WHEN AND HOW TO NUDGE?
CHOICE ARCHITECTURE IN THE FIELD OF PUBLIC POLICY WITH A FOCUS ON HUNGARY

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Abstract

Present work examines the nature and application of nudges. It aims to provide arguments for when choice architectural interventions are appropriate, why such methods should be preferred to coercive measures and what types of nudges are acceptable. Apart from establishing a theoretical framework encompassing the aforementioned dimensions, present thesis also uses interview data to gain insights into the conditions Hungarians set for accepting nudges. By comparing my empirical findings with the theoretical framework it is shown that apart from complying with certain pre-set conditions, in order to create successful and broadly accepted interventions, significant attention has to be paid to the criteria specified by the general public as well.

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Contents

Introduction

Improving people's lives has served as a desirable goal for many individuals, companies, politicians, and, possibly, for entire disciplines. This notion is not alien to the field of political science either, as there are many scientists and researchers who wish to seek solutions to the problems of society and individuals and thus ensure that they can lead a life of higher quality. One area where the implementation of such ideas can happen is the field of public policy. Policies that govern and regulate everyday matters of citizens clearly appear to be a good candidate for the implementation of life-bettering tools. That is, essentially, what choice architecture aims to do in various aspects of life and in public policy as well. It refers to the idea that the way choices are presented to us matters and can influence our decision making to a considerable extent (Johnson et al., 2012, p.1). Choice architecture, and nudging specifically, are terms introduced by Thaler and Sunstein in their book titled *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness.* Originally, Thaler and Sunstein defined nudge as "any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid." (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). Although I will explore the nature of nudges more closely in the first chapter, Thaler and Sunstein's basic definition is provided here since the concept of nudge will be one of the centerpieces of my thesis.

Present work seeks to introduce a refined definition of nudges, by expanding the conditions specified by Thaler and Sunstein, and give a theoretical framework of when and what type of nudges are acceptable in policy making. I believe that a more fine-grained definition and a clearer theoretical framework are essential in making sure that nudges are used correctly and transparently. Moreover, in my thesis, I aim to explore and investigate the

specific ways choice architecture is and could be used in policy making, and get an understanding of how such methods are being and could be used in Hungary particularly. More specifically, my aim is to lay out the conditions and restrictions under which Hungarian citizens are comfortable with accepting nudges as part of the government's practice and under which governments should be allowed to nudge. I will claim that there are particular policy areas, primarily regarding health care and environment protection, where nudges are principally acceptable and will argue, among others, that neutral or positive nudges, rather than negative, stigmatizing nudges should be endorsed.

While governments in the U.S. and in the UK have been familiarizing themselves with the tools of choice architecture – in the U.S., Cass Sunstein, the author of *Nudge*, was nominated as Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget by Barack Obama in 2009 (The White House, 2009), while the UK's government has its own nudging unit, the Behavioural Insights Team – Hungarian governments have not fully explored or utilized these methods so far. Moreover, research about choice architecture concerning Hungary is practically non-existent. It is not only for these reasons that Hungary is an ideal case to study, but also because there are a number of areas in life where, even within the Eastern European region and within the EU, the country seems to be doing worse than others, and governments struggle to create effective policies targeting these issues.

Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to differentiate between various kinds of nudges and explore the possible ways and policy areas where nudges could be applied by the Hungarian government. This would be desirable both for policy makers and for Hungarian citizens since these tools can prove to have a number of benefits over traditional policy measures and could therefore help achieve better results in certain areas of life. Additionally, understanding and establishing a clear framework for nudges is not only important for

creating improved policies, but also because it is essential to be aware of and comprehend the new tools that some governments are already using and others might be implementing as well.

In doing so, in chapter 1, this paper will first discuss the most important cognitive biases nudges build upon and briefly discuss the cognitive mechanisms behind them and then move on to elaborate on the concept of nudges. I will introduce the definition given by Thaler and Sunstein and specify my own criteria as well. As a next step, in order to show the multifaceted nature of choice architectural interventions, I will introduce some of the classifications that have been presented in the literature and that I will use during my analysis. Since nudges have raised a considerable amount of criticism, the subsequent section will address some of the objections towards nudge. Building on these aforementioned classifications, I will establish my own framework stating when and what types of nudges are acceptable and why they should be preferred to coercive interventions. This framework will serve as a basis for my selection of policy areas and will act as the backbone of my empirical research.

After having set the framework for my research, in the second chapter I will talk about the specific policy areas of health care, such as reducing smoking or obesity, and illustrate why these areas are especially fit for intervention. Within this chapter, I will also take a closer look at the case of Hungary with regards to the state of smoking and obesity. I will state why these areas are problematic and what governments have done to tackle them so far. I will elaborate on how nudging could help in these cases and why they are immune to many of the objections generally raised against nudges.

Finally, in chapter 3, I will present and discuss findings based on my data from interviews made with Hungarian citizens. In order to help support and complete my claims established in my framework, I carried out several interviews which were meant not only to

test my theoretical arguments, but also to gain a better understanding of what nudging means to those affected by it and how they receive such interventions under different circumstances. My conclusion will summarize my findings and point out the possibilities for future research.

Chapter 1. Defining nudges and establishing my framework

Present chapter will introduce the concept of choice architecture, nudges, and shed light on the mechanisms they use. In order to get a full picture of the notion itself, I will talk about some of the criticism nudging has received and look at the various classifications in the literature. Ultimately, I will introduce my own framework for the categorization and validation of various nudges.

1.1 What is choice architecture?

Choice architecture, broadly speaking, is any environment in which choices are made (Barton, 2013, p.2). Although I will use the term in a more narrow sense, this approach draws attention to the fact that the possibilities and situations in which people can be influenced are endless, a point to which I will come back later on. In a more restrictive sense, choice architecture is strongly connected to libertarian paternalism, a term coined by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008). Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argue that it is possible to preserve people's liberty and freedom of choice while still trying to influence their decision. Interventions that are consistent with the criteria of libertarian paternalism are, as specified above, called nudges.

Ultimately, choice architecture supports the claim that humans are not fully rational beings and their decisions are influenced by external factors, desires, and the like. Of course, these influences are not necessarily bad; the primarily focus is on irrelevant external influences or seemingly irrelevant or unwanted desires. In order to make this more apparent, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) distinguish between two species, Econs and Humans. Econs are fully rational while Humans are bound by cognitive biases and irrationality and are susceptible to nudges (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Therefore, "nudges are identified when an environment's feature produces a mismatch between a fully rational agent's behaviour and a

typical human being" (Moles, 2014, p.5).

In order to understand the concept of nudging and how they work, Thaler and Sunstein distinguish between two rather different types of thinkings, governed by two different systems. These two systems are called the Automatic and the Reflective System by Thaler and Sunstein and are associated with different sets of characteristics (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). According to them, the Automatic System is, among others, "uncontrolled, fast, associative, and unconscious", while the Reflective System is "controlled, slow, deductive, and self-aware" (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 20). However, it has to be noted that this distinction is not universally accepted and preferred.

Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011), for example, argue that both deliberative and intuitive decision making processes can rely on the same rules and heuristic and that "the core capacities needed appear to be exactly the same" (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011, p. 102). Similarly, Keren and Schul (2009) question whether the assumption of two different systems is correct and can be supported by evidence. Among other things, they state that the two "systems" could not function without each other, and thus fail to comply with the isolability criterion and cannot be treated as two separate systems (Keren & Schul, 2009, p.540). Moreover, they argue that the set of conditions associated with each system (hot, uncontrolled, fast, unconscious, irrational, etc. with System 1 and cold, controlled, slow, self-aware, rational, etc. with System 2) do not necessarily belong to one of the systems and bring examples to possible scenarios where hybrid combinations (e.g. "hot" System 2) may be observable (Keren & Schul, 2009, p.543). For these reasons, in my paper, I will not commit to using a distinction between these two systems and will simply work with the – less contested – notion of humans having certain biases, be it because of the interaction of two different systems or the complex processes occurring within one single system.

1.2 Biases and heuristics

In order to illustrate the possible shortcomings nudges can correct for, I will list some of the cognitive biases and heuristics below and then briefly explain the cognitive mechanisms behind them.

- Anchoring: adjusting a guess or an estimate in light of some data one is aware of. These adjustments are often insufficient, and are influenced by the anchoring data even if that is irrelevant to the matter at hand (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p.23).
- Status Quo Bias: sticking with the default option even if that option is not the best for us and there is another, more preferable option available. Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p.34) mention the example of subscriptions that have a free trial period and are then renewed automatically. Most people will fail to cancel their subscription even if they have no interest in the given service anymore.
- Overconfidence: overestimating our own capabilities or the probability of a positive outcome. According to a survey, 94% of professors at a university in Nebraska thought they were better than the average teacher at their institution (Price, 2006, p.7).
- Framing: having different evaluations of and emotional reactions to the same information based on how the information was presented to us (Kahneman, 2012, p. 88).
- Availability Bias: assessing the likelihood or the risks of an event by how quickly similar examples come to mind (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p.25).

The occurring biases listed above cause human beings to be irrational and make them unable to assess risks or consequences correctly. Whether or not we treat the human brain as having two separate systems or as one single system, there is a clear difference between the different ways of how individuals arrive to certain decisions (Thaler & Sunstein 2008; Keren & Schul 2009; Kahneman, 2011). Some decisions are made quickly and impulsively, without

much deliberation, while with other decisions people take their time and reflect much more on their final choice. Among others, Janis and Mann (1979) distinguished between a 'hot' and a 'cold' state of mind which they argued to be similar to a continuum and thus our decisions can be made either in a way that involves intense emotions or in a more rational state of mind.

Moreover, there are certain situations in which people are more susceptible to the different heuristics. It has been argued that in cases when there is a strong time pressure, when people are inexperienced about a certain situation, when there are many and conflicting pieces of information, or when the consequences of choices are delayed in time (and rewards are immediate), people struggle more to arrive to an optimal decision (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011).

Temptations are vivid examples of the situations described above. Robert Noggle describes such situations by saying that people can have strong (or the strongest) desires to do something that they do not believe they have the most reason to do (Noggle, 1996, p.45). To use the most common example, we might eat a slice of cake because we have a strong and uncontrolled desire to do so, whereas if we had time to reflect on our decision, maybe calculate the calorie intake it would mean and the amount of exercise we would need to do to counteract the effects of the cake, we might arrive to a more optimal decision. Such a decision is likely to be made in a 'hot' state of mind, and arriving to the most optimal decision is made all the more harder by the fact that the rewards of eating a slice of cake (the joy one feels upon tasting it) are felt immediately, whereas the consequences (gaining weight) are delayed in time.

It has to be noted, however, that not all desires are the same and not all of them can be tackled by nudges. Some types of desires couldn't be controlled even if we had all the time and rationality to think about them. For some people, it might be the case that even after the

calorie information is provided, and half an hour has passed, they still cannot resist the cake when they see it. Other types of desires, however, are more controllable and can be put a stop to by the aforementioned tools. Moreover, desires do not necessarily have to be controlled: as it has been mentioned before, it is mostly irrelevant or unwanted desires that are of concern.

Another example of arriving to suboptimal decisions can occur through the "doing what others do" behavior (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 55). According to a study carried out by psychologist Solomon Asch (2010), people can also conform to what the majority is doing when it is against their own judgment. In Asch's experiment, people were asked to judge the lengths of certain lines, a relatively easy task, and mistakes occurred in less than 1% of the time ("Asch's Conformity Study", 2010). However, when confederates who deliberately gave wrong answers were introduced to the experiment, errors occurred 36.8% of the time ("Asch's conformity Study", 2010). Another excellent example where a heuristic is at work is the behavior that is triggered once people receive data on what people in their immediate or broad environment do, as illustrated by Dilip Soman. Soman's example includes tax-payment and as he notes, "making it clear that your neighbours have paid their taxes has been shown to be an effective way to encourage laggards to pay their tax bills" (Soman, 2013). In both of these situations, people are expected to make decisions in field where they are either inexperienced, or where people are faced with conflicting information and thus rely on shortcuts when making a decision.

It is believed that all these illustrations of the various cognitive biases provide a reasonable understanding of why nudging and choice architecture can be of great help in many situations. It is not hard to acknowledge that many of these defects cause people to make bad choices, or at least non-optimal ones, and cause them to fail to choose the option that would be most fitting for their needs and preferences. In order to help humans arrive at better decisions, the tools of choice architecture can be applied to neutralize these biases.

Evidently, there are a number of different ways to do that, involving a set of different nudges. This is especially important in light of the fact that these biases can occur in countless situations, and, as a result choice architecture can also be applied in various aspects of life, including personal life, education, and health care, just to mention a few. These are some of the reasons why nudges have to be investigated more thoroughly.

1.3 Specifying the concept of nudge

After having introduced the concept of choice architecture and having taken a look at some of the cognitive biases, let us examine the nature of nudges more closely. In some respects, giving advice or information could appear as a nudge, and if we walk into a supermarket or a cafeteria, it could be said that our decision-making process is already being interfered with. Similarly, going out on the street and seeing signs that inform us about video surveillance or the like can also be said to nudge us to behave in a certain way (Curtis, 2011). Moreover, whenever we make a decision, we are bound to face options that are presented in one way or another. Even if not consciously designed, this presentation can influence our choice. As Soman puts it, "every choice always has a default option" (Soman, 2013). As mentioned previously, this also gives way to the status quo bias which can have serious implications for our decisions.

Thaler and Sunstein's classical example for a nudge is that of a school cafeteria where students are faced with many options and have to make a decision. According to the theory of choice architecture, this decision can be influenced by a choice architect who decides how these options are presented to the students (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.3). The assumption is that if, for example, salad is put first and fries are put last, more people will choose salad over fries than when the order of the foods is reversed (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). However, this intervention can also be avoided without having to put too much money or effort into it. If one has a strong preference for fries they can still have them, they would only have to walk a

couple extra meters.

As it follows from the definition provided earlier, nudges, according to Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p.6), are characterized by the following qualities:

- They alter people's behavior
- They have a predictable outcome
- They do not forbid any options
- They do not change economic incentives
- They are cheap and easy to avoid

Additionally, I specify two other characteristics, namely:

- Nudges have to be deliberately designed to encourage people to choose one form of behavior *over* another.
- Nudges are not content dependent.

