. Around 200,000 Greek Cypriots left the north of the island and moved to the south while around 40,000 Turkish Cypriots moved to north⁹³. On November 15th 1983, Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared independence and established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which, apart from Turkey, is an unrecognised state⁹⁴. In that sense, it is possible to say that Turkish Cypriots began to live in a phantasmatic state in which nationalist symbols such as monuments of Atatürk and monuments to commemorate the people who lost their lives between 1963-1974 were erected in addition to many other symbols which served to remind people that the island is Turkish and that, thanks to the Turkish 'motherland', Turkish Cypriots are alive today.

⁹³ Interim Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to UN Security Council (1975, August 5), S/11789 Resolution 370

⁹⁴ Mirbagheri, 2010, p.42

2.3. National Narrative: On the margins of ‘the Turk’ and ‘the Cypriot’

History education among other reasons could be defined as “the inculcation of national identity to the propagation of moral and political positions, the creation of empathy and presentation of diverse viewpoints, or historical analysis and the promotion of critical thinking”⁹⁵. Hálfðanarson and Kızılyürek state that “[h]istory is also used to legitimate population groups in the present, and to define their existence vis-à-vis other groups – with other memories and origins”⁹⁶. Therefore, history education could draw the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and consequently it could define who belongs to the group of ‘our’ and who is not. According to Papadakis, in many places where divisions occur through ethnonational disputes, history education might be used as a tool to propagate a national narrative of suffering and to silence the suffering and existence of the ‘other’⁹⁷. Even though negotiations have been carried on by the parties, Papadakis claims that history education was not changed and the ‘other’ has always been defined as the ‘aggressor’. Papadakis states that what is defined as ‘identification stance’ is “stories of national origins and historic turning points [that] can create a sense of group membership and allegiance, and historic societal achievements [that] can be used to justify contemporary social arrangements or political actions.”⁹⁸

Hálfðanarson and Kızılyürek suggest that in Cyprus there was no internal movement for independence or a state building process during the British Administration. Instead, communities tend to want to unite the island with Greece or Turkey. The nationalist political elite have tended to see themselves as ‘organic parts’ or ‘extensions’ of their ‘motherlands’-

⁹⁵ Papadakis, Yannakis. Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus, *History & Memory* Vol.20(2), 2008 pp.128-148, p.128

⁹⁶ Hálfðanarson, N.K. Two Islands of History: ‘History Wars’ in Cyprus and Iceland. In Candaş Bilşel et al. *Constructing cultural identity, representing social power*. Pisa: Plus, 2010, pp. 1-19, p.1

⁹⁷ Papadakis, 2008, p.128

⁹⁸ Keith C.Barton and Linda S. Levstik, *Teaching History for the Common Good* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004. Cited in Papadakis, Yannakis. *Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus*, *History & Memory* Vol.20(2), 2008 pp.128-148, p.129

the Turkish and Greek nations. Hence, it might be argued that, there was not a ‘history of Cyprus’ but the ‘History of Greek and Turkish nations’⁹⁹.

Yannakis Papadakis in his study *Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus* analyses the history books of the Cypriot communities and claims that both parties use similar ethnonationalist approaches in history education. Papadakis states that in history books of both communities it is possible to observe the “stressing of common history, descent, language, culture and religion with the people of the ‘motherlands’- Turkey and Greece”¹⁰⁰. Papadakis compares the school books in both entities of Cyprus. However, due to the limitations and focus of this thesis, only history books in ‘*Cyprus northern*’¹⁰¹ would be discussed in detail. According to Papadakis, history books in Cyprus northern begin history with the conquest of the island by the Ottoman Empire. It can be observed that special attention is given to show how the island is connected with Turkey through its geography and history. Whereas, according to the history books, Greece has no significant connection with the island. Papadakis states that in history books, it is argued that Cyprus has maintained its Ottoman heritage and it is argued that the Ottoman Period was a time of freedom and progress. It is stated in the books that the Ottomans freed the Orthodox from Venetians and that ‘their’ rebellions were ungrateful actions¹⁰². Greek Cypriots are referred as ‘*Rum*’ or ‘*Rum Milleti*’ which states their previous connection with The Ottoman Empire as *subjects* and which is a way to differ Greek Cypriots from *Yunan* (Greeks - Ionian) who gained Greek identity after the Independence of Greece from the Ottoman in 1821. By selection of these words, writers of the history books aim to challenge Greek Cypriot history books where

⁹⁹ Hálfðanarson, N.K., 2010, p.5

¹⁰⁰ Papadakis, 2008, p.131

¹⁰¹ The usage of ‘Cyprus northern’ is intentional. After this point, I would prefer to use geographical nouns after geographical name of the island without capital letters. By this way, I aim to differentiate only ‘political entities’ in Cyprus and not to repeat constructed social division through my thesis. As long as, it is not requirement to refer political entities with their claimed name, I would prefer to refer them as, Cyprus northern and Cyprus southern.

¹⁰² Papadakis, 2008, p.135

Greek Cypriots are shown as being a part of the heritage of Greeks. In history books of Cyprus southern, Mycenaean and the Byzantine Empire are glorified as Hellenistic Ancestors. In contrast, in Cyprus northern, The Ottoman Empire is glorified and thus roots of Turkishness are provided with historical connections. It should be noted that Turkey is referred as the 'The Motherland' in history books in Cyprus northern. Papadakis adds that the period 1963-1974 receives the greatest emphasis in Cyprus northern history books. In the books, 'barbaric actions'; battles, killings and mass graves and forced displacements by the 'Rums' are described in detail, day by day, village by village and with pictures of the victims of violence. However, the suffering of Greek Cypriots in 1974 is not mentioned. According to history books in Cyprus northern, 1974 was the 'Happy Peace Operation' which ended the suffering of the 'Turks' of Cyprus¹⁰³.

According to Papadakis,

"if the Self (and the Enemy [other]) were the same throughout history, any injury to the National Self in the past is an injury to the current Self too, calling for revenge or retribution against those currently designated as descendants and hence part of the Enemy [other]"¹⁰⁴.

In that sense, in 2005, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) government in Cyprus northern has attempted to remove the victimisation and revenge against the 'other' from the history books and even tried to foster the idea of the common struggle against the British Colonial Period. However, in 2009 when the National Unity Party (UBP) obtained a parliamentary majority in the north the old books were brought back¹⁰⁵. Since 1968, negotiations between community leaders aim to reach a comprehensive solution to the conflict. However, in both entities history books are still propagating self/other differentiation through victimisation and sufferings of the past. This should be noted as a paradox of the political will of Cypriots.

¹⁰³ Papadakis, 2008, p.136

¹⁰⁴ Papadakis, 2008, p.143

¹⁰⁵ Hálfðanarson, N.K., 2010, p.4

Hálfdanarson and Kızılyürek argue that Greek Cypriots' history education aims to develop a stronger 'sense of belonging to Hellenism' and 'enforcement of the cultural union with mother Greece'. At the same time, Turkish Cypriots' history education aims to strengthen its relations with 'Mother Turkey' and its connection to a Turkish past¹⁰⁶.

Doğuş Derya argues that the dispute of the two communities has become the problem of remembering. According to Derya, the Greek Cypriot leadership aims to focus more on the suffering of Greek Cypriots in 1974 whilst erasing the Turkish Cypriots' suffering in the pre-1974 period. By doing so, the Greek Cypriot leadership aims to describe the problem of Cyprus dispute as an international relations crisis, whereby Turkey, as a foreign state has invaded the sovereign Republic of Cyprus. This also de-emphasises the bi-communal aspects of the Cyprus dispute. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, on the other hand, emphasises more the ethnic violence faced by the Turkish Cypriot community prior to the 1974 military intervention. Derya states that these two different approaches to the same past are the basic formation of different or even conflicting concerns of the future¹⁰⁷. Derya adds that Cyprus northern should be considered as a *phantasmatic space* where national desires are opposed. In that sense, Derya argues that the state was not established to serve as a nation-state of Turkish Cypriots but more a possible spatial organisation in which disciplining and ordering the people of the north as 'Turkish'¹⁰⁸.

Derya follows Bhabha and explains that narratives of the nation are never unchanged. Derya argues that there should always be splits between accumulative temporality and the performative. According to Derya, Cyprus northern is perceived as *Yavruvatan* (Babyland) by a Turkish nationalism that sees itself as *Motherland*. On the other hand, the Cypriotism

¹⁰⁶ Hálfdanarson, N.K., 2010, p.5

¹⁰⁷ Derya, Doğuş. Living on the margins of 'the Turk' and 'the Cypriot': The Cyprioturk as the subject of ambiguity, Istanbul: Boğaziçi University (Unpublished MA thesis), 2007 pp.7-9

¹⁰⁸ Derya, 2007, p.42

discourse perceives Turkish Cypriots as the Turkish minority in the island. These perceptions of Turkish Cypriots have played a significant role in an alteration of the identification of the people in Cyprus northern. At the same time, this has constructed Cyprus northern as a phantasmatic space wherein, as the two narrativizations, the motherland discourse of Turkey and the Cypriotism discourse have excluded Turkish Cypriots¹⁰⁹.

The Motherland discourse constructs the Cyprus issue as a national case and thus shapes the narrative that Cyprus is a Turkish land. Derya adds that this is part of the greater aim of *Panturkist* imagination where *Turan* aims to gather all the Turkish-speaking people in a greater Turkish world which would be centred on the Turkish Republic¹¹⁰. She argues that the narrativization of Turkish Cypriots as ‘Outer Turks’ and as enslaved by the atrocity of Greeks, makes the Cyprus dispute a national duty for the Turkish nation to save their siblings from the eternal enemy, the Greeks. On the other hand, within the Motherland discourse, the fight against the eternal Greek enemy, narrates the possible outcome that Turkish Cypriots and Anatolian Turks are *many as one* and could fight the same ‘other’, the Greeks¹¹¹. Besides, the strengthening of the disputes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots could be reduced to the consequences of the Greek will of reconstructing the Byzantine Empire and removal of Turkish existence in the region. Therefore, the fight of Turkish Cypriots for existence could be rooted as the historic fight of Turks against the establishment of the Byzantine Empire¹¹². Derya suggests that the equalisation of two different historical cases the War of Independence and inter-ethnic conflict narrates the possibility of imagining a Turkish nation in Cyprus. Thus, the anti-enosis struggle could be transformed into a Turkish national

¹⁰⁹ Derya, 2007, pp.44-45

¹¹⁰ Derya, Doğuş. North Cyprus as a Phantasmatic Space of Turkish Nationalism, in *Constructing cultural identity, representing social power*, ed. Cana Bilsel et al., Pisa : Plus-Pisa University Press, 2010, pp.19-30, p 21

¹¹¹ Derya, 2010, p.23

¹¹² Derya, 2007, p.51

struggle in Cyprus¹¹³. She claims that the Panturkist narrative which has locked the identity of Turkish Cypriots into the Turkish nation, has also created an imagined past which might be linked to an imagined future. Thus, it should be stated that the Panturkist invention of the past for Turkish Cypriots has facilitated the construction of ethnic and racial ties between Anatolia and Cyprus. Therefore, Turkish Cypriot history became a part of the continuous development of the Turkish Nation¹¹⁴.

