'From citizen to subject':
Governmentality and the Politics of Internal Displacement in post-2002 Ahmedabad (Gujarat)

by

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ABSTRACT

Situated in the field of nationalism studies, this thesis aims to broaden our understanding of ethnic violence by focusing on the structural nature of communalism following the 2002 riots in Gujarat. By analysing the responses of state and non-state actors to the crisis of internal displacement in post-2002 Ahmedabad, this thesis unpacks the power dynamics within a localised 'refugee regime' through the prism of Foucault's concept of governmentality.

Based on a month-long fieldwork in Ahmedabad in April 2015, this thesis maps out the topography of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in a post-riot context, reflecting on the role institutions play in boundary creation and maintenance. Stepping beyond an analysis of *Hindutva* discourses on minorities, it puts forward the mechanisms through which Hindu nationalism has seeped into the daily working of state institutions – degrading the Muslim minority from citizen to subject by excluding them from full citizenship rights and mainstream urban space. By examining the response of civil society organisations, this thesis puts forward their important role in shaping dynamics within the relief colony. Finally, an examination of the impact of the state on civil society is undertaken, analysing how non-governmental organisations are governed through limitations on foreign funding and the strength of a Hindu nationalist discourse. By analysing these three relationships, this thesis puts forward the important role of the state in the field of internal displacement in Ahmedabad: although it has been described as 'passive' or 'neglectful', the state is very much present, simultaneously exerting its power through discourse and bureaucracy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In a moment
the city turns to pebble, stone, dagger, razor
ruin, spark, flame, ash

In a moment,
mobs with hammer, pickaxe, shovel and hand grenade
pulverise the city

My pen collides with the skeletons of history
Winds howl, like the death rattle of corpses waking from their slumber
Whirling winds of death shake the very pillars of civilisation
Hurling dust into an ebbing faith in life
Sinking claws, vomiting blood everywhere.
In a moment, vision is blinded and directions obscured,
The skin of humanity flayed off

I: a poet
I cannot exist as a mere reporter.
Nor as a court bard.
I want to grit my teeth and speak without mincing my words
about this conspiracy
But for that
I must retrieve my pen
from a deep dark well –
my father's well,
my ancestral well,
the well that is the final refuge of women
who dive to their own shameful death.

I have to throw in a fishing hook, and pull out
my pen, a brand new pen
with my hands alone.

Saroop Dhruv
It's All in My Hands, 2007.

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GLOSSARY

Bandh. Hindi word meaning 'closed', a general strike used as a form of protest by political parties or communities.

Bajrang Dal. Militant Hindu organisation, youth wing of the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP).

BJP – *Bharatiya Janata* Party. Indian People's Party, one of the two major political parties in India. A right-wing party, it has close ideological and organisational links to Hindu nationalist organisations.

Colony. Indian English for a residential compound, often built by an employer for his staff.

Dalit. Untouchable castes.

Dargah. Sufi shrine built over the grave of a saint or dervish.

Dhamaal. Hindi word meaning 'chaos', 'trouble'. Term used in Ahmedabad to describe the 2002 riots.

FBO – Faith-based organisation.

FCRA - Foreign Contributions Regulation Act.

GSWT - Gujarat Sarvajanik Welfare Trust.

Hindutva. Term coined by Vinayak Damodar Sarvarkar in 1923, adopted by the *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP) as its official ideology in 1989. Denotes the predominant form of Hindu nationalism in India.

IDPs – Internally Displaced Person. According to the UN Guiding Principles on IDPs: "Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border."

IRC - Islamic Relief Committee.

Jamaat. Arabic word meaning 'assembly'. In the Gujarati context, "jamaats are composed of people who share the same traditional occupation or ethnicity or regional origin, or those who respect the authority of a particular shrine or framework for social administration and jurisprudence". (Jasani 2010: 167)

Karsevak. Compound of the Sanskrit words *kar* (hand) and *sevak* (servant). A volunteer for a religious cause.

Maulana. Religious title used in the Indian subcontinent for respected Muslim religious leaders.

NCM - National Commission for Minorities.

NHRC - National Human Rights Commission.

Relief colony. Term used to denote the colonies of basic houses built to house IDPs displaced during the 2002 riots. Mander explains the local use of this term: "despite their rudimentary public services, they have a much more permanent character than relief camps. Yet, they are not colonies where the state has systematically resettled persons […]. To call them resettlement colonies, suggesting some kind of orderly resettlement supervised by a responsible state, would be misleading". (Mander 2006: 5236)

RSS – *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh*. A right-wing, Hindu nationalist charitable organisation, currently the world's largest voluntary non-governmental organisation. Has been accused of inciting and participating in communal violence.

Sangh Parivar. Term denoting the family of Hindu nationalist organisations affiliated with the RSS, including the *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP), *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* (VHP) and *Bajrang Dal*.

VHP – Vishwa Hindu Parishad, or World Hindu Council. Hindu nationalist non-governmental organisation based on the ideology of *Hindutva*.

Zakat. One of the five pillars of Islam, charitable contribution.

INTRODUCTION

A first glimpse of Juhapura

My first visit to Juhapura took me to the offices of the Islamic Relief Committee (IRC) of Gujarat, nestled behind a complex of family businesses opposite the bustling Agriculture Produce Market of Ahmedabad. A small, dusty alleyway led up to an entrance hall, which offered a choice – a rickety elevator or an open plan staircase. I picked the latter. As I climbed to

the fourth floor, the sound of children playing cricket echoed from a neighbouring lot. My first glimpses of the sprawling expanse of Juhapura revealed a bustling, dynamic sprawl, a landscape crisscrossed with dirt roads and interspersed with construction sites.

Time and time again, Juhapura has been described as the largest Muslim ghetto in Ahmedabad, a testament to the levels of polarisation that has become evident in Gujarati society. The road that divides Juhapura from neighbouring Hindu areas is locally known as the border. (Janmohamed 2013: 468) A formerly mixed area, Juhapura has become predominantly Muslim since the waves of communal riots that gripped through Gujarat during the late 1980s and 1990s. It went on to become the "largest refugee camp of Gujarat" with the unprecedented brutality of the 2002 anti-Muslim violence. (Ohm 2007: 29) As Ahmedabad became further divided along communal lines, Muslims of all social classes have flocked to Juhapura – from the victims of the 2002 riots who fled the violence of Hindu nationalist mobs, to the Muslim civil society leaders who left their upper middle class flats fearing the cloaked warnings of their Hindu neighbours. Transforming the social fabric of Ahmedabad and the configuration of urban space, displacement has taken many forms in Gujarat. Violence and the threat of violence have instilled a sense of fear and mistrust in the Muslim community, which has been heightened by the state's hostility and neglect towards Muslim majority areas in general and relief colonies housing displaced families in particular.

I was ushered into the office of my informant, Dr. Shakeel Ahmad, President of the Gujarati Branch of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and Chairman of the IRC. Curious to learn more about the long-term involvement of his organisation with displaced communities in Ahmedabad, I had

asked Dr. Ahmad for an interview to discuss the living conditions in the relief colonies built and managed by the IRC. As many of them were situated within Juhapura itself, I was curious to visit relief colonies and witness how these temporary shelters had become permanent in the decade since the riots. As I pulled out my recorder and asked whether he was comfortable with me taping our conversation, Dr. Ahmad joked and said, don't worry, – "the government has been recording us for the last fifteen years. No problem, we have become habitual to these things". (Ahmad 2015)

This casual statement revealed a more complex dynamic than I had expected. Scholarly literature on internal displacement in Gujarat has stressed the negligence of the state in managing displacement, presenting the hastily built relief colonies as a space existing in a 'state vacuum'. (Chandhoke 2009) The state, it seemed, instead of being absent from the management of displacement was very much present – shaping the lives of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the functioning of the civil society organisations advocating on their behalf.

The management of forced migration following the 2002 riots raises an important question regarding the neutrality of the state and its power in shaping the physical and imagined realities of a vulnerable minority. Paul Brass' argument for a more nuanced interpretation of the state is important within this context; he sees the state as acting as an "an instrument of a class or an ethnic group, or as a relatively autonomous fore, as a distributor of privileges, or a promoter of justice and equality among groups". (Brass 1991: 248) The role of the state in fostering communal violence has been discussed at length in existing scholarship focusing on South Asia. The communal violence that shook Gujarat in 2002 has been a focus point for many scholars,

because of involvement of state officials and institutions. (Chandhoke 2009: 3) A dimension that has been neglected in existing scholarship on communal violence centers on the role of the state in shaping a post-riot context. This is a gap that this thesis seeks to fill by exploring the dynamics of relief and rehabilitation following the 2002 anti-Muslim violence. Through the prism of Foucault's concept of governmentality, this thesis will analyse the ways in which the state government of Gujarat and segments of the civil society govern the vulnerable IDP community.

The dynamics of relief and rehabilitation provide a rich terrain to explore Foucault's concept of governmentality. Defined as the organised mentalities, rationalities and techniques through which subjects are governed as the boundaries between the role of the state and civil society are fluid and dynamic. Governmentality, defined as "the organised mentalities, rationalities and techniques through which subjects are governed", is particularly relevant to the analysis of internal displacement as the boundaries between state and civil society are fluid and dynamic. (Lippert 1999) As Hindu nationalism imagines the Indian nation based on religious lines, governmentality will allow us to analyse how this nationalist ideology impacts on the working and experiences of the state.

In its everyday workings, the state inevitably classifies its population by distributing rights, entitlements and resources to groups along caste, class and community lines. (Brass 1991: 248) By embodying an imagined conception of the 'nation', the state is the main institution structuring identity politics through its administrative framework and behaviour on the ground. (Adeney & Lall 2005: 258) When state institutions and officials are complicit in communal

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violence against a minority community, citizenship becomes "unevenly experienced and spatialised". (Sharma & Gupta 2006: 26)

Following the 2002 riots, the management of forced migration was shaped by the hostility of the state towards a predominantly Muslim displaced population and by the exclusion of this population from basic citizenship rights and entitlements guaranteed by the Indian constitution. (Gupta 2010: 82) This led to the emergence of an *ad hoc*, localised refugee regime that has shaped the lives of IDPs in the long term, affecting their relationship to the state and their living conditions on a day-to-day basis. Despite literature defining relief colonies as a zone where the government of Gujarat is largely absent, the state is actively forging the conditions of relief and rehabilitation and the functioning of non-state actors on the ground. It has shaped the field of civil society by affecting the ways in which non-state actors articulate claims and by limiting the sources of transnational funding available to non-governmental organisations. This has affected the relationships of non-state actors to one another and the scope of their presence in relief colonies. An analysis of these relationships through the prism of governmentality will shed light on the complex series of negotiations and renegotiations by state and non-state actors managing violence-induced displacement. By situating this analysis within the context of social and spatial segregation in Ahmedabad, this thesis aims to elucidate the complex dynamics characterising the aftermath of communal violence.

Thesis Statement

Situated within the field of nationalism studies, this thesis aims to broaden our present understanding of ethnic violence by focusing on the ongoing, structural nature of communalism

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and exploring how Hindu nationalist ideology continues to impact the day-to-day lives of Muslims in Gujarat. An analysis of the continuum between the violence itself and post-violence dynamics is essential. As Brubaker and Laitin argue, "the shift from nonviolent to violent modes of conflict is a phase shift that requires particular theoretical attention". (Brubaker 1998: 426)

Based on a month-long fieldwork in Ahmedabad, this thesis explores uprooting and marginalisation in a highly polarised urban environment where Hindu nationalist discourses stigmatising minorities have become mainstream. By focusing on aspects of governmentality characterising the relationships between the state, civil society and the internally displaced, this thesis will highlight how displacement "acts upon different peoples, lands them in different predicaments, and brings into being new social and physical environments, including new institutional orders and labels". (Colson 2003: 2) The relations of power that shape the institutional order governing displacement in post-2002 Ahmedabad will emerge through a topography of relief and rehabilitation.

