

# **THE IMPACT OF DAYTON AND OHRID PEACE AGREEMENTS ON THE EVERYDAY: HOW DO LOCAL PEOPLE LIVE THE PEACE PROCESS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

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## **Abstract**

This research will provide the empirical contribution to the ongoing debate on the exportation of liberal norms during the peace-building process. It will do so by using the examples of internationally led peace-building processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia). Through the Dayton and Ohrid Peace Agreements, respectively, the two countries have been targeted by the institutionalization of liberal norms that obviously fail to be internalized by the everyday people. Moreover, this thesis explores the limits of liberal norm exportation through the liberal international intervention in peace-building projects in Bosnia and Macedonia. Hence it will differentiate between the exportation of liberal norms by the so-called peace-builders in weak states and the actual internalization of these very norms by the everyday citizens in specific territories. Additionally, the research is primarily based on the interviews conducted with everyday citizens of the two countries and their personal opinions on the impact and role of the Dayton and Ohrid Peace Agreements in peace-building activities.

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# Introduction

Peace agreements have become an increasingly important tool in response to inter-state conflicts in the post-cold-war period.<sup>1</sup> A peace agreement is generally defined as a contract “intended to end or significantly transform a violent conflict so that it may be addressed more constructively.”<sup>2</sup> In theory, a peace agreement aims to create foundations needed for a conflict transformation that will enable a constructive conflict resolution in the long run. It is important to note that the creation and implementation of a peace agreement will **settle** the conflict, but will not **resolve** it. Hence, a signed peace agreement is a vital component within the conflict settlement that indeed does bring an end to fighting, but it is only the first step in the process of peace-building. In addition, after ending a conflict, the process of conflict resolution and transformation require careful understanding and addressing the root causes of the conflict itself in order to prevent its reappearance. Peace agreements signed during the last two decades have demonstrated that a signed agreement itself only prevents further physical violence. Unfortunately, providing a peace that continues after the fire is ceased, and which ensures concrete benefits to local people, is a long and challenging process.

In the post-cold-war period inter-state ethnic conflicts have been a frequent phenomenon in numerous newly established sovereign countries. Naturally, the management of these conflicts has become significantly important for the stability of the entire international community. The most frequent agent in charge of peacekeeping is the UN<sup>3</sup> as an ‘internationally neutral body’. In addition, other multinational and national actors have increased their work with the civil society

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<sup>1</sup> “Post Cold-War Surge,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed May 5, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml>

<sup>2</sup> Nita Yawananarajah and Julian Ouellet, “Peace Agreements,” *Beyond Intractability*, September 2003, accessed May 1, 2015, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/structuring-peace-agree>.

<sup>3</sup> Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi Shimizu, “Sharing the Financial Burden for UN and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 2 (1998): 176-195.

in conflict areas recently.<sup>4</sup> The effectiveness of international involvement in conflict resolution remains questionable. However, it is obvious that without strong international pressure some conflicts such as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia) would have taken even more civilian lives. Thus, this is not to say that the international involvement was not needed, but that it is difficult to assess whether the peace-building process in Bosnia and Macedonia was a success. Evaluating a peace-building effectiveness is challenging task as it requires taking in consideration relevant factors including the international community, local elites and politicians, and everyday people as the most important actors.

Even though they are difficult to evaluate, peace agreements and international intervention have been extremely important in ending various ethnic conflicts. They are still perceived as the main way of intervention that aims to stop conflicts and violence. The presence of the third party negotiator (that is hopefully neutral) should strive to transform the hostile relationship between the divided parties in the long run. Thus, the peace agreement should create pre-required foundations for a stable and safe environment that will enable citizens to continue with their lives in peace. In order for the agreement to build upon provision of peace for all sides, a well-planned and coordinated approach of the international community needs to also encourage mutual cooperation between the divided groups. Hopefully, once established cooperation between the divided sides will potentially grow into a complete reconciliation.<sup>5</sup>

It is important to note that the peace agreements created since the 1990s have been initiated and designed by the international community, which is predominantly represented by the Western,

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<sup>4</sup> Patrick M. Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict* (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan Press, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> Herbert C. Kelman, "Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective," in *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, ed. Y. Bar-Siman-Tov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 111.

liberal democratic states.<sup>6</sup> As such, it is of no surprise that these agreements, in general, advocate for the promotion of liberal democratic norms and impose democratic government institutions on a state in order to ensure peace and collaboration between divided sides.<sup>7</sup> One of the crucial bodies in a democratic system is the civil society, which plays the key role in representing the local voices in democratic societies. Therefore, one would expect that states that claim to hold high democratic values would include the representatives of a local civil society in the peace agreement drafting process. However, a peace agreement that is designed with the careful mediation of the international community rarely involves the direct presence of local, everyday voices during the agreement drafting and negotiating processes. Of course, it is a challenging task to reach to the local voices of everyday people during the war or conflict times. Yet, considering the fact that one of the liberal norms in peace-building is the establishment of active civic participation in decision making processes, it is vital to somehow enable the local citizens to feel involved in the agreement design process as well.