What I mean by the first criterion is that unless an intervention has been created with the specific aim to nudge people away from one behavior and towards another, it cannot be considered a nudge. In this sense, I disagree with Sunstein, who argues that a GPS should be considered a nudge (Sunstein, 2014, p.17). Although a GPS will most likely have an impact on our behavior, it has not been designed with an intention to guide us away from one option and towards another. The device merely displays information: how to get from A to B (often, there is only one way and there are no alternatives possible). Thus, I do not consider it a nudge.

This distinction can be illustrated by comparing two examples: a sign on a highway showing us the way to Vienna, for example, and the "Look right!" signs in London. The former is not a nudge, since it only provides a piece of information for car drivers, it does not intend to make them divert from their route towards one destination and go to Vienna. On the other hand, "Look right!" signs do have the intention of making people look right *instead of* looking left. I believe this is a major difference between the two types of influences and

based on this criteria, the former cannot qualify as a nudge.

As for the second criteria, it is meant to express that no matter what the aim of a nudge is, even if it aims to make people worse off (for example, make them less healthy, or poorer, or the like) I would still consider it a nudge. The difference between such interventions and nudges that aim to make people better off is that the former would be non-acceptable nudges, while the latter are (more) acceptable. Nevertheless, both interventions would qualify as a nudge according to my list of criteria.

1.4 Categorization of nudges

This section aims at showing that the concept of nudging is not fine-tuned enough to be accepted or rejected in its entirety and thus there is a need to distinguish between various features and types of nudges. In line with this, it is an assumption of present work that classifying nudges can do more in deciding which situations are most appropriate for what kind of nudging than establishing an undoubtedly sound definition to fit all scenarios. For one, the "one-size-fits-all" approach seems less feasible and less flexible. By employing different categories, we can make sure that we have a system with sufficient borders between cases that is still flexible enough to accommodate a number of very different incidents.

One useful addition to understanding and handling the tools of choice architecture is the creation of a subcategory within nudges by defining justified nudges. According to Andres Moles (2014), introducing a two-track requirement for nudges can help us shed a light on how and what type of nudges can be justified. The two-track requirement says that actions have to be supported by reasons and that these reasons can then be reinforced with nudges (Moles, 2014). This prompts us to take a more substantive look at things and decide whether there exist relevant and sufficient reasons for a certain action and evaluate whether a nudge would help fulfill that action. Consequently, this leads to a classification of when and what kind of nudges can be justified: nudging enforceable duties, nudging public goods, or

nudging non-public duties, to mention a few (Moles, 2014). By this point, we are already starting to see that not all nudges are equal and that even if we take nudging to be ubiquitous it does not mean that we can not restrict it or assign nudges into different categories. This is important because it provides a general guideline to nudging regardless of the environment it is used in, yet it does not strangle the concept in a way that it becomes rigid and an open target for criticism.

Similarly, Ly, Mazar, Zhao & Soman (2014) aim at discussing and distinguishing many different types of nudging, rather than creating one uniform definition to fit it all. They classify nudging along two main lines: whether it is activating a desired behavior or boosting self-control and whether a nudge is mindful or mindless (Ly et al., 2014). Desired behavior activating nudges are intended to activate a preferred – as judged by the nudger – behavior, an action that individuals are otherwise "indifferent or inattentive to" (Ly et al., 2014, p.30). A good example for this can be tax paying which is desired by the state – the potential nudger – but people are not especially keen on doing it. Self-control boosting nudges, on the other hand, serve to correct discrepancies between what people would like to do and what they actually do. Nudges for creating a savings account are a good example: although most people would like to save up, many of them fail to succeed with it.

While self-control boosting nudges can be both externally-and self-imposed, nudges that serve to activate a desired behavior are evidently imposed by some external agent (Ly et al., 2014). Mindful nudges work by helping people to reach a more "controlled state" and achieve their goals that way while mindless nudges "include the use of emotion, framing, or anchoring to sway the decisions people make" (Ly et al., 2014, p.30). Moreover, mindful and mindless nudges both have encouraging and discouraging subcategories which highlight the different approaches to nudging. This distinction is similar to the division used in the framework of this paper introduced later on: pro-action or anti-action nudges.

This approach can be practical both when tackling different policy areas and when enacting policies in different countries. In creating policies about environment protection, for example, desired behavior-activating nudges might be more appropriate in countries like Hungary, since most people could be said to be indifferent or inattentive to their environment and its protection. However, in countries such as Canada, where people are more aware of pollution and are more eager to help the environment, self-control boosting nudges could be more adequate.

This classification introduces a matrix with twelve different ways of nudging. Ly et al. also suggest to first map the context of the given decision-making process and then consider the different types of nudges and choose the most fitting one according to how much the individual is aware of what they have to do, how motivated they are, and so on (Ly et al., 2014, p.32). Once we come to see nudges as something that can be tailored to the specific situation decision-makers have to deal with, it becomes easier to dismiss the claims of it creating a slippery slope and leading to an overly paternalistic state.

This is so because as soon as we get a rough idea of the various types of nudges and the ways they could be utilized, the whole concept becomes more well-defined and any deviation ("slipping") from it becomes more easily identifiable. If we know what type of nudges are justified for what types of situations, the boundaries of nudging can be defined more clearly and the concept itself becomes more tangible. Rather than having a fuzzy, fluid concept that allows for a lot of smudging, we can ensure that it is used appropriately in the relevant circumstances.

Table 1. Reproduction of the matrix by Ly et al.

		MINDFUL		MINDLESS	
		ENCOURAGE	DISCOURAGE	ENCOURAGE	DISCOURAGE
ACTIVATING A DESIRED BEHAVIOR	EXTERNALLY IMPOSED	Simplifying tax rules to make tax filing easier.	Placing signs to remind people not to litter.	Advertising that most people are recycling to increase recycling efforts.	Using fake speed bumps to discourage speeding.
BOOSTING SELF-CONTROL	EXTERNALLY IMPOSED	Simplifying application processes for college grants to encourage higher-level education.	Installing car dashboards that track mileage to reduce gas usage.	Automatically enrolling for prescription refills to encourage taking medication.	Placing unhealthy foods in harder to reach places.

By matching the different methods to different goals and labels – understanding the connection between a nudge and its purpose is also a significant part of the process –, these categorizations not only provide a more thorough and defendable understanding of the tools of choice architecture, but they also encourage a more structured approach to designing nudges. Ly et al. (2014, p.32) also provide a so-called "decision map checklist" with four set of questions which help with the actual designing of nudges. Such questions can serve as reminders of the most important aspects that the nudger should take into account if they want to come up with effective and justified nudges.

If there is a list of issues policy-makers have to take into consideration when creating nudges, the whole process becomes more transparent and decision-makers can be held accountable more easily. This could guarantee that these powerful tools are used in an ethical manner. Also, having a set of criteria to assess each situation by can help keep nudging under control and fight off the slippery slope criticism. At the same time, such a list can shed light on important differences between social and economic backgrounds of various countries, in which nudges would have to be applied.

Apart from the categorization provided by Ly et al (2014), Hansen and Jaspersen (2013) also provide a valuable distinction between nudges, one that will serve as the backbone of my own research. In their matrix, they distinguish between nudges that aim at only influencing automatic modes of thinking, called type 1 nudges, and nudges that aim at influencing our automatic modes of thinking while also engaging a more reflective mode of thinking, named type 2 nudges (Hansen & Jaspersen, 2013, p.14-18).

Their other distinction concerns the transparency of the nudge: they characterize transparent nudges as "a nudge provided in such a way that the intention behind it, as well as the means by which behavioural change is pursued, could reasonably be expected to be transparent to the agent being nudged as a result of the intervention" (Hansen & Jaspersen, 2013, p. 17). Consequently, non-transparent nudges are those that do not allow for the reconstruction of the intentions or the mechanisms behind the intervention or the mechanisms (Hansen & Jaspersen, 2013, p.18). This distinction is in line with the transparency argument of Luc Bovens (2008) who states that in order for nudges to count as transparent it is enough to make it "possible for everyone who is watchful to unmask the manipulation" (Bovens, 2008, p.14).

The matrix below shows the four possible cases created from the interaction of these two distinctions and incorporates a number of examples for each case.



Figure 1. The matrix created by Hansen and Jaspersen

If we look at one of the transparent examples, change of printer defaults, it is easy to see that anyone who gives some thought to the matter is able to decipher the intentions behind such a move: two-sided printing saves paper and such a default setting encourages that. On the other hand, reducing the plate size so that the same amount of food seems bigger than before, might not even be salient for many people and if they were to notice it, the intentions behind such a change are far less straightforward.

1.5 Objections against nudges

Admittedly, nudging has also faced a fair amount of criticism. Although examining all of these is not the purpose of present work, a few of them will be highlighted below. In the following section, I will describe and answer to the most frequent and most critical concerns about libertarian paternalism.

1.5.1 Manipulation and Autonomy

One main objection is that nudging is manipulative and hence ethically questionable because it violates one's autonomy. As Joseph Raz (1986) put it, both coercion and manipulation "subject the will of one person to that of another" which, according to him, "violates his independence and is inconsistent with his autonomy" (p.378). When addressing the claim that nudging is wrong because it is manipulative, it is essential to acknowledge that neither of these two are monolithic concepts.

Manipulation, as Robert Noggle (1996) points out, can take many forms and clearly depends on many conditions, such as the mental state of the manipulator. Similarly, Moles (2014, p.16) also points out that manipulation is not a binary concept, rather, actions lie closer to or further away from the two ends of the scale: fully manipulative and fully non-manipulative. Moreover, we should recall that nudges also come in various shapes and forms: while some of them (e.g. non-transparent, type 1 nudges) might lie closer to the manipulative end of the scale, other types of nudges can remain non-manipulative, given that their goals and mechanisms are transparent and can easily be reconstructed. Thus, though the manipulation argument can disqualify some types of nudges from being acceptable, it cannot be considered an argument against nudging itself.

Furthermore, Noggle suggests that manipulation is wrong because it intends to lead people astray, away from rationality and their true beliefs (Noggle, 1996, p.47). Once again, such an argument can be brought up against nudges that would aim at nudging people towards immoral or destructive actions and we very well may deem those interventions

unacceptable for exploiting cognitive biases in order to make people engage in unethical or harmful behavior. In these cases, neither the tool nor the aim is acceptable. However, the intention behind those nudges that I deem acceptable is exactly the opposite; namely, to guide people towards what is best for them. In fact, as Moles (2014, p.6) highlights, making some piece of information more salient can contribute to a better decision making process without being manipulative. In this way, they can even increase one's autonomy by helping them arrive to a decision that is better informed and thus more in line with their actual desires.

Another way to look at the autonomy problem is presented by Adrien Barton with relation to smoking and health warnings. Barton (2013, p.3) builds on the autonomy definition of John Christman and distinguishes between a self-ruling component ("the capacity to rule oneself") and an independence component which implies that in the case of perfect autonomy, the agent's non-deliberative faculty (Automatic System in Thaler and Sunstein's terminology) should not be addressed by external influencing forces. Since this is exactly what nudging aims at, Barton concludes that "libertarian paternalistic measures that address people's non-deliberative faculties interfere with people's independence component of autonomy, and therefore raise ethical worries" (Barton, 2013, p.3). However, upon examining health warnings placed on cigarette packaging, Barton concludes that although they do violate the agent's independence component of autonomy, they also help balance "another attack on autonomy, namely the implicit advertisement in the cigarette's packaging design" (Barton, 2013, p.10). At the same time, in the case of smokers, he deems the self-ruling component of autonomy more important than the independence component, and the former is not infringed upon at all.

1.5.2 The knowledge problem

At this point, another objection has to be mentioned, namely the knowledge problem. As Evan Selinger (2013, p.37) notes, it could be problematic to say that people do not know

what is good for them and therefore need others – essentially with the same built-in cognitive biases as them – to tell them and nudge them towards their true preferences. Similarly, David Colander and Andrew Qi Lin Chong (2009, p.3) also recognize the knowledge problem and claim that nudge becomes paternalistic and worrying for some because it supposes that some individuals or entities (such as the government) know the true preferences of individuals better than they themselves.

Likewise, Mark White, in his book titled *The manipulation of choice*, holds the classical view that true and right preferences cannot be judged by an outsider, only by the individuals themselves (White, 2013). This, in turn, makes it impossible for anyone but the decision maker himself to establish a hierarchy between different options and judge one as superior to others, because the judgment of what the "right" preference is, always remains subjective (White, 2013).

This seems like an oversimplification of the matter, though. There are a number of instances in which people could indeed use some help to arrive at the most optimal decision as judged by themselves. As mentioned by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) as well, in overly complex and unfamiliar situations, most individuals would value the insights of someone who is more knowledgeable than them, for example in choosing a health care or a savings plan. Officials dealing with these things on a daily basis are indeed likely to know more about what might be beneficial for us, than ourselves, simply because of their information surplus.

As it can be inferred from the previous sections, our preferences are rather complex and not all of them are the same: some are permanent or long-term, while others are temporary, some are settled while some are unstable, and there are differences between their orders as well, some are lower order preferences while others are higher ones. Someone might have a lower order preference to spend a hundred dollars every day, but that same person can have a higher order preference to save up for when they are retired. Or, as Barton

(2013) summarizes it, some smokers have a first-order desire to smoke and a second-order desire not to smoke. It is these higher order or settled preferences, consistent over a longer period of time, that nudges are aimed to satisfy.

Thus, we have to consider people with an addiction or those who have conflicting preferences. Through what is called hyperbolic discounting, for example, individuals "make different choices about present versus future consumption depending on the time at which the decision is made, even if the two periods being compared do not change" (Rizzo & Whitman, 2009, p.119). Thus, a person might say they do not wish to exercise today but will tomorrow but once that day comes, their preferences change (Rizzo & Whitman, 2009). Similarly, depending on whether an individual is in a hot or cold mental state, their preferences might change (Rizzo & Whitman, 2009). One might have a strong desire to eat a piece of cake when in a hot state, while having a desire to eat healthy in a colder state. This problem is particularly present in the case of individuals struggling with an addiction: while they might prefer to indulge in the addictive activities in a hot state, guilt or regret can be felt in a later, colder state. These inconsistent preferences further complicate the knowledge problem: if individuals themselves struggle to establish what they value more, it can seemingly be impossible for outsiders to do so.