This paper is divided into two six chapters. The first chapter outlines existing scholarship on communal violence in India concentrating on scholars who have focused on the aftermath of the 2002 riots in Gujarat, and conceptualizes governance and governmentality within a post-riot scenario, providing the theoretical framework upon which the analytical chapters will be grounded. The methodological foundations, ethical considerations and limitations of the fieldwork will be discussed in the second chapter. The third chapter will provide a final building block for the analytical segment of this thesis by situating the development of Hindu nationalism in Gujarat, analysing how the 2002 riots were a departure from previous instances of communal

violence and discussing the impact of communal riots on the segregation of space and polarisation of society in Ahmedabad. The three remaining chapters will analyse how governmentality shapes a relationship in the aftermath of the 2002 riots. Chapter four will outline how state policies towards IDPs in particular, and the Muslim minority in general, have downgraded the members of these communities from citizens to subjects, excluding them from mainstream society and urban space. Chapter five will outline the forms of nonstate governmentality that have shaped relief and rehabilitation dynamics, focusing on the negotiations between Muslim faith-based organisations, secular organisations and IDPs within the space of the relief colony. This chapter will focus on the long-term impacts of the localised refugee regime on the lives of IDPs, particularly how mediating institutions have shaped the claim-making and belonging of the displaced communities. The final chapter will analyse how the state exerts power over civil society to limit their scope of action, by regulating their access to foreign funding and discouraging claim making based on religious lines.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature Review

This thesis aims to complement largely nonintersecting literatures in anthropology, sociology, political science, nationalism studies and refugee studies by focusing on the relationship between the state, non-governmental actors and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a post-violence setting.

Through a broad temporal lens, this thesis will enrich existing literatures on communal violence focusing on South Asia in general and Gujarat in particular by looking at the spatial and institutional dynamics of inclusion and exclusion within the urban space of Ahmedabad. Its focus on both state and non-state aid policies will complement existing work in the field of refugee studies, simultaneously responding to Malkki's call for the reintegration of the nation-state in studies of forced migration and offering an analysis of the 'refugee regime' governing a localised displaced population. (Badigar 2012: 46)

The post-Godhra violence that shook the province in 2002 has become an important focus for scholars working on communal relations in South Asia. As Oza emphasises, "the Gujarat pogrom is significant in both the genealogy and the geography of Hindutva violence in many respects". (Oza 2007: 164) Mehta has noted that "perhaps no other Indian state in the past

decade has received as much journalistic and scholarly attention connected with the infamy of communal violence as the western state of Gujarat". (Mehta 2013: 108) With the 2002 riots, Ahmedabad has become the Indian city most affected by communal riots in terms of the scale of violence and the number of victims. (Chandhoke 2009: 1) The election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 and the overwhelming electoral victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have cemented the importance that Gujarat holds in the Indian political scene, simultaneously bringing the dynamics of the 2002 Gujarat riots back into the scholarly limelight.

This study opts for a broader temporal lens, undertaking an analysis of the continuum between the violence itself and post-violence social and institutional dynamics. As the case of Gujarat illustrates, the shift from communal violence to a non-violent status quo based on the primacy of Hindutva in the public and political spheres and the marginalisation of the Muslim community is one that merits just as much scholarly attention. This fits into Deshpande's argument that a broader understanding of the deep social roots of communalism is only possible by recognising the continuities between its normal and pathological forms. (Desphande 1998: 271) Shubh Mathur further emphasises the need to analyse the day-to-day, long-term entrenchment of national ideologies, instead of solely focusing on its 'high moments'. (Mathur 2008) Varshney further claims that peace in the aftermath of violence consists of heightened level of ethnic politics, demonstrated by the "institutionalised channeling and resolution of ethnic demands and conflicts", which can be seen as "an absence of violence, not as an absence of conflict." (Varshney 2013: 366)

A number of scholars, activists and journalists have produced rich analyses of the communal dynamics of post-2002 Gujarat. Despite the pressing need to develop a multi-layered understanding of the relationship between the state and the victimised Muslim minority, analyses focusing on the post-violence dynamics between the state, civil society and the marginalised Muslim community have developed in clusters that communicate insufficiently with each other. Lawyers and activists have focused on dynamics of post-violence justice and reconciliation, political scientists have focused on the repeated electoral success of the BJP in Gujarati and Indian election, anthropologists and refugee studies scholars have focused on the conditions of IDPs and the role that non-state actors have played in their rehabilitation work. (Desphande 2001, Mander 2006, Oza 2007, Jasani 2008, Chandhoke 2009, Gupta 2010) These disparate clusters have often obscured the interrelationship between state and non-state actors in forging unique political and social dynamics in post-2002 Ahmedabad.

Chandhoke has stressed the need to analyse the relationship between state and civil society policies towards the IDPs, arguing that the increase in power of Muslim relief networks in certain communities is "the natural outcome of state fundamentalism and neglect of religious minorities; for when religious organisations step into the vacuum, they are likely to demand their own price for helping people". (Chandhoke 2009: 12) Her argument rests on the idea that the state of Gujarat has downgraded internally displaced communities 'from citizen to subject' by withholding basic rights and entitlements to this religious community. (Chandhoke 2009: 12) Her emphasis on the state and Muslim relief organisations provides valuable insights into the dynamics of displacement in Ahmedabad, yet – her work does not sufficiently reflect upon the individual agency of IDPs, or how 'secular' NGOs exert power over this group. By analysing

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civil society as a whole, and reflecting upon the relationship between different non-state actors, this thesis aims to complement Chandhoke's work. This focus will additionally benefit from current scholarship in refugee studies, which highlights the need to analyse 'significant nodes and spaces in the provision of legal and social services and resources to marginalised and minority populations'. (White 2002: 77) By focusing on the institutions and organisations that work with and govern the displaced communities of Ahmedabad, this thesis will serve as a valuable case study for understanding internal displacement through the prism of governmentality.

Over the course of several years, Jasani has conducted extensive ethnographic fieldwork in two 'ghettoes' in Ahmedabad, where rehabilitated IDPs have been given new homes in Muslim-majority neighborhoods. Her rich analysis of the relationship between Muslim faith-based organisations and the local community's perceptions of religiosity puts forward the nuanced social fields that emerge in a post-violence setting. Her study of the perceptions of the police, judiciary and state institutions by members of the Muslim minority analyses how gender shapes individual coping mechanisms in the aftermath of violence, and how it affects claim making towards state institutions. Jasani's work will provide a useful starting point for analysing the institutional order that has developed since 2002 to manage relief and rehabilitation, and its interrelationship with displaced communities. This thesis aims to complement her work by offering an integrated analysis the governmentality of secularist NGOs, Muslim relief organisations and state institutions alike, and their respective impacts on discourses of IDP identities.

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Dipankar Gupta has produced a comparative analysis of the long-term effects of two spates of ethnic violence, the first in Mumbai following the communal violence ignited by the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, the second in Ahmedabad following the communal violence of 2002. His focus on the coping mechanisms of victimised Muslims reveals the complex ways in which members of this minority negotiated a 'new normal' based on their interactions with state institutions, non-governmental organisations and Muslim faith-based organisations. He argues that the lasting impact of majoritarian-led ethnic riots is the 'de-recognition of claims to citizenship by the minority population', a dynamic he found in Mumbai and Ahmedabad alike. (Gupta 2010: 28) Focusing on the coping mechanisms of Muslim communities, Gupta argues that 'the first instinct of the minoritised community is to insist on the tenets of citizenship', a dynamic prevalent during my fieldwork in Ahmedabad. (Gupta 2010: 30)

Both Oza and Deshpande have focused on spatiality – conceptualising the urban marginalisation of the Muslim displaced population as the physical expression of Hindutva ideology. Deshpande views relief colonies and Muslim ghettoes as a symptom of the Hindtuva claim for a "nation-space where the major axis of exclusion is cultural". (Deshpande 2001: 261) Oza further argues that the through the displacement of Muslim spaces, the riots constructed "sanitized, safe, and Hindu public spaces in Gujarat. (Oza 2007: 166) Their work will serve as a basis for this thesis to integrate a nuanced spatial element to our understanding of how state and non-state actors engage with urban spaces and marginalised communities – by providing or withholding the providing of basic infrastructure, such as paved roads, hospitals and schools. Understanding how the state and civil society exert their presence in minority-dominated spaces is an important dimension to understanding the dynamics of relief and rehabilitation in post-2002 Ahmedabad.

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Theoretical Framework

This analysis of the institutional order that arose in response to displacement in post-2002 Ahmedabad answers Abu-Lughod's call to 'study up' by examining the culture, practisce and policies of the organisations governing the daily lives of displaced communities in Ahmedabad. (Hyndman 1997: 16) In doing so, this thesis aims to contribute to a more complete understanding of the central institutions of power governing IDPs in urban Ahmedabad, casting light on the relationships between the state, civil society and the marginalised Muslim minority.

Foucault's concept of governmentality, defined as the 'ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power' is particularly relevant. (Lippert 1999: 295) It emerges as a key concept to understand the structures of power that shape the lives of displaced individuals, as it allows to "unhinge rule from the 'body' of the state by enlarging the space of governance'. (Sharma & Gupta 2006: 25) Through governmentality, this thesis gains a broad lens through which we can conceptualise how power manifests itself through a web of institutional arrangements that are not automatically situated in the domain of the state. (Sharma & Gupta 2006: 25) Governmentality allows us to conceptualise the 'state' within civil society and to evaluate how the state asserts itself as the codifier of social relations within civil society. (Sharma & Gupta 2006: 9)

Analysing the workings of the state will allow us to shed light on the "mechanics of rule and workings of power through such apparently mundane state activities, such as the collection of

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taxes, the distribution of subsidized food to the poor, or the issuance of passports". (Sharma & Gupta 2006: 9) These mundane bureaucratic procedures are nevertheless relevant in understanding how the state and government operates in people's daily lives, and how the state comes to be imagined, encountered and reimagined by the population. (Sharma & Gupta 2006: 11-12) In the case study of Ahmedabad, this concept will serve as a prism through which we can observe the negotiations and renegotiations of normalcy between the state and a victimized minority group. The claim-making put forward by the victims, and the non-governmental organisations representing them, will highlight the responsibilities and roles imagined for the state by individuals and civil society operating in a highly polarized environment.

Lemke argues that Foucault's concept of governmentality should be conceptualised as simultaneously internal and external to the state, since 'it is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus private'. (Lemke 2002: 11) This resembles Chandhoke's conceptualisation of the state as a constitutive actor in 'producing, codifying and constructing power'. (Chandhoke 2003: 49) One of the main roles the state plays, in this regard, is the codification of power and spheres of influence, central to shaping the complexities of civil society. (Chandhoke 2003: 48) Chandhoke defines civil society not in institutional terms, but rather as a process, 'whereby the inhabitants of the sphere constantly monitor both the state and the monopoly of power within itself'. (Chandhoke 2003: 57) Tandon further highlights the need to analyse civil society as 'the space where subaltern, hitherto inaudible and unarticulated views can be expressed'. (Tandon 2003: 65)

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Within this field, bureaucracy emerges as a constitutive force, acting as the interface through which citizens experience the power of the state, through the "day –to-day provision of services like sanitation, water, electricity, telephony, transport, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, transfer of land and housing, health services and educational institutions." (Tandon 2003: 73) In the Indian context, Tandon argues that civil society has a particular role: to protect the accountability of state bureaucracies through petitions, campaigns, and public interest litigations, acting as the interface between the state and its citizens. (Tandon 2003: 72)

Within the context of displacement, civil society plays another important role. In the context of refugee populations, agencies administering relief often prefer to "bypass the local channels of governance and establish new administrative structures answerable, if at all, to the authorities in the capital or at some level of the international order". (Colson 2003: 6) The governmentality of these 'international refugee regimes' have become a focal point in the field of refugee studies, as international NGOs, from the onset, were imagined 'carrying out tasks distinct from those thought appropriate to governmental or primarily public bodies'. (Lippert 1999: 310) The roles of international organisations such as the UNHCR who manage displacement are transformed by their dealings with refugee communities, simultaneously transforming the ability of state governments to govern a specific territory or population. (Colson 2003: 1) To parallel Hirst and Thompson's argument that certain 'NGOs also 'govern', as observed in the practices of Greepeace and Oxfam in relation to, respectively, the ocean environment and famine relief', UNHCR and international NGOs 'governs' refugee populations on a global scale. (Lippert 1999: 311) Although the numbers of IDPs now exceeds those of refugees, no international institution is similarly charged with their protection. (Cohen & Deng 1998: 13) This makes the

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analysis of state and local civil society interactions all the more interesting within a context of internal displacement, as relief and rehabilitation are often organised in ad hoc and grassroots ways. Because constructions of the state are dependent on the positioning of different actors in society, a broad analysis of the construction of state and civil society responsibilities is pertinent within the context of internal displacement. (Gupta, 1995: 392)

