CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2015
| Author | Szalai, András |
|---|---|
| Title | Wor(l)ds of Dr. Strangelove: The Persuasiveness and Institutionalization of Defense Rationalist Ideas on Nuclear Strategy, 1948-1963 |
| Summary | The Cold War has been over for two decades, yet (nuclear) deterrence theory remains a key conceptual tool in strategic studies. Ideas such as counterforce—the targeting of enemy forces as opposed to cities—and second strike deterrence are still naturalized artefacts for academics and policymakers alike: not as much debated but refined by contemporaries. The logic of a “delicate balance of terror” outlived the superpower confrontation and has been transplanted into other issue areas, such as drone warfare, deterring terrorism or cyberattacks. Thus, the jargon of the civilian strategists commonly referred to as “defense rationalists” is still a prominent feature of contemporary US defense policy narratives, along with its inherent biases. Although claims about the laws of a non-event like nuclear war are still highly problematic, something makes these ideas “sound right”, or commonsensical. This dissertation problematizes the historical contingency of these concepts by reinterpreting the realm of nuclear strategy, construing it as an interpretative enterprise where a multitude of ideas compete. The power of ideas is most obvious in the act of naming: assigning names to phenomena, thereby enabling multiple avenues of actions. Experts in this environment in turn influence outcomes by rendering their ideas persuasive for other actors through language. This dissertation applies the toolkit of discursive institutionalism and interpretivism, and offers a conceptual synthesis of the two through a new micro-theory of persuasion: contextual suasion. Contextual suasion improves on existing approaches by linking the agency concept embedded in interpretivism, and discursive institutionalism’s concept of structure through a mechanism of idea dissemination via textualization and re(con)textualization. It understands persuasion as a correspondence between idea and its environment—a correspondence that is not necessarily static, but can be manipulated. The more an idea is in line with its context—a composite of traditions, beliefs about interests, other ideas etc.—the more it “sounds right” to audiences, and is more likely to be accepted either as an internalized belief or as a strategic tool. Institutionalization then is linked to persuasiveness through the concept of discursive dominance: in order to serve as the basis of policy decisions and institutions, an idea has to dominate the policy discourse. In order to answer the central research question—What explains the initial successful institutionalization of defense rationalism?—an empirical analysis is conducted on a selection of hallmark research from the RAND Corporation (“the quintessential Cold War think tank”) on nuclear bombing, second strike deterrence and war limitation in the early Cold War (1948-1963), showing that the lasting impact of these ideas has less to do with their problematic correspondence to reality, than their versatility as carriers of “scientific” and “rational” storylines. |
| Supervisor | Astrov, Alexander |
| Department | Political Science PhD |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2015/szalai_andras.pdf |
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