However, there are certain things that, supposedly, most people want more as the pleasure that would go against them, the most general probably being health. Thus, it could be said that whatever aims at improving the health of people generally addresses most people's true preferences. What has to be considered here is that the cost people are willing to pay for health may vary greatly. For example, someone might be willing to pay the cost of not indulging in the pleasures of eating greasy or sugary foods in order to stay healthy, but unwilling to sacrifice time for and endure the pain of exercising, while others might have no problem paying the costs of both. Although this variance might seem problematic at first

nudges do not interfere with these preferences.

Those who propose to have a clear understanding of their own true preferences and have a strong preference for an option other than the nudged one, or are unwilling to "pay" the costs of an outcome beyond a certain level, can still pursue their preferred option without any significant costs. Exactly because nudges are "soft" tools, they do not necessarily affect everyone. They can be designed to help those people whose preferences are known, yet, those with unknown or differing preferences can remain unaffected since they can still choose otherwise. As Thaler and Sunstein (2008) put it, "(…) for unsophisticated choosers, there is little harm in putting some warning signs along the way" (p. 241). Thus, although nudges do advocate a certain choice, the designers of such interventions do not and need not claim to know everyone's preferences.

1.5.3 The slippery slope

The last objection to be discussed in present work is the slippery slope criticism. Thaler and Sunstein (2008), as well as Selinger (2013) touch upon this issue, namely that policy makers might start out with employing subtle nudges and move on to implement intrusive or coercive measurements. Although the argument sounds powerful at first, it can be countered easily. As Thaler and Sunstein (2008) point out, this argument does not address nudges themselves, so it says very little about the original proposition. Next to this, although nudging can take many forms, and the initial definition is not too restrictive, it does set certain conditions that ensure that a rather clear line can be drawn between coercive, paternalistic actions and nudges. As a result, moving from one to the other is far less easy than this argument would suggest.

Another aspect of the slippery slope argument is that once policy makers start using nudges, they can manipulate people in any areas of life, through using non-transparent interventions that advance ethically questionable goals in the worst case. White mentions the

example of voting, suggesting that it would be highly unethical and controversial to nudge voting decisions by shuffling around the order in which different candidates appear on the ballot, only to facilitate an outcome that is preferred by a certain group of officials (White, 2013, p.80). However, present work, as well as the aforementioned works trying to classify and distinguish between nudges all aim to put up clear boundaries between acceptable and non-acceptable ways of nudges and thus prevent the misuse of these techniques. Moreover, it has to be emphasized once again, that this aspect of the slippery slope criticism is not specific to nudges: the use of governmental tools (be it paternalistic or not) for unjustifiable causes is a general danger, not something particular for nudges.

1.6 When are nudges acceptable and why should they be preferred?

As it becomes evident from the sections above, nudges can take many forms and there are also a wide variety of objections against them. However, I believe that most critiques, wrongly, treat nudge as a monolithic concept and approach them in a binary way: they are either fully acceptable or not. Contrary to this approach, I argue that while some types and forms of nudges are indeed guilty of some of the objections and thus cannot be accepted, there is a clear group of interventions that can be defended and accepted. In this section, I will specify when and what kinds of nudges are acceptable and why they should be preferred to more coercive measures.

1.6.1 When are interventions acceptable?

In order to answer the aforementioned question, I have set one criterion for choice influencing governmental intervention for both coercive and libertarian paternalistic tools. This entails that the intervention has to advance an objective aim that can be supported by scientific evidence (objectivity claim). This first criterion goes along the lines of Moles's (2014) two-track requirement. If a government wants to employ nudges, it has to "give reasons that support such a choice" (Moles, 2014, p.8). Additionally, I believe that it is only

acceptable to use nudging in areas where such reasons can be objectively defended by a community (specialists, NGOs, etc.) who are able to provide factual evidence in favor of the aim. In my opinion, advancing health and advancing the protection of the environment constitute such policy areas. However, I believe that this criterion has to apply not only for nudges, but any other coercive measures attempting to sway people's choices as well.

Hence, the previously mentioned example of nudging voting is a particularly problematic one with regards to objectivity, since political preferences are especially delicate and subjective. There are no objective, scientific reasons for why a liberal mindset would be more or less preferable to a conservative one. This makes the area of voting a forbidden territory both for nudging and for coercive ways of trying to influence people's decisions. Similarly, the recently introduced Sunday closing of Hungarian shops ventures onto a territory that does not meet the first criterion. The coercive measure bans shops from opening on Sunday and does so in the hope of encouraging people to spend more time with their families and organize programs outside, "go to museums or to the zoo" (HVG, 2015). There is no scientific or objective evidence that proves that going to the zoo is more beneficial in any way than going to the mall. However, the fact that these areas are unacceptable for intervention has little implications for other policy issues.

Let us consider the area of health, for example. It wouldn't be irrational to assume that most people prefer being healthy, meaning a life without sickness, pain, and the like, but it could be argued that some people might have a higher preference for an unhealthy habit, than a healthy life. That is to say, although they value the prospect of a life free of illnesses and various health-issues, they are not either willing to or cannot (because of an addiction, for example) pay the costs to have that life. Even if this is the case, being healthy still has an objective value over being unhealthy, supported by evidence from the medical sciences.

The same can be said about environmental policies. Although it can be argued that not everyone may want to protect the environment, or that the issue does not have the same importance on everyone's list of preferences, it is still feasible to say that being environmentally conscious and acting in ways that protect the environment has scientifically defendable, objective benefits. Environmentally considerate actions help preserve and maintain processes that make our planet livable, they help reduce various health risks (which is obviously intertwined with the aforementioned issue of health), and so on. Thus, while not everyone may want to pursue an environmentally-conscious life, reducing waste and saving resources is still an acceptable and objective aim that is preferred to a more destructive way of life based on scientific proof, rather than ideology.

1.6.2 Why should nudges be preferred?

After singling out areas where choice influencing interventions, in general, are acceptable we have to look at the reasons why nudges should be preferred to more coercive measures. At this point, it is important to emphasize that present work does not take a principally anti-paternalistic view, that is, in cases that meet the first criterion, purely paternalistic acts are not deemed unacceptable. However, there are a number of reasons why nudges are preferred. These are:

- effectiveness
- sensibility
- flexibility
- advancing autonomy

Effectiveness is illustrated by the “last mile problem”, as specified by Sendhil Mullainathan (2009). Although there are a number of issues that we have effective solutions for, non-adherence often results in an overall failure to tackle the problem at hand. That is to say, even if everything is given for a beneficial outcome, the “last mile” of making people

utilize those means requires an additional step, a nudge (Mullainathan, 2009).

By sensibility, I mean the beneficial feature of nudges that they do not make arbitrary distinctions between who the intervention affects, as opposed to coercive measures. Raising the prices of cigarettes, for example, targets poor people much more than rich people, a distinction that does not make sense when it comes to increasing health. On the other hand, the effects of nudges change based on a sensible difference, namely, people's preferences.

Flexibility means that nudges, as their definition entails and as it has been illustrated before, leave room for other choices as well and do not force people into any option. This means that, as opposed to coercive measures which affect everyone at any given time, nudges can be flexible in who they affect and when, adapting to different situations and contexts.

The advancement of autonomy means that nudges are much more likely to enhance autonomy than coercive tools since they are able to advance conscious understandings of certain goals, and help people develop new mental ways of decision making, as opposed to tools that involve coercion or strong, possibly economic, incentives.

For a better understanding of this claim, let us think of the example mentioned by Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p.68) about including a sad/happy emoticon on consumer's electricity bills and how this prompted those with an overconsumption to reduce their usage of resources. What's more, users who consumed less energy than the average didn't feel prompted to reach the average consumption, instead, the happy emoticon was understood as a cue that they're doing well (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.68). This constitutes a clear nudge, since the intervention operates through a bias that people will aim to avoid the sad emoticon and instead thrive to receive a happy one.

However, the overall implication of this process is that saving resources is a good thing in and of itself and leads to a beneficial outcome (receiving a happy emoticon, as well as protecting our environment) and the happy emoticon expresses a sign of approval.

Moreover, people's consumption information is also made more salient this way: rather than a series of numbers that are hard to understand, people receive more understandable and salient cues about their action. Because receiving a happy emoticon is a very mild but efficient signal, the link between the decision and the real benefits – bettering our environment – is not overshadowed or jeopardized by other, stronger incentives.

If we take the case of a price increase of electricity, with the aim of prompting people to consume fewer resources and be more environmentally conscious, the rather strong incentive of avoiding to pay more will dominate the overall decision making and cloud out other concerns. Thus, there is no or little room left in the deliberation process for other considerations of why using fewer resources could be a good thing. The sharp indicator of price overrules all other aspects and does not allow for the real benefits (saving resources and the environment) to become salient. This means that in the case of nudging, people are actually given the chance of deliberating why the nudged decision would be beneficial (but can still choose to avoid it without further costs) and can employ those links in future decision making situations, giving them the chance for active learning and improving their own choices.

This is beneficial for two reasons. Firstly, I hold the view that being motivated by the right reasons has a value in and of itself, thus it is preferable for a person to reduce their consumption out of consideration for the environment than for their own wallet. Secondly, although it is not wrong to be motivated by economic incentives per se, it is better to be motivated by the right reasons since it might increase conformity in the future. That is, if one understands and acts because of the right reasons, chances are higher that they will make the right decision in the future as well, possibly under different circumstances.

1.6.3 What kinds of nudges are acceptable?

After having established the cases where intervention is justified and having looked at the benefits of nudges over coercive tools in these fields, the final step is to identify the subset of nudges that are acceptable in their mechanisms. In order to do this, I have established three criteria which entail that nudges have to:

- engage as few or as weak emotions as possible (emotion-minimizing).
- be transparent (transparency)
- aim at encouraging a certain action rather than despising its opposite (pro-action)

The first criterion entails that a nudge should avoid involving or exploiting deep emotions and that it should rather be objective and appeal to reasons rather than emotions. Thus, when nudging people to quit smoking, a factual presentation of risks is more acceptable than an off-putting picture that possibly prompts a response of fear, disgust, sadness, and the like. Although the former method may result in the same emotions, they are believed to be less intense. Though the emotion-minimizing claim is meant to distinguish between acceptable and non-acceptable nudges, it is important to keep in mind that the strength of emotions is more like a scale, thus, it is hard to draw a clear line between acceptable and unacceptable nudges.

My second criterion is that nudges applied by the government have to be transparent in nature, as defined by Hansen and Jaspersen (2013). Citizens should be able to easily reconstruct the goals and mechanisms of the nudge. Naturally, transparency can take many forms and go to different extents, so the question arises: "does this mean we need to put up a billboard next to the food line" explaining the food rearranging nudge in detail (Bovens, 2008, p. 13)? In my understanding, I stick to the argument provided by Bovens (2008) and say that the intervention is sufficiently transparent if "a watchful person would be able to identify the intention of the choice architecture" (Bovens, 2008, p.13). This means that there

needs to be no billboard advertising a nudge, but the logic behind a nudge has to be reconstructable and the underlying causes and mechanisms should be accessible to citizens in some forms: in the text of the regulation, possibly on a web page, or the like. Additionally, the government has to be as open and transparent about the planning and implementation of such interventions as with other policies.

Finally, the third criterion is meant to ensure that nudges do not stigmatize certain types of behavior and create a feeling of shame, or inferiority among people. Thus, nudges meant to encourage a healthy lifestyle should be framed as advancing the goal of more healthy individuals, rather than preventing them from getting fat or sick. This way, less healthy individuals are not put in a negative light and, referring back to the first criterion, the emotions that are evoked are more likely to be positive than in the case of a nudge that is meant to nudge against some action.



Figure 2. Theoretical framework

The figure above summarizes the various criteria and theoretical framework established in this chapter and outlines the process of arriving to acceptable nudges. In the following chapter, I will focus on the specific case of Hungary and how the previously characterized interventions could tackle issues in problematic policy areas.

Chapter 2. Health, smoking, and the case of Hungary

Choice architecture and its use in policy making is still a relatively new phenomenon in most countries and is almost non-existent in Hungary. However, just because the use of nudging does not have its well-rehearsed channels and processes in policy making yet, it does not mean that it is impossible to distinguish between different issues and policy areas that are more suited for these kind of interventions, and ones that should be left to the workings of more traditional mechanisms.

Hence, there are a number of reasons why present work mainly focuses on Hungary. First of all, both health-related issues (such as smoking and obesity) are pressing concerns in Hungary, as data will show later in this section, and environmentalism is in its early days as well. These areas are exactly those that, according to my criteria, could be effectively and acceptably tackled by nudges. Moreover, Hungary is a young democracy and thus provides an interesting case for understanding how much and what kind of influence people are willing to accept from the state. Finally, as it has been mentioned before, nudging and the possibilities it offers are largely under researched in the country. All these factors make Hungary an adequate case for studying the prospects and conditionalities of such techniques.

2.1 Health and smoking

Both health and smoking are considered to be areas that meet my criterion for choice architectural intervention and thus will serve as a focus of present work. In the sections below, I will take a look at both areas and show why nudges are not only acceptable but also necessary regarding these issues.

2.1.1 Why nudge health related issues?

Health, in general, is an extremely complex and far-reaching territory, with a myriad of subfields in which nudging could be implemented. Nudges that are directed to enhance the health of people, as understood in the broad sense of general health conditions, rather than

specific to certain diseases, are some of the most acceptable interventions since they address a real, acute problem and can serve an objective goal and comply with the first, objectivity criterion. This argument is elaborated upon in more detail in the context of the specific nudges.