Because 'internal displacement is a symptom of state dysfunction', (Cohen & Deng 1998: 12) it is important to understand how citizenship is unevenly experienced and spatialised within this context. (Sharma & Gupta 2006: 26) For displaced communities, the impact of state power is felt in a very intimate way – as Das argues 'power is experienced close to the skin, embodied in well-known local officials, through practices of everyday life'. (Das 2003) Although the nationalist discourse of citizenship remains intimately linked to an abstract notion of the state, the day-to-day experiences of marginalization, disempowerment and violence show the need for a more nuanced understanding of the realities of lived governance. (Aretxaga 2003: 396) Lama estimates that the number of IDPs in India ranges between 507,000 and 21.3 million, most of which have been induced by development displacement. (Lama 2004: 24) This broad estimate illustrates the diversity of political situations and the range of daily conditions affecting IDPs in the Indian subcontinent. (Lama 2004: 24) This complex problem is attenuated by the lack of a national policy, institution or legal framework to deal with refugees or IDPs in India. (Lama 2004: 25) The lack of a unified response to displacement has given rise to a variety of ad hoc, localised refugee regimes, involve in labeling, identity management, boundary creation and maintenance, and forms of social governance. (Colson 2003: 1) As internal displacement

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following episodes of communal violence can provoke a loss of trust in governments, this context is particularly interesting for the analysis of governance and governmentality.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

In order to analyse the institutional order that has developed after the 2002 anti-Muslim violence, I have conducted fieldwork in Ahmedabad in April 2015. My goal was to examine the relationship between the state and civil society and to understand how they asserted themselves towards the IDP population by combining semi-structured interviews, participant observation and institutional analysis. These methods combined will enable this thesis to explore two interrelated dimensions put forward by Akhil Gupta: the everyday practices of local bureaucracies and the ways in which the boundaries between state and civil society are blurred by marginalised populations. (Gupta 1995: 377) Aware of the fact that research on forced migration is often criticised as methodologically weak because 'key components of the research design and methodology are never revealed', this section will outline the sampling methods, ethical considerations and research limitations in detail. (Jacobson & Landau 2003: 186)

I have chosen Ahmedabad, 'the state's largest and most politicized city' as the basis of my fieldwork because it accounted for the bulk of deaths and displacement during the 2002 riots. (Spodek 2010: 350) On a more practical level, Ahmedabad is also the seat of many NGOs that have played an active role in relief and rehabilitation efforts, making it easy to access informants and visualize the impacts of NGO initiatives in the relief colonies.

Qualitative Interviews

During this fieldwork, I have conducted three types of interviews that have helped me gain a better understanding of the dynamics of displacement and rehabilitation in Gujarat: investigative interviews with experts, semi-structured interviews with members of civil society organisations, and brief interviews with displaced individuals in the course of participant observation and visits to relief colonies.

In order to gain a better understanding of the political dynamics within Gujarat, I conducted 8 investigative interviews with journalists and scholars who have lived, worked and extensively written on communalism in Gujarat. (Appendix 1) Their input and recommendations helped shape my understanding of the history and focus my research question. These preliminary expert interviews drew my attention to the nuances within civil society in Gujarat, drawing distinctions between the operational fields of relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. An awareness of this conceptual distinction helped me prepare for my fieldwork, helping me to gain a basic understanding of the roles and relationships between different organisations.

The bulk of my analysis rests upon 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with members of civil society organisations who were either working with displaced populations or who had played a part in the post-riot relief efforts. (Appendix 2) Because of the sensitive nature of my research, I have chosen to focus on the segments of civil society that had played an active role in helping IDPs, as I felt that interviewing state officials and bureaucrats was beyond the scope of the short duration of my fieldwork. A number of informants also urged me to talk to Hindu

nationalist organisations in order to gain a better understanding of their ideology and their role instigating communal violence. I have chosen to exclude this group from the scope of my thesis, because of the abundance of literature focusing on Hindu nationalist organisations, and their obvious lack of involvement with Muslim IDPs.

In order to ensure a diversity of perspectives and opinions, I targeted: a) representatives and staff of Muslim faith-based organisations that had managed relief and rehabilitation in the aftermath of the riots, b) the leaders and staff of secular NGOs involved with displaced communities, riot victims, and the Muslim minority in Ahmedabad, c) social activists advocating minority rights and communal harmony in Gujarat, and d) volunteers and young people working on civil society projects targeting the urban poor in Muslim-majority areas. The sample is limited, but representative of the civil society in Ahmedabad. Differences in religion, age group and gender are accounted for. By targeting NGO managers and ground-level staff who are the most frequent point of contact between the displaced population and the organization, I made a point to get different perspectives within organisations that reflect the natural discrepancies between policy and implementation.

These interviewees were selected through a dual process: a preliminary mapping of civil society in Ahmedabad, complemented with a snowball sampling method. In the initial phases of my research, I conducted a preliminary investigation on the civil society organisations active on the issues of displacement, communalism and minority rights, by conducting expert interviews as well as consulting official reports and existing secondary literature. Through this preliminary mapping, I realised that the organisations most prominently featured in the media were not

always the organisations that had contributed the most to displaced communities on the ground. As Gupta highlights, the bulk of media attention has focused on secular NGOs, while Muslim FBOs failed to garner as much attention despite their continuing involvement with displaced communities. (Gupta 2010: 45) Based on this mapping, I proceeded to contact the representatives of two groups of civil society organisations to gain a complete perspective: those at the forefront of relief and rehabilitation in the immediate aftermath of the violence, and those still actively working with displaced communities.

Furthermore, both interviewees and expert interviewees eagerly suggested potential informants, often helping me to arrange interviews by giving me the telephone numbers of other activists and NGO representatives. The response rate differed depending on the ways in which I approached each organisation. Not a single organisation refused to participate, but many did not answer emails sent out in March 2015 introducing my research purposes. Informants were always willing to discuss their work after a personal call, especially after the referral of another member of civil society. Overall, they were eager to share their personal and professional experiences with me and interested that a foreign researcher was focusing on displacement in Gujarat.

The use of semi-structured interviews helped me develop a detailed understanding of the dynamics and conditions of displacement in Ahmedabad, allowing me to refine the concepts and themes as the research progressed. Amongst this group of informants, language was not a barrier for communication, as all of my informants spoke fluent English. As this group of informants had expansive knowledge on displacement and communal dynamics in Gujarat, I was aware of

the need to focus my interviews by referring to my topic guide and using bridges to get back to my research questions. (Berry 2002: 682)

Encounters with Displacement: the Relief Colony

During my fieldwork, I also had the opportunity to meet and converse with a number of IDPs who had benefited from the relief and rehabilitation programs run by different types of organisations. I had originally intended to have a more in-depth participant observation component in my fieldwork, but this was limited by the logistical difficulties of accessing relief colonies, combined with the fact that many organisations no longer had regular staff or programs on the ground in relief colonies. Interviewing displaced persons directly is often problematic because of 'access difficulties stemming from logistics (remote areas, bad roads, hidden communities), security problems and lack of trust'. (Jacobson & Landau 2003: 195) Because the short duration of fieldwork and the difficulties reaching this community, my limited contact with displaced people was made possible through NGO staff and activists, who often assisted in translation. Inevitably, conversations with IDPs were coloured by my perceived relationship with the institution or organization they represented. As both Muslim FBOs and 'secular' NGOs enabled my entry into the field, I was able to gain some insights into the impact of different organisations on the displaced individuals. Participant observation revealed complex relationships between the IDPs and the organizational staff governing their daily lives.

Encounters with IDPs occurred during my visits to three relief colonies in Ahmedabad: Siddikabad Relief Colony in Juhapura (facilitated by the Gujarat Sarvajanik Welfare Trust), Ekta Nagar Relief Colony in Vatva (facilitated by the Islamic Relief Committee), Citizen Nagar Relief Colony in the Bombay Hotel area (facilitated by the Islamic Relief Committee). These experiences helped me understand the physical space of the relief colony, as well as the living conditions of IDPs. I was also able to grasp different paths of displacement by visiting the headquarters of Himmat, a cooperative of displaced women and widows, where I met women who had originally resettled in relief colonies and had since moved out by investing in buying their own home.

During these visits, I had the opportunity to observe casual interactions between NGO staff and IDPs who had developed links of friendship over the years, as well as more structured encounters. I witnessed the resolution of a dispute between the headmaster of a municipal school and the parents of children living in a relief colony, by a representative of the IRC; the conditions in schools administered by the GSWT; as well as interactions between representatives of NGOs and the representatives of relief colonies. These revealed the complex negotiations and ideological disputes arising between the IDPs and different segments of civil society.

Bearing in mind this obvious limitation of these encounters, data obtained from these visits will remain anecdotal within this paper, exemplifying the difficult situation of displaced communities who remain vulnerable to the arbitrary action of state authorities and civil society groups. (Jacobson & Landau 2003: 187)

Institutional Analysis

Although most of my work is based on interviews and my observations in the field, this is complemented by the analysis of related primary sources, including: brochures, pamphlets, annual reports and other publications by civil society organizations, articles and other media published by activists and civil society representatives, correspondence between NGOs and the state government, and reports and recommendations of the National Human Rights Commission and the National Commission for Minorities. The analysis of these documents helped me gain background knowledge on the culture, practices, and politicies of the organisations managing relief and rehabilitation in post-2002 Ahmedabad. This will help shed light on the processes of 'contestation, negotiation, and collaboration' between the state and civil society. (Gupta 1995: 393)

Ethical Considerations and Limitations

Ethnographic methods are particularly sentitive to positionality: 'who the researcher is and where the research is conducted' will shape the personal interactions with the informants. (Naz 2012: 97) By conducting fieldwork in post-2002 rural Gujarat, Naz became aware of the ways in which rapport is shaped by the manners in which the researcher presents him or herself and how 'these identities are perceived and decoded by participants and stakeholders in the village community or social group'. (Naz 2012: 101) My ethnicity, nationality and gender played a significant role in how informants perceived me, shaping the content of our interviews and the nature of the data obtained. An element of my personal background emerged as a bond between myself as a

researcher, and the civil society representatives I was interviewing: my family's experiences of the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. A number of informants expressed interest in hearing about displacement and post-conflict dynamics in the former Yugoslavia, which they perceived as another example of ethnic or communal violence that divides communities. Having family members who were persecuted as Muslims and became refugees blurred their perception of me as an 'outsider', cementing my legitimacy as someone who had a genuine interest in their work and their experiences of displacement and marginalisation. My ethnicity and gender also affected the outcome of my research, as many members of civil society were keen to facilitate my research by helping with translation and local transportation. Representatives of Muslim faith-based organisations were particularly keen to provide me with transportation, emphasising the need to stay safe in an urban Indian context.

Coming as a foreigner linked to a Western academic institution made me particularly cautious of how I approached this politically sensitive environment. Because my fieldwork was limited due to time and language barriers, I was aware that building rapport with riot victims and survivors would be very difficult. Wishing to avoid potential re-traumatisation, I avoided approaching sensitive issues in my interactions with them, preferring to focus on their post-riot living conditions than on narratives of suffering. Throughout my fieldwork, I also remained conscious to the spatial polarisation within Ahmedabad, choosing to conduct interviews in a neutral location where the informant would feel comfortable discussing potentially controversial issues.

Because of the short duration of my fieldwork, I encountered a surprising dynamic in post-riot Ahmedabad. Although certain events, such as the responsibility of the state in the 2002

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communal violence, were described with surprising homogeneity, there was a degree of blurriness when it came to discussing the realities of displacement and marginalisation of the Muslim minority. Informants working within the same organization, or working with the same community often depicted the situation on the ground in radically different ways, at times contradicting each other when it came to basic facts – which organization had built the relief colony, or whether displaced families had legal ownership over their new houses. Jasani, who had conducted a ethnographic research in relief colonies in Ahmedabad, stressed that during her fieldwork, there was a thin line between 'rhetoric' and 'truth, as "stories had travelled – people had taken on each other's complexes, appropriated experiences and experienced despair, pain, loss, lack of jobs, untimely deaths". (Jasani 2009) My fieldwork revealed a mixture of homogenisation and disparity when it came to assessing post-riot dynamics in Ahmedabad, a dynamic I remained conscious of when coding and interpreting my interviews.