The Motherland discourse narrates that Turks have been masters of the Greeks for centuries. The refusal of inferiority *vis a vis* Greek Cypriots has deep connections with the attachment of Turkish Cypriots with greater Turkish history. Therefore, the conflict becomes a matter of honour for Turkish Cypriots. Probably, this might indicate the desire of Turkish Cypriots to be an *adult man* in the eyes of the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, it is possible to say that the code of honour was employed by the Turkish Cypriot nationalist as a sign of maturity against the Greek Cypriot. The honour code also enabled these men to represent themselves as *real men* who could be martyred with dignity instead of being slaves to the Greeks¹¹⁵. Derya argues that the fantasy of Panturkism to possess Cyprus has created an effect for the Turkish Cypriot nationalist to be defined with Turkism. She suggests that Turkish Cypriots being defined as the children of the Motherland, for the first time has found a subject position for themselves. The desire for the Turkifying of Cyprus has created a possibility for nationalists. If they win the war in the nationalist struggle against the eternal enemy, they might thus end their inferiority to Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, they might have the chance to prove their maturity to their mother and become an adult man. At the same time, the characterisation of the Turkish Cypriots as the children of the motherland has opened a space

¹¹³ Derya, 2007, p.52

¹¹⁴ Derya, 2010, p.23

¹¹⁵ Derya, 2007, pp.67-68 and Derya, 2010, p.27

for the Turkish nation to be the saviours of the miniature Anatolia, *babyland*¹¹⁶. Turkish Cypriots who aim to end their inferiority against the Greek Cypriots` political and economic dominance has only managed to create an adult men/subject position for themselves only by being the children of the motherland¹¹⁷. The struggle to end the inferiority has created another problem. Being children of a mother, Turkish Cypriots have faced a mother who would like to control every action of her children. Turkish Cypriots were not Turkish enough nor mature enough in the eyes of the Motherland discourse. Therefore, Turkish Cypriots needed to live under the dominance of the mother, until they learn to be mature and are able to rule on their own¹¹⁸. It is possible to say that Turkish Cypriots, are trying to establish a political organisation in order to be part of *Turan*, or putting it another way, trying to prove their maturity, has created a sort of phantasmatic space in Cyprus northern.

Cyprus northern has been established as a separate political entity since 1974. However, this was not an aim to create a separate nation-state but more to continue the motherland discourse and to educate/discipline Turkish Cypriots according to the Panturkist narratives¹¹⁹. After the establishment of a separate state, the nationalist front viewed leftists as an obstacle to the legitimization of the division. In the main, the leftist opposition supported the reunification of the island. Therefore, the nationalist front has taken every precaution to limit the political arena. In other words, politics were only possible if it were remotely controlled by the Turkish Republic¹²⁰. Nergis Canefe states that, in Cyprus northern an independent state has been established but which is solely dependent on the existence of the Turkish military and economic support of Turkey. According to Canefe, Turkish Cypriots are half-

¹¹⁶ Derya, 2010, p.28 and Derya, 2007, p.69

¹¹⁷ Derya, 2007, p.70

¹¹⁸ Derya, 2007, p.71 and Derya, 2010, p.28

¹¹⁹ Canefe, Nergis. Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunda Vatandaşlık, Tarih ve Hafıza: Kıbrıslılık Mümkün mü?(Citizenship, History and Memory in Cypriot Turkish Community), in Canefe, Nergis. Anavatandan Yavruvatana: Milliyetçilik, Bellek ve Aidiyet (Motherland to Babyland: Nationalism, Memory and Belonging), İstanbul: Bilgi University, 2007, pp.271-287, p281

¹²⁰ Derya, 2007, pp.77-78

colonised by Turkey¹²¹. Turkey has a direct effect on citizenship policies and there is systematic movement of Turkish population into Cyprus northern¹²². According to Derya, the condition of being colonised is not limited to citizenship policies. Laws of Ownership allow Anatolian Turks to settle in properties which are left by Greek Cypriots. Derya states that this is spatialization of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus¹²³.

Cyprus southern has also been affected by the events of 1974. Greek Cypriots have revoked Hellenistic nationalism and define their belongingness with Cypriotism¹²⁴. Derya argues that Cyprus southern also aimed to create a phantasmatic space as if Turkish Cypriots have not left and established their politics based on the arguments as “the common land of Cyprus”, “a common state”, “past peaceful coexistence” and especially “the political independence of the island”¹²⁵. The Greek Cypriot approach of de-emphasizing the suffering of Turkish Cypriots and the reflection of the Cyprus dispute only as an invasion of Cyprus by Turkey is interesting and worthy of discussion¹²⁶. Ceasar V. Mavratsas states that Cypriotism as a political stand has been used in 1920-1940`s especially by Cypriot Communist Party as a bi-communal struggle against British rule for labour rights but that it had only one purpose; to de-ethnicise the communities for the common struggle¹²⁷. However, this was not attractive to Greek Cypriots who held a strong belongingness with Hellenic culture. In this sense, it could be claimed that Cypriotism has only surfaced in a political agenda for self-determination. The aim of Enosis was in pushing for Greek Cypriots to defend the argument that “Cypriots want to decide the future of the island”¹²⁸. However, by 1967 Cypriotism had undergone a political

¹²¹ Turkey could also be referred as ‘Patronizing-state’.

¹²² Canefe, 2007, pp.281-282

¹²³ Derya, 2007, p.79. and Derya, 2010, p.21 and p.25

¹²⁴ Cambazis, Kiriakos. *Kıbrıs Siyasetinde Milliyetçilik (Nationalism in Politics of Cyprus)*, Nicosia: Galeri Kültür, 2011, p.103

¹²⁵ Derya, 2007, p.80

¹²⁶ Derya, 2007, p.82

¹²⁷ Mavratsas, C. V., The ideological contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974–1995: Politics, social memory and identity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 20(4), 1997, pp. 717-737, p.723

¹²⁸ Derya, 2007, p.84

shift by Makarios who had different views from the Greek Junta. Makarios has used Cypriotism as belongingness to the republic by citizenship. Therefore, he claimed that Cypriots could decide when and how they would like to achieve enosis and that it was not to be not by order of Greece¹²⁹¹³⁰. Ceaser V. Mavratsas argues that this invention of “shared happy life” by Neo-Cypriots has been conducted at the expense of silencing of the Turkish Cypriot Suffering between 1963-1974.¹³¹ As Michel R. Trouillot argues “the epistemological break between history and fiction is always expressed concretely through historically situated evaluation of specific narratives”¹³². According to him, “at some point, historically specific groups of humans must decide if a particular narrative belongs to history or to fiction”¹³³. If it is possible to consider the nation as strategies which operate to create silencing, that it is possible to argue that the narrativization of the Cypriot has no space for Turkish Cypriots and therefore, it pushes Turkish Cypriots to invent their own past¹³⁴. Perhaps, as Mavratsas argues, Neo-cypriots without “denying their national origins” imagine a Cypriot community under Greek Cypriot domination¹³⁵. In that sense, by denying heterogeneous structure of Cyprus, Neo-Cypriots aim to establish a nation for an already existing state¹³⁶.

Turkish Cypriots who were living under a Turkish patronizing-state started to question their identity during the 1990s. The involvement/interference of Turkish government in internal affairs of Cyprus northern during the Democrat Party (DP) – Republican Turkish Party (CTP) coalition was publicised by the CTP. Since 1981, the mainly leftist parties CTP and Communal Liberation Party (TKP) have been distanced from the power. Rauf Denktaş, as the leader of the newly established state was informing Turkey about the politics of the leftist

¹²⁹ Derya, 2007, p.87

¹³⁰ Mavratsas, 1997, p.724.

¹³¹ Mavratsas, 1997, p.724.

¹³² Trouillot, Michel R. *Silencing the Past, Power and the Production of History*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1995, p.8.

¹³³ Trouillot, 1995, p.8.

¹³⁴ Derya, 2007, p.90.

¹³⁵ Mavratsas, 1997, p.721.

¹³⁶ Cambazis, 2011, p.105

CTP and TKP. Denктаş described the parties as ‘traitors’. CTP and TKP were not desired as a part of government coalition since they were supporting reunification. According to Turkey, this was too risky as it could damage Turkification of Cyprus¹³⁷. In 1983, Rauf Denктаş set up a new system for the Panturkist narrative. The declaration of Independence of the TRNC was reflected as a process of recognition. Denктаş wanted to have the mother’s approval that Turkish Cypriots were mature enough to have their own state. The declaration of the TRNC was a *fait accompli* for Turkish Cypriots and for Turkey. Opposition parties were invited to a meeting and they were asked to support the declaration, otherwise their political activities would be banned¹³⁸. During the same period, military rule was about to transfer the administration to the elected parties in Turkey. The United Nations adopted a resolution (541) and condemned the declaration and assured that the only government which was recognised by the United Nations was the Republic of Cyprus¹³⁹. According to Derya, the phantasmatic state was strengthened when the babyland became the neverland¹⁴⁰. Begoña Aretxaga explains that

“[t]hey [nation states] have actively engaged in the production of national fantasies of *communitas* in a variety of ways, from monumentalization of heroism aimed at creating collective memory and myth, to monumentalization of fable and folktale projecting the erasure of memory and the infantilization of the nation”¹⁴¹.

Derya states that conditions created through establishment of the TRNC such as ‘internal differences, power struggles, fantasies, discourses and narratives’ might help us to understand that the TRNC was also an instrument for expansion of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus¹⁴². Aretxaga argues that “the state – as unified political subject or structure – does not exist; it is

¹³⁷ Kızılyürek, 2005, p.256

¹³⁸ Kızılyürek, 2005, p.260

¹³⁹ Resolution 541, (1983, November 18th), United Nations.

¹⁴⁰ Derya, 2007, p.122

¹⁴¹ Aretxaga, Begoña. *Maddening States, Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 32, (2003), pp. 393-410, p.396.

¹⁴² Derya, 2007, p.125

a collective illusion, the reification of an idea that masks real power relations under the guise of public interest.¹⁴³ In Cyprus northern, there is consciousness that the state is not legitimate, even though it provides services such as education, health etc. and has legal documentations for its citizens. However, due to its isolated condition as a phantasmatic state it does not have economic self-sustainability. It has dependency to Turkey for economic survival. Aretxaga discusses that people forms the ‘psychic glue’ at the heart of a nation which makes a state legitimate but at the same time, it pushes people to stay as the object of fear. As *modus operandi*, states have to create certain narratives which haunt fear and also help on creation of enemies/others in order to have absolute control over the people through mirroring paranoid dynamic. As we have discussed earlier, collective memory is what keeps a nation together¹⁴⁴.