The first general health issue that is often tackled by governments and other organizations is obesity. It has become commonplace to condemn the U.S. for the lifestyles of its citizens: over 30% of the U.S. population is diagnosed as obese, and 20% of Americans smoke (Gold and Lichtenberg, 2012, p.18), but these health problems are not at all specific to the U.S. According to the World Health Organization, "around 3 in 10 deaths globally are caused by cardiovascular diseases (…) At least 80% of premature deaths from cardiovascular diseases could be prevented through a healthy diet, regular physical activity and avoiding the use of tobacco" ("10 Facts on the State of Global Health", 2014). Moreover, "almost 10% of the world's adult population has diabetes" and "Deaths due to diabetes have been increasing since the year 2000, reaching 1.5 million deaths in 2012" ("10 Facts on the State of Global Health", 2014).

The importance and the necessity of interventions in the area of health is further demonstrated by the United Nation's position. Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2000) states that health is a fundamental human right and that "every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity" ("International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 2000, p.1). Although the document highlights that the State is not always able to protect citizens from genetic diseases, or risky and unhealthy lifestyles, it still has to provide the facilities and services to maintain the highest level of health possible ("International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 2000).

On these grounds, I deem it acceptable for the state to use intervention in these areas, especially since it can be assumed that most people have a preference to be healthy (not necessarily live healthy), nudging them towards choices that advance this goal will help them satisfy their preferences. Moreover, as I will demonstrate later through the case of Hungary, and as Sendhil Mullainathan (2009) asserts in his presentation, solutions in these issues are often readily available, the missing piece is only to encourage people to make use of them.

2.1.2 Why nudge smoking?

Smoking, as a part of health-issues is similarly fit for intervention for the aforementioned reasons. We can, once again, rely on the United Nation's International Covenant to provide support for why the state needs to be involved in issues related to smoking and should not be neutral when it comes to these matters. The document states that "Article 12.2 (b) (…) discourages the abuse of alcohol and the use of tobacco (…)" ("International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 2000, p.5). Although the passage refers to healthy working conditions, it supports the idea that smoking and its consequences should be tackled by the state.

Moreover, smoking poses some scientifically acknowledged risks not only on those who engage in the activity but on others as well. According to the World Health Organization, more than 5 million people are killed as the result of direct tobacco use every year[1] ("10 Facts on the State of Global Health", 2014). WHO states that "unless urgent action is taken, the annual death toll could rise to more than 8 million by 2030" ("10 Facts on the State of Global Health", 2014). Furthermore, smoking is a type of addiction and thus it is expected that at least some percentage of smokers experience conflicting preferences: a lower order preference of smoking and a higher order preference of wishing to be able to resist or quit entirely (Barton, 2013, p.7).

[1] Moreover, second-hand smoking also poses a serious risk, since "more than 600 000 are the result of non-smokers being exposed to second-hand smoke"

2.1.3 Healthy choices and smoking

Since both healthy eating and smoking belong to those areas where people often struggle with inconsistent or conflicting desires, rather than having strongly set preferences, guiding people towards healthier choices is preferable in both contexts. Moreover, neither healthy lifestyle choices nor smoking involve particularly deep convictions, apart from possible extreme cases which would belong to those that have to be treated by medical professionals rather than tackled by state interventions. In other words, the choice to eat a bar of chocolate or an apple is not a defining moment for the majority of people. In most cases, choices made in these fields do not involve deep, long-lasting emotions and thus influences exerted on them carry virtually no risk, while having the possibility of bringing along some positive changes.

2.2 The case of Hungary

In the following section, I aim to show that both obesity and smoking are acute concerns in Hungary, yet, they have not been successfully tackled yet. Although there have been improvements in these areas, nudges could help achieve even better results without any of the constraints the coercive methods pose on citizens.

2.2.1 Problems of obesity in Hungary

Hungary proves to be a particularly good case to study with respect to nudges, since both of the aforementioned areas appear to be very problematic. First of all, the country's population struggles with acute obesity. According to the statistics of the OECD, over 16.7% of adults in the EU are obese, and Hungary appears to be in a particularly worrying situation, with a leading figure of a 28.5% obesity rate, making it the "most obese" country within the European Union (OECD, 2014, p.57). An even more recent, and more worrying study by Rurik et. al. (2014) found that 32% of Hungarian men and 31.5% of Hungarian women were obese. The authors argue that apart from medical intervetion, "much more governmental support, population awareness are needed" (Rurik et al, 2014, p.7).

A new study sheds light on the fact that the cost of various health services provided for overweight and obese individuals reaches 207 billion HUF, 11,7% of all health care costs, and 0.7% of Hungary's GDP ("Elhízás viszi el a magyarországi GDP 0,7 százalékát"[2], 2014). Moreover, if we take into account that obese people tend to suffer from other illnesses as well, such as cardiovascular diseases and the like, the study estimates that the costs could be as high as 300 billion HUF, 1% of Hungary's GDP ("Elhízás viszi el a magyarországi GDP 0,7 százalékát.", 2014). The numbers provide a stark reminder that obesity and an unhealthy lifestyle have serious implications for a country's productivity and economy. At the same time, it is also apparent that recent measures are unable to effectively tackle the problem of obesity and a truly successful policy is yet to be introduced.

Although from a strictly rational and economic standpoint, it would be most advantageous for the state to not care for these people and thus minimize the burden they pose on the economy. However, this strategy would be unacceptable for a number of reasons. First of all, this could create a kind of hierarchy between health conditions: ones where the state should intervene by subsidizing treatment and ones where it shouldn't. This approach would then lead to an unmanageable, arbitrary ranking of diseases. Moreover, as it has been discussed earlier, states have the duty to care for their citizens' health, as proclaimed by the United Nation's Economic and Social Council. Because of this and for reasons outlined above, it is clear that sole economic considerations shouldn't be the only driving force when it comes to health issues and state intervention.

At the same time, I believe that issues of responsibility should not play into health care when it comes to subsidizing treatment. As my arguments for nudging show, I deem it acceptable for the state to try to push people towards healthier choices but I do not believe incentives such as the high costs of certain treatment should be used. In line with this, and

[2] "Obesity takes 0.7% of Hungary's GDP"

with the claims made by the United Nation's Council, I believe that any "punishment" at the time of the treatment is morally unacceptable and interventions or incentives for healthier choices should come at earlier stages.

Another condition that strengthens the argument that intervention at earlier stages is necessary is the confirmation of people's conflicting preferences in these areas and the salience of their overall preference not to be obese. The aforementioned assumption that most people, therefore most Hungarians, suffer from the consequences of an unhealthy lifestyle – rather than enjoy it – is validated by recent statistics from Nielsen. Based on consumer data from between July 2013- June 2014, the company found that sales of prescription-free weight-loss products grew by 6%, making it a 2.2 billion HUF industry ("Drága diéta: milliárdokat költenek a magyarok fogyasztószerekre"[3], 2014). Although this does not provide deeper insights into people's values on healthy and unhealthy lifestyles and preferences, it is evident that there is an internal struggle that most people face when confronted with such choices.

It seems that most people have a desire to eat unhealthy food which is conflicted with another, possibly more long-term, desire of staying slim and healthy. Although there might be people who, despite of all the negative consequences of an unhealthy diet, prefer to indulge in the pleasures of it, the high number of those trying to correct for their actions by purchasing weight loss products shows that many could benefit from a certain intervention that would make healthier choices easier. That is one of the reasons why nudging can be desirable in this area: for a significant number of people, the knowledge problem is out of the way, they have already expressed their true preferences through their choices and nudges can effectively help them. At the same time, those who value the pleasures of an unhealthy lifestyle more than health can remain unaffected; something that could not be possible through coercive

[3] "Expensive diet: Hungarians spend billions on dietary supplements"

measures.

2.2.2 Attempts to solve obesity problems in Hungary

The Hungarian government is, of course, aware of these problems and has tried to implement various policy measures to improve the situation in the aforementioned areas in the recent years. In 2014, new regulations have been issued with regards to school cafeterias and the like. The new law specifies that children have to receive at least four doses of fruits and/or vegetables during a whole day of catering, with at least one portion being raw fruits or vegetables. Stricter regulations will be applied to salt and sugar usage as well. Milk served as a drink cannot contain added sugar, while sugar-levels of teas served will have to remain below a specified level, putting an end to the immensely sweet drink dubbed as "menza-tea" (cafeteria-tea) by many Hungarians. Moreover, according to the new law, it is forbidden to place salt and sugar shakers on cafeteria tables (Act of May 30, 2014, 37/2014).

Although the regulation correctly targets the problems of excessive sugar and salt consumption, both being apparent in the diet of most Hungarians, it contains elements whose success could be improved by possible nudges. For example, the sole act of providing raw fruits/vegetables as part of a meal does not mean that students will choose to consume those. It is quite plausible for them to ditch the "healthy option" and decide to buy a chocolate bar at the school buffet. This is connected to the aforementioned effectiveness feature of nudges: school-cafeteria regulations can provide all the means students need to have a healthy diet, but in order to realize that goal, and make regulations effective, they might need a nudge.

Of course, banning chocolate, cakes and other sweets can also be an option in schools, as it would definitely decrease the consumption of unhealthy foods. In principle, coercive paternalism is not unacceptable, especially when it comes to children. However, there are a number of reasons why nudges should be preferred in this environment as well. First of all, nudges provide a much more flexible measure and thus allow for indulging every now and

then, which is a more suitable approach given that eating sweets in moderation does not do much harm. Second, a nudge could efficiently complement the aforementioned new Hungarian regulations without coercion and on top of providing children with healthier food, they can also be encouraged to "take the last mile" and take advantage of those healthier alternatives. Finally, as it has been mentioned before, it can have some educational power as well, since children can become more trained in making an active decision in favor of healthy foods, rather than being forced to opt for them.

Regulations on cafeteria meals are not the first ones introduced by the Hungarian government in order to tackle the health problems of citizens. In 2013, the government introduced a special tax on packaged goods containing sugar or salt above a certain level ("Népegészségügyi termékadó", 2013). Moreover, certain ingredients found in energy drinks were also taxed more heavily, making chocolate, chips, and energy drinks more expensive, and, as was hoped by policy makers, a less attractive choice for consumers. Similarly, in February, 2015, the American Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee proposed a tax on sugary drinks and sweets (Bjerga & Bloomfield, 2015). The revenues coming from these taxes could then be used to promote healthy eating or to subsidize fruits and vegetables (Bjerga & Bloomfield, 2015).

Both measures make use of traditional policy tools, rather than nudges, and, once again, just like in the case of cafeteria regulations, several problems arise. According to the Federation of Hungarian Food Industries, salt and sugar consumption levels have not changed in the general population since the introduction of the so-called "chips-tax" ("Nem ért célt a chipsadó", 2013). This implies that consumers either keep on choosing the same products, regardless of the moderate increase in price, or simply opt for cheaper versions, which may contain the same amount of salt, while saving costs on other ingredients and resulting in an even worse quality product ("Nem ért célt a chipsadó", 2013). Both possibilities mean that

policies of this kind remain highly ineffective in incentivizing healthier behavior and that new tools should be used in order to tackle these areas.

Moreover, it has to be noted, that raising the prices of unhealthy foods affects the poor much more than the rich. For poorer people, even a seemingly minor increase in price can have a huge effect, let alone more salient changes. However, most food-price increases remain unnoticed by the rich. Thus, such a measure is highly selective in who it affects and this selection is unjustified. There is no reason to assume that people who are less well-off should be more affected by regulations targeting their health. Especially since it is exactly them who will look for cheaper, more damaging alternatives. Contrary to these types of interventions, nudges would have a bigger effect on those who have conflicting preferences and would stay ineffective for those whose preferences are strongly set: a selection that is sensible.

2.2.3 Problems of smoking in Hungary

Another major problem in Hungary is smoking. According to a study published by the National Institute for Health Development 32.3% of all men and 23.5% of all women smoke on a daily basis (Vitrai, 2012, p.3). This means that Hungary ranks as having the 8th most smokers in the European Union (OECD, 2012, p.59). These data have serious implications for Hungary's economy, workforce, and the life expectancy of Hungarians. In 2010, 500.000 people were hospitalized due to conditions that can be related to smoking, while out of the 3.6 million visits paid to doctors for smoking-related reasons, 36% needed medication for conditions caused directly by smoking (Vitrai, 2012, p.8-9).

The most recent publication from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office reveals that in 2014, 28% of the adult population smoked regularly (KSH, 2015, p.6). Moreover, the percentage of smokers even grew in certain age cohorts: most worryingly, smoking amongst young men between the ages of 18 and 34 rose from 36% in 2009 to 42% in 2014 (KSH,

2015, p.6). Similarly, the percentage of smoking women in this age cohort grew from around 25% in 2009 to 29% in 2014 (KSH, 2015, p.6).

Moreover, although relevant statistics for Hungary were not found, data from the United States reveal that smokers, just like people with an unhealthy lifestyle are fighting an internal battle: 68.8% of all smokers said they wanted to stop smoking completely and "52.4% had made a quit attempt for >1 day in the year before the interview" (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011, p.1513). Although the data is specific to the U.S., it does show that people overwhelmingly have conflicting preferences. Even if the number of people wanting to quit smoking was lower in Hungary, the indication is that some people are faced with an acute struggle.

Further data reveal that 1/6 of annual deaths in 2010 were attributable to smoking, and, what is even more worrying is that 29% of early deaths (among those under 65) were caused by smoking (Vitrai, 2012, p.7). Due to early smoking-attributable mortality, Hungary has lost 25 thousand (!) working years in 2010, a rather shocking number given the size and population of the country (Vitrai, 2012, p.9). All things taken together, direct and indirect costs of smoking meant a burden of 441 billion HUF for the state (Vitrai, 2012, p.9). These numbers help us grasp the intensity of the issue and how detrimental it is both to citizen's health and the functioning of the state itself.

2.2.4 Regulations about smoking

After having won the elections in 2010, Fidesz, Hungary's right wing governing party, started to introduce a number of regulations that aimed at decreasing the number of smokers, and more importantly, at protecting non-smokers. In 2011, the party modified the law about the protection of non-smokers and the regulation of consuming and marketing tobacco products. The new regulations completely prohibited smoking on vehicles, work places, bars, clubs – virtually any closed space (XLII. Act of 1999, 2011). Moreover, since 2011, it is also

prohibited to smoke at underpasses, stops and stations of public transportation (XLII. Act of 1999, 2011).