The experience of doing fieldwork made me realise the complexity of internal displacement and the necessity to move beyond the main paradigms put forward by existing literature. My conceptualisation of the relief colony was transformed through my fieldwork experiences, which emphasised the embeddedness of the relief colony within a nuanced spatial, social and political context. This reinforced my appreciation for anthropology as a discipline emphasising the complexity of local contexts. The short duration of fieldwork, however, limits the scope of my findings. I remain conscious that organisations will choose to present themselves in specific ways when discussing their work with a researcher. Having the opportunity to engage with civil society and IDPs over a longer period of time would have enabled me to gain a more intimate

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understanding of the local political context and develop a rapport with informants which would have enriched my knowledge of the field.

CHAPTER 3: COMMUNALISM AND VIOLENCE IN GUJARAT

To gain a more complete understanding of the dynamics of displacement in Gujarat, it is necessary to understand the political contexts in which uprooting, relief and resettlement take place. (Colson 2003: 13) The institutions and networks governing displacement in Ahmedabad were created by the particular context of the 2002 riots, and shaped by the recent history of communalism in Gujarat. This chapter shall proceed to analyse the state involvement in the 2002 riots, by placing it within the larger framework of the communalisation of politics in Gujarat. Finally, it will discuss the impact of communal violence on urban space and social dynamics in Ahmedabad.

A mention on vocabulary is necessary at this point. Although the expression 'communal riots' has commonly been used to describe Hindu-Muslim violence in the Indian subcontinent, it has become an umbrella term dissimulating different types of communal violence, camouflaging a variety of political and social dynamics. Because the term 'riot' implies an element of spontaneity, scholars and activists have argued it should not be applied to the communal violence that shook Gujarat in 2002, due to the extensive and undeniable involvement of state authorities in the anti-minority violence. Indeed, Kakar distinguishes between a riot, 'the bursting of a boil, the eruption of pus, of 'bad blood' between Hindus and Muslims' and the more entrenched form of communal tension that exists in Ahmedabad, 'where the boil is a festering sore, the tension never really disappears but remains at an uncomfortable level which is below that of a violent eruption'. (Kakar 1996: 41) The long-term hostility of the state government of Gujarat towards the survivors of the violence and the Muslim minority hints towards the entrenchment of communal politics within the state institutions. During my fieldwork in Ahmedabad, the anti-

Muslim violence that occurred between February and May 2002 was referred to by using the words 'riot', 'pogrom', 'massacre', 'genocide', 'Holocaust' and the Hindi word *dhamaal* meaning 'chaos'. This thesis will use the neutral term word 'violence' to denote these events.

Gujarat: a 'Hindutva Laboratory'

Communal violence continues to shape social and political dynamics in independent India. Mathur argues that the anti-Sikh pogrom that swallowed Delhi following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguard in 1984 was a defining moment for Indian politics, as "popular violence transformed with barely a pause into anti-Muslim riots, as early as 1983 and 1986". (Mathur: 5) Within this context, Gujarat emerges as the most-riot prone state of India based on the number of deaths associated with communal violence. (Jaffrelot 2003: 637) The 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom needs to be understood within the context of periodic communal violence in Gujarat. Chandhoke emphasizes that since Partition, minor riots took place in 1969, 1971, 1973, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1982, followed by major riots in 1985, minor riots in 1986, 1987, 1989 and major riots in 1990, 1993, 2000. (Chandhoke 2009: 1)

In Gujarat more so than in the rest of India, *Hindutva* discourses have penetrated everyday life, acquiring legitimacy and a growing social respectability in the public sphere. (Hansen 1999: 3) A key tenet of *Hindutva* is the belief that the secular Indian state is a 'political fiction that conceals real cultural incommensurabilities, or in their words, a 'culturally alien' construction imposed on India by anglicised intellectuals'. (Hansen 1999: 11) This view is rooted on the idea that there is a basic opposition between Islam and Indian nationalism, based on the experience of partition,

'the final proof that Hindus and Muslims were really two different nations as Jinnah had claimed'. (Kakar 1996: 38-39) This nationalist ideology promotes the 'Hinduness' of India, viewing Indian Muslims and Christians as 'foreigners' whose religious lands is not rooted in the Indian subcontinent. A key tenet of Hindu nationalist ideology is the fear of the abstract, stereotypical 'Muslim' figure, dangerous to Indian society because he represents "a constitutive defect, an impurity that has to be 'cleansed' before India can emerge as a modern self-conscious nation". (Hansen 1999: 3) By framing the figure of 'the Muslim' as a threat to the Hindu nation, *Hindutva* ideology normalises violence against this minority community in the name of national security. (Anand 2005: 203)

 Mukta argues that the emergence of communalism in Gujarat is linked to the collapse of the Congress between 1985 and 1998, and the overwhelming victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which reinforced the power of dominant groups within Gujarati society. (Mukta 2002: 61) Jaffrelot further emphasises that since the 1990s, Gujarat has become the 'main stronghold of Hindu nationalists'. (Jaffrelot 2010: 386) The consolidation of the BJP has resulted in the legitimation of Hindu nationalist agendas, discourses and institutions in the political sphere of Gujarat. (Hansen 1999: 3) Spodek argues that Gujarat is a unique case, 'the only state in India where the BJP held on its own, without the need for coalition partners'. (Spodek 2010: 360-361).

The 2002 violence – a departure from the norm

A casual conversation with a Hindu professor in Ahmedabad revealed the extent to which the 2002 violence is seen as a departure from the social norm. As I inquired whether this instance of communal violence had a lasting impact on Gujarati society, my interlocutor draw a clear distinction between past instances of communal violence and the events of 2002:

> *"Riots are like a rash – an autoimmune reaction that eventually subsides. Allergic reactions in and of themselves are not a problem, as the body balances it out. When the allergen remains – allergic reactions become a problem. The sense of community to a society is like the auto-immune system of a body, a society can't live without it. There is a problem with the auto-immune system of Gujarat, this is why the post-violence situation is so problematic."*

To him, the continued polarisation in Gujarati society was a symptom of the communalisation of politics at a state level, the very allergen that made the 2002 violence so deadly and that destroyed the auto-immune system of Gujarat.

In February 2002, India witnessed the worst episode of communal violence in its recent history. Following the controversial burning of a train carrying Hindu *karsevaks* in Godhra on February 27, violence targeting the Muslim minority erupted throughout Gujarat, affecting 151 towns and 993 villages. (Oomen 2008: 47) The exact course of events that led to the death of 59 Hindu pilgrims in Godhra is unclear to this day, but state officials and local media immediately alleged it was a terrorist act, planned by Muslim militants. (Engineer 2002: 5053) This led to the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) to declare a *bandh* for the state of Gujarat, a strike bringing institutions and businesses to a standstill. (Engineer 2002: 5053) In this tense political climate, instances of anti-Muslim violence spread throughout the state, affecting urban areas and village alike. In Ahmedabad, Muslims of all social classes were affected: Muslim men, women and children were

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tortured, murdered and set alight, Muslim women were targeted by widespread sexual violence, Muslim homes were targeted and destroyed, Muslim businesses looted and burnt. Prominent Muslim leaders were not spared, including the burning alive of Ehsan Jafri, a parliamentarian who had campaigned against Chief Minister Narendra Modi in his election for state assembly. (Engineer 2002:5052)

In total, this instance of communal violence took the lives of more than two thousand people, displaced a further 150 thousand and caused property damage worth Rs. 38 billion to the victimised Muslim community. (Janvikas 2012: 5) Charlotte Thomas puts forward that 'the violent events of 2002 thus constitute the most violent attack against Indian Muslims in their country, whether in terms of the number of victims or of the modalities of murder'. (Thomas 2015: 4) This was also the first instance where communal violence reached the administrative capital, Gandhinagar, where the offices of the Wakf and Minority Development Board were burnt. (Yagnik & Seth 2002: 1009) With this grim episode, Ahmedabad became the city with the most number of victims of ethnic violence in independent India. (Varshney 2002: 7) Yet, skirmishes were still claiming victims several months after the initial quake, spurred by Hindu nationalist groups. (Majumder 2011)

This instance of communal violence is seen by scholars, activists and human rights lawyers as a departure from the 'normal' forms of communal violence in India. Chandhoke, Gupta and Jaffrelot all stress the levels of administrative support behind the communal violence. Chandhoke argues that the 2002 violence was distinctive due to the one-sided nature of the violence and the complicity of politicians, state officials and policemen. (Chandhoke 2009: 3)

Chandhoke argues that reliable reports point to the fact that "the government gave cadres of its own party and allied organisations a free hand when they set about exterminating members of the minority community". (Chandhoke 2009: 3) Gupta insists that in 2002, 'ethnic violence was clearly encouraged, if not sponsored, by the state', leaving 'little room for Muslims to maneouvre, as they had to contend against the might of the entire administrative apparatus'. (Gupta 2010: 39) Jaffrelot argues that the large number of casualties is partly due to the complicity of the police, who 'shut their eyes and their mouths'. In Ahmedabad, some of the most violent attacks on Muslim homes and businesses occurred within close proximity to police stations. (HRW 2002: 21)

Map of violence-affected areas in urban Ahmedabad

The duration and the widespread nature of the violence suggests that this was more than a spontaneous outburst of communal violence. On March 1, Chief Minister Modi confidently assured that he would control the "riots resulting from the natural and justified anger of the people". (HRW 2002: 35) Despite claims Modi has made that he had contained the violence within three days, "the violence went on for months, although in less intense and more scattered form". (Spodek 2010: 356) Affecting a total of 151 towns and 993 villages, the center of violence continued to be Ahmedabad (Jaffrelot 2012: 77) Twenty-six towns were put under curfew following days – even weeks – of rioting. (Jaffrelot 2012: 77) Human Rights Watch characterizes the passivity of the state government as extreme. (HRW 2002: 21-22) Although several contingents of the Indian army arrived in Gujarat soon after the Godhra train burning, the state government of Gujarat delayed the deployment of these troops for over twenty-four hours, refused to provide them with logistical support or provide them information regarding the areas where the worst violence was occurring. (HRW 2002: 21-22) Despite repeated calls for both the BJP-led central and state governments to stop the violence, a decisive intervention did not happen for nearly three months, making the 2002 Gujarat violence 'the longest drawn out carnage in India since Partition'. (Gupta 2010: 27)

This was made possible by a long-term process of communalisation within state institutions: 'the police force had been Modi's first target after he had become chief minister of Gujarat in October 2001', reducing the number of Muslim police officers from 65 to 1 by February 2002 (Jaffrelot 2012: 78) In the build-up to February 2002, the confidence of Hindu nationalist organisations had increased: Sheba George emphasises that members of the *Durga Vahini*, the

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BJP's women's wing, frequently interrupted the meetings of civil society organisations to protest against them working with the Muslim minority. By the late 1990s, representation of Muslims in the legislative assembly, state bureaucracy and the police force had also dipped to an all-time low, enabling the spread of Hindu nationalism in state institutions. (Chaudhary 2007: 702). The communalisation of basic state institutions and the mainstreaming of Hindu nationalism had profound impacts on the post-violence political dynamics, giving rise to a feeling of insecurity and mistrust for the state amongst the displaced community, a dimension we will turn to in Chapter 4.

Together but Separate? Redrawing the city: the case of Ahmedabad

In order to understand displacement in the aftermath of the 2002 violence and to situate relief colonies within their urban context, we need to undertake a nuanced topography of the spatial polarisation which has shaped Ahmedabad following repeated instances of communal violence.

Built by Sultan Ahmed Shah in 1411 and home to Mahatma Gandhi, Ahmedabad is the most urbanised and industrial city of Gujarat, the seventh largest metropolis in India - and one of the most polarised urban spaces in India. (Chandhoke 2012: 7) Ahmedabad is divided into two distinct areas, east and west of the river Sabarmati, which offer different living conditions and economic opportunities to its residents. The east of Ahmedabad, comprising of the historic walled city and newer industrial hubs was home to a thriving textile industry. (Chaudhary 2007: 697) For decades, Ahmedabad was considered the 'Manchester of India', attracting migrant workers from Gujarat and neighbouring states. (Chaudhary 2007: 697) However, the last two

decades have witnessed the closure of many textile mills in Ahmedabad, causing unemployment among local Dalit and Muslim communities, a factor that has contributed to the polarisation of local politics along communal lines. (Chaudhary 2007: 700) The gradual decimation of left-wing labour unions by Gandhi is put forward as an additional factor for the rise of *Hindutva* in Gujarat: Breman argues that their decline negatively impacted the possibility to establish a secular identity amongst popular classes mobilising for labour rights. (Breman 1999) The Western part of the city benefits from modern urban planning and one of the best level of basic services in India. (Mahadevia 2002: 4851) Testament to the economic liberalisation in Gujarat, Western Ahmedabad is home to a growing number of shopping malls, multinational headquarters and cosmopolitan cafés.