In the case of Cyprus northern, the eternal enemies are the Greek Cypriots and leftists who imagine Cypriotism instead of Turkism. Derya states that “[a]fter the establishment of the TRNC, the problem of recognition was inextricably linked to the collective subjectivity of the Turkish Cypriots and constructed as the site where the required consent for Turkish national hegemony was produced”¹⁴⁵. The establishment of the TRNC created a position for Turkish Cypriots to be recognised by its mother, however, it is mainly its desire to be recognised by its other/Greek Cypriots as an equal party. Derya claims that

“the emancipation of Turkish Cypriots from the position of minority, or the guarantee of their rights, was equated with being a part of the TRNC. This subject was defined as Turkish, because the Greek Cypriot official position was elaborated through the discourse of Cypriotism, and to be recognized as a separate state required being different from its Other”¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴³ Aretxaga, 2003, p.400

¹⁴⁴ Aretxaga, 2003, p.402

¹⁴⁵ Derya, 2007, p.129

¹⁴⁶ Derya, 2007, p.130

During the 1990`s the CTP and TKP opposition parties established a front *Demokratik Mücadele Partisi* (DMP, Democratic Struggle Party) with Turkish settlers against the Denktaş regime. However, due to the involvement of the Turkish government this front did not last long¹⁴⁷. However, after this period, Turkish Cypriots began to see Turkish nationalism as a method of oppression and tried to differentiate themselves from Turkish settlers and become more curious about Cypriotness. During this period, Serdar Denktaş began to use Turkish Cypriot identity as if it was a nation-state identity¹⁴⁸. Serdar Denktaş has aimed to fill the interstices of Turkish nationalism, in order to re-legitimize the state in the eyes of Turkish Cypriots¹⁴⁹. Nazım Beratlı has aimed to create a Turkish Cypriot narrative which was different from the Turkish narrative. Beratlı argues that according to registries of Divan-ı Hümayun, people who were sent to the island by the Ottoman Rule are ethnically Turks; however, they were Azeri Turkmen and instead of being *Sunni Muslim*, they are *Alevi (Shia)*. Consequently, this new narrative was not creating an ethnic differentiation but more a religious one¹⁵⁰. Even though it has challenged the national narrative about the origins of Turkish Cypriots, it has not challenged the Motherland discourse which creates dominance over Turkish Cypriots.

In the early 2000s, when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented a draft version of the Annan Plan to the parties¹⁵¹, Turkish Cypriots were reliant on the fact that the entity in Cyprus northern was not sustainable. Democracy and human rights were not respected by the authority in Cyprus northern. Turkish Cypriots gathered to declare their will to self-govern and their demand for reunification. The narrative changed and it was “This country is Ours”. The Motherland discourse had lost its credibility when intervention of Turkish governments

¹⁴⁷ Kızılyürek, 2005, p.262

¹⁴⁸ Derya, 2007, p.156

¹⁴⁹ Derya, 2007, p.157

¹⁵⁰ Beratlı, Nazım. *Kıbrıslı Türklerin Tarihi 1 (History of Turkish Cypriots 1)*, Nicosia: Galeri Kültür, 1997, pp.127-131

¹⁵¹ Kızılyürek, 2005, p.269

into the internal affairs of Cyprus northern became more visible and economical struggles made it clear that the entity was not sustainable¹⁵². Turkish Cypriots who were stuck between Turkism and Cypriotism, were seeking a third possibility for politics of difference and equality. The anti-status quo front has created its own narrative as *Adavatan* (island-land) instead of the Motherland discourse. *Cyprioturkishness* gathered people from different social backgrounds into meeting area. Doğuş Derya states that it was not an easy step to replace *Anavatan* with *Adavatan*, since any negative attribution to the motherland could be seen as treachery¹⁵³. As it was stated earlier, the transformation of motherland discourse in phantasmatic space would not be easy. The state itself was based on a discourse which was about to be challenged. The anti-status quo front chose to negotiate the terms of Turkish hegemony in order to come into power and make the demanded changes. The CTP as the main opposition took the old national terms and change their meanings in order to create the nucleus of a new ideological and doctrinal ensemble as is suggested by Gramscian War of Position. Mehmet Ali Talat, as the leader of CTP, once said that as a Cyprioturk his motherland is Cyprus and Turkey could only be the Cyprioturks' fatherland¹⁵⁴. As has been discussed in motherland discourse, Turkish Cypriots who were perceived as immature, not real Turks, were creating a new identity position *Cyprioturk* which was in the margins of the Turk and the Cypriot. "Cyprioturks have to talk from within the language of the colonizer in order to represent their cultural differences. Thus, the struggle for self-representation and for claiming an identity through difference could require renegotiation with the terms of the old hegemonies"¹⁵⁵. Cyprioturkism needed to open new channels in order to make the suffering of pre-1974 and post-1974 visible. This was not a challenge to mobilize people as Cyprioturks but more an attempt to find possible ways to tell the story of Cyprioturks`

¹⁵² Kızılyürek, 2005, p.267

¹⁵³ Derya, 2007, p.161

¹⁵⁴ Derya, 2007, pp.163-164

¹⁵⁵ Derya, 2007, p.164

subordination. This was the story of Cyprioturks desire to be respected in their homeland and the right for self-rule, to be accepted as children of the same patria with Greek Cypriots.

Derya adds that:

“As Constantinou and Papadakis argue, for both communities of the island, the recognition or even the possibility of recognition of the “other’s regime” as a legitimate government or sovereign state determines what constitutes the Cyprus Problem. [...]In other words, the discourse of recognition has shaped the political subjectivities of the two sides’ people and has forced these people to speak from within already constructed ideological measures.”¹⁵⁶

In this chapter, I have discussed the Cyprioturk identity which is in the margins of the Turk and the Cypriot. Through the chapter, I have analysed how Cyprioturkishness has created a space for the politics of difference and equality and has offered a voice for Turkish Cypriots to express their subordination both to Turkish nationalism and the Cypriotism of Greek Cypriots.

¹⁵⁶ Derya, 2007, pp.169-170

Chapter 3 : Nationalism and Sexuality

In his book *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson discusses the origins of the nation and nationhood. He states that a nation:

“is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”¹⁵⁷

Anderson states that one should consider multiple significations of nationness and nationalism in order to understand how they have been culturally established and gone through a cultural change over time. Anderson mentions that a nation:

“is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”¹⁵⁸

According to Anderson, changes in communication technologies, mainly print techniques, were an important factor on national consciousness. He argues that this brought fixity to languages in fields of exchange and communication which created power of language in the creation of consciousness. As been quoted in Anderson`s book “nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one”.¹⁵⁹ We discussed earlier how print capitalism affected Cypriots in the formation of religious/ethnic ties through the print media. The interrelation of nationalism and sexuality may shed some light on these relations and on how the print media has been able to play a role in the shaping of public consciousness on homosexuality on the ‘national’

¹⁵⁷ Benedict, Anderson. *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso, 1983, p.6

¹⁵⁸ Benedict, 1983, p.7

¹⁵⁹ Seton-Watson, Hugh. *Nations and States: An Enquiry Into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977, p.5. Cited in Benedict, Anderson. *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso, 1983, p.6

level. In this chapter, theoretical discussions will give us an opportunity to understand how the intersectional relationship of nationalism and sexuality could play a role in understanding how sexuality is controlled, how heterosexuality is enforced as the only sexuality, and how nationalism effects representation of certain sexual acts as ‘perversion’, ‘anormalcy’ or ‘illegal’. In this sense, I will focus more on homosexuality and the declaration of homosexuality as ‘unnatural’, a ‘sin’ or a ‘perversion’ during the 19th Century. I will trace back the roots of the Sodomy Laws which were enforced until very recently in Cyprus northern. Thus, I hope to understand the interrelation of how nationalism and sexuality play a role in the creation of a homophobic reaction to the representation of self by LGBT people.

In his book *Nationalism and Sexuality*, George L. Mosse discusses nationalism and the concept of respectability. According to him, respectability becomes an instrument for the middle classes which were seeking stability in order to legitimise its normative understanding¹⁶⁰. He claims that nationalism in this sense helped respectability understanding to spread in society while keeping its essence intact. It is argued by Mosse that with respectability control of the human body and sexuality were introduced. He states that physicians replaced religious clergy in creating a distinction between ‘normalcy’ and ‘abnormality’ and also became guardians of ‘normalcy’. Mosse disputes whether nationalism and respectability, through their cooperation which has “assigned everyone his [sic] place in life, man and woman, normal and abnormal, native and foreigner; any confusion between these categories threatened chaos and loss of control”¹⁶¹. Mosse states that nationalism has tried to lessen the effect of homoeroticism in order to have masculinity clear in its message sent to society. According to him, it is important to keep masculine beauty and its

¹⁶⁰ Mosse, George L. *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe*, New York: Howard Fertig, 1997, p.9

¹⁶¹ Mosse, 1997, p.16

respectability¹⁶². Mosse, in his analysis, provides a very clear connection of nationalism and masculinity through his concept of respectability. Manliness has been defined by nationalism according to Mosse's observation and some groups of people have been placed in the category of 'abnormal'. He argues that during the period he discusses, homosexuality becomes the "anti-thesis of respectability"¹⁶³. Therefore we could assume that manliness, as it is depicted in Mosse's analysis, needs its significant 'other' homosexuality to exist. As was mentioned in Mosse's analysis, the main aim is to keep a certain group of people and their sexual practices within the 'abnormal' category and thereby under control.

In her article *Sexing Political Identities: Nationalism as Heterosexism*, V. Spike Peterson discusses nationalism as a homogenisation project of political identification in which normalisation of heterosexuality takes place in state institutions. Peterson argues that "whereas heterosexuality refers sex/affective relations between people of the 'opposite sex', heterosexism refers to the institutionalization and normalization of heterosexuality and the corollary exclusion of non-heterosexual identities and practices."¹⁶⁴ She states that heterosexism in today's state-centric nationalism becomes a key to sexist practices in the sense that "[h]eterosexism presupposes a binary coding of polarized and hierarchical male/masculine and female/feminine identities and denies all but heterosexual coupling as the basis of sexual intimacy, family life, and group reproduction"¹⁶⁵. Peterson claims that "heterosexist ideology and practice is inextricable from the centralization of political authority/coercive power that we refer to as state-making"¹⁶⁶. She argues that normalisation of heterosexuality is based on biological differences which are accepted as masculine/men

¹⁶² Mosse, 1997, p.16

¹⁶³ Mosse, 1997, p.37

¹⁶⁴ Peterson, V.Spike. *Sexing Political Identities: Nationalism as Heterosexism*, *International Feminist Journal of Politics* Vol:1(1), June 1999, pp. 34-65, p.39

¹⁶⁵ Peterson, 1999, p.39

¹⁶⁶ Peterson, 1999, p.39

and feminine/women. She declares that through state-centric nationalism, hetero-patriarchal families, and thus, control of human sexuality and reproduction are normalised¹⁶⁷.

In his article *The Emergence of Political Homophobia in Indonesia*, Tom Boellstorff discusses how shame in the Indonesian context turns into public acts with political homophobia against LGBT people and their public events.

Boellstorff argues that

*“the potential for the nation to be represented by non-normative men challenges a nationalized masculinity, enabling what has long been understood to be a normative male response to ‘mali’ – namely the masculine and often collective enraged violence known in Indonesian as ‘amok’.”*¹⁶⁸

He argues that “homophobia and heterosexism feed off each other; heterosexism creates a climate where fear and hatred of non-normative sexualities and genders can take root, and homophobia creates a climate where heterosexuality is assumed to be superior”¹⁶⁹. According to Boellstorff, political homophobia is “an emergent cultural logic linking emotions, sexuality and political violence. It brings together the direct object of non-normative Indonesian men with the indirect object of contemporary Indonesian public culture, making enraged violence against gay men intelligible and socially efficacious.”¹⁷⁰ He disputes that “[w]hile all homophobia has political effects, the notion of ‘political homophobia’ is useful for highlighting violence deployed as a means of controlling who can make claims to belonging”¹⁷¹.