It is important to note that the civil participation is visibly encouraged in the state-building and peace-building process that precedes the peace agreement. Various international representatives provide direct financial means and capacity building activities for establishment of active civil societies in the so-called ‘developing’ countries. With these imperatives in mind it is interesting to note that the same voices they are aiming to ‘rescue’ are actually the ones who are completely excluded from the peace agreement design process. Therefore, the design of the peace agreement is primarily initiated, led, and coordinated by the international community and as such is negotiated with the representatives of the parties in conflict. In this kind of situations, everyday

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<sup>6</sup> Michael N. Barnett, “International Paternalism and Humanitarian Governance,” *Global Constitutionalism* 1, no. 3 (2012): 485-521.

<sup>7</sup> Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald, “Democracy and Peace-Building: Re-thinking the Conventional Wisdom,” *The Round Table* 97, no. 394 (2008): 137-145.

people – ordinary local citizens act as passive ‘recipients’ of the decisions made on their behalf. Hence, everyday people, whose lives are the most impacted by the agreement itself, are the least involved in the negotiation process of a peace agreement. Thus, one of the norms of liberal peace-building is the creation of a strong and active civil society, an actor which seems to be ignored during the negotiation process.

Since the local people are not engaged in the agreement writing process, their opinions on the agreement itself are often unknown. Thus, in order to investigate the perceptions of the everyday people in regards to the negotiation, creation, and implementation of a peace agreement this research focuses on two important peace agreements, Dayton and Ohrid, made in Bosnia and Macedonia respectively, at the doorsteps of the European Union (EU). The significance of these peace agreements is unquestionable since they created foundations for the creation of multi-ethnic societies and stopped further violence in Bosnia and Macedonia. Yet, the continuation of the ethnic divisions among the societies in these two countries demonstrate that these two ‘successful’ agreements do lack a crucial component, that is, a clear vision for not only conflict elimination, but also through understanding its rationalistic nature to achieve a conflict transformation that will eliminate possible hostilities in the future.<sup>8</sup>

Yes, it is true that the two agreements ended ethnic conflicts and provided basis for a peaceful continuation of people’s lives in Bosnia and Macedonia. However, besides the prevention of further conflict escalation, there is no visible social change that would encourage the transformation of hostile relationship between divided parties.<sup>9</sup> In addition, academics and

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<sup>8</sup> John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*, (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995).

<sup>9</sup> Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Violent Conflicts and Their Termination,” in *Susanne Buckley-Zistel: Conflict Transformation and Social Change in Uganda*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).



practitioners such as Burton, Mitchell, Galtung and Lederach<sup>10</sup>, who focus their research on conflict transformation, argue that peace agreements have a potential to create weak peace unless a fundamental social transformation takes place within the society.<sup>11</sup> This social transformation primarily refers to local stereotypes and perceptions of the other group(s) and encouraging the mutual tolerance among all citizens.<sup>12</sup> Instead of focusing on achieving the social transformation, the liberal peace-builders assume that the social transformation will naturally occur once the ‘prescribed’ liberal norms in the peace agreements have been successfully internalized by the local populations. However, these norms are often not internalized and as such the peace-builders miss to achieve a social transformation.

Consequently, in order to investigate whether the Dayton and the Ohrid Peace Agreements impact the everyday lives of ordinary citizens in Bosnia and Macedonia respectively, interviews were conducted in these two countries. Since both Agreements primarily deal with the major ethnic groups and due to limited time, the research only included random representatives of major ethnic groups in the two countries. Thus, in Bosnia fifteen random representatives of everyday people from each Bosniak, Croatian, and Serbian ethnic groups were interviewed. As a result, a total of forty five interviews were conducted in Bosnia over the period of two weeks in April 2015. Similarly, in Macedonia a total of thirty interviews were conducted with fifteen representatives of each Albanian and Orthodox Macedonian ethnic group over the period of eight days in April 2015.