Another substantial government regulation that tackled the smoking habits of Hungarians was the creation of national tobacco stores in 2013. The regulation was issued in accordance with a 2012 regulation on selling tobacco reducing juvenile smoking. The new law meant a state monopoly for the industry and came with serious regulations. It specified and unified both the exterior and the interior of the stores: the logo, the names, the sign banning children under the age of 18 all have to conform with the uniform instructions specified in the regulation and additional text, pictures or logos cannot be added (Act of 2012, 134/2012). As it is mentioned in the regulation, the exterior of tobacco stores cannot contain any "pictures, visuals, or texts that refer to tobacco products, tobacco supplements, or smoking" (Act of 2012, 134/2012).

The strict rules imposed by the state give us an idea about the importance and severity of the smoking situation and the rather strong measures the Hungarian government is taking to deal with it. This becomes all the more transparent when reading the government's reasoning behind the updated regulations of tobacco sales. The law explicitly says that all these measures are taken primarily in order to "reduce the rate of juvenile smoking in Hungary" which is identified as a "priority issue of public health" (Act of 2012, 134/2012). The law then goes on to say that it is among the aims of the new policy to "better the health of the entire Hungarian population in the medium and long term, by reducing the rate of juvenile smoking" and to be able to protect those under the age of 18 more effectively (Act of 2012, 134/2012).

Thus, it becomes clear that there was a serious value-based reasoning behind these measures, not just plain economic considerations. It is safe to say, then, that taking a stand on what's best for people is not a particular feature of nudge policies, but is a prevalent side of

many public policy regulations, making it a more of a general concern for those sensitive to the government's involvement in people's life and less of a nudge-problem.

It can also be said that the new law has some elements that could qualify as a nudge for adults. While the regulation bans anyone under the age of 18 to enter the tobacco shops, the opaque windows serve as a nudge for the adult population. If we think of the prohibition of pictures, texts or visuals relating to tobacco or tobacco supplements, or the resulting uniform opaque glasses of the stores, the famous “marshmallow experiment” from Mischel, Ebbesen and Zeiss (1972) easily comes into mind. Said experiment tested kids' ability to resist some sweet treats and found that they were more able to resist if the treat was out of sight – by being placed in an opaque jar, for example (Mischel, Ebbesen & Zeiss, 1972). Thus, the regulation provides an excellent example of a choice architecture intervention that influences citizens' lives every day. As such, it can serve as a tangible real-life situation to test some of the issues raised in present paper.

Chapter 3. Methodology, analysis and findings

Present work, apart from identifying the key conditions for governmental nudging, also attempts to bring theory and practice together and find out how people actually relate to the claims made earlier in this work. Firstly, I wanted to see wether people notice a nudge that can affect them every day and how they think about it prior to knowing the exact mechanisms behind it. This condition is important since it can be assumed that the majority of the population does not have substantial (or any) knowledge about nudges and thus any opinion they form this way can be decisive about how they accept these policy tools and how they think about them.

Secondly, I aimed to investigate whether people prioritize the same conditions as present work mentioned earlier, namely, whether they find nudges involving less emotions more acceptable, whether they make the same distinctions between transparent versus non-transparent nudges (Hansen and Jaspersen, 2013), whether individuals place a particular emphasis on the aim/policy area of the nudge, and whether they are concerned with how a certain intervention is framed. This was an important step in gaining support for my theoretical framework and also for acquiring additional information on the criteria that those most affected by the regulations pose. Finally, I intended to find out what, if any, other conditions Hungarians specify as important factors that play into accepting nudges. In order to tackle these issues, I conducted interviews with Hungarian individuals.

Present research employs the methods of interviews since qualitative methods are an excellent tool for understanding underlying processes and considerations when making a decision. According to Weiss (1994), through interviewing, we get a chance to learn about:

> people's interior experiences. We can learn what people perceived and how they interpreted their perceptions. We can learn how events affected their thoughts and feelings. We can learn the meanings to them of their relationships, their families, their work, their selves. (p.1)

Employing the methods of qualitative interviewing was essential for my research since it enabled me to engage with my respondents on a deeper level, and tailor my questions to their experiences, their perceptions. As Weiss (1994) puts it, it allowed me to "gain in the coherence, depth, and density of the material" (p.3), crucial for the topic of my research, which is evidently complex and involves different thinking and deliberation processes on multiple levels.

I am particularly interested in how theoretical arguments and objections against nudges play out in real life and how the very citizens affected by these measures think about such policies. Through individual, one-on-one interviews I aimed to explore the underlying thoughts people have about policies and choice architecture in great detail, a territory that is much unexplored although it holds high importance. Moreover, much of the data and information needed for this research is not available or reconstructable from other sources. In addition to the lack of research in the Hungarian context, there is also a shortage of studies that focus on testing the theoretical theories about nudge in a real-life setting. In this sense, interviews are seen as a tool to give us a unique insight into how Hungarian policies affect citizens and how, under what circumstances, choice architecture measures could be introduced.

3.1 Topic Guide

The questions in my topic guide followed an open-ended question style, which allowed my respondents to express their opinions freely about each issue (Keats, 2000). Although I tried to make sure my topic guide is constructed in a way that gives interviewees enough space, at the same time I had to make sure my questions remain somewhat specific in order to be able to elicit the relevant responses. Since my work focuses on concepts and issues that most people do not consciously deliberate about in their daily lives, having a strong structure was essential in preventing respondents from getting off-track.

My topic guide had four main parts that can be divided into two sections: in the first section, respondents were not explicitly introduced to the concept of nudge. In an attempt to understand what "intrusiveness" means for my respondents, I asked them to mention a campaign or regulation that they felt was "too much", intrusive, or didn't like for some reason. This discussion helped me get a grasp of what interventions people genuinely detest and for what reasons. These initial responses helped me shape my questions for the rest of the individual interviews and ensured that I wasn't rigidly applying my own criteria. In this section, respondents were also asked about the policy example of the opaque windows of tobacco shops and how they thought about them in order to see how they viewed nudges prior to having any knowledge about them.

In the second section, respondents were introduced to the concept of nudge and were asked about the opaque windows again to be able to express any change of opinion. In the first part of the second section, respondents were presented with a number of other possible nudging policies concerning smoking (e.g. changing the cigarette packages to a uniform design) and were asked whether they find them acceptable or not and why that is so. I also asked my respondents to compare nudges with traditional policy measures (e.g. raising the price of cigarettes) and express their opinion about which one they find more effective, more acceptable or preferable.

In the third part of the topic guide, questions related to healthy eating and, similarly to the previous section, it contained examples of various nudges (transparent and non-transparent) which respondents were asked to form an opinion about them. Respondents were also asked to compare nudges with traditional policy measures. Finally, in the fourth part, interviewees were asked to list some areas of life where they find nudges acceptable and where they do not and were invited to explain the distinctions between these areas.

Although my topic guide was divided into various parts based on the area of the given examples, with each proposed policy measure, I aimed to explore under what conditions people who are potentially affected by them accept them and thus my questions had some overarching considerations that run across all the examples. In addition to this repetition being necessary because of the changing context but similar focus of my questions, I believe it also helped respondents to become more and more familiar with these rather complex phenomena and form a more solid, coherent opinion about them. These recurring considerations – following the logic of my theoretical framework – are:

1) does the area/aim of the intervention matter?

2) does the transparent or non-transparent nature of a nudge matter?

3) are nudges that involve deeper emotions less accepted?

4) does the framing of a nudge matter?

5) how do nudges compare to more traditional policy tools?

3.2 Sampling and respondents

Since my theoretical framework and my topic guide highlight the issue of smoking, I interviewed smokers, the target group of the regulations mentioned in my examples. Although the second set of examples (healthy eating) does not specifically affect smokers more than other groups of the society, but rather raises a more general issue, it provided an interesting contrast to test how respondents think about policies that are not targeted at them but they are nevertheless affected by. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that there is a significant difference between smokers within my sample and non-smokers when it comes to healthy eating and thus these findings might be more generalizable within the demographic group my respondents came from.

My sampling was purposive (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006) as I only interviewed smokers from Budapest, specifically from district V. and VII. Although it would have been

desirable to employ non-purposive sampling, the scope of the study only allowed me to stay within Budapest. The average age in the aforementioned districts is between 44-47 and 41-42, respectively, while the percentage of people holding a graduate degree is around 31% in the city center ("Budapest városfejlesztési koncepciója", 2011, p.28, 40).

I recruited my interviewees in two ways: I went to tobacco shops in the above mentioned districts, and asked employees/owners to put me in touch with some of the regular customers. Originally, I aimed to combine this method with staying in tobacco shops and recruiting customers on the spot, however, due to the fact that customers were usually in a hurry, it quickly became evident that it is unrealistic to expect people to devote 20-30 minutes of their time to answering my questions. Thus, the other method of recruiting interviewees was by approaching smokers in a park in district V.

Altogether, I interviewed 12 people, but in the final analysis, I only worked with 9 of the interviews, with 3 of the 12 interviews not being adequate for analyzing. My respondents came from the age group of 19 – 35, thus my findings mostly represent the opinion of young adults in Budapest. This age bias might be accountable to the location where I recruited my interviewees from, and their willingness to participate due to them having more time. Out of my 9 respondents, 6 were female and 3 were male. Generally, females were much more likely to participate in the research than males.

3.3 The interview process

My interviews either took place in a park, in the tobacco shop, or somewhere nearby. In most instances, a relatively peaceful environment was ensured. On average, my interviews lasted around 20-30 minutes. This duration seemed to be enough to explore the issues raised in a significant depth without taking too much time from the respondents. Since there was no economic or other type of incentive provided for the participation, I had to make sure I stayed within certain limits. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed subsequently.

Generally, there were no major difficulties throughout the interviews: no respondents wished to stop the interview before the end and there were no other disruptions either. However, although the concepts of autonomy, freedom of choice, or manipulation are not exactly straightforward, and the territory of public policy is not something most Hungarians engage with on a daily basis on a conscious level, my respondents sometimes felt baffled by some of the questions or got a bit off track. Moreover, although in most cases I feel that I managed to explore the "backstage" area (Goffman, 1959) of my respondents as well, that is, some of the more hidden thoughts and opinions they have, a longer interview duration would have been beneficial for an even deeper engagement with my respondents.

Another challenge I had to face was the fact that the terminology – nudging, choice architecture, etc. – are completely non-existent in Hungarian which made it really hard to refer to these techniques and created a bit of a setback in explaining these notions. In other words, the inability to use a unifying term for these specific types of policy tools made it much more difficult to create a clear understanding about what they are, and made discussing these issues more bothersome. Nevertheless, it seemed that all of my respondents understood what the concept meant and managed to engage with it.

Following the work of Keats (2000), I found it necessary to slightly tailor the language and style of my questions from respondent to respondent. The explanation of nudges, for example, was done with simpler or more complex terms, depending on the educational background of the respondent. In addition, I made sure to use the technique of probing, that is, to follow up on what my respondents (Keats, 2000, p.39) said rather than rigidly stick to my topic guide. This technique helped me to clarify some of the answers given by my respondents while at the same time understand their reasons for being of a certain opinion (Keats, 2000, p.39).

3.4 Coding

Throughout the coding process, I have used the method of thematic analysis for analyzing my interviews. After transcribing my interviews and familiarizing myself with the data, I have created a first-cycle coding scheme (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014). The method of creating my coding scheme was primarily deductive, that is, my codes were derived from my theoretical framework (Miles et al., 2014). Since my interview data was meant to confirm and complement my hypotheses and my theoretical framework, a deductive approach proved to be more feasible. However, mostly in the second-cycle coding process, some inductive codes also emerged. Allowing for and using inductive codes was meant to ensure that "the researcher is open to what the site has to say rather than determined to force-fit the data into preexisting codes" (Miles et al., 2014, p.81) My codes were mostly descriptive and provisional codes (Miles et al., 2014). The combination of these two types of codes allowed me to categorize my data and relate them to my theoretical framework.

In my analysis process, I relied heavily on Ritchie and Spencer's (2002) guide for doing qualitative data analysis for applied policy research. According to them, the thematic framework of the data is created by drawing upon a priori issues (those informed by the original research aims and introduced into the interviews via the topic guide), emergent issues raised by the respondents themselves, and analytical themes arising from the recurrence or patterning of particular views or experiences (Ritchie & Spencer, 2002). This process closely resembles the way I coded and analyzed my data and how I reached my subsequent findings. In the next section, I will present and discuss these findings.

3.5 Analysis & Findings

In this section I will introduce the overarching and reoccurring concepts that have emerged throughout my analysis. All concepts will be described and illustrated by a number of quotes from my empirical data.

3.5.1 Intrusiveness

According to my framework, a regulation is intrusive or unacceptable if its aim cannot be supported by objective reasons or facts. Throughout the interviews, my criterion got some verification and was also altered somewhat. It seems to be the case that the aim/area of a certain regulation does matter for people, as there were some clearly identifiable spheres where my respondents strongly contested intervention and some others where they saw it as necessary. Some of the most commonly mentioned examples for acceptable areas were smoking, alcohol consumption, unhealthy lifestyle, and animal protection. All these areas or causes point to a common theme: severity. That is, if the issue at hand is severe, intervention does not seem intrusive. The general aims of interventions in the acceptable spheres were often referred to as a good, or common goal. This, in turn, justified intervention in these areas for the respondents.

- "I consider it [opaque tobacco-shop windows] a good thing, if my aim is to quit, it helps me"[4] (Interviewee 1, p. 3).
- "If it's a good cause, you have to support it. You must." (Interviewee 8, p. 34).
- "If I think of it [any intervention to reduce smoking] as the state's attempt to work for our well-being and it's an unhealthy thing, it causes cancer (…) then I understand the intention to restrict this source of danger, in order to live in a better, healthier society" (Interviewee 7, p. 28).

There were three strong, and interconnected predictors of what counts as a "good cause" for my respondents. These three were whether the regulated action involves a sufficient health risk, whether it is potentially damaging to others, and whether it is addictive.