Howard Spodek describes Ahmedabad as a 'shock city', in which "nation-wide issues are confronted most dramatically" and the gradual discrimination of the Muslim minority is exacerbated by an uneven development model which has created "ethnic/religious enclaves of excluded and impoverished populations coexisting alongside modern, highly productive and expanding economies". (Spodek 2010: 397-398) Although Ahmedabad has always been divided along class, caste, religion and jamaat lines, Jasani argues that these boundaries were reinforced with each episode of communal violence: 'Being a 'Hindu' or a 'Muslim' within the city was not a homogenous identity and was contingent upon class, migration, caste, location within the city and the episode of violence one was last affected by'. (Jasani 2010: 166)

Simultaneously a cause and a consequence of social discrimination, the gradual segregation of communities has become the norm in Ahmedabad. Chandhoke highlights the role of communal

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violence in this process, highlighting the 1969 riots as the starting point of a process of ghettoizing Muslim communities, removing them from the social mainstream spatially and symbolically. (Chandhoke 2009: 13) The wave of communal violence in the 1980s intensified this process: by the 1990s, few mixed neighbourhoods remained. (Yagnik and Seth 2005: 230) A measure introduced by the state heightened the residential fragmentation in Ahmedabad was the prohibition of sale of property between Hindus and Muslims through the Gujarat Prohibition of Transfer of Immovable Property and Provisions for Protection of Tenants from Eviction from Premises in Disturbed Areas Act 1986. (Badigar 2012: 43) This gradual process led to a complete reorganisation of the urban space: "a city that had been characterized by different patterns of residential ordering rights from its establishment in 1411 is now reorganised on the principle of 'single community areas' where no intercommunity mixing is possible. (Chaudhary 2007)

Upon discovering that I had met a young Muslim whose family lives in a modern, middle class Hindu-majority neighborhood in Western Ahmedabad, informants expressed disbelief. They confessed that they had only heard of one such other story – of a Muslim man married to a Hindu woman who still remained in a Hindu-majority neighbourhood of western Ahmedabad after 2002. The rationale behind this segregation was the creation of cleansed Hindu spaces, which Thomas defines as an ethnic *entre-soi*. (Thomas 2015:4) Dr. Shakeel Ahmad emphasised that an element of spatial discrimination, vegetarianism, did not only affect Muslims: 'A Bengali would not be able to rent a house in western Ahmedabad, even though he is Hindu, because he is non-veg'. Vegetarianism emerged as an identity marker during my fieldwork, as most Hindu-dominated colonies banned meat. Muslim-dominated areas, on the contrary, were characterised

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by the presence of non-vegetarian restaurants and butchers, places where non-vegetarian communities would congregate to get access to meat.

Chandhoke defines Ahmedabad as a 'conflict city', a situation resulting from the gradual segregation of communities through violence: 'the slide from segmented neighbourhoods to ghettoes and the spatial marginalisation of the Muslims is the most powerful symbol of their economic, political, and social exclusion from the city life'. (Chandhoke 2009: 12) Dr. Shakeel Ahmad, Chairman of the IRC describes the polarisation of Ahmedabad within a general phenomenon of marginalisation of minorities in India: 'Minorities in India are being marginalised, they are living on the fringes. Ghettoisation is occurring in Indian society'. (Interview) At the heart of the marginalisation of Muslims from the social sphere was their marginalisation from the urban space of the city: 'not only where these ghettoes labeled as 'mini Pakistan', their way of life and their sensibilities were simply rendered invisible'. (Chandhoke 2009: 13) Thomas distinguishes an ethnically homogenous neighborhood from a ghetto on the basis of four principle: forced homogenisation, confinement combined with the stigmatization of an ethnic identity, and the creation of a parallel institutional system by private actors in the absence of state investment. (Thomas 2015:4)

The 2002 anti-Muslim violence were the culmination of this gradual process, as the few remaining mixed communities were targeted in the violence. (Chandhoke 2009: 12). Whereas earlier riots had concentrated in old Ahmedabad, the entire city was affected in 2002, including middle class neighbourhoods that had emerged unscathed during previous instances of communal violence. (Chandhoke 2009: 4) Muslim upper classes, for the first time, were affected

by the violence, a dimension which shaped internal displacement within the city. (Thomas 2015:4)

The mass migration of Muslims seeking protection in numbers led to the growth of areas such as Juhapura, which evolved from "an economically disadvantaged Muslim neighbourhood of 50,000 inhabitants" in 2002 to "an economically heterogenous Muslim ghetto housing 500,000" in 2015. (Thomas 2015: 4) Within this context, displacement has taken a number of forms – some Muslims lost their houses and members of their families during the violence, and had nowhere else to turn but makeshift relief camps, whilst other Muslims were displaced due to threats of violence or pressure to sell their house from their Hindu neighbours. (Badigar 2012). More closely resembling traditional conceptualisations of forced migration, it is the former category that found itself housed in relief camps, and subsequently resettled in relief colonies with the help of faith-based organisations. The latter category often included the Muslim human rights activists and NGO workers providing relief and rehabilitation to the victims of the violence. Sheba George, founder of NGO Sahr Waru, stressed that even "educated Muslims who wanted to live in so-called open-society were pushed into the Muslim ghettoes, in defined areas like Juhapura and Paldi."

Situated within Muslim-dominated areas, relief colonies emerged following 2002 to provide basic housing for Muslim families. With rapid urbanisation, some relief colonies have integrated the urban fabric, whilst others remain more isolated. Relief colonies share many of the dynamics common to Muslim ghettoes, making it necessary to situate them within a nuanced

understanding of space and segregation in Ahmedabad. We will analyse the dynamics specific to

relief colonies in Chapter 4 and 5.

CHAPTER 4: CEMENTING BOUNDARIES: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE

The following chapters will analyse the governmentality of displacement in post-2002 Ahmedabad. Chapter 4 will analyse the construction of physical and imagined borders between Hindus and Muslims by analysing the response of the Gujarati state to the crisis of internal displacement. It will focus on the marginalisation of Muslims embodied in the everyday work of state bureaucracies and in the daily experiences of the state, a dynamic cemented by the mainstreaming of Hindu nationalist ideology, the communalisation of state institutions and the ethnicisation of citizenship in Gujarat. Chapter 5 will look at the relationships of power within the relief colony, analysing the impact of Muslim faith-based organisations and 'secular' NGOs on the IDP population through the prism of the dispute regarding ownership rights. This dispute has affected claim-making among IDPs by affecting their relationship to the state. Finally, Chapter 6 will focus on the power of the state over civil society in limiting the scope for transnationalism and affecting how non-governmental organisations can define themselves in Gujarati society. Analysing how governmental power works within these three relationships will help unveil the mechanisms underlying the marginalisation of the displaced and the Muslim minority in Ahmedabad and the extent to which the power of the state governs civil society. Aware that governmentality is a more complex process, this thesis has nevertheless teased out interesting dynamics in these three relationships.

Dealing with displacement: Analysing state hostility and denial

The failure of government, police and judiciary to protect the rights of minorities is a continuation of the communal logic that prompted the violence. Brass argues that the state plays an important role, by acting as a 'distributor of privileges and the promoter of justice and equality among groups', or by its failure to do so. (Brass 1991: 248) The state government's response to the displacement crisis in 2002 violated the basic rights and dignity of the victimised Muslim population, undermining their status as equal citizens of the Indian republic.

When the violence began on February 27, 2002, victims reported that they had nowhere to flee but impromptu relief camps set up by the community itself, in *dargahs* (shrines), mosques and graveyards in Muslim-dominated areas. (Jasani 2008: 438) In an interview, Gagan Sethi, founder of the local NGO *Janvikas*, stressed that "for the first time in Indian history, a state government failed to set up any relief camp for individuals displaced in the communal violence. Even as the anti-Sikh riots was ongoing in 1984, abetted by local Congress politicians, the government was simultaneously organising relief for displaced families". (Sethi, Interview) Members of Muslim faith-based organisations and 'secular' NGOs alike criticised the government of Gujarat by referring to two national and international norms: international human rights standards put forward by the UN Guiding Principles for IDPs, and national norms based on the precedents of responding to communal violence laid out by independent India's history. The homogenisation of civil society discourses on the failure of the state government to provide adequate protection to IDPs reflect a common vision of the role and responsibility of the state towards its citizens.

By May 2002, Ahmedabad alone had over 80 relief camps, all of which had been set up and managed by Muslim relief organisations, assisted by local non-governmental organisations. (Jasani 2008: 438) It took the government of Gujarat several weeks to assume responsibility for relief camps. Government aid, in the form of food rations, failed to reach camps until a week after the onset of the violence and the amounts received were inadequate to fulfill the camps' daily requirements. (Gupta 2010: 44) State relief assistance packages were also based on strict conditionalities, reaching only a limited number of relief camps – those that were managed by a registered trust, accommodating at least a hundred displaced individuals, with drinking water, clean kitchens and medical facilities. (Gupta 2010: 44) Although this condition is cloaked in administrative terms, this policy enabled the government to take the political decision to effectively ignore relief camps set up on an ad hoc basis to house the continuous influx of displaced families belonging to a single religious minority.

In the weeks following the initial outburst of violence, police and members of state institutions have reportedly obstructed the work of NGOs and other organisations attempting to deliver aid to relief camps. Zaid, a young Muslim who came to Ahmedabad as a volunteer, stressed that relief efforts were hampered by local authorities who refused access to specific neighborhoods, or denied volunteers the protection necessary to carry out assistance work. (Shaikh, Interview) The state-imposed curfew, enacted to halt the violence, also hampered relief efforts by making it difficult for NGO staff and volunteers to travel within Ahmedabad. Zaid stressed that civil society travelled together for safety, as the political situation was still tense and rickshaw drivers often refused to travel to an area dominated by another religious community. (Shaikh, Interview)

The communalisation of state institutions, such as the police, had profound impacts not only on the severity of the violence, but on the shaky post-violence political situation. For the victims and survivors displaced by the violence, there was a lack of protection by the police and local authorities, coupled with a distinct feeling of insecurity. (HRW 2002: 6) In an interview with Human Rights Watch, a camp resident asked – "The same people who shot at us are now supposed to protect us? There is no faith in the police." (HRW 2002: 6) On the contrary, the police was a threatening presence in Muslim-majority areas, especially those affected by the riots. Sheba George, founder of women's organisation Sahr Waru, described how riot survivors often complained of 'midnight knockings' by police officers conducting sweeps of Muslim-dominated neighbourhoods in the weeks and months following the initial outburst of violence. (Sheba, Interview). These intimate encounters with state officials enhanced the lack of trust of the Muslim minority in the state. The state of Gujarat furthered this feeling of insecurity by actively avoiding all mention of the term displacement, denying the very existence of IDPs in Gujarat. By referring to this population as 'migrants', the state denied its responsibility towards these citizens, implying that IDPs had voluntarily moved for economic opportunities. (Badigar 2012: 45)

The state government of Gujarat's response to displacement caused conflict between the centre and the state levels. When the central government gave Rs. 150 crore to the state government of Gujarat to finance relief efforts, this logic prompted Modi's administration to send back as much as 19.1 crore, stating it was unnecessary. (Gupta 2010: 48) Despite pressure from Delhi, the state of Gujarat escalated its response to displacement from denial to overt hostility. In direct opposition to recommendations put forward by the National Human Rights Commission

(NHRC), the Gujarat state government took the decision to close all relief camps by July 2002, deeming the political situation 'stable enough' to ensure the safe return of displaced populations. (Jasani 2008: 439) Although the NHRC had explicitly stressed that IDPs should not be forced to leave the camps until appropriate rehabilitation and reconstruction measures were put in place, the state of Gujarat took the decision to forcibly close relief camps at a time when monsoon rains made conditions worse for individuals in makeshift shelters, without offering any further rehabilitation provisions or concrete guarantee for a safe return. (Jasani 2008: 440)

The closure of relief camps left displaced families with few options, other than moving into more permanent living arrangements in Muslim-dominated areas in the city. (Jasani 2008: 440) A survey conducted in the camps at the time showed that almost 99 percent of the displaced did not want to return to their former homes, citing fear of facing their killers and a lack of confidence in police protection. (Gupta 2010: 49) The abrupt closure of the camps shaped the field of rehabilitation by making the displaced dependent on a segment of civil society actively involved in resettlement: Muslim faith-based organisations, a dimension we shall explore in Chapter 5.