Finally, this research aims to examine whether a peace agreement has any kind of impact on the everyday life of ordinary citizens who live Bosnia and Macedonia. By exploring the limits

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<sup>10</sup> Christopher Mitchell, “Beyond Resolution: What does Conflict Transformation Actually Transform,” *Peace and Conflict Studies* 9, no. 1 (2002): 1-23.

<sup>11</sup> Herbert C. Kelman, “Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-psychological Perspective,” *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation* (2004): 111-124.

<sup>12</sup> “Preventing and Managing Violent Conflict,” Applied Knowledge Services, accessed 14 May 2015, <http://www.gsdrc.org/go/conflict/chapter-3-preventing-and-managing-violent-conflict/ending-violent-conflict-peace-agreements-and-conflict-transformation#peace>

of liberal norm exportation during the peace-building processes, the thesis intention is to investigate whether the exportation of liberal norms has been successfully internalized in the context of Bosnia and Macedonia. Hence, the thesis firstly offers a theoretical overview on the norm exportation within the context of humanitarian governance and compares it with a neocolonial exercise in Bosnia and Macedonia. Further on, in Chapter 2, the thesis presents the results of interviews from Bosnia and Macedonia on everyday perceptions of the Dayton and Ohrid Peace Agreements, and their implementation, respectively. Besides providing a very short background of the Dayton and Ohrid Agreements, Chapter 3 analytically relates the findings presented in Chapter 2 with the existing theories discussed in Chapter 1.

# Chapter 1: Norm exportation and Humanitarian Governance in Liberal Peace-building Processes

In order to investigate the limits in internalization of liberal norms by targeted populations, this Chapter aims to explain the global trend in norm exportation during peace-building processes. Hence, the first section focuses on defining the norm and its ‘life cycle’ in the international environment. Afterwards, in order to further explore the role of norm exportation within the peace-building process, the second section focuses on the imperative of liberal peace-building in the global context. Furthermore, the focus of the third section is on the humanitarian governance and its role in the promotion of liberal norms. Finally, the fourth section observes the norm exportation as a neo-colonial exercise. Hence, the final section recognizes the lack of local ownership, Eurocentric approach, and paternalism in peace-building operations, as the main obstacles to the liberal norm internalization in post-conflict societies such as Bosnia and Macedonia.

## 1.1 International Community and the Norm ‘Life Cycle’

In order to be able to explain terms such as norm exportation, norm transfer, and norm internalization it is necessary to define what norm means and how it emerges in the international context. The norm is most generally defined as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”<sup>13</sup> According to Finnemore and Skkink a norm is developed in a sequenced ‘life cycle’ that is led by various behavioral rationalities through different phases of its life cycle.<sup>14</sup> Namely, the two authors define three phases in the norm life cycle: norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm internalization.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 888.

<sup>14</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 887.

<sup>15</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 893.

During the first phase the norm entrepreneurs ‘create’ a new norm. Once the norm is established, it needs to be promoted by the norm entrepreneurs to the ‘critical masses’. The interaction between the entrepreneurs and the masses is essential, as it is considered to be the crucial point in the life of a norm – as the ‘critical masses’ will decide whether or not to internalize the norm. Finally, once the norm is accepted by the mass it becomes internalized and acted upon.<sup>16</sup> Once it is internalized the norm becomes part of everyday life and as such is not a debated topic anymore. Interpreting the norm cycle in the context of the international liberal peace-building context one may recognize the representatives of the Western liberal democracies as the norm entrepreneurs. Once the liberal norms in peace-building emerged and were adopted by the rest of the international community (other states) the norm became internalized and absorbed by the international peace-building actors. As such, logically, liberal norms such as democracy promotion, good governance, etc. became the international norms in liberal peace-building activities.<sup>17</sup>

However, even though the international peace-builders have internalized certain norms and are striving to further ‘spread’ them through their peace-building activities, the norm internalization does not always necessarily happen. It is important to note that the norms are always perceived as being good and beneficial. As such, in instances when the norm internalization does not take place, the international norm exporters usually blame the non-Western actor, the recipient as being unable to comprehend the benefits of a particular democratic norm.<sup>18</sup> Namely, David

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<sup>16</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 894.

<sup>17</sup> David Chandler, “Promoting Democratic Norms? Social Constructivism and the ‘Subjective’ Limits to Liberalism,” *Democratization* 20, no. 2 (2013): 215-239.