- "[I find intervention more acceptable because] smoking has much bigger and much more salient health risks than unhealthy eating" (Interviewee 1, p.4).

[4] All interviews were conducted in Hungarian. All translations provided in present work are my own.

- "but for example alcohol, tobacco...more people can get addicted, you can get addicted much more, it can cause much bigger harm" (Interviewee 2, p.10).
- "[chocolate] is not such a harmful thing, I won't get cancer from it" (Interviewee 8, p.33).

Consequently, non-acceptable areas for intervention mostly revolved around actions that are not harmful and sensitive issues such as human rights, abortion, religion, marriage, or culture. These areas were mentioned as spheres where the state should not intervene at all – in the sense of influencing or incentivizing decision making. Moreover, it appears that my interviewees had a special focus on identity. Thus, areas in which our decisions are seen as being strongly connected or influenced by our identity seem to be unacceptable for respondents to interfere in. The issue of identity will be discussed later on as well, since it turned out to be a central, interconnected concept for the acceptance of nudges.

Two other common themes that were mentioned in connection with intrusiveness were the "telling me what to do" and the "no discussion" themes. When talking about an especially unacceptable or intrusive policy or campaign, respondents often mentioned that their reasons for finding that particular policy invasive is that they feel like someone is trying to tell them what to do – either through coercive measures or nudges – or that they feel there should have been a public discussion about the matter. One respondent has mentioned that in such cases, he feels like "they forced something on me, something about which there was no consultation" (Interviewee 1, p.1). Similarly, another respondent highlights the reason she feels a particular policy was insulting is because "I wasn't asked about it" (Interviewee 8, p.30).

3.5.2 Finding the balance

Although the aim and policy area of an intervention is crucial, it is intriguingly and delicately intertwined with other considerations, highly important for the findings of this

work. The most overarching concept among my interviews that relates both to accepting interventions and to preferring and accepting nudges against traditional, more coercive policy measures, is the concept of balance or proportionality. Even if the previously mentioned two conditions were met (aim and identity), the acceptability of a certain intervention depended largely on whether proportionality was maintained, that is, whether the severity of the measure matched the severity of the problem at hand.

This finding is best illustrated by the example of the new Hungarian regulation which prohibits most stores to be open on Sundays.[5] Several respondents mentioned the new regulation as something that they find unacceptable and highly intrusive, however, the same respondents had no problem accepting a campaign – involving nudges – to encourage people to quit shopping and spend more time with their families on Sundays. It is clear, that both interventions are, indeed, trying to tell individuals what to do and are heavily value-based. They both tell people they should prioritize their families over shopping and yet, the nudge seems non-problematic while the ban is contested. Respondents have said the Sunday ban:

- "requires some conscious planning. And I do not want to plan my life as others tell me to" (Interviewee 2, p.9).
- "it would be good if the government didn't intervene in that, I would be happy about that" (Interviewee 4, p. 18).

However, the aforementioned campaign was welcomed by respondents and they did not express concerns over being pushed towards certain values, or being told what to do. Interviewees highlighted that they agree with the aim of spending more time with family and would prefer to be reminded of that, thus they confirmed that the aim of the intervention is acceptable for them. In this example, the encouragement of spending time with family is seen

[5]In December, 2014 the Hungarian government passed a law stating that all stores – with a few exceptions – have to be closed on Sundays. The complete law in Hungarian can be found online: http://www.parlament.hu/irom40/01914/01914.pdf

as a perfectly acceptable aim, but the problem itself is not severe enough to allow for such a strong and coercive measure as a complete ban. Hence, an intervention is generally accepted when its aim is agreeable, but not if it fails to strike a balance between its aim and the measures it employs. Nudging, on the other hand, presents a viable alternative, by better matching the seriousness of the issue with the policy tool that targets it. This balance appears to be of high value to the majority of respondents.

3.5.3 Transparent vs. non-transparent

The two other conditions involved in my framework are transparency and being pro-action, rather than anti-action. The distinction between transparent and non-transparent nudges seems to be largely irrelevant for my respondents and appears to be overruled by the two aforementioned conditions of balance and identity. This can be illustrated by two examples. First, while the interviewed smokers themselves had no problem accepting the regulation of having tobacco-shops with opaque windows, they strongly opposed a similar intervention of putting sweets behind opaque glasses in supermarkets to encourage healthy eating. Once again, the balance was broken: while in the case of strongly damaging substances, such as cigarettes, the intervention is seen as appropriate, the very same measure is seen as disproportionate with regards to things that are considered to have a much milder effect. Some of the contrasting opinions included:

- "I understand it [opaque windows of tobacco-shops], and it's good they did it, I find it acceptable, yes" (Interviewee 2, p.8)
- "This [putting sweets behind opaque glasses] would be funny. (…) If they started regulating all of these things like that, it would be ridiculous" (Interviewee 2, p.10).
- "When it comes to cigarettes, I understand it, but when it comes to sweets....is it really that big of a sin, to eat a bar of chocolate (…)?" (Interviewee 5, 21).

The second example that supports the conclusion that balance, rather than transparency, influences the acceptability of nudges builds on the comparison of the aforementioned nudge with another intervention. Most respondents found a similarly non-transparent nudge, namely, rearranging the order of foods in restaurants and on menus non-problematic as they judged it to be a lot less harsh than the previous measure, and more fit for the goal of encouraging healthy eating. This emerging pattern is well illustrated by the following quote:

"Putting the food in different order just puts it in a new light. But if you put something behind a glass, it's a restriction. It's different if you offer a new alternative than if you say that these products here are bad, you can only keep them behind opaque windows (…)" (Interviewee 2, p.10).

Thus, it seems that irrespective of being transparent or non-transparent, a nudge can evoke the feeling that the intervention is out of proportion and can cause objections. In this case, it appears that the damage caused by sweets is estimated to be relatively low by respondents and hence they remain reluctant to accept certain, seemingly disproportional measures.

3.5.4 Identity

The prevalence of identity is demonstrated again when distinguishing between certain types of nudges. It may be the case that intervention is accepted for a certain cause and identity issues are not at stake at a general level, but as soon as the intervention touches upon an issue that is felt to be connected to identity, that particular intervention is opposed. My respondents, as previously mentioned, all accepted certain measures against smoking, most of them even agreed with coercive ones such as banning smoking in virtually all closed spaces. At the same time, when asked about a possible policy of introducing uniform cigarette packaging, most of them expressed concerns and immediately raised the issue of identity,

something that was not mentioned in connection with any other proposed or existing smoking regulation. Some of the responses include:

- "To some extent, how it's packaged, the kind of cigarette you smoke, it's part of your personality. I wouldn't necessarily be happy about it. (…) Well, I have my own cigarette, and it's mine, and I feel like it's my own, with its design, color, everything" (Interviewee 6, p.24).
- "The uniform packaging can restrict my own personality" (Interviewee 7, p.32).

Based on these answers, it seems that having to buy tobacco products from shops with opaque windows, or even not being able to smoke at a bar, however restrictive, touch less on the identity of smokers than taking away the packaging of their "own" cigarettes. Where you smoke appears to be a technical or logistical issue, even those smokers who mentioned the ban as something intrusive focused on the fact that it restricts them too much and makes it bothersome to travel by train, for example, never on identity or personality. On the other hand, what you smoke seems to be seen in the light of identity, almost like a signature characteristic. Identity appears to hold such an important value that even interventions working for an otherwise accepted goal become intolerable when it is involved.

3.5.5 Stigmatizing

My fourth criterion concerning nudges was that it should be pro-action in order to avoid stigmatization. This criterion was both confirmed and refined through my interviews. Indeed, most respondents expressed a preference for pro-action framing and rhetorics. They have claimed that, in general, being for something sounds nicer and friendlier, and more acceptable. However, being pro-action with regards to framing was not enough, for most respondents, to ensure that the nudge would not stigmatize choices and certain individuals. Putting sweets behind opaque windows was, for example, seen as potentially condemning

certain choices even if the official framing presented the intervention as being pro-health, rather than anti-obesity. The previously mentioned distinction between rearranging food in restaurants and putting sweets behind opaque windows can be examined in this context as well, connecting balance and stigmatization. As a result of the disproportionate intervention, certain choices are felt to be condemned, while when the balance is kept, all choices are felt to be equally accepted, it is only that one is encouraged more.

This distinction is a rather important one. Although respondents allow the state to encourage certain choices in some spheres, it does not mean that they accept the state to label other choices as "bad" in the same sphere. It would be logical to think that once people allow for pointing out, or pushing towards "right" choices, they have no problem accepting that certain other choices end up being framed as "bad". This, however, is not the case, and there seems to be a stark difference between the two that can be highlighted by a few quotes.

On rearranging food in restaurants:

- "These are just little tricks with which you can gain, but it also doesn't offend those who they're against" (Interviewee 7, p.28).
- "It's different because I see the other stuff as well, nothing is hidden" (Interviewee 3, p.14).
- "I completely agree with this. Even for myself, maybe I would also crave salad more if I saw it first" (Interviewee 6, p. 25).

On putting sweets behind opaque windows:

- "You say that these products here are bad, you can only keep them behind opaque windows and whoever opens it belongs in hell" (Interviewee 2, p.10).
- "It would be very weird, like saying you shouldn't open this, you shouldn't touch this, you shouldn't buy anything that's here, that's how it would make me feel" (Interviewee 7, p.28).

- "You can campaign for something or against something as well, you just shouldn't force it on people. Putting sweets behind opaque windows is trying to force something on to you, but rearranging food is not like that" (Interviewee 5, p.22).

These quotes illustrate that while the accepted measure is associated with an opportunity, an alternative, a positive encouragement, the contested measure is connected with hiding, forcing, prohibiting, and stigmatizing.

3.5.6 Can bad be good?

Is condemning a certain choice ever accepted? When and why is stigmatization so contested? Based on the data from my interviews, it seems that stigmatizing is specifically unacceptable when it comes to nudges. This can be attributed to the fact that the threshold for accepting nudges is lower: we have seen that there are spheres of life where coercive interventions are not accepted, but people have no problem with nudges in the same area, depending on how proportional they perceive the intervention to be. Thus, it can be argued, that once an issue seems fit or severe enough for coercive intervention, stigmatizing is not problematic anymore. However, since people accept nudges in areas where coercive measures would be contested, areas where one choice might be perceived better but the alternative is not seen as particularly bad, stigmatizing the "less good" choice is problematic.

In the case of smoking, an issue that is seen as positing sufficient health risks, coercive measures, such as bans are not contested, thus, if smoking ends up being stigmatized, people do not feel offended. It is unhealthy, risky, and harmful after all. On the other hand, when it comes to healthy eating, while encouraging the consumption of fruits instead of sweets is accepted, portraying chocolate eating as the "bad choice" is strongly detested. After all, eating a bar of chocolate does not hurt anyone! Why should any

government tell me I am making the wrong choice if I choose it over an apple?[6]

As a result of this, it is perfectly logical that stigmatization, over time, can become more and more accepted: 50 years ago, people might have opposed any nudge that indirectly labeled smoking as the "bad" alternative, just because the severity of the issue was not visible enough for people to accept such framings. Similarly, in 50 years' time, people and science might start to see sugar, or any other ingredient, equally as harmful as tobacco, and any intervention that implies it is a poor choice to prefer chocolate might become perfectly reasonable and acceptable.

3.5.7 A slippery slope

Apart from stigmatization, there was one other nudge-specific concern mentioned by my respondents, namely, the slippery slope criticism. It appeared that some of the respondents, upon accepting a certain kind of nudge, expressed their concern about the spread of such tools in areas where they wouldn't feel comfortable with them, such as culture, or other fields. I have addressed the slippery slope concern earlier in this paper and have shown that it is not something particular to nudges. Why respondents associate this concern especially with nudges is, I believe, due to two reasons: first, because nudges are not part of regular policy making yet, they seem to be peculiar, out of the system, a way to achieve something that would not be achievable through normal, transparent, coercive tools. Second, similarly to the stigmatization problem, since people feel that their own threshold of accepting nudges is lower than of accepting coercive measures, they fear that the government would take advantage of that and introduce similar interventions in otherwise unacceptable spheres.

However, present work builds on the assumption that nudges will be and have to be part of the regular policy making process and thus have to comply with all the criteria and

[6] It seems that most respondents do not insist on their basic liberty to be free to do anything even if it is harmful. Rather, my interviewees adjusted their 'liberty requirements' according to how damaging a certain behavior is.

rules there are to pass traditional regulations. Although people might have a lower threshold for accepting nudges, this should not make it any easier for policy makers to introduce them in contested spheres. In fact, exploring and addressing these concerns is meant to further ensure that a slippery slope is avoided and that these measures do not pose any threat to citizens.

3.5.8 When are nudges preferred?

According to my framework, nudges should be preferred to traditional, or more coercive policy measures for three reasons: they can be more effective, they offer a sensible distinction between who they affect and who they do not, and they leave room for a free choice by not forbidding or incentivizing any options. As it appears from my respondents' answers, the biggest reason for preferring nudges is the latter, that is, they are thought to grant a bigger personal freedom than coercive measures. However, for most respondents, this only holds true if the particular nudge keeps the aforementioned balance and does not seem disproportionate.

As soon as the nudge is seen to be too harsh – as in the case of putting sweets behind opaque windows – it starts to be perceived as intrusive and restrictive, much like a coercive measure. This can be illustrated well by the following response given by an interviewee when asked about putting sweets behind opaque windows:

"R: It's outrageous! Very much! This is like...restricting my freedom to even...very outrageous.

I: So you would feel restricted.

R: Well yes! Why can't I see them [sweets]? (…) Although it serves a good cause, they have to let me decide whether I want to eat chocolate today or not.

I: So you would feel restricted even though you can choose to eat chocolate, you just don't see it?

R: Yes. I am a thinking, grown-up individual, I can decide, even if I see it.... hiding something, it's like sweeping it under the rug (…).” (Interviewee 3, p.14).

Although most respondents pointed to the ineffectiveness of coercive measures – in the case of taxing tobacco, a recurring theme was the appearance of the black market – they did not explicitly state they found nudges more effective in a comparative sense. That is, respondents have not felt effectiveness to be a specific value of nudges, although most of them did feel they would be affected by some of the proposed nudges.