Scholars and policy makers alike have described this response as a failure to protect the basic standards of human rights laid out in international treaties, highlighting the state passivity to provide for the displaced of the 2002 violence. Mander has emphasised that "the state was not at the forefront of the move to provide rehabilitation to those who could not return to their homes after the riots" (Mander 2006: 5236) The National Commission for Minorities (NCM) has further criticised the state government for leaving a space for organisations that are 'not purely

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philanthropic or service oriented' to govern displacement. This interpretation characterises the state's behaviour as passive, rather than active, as negligent, rather than hostile.

This thesis argues that the state response to the crisis of internal displacement in 2002 is the physical manifestation of a Hindu nationalist ideology. Chief Minister Narendra Modi actively used the issue of relief camps during the run-up to the legislative elections by framing his government's hostile response to IDPs as a defense of the Hindu nation. During the infamous Becharaji Speech of September 2002, Modi highlighted the dependency of Muslim populations on state institutions by alluding to relief camps as 'child producing centers', and the victimised Muslim minority as 'those people who are expanding their population'. This speech politicises the issue of relief by emphasising the short term dependency of Muslims on state assistance because of their displacement, and the long-term dependency of this population on the state, by producing high numbers of children requiring state welfare and education. This speech is an example of the ways in which the state legitimises overt hostility towards a victimised minority and mainstreams a Hindu nationalist discourse. Anand emphasises that *Hindutva* has gained traction in Gujarat through the "(meta)discourse of security", which offers the government a "tool to legitimise violence as non-violence, killers as defenders, rape as understandable lust, and death as non-death". (Anand 2005: 210) In this context, we could add that it legitimises state hostility towards a vulnerable population of IDPs as an act of self-defense for the Hindu nation.

The tangible workings of the state and the discourse put forward by the Chief Minister of Gujarat illustrates how the management of displacement had distinct communal tones.

Excluding the 'Other': State-society relations in the aftermath of violence

The 2002 violence was a psychological and structural break for the 5.5 million Muslims living in Gujarat, transforming the relationship between this minority group and the state. (Bandukwala 2012: 17) A decade later, the condition of displaced communities remains precarious. Despite statements issued by high officials of the Gujarat government, claiming that "things have returned to normal in Gujarat for everyone save some sections of the media, academicians and activists who keep recalling it", thousands remained displaced, living in makeshift relief colonies hastily constructed by Muslim charities at the periphery of urban spaces. (Badigar 2012: 42)

Mander has argued that the communal reconfiguration of the city and the state neglect of the victimised Muslim population has made "the aftermath of 2002 even more chilling, with congealed covert violence embedded in transformed social relations". (Mander 2009: 8) Chandhoke has framed the condition of internally displaced communities as "one indication of lack of choices, which arguably is the hallmark of democratic freedom and of citizenship rights". (Chandhoke 2009: 12) Gujarati state institutions, by withholding infrastructure, basic protection and socioeconomic rights from the IDP community, have downgraded an entire religious minority "from citizen to subject". (Chandhoke 2009: 12) The precarious conditions of the displaced community of Gujarat are a clear betrayal of international human rights and India's framework of minority rights. Although formally, Muslim citizens have the same rights as their Hindu counterparts, in Ahmedabad, their ethnicity disqualifies them from an effective form of citizenship". (Thomas 2015: 4)

IDPs in Ahmedabad suffer a double disadvantage, being discriminated against by state institutions because of their Muslim identity, while also being vulnerable to the agendas of relief

organisations because of their displacement. Vijay Parmar from Janvikas stressed that on the whole, "the state is very biased towards providing basic amenities, most government schemes are not accessed by the Muslim community in recruitment, in employment, in providing bank loans". (Parmar, Interview) In this context, IDPs resettled in relief colonies did not have access to certain citizenship rights, such as voter identity cards or government ration schemes, due to a combination of state hostility and an ongoing dispute between civil society organisations as to the ownership of houses in relief colonies. We shall proceed to analyse these dynamics further in Chapter 5 to investigate how they have affected the relationship between IDPs and the state.

Relief colonies also suffer a double disadvantage. Overlooked by state institutions, they have a need for the development basic infrastructure much like other Muslim-majority areas in Ahmedabad. The urgent need for housing due to the rapid closure of relief camps invariably meant that relief colonies were hastily built in the periphery of Ahmedabad, naturally excluded from the infrastructure and economic opportunities the city offers.

The three relief camps I visited, Siddikabad Relief Colony in Juhapura, Ekta Nagar Relief Colony in Vatva and Citizen Nagar Relief Colony in the Bombay Hotel area, had developed in different ways, offering different standards of living to their inhabitants. Because of the active campaigning of NGOs, Ekta Nagar has recently benefited from water supply and drainage facilities, as well as the construction of a new municipal school in close proximity to the colony. Home to 42 displaced families, Ekta Nagar also benefits from a daycare center, a mosque, a small madrasa and a community hall built by the Islamic Relief Committee. Residents reported being connected to the city by a municipal bus route, which enables them to benefit from

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economic opportunities offered by the urban space. On the other end of the spectrum is Citizen Nagar, built at the foot of Ahmedabad's municipal waste center in an industrial area specialising in the manufacturing and processing of chemical dyes. The stench of this mountain of industrial waste is overbearing. Because this terrain is low-lying, the relief colony is flooded during every monsoon: water contaminated by chemical dyes seeps into houses, spreading chemical dyes into households. Although this relief colony does not benefit from the same level of infrastructure as Ekta Nagar, the recent opening of a municipal health dispensary is seen as a positive development. A local health worker reported very high levels of tuberculosis and other respiratory infections, especially among younger children. She stressed that governmental programs were being implemented for the sick, but that her clinic was overwhelmed by the health needs of local populations.

Amidst mountains of municipal waste lies the relief colony of Citizen Nagar

These relief colonies share many common characteristics – most prominent, neglect from the municipal institutions responsible for the development of urban infrastructure. This sub-chapter will explore the impact of state institutions on relief colonies, situating it within a context of neglect towards Muslim-majority urban spaces. Chapter 5 will provide a more detailed analysis of governmentality within relief colonies by looking into the workings of the non-governmental organisations that govern this space.

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Although the state government argues that the lack of civic amenities is proportionate to the areas in which they are located and not specific to the 'resettlement colonies', I encountered a widespread feeling of discrimination and a discourse of state abandonment throughout my fieldwork. (Badigar 2012: 45)

Umar Vahora, Secretary and one of the founding members of the Islamic Relief Committee, explained that there is discrimination towards Muslim-dominated areas when it comes to providing basic governmental infrastructure. He claimed that government institutions invest in infrastructure by giving priority to areas depending on the ethnicity of its inhabitants: "when they start giving facilities to people, in the first list, Muslims are not there. Second, third list, Muslims would not be there. At the end of the grant, when the money is to be spent anyway, and they also lose their share of corruption if they do not utilise these funds." (Vahora, Interview) Complaining of the difficulty to obtain any kind of infrastructure in relief colonies, Vahora pessimistically stated that local politicians would only invest in Muslim areas to benefit from corruption money. His colony, Vijapur, was built in 2003, but the land quality was not permeable enough to absorb the water consumption of the newly built households. After 2005, they appealed to the government to create a pipeline. It has since been installed after pressure from the residents – but is still not in working conditions. Vahora is not optimistic about the possibility of pressuring the state government to finish installing a pipeline, citing that even in places were sanitation facilities have been provided, it is often not up to the norms set forward by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). (Vahora, Interview)

He explained that an interaction with one of the contractors in charge of installing the pipeline in his colony cemented his mistrust in state institutions. He described:

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"I got surprised when the work was started in our colony, way back in Vijapur. Oh, it is
good news that now they have started working. One of the corporators told me that 'this is
not for your benefit, or your facilities, or your advantage. It is being done, because if they
do not utilise these funds right now, it would get lost and they would lose their share of
corruption. So they have been forced to use it right now, accordingly. It is not that by law,
they have come here and are ready to give this to you people".

This anecdote reveals the widespread perception I had encountered during my fieldwork in Ahmedabad: the belief that the ethnicisation of citizenship has come full swing. Muslims living in relief colonies situate themselves within a discourse of abandonment: the state is experienced as negligent and hostile on a day-to-day basis.

Throughout my fieldwork, informants framed this discrimination as a part of the marginalisation of the Muslim minority from access to state services and basic infrastructure. Dr. Shakeel Ahmad attributed the difficulties of obtaining civil amenities in relief camps to the overall neglect of Dalit and Muslim localities by state institutions. Conceding that the relief colonies are "more neglected in terms of sanitation, roads, street lights", Ahmad decries the fact that even with the help of government agencies, "everything is in very poor conditions as far as education facilities and health facilities are concerned". (Ahmad, Interview) Highlighting the fact that within the whole of Juhapura, there is no government hospitals, Ahmad asks – "How do we expect them to provide health facilities for migrated populations, when the general population has no health facilities?" (Ahmad, Interview)

Thomas argues that the living conditions within Juhapura, and the difficulties of Muslim population to access an affective form of citizenship, consisting of a form of state domination over a marginalised minority. (Thomas 2015: 5) Compared to other neighbourhoods in

Ahmedabad, the absence of public infrastructures and services in Juhapura tells a story of daily domination and stigmatisation.(Thomas 2015: 5) Education is seen as a pressing need in relief colonies in particular, and Muslim-majority areas in general, as a way of ensuring economic survival and reintegrating into mainstream society. Many of the Muslim faith-based organisations providing for the IDP population has also been involved in financing hospitals, health centers, and schools in Muslim-majority areas, resulting in the creation of a parallel social service structure.

We shall proceed analyse civil society responses to displacement in the following chapter by focusing on the relationship between different segment of civil society and their impact on the dynamics within relief colonies.

CHAPTER 5: GOVERNING DISPLACEMENT: CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONSES TOWARDS DISPLACEMENT

Dealing with displacement: Analysing the role of civil society

Because of the refusal of the state to provide relief and rehabilitation to the internally displaced in the initial weeks after the violence, non-governmental organisations stepped in to provide initial relief. Badigar stressed that the response to the violence in 2002 was distinctive: "perhaps due to normative developments internationally, more than ever before rights language was used to articulate the plight of the displaced", as national and international human rights activists poured in to investigate the scope of the violence. (Badigar 2012: 45) According to Human Rights Watch, the Indian government did not acknowledge requesting any international or UN relief agencies to step in and provided assistance to those displaced by the violence. (HRW 2002: 52) The lack of state involvement or the involvement of international institutions resulted in the creation of an ad hoc, local 'refugee regime'.

Among the segments of civil society active in relief and rehabilitation were Muslim faith-based organisations, as well as a variety of secular NGOs active in promoting development and human rights. In the immediate aftermath of the violence, the main organisations providing relief for the victimised Muslim communities were local Muslim organisations. (Gupta 2010: 45) Although secular organisations were also involved in relief camps, many concentrated on organising psychological and social support programs in relief camps. (Paul, Interview) This dynamic shows the underlying division of responsibilities between different segments of civil society. While Muslim faith-based organisations played a major role in fulfilling the basic needs of displaced populations, secular NGOs concentrated on reconciliation projects and turned to the

state for compensation and justice (Mander 2009). Because relief camps were primarily situated in *dargahs* (shrines), mosques and graveyards, access to displaced communities was often conditioned through Muslim relief organisations.