¹⁶⁷ Peterson, 1999, p.40

¹⁶⁸ Boellstorff, Tom. *The Emergence of Political Homophobia in Indonesia: Masculinity and National Belonging*, *Ethnos* 69(4), December 2004, pp.465-486, p.469

¹⁶⁹ Boellstorff, 2004, p.472

¹⁷⁰ Boellstorff, 2004, p.469

¹⁷¹ Boellstorff, 2004, p.480

In his article *Homophobia and Queer Belonging in Hungary*, Hadley Z. Renkin discusses the limits of interpretations of homophobia which is blind to the agency of LGBT people and portrays them as passive objects. Renkin argues that homophobia in psychological analysis is argued to be an individual reaction which is fear of sexual others. However, he argues that this does not justify why homophobia becomes a political tool, present in certain periods but not in others¹⁷². Renkin states that modern European nation-building which locates homosexuality as sexual ‘other’ to itself, accepts homophobia as a static element of nationalism. Thus, he argues that people are placed within a binary of nationalist/homophobic and homosexual/anti-nationalist¹⁷³. Renkin states that due to LGBT people’s transnational belonging they are accepted to be ‘other’ to their nation. He states that LGBT people’s rights become a way of ranking the level of democracy. Since, transnational values brought by LGBT people are accepted as the values of the EU and the West, Renkin argues that this produces a challenge to national identity formation. According to Renkin, right wing homophobia thus stands as a rejection of moral colonialism by Western Europe¹⁷⁴. Therefore, he argues that according to this understanding, the scope of homophobic reaction does not target LGBT individuals but what they represent¹⁷⁵. According to Renkin, all these methods of analysing homophobia erase the agency of LGBT people¹⁷⁶. Thus, Renkin suggests that the homophobic reaction is not an individual antipathy nor a nationalist response to the other but is more a challenge to a national identity representation of self that LGBT people deployed for belonging¹⁷⁷. Renkin assures that LGBT people’s connection with the ‘global gay’ and nationhood in one’s native country challenges the heteronormative

¹⁷² Z. Renkin, Hadley. *Homophobia and Queer Belonging in Hungary*, *Focaal*, Vol. 53(Spring), 2009, pp.20-37, pp. 22-23

¹⁷³ Z. Renkin, 2009, pp. 22-23

¹⁷⁴ Z. Renkin, 2009, p. 24

¹⁷⁵ Z. Renkin, 2009, p.25

¹⁷⁶ Z. Renkin, 2009, p.26

¹⁷⁷ Z. Renkin, 2009, p.27

national identity¹⁷⁸. Therefore, he claims that LGBT people's queer belonging challenges national identity, and thus it challenges identities which are stable and distinct altogether¹⁷⁹.

3.1. Journey from sin/unnatural to perversion and illegal: Sodomy Laws

Florence Tamagne argues in *A History of Homosexuality in Europe* that we have to distinguish between homosexual conduct as an act and homosexual identity. Thus, she states that until the term homosexuality was invented by Karoly Maria Kertbeny in 1869 and its use starting to be abused widely in medical discourse, society did not differentiate people but acts¹⁸⁰. In relation to this logic, Tamagne states that homosexuality was not separated from *sodomy*.¹⁸¹ She states that psychiatry, with these newly created 'types' placed homosexuality into a new field of *perversions*¹⁸². Until psychiatrists entered the scene, Tamagne argues that the law was criminalizing certain sexual acts but did not aim to define perversion or perverts¹⁸³.

Jeffrey Weeks in his book *Sexuality* argues that not all sexual practices lead to procreation even the most erotic heterosexual ones. He states that sometimes intimacy is not a sufficient criterion to evaluate what is sexual.¹⁸⁴ He argues that "[i]f the way we think about sex shapes the way we experience it, then words are tiny marks of those thoughts, haphazard signs scribbled on the page or floating in the air, which we charge with meaning"¹⁸⁵. Weeks discusses two words 'perversity' and 'diversity' in order to make sense of sexuality. He argues that both of the words create certain relations to sexuality but each suggests a move away from strict rules of 'normality'. Thus, for him, "perversity is the state of being perverse

¹⁷⁸ Z. Renkin, 2009, p. 31

¹⁷⁹ Z. Renkin, 2009, pp. 31-32

¹⁸⁰ Tamagne, Florence. *A History of Homosexuality in Europe*, New York: Algora, 2006, pp. 5-6

¹⁸¹ Tamagne, 2006, p.7

¹⁸² Tamagne, 2006, p.152

¹⁸³ Tamagne, 2006, p.153

¹⁸⁴ Weeks, Jeffrey. *Sexuality*, London: Routledge, 2003, p.13

¹⁸⁵ Weeks, 2003, p.69

or perverted or a turning away from what is proper and right”¹⁸⁶. He defines diversity as “the condition of being diverse, concerning difference or unlikeness”¹⁸⁷. Weeks acknowledges that even though the words might appear to refer to the same phenomenon; in reality the differences that exist between them signifies a major shift in the language of sexuality and how we think about our desires. He states that perversions define a set of standards for behaviours in which perversions are at the bottom, whilst diversity refers to a continuum of behaviours which have fundamental value than any ‘other’.¹⁸⁸ Weeks states that the language of perversion through the 19th century in sexology and its manner of usage, which had its moral justification as to what is normal, carried a powerful charge¹⁸⁹. According to Weeks the list of perversions was endless and it included “homosexuality, fetishism, voyeurism, kleptomania, sadism and masochism, transvestism, coprophilia, undinism, frottage, chronic satyriasis and nymphomania, necrophilia, pederasty”¹⁹⁰. According to him, each of the perversions were investigated carefully and their possible ‘harms’ were speculated upon. Weeks argues that “the debates over the causes of the perversions and the eager descriptions of even their most outrageous examples inevitably worked to emphasize their pathology, their relationship to degeneracy, madness and sickness, and helped to reinforce the normality of heterosexual relations”¹⁹¹. Even though homosexuality was listed by some as perversion, according to Tamagne, there had been different understandings on what homosexuality is. She gives an example from *Psychopathia Sexualis* of Richard von Krafft-Ebing where he “distinguishes four stages of homosexuality: the psychosexual hermaphrodite, who preserves some traces of the heterosexual instinct; the homosexual; the effeminate; and the

¹⁸⁶ Weeks, 2003, p.69

¹⁸⁷ Weeks, 2003, p.69

¹⁸⁸ Weeks, 2003, pp. 69-70

¹⁸⁹ Weeks, 2003, p.70

¹⁹⁰ Weeks, 2003, p.70

¹⁹¹ Weeks, 2003, p.71

androgyne”¹⁹² which accordingly distinguishes homosexuality from “perversion of the sexual instinct to the belief in sex changes”¹⁹³. According to Weeks, ‘*Krafft-Ebing offered a distinction between a perversion and a perversity, the latter a product of vice, the former a psycho-pathological condition*’¹⁹⁴. On the other hand, Tamagne suggests Karl Heinrich Ulrich’s views in which he invents the concept of *uranism* where ‘the heart of a woman in the body of a man’ is presented. According to Tamagne, Ulrichs argues that homosexuality is not a disease but a ‘third sex’¹⁹⁵. Tamagne shares Havelock Ellis’ views that he argues in *Sexual Inversion* that homosexuality is not a disease but an inborn characteristic¹⁹⁶. Weeks states that “Havelock Ellis distinguishes between inversion, a more or less random biological ‘sport’, and perversion, which sprang from moral indulgence”¹⁹⁷.

Weeks presents the views of Freud where in *Three Essays* Freud states that

“perversions are simply acts which either extend sexual practices beyond those regions of the body conventionally designated as appropriate, or linger over activities that may be proper if they ultimately lead to genital sexuality, but which become perverse if they remain as ends in themselves”¹⁹⁸.

According to Weeks’ interpretation of Freud, perversion is a technical term which we cannot escape in our lives but which only becomes a problem if it becomes an end in itself and hinders our approach to mature sexuality.¹⁹⁹ Weeks states that there was an ever-growing process of creating a catalogue of perversions, deviations and paraphilias which marginalised many sexualities and pathologised them. He argues that this language of perversion is what divides our sexual life as ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’²⁰⁰. Weeks presents views of Foucault in

¹⁹² Tamagne, 2006, p.154

¹⁹³ Tamagne, 2006, p.154

¹⁹⁴ Weeks, 2003, p.70

¹⁹⁵ Tamagne, 2006, p.154

¹⁹⁶ Tamagne, 2006, p.157

¹⁹⁷ Weeks, 2003, p.70

¹⁹⁸ Weeks, 2003, pp.71-72

¹⁹⁹ Weeks, 2003, p.74

²⁰⁰ Weeks, 2003, p.76

which he sees ‘perverse implantation’ as a twofold process. According to Weeks, Foucault argues that as a positive approach these new types of sexual being have expanded our understanding of ‘sexual’. On the other hand, on the negative side, it created reinforcement of the normal in which heterosexuality itself was not part of this questioning and accepted as pre-given²⁰¹. Weeks cites from Alfred Kinsey where he states that

“Biologists and psychologists who have accepted the doctrine that the only natural function of sex is reproduction have simply ignored the existence of sexual activity which is not reproductive. They have assumed that heterosexual responses are a part of an animal’s innate, ‘instinctive’ equipment, and that all other types of sexual activity represent ‘perversions’ of the ‘normal instincts’. Such interpretations are, however, mystical”.²⁰²

Weeks cites Jonathan Dollimore’s argument that a “perverse dynamic lies at the heart of the western construction of sexuality”.²⁰³ Weeks argues that “[t]he striving to produce and regulate the norm inevitably produces the Other, the feared and execrated or merely despised, which simultaneously denies and confirms the norm”²⁰⁴. Weeks argues that as long as the norm produces its own Other, which in the end works against the norm and creates resistance, subversion and transgression, it is the reason why pluralism of sexualities exists and diversity is a fact of life.²⁰⁵

Sean Brady in his book *Masculinity and Male Homosexuality in Britain, 1861–1913* cites the ideas of Halperin related to homosexuality²⁰⁶. According to Halperin sex between men pre-existed 1892, however, in the English language before construction of the word ‘homosexuality’ by Ellis, there was ‘no conceptual apparatus available for identifying a

²⁰¹ Weeks, 2003, p.71

²⁰² Weeks, 2003, pp.12-13

²⁰³ Weeks, 2003, p.76

²⁰⁴ Weeks, 2003, p.76

²⁰⁵ Weeks, 2003, p.76

²⁰⁶ Brady, Sean. *Masculinity and Male Homosexuality in Britain 1861-1913*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 11

person`s fixed and determinate sexual orientation²⁰⁷. Halperin differentiates sexual inversion which is used to refer to a variant range of deviant gender behaviour and homosexuality which is based on sexual object choice.²⁰⁸ This separation aimed to show the difference between the homosexual and homosexuality.

Kinsey states that

“[t]he publicly pretended code of morals, our social organization, our marriage customs, our sex laws, and our educational and religious systems are based upon an assumption that individuals are much alike sexually and that it is an equally simple matter for all of them to confine their behaviour to the single pattern which the mores dictate”.²⁰⁹

Mary McIntosh in her article *The Homosexual Role* discusses the ways in which homosexuality is observed to be a pathological condition without scientific facts. McIntosh argues that anthropological evidences suggest that it is not available in all societies and could vary in different western societies²¹⁰. Brady argues that it is European Christian interpretation of same sex behaviours which aims to keep men law abiding through criminalisation of certain pathologised species²¹¹.