3.6 Theory and practice compared

In my theoretical framework I have specified when interventions are justifiable, why nudges should be preferred and what types of nudges are acceptable. As it could be seen from my analysis, the interviews I conducted both supported and modified this framework, as respondents introduced their own criteria and considerations, at times different from what is highlighted in the broader literature or in my own framework. The figures below summarize the conditions and criteria regarding when, why, and what kind of nudges are accepted or preferred, as developed from my data and as defined by my theoretical specifications.



Figure 3. Theoretical framework



Figure 4. Framework based on interview data

My respondents had the same criterion for accepting interventions as the one specified in my framework, the only difference being that apart from objective aims, they also accepted interventions whose aims they agreed with, naturally. I have included this in the figure above, but it has to be noted that objectivity has to be kept as an overriding principle. When looking at why nudges are preferred to more coercive actions, interviewees mentioned flexibility, namely that nudges allow them to keep their freedom of choice, consistent with my theoretical framework. However, they did not place a special emphasis on the effectiveness, sensibility, or the autonomy advancing features of nudges. I expect that the latter two concepts would become more salient to people upon further deliberation, while I suspect that the effectiveness of nudges was often underestimated due to the fact that they are easy to avoid.

Next to this, my respondents have valued and preferred nudges for their feature of tackling some issues in a more balanced way. As mentioned before, proportionality was an

important concept for my interviewees and played greatly into their preference for nudges. Often, when they found a coercive measure too harsh in tackling a given problem, nudges were preferred for their ability of tackling the matter in a more proportional way, better matching the severity of the issue. Nudges were seen as providing a way to tackle important but less severe problems with softer measures.

My interview data have confirmed that people only accept nudges when they are non-stigmatizing, that is, they support one type of behavior rather than condemn another. At the same time, the emotion-minimizing condition was altered by my respondents as they put the primary focus on identity, rather than emotion. According to them, nudges that involve issues connected to identity are unacceptable. Finally, as mentioned before, my respondent did not make a difference between nudges based on transparency; instead they focused on proportionality once again. Although nudges, in general, were seen as more balanced tools in tackling various issues, respondents distinguished between softer and harsher nudges and they only accepted harsher nudges if it tackled a more severe problem, that is, if proportionality was maintained.

Conclusion

Present work aimed to establish a theoretical framework against which the acceptability of nudges can be checked and contrast it with the conditions specified by those affected by these interventions. In the first chapter, I specified the concept of nudges by building on the definition of Thaler and Sunstein and adding some additional criteria to their definition. In order to examine how nudges work, I have looked at and explained some of the biases humans have that prevent them from making rational decisions and brought some examples of how these can be corrected by libertarian paternalistic tools. I have described some of the already existing categorizations of choice architectural tools and have built my own framework according to which nudges can be characterized and accepted or rejected. I believe that this framework, by building on already existing schemes and incorporating several new aspects, provides a good background for checking nudges and ensuring that they are not misused in any way.

After having developed my framework, in the second chapter of my thesis, I selected one policy area, namely health care in the broad sense, and argued for using nudges in this sphere. Within health issues, I decided to focus on obesity and smoking in particular. The importance of these fields was demonstrated both by international and Hungarian data which also showed how severe these concerns are in Hungary specifically. By listing and assessing a number of the regulations the Hungarian government has introduced so far in order to tackle these issues, I showed how these measures are ineffective and provided further support for the need of nudges in these areas.

In the third chapter of my thesis, I described the methodology of collecting, coding and analyzing my interview data and presented my findings by comparing my respondents' conditions and criteria to those specified in my theoretical framework. As a result of this

comparison, theory and practice could be compared and contrasted, giving way to a more complete understanding of the acceptability of choice architecture.

I believe that the most intriguing part of my research lies exactly in this comparison: although nudges have been assessed, criticized, and categorized by many in various different ways and according to various different criteria, research has rarely shown us how the nudged themselves think about these issues and whether their criteria of accepting nudges match those set by academics. As it can be seen from present work, some points (objective aim, flexibility, no stigmatization) are matched closely but others (effectiveness, sensibility, autonomy, and transparency) are not present in people's understanding of these issues at all. At the same time, there are certain other features (identity, proportionality) that are not necessarily considered by more theoretical approaches but are valued highly by citizens.

Consequently, present paper, instead of solely examining choice architecture in the context of autonomy, manipulation or freedom of choice, as it is often done, put the topic in a new light by incorporating and emphasizing intriguing new concepts such as proportionality, identity, and stigmatization. These additional notions can help to complement and advance our understanding of libertarian paternalism and how it could be used in a way that is acceptable for a wide majority of people.

It is also hoped that present work can provide some support and guidance for introducing nudges in Hungary in the future. Apart from highlighting some policy areas where such interventions could be especially useful and effective, insights about citizens' preferences and conditions about such tools can also serve as a valuable input when designing or implementing nudges. This way, policy makers can make sure that nudges will not only serve the right purposes but that they will also work in a way that is acceptable for citizens.

Limitations

Although present work focuses on Hungary and the perceptions of Hungarian citizens, their insights could be better characterized and put into perspective if they were compared to citizens of other countries. Due to limitations in time and resources, however, my paper could not cover such aspects. Moreover, although qualitative research does not aim to be generalizable, it should be noted that a higher number of interviewees might have further enriched and strengthened my findings. What is more, my respondents belonged to the age group of 18-35, and were mostly educated. In order to get a full picture of the various existing viewpoints, it is beneficial to include people from different age groups and different backgrounds in the research.

It also has to be mentioned that my interviewees were not incentivized to take part in my research in any way, thus any time they offered to spend on answering my questions was a sacrifice on their part. Due to this, the time spent on interviews was often constrained and, although it was sufficient in all cases, it is supposed that a more generous timeframe would have helped me in developing an even deeper understanding of how individuals think about the rather complex concepts my thesis is centered around.

Ideas for future research

It follows from the aforementioned limitations, that there is room and need for future research in the field of choice architecture, both in Hungary and in other countries. I am of the opinion that it is essential for future works to consider not only theory, but also practice and aim at understanding how people think about and react to the use of libertarian paternalism in areas that affect their everyday lives. In order to understand the specificities of how Hungarians differ from other nationalities when it comes to thinking about nudges, it would be desirable to conduct research in other countries as well, and employ some comparative methods.

As I have mentioned before, increasing the number and broadening the range of respondents is also crucial for further research done in this field. Apart from refining and enhancing the qualitative methods of such research, it could also be beneficial to combine these methods with quantitative tools. While questionnaires or surveys can increase generalizability and ensure that representative opinions are obtained, qualitative interviews can help better understand why and how such opinions are formed and can provide a deeper and richer insight into people's perceptions. I believe that when such complex notions and psychological considerations are involved, qualitative methods cannot be left out of the equation.

All in all, while there is undoubtedly more room for research, I am optimistic that present work has contributed to a better, more rigorous and accountable use of nudges by providing a clearer understanding of the criteria that should be applied to such measures both in theory and in practice. Employing these tools in public policy can benefit a broad range of people and can go a long way in solving some pressing concerns while not restricting or punishing the choices of those who wish to act in line with their own, unique set of preferences.

Appendix

Topic guide[7]

1) Bevezetés

A kutatásom témája az egyéni döntéshozatal, és ennek kapcsolata bizonyos, országos szintű, szabályozásokkal a magyar kontextusban. Az interjú során különböző példákat említek majd, és arra leszek kíváncsi, hogyan gondolkodsz te ezekről a szabályokról, hogyan érintened téged a mindennapi életedben. A kutatásban való részvételed szigorúan bizalmas. Az interjút diktafonnal rögzítem, annak érdekében, hogy az elemzés során pontos információ áljon rendelkezésemre, de az elemzés végeztével a hanganyagot megsemmisítem. Az interjúból származó adatok csakis számomra lesznek hozzáférhetőek. A kutatásban való részvételed nagyon fontos számomra és óriási segítséget jelent. Azonban ha bármilyen okból szeretnéd megszakítani az interjút, vagy nem szeretnéd továbbfolytatni, minden következmény nélkül megteheted. Ha bármilyen kérdésed van az interjú során, nyugodtan tedd fel. Kezdhetjük?

2) I. rész

- Az első kérdésem az lenne, hogy fel tudsz-e idézni egy olyan szabályozást vagy kampányt, amiről úgy érezted hogy nagyon tolakodó volt, esetleg megsértette a személyes szabadságodat, vagy bármilyen értelemben "túl sok" volt számodra?
  - → ha igen: miért érezted így? Az üzenet, esetleg a kivitelezés miatt? Vagy maga a témakör volt túl érzékeny?
  - → ha nem: valami ami vitatott volt? Hogy emlékszel, miért volt vitatott?

- Valószínűleg tudod, hogy 2012 csak az erre a célra létrehozott nemzeti dohányboltok árusíthatnak cigarettát. Ezen boltok külső üvegén pedig nem lehet belátni, a trafikok egységes kinézetét ugyanis egy törvény szabályozza. Mit gondolsz erről a szabályozásról (mármint hogy nem lehet belátni az üvegen?)

[7] The topic guide and the subsequent sample transcript are provided in Hungarian since the interviews and the analysis were done in Hungarian.

- → volt már hatással rád ez a tény?
- → mit gondolsz, mi célt szolgálhat ez?
- → Mit tart előnyösnek és mit problémásnak az interjúalany?
- → egyetértesz ezzel a szabályozással? Miért? Ha nem, miért nem?

3) II. rész

Az előbbiekben említett szabályozás, a dohánybolttal kapcsolatban, bizonyos technikát alkalmazott, amelyek befolyásolják az emberek választásait, és hogy hogyan, milyen döntéseket hoznak. A legalapvetőbb péda ennek szemléltetésére: az ételek sorrendjének megváltoztatása. Ezen a ponton elmondom a 'nudge' definícióját és néhány példát hozok rá.

- Mit gondolsz az ilyen szabályozásrokól?
- Most, hogy birtokában vagy ennek az információnak, hogyan gondolkozol a dohányboltok szabályozásokról?
- Elfogadod ezt a szabályozást? Mit gondolsz róla?
- Hogyan érzel ezzel kapcsolatban?
- Mennyiben érzed úgy, hogy befolyásolja a döntésedet?
- Jó dolgnak tartod, hogy befolyásolja a döntésedet?
- Van bármilyen olyan kritérium, amit feltétlenül szükségesnek érzel ilyen jellegű szabályozásoknál?
- Mik azok a feltételek amiknek teljesülnie kell ahhoz, hogy elfogadd ezt a szabályozást?

- Mit éreznél hatásosabbnak/elfogadhatóbbnak/kívánatosabbnak: a dohánytermékek árának felemelését vagy az előbbi szabályozást?

- Az egészséges étkezés, életvitel is szabályozható hasonló mechanizmusokkal. Mit gondolnál arról, ha az állam bevezetné, hogy ezentúl mindig az egészségesebb ételeket kell előre tenni a sorban?
  - → úgy éreznéd megsérti ez a személyes szabadságod? Miért/miért nem?
  - → minek kéne teljesülnie hogy ez elfogadható legyen számodra?

- Hogyan érintene egy olyan szabályozás miszerint az édességeket a boltokban nem-átlátszó üveg mögött kéne tárolni?

- 2013 óta érvényben van az úgynevezett chips-adó, amely magasabb adót szab ki a magas cukor-és sótartalmú termékekre, ezzel drágábbá téve azokat. Ez szintén az egészséges életmód növelésére szolgál. Mit gondolsz erről az adóról?
  - volt már hatással rád ez a tény?
  - egyetértesz ezzel a szabályozással? Miért? Ha nem, miért nem?
  - Mit tart előnyösnek és mit problémásnak az interjúalany?

- Mit gondolsz, a két utóbbi szabályozás közül melyik jobb/hatásosabb a só-és cukorfogyasztás visszaszorításában? Látsz bármilyen különbséget a két szabályozás milyenségében? Melyiket preferálod te? Miért?
  - mit gondolsz, van különbség a két szabályozás között abban a tekintetben hogy mennyi szabadságot hagy a TE döntésednek?

- A véleményeden változtatna bármit a szabályozás retorikája? Pl. az elhízás megelőzésének érdekében vs. az egészség javítása érdekében?

- Ha visszatérünk az általad említett példára, egy hasonló kivitelezés elfogadhatóbbá tette volna számodra a szabályozást?

- Milyen területeken tartod elfogadhatatlannak hogy az állam ilyen eszközökkel éljen? Milyen területeken tartod kifejezetten jónak? Különböznek ezek a területek azoktól amiken erősebb szabályozásokat elfogadsz/nem?

Sample Transcript

Present transcript is one of the 9 interviews that were carried out throughout my research.

RESPONDENT 2 – female, 28, working

I: Az első kérdésem az lenne, hogy fel tudsz-e idézni egy olyan szabályozást vagy kampányt, amiről úgy érezted hogy nagyon tolakodó volt, esetleg megsértette a személyes szabadságodat, vagy bármilyen értelemben "túl sok" volt?

R: Fú most így hirtelen nem tudok ilyesmit mondani. Amikor ilyen 20 éves körül voltam, akkor engem bosszantott az hogy nem lehet dohányozni. Külföldre jártunk, barátokkal ide-oda, bosszantó volt nekem hogy nem lehet a szórakozóhelyeken dohányozni. És amikor bevezették itthon addigra már egy kicsit benőtt a fejem lágya és akkor már ezzel maximálisan egyetértettem. Tényleg, borzasztó volt az hogy hazamész és midnen iszonyatos füstszagú...meg...meg nem kapsz levegőt. Mert még dohányosként is volt olyan hogy meghaltál a füsttől és elviselhetetlen volt. Szóval az nekem így nem volt egyáltalán probléma. Nem, nem tudok olyat mondani ami úgy felbosszantott volna. Meg az abortuszellenes kampány, az felbosszant.

I: És miért?