Among the organisations active in the camps from the onset of the violence, there was a palpable discourse of abandonment not only of the state, but also of other segments of civil society who did not come out to help because of the strength of anti-Muslim discourse. Sheba George emphasises that her organization, Sahr Waru, worked on the ground in relief camps from the second day of the violence. She describes: "wherever we used to go – there were hardly even NGOs there in the first six months. That brings out the anger and anguish in me. The first six months people were either shell-shocked or so scared, or lack courage. There were few groups who were right there in the camps". (George, Interview) George explained that in the initial weeks, Sahr Waru could not find psychiatrists to counsel victims of sexual violence because local Hindus did not want to work with the Muslim community: "Finally, a woman came all the way from Delhi as a volunteer". (George, Interview) There was a distinct feeling that Hindu nationalism had spread not only in state institutions, but also mainstream society, was echoed in interviews with the first responders. Secular NGOs actively working with Muslim communities before the 2002 violence framed their involvement with displaced Muslim communities as of the utmost necessity – "this group was even more vulnerable now then it was in the past, meaning it is necessary to stay involved and assist them in claiming their basic citizenship rights". (Sethi, Interview).

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Other segments of civil society became involved in relief and rehabilitation more gradually. Gazala Paul, founder of the NGO Samerth, stressed that her organisation became involved in relief efforts after Muslim community leaders approached Samerth to ask for help. In the first days, relief was organised by local individuals: GP stressed that "people came out, and as a response, they gave them food, shelter, some people asked them to come and stay on their terrasse, or some houses had open grounds, but that could not go on for a long time". (Paul, Interview) Knowing that Samerth had engaged in relief work during the earthquake in Kutch in 2001, Muslim community leaders turned to Paul as a potential source of help. She explains: "they knew we had worked in disaster, like earthquakes, and they thought this was also a kind of disaster, so why not approach them and get some immediate relief in terms of food and shelter? That's how we started."(Paul, Interview) Paul and other informants stressed that they did not expect displacement to be a long-term issue, as instances of communal violence did not generate such massive migration. In the initial month, Paul described, "NGOs were thinking that things will calm down, and we'll be able to move on. This didn't happen. The trouble continued for a long time". (Paul, Interview)

The different trajectories NGOs took in getting involved with IDP populations affected the long-term relationship between non-governmental organisations and this community. During my fieldwork, I noticed two distincts paths emerged that defined how FBOs and NGOs stayed involved with IDPs in the long term. Firstly, Muslim faith-based organisations provided the bulk of reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts, which entrenched these organisations in the daily lives of displaced communities. Three major organisations built the bulk of relief colonies after the forcible closure of the relief camps by the state government: the Jamaat-e-ulema Hind, the

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Gujarat Sarvajanik Welfare Trust (GSWT), and the Islamic Relief Committee (IRC). Afzal Menon from the IRC explains that Muslim organisations need to "step in to set up relief colonies and relocate displaced families because of the negligence of the state towards these communities". (Menon, Interview). The groups that ended up being re-settled in relief colonies were amongst the poorest of the IDPs. A lot of illegal development occurred following the riots to accommodate the arrival of IDPs in Muslim-majority areas. Many displaced families were able to self-settle as builders offered plots of land in installments starting from Rs. 500 a month [the equivalent of 6 euros]. (Badigar 2012: 45) Those that were resettled by Muslim faith-based organisations were the IDPs that could not afford even that much, as they had lost their livelihoods in the violence. (Menon, Interview) By focusing on basic infrastructure, Muslim faith-based organisations cemented their power over IDPs over the long-term.

Secondly, secular NGOs became involved with IDPs in the long-term by following the populations they had built a rapport with in the relief camps. Many non-governmental organisations only became involved with IDPs because of the pressing needs of this community, reverting to their original focus when the situation normalised. Paul explains that Samerth had originally become involved "the needs of children, of families, and the special gender needs of women" in the camps. By organising educational and creative activities for children, the staff of Samerth developed a relationship with displaced women, whom they actively followed to whichever relief colony they migrated to. (Paul, Interview) When discussing personal relationships with IDPs, the staff of secular NGOs often stressed their emotional connection to IDP communities, emphasising that they saw certain children grow up over the years, and had a personal interest in defending these IDPs. Shaikh, who had come to Ahmedabad in 2002 to work

as a volunteer in a relief camp, stressed his long-term work and personal attachment to a circle of widows who had formed the basis of Himmat, a women's cooperative. Shaikh emphasised that his aim in setting up Himmat was the empowerment of these women by teaching them to sewing, as a source of livelihood. He turned over the management of the organisation to the women themselves, emphasising that his ultimate goal was the empowerment of this group. (Shaikh, Interview) Although Shaikh remains a close family friend to the women he helped, his involvement with this group of IDPs has reduced, as the women have gained confidence and an individual source of income. (Shaikh, Interview)

The different roles Muslim faith-based organisations and secular NGOs took during relief and rehabilitation efforts affected their ability to govern this community in the long-term. The FBOs that built relief colonies remained necessary in the lives of vulnerable IDPs, whereas many NGOs offering workshops and trainings disengaged from these communities over time.

Governmentality in the Relief Colonies: the role of Mediating Institutions

Muslim relief organisations were at the heart of rehabilitation efforts, building relief colonies comprised of modest, standardised houses, a mosque, a school and a community, on land purchased by or donated to relief organisations by charitable members of the Muslim community. (Ahmad, Interview) The three colonies I visited follow this pattern: each comprised of one or more rows of identical houses containing a single room, a small kitchen and a bathroom. The single room doubled as both a living room and a bedroom, serving as the hearth of the family home. Although these houses looked identical from the outside, their inhabitants had customised the interior to meet their needs, investing in marble floors, a large canopy bed, or

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decorations. All of the three relief colonies had a large mosque, often accompanied by a *madrasa*. The size of the mosque and its prominent positioning within the relief colony made it seem like the main space for socialisation: daycare facilities, or schools were often small and in poor condition. In two of the three relief colonies, many of the residential units seemed deserted, their doors bolted and locked. Conversations with local residents confirmed that none of the relief colonies were full, and many had units that remained unused. In at least one of the colonies, Siddikabad Relief Colony, residential units were converted into working space, housing a sewing workshop run by a young man from the locality. The level of engagement of the inhabitants with their residential space varied: in Ekta Nagar, residential units were painted in individual colours, reflecting some sense of ownership over the lived environment, whereas Citizen Nagar and Siddikabad Relief Colonies were characterised by a drab, universal appearance.

Although displaced families often gave the meagre government compensation they had received for property damage to the relief organisations in return for their new homes, property rights were not transferred to individuals and their names were not registered in utility bills in certain cases. (Gupta 2010: 52) The lack of legal protection created a precarious situation for displaced families, who have become dependent on the Muslim relief organisations on the long term, without legal ownership over their new houses. In the context of Muslim relief colonies, the lack of a proof of address is particularly problematic for the day-to-day lives of the IDPs. (Ujjaini, Interview)

The lack of legal ownership of IDPs renders them vulnerable to a moral policing by local *maulanas*, or the staff of Muslim relief organisations operating in this colony. Zaid Shaikh highlighted the case of a widow from Ekta Nagar, who had lost her husband and sons in the riots and was accused of prostituting herself in order to make ends meet. The local IRC representative, weary of the potential scandal this might cause, requested that the widow vacate her house and settle elsewhere. It is only through her connection with the women's cooperative Himmat that this widow was able to defend her case in front of her neighbours, and return to the relief colony. This anecdote illustrates the extent to which individual IDPs, especially vulnerable groups such as widows, are vulnerable to Muslim relief organisations because of their lack of property rights.

Shaikh pointed out that many similar stories occur on a smaller scale within the space of the relief colony. During fieldwork, I noticed that women's bodies were particularly policed by representatives of Muslim faith-based organisations. In all of the relief colonies I have visited, women were generally uncovered, and dressed in colourful *salwar-kameez*. In encounters with staff and officials of Muslim faith-based organisations, women and girls were often gently reprimanded to cover their hair using their *dupatta*, a scarf traditionally worn by women in India. Despite alarmist coverage that Muslim relief organisations were implementing sharia law and internal restrictions within relief colonies, the interactions I had observed were friendly and laid-back. (Chakravarty 2009) The representatives of the IRC conversed freely with the colony's children, playfully reprimanding them for not attending school sufficiently. The short duration of my fieldwork makes it impossible for me to draw a thorough conclusion on the extent to which Muslim relief organisations have affected the religiosity of IDPs.

Residents of Ekta Nagar Relief Colony, Vatva (Ahmedabad)

Overall, there is a conflict between faith-based organisations and civil society organisations about the ownership of houses in all the relief colonies of Ahmedabad. This has distanced IDPs from the possibility of asserting full citizenship rights. Not having a proof of residence excludes this group from accessing the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, as applying for a voter identification card or for government schemes becomes very difficult. Despite pressure from

secular civil society, most Muslim relief organisations have not conceded to transfer property ownership to the IDPs.

Sethi details the strategies employed by Janvikas to aid Muslim IDPs in accessing basic citizenship rights and entitlements. "The voter ID cards were a lot of work", involving a preliminary screening of IDP locations, three levels of surveys which led to the establishment of a huge record of IDPs linked to the legal cases they had filed. (Sethi, Interview) For Janvikas, voter IDs were a priority in order to give legitimacy and a basic proof of citizenship to IDPs : "If you don't have any identity, then you can be picked up by the police – who are you? You are coming from Pakistan? You have no way of proving that you're Indian". This need was especially acute given the discrimination of the police towards members of the Muslim community in Gujarat. Sethi explains that the process of legitimising IDPs has taken almost a decade, due an impassive state bureaucracy: "Few must be still left, because we haven't been able to cover everybody". (Sehti, Interview)

Hozefa, a Programme Officer at Janvikas who has worked extensively in relief colonies, stresses that faith-based organisations are worried that individual families will sell the houses for profit. (Ujjaini, Interview) He complains - "So what, they have lost many things, and it is good that you have given help to them. Now, your role is over. Either you train them for a rights-based approach… But they don't want to do that, they want people to get more religious, they should pray namaaz and all that". (Ujjaini, Interview) Having worked on the ground with IDPs over the last decade, Hozefa has had frequent contact with different Muslim relief organisations.

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Although he describes their relationship as cooperative, Hozefa underlines that their approaches to helping IDPs are fundamentally different because of their organisational differences. Since Muslim faith-based organisations are interested in gaining traction among local populations, their goal is to remain involved in these communities. Organisations such as Janvikas advocate a rights-based approach focused on training local leaders to articulate claims directly to state institutions. This has resulted in tension and territoriality between different segments of civil society in relief colonies.

Hozefa narrated one such altercation that had occurred the week before our interview in Ekta Nagar Relief Colony, where Janvikas has been training community leaders to file applications to the municipal corporation to build a road connecting the colony to the surrounding area. When their application was successful and the corporation finally provided them with a paved road, Hozefa describes an argument between local leaders and the IRC: "one administrative person [from the IRC] said – how could you have done this? Their [community] leader said, why? Why should we not? They said – no you have to ask me if you want to do this. And he said – why should we ask? This is not for me, this is for everybody. The IRC administrator answered – "if you want to work for everybody, you have to ask us." (Ujjaini, Interview) The territoriality manifest in the official's response is the direct consequence of the fact that the IRC maintains full ownership over the relief colony, allowing it to assert itself in intrusive ways towards the IDPs. Secular organisations, such as Janvikas, have responded to this by helping IDPs access their basic citizenship rights, and appealing for the state to recognise its responsibility towards the IDP population. (Hozefa, Interview)

The dynamics occurring within relief colonies illustrate how segments of civil society actively challenge each other's dominance over the internally displaced, articulating different visions of the rights and agency of IDPs.

CHAPTER 6: LIMITING THE FIELD: STATE POWER AND CIVIL SOCIETY

This chapter will elaborate on the relations of power between the state and non-governmental, focusing on the mechanisms and discourses used by the government to shape the dynamics of civil society.

Limiting the field: transnationalism and foreign funding

In the post-2002 context, certain segments of civil society benefited from considerable donations from abroad. In this highly politicised context, we need to distinguish between two sources of transnational income. Dr. Shakeel Ahmad from the Islamic Relief Committee stressed that the Gujarati state was weary of Muslim transnational funding. Although the IRC was in possession of the necessary Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) certificate in 2001, the Gujarati state rescinded it just weeks after the violence erupted.[1] (Ahmad, Interview) This meant that although the IRC had received donations from Muslim governments, they could not access these funds: "We had to send them the money back, despite the fact there was a need for help for the riot affected". (Ahmad, Interview) Ahmad emphasised that although the IRC has submitted an application for the FCRA certificate every year since then, the government of Gujarat has rejected its application time and time again. Without this permission, non-governmental organisations could not gain access to donations from foreign organisations or governments: the scope for transnational claim-making and solidarity becomes limited. Afzal Menon, President of the Gujarat Sarvajanik Welfare Trust (GSWT) stressed that their organisation has never managed

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[1] This procedure is based on an application to the Central Government with extensive referrals and documentation provided from state institutions.

to receive the FCRA certificate. (Menon, Interview) Although they had applied for FCRA clearance every year since 2003, the GSWT received a letter each time refusing their application on the basis that "the activities of your organisation are reported to be against public interest".