Mark Jordan in his book *The invention of sodomy in Christian theology* argues that

“[s]odomy is as much a theological category as trinity, incarnation, sacrament, or papal infallibility. As a category, it is richly invested with specific notions of sin and retribution, responsibility and guilt. The category was never meant to be neutrally descriptive, and it is doubtful whether any operation can purify it of its theological origins. There is no way to make ‘Sodomy’ objective.”²¹²

²⁰⁷ Halperin, David. ‘Sex before Sexuality: Pederasty, Politics and Power in Classical Athens’, in Duberman, M, Vicinus, M and Chauncey, G (eds), *Hidden from History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past*, London: Penguin, 1989, p. 39

²⁰⁸ Halperin, 1989, p. 38

²⁰⁹ Kinsey, Alfred C. et. Al. *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, London: Indiana University Press, 1948, p 197.

²¹⁰ McIntosh, Mary. *The Homosexual Role*, *Social Problems*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1968, pp. 182-192, p.182.

²¹¹ Brady, 2005, p.5

²¹² Jordan, Mark D. *The invention of sodomy in Christian theology*, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997, p.29

William Burgwinkle in his book *Sodomy, Masculinity, and Law in Medieval Literature* argues that “sodomy is an ‘invention’ of eleventh-century Christian theology”.²¹³ According to Burgwinkle, Jordan refers to sodomy as “a discursive innovation which allowed for new ways of organizing and conceptualizing behaviour and individuals within groups without ever really succeeding in exerting control”.²¹⁴ Burgwinkle defines sodomy as “simple descriptions of homoerotic relations or attractions to a theological category synonymous with the sinful”.²¹⁵ Therefore, sinful acts like sodomy could be corrected through proper training²¹⁶.

The regulations regarding homosexuality went through various stages in Great Britain. Sodomy was defined as a ‘sin against nature’ and it was not only sexual relations between men that were prohibited but also included anal penetration of women and relations with animals. The *Buggery Act* was enacted in 1533 under Henry VII²¹⁷²¹⁸. The Buggery Act “was directed against a precise type of sex act and not against a category of people”²¹⁹. Its main goal was to ensure sexual relations which would lead to procreation. It prescribed the death penalty until 1861 when it was amended to 10 years of imprisonment for people who were considered to have practiced sodomy.²²⁰ In 1864, 1868 and 1869 with the enactment of the *Contagious Diseases Acts*, the state used its power to forcibly examine any women in cases where they believed the person had engaged in prostitution. The control of venereal diseases itself become a method of construction of deviant personalities in the British state.²²¹ In 1885, a *Criminal Law Amendment* was proposed by Labouchere on Clause 11 concerning the

²¹³ Burgwinkle, William E. *Sodomy, Masculinity, and Law in Medieval Literature*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 4

²¹⁴ Burgwinkle, 2004, p.4

²¹⁵ Burgwinkle, 2004, p.3

²¹⁶ Burgwinkle, 2004, p.3

²¹⁷ Tamagne, 2006, p.306

²¹⁸ Brady, 2005, p. 51

²¹⁹ Tamagne, 2006, p.306

²²⁰ Tamagne, 2006, p.306

²²¹ Brady, 2005, p.7

origins of juvenile prostitution which aimed to protect girls from sexual abuse, by raising the age of consent from 13 to 16. However with its particular language it became for the first time a law in which homosexuality was not defined as a sexual practice but it was more acts of individuals who wished to find sexual partners of the same sex. Therefore for the first time sodomites were not defined as sinners but criminals.²²²

The law was enacted thus;

“If any person of the male sex, in public or in private, perpetrates or is party to the perpetration, facilitates or tries to facilitate the perpetration by a person of the male sex of any act of gross indecency on a person of the male sex, this constitutes a misdemeanor; upon being found guilty he is liable to a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding two years, with or without forced labour”.²²³

It can be argued that with this formulation it allows for the possibility of interpretation. *The Buggery Act* remained as the basis of this law as well which declared the illegality of certain sexual activities. Until the law amendment of 1967, homosexuality was criminalised in Britain²²⁴.

Colonised Cyprus enacted a law to criminalise certain sexual acts in 1889²²⁵ soon after Great Britain. Even though Cyprus became an independent state in 1960, laws which criminalised homosexuality were kept²²⁶. Even though, Britain decriminalised homosexuality in 1967, Cyprus, as an independent state, did not amend the laws. Even though since 1963, both entities in Cyprus separated their administration, both kept the Common Law system. Entities on both sides of the island were not eager to decriminalise homosexuality. The law which criminalised homosexuality was enacted with same logic as the Buggery Act in which certain sexual acts were declared illegal. However, due to its wording, it was open to the

²²² Tamagne, 2006, p.306

²²³ Tamagne, 2006, p.306

²²⁴ Brady, 2005, p. 51

²²⁵ According to Farid Mirbagheri, Criminal Code has been amended in 1929. Mirbagheri, 2010, p. xxix

²²⁶ Republic of Cyprus has continued to use existing criminal code which was enacted by British Colonial Administration. Therefore, the law which criminalises of homosexuality was not the only law which was kept.

interpretation of the judge hearing the case. It was stated in Chapter 154, which regulates sex that is against the order of nature as;

“171. Any person who –

- (a) has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature; or
- (b) permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him against the order of nature, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for five years

172. Any person who with violence commits either of the offences specified in the laws preceding Section is guilty of a felony and liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.

173. Any person who attempts to commit either of the offences specified in Section 171 is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for three years, and if the attempt is accompanied with violence he is liable to imprisonment for seven years.”

In 1987, a Greek Cypriot LGBT activist Alecos Modinos filed a court case against the Republic of Cyprus in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)²²⁷. He argued that the existence of the law creates ‘fear of prosecution’²²⁸. The ECHR, in its hearing in 1992, stated that even though government officials argue that the law had not been used since 1981, it nonetheless found it contrary to article 8 of the convention which meant that existence of a written law is intervention into people’s private lives²²⁹. The Republic of Cyprus abolished the law in 2002 as part of the European Union accession process.

However, the same law was enforced by Cyprus northern until January 27th, 2014²³⁰. Even though Cyprus northern is not recognised by the ECHR, due to fact that the European Convention of Human Rights was signed by the Republic of Cyprus in 1961, the Cyprus northern judiciary accepts the conventions as a part of its legal code. In its decision on the *Loizidou vs. Turkey*²³¹ immovable property case, the ECHR accepted Turkey as a higher administration responsible for human rights discriminations. A court case had been lodged at

²²⁷ Modinos vs. Cyprus, 15070/89, (ECHR, April 22 1993)

²²⁸ Modinos vs. Cyprus, 15070/89, (ECHR, April 22 1993)

²²⁹ Modinos vs. Cyprus, 15070/89, (ECHR, April 22 1993)

²³⁰ Amendment to Criminal Code, 20/2014, TRNC Parliament.

²³¹ Loizidou vs. Turkey, 40/1993/435/514 (ECHR, July 28th, 1998)

the ECHR by a Turkish Cypriot before the decriminalisation²³². However, the law was enforced during the Sarris Case which will be analysed later on in the final chapter.

In this chapter, the interrelation of nationalism and sexuality has been discussed. The reflection of heterosexuality as a norm and the acceptance of homosexuality as sin/perversion/unnatural or illegal have been discussed. The role of nationalism in the shaping of people`s belongingness and the limitation to sexuality only through heterosexism has been discussed. Therefore, it has given us an opportunity to observe how self is not accepted to be represented by LGBT individuals. We have shed a light on the roots of the Sodomy Laws in Cyprus which will be useful in analysing the Sarris Case later on.

²³² H.Ç vs Turkey, 6428/12 (ECHR, January 30th, 2012)

Chapter 4 : The Sarris Case

On October 13th 2011, Sodomy Laws in Cyprus northern were brought into force. Three men - Former Finance Minister of the Cyprus Republic Michael Sarris, M.B (28) and M.K (17) - were arrested by the police force in Nicosia. It was stated in the Police Bulletin that neighbours of M.B had informed the police and claimed that people in M.B`s house had conducted ‘unnatural sex’. Police Forces broke into M.B`s house around 23:00 and arrested the suspects. On October 14th, the suspects were brought to court where they were remanded in custody for 3 days while further investigations were carried out by the police²³³. At this time, Cyprus northern was the only entity within Council of Europe territory which criminalised same-sex acts in Europe²³⁴. In that sense, this was nothing new for people in Cyprus northern. Many people had been arrested previously but there was no such public interest. In this chapter, my aim is to analyse the news that was published in October 2011 and to find answers as to how the Sarris Case was so different. Why did the media pay so much attention to this case? Why was the national identity of Michael Sarris so important? How did the bodies of the suspects become battlefields of nationalism and hegemonic masculinities? In this regard, theories of hegemonic masculinity and its relationship to nationalism will be provided. Later on, I will present the case from the news standpoint and attempt to analyse it.

Raewyn Connell formulises her concept of hegemonic masculinity by criticising the sex role paradigm. Demetrakis Z. Demetriou discusses Connell`s argument and states that

²³³ *Eski Rum Bakan Tutuklandı* (Former Cypriotgreek minister arrested), (2011, October 14th) Yenidüzen.

²³⁴ Rainbow Europe Map & Index, (2011, May 17th), Brussels: ILGA-Europe.

“[b]y identifying the social structure with biological difference, sex role theory reduces gender to two homogeneous and complementary categories and thus underplays social inequality and power”²³⁵.

Connell, with the aim of analysing the power relations between genders and within genders claims that the sex role paradigm is unable to “conceptualise power (resistance to power) as an essential feature of the relationships between genders and within genders”²³⁶. Connell, in her critique to the Sex Role Paradigm states that gender is not a fixed social norm as the sex role paradigm suggests and she argues that gender is constantly produced and reproduced by social practices.²³⁷ Therefore, she would argue that if in a different historico-cultural context gender practice would be different, masculinity and femininity would also be different. Thus, she would claim that we should talk about masculinities and femininities in the plural sense.

Connell argues that

“[m]asculinities are configurations of practice within gender relations, a structure that includes large-scale institutions and economic relations as well as face-to-face relationships and sexuality. Masculinity is institutionalized in this structure, as well as being an aspect of individual character and personality”²³⁸.

Connell talks about hegemonic masculinity as a culturally constructed ideal which she assumes is always constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities and as well as in relation to women. According to Connell divisions of masculinities could be defined as such: hegemonic masculinities, subordinated masculinities, complicit masculinities and marginalised masculinities. Hegemonic masculinities create hegemony over women as an external source of domination and to this end it creates domination over subordinated masculinities. Subordinated masculinities refer to the people who are effeminate. Complicit masculinities are those majorities of men who do not act as a ‘hegemonic model’ but due to

²³⁵ Demetriou, Demetrakis Z., Connell's Concept of Hegemonic Masculinity: A Critique, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jun., 2001), pp. 337-361, p.338

²³⁶ Demetriou, 2001, p.338

²³⁷ Demetriou, 2001, p.338

²³⁸ Connell, Raewyn. *The Men and the Boys*, California: California University, 2000, p.29

its benefits try to sustain its existence. Finally, marginalised masculinities are men who are marginalised due to their class and race/ethnicity²³⁹.

Connell argues that

“[h]egemonic masculinity can be defined as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of the women”²⁴⁰.

Connell, in her model, argues that the main aim of men is to generate dominance over women and thus, in that aim, subordination of men is also possible. Connell states that all men receive their patriarchal dividend from this system. Therefore, even subordinated and marginalised masculinities do not show resistance to power or, at least, her analysis of power relationships is ‘blind’ to this point²⁴¹.