R: Mert szerintem nem az a megoldás hogy az abortuszt tiltod be, mert az abortusznak nem az lenne a célja hogy az egészséges magzatot vedd el, de hogyha kiderül hogy vmilyen probléma van vagy tényleg olyan helyzetben van az adott nő vagy család vagy pár akkor sztem egyszerűen nem tilthatod meg valaki számára hogy a saját jövőbeni életéről ne tudjon dönteni.

I: És ha nem tiltás csak mondjuk egy kampány az abortusz ellen?

R: Biztos hogy megjegyezném. De hogyha cska egy kampány akkor annak uolyan joga van megjelenni, mint hogy legalizálják a füvet.

I: És ha mondjuk az állam vagy a kormány indít egy kampányt az abortusz ellen?

R: Hát nem erről elég ilyen...sarkalatos véleményem van. Engem borzasztóan bosszant meg dühít a mostani kormánynak a politikája meg hozzáállása sok mindenben és hogyha amostani kormány hozná ezt fel akkor valószínűleg sokkal jobban ugranék rá.

I: És ha a mindenkori kormány?

R: Hmm...az is zavarna, azért mert nem itt kéne kezdeni. Hanem sokkal előrébb. Indítsunk egy fogamzásgátló kampányt, vagy felvilágosító kampáynt, fiataloknak. Nem tudom, támogatnám az óvszert, vagy bármit, nem tudom. Tehát hogy inkább onnan közelíteném meg.

I: Nyugodtan javíts ki ha félreértelek, de úgy érzed hogy van különbség aközött hogy vmi mellett vagy ellen kampányolnak? Tehát hogy ne az abortusz ellen indítsunk kampányt hanem a fogamzásgátlásért?

R: Hát nyilván van különbség, nekem azért van különbség mert hogyha már odajut valaki hogy abortuszra van szükség, nem gondolom hogy megoldást kínál a vmi ellenes kampány mint a valamiért történő. Nem gondolom azt hogy ha elkezdenék kiplakátolni hogy az abortusz rossz, akkor attól kevesebb lenne, de azt el tudom képzelni hogy ha hozzáférhető lenne, nem tudom mennyibe kerül egy doboz óvszer, mondjuk 1000 FT, az nem 1000 Ft lenne hanem 200, most csak mondok vmit, akkor lehet hogy meg tudnák venni maguknak a fiatalok. Igen, van különbség mert az egyik egy ösztönző, a másik pedig egy kicsit diszkriminatív hozzállás.

I: Tehát mondjuk az egyik kicsit megbélyegző...

R: Igen, aha, igen.

I: Valószínűleg tudod, hogy 2012 óta csak az erre a célra létrehozott nemzeti dohányboltok árusíthatnak cigarettát. Ezen boltok külső üvegén pedig nem lehet belátni, a trafikok egységes kinézetét ugyanis egy törvény szabályozza. Erről mit gondolsz?

R: Szerintem egy komplett hülyeség. Hazamegy a család, azt nézem a játszótéren az anyukáknak a fele dohányzik. És nem ott kezdődik az hogy vki rá fog e gyújtani vagy sem hogy belát-e a dohányboltba és látja hogy ki van pakolva a rengeteg cigaretta hanem hogy

otthon a szűkebb meg a tágabb környezetében midnenféle ilyen tanulás közegben mit lát. És hogyha azt látja hogy ez teljesen rendeben van otthon akkor az esetek nagy többségében ez fog rögzülni és hogyha elérhetővé válik számára a dohányzás akkor lehet hogy meg fogja tenni. Tehát ez egy hülyeség, semmi értelme nincsen szerintem.

I: Akkor rád nem volt még ez hatással?

R: Soha.

I: Akkor nem tartod problémásnak vagy ilyesmi?

R: Hát problémásnak azért mert hallottunk már ilyen rablós eseteket...elképzelhetőnek tartom hogy ez megkönnyíti a dolgát a támadóknak.

I: Ezen a ponton elmagyaráztam a nudge koncepcióját. Ezzel együtt mit gondolsz erről a szabályozásról?

R: El tudom képzelni hogy van hatása, de aki dohányzik, az ha látja ha nem, be fog menni ennek ellenére. Azt észrevettem magamon, akkor fejeztem be a dohányzást 3 évre, amikor bejöttek a trafikok. És mostanáig, pár hónappal ezelőttig nem gyújtottam rá. 2 és fél évig nem gyújtottam rá egyáltalán. És arra emlékszem hogy régen mindent megtettem egy doboz cigiért, tök mindegy volt, bárhova beültem a kocsiba, elmentem a benzinkútra vagy rnedeltem taxival, volt oylan is, tehát hogy midnent. És most hogy nem elérhető annyira, mert zárva van, csak bizonyos helyen tudod megvenni...vasárnap például nem mentem el egy doboz cigiért mert nem volt a közelemben. És ez így lehet hogy vmilyen szinten korlátozza azt hogy én rágyújtok-e vagy sem. Hogy nem olyan könnyen beszerezhető.

I: De alapvetően erről a kísérletről hogy így csökkentsék a dohányzást, erről mit gondolsz?

R: Nice try. Hogyha ennek ez a célja, ezt eddig nem tudtam, akkor értem, és jó, hogy megtették, elfogadhatónak találom, igen.

I: Tehát nem érzed úgy hogy a szabad akaratodban korlátoz?

R: Nem, de ez pont ugyanolyan mint amikor a plázákban úgy van kialakítva a mozgólépcső, hogy midnenképpen végig kelljen menned minden bolt előtt. Ez egy kicsit hasonlóan befolyásolja, csak az egy ösztönző, ez pedig egy visszafogó.

I: És ha mondjuk összehasonlítod azzal hogy megemelik a cigi árát? Akkor a 2 szabályozás köüzl melyiket tartod akár hatékonyabbnak, elfogadhatóbbank, jobbnak?

R: Húha. Ez egy nagyon jó kérdés...nem tudom hogy melyiknek van nagyobb ereje, fogalmam sincs. Nem tudom hogy valaki azért mert már elér egy bizonyos értékhatárt a cigi, attól nem fog rágyújtani...

I: És melyiket tartod elfogadhatóbbnak?

R: Mindkettőt elfogadhatónak tartom.

I: Miért?

R: Mert a dohányzáshoz való jogot nem tartom olyan alapvető emberi jognak...vagy...egyszerűen nem tulajdonítok neki oylan jelentőséget amibe hogyha engem vmilyen formában korlátoznak akkor az nekem fáj. Még eddig nem tapasztaltam ilyen korlátozást. Amitől úgy érezném hogy na jó, mostmár elég. Drága a cigi. Oké. Szerintem mindakettő pont annyira elfogadható. Valamivel finomabb nyilván az hogyha besötétítik az üveget.

I: És van olyan területe az életnek amiben viszont úgy éreznéd hogy sért téged egy bmilyen szabályozás? Tehát mondtad hogy a cigizést nem tartod olyan dolognak.

R: Nekem a vasárnapi zárva tartás, az kivágta a biztosítékot.

I: És milyen különbséget érzel a cigizéshez való jogod és a vásárláshoz való jogod között? Tehát mi miatt érzed elfogadhatóbbnak azt hogy az egyiket korlátozzák?

R: Mert a cigizés egyrészt nem létszükséglet, az egy élvezeti cikk. És a vasárnapi zárvatartás pedig egy tudatosságot igényel. És én nem szeretném úgy alakítani az életemet, ahogy nekem

mások megmondják. És az hogy én vasárnap nem mehetek el beváásrolni, mert nincs otthon élesztő és én mindenképpen pogácsát akarok sütni, akkor kiborulok. És nem tudom olyan tudatosan és szervezetten csinálni az életemet hogy az beleférjen hogy én most szombaton elmegyke és bevásárolok és akkor minden van othton és szuper és nem tudom. Sokkal jobban van szükségem arra az idő szabadságra mint a dohányzásra.

I: Az egészséges étkezés, életvitel is szabályozható hasonló mechanizmusokkal. Mit gondolnál arról, ha az állam bevezetné, hogy ezentúl mindig az egészségesebb ételeket kell előre tenni a sorban?

R: Nem gondolom úgy hogy ez baj lenne. Tényleg nem.

I: Mi miatt érzed elfogadhatónak?

R: Fogalmam sincs. Tényleg nem tudom hogy ez számomra miért elfogadható. Lehet hogy azért is mert nekem az egészséges táplálkozáshoz van vmilyen személyes kötődésem, vagy hogy személyesen is fontosnak találom. Tényleg annyira sok hulladékot esznek az emberek és hoygha ezzel vmilyen szinten így lehetne manipulálni, hát belefér.

I: Tehát mondhatjuk azt hogy a cél...

R: Igen, az így...kicsit humánusabbá teszi.

I: És hogyan érintene mondjuk egy olyan szabályozás miszerint az édességeket a boltokban nem-átlátszó üveg mögött kéne tárolni?

R: Ezt már egy kicsit viccesnek találnám mert azért alapvetően mindannyian jóhiszeműen gondolkozunk és azt gondoljuk hogy a másik van annyira felnőtt, intelligens, belátó, tudatos, hogy nem zabál szart, nem dohányozza szét a tüdejét és nem iszik folyamatosan mint a gödény. Nyilván ez nem így van, de hogy alapvetően azért ebből kéne kiindulni. És ha minden ilyen dologt elkezdenének korlátozni, azért egy kicsit már nevetségessé válna.

I: Szóval úgy érzed hogy van különbség mondjuk az ételek sorrendje meg eközött?

R: Van. Az ételek sorrendje, az talán...csak egy más lehetőségben világítja meg. Az hogyha elzársz valamit, az pedig egy korlát. Az más, hogyha egy új alternatívát kínálsz, mint hogyha azt mondod, hogy ezek a termékek itt csúnya rossz termékek, ezeket csak opálos üveg mögött lehet tárolni és aki kinyitja az pokolra való.

I: Tehát itt is van benne egy olyasmi hogy vmi mellett vagy ellen és hogy vmennyire megbélyegző.

R: Igen..meg azt gondolom hogy teljesen más egy cigaretta ami...jó mondjuk a cukor is addiktív. De mondjuk az alkohol, a cigi...sokkal többen rá tudnak csúszni, jobban rá tudnak csúszni, sokkal nagyobb kárt tud okozni, bár mondjuk tényleg ez sem igaz, mert rengetegen zabálnak cukrot és midnenféle finomított förmedvényeket minden nap tonnaszámra és lehet hogy annak nagyobb egészségkárosító hatása van mint hogyha elszívnál fél doboz cigit naponta...nem tudom. Szerintem az élvezeti cikkeket valamilyen szinten korlátozni az kevésbé nem tudom....az kevésbé szabadságkorlátozó, mint hogyha az élelmiszerekbe nyúlnak bele.

I: Chipsadó. Mi a véleményed? Ha összehasonlítod azzal hogy tegyük az édességeket nem átlátszó üveg mögé, melyiket tartod jobbnak?

R: Fú, egyiket se. Chipsadó? Nem tudom milyen hatása van, sose olvastam róla, semmilyen egészségügyi vagy gazdasági vagy bmilyen kimutatást. Chipsadót ráverték vszínűleg a gyártókra és nem nagyon tudnak emelni gondolom az árukon, vmennyire biztos, de nem nagyon, és attól függetlenül sztem az emberek meg fogják vásárolni ugyanúgy a termékeiket.

I: És menynire érzed úgy hogy a személyes, vagy döntési szabadságodat sérti?

R: Nem érzem azt, szerintem egy elfuserált ötlet. Abszolút nem érzem azt hogy engem bmiben korlátozna, szerintem nem egy túl racionális ötlet. Kíváncsi lennék rá hogy ezzel bármit is el lehet-e érni.

I: Ha visszatérünk a vasárnapi zárvatartásra, elfogadhatóbb lenne ha mondjuk egy kampányt indítanának: 70% vasárnap a családjával tölt időt és nem vásárol, többséghez húzás. Erről mit

gondolnál?

R: Sokkal elfogadhatóbbnak tartom. Mert ettől még megmarad az a lehetőséged hogy elmész és bevásárolsz, mert mondjuk úgy alakult hogy minden este 10re értél haza egész héten és tényleg nem volt rá időd, mert sztem nagyon nagyon sok ember így él, hogy nagyon nagyon komoly feszített tempója van és lehet hogy végiggondolom azt hogy ő, baszki, lehet hogy vasárnap nem a boltban kéne ácsorognom a sorban, hanem a családommal lenni....hogyha ezt így látom plakáton vagy újságban vagy tökmindegy.

I: Tehát akkor ezt elfogadhatónak tartod.

R: Ezt inkább, igen.

I: Tudsz mondani olyan területet ahol könnyebben elfogadnál ilyenfajta szabályozásokat?

R: Nem tudom. Jah, a cafeteria csomagban választható sport és kultúra rész, ami adómentes és azzal adómentesen tudsz vásárolni, sporteseményekre, focimeccs és stb, mittudomén mikre, jegyet. Elárulom neked hogy kb az országban alig alig van olyan hely ahol ezzel tudsz vásárolni, színházjegyet alig, mozit nem, könyvet egy helyen, de focira el tudsz menni vele. Tehát ez sztem erősen egy mederbe terel. Ez gáz. Hmm...milyen olyan dolog van még amit károsnak ítél meg a társadalom de nincs még szabályozva...már vmilyen szinten az alkohol, a cigi, a drog, a zsíros ételek....a cukor nincsen.

I: Tehát mondjuk ami az egészséget elősegíti, ott elfogadhatónak tartod.

R: Ott el. De nem a teljes korlátot tartom elfogadhatónak, az ösztönzőt, az igen. De nem tudok olyat mondani ami....hát a tv. A tv nézési szokások...arra én azt mondom, hogy nem lenne hülyeség valamit kitalálni mert gyakorlatilag mindenki beleragad a tv elé, gyerekek úgy nőnek fel, hogy nem mennek ki játszani, ebben el tudnám képzelni, hogy valamilyen alternatíva az segíthetne. Meg talán még az állattartás, amit még jobban ösztönözni kellene, hogy tudatosak legyenek az emberek, ne vágják ki az állatokat az utcára, hogy ivartalanítsák őket, tehát ilyen állatvédelem.

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