In the case of certain Muslim relief organisations, bypassing state restrictions was possible through individual transfers by activating diaspora channels based on religious affiliation and ethnic belonging. One informant stressed that "our brothers and sisters made relief work possible through their *zakat* contributions", blaming the Gujarati state for having to turn back funding made available by Muslim countries. The importance of the Gujarati Muslim diaspora was key for faith-based organisations. Jasani emphasises that in the aftermath of the riots, "each Islamic organisation had a jeep parked outside Ahmedabad airport. Any Muslim businessmen or NRI arriving was whisked off for a guided tour of the activities in the Jamaat." (Jasani 2008: 445) Although I found no trace of this type of behaviour during my fieldwork, many informants suggested that diaspora links were key sources of funding and support for both Hindu nationalist organisations and Muslim non-governmental organisations. (J1 Interview, Shah Interview)

State restrictions also shaped interactions between civil society groups. Unlike the faith-based organisations engaging in relief works, most secular organisations benefited from the FCRA approval, allowing for international foundations and governments to channel funding for the riot-affected through them. Gagan Sethi, founder of the secular organisation Janvikas stressed that these international donations shaped local agendas when it came to relief and rehabilitation, affecting how secular organisations interacted with the displaced. Although secular organisations received considerable support, their access to the field was nevertheless conditional to cooperation with the Muslim faith-based organisations that had provided basic shelter and

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infrastructure to the riot-affected. As Muslim relief organisations were already embedded in the local displaced communities, this dynamic led to effective partnerships, negotiations and disputes between Muslim relief organisations and secular NGOs within the space of the relief camp. Access to foreign funding also shaped the accountability of NGOs. Western donors are often stringent when it comes to organisational accountability, whilst Muslim relief funding is often unofficial and notoriously difficult to pinpoint. (J1 Interview) The lack of accountability of Muslim relief organisations helped shape dynamics within relief colonies, as FBOs have maintained ownership of houses ostensibly intended for IDPs. Local residents have complained of the lack of transparencies, arguing that "they see no benefits from the international donations received (except for an elaborate mosque and meeting hall)". (Gupta 2010: 46)

The FCRA has drawn criticism from secular civil society in its attempt to impose restrictions on civil society. Sethi emphasises that the FCRA is a paradox in the model of economic liberalization of Gujarat: "the point is, you have opened up the economy, for trade, commerce, money can flow from anywhere to anywhere. A year from now, there will be no restriction on buying or selling foreign exchange. Once that is there, what does the FCRA mean? It means nothing. But they think it's a lifeline to stop protest-based organisations". (Sethi, Interview) The distribution of the FCRA certificate is seen by Muslim relief organisations as a blatant exercise of state control over the Muslim minority, as an "attempt to limit the scope of our work". (Menon, Interview) Complaining about the difficulty of getting an FCRA clearance for Muslim organisations, Dr. Shakeel Ahmad bemoaned : "So, already we are not getting clearances. And for that, you have to change your name. It must not be shown that you have any religious or community link. Then you will get it." (Ahmad, Interview)

The refusal of the state to grant Muslim organisations the FCRA clearance has limited the scope for transnational Islamic funding, localising the plight and claim-making of Gujarati Muslims, and limiting the dynamics of relief and rehabilitation of IDPs to a national level. It has affected the relationship between different segments of the civil society and the dynamics within relief colonies.

Representations and civil society in the aftermath of communal violence

The state governs civil society not only by limiting its potential sources of funding, but also by shaping the ways in which organisations represent themselves. A number of informants emphasised that the decrease in foreign funding was compensated by the government beginning to outsource NGOs to deliver goods and services to specific communities. (Sethi, Interview; Menon, Interview) Through funding, the state can emphasise certain segments of civil society, involved in projects politically compatible with the government's political ideology. Dr. Shakeel Ahmad emphasised that the state is disbursing funds to "NGOs related to Gandhi, Gandhi ashrams and all these things. The funds are going for Hindu organisations, some Christian organisations." (Ahmad, Interview) Ahmad stressed that Muslim organisations are not only a small segment of civil society, but also one that is actively discriminated against for catering to this religious community. (Ahmad, Interview) Umar Vahora further stressed that NGOs are limited by their resources, and civil society as a whole is looking towards the government, the only institution which could provide the budget and facilities necessary to cater to displaced

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populations. Uma Vahora stressed that despite all their efforts, "The IRC can provide to some pockets. It is not possible to help the area at large." (Vahora, Interview) This attitude reflects the perceived need of Muslim-faith based organisations to cooperate and work with state institutions.

This stance has impacted the ways in which Muslim relief organisations brand themselves in wider Gujarati society. Within minutes of beginning our conversation, Umar Vahora emphasised that his organisation – the IRC – had built houses for displaced families of both religious communities: "Among them, seventy give were for Hindus. For non-Muslims. So the Islamic Relief Committee, we have rehabilitated both the communities. We have rehabilitated some five hundred non-Muslim families in Ahmedabad itself." Afzal Menon from the Gujarat Sarvajanik Welfare Trust (GSWT), emphasises that his schools and hospitals do not discriminate based on community, caste, or creed and remain open to all "disadvantaged and dispossessed individuals". (Menon, Interview) These were conscious attempts to portray themselves as organisations not solely defined along religious lines. By redefining themselves as organisations protecting IDPs, or healing the poor, Muslim relief organisations are attempting to open up and legitimate their presence in wider Gujarati society.

This process of rebranding is a conscious response to the increase of state budget channeled towards NGOs, and to widespread discrimination against the Muslim minority in Gujarat. Hozefa Ujjaini stresses the situation is rendered even more difficult because of the unwillingness of many donors to fund organisations working on communalism. (Ujjaini, Interview) Shakeel Ahmad also described the daily discrimination experienced by his organisation because of its religious affiliation: when attempting to register for the annual book fair of Ahmedabad, their

application was initially refused because "they didn't allow us to book a stall with the name Islam". When Dr. Ahmad changed this application, using the shorthand IRC, they were able to participate in the book fair. (Ahmad, Interview)

The ways in which the state asserts its power over civil society is a dimension that needs further analysis. Due to the short duration of my fieldwork, I was only able to get a glimpse of the ways in which civil society, particularly Muslim faith-based organisations were governed by the state of Gujarat and how it impacted the scope of their work, and the nature of their claim-making.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

By focusing on the dynamics of power and governmentality present in the management of internal displacement in post-2002, this thesis offers an alternate way of looking at ethnic violence. Stepping beyond an analysis *Hindutva* discourses othering the Muslim minority, it focuses on the concrete, lived experience of the state and the communalisation of its institutions. The mass internal migration following an extremely brutal instance of anti-Muslim violence allows us to evaluate a context unprecedented in India history: one in which the state does not step in to protect its citizens, further marginalising the Muslim majority through spatial segregation, the withholding of infrastructure and the denial of basic citizenship rights. Although many scholars have defined this situation as a state vacuum, which has allowed civil society to govern displacement as a localised 'refugee regime', the dynamics on the ground reveal a more complex series of relationships. Using Foucault's concept of governmentality allows us to draw out the exercise of power in the relationships between the state and this marginalised minority, between different segments of the civil society and the internally displaced populations they cater to, and between the state and the civil society. These relationships show the extent to which displacement is a fluid phenomenon, that can only be understood in Ahmedabad by situating it within a broader context of Muslim marginalisation. They also unveil the tensions and territoriality between different segments of civil society, manifested through the dispute concerning property rights in relief colonies, an issue that has transformed the ways in which IDPs have access to the state and basic citizenship rights. Finally, a dynamic that has been missing from previous work focusing on communalism in Gujarat is the important role of the state in shaping civil society. By limiting the possibility of foreign funding to certain segments of the civil society, such as Muslim relief organisations, the state of Gujarat has affected the ways

in which Muslim relief organisations make claims and represent themselves. This dynamic reveals the tight grip the state has on civil society, a relationship too often obscured in literature focusing on displacement.

Although these three relationships are just one prism through which we can evaluate governmentality in post-2002 Ahmedabad, they are essential for unpacking the mechanisms through which urban space has become segregated, through which citizenship has become ethnicised and the ways in which Hindu nationalism has become mainstreamed and its anti-minority logic depoliticised.

The short duration of my fieldwork makes this a rough sketch of the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction dynamics in post-2002 Ahmedabad. Longer ethnography would have facilitated my insertion into this field, allowing me to dig deeper into certain themes I have briefly skimmed over – the transformation of religiosity within relief camps, and the impact of Jamaats on forms of Islam among the internally displaced population, an exploration of class as a factor transforming the ways in which displacement and marginalisation are experienced, and the gendered impact of violence, displacement and the state.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: List of Expert Interviews

Name	Capacity Interviewed
Dionne Bunsha	Journalist and author of the book *Scarred: Experiments with Violence in Gujarat* (Penguin India).
Zahir Janmohamed	Journalist and freelance writer based in Ahmedabad. Eyewitness to the 2002 riots, currently working on a memoir about the aftermath of violence, set in the Muslim ghetto of Juhapura.
Rubina Jasani	Anthropologist who conducted extensive fieldwork in Ahmedabad between 2003-2008 focusing on the moral and material 'reconstruction' of life after an episode of ethnic violence in Gujarat, Western India.
Yasmeen Peer	Lawyer. Conducted fieldwork in Ahmedabad in 2006 focusing on the institutional dynamics of violence.
J1	Journalist with extensive knowledge on the 2002 riots, communal violence, and the political dynamics in Gujarat.
Damini Shah	Sociologist based in Gujarat Vidyapith, a university founded by Mahatma Gandhi. Research focusing on the religiosity in Muslim ghettos in Gujarat.
Rajiv Shah	Journalist. Times of India correspondent for Gujarat's capital, Gandhinagar between 1997 and 2012.
Achyut Yagnik	Activist and Scholar. Author of the book *Ahmedabad: From Royal City to Megacity* (Penguin India).

Appendix 2: List of Civil Society Informants

Organisation	Name	Capacity Interviewed
Behavioural Science Center	Prasad Chacko	Director of the BSC, worked for Action Aid following the 2002 riots.
Center for Social Justice	Johanna Lokhande	Programme Officer with a long-term involvement with displaced communities.
DARSHAN	Hiren Gandhi	Activist and Youth Trainer, involved in promoting reconciliation and the empowerment of Muslim and Dalit youths
	Saroop Dhruv	Poet and cultural activist, involved in promoting reconciliation through creative processes, such as street theater.
Gujarat Sarvajanik Welfare Trust (GSWT)	Afzal Menon	Director of the GSWT
	N1	Nurse and administrator working at the main hospital run by the GWST
Himmat	Zaid Shaikh	Founder of Himmat, an organisation working with widows and survivors of 2002. Started as a volunteer in relief camps.
Islamic Relief Committee	Dr. Shakeel Ahmad	President of the Gujarati branch of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, Director of the IRC
	Umar Vahora	Founding Member and Secretary of the IRC
Janvikas	Gagan Sethi	Founder and Managing Trustee of Janvikas.
	Vijay Parmar	CEO of Janvikas, focusing on communal issues and internal displacement.
	Hozefa Ujjaini	Programme Officer with a long-term involvement with displaced communities. Started as a volunteer in a neighborhood relief camp.
PRASHANT	Father Cedric Prakash	Human Rights Activist and Jesuit priest, Director of Prashant.
Sahr Waru	Sheba George	Director of Sahr Waru, an organisation focusing on women's rights and reconciliation
Samerth	Gazala Paul	Director of Samerth, worked on relief in the 2001 earthquake and the 2002 violence
Sanchetana	Dr. Hanif Lakdawala	Medical Doctor, Founder of Sanchetana, an organisation focusing on communal health and harmony