Demetrakis Demetriou, in his critique to Connell’s framework of Hegemonic Masculinity, argues that the originality of her approach lies in the method where she claims that “the relationships within genders are centred on and can be explained by, the relationships between genders”²⁴². Therefore, Demetriou attempts to explain that patriarchy is “not a simple question of men dominating women, [...] but it is a complex structure of gender relations in which the interrelation between different forms of masculinity and femininity plays a central role”²⁴³. Demetriou states that Connell’s concept of Hegemonic Masculinity does not follow the Gramscian cultural hegemony understanding in which Gramsci argues that external attempts over the internal for domination creates internals’ resistance over external which creates transformation of external with pragmatic value. Thus, Demetriou

²³⁹ Connell, R. & J.W.M. Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept, *Gender and Society*, Vol.19(6), 2005, pp. 829-859

²⁴⁰ Connell, Raewyn. *Masculinities*, Los Angeles: California University, 1995, p.77

²⁴¹ Connell, 2005, pp. 829-859

²⁴² Demetriou, 2001, p.343

²⁴³ Demetriou, 2001, p.343

argues that Connell's approach creates a hegemonic/non-hegemonic division in which the non-hegemonic's pragmatic value does not have any effect on the hegemonic. Demetriou argues that, with this model, Connell's concept formulates a masculine bloc which does not accept any change. Thus, he argues that Connell creates a new sex role paradigm. In relation to the above mentioned critique, the hegemonic masculinity concept could easily be criticised as being heteronormative where it does not accept subordinated/effeminate masculinities' pragmatic value on the creation of patriarchy. In other words, by creation of men's dominance over women, the hegemonic masculinity model became the source for the reproduction of patriarchy²⁴⁴.

In her article *Masculinity and nationalism: gender and sexuality in the making of nations*, Joane Nagel discusses the ways in which nationhood and manhood have interrelations. According to Nagel, like other institutions of states, military institutions are dominated by men. Nagel argues that in states "there is an identifiable 'normative' or 'hegemonic' masculinity that sets the standards for male demeanour, thinking and action"²⁴⁵. She argues that there is no surprise that hegemonic masculinity and nationalism go hand in hand²⁴⁶. Nagel mentions that nationalist politics are the major venue for 'accomplishing' masculinity in the states²⁴⁷. "Its hierarchical authority structure, the male domination of decision-making positions, the male superordinate/female subordinate internal divisions of labour, and the male legal regulations of female rights, labour and sexuality"²⁴⁸ makes it possible for it to precede its domination. Nagel mentions that "[h]egemonic masculinity is more than an

²⁴⁴ Demetriou, 2001, pp. 337-361

²⁴⁵ Nagel, Joane. *Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.21 (2), March 1998, pp.242-269, p.247

²⁴⁶ Nagel, 1998, pp. 248-249

²⁴⁷ Nagel, 1998, pp. 251

²⁴⁸ Nagel, 1998, p.251

‘ideal’, it is assumptive, widely held, and has the quality of appearing to be ‘natural’²⁴⁹. She states that this does not mean that there is a consensus among men and women about the ‘ideal’ man. “[H]egemonic masculinity often stands in contrast to other class, race, and sexuality based masculinities. None the less, hegemonic masculinity remains a standard – whether reviled or revered – against which other masculinities compete or define themselves.”²⁵⁰ Therefore, Nagel claims that what men are defending is not only the traditions but

“they are defending a particular racial, gendered and sexual conception of self: a white male, heterosexual notion of masculine identity loaded with all the burdens and privileges that go along with hegemonic masculinity. Understanding that their reactions reflect not only a defence of male privilege but also a defence of male culture and identity, makes clearer that there are fundamental issues at stake here for men who are committed to these masculinist and nationalist institutions and lifeways.”²⁵¹

In his article, *Suck my nation - Masculinity, Ethnicity and the politics of (homo) sex*, Sasho A. Lambevski discusses the gay scene in Skopje and analyses how sexual practices of ‘gay’ men are deeply politicised by class, gender, ethnicity and religious aspects and the ways in which nationalism controls the bodies of Macedonian and Albanian men. Lambevski in his analysis of gay scene in Skopje uses Hüseyin Tapınç’s four scenario of relations. In first scenario “masculine heterosexual’, individuals practice mutual masturbation but do not practice oral or anal sex²⁵². In the second scenario “Homosexual encounters”, masculine heterosexual and feminine homosexual are present. According to this scenario the most important part is to keep differentiation of ‘active’ inserter and ‘passive’ feminine insertee²⁵³. In the third “homosexual scenario”, two homosexual identified men are included. However, there are

²⁴⁹ Nagel, 1998, p.247

²⁵⁰ Nagel, 1998, p.247

²⁵¹ Nagel, 1998, pp.258-259

²⁵² Lambevski, Sasho A. *Suck My Nation - Masculinity, Ethnicity and the Politics of (Homo)sex*, *Sexualities*, November 1999 Vol.2(4), pp.397-419, p. 403

²⁵³ Lambevski, 1999, p. 404

rigidly enforced gender roles as masculine and feminine²⁵⁴. Finally, in the fourth scenario active passive distinction among partners disappears²⁵⁵. According to Lambevski, the second scenario includes ethnic and class dimensions as well. He argues that Muslim Albanians mainly working class backgrounds are ‘fuckers’ whereas Christian working and middle class Macedonian are ‘aunties’²⁵⁶. Lambevski argues that “there is nationalist governance of sex which orders Macedonian homosexuals to avoid Albanians as much as possible when looking for sexual liaisons, while at the same time requiring Albanians to assume the ‘top’ positions in their sexual encounters with Macedonians.”²⁵⁷

According to Lambevski,

“[t]he exclusive desire for the dominant Albanians and the pleasure that these Macedonian men take in being fucked by such Albanians, can only be sustained as long as the Albanians plays the role of a ‘hard-fucking brute’ that is given to him in the fantasmatic scenario of Macedonian nationalism”²⁵⁸.

Lambevski states that this fantasy only sustains itself if the othering process continues in Macedonian nationalism. Because Lambevski disputes that “[t]he very body of the Macedonian male Other, particularly his anus, becomes a stage where this masculinizing fantasy of class and ethnic revenge can be acted out”²⁵⁹.

On October 13th, as mentioned earlier, three suspects were arrested. ‘Carnal knowledge’ is not clearly defined in the Criminal Code which was enacted in British Colonial Period. This, consequently has always left the case open to interpretation by the judge hearing the case.

²⁵⁴ Lambevski, 1999, p. 404

²⁵⁵ Lambevski, 1999, p. 404

²⁵⁶ Lambevski, 1999, p. 405

²⁵⁷ Lambevski, 1999, p. 410

²⁵⁸ Lambevski, 1999, p. 410

²⁵⁹ Lambevski, 1999, p. 413

After their arrest the suspects were taken to the hospital for a health check and investigation of possible traces of ‘unnatural sex’²⁶⁰. On October 14th, the court remanded the suspects in custody for a period of three days whereupon they were taken to the national prison.

On October 14th, the majority of newspapers and internet portals published the case as headline news. The case had already received great deal of attention due to the involvement of former minister Michael Sarris who was a technocrat in the Cyprus southern negotiation team. Thus, it is possible to say that for the first time a court case for ‘unnatural sex’ claim has received such interest. The court hearing on October 14th was closed to media due to the involvement of a minor (M.K 17). However, the media had already published names and pictures of the suspects and has started to shape public opinion on the case. Even though the court had ordered closed hearing, it was ironical to observe that the Cyprus Turkish Agency (Türk Ajansı Kıbrıs), as a government news agency, was the source of the news. I think that the Sarris Case in this sense provides an excellent example of print capitalism of Benedict Anderson which was discussed earlier. It is possible to say that the state or at least branches of the state were in cooperation with the print media with the aim of re-shaping public consciousness on homosexuality on the ‘national’ level. Even though, at this time, the court had only just finalised its first hearing and remanded the suspects in custody for three days. The media had already declared Michael Sarris as an ‘erotic other’/ ‘pervert’ and his national identity as an ‘other’ had begun to represent the hegemonic narrative in the media for ‘otherisation’. In that sense, Michael Sarris’ declaration of ‘Greek’ and ‘other’ to national self would make it easy to show him as a ‘threat’ to the ‘nation’. Haberkktc argued that “they were conducting group sex and the Turks were the penetrators”²⁶¹. Some media

²⁶⁰ It is assumed that, it is possible to confirm anal intercourse from the condition of muscles in rectum area. Indeed, it is very insulting process when suspects are brought to hospital and their bodily integrity is violated.

²⁶¹ *Rum bakan KKTC’de Doğaya Aykırı İlişkiden tutuklandı* (Greek Cypriot minister has been arrested from unnatural sex), (2011, October 14th), Haberkktc.

representatives began to publish news that have no relation to the facts. However, it was establishing a national discourse that, if a Greek Cypriot minister had been arrested in Cyprus northern for engaging in ‘unnatural sex’, ‘Turks’ should be the penetrators. In the Cypriot cultural formation of ‘masculine’ if a person penetrates, his object choice is not questioned. Even if he has sex with another man, he is perceived a ‘heterosexual’. This similar logic was also available the in old Criminal Code. The penetrator was subject to a lesser charge for the same ‘crime’ than the one who was penetrated.

On October 15th, Michael Sarris’ picture was published on the cover of the majority of newspapers. The other two suspects were practically forgotten. The media discourse met on a common ground and they were eager to depict Michael Sarris as a ‘shameful’ ‘Greek’ technocrat of the Cyprus Republic who crosses the border from Cyprus southern to Cyprus northern and practices ‘unnatural sex’ with minor(s)(?). The number of the suspects increased when the police arrested several more minors. Kıbrıs ran the news as “Massage for 20 Euro” and provided the information that “as an important economist, former minister of south, part of negotiation team, Sarris has been arrested naked and ended his successful career”²⁶². M.K (17) had 20 Euros in his pocket when he was arrested and it was assumed that he has received this ‘foreign’ money from Michael Sarris. Volkan stated that “‘Former Greek Minister is also a faggot’”²⁶³, Haberdar printed the headline, “Close Economic Relatio”²⁶⁴ and Havadis “Day of Shame for Former Minister”²⁶⁵. Even though, Volkan had self-censored some of the letters of the word, they used ‘*puşt*’ in order to stigmatise Michael Sarris. This choice of word is interesting when viewed against the word selection of other newspapers, particularly. ‘*Puşt*’ is a word of Persian origin which has several meanings in Turkish. It could mean ‘a person who is not trustworthy’, ‘a pervert who serves homosexual men for their sexual pleasures’ or

²⁶² 20 Euro’ya Masaj, (2011, October 15th), Kıbrıs Gazetesi.

²⁶³ Eski Rum Maliye Bakanı da p.t çıktı, (2011, October 15th), Volkan.

²⁶⁴ Ekonomik Yakınlaşma, (2011, October 15th), Haberdar.

²⁶⁵ Eski Bakan’ın utanç günü, (2011, October 15th), Havadis.

it can mean ‘treacherous’. What makes the word interesting is that in all its meanings it stigmatizes. Interestingly it is used with a related meaning by Greek Cypriots as well. Πούστης (pustis) in Greek however does not have the same meaning as ‘puşt’. Πούστης is close in meaning to the Turkish word ‘*ibne*’ which is Arabic in origin word and means ‘passive’ gay.

On October 16th, it was announced that the number of minors who had practiced ‘prostitution’ had increased. The number of suspects has increased to six. *Star Kıbrıs* conducted an interview with a social worker who stated that “47 children practice prostitution”²⁶⁶. However, the discourse of the interview was not clear and it was offering an impression that all minors have a connection with ‘Sarris Case’. Some published the arrests of minors as a success for the police²⁶⁷. However, if the claims were true, and minors were involved in the case, then they were victims of child abuse and were in custody as suspects of ‘unnatural sex’ claims. The Criminal Code which was being enforced at this time was not offering any protection for minors older than 13. Therefore, even if they were victims, they could still be found guilty for taking part in ‘unnatural sex’. It is possible to say that for the media with a nationalist discourse, the possibility of child abuse was unimportant. It was important that a Greek Cypriot and minors may have had sex. The *Kıbrıs* newspaper published a large picture of the house with the headline “This is the House”²⁶⁸ as though the house was a sort of a cabaret where minors could meet adults occasionally for sex. Therefore, it was assumed that M.B, by providing a location for ‘Greeks’ to have sex with minors was guilty. Homofobiye Karşı İnisiyatif (Initiative Against Homophobia) together with other NGO`s released a press statement and condemned the arrests of the minors and the existence of an archaic law in the 21st century which criminalises homosexual relations. However, only

²⁶⁶ 47 Çocuk Fuhuş yapıyor, (2011, October 16th), *Star Kıbrıs*.

²⁶⁷ Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi, *Haberdar Newspapers* (2011, October 16th).

²⁶⁸ *İşte o ev*, (2011, October 16th), *Kıbrıs*.

Yenidüzen offered a place to the press release. The rest of the media was more focused on Michael Sarris as ‘pervert’ and ‘child abuser’. However, it was not even questioned whether or not the allegations. Could it be rational to hold minors together with their abuser in prison? Clearly, it was mistake of the police and the existing law that time.

On October 17th the court hearing was postponed. On October 18th, the Court was unable to reach a conclusion²⁶⁹. The police arrested several minors even though they were not related to the Sarris Case, but who were believed to be guilty of having engaged in ‘unnatural sex’. However, the public prosecutor was unable to produce any evidence against Michael Sarris. M.K told the court that he had been beaten by the police to accept that he had had sex with Michael Sarris. However, he rejected the claims. Even though, there was no evidence related to Michael Sarris, the media has continued to publicise homosexuality as ‘child abuse’ and ‘perversion’. Star Kıbrıs published news relating to an alleged incident of “Sexual Relations in a Car”²⁷⁰ with a large picture of Michael Sarris on the cover of the newspaper. Readers were encouraged to suppose that Michael Sarris had practiced sex with minors in a car. However, the actual article concerned another arrested individual alleged to have had sexual relations with a minor. Therefore, the use of Michael Sarris` picture was aimed solely to attract attention.

On October 20th, the court ordered the release of the arrested suspects on bail. Michael Sarris was ordered to pay 47 thousand Euros as bail²⁷¹. The release of the suspects on with bail was due to the cooperation of local NGO`s and their international supporters. The European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights supported the LGBT activists by addressing the representatives of Cyprus northern on many occasions. On the other hand, international organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and ILGA-Europe

²⁶⁹ Suspects were sentenced another 3 days of custody.

²⁷⁰ *Arabada İlişki iddiası*, (2011, October 18th), Star Kıbrıs.

²⁷¹ *Para Karşılığı Serbest*, (2011, October 21st), Yenidüzen.

gathered and release a press statement. They supported the LGBT activists in their cause and asked for the immediate decriminalisation of homosexuality. However, LGBT organisations in the entities, Homofobiye Karşı İnisiyatif (Initiative Against Homophobia) and AcceptCy were unable to cooperate on LGBT rights. It was ironic that, AcceptCy, instead of cooperating with LGBT organisations in Cyprus northern for the release of people from prison, instead later sent an official to the organisations which supported LGBT activists in Cyprus northern. The international actors have been warned on their relations with authorities in Cyprus northern and reminded to use the ‘proper’ terminologies while referring to the ‘occupied territories of the Republic of Cyprus’ in order to not end up being part of an international relations crisis.

The court case was postponed until December 14th. However, after his release, Michael Sarris has not crossed to Cyprus northern nor does he intend to attend to court again. However, the issue of the equalisation of homosexuals as ‘child abusers’ continues to occupy the mass media. It is clear that in the Sarris Case, nationalists in Cyprus were eager to keep British Colonial Laws which criminalised same-sex acts as ‘unnatural’. Mosse has stated that some sexual practices should be declared ‘abnormal’ in order to sustain control. Therefore, representation of Sarris as ‘pervert’, ‘faggot’ or ‘shameful’ and an erotic ‘other’ in the media through nationalist discourse aims to produce certain categorisations which would benefit the middle class and its needs on the continuation of heteronormative understanding and control of sexuality in general.

The Kıbrıslı newspaper published a large picture of Michael Sarris on its cover stating, “Perversion has become Human Rights!”²⁷² Sheikh Nazım Kıbrısı was interviewed and he reminded readers what happened to the Tribe of Lot in Sodom and Gomorrah. Haberdar conducted an interview with Hasan Sözmener, President of Bar who stated, “Society will be

²⁷² *Sapıklık İnsan hakkı oldu!*, (2011, October 21st), Kıbrıslı.

corrupted” when referring to the decriminalisation of homosexuality²⁷³. He argues that we cannot legitimise homosexual relations just because it is decriminalised in Europe. He declares that these changes which will not be accepted by a majority of the society would bring disorder rather than order. He emphasises the importance of laws on keeping order and how to make people obey laws and stay away from the crimes. In this regard he makes an analogy to make his thoughts ‘clear’.

He states that;

“If the general life style of society, the rules and issues that some do not see as crime and the majority sees as order passed as law, society would obey it. If we imagine society as a bunch of grapes, there are surely some bad ones. If we try to protect the bad ones it will not decrease them, instead it will spoil the healthy grapes. However, the bad ones must be separated from the bunch, in order to bring order to the society. What is trying to be done here is to correct society by correcting the bad ones or the ones that are not right. However as soon as the bad ones are accepted by the society, society will be destroyed arithmetically. These kinds of relationships of hygiene and health and the falling apart of the society are under threat. These are events we do not approve of. We cannot act as if whatever happens in Europe is correct”²⁷⁴.

Sözmener’s logic on the creation of laws and in making people obey them are thought out only in a unilateral dimension. It seems that he does not question the origin of morals and it is clear that he does not want to see the relationship of morals and laws in which they mutually construct each other. Therefore, he only argues that morals are important and if something goes outside of the guidelines, society would not accept it. However, in many examples in history, laws have powerfully changed the minds and morals of people. Sözmener’s analogy of grapes clearly creates ‘norms’ for good and for bad. And it is clear that according to his understanding homosexuality is ‘bad grape’ which is like ‘plague’ which could spread the illness to the healthy ‘good grapes’. It seems for him, laws are regulated in order to protect

²⁷³ *Toplum Bozulur*, (2011, October 21st), Haberdar.

²⁷⁴ *Toplum Bozulur*, (2011, October 21st), Haberdar.

the norms and morals of a society. Therefore, he sees himself as guardian of ‘morals’ and warns members of society that if we do not decriminalise homosexuality and do not offer them rights we are not going to be corrupted as the European states are. He sees the corruption of society in relation to decriminalisation of homosexuality. In that sense, in his understanding, the countries where homosexuality has been decriminalised a slow, gradual corruption of society would take place because the concept of homosexuality has become normalised and accepted. Therefore, the majority of the people would like to act like ‘them’ and be like ‘them’.

Hasan Sözmener’s comments are important. It represents a nationalist stance which aims to protect the national self from ‘other’, especially the ‘sexual other’. In that sense, his argumentation is a defence mechanism of hegemonic masculinity which aims to differentiate itself from subordinated masculinity and also from the homosexual. I also would like to share comments of Ahmet Tolgay. He is a journalist and he expresses his feelings about the discussions related to homosexuality in the media.

It is clear that Ahmet Tolgay is not happy about the discussion on homosexuality.

Tolgay states that

“Must the discussions on the 171th article which emphasizes that homosexuality is an act against nature, be a leading subject on our agenda? The issue has been turned into neighbourhood pressure. The ones applying the pressure are forcing people to talk about gay rights. Where is the democracy in this? I do not agree with the idea that our country has dealt with all of its issues and that the only issue left to solve immediately is the issue of article 171.”²⁷⁵

Tolgay is clear in his position that for him discrimination of homosexuals or LGBT people in general is not important. Criminalisation of people because of their sexual practices seems to

²⁷⁵ Tolgay, Ahmet. Eşcinsellik üstüne(On homosexuality), (2011, November 3rd) Kıbrıs.

be insufficient for him to form a discussion. For Tolgay, people who try to be the voice of suppressed people need to be silence because it is not democratic to talk about homosexuals when we have more important issues. He feels pressured by these discussions but he is less troubled by the creation of a hierarchy over some rights. Therefore, as Sözmener said, ‘bad grapes’ and their issues are not important enough to remain on our agenda. We should not talk about this issue and we should not force people to talk about it. Tolgay’s comments could also be related to national belonging whereas problems of LGBT individuals do not concern society in general. According to this view, LGBT individuals do not belong in the national identity.

Tolgay acknowledges that

“Countries which legally recognize gay rights have experienced many evolutions that have shaped human history and solved many cultural, social and political issues by the time of their recognition. Now as a society, without experiencing those evolutions, with our twisted order that accepts being systemless, and in a system that does not even institutionalise civilized men and women rights, if we focus on allowing gay rights, we will be seen as ridiculous in the eyes of the world and history.”²⁷⁶

So, as an unrecognised state which has systematic problems, for ‘us’, the time has not yet arrived to discuss homosexuals and ‘their’ issues. It seems that for Tolgay that we need to have more cases of ‘unnatural sex’ claims and then maybe we could fulfil the necessary requirements of evolutions in the cultural, social and political sphere. Otherwise the world would laugh at us if we decriminalise homosexuality before the time is right. It seems that he is not aware of human rights documentations made in relation to the rights of LGBT people in Cyprus northern. According to Tolgay, we need to first regulate laws which bring equality rights to men and women. In this regard, we could assume that LGBT people are not part of this gender dimension. Therefore, in his hierarchical system of rights, homosexuals should

²⁷⁶ Tolgay, Ahmet. Eşcinsellik üstüne(On homosexuality), (2011, Novemver 3rd) Kıbrıs.

wait ‘their’ turn. It seems that the intersectional approach for him does not mean anything. He forgets that LGBT people are also facing discrimination as being men and women as well. In that sense, Tolgay’s views are moderate compared to Sözmener’s. He does not deny the necessity or claim that the expected changes are not for ‘us’. But he gives importance to certain other aspects before LGBT rights.

For Tolgay

“It had not been easy to liberalize homosexuality in the countries we now call ‘civilized’. They reached this with huge struggles against the values of society. Although, the countries which have advanced liberalisation of homosexuality have still got masses that cannot perceive homosexuality as normal. The issue has not stopped being an issue of taboo and morals. The homosexuals locked out from society, can only gather within their own institutions and clubs, and their participation in society is limited.”²⁷⁷

Now Tolgay challenges his own thoughts. He argues that the countries which are ‘civilised’ and have decriminalised homosexuality only arrived at this position after great struggles. But when people who support suppressed groups try to make it publicly discussible he claims that it is not part of democracy and the time is not proper. As a person who does not feel the taste of suppression he tries to avoid the discussion of the issue. He claims that even in countries where decriminalisation of homosexuality has occurred, homosexuals are not integrated into society fully and the issue remains as a moral taboo. It seems that he tries to suggest that even in countries where legal changes have been offered there is no change. However, it is clear that he is not questioning the fact that people’s minds are not bound by the laws but still need time to escape from homophobia, biphobia, and transphobia. If the change requires an evolution process as he suggests, why does he expect such a sudden change in people’s attitudes towards LGBT sexualities?

²⁷⁷ Tolgay, Ahmet. Eşcinsellik üstüne(On homosexuality), (2011, Novemver 3rd) Kıbrıs.

For him;

“Nature has created man to live like a man and woman to live like a woman. I believe that the event of a man with higher female hormones becoming a woman through surgery, and a woman with the same issue becoming a man is natural. This is a medical event concerning hormones that determine the sexuality. Modes of behaviour apart from these are, for sure, against nature. What is natural about a person created as a man living like a woman, a person created as a woman living like a man and being interested in the same sex? Nobody can explain this to me...”²⁷⁸

He states that for him there is only one category of man and woman. But he is generous enough to let people who feel that they are in the wrong body to have gender reassignment surgery. Because according to him this is a health need. He argues that nobody spent time to explain him the reasons of different sexual orientations and gender identities. However, it is hard to understand his situation, when he claims that he lacks knowledge and then claims some sexualities are against nature. He said that he did not have any knowledge but he seems to have at least some ideas related to homosexuality. Clearly he feels that he has the right to define some sexualities as ‘unnatural’ because he feels so, not because he has any scientific or theoretical background in gender studies. Tolgay with his perspective on homosexuality represents complicit masculinity. He does not represent hegemonic masculinity. However, its very existence gives him power in a certain way. Therefore, he challenges any attempt to destabilise his position in the hierarchy.

The Sarris Case has brought a chance for the Turkish Cypriot community to discuss homosexuality. I have tried to select news and comments of individuals which I believed were important enough to be discussed in relation to this topic.

²⁷⁸ Tolgay, Ahmet. Eşcinsellik üstüne(On homosexuality), (2011, Novemver 3rd) Kıbrıs.

In this chapter, I have analysed the Sarris Case through the news that was published in October 2011. The Sarris Case was a corner stone in discussions of homosexuality in Cyprus northern. Even though the basis for the discussion was not healthy nor mature enough, it has created a certain level for the possibility of both sides to have a voice; people who would like to keep within the law and people who would like to amend it. During its tenure, the sodomy laws allowed people to be judged and imprisoned for having same-sex relationships. However, the Sarris Case has created a difference in many ways. I have tried to find answers to these questions: how is the Sarris Case different? Why has the media paid such attention to this case? How is the national identity of Michael Sarris important? How have the bodies of the suspects become battlefields of nationalism and hegemonic masculinities?

In the Sarris Case, Mosse's arguments related to nationalism and respectability were important. It was easier for the nationalist media to declare Michael Sarris 'other' and 'pervert'. Perception of him as 'Greek' has enabled the nationalist discourse to create him as the eternal 'other'. In this sense, he was a mirror image of the self. Therefore, every unrespectable action of his was a proof how decent the 'Turks' were. The existence of sodomy laws was the basis of the prejudice against people who practices same-sex. Therefore, throughout the news, we observe that Sarris was the body of a 'pervert'. Everything which was meant to be said related to this issue has been said through Michael Sarris' personality. In this regard, he has been a victim of a massive sexual scandal.

Michael Sarris' perception as 'pervert' or 'homosexual' has eased the state authorities work to propagate heterosexuality as the only available sexuality if we remember the arguments of Spike Peterson. When we analyse the news published during the period, it is crystal clear that it was the last calls of the nationalist government to re-shape public opinion against homosexuality. It was interesting to observe the cooperation of the media in both sides through nationalist discourses. Both have aimed to depict Michael Sarris as the new Dionysus

who enjoys ‘orgies’ with young males. The reflection of Michael Sarris as ‘other’ was not limited to Cyprus northern; it is possible to say that, both entities have tried to differentiate their national selves from the homosexual representation in belonging.

The psychological violence which has been applied to Michael Sarris could be analysed from the perspective of belonging. When we remember the arguments of Tom Boellstorff related to the emergence of political homophobia, the declaration of Michael Sarris as ‘other’ becomes more understandable. It is perceived that the involvement of a person who is ‘other’ or ‘pervert’ in representation of self, could damage the normative self and its nationalised masculinity. Therefore, the aim of the reaction was to separate the self from what Sarris has represented. In that sense, the psychological violence applied was a source of claim to belonging or to keep it without representation of Michael Sarris with the self. When, we observe that the case was published in the media with stereotypes of gay men as people who are ‘obsessed with sex’ and who are ‘child abusers’. The fears of hegemonic masculinity from being represented by non-heterosexual men led to political homophobia as Boellstorff suggests. It seems to me that the national identity of Sarris was an important factor for this political homophobia. Otherwise it does not explain why so suddenly the media, utilising nationalist discourse, came to a position to stigmatise same-sex acts and published for weeks to keep this issue on the agenda. Especially as there were similar court cases several months before than Sarris Case.

LGBT people’s national belonging to the self, and their demand for decriminalisation during the Sarris Case, has provided a voice to the nationalist front who were keen to keep the self as a ‘hetero zone’. I do not consider these reactions as individualist reactions following the views of Hadley Renkin. There were several other court cases recently where such reactions could easily have been shown. Indeed, the nationality of Sarris had a significant level of importance in making the case more visible. I think it has connections also with the LGBT

rights movements which supported the release of Michael Sarris and asked for decriminalisation of homosexuality in Cyprus northern. The involvement of LGBT activists in the case and their demands for decriminalisation of the law could be perceived as ‘demands for Western values’ as Hadley Renkin discusses. In this sense, Hasan Sözmener’s reaction that decriminalisation cannot be enacted just because the EU states have done so could be a nice example to this matter. In this sense, belongingness of LGBT people in the national self got its reaction during the Sarris Case. Therefore, I would claim that the homophobic reaction of media with nationalist discourses was a reaction to the LGBT movements as well.

Reaction to Michael Sarris could also be related to hegemony and power relations. His entrance into Cyprus northern could be an intervention in the nationalist front’s safe zone. Therefore, reminding him who is in charge in Cyprus northern could also be a show of power. Hence, as a high ranked technocrat he might be observed as representative of Hegemonic Masculinity in Cyprus southern, or at least complicit masculinity. In this sense, a challenge to his masculinity by referring to him as subordinate/effeminate masculine, is a challenge of Cyprus northern hegemonic masculinity to Cyprus southern. Similarly, by defining Michael Sarris as ‘other’, as ‘Greek’ could also be read as definition of the self as Joan Nagel discusses. In that sense, otherisation of Michael Sarris could also mean defence of the nationalist front’s perception of their masculine identity or masculinist and nationalist institutions. However, it is also interesting to note that, AcceptCy has shown a significant example to Cypriotism discourse. Instead of being transnational LGBT rights activist, the organisation has preferred to articulate national discourse on the Cyprus dispute.

The nationalist declaration of sexual roles was also interesting. Michael Sarris was declared as ‘passive’ where as ‘Turks’ were as ‘active’. Clearly, it is related to domination. Sasho Lambevski discusses the similar situation in the Albanian and Macedonian context. When we

consider the similarities with Lambevski`s example it makes more sense. Similarly, in our case, working class Muslim ‘Turks’ and middle class Christian Michael Sarris were represented. We could argue that, the representation of their sexuality was governance of sex by nationalism. On the other hand, it was also interesting how the media has intentionally chosen to refer parties as representatives of ‘motherland’ nationalism but not Cypriots. It is possible to say that representation of Sarris as ‘passive’ and ‘Turks’ as ‘active’ could also be read as the will of Turkish nationalism to be super ordinate over Greek nationalism through Sarris`s body. As Lambevski argued, bodies and anuses of individuals become battle fields for masculinities and their hierarchical relations.

Conclusion

The millet system of the Ottoman Empire created an authority for religious clergy in Cyprus. We observe that communities have been represented by religious leaders for centuries. In that sense, it is possible to argue that existence of religious authority has created the possibility for creation of religious ties with ‘motherlands’ Greece and Turkey, especially when print capitalism developed. However, it is also possible to say that both communities have developed their belongingness into national identification with the rise of Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus during the British Administration. Even though an independent republic was established, it did not live for long due to the Cypriots preference for being organic parts of existing nationalisms. I will argue that Cypriots have found themselves within the struggle of an eternal power dominance game of Greek and Turkish nationalisms. Therefore, the Cypriots struggle for existence has been glorified as a part of nationalist struggle of the ‘motherlands’.

Military intervention and invasion in 1974 created transformation in Cypriot communities. ‘Phantasmatic entities’ have been created in Cyprus. In Cyprus southern, Cypriotism discourse has been established which only emphasises the sufferings of Greek Cypriots and thus aimed to create a national identity to the existing state in Cyprus southern. On the other hand, Turkish nationalism has expanded itself into Cyprus northern and fantasied establishing *Turan* on a grander scale. The Turkish Cypriot community has found itself within the discourse of Motherland where they were the ‘babyland’ of their mother. Turkish nationalism has been used as a disciplining mechanism through the entities established in Cyprus northern. Turkish Cypriots have been forced to be fully Turkish and mature enough to self-rule. Therefore, the political actions of Turkish Cypriots have always needed to claim to be ‘mature’ in order to prove itself to the motherland discourse. In that sense, Cyprioturkish

identity is a way of seeking possible ways for creations of a different language. It is an aim to share subordination and exclusion of Turkish Cypriots in pre- and post-1974 periods. It is a search for politics of difference and equality within the limited space left for existence of Turkish Cypriot community.

Cyprioturkish identity which was aiming to find an alternative language to share its subordination failed to be visible during the Sarris Case. The declaration of Michael Sarris as 'Greek' and 'sexual other' has created a power struggle among Greek and Turkish nationalisms. Therefore, once again, Cypriots representation in Cyprus was altered. The nationalist discourse has aimed to differentiate itself from the 'pervert' other. In that sense, The Sarris Case, and the sexuality of individuals has become a tool for showing dominance. The recognition issue which establishes the core of the Cyprus dispute has shown itself once again. The declaration of Michael Sarris as subordinated/effeminate masculine was a challenge to his 'national identity'. Similarly, identification of Michael Sarris as 'other' was definition of the 'self' through its mirrored image, 'other'. Therefore, the political homophobia shown to Michael Sarris had the aim of differentiating the 'national self' from 'non-heterosexual' belongingness. Clearly, depiction of Michael Sarris as 'passive' and 'Turks' as 'active' is a formation of national fantasy. A fantasy in which, Turkish nationalism aims to be superordinate to Greek nationalism through Michael Sarris's body. I will argue that the silence of Cyprioturkish identity or weak positioning, has led Turkish and Greek nationalisms to be dominant and offer their struggle for dominance to invade bodies of the individuals as governance of sex. Another ways of saying it; bodies of individuals have become battle fields for Turkish and Greek hegemonic masculinities and nationalisms.

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