<sup>18</sup> Chandler, “Promoting Democratic Norms?,” 217.

Roberts argues that the external imposition of liberal democratic norms upon citizens of ‘weak’ states primarily does not take place since the norm is externalized from the local context.<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, in the context of conflict settlement, the drafting of a peace agreement can be viewed as a ‘direct’ norm institutionalization exercise.<sup>20</sup> As such the Dayton and Ohrid Peace Agreements prescribe what exactly needs to be ‘improved’ in Bosnia and Macedonia, respectively, in order to achieve peace and future progress into a developed liberal democratic society. Unfortunately, the obviously imposed norm institutionalization failed to be internalized by the local populations. Hence, by comparing the norm imposition to the neo-colonial exercise, the last section of this Chapter offers reasoning on why particular norms failed to be internalized by local communities in Bosnia and Macedonia.

## **1.2 Democratic Norm Exportation in Liberal Peace-building**

International peace-building processes focus on preventing conflicts from recurring within states that have just experienced inter-state conflicts. The ex-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan defines the term ‘peace-building’ as “actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation.”<sup>21</sup> Hence, the first step in international peace-building process is to settle a conflict, which is commonly done through a peace agreement. It is important to note that even though this thesis focuses on an essential piece of peace-building process, namely, ‘conflict settlement’ through peace agreements, the literature relevant to peace-building can rationally be extended to this segment as well.

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<sup>19</sup> David Roberts, *Liberal Peacebuilding and Global Governance: Beyond the Metropolis*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 65.

<sup>20</sup> Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl, eds. *Rethinking Peacebuilding: The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans*. (London: Routledge, 2012), 85.

<sup>21</sup> Kofi Annan, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa,” *African Renaissance* 1, no. 3 (2004): 9-42.

Moreover, the literature on the contemporary liberal peace-building has been emerging since the end of the Cold War. This is primarily due to the increasing number of inter-state conflicts in countries around the globe during this period. Reading the peace-building literature one may notice that the majority of scholars such as Michael Pugh<sup>22</sup>, Elizabeth Cousins and Chetan Kumar<sup>23</sup>, Nicole Ball with Tammy Halvey<sup>24</sup>, are primarily focused on practical challenges of peace-building. Hence, in their work there is very little emphasis on the ideological norms of peace-building processes. Fortunately, in this century there is a growing number of scholars who focus precisely on recognizing norms and attitudes underlining various, still widely present, peace-building operations across the globe.

Some of the contemporary scholars such as Roland Paris<sup>25</sup>, Michael Barnett<sup>26</sup>, Edward Newman<sup>27</sup>, Oliver Richmond<sup>28</sup>, and Thomas Weissas<sup>29</sup> focus their work on criticizing various segments of the contemporary peace-building processes. Namely, they agree that the main goal of the international peace-building is to stabilize states that have experienced inter-state conflicts. However, these authors emphasize the fact that in order to achieve this target the international peace-builders have been promoting a certain view, specific norms, on how countries should form

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<sup>22</sup> Michael C Pugh, *Regeneration of War-torn Societies*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).

<sup>23</sup> Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar, and Karin Wermester, eds. *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).

<sup>24</sup> Nicole Ball and Tammy Halevy, *Making Peace Work: The Role of the International Development Community* (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1996): 6-7.

<sup>25</sup> Roland Paris, "International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'," *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 4 (2002): 637-656.

<sup>26</sup> Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

<sup>27</sup> Edward Newman, "Human Security and Constructivism," *International Studies Perspectives* 2, no. 3 (2001): 239-251.

<sup>28</sup> Oliver P. Richmond, "Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-local Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, no. 3 (2009): 324-344.

<sup>29</sup> Gelijn Molier, "Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect after 9/11," *Netherlands International Law Review* 53, no. 1 (2006): 37-62.

themselves domestically, usually in accordance with the fundamentals of “liberal democracy and market-oriented economies.”<sup>30</sup>

Furthermore, according to Paris, peace-builders aim to transform conflict torn countries by exporting democratic norms of correct conduct from the Western, liberal democratic center of the global systems to the periphery, the weak states.<sup>31</sup> Observing peace-building processes from this perspective, one may conclude that it mirrors a modern and softer form of colonial civilizing missions where European powers acted upon their conviction of duty to ‘civilize the uncivilized’ by exporting their liberal norms to these regions. The main difference is that nowadays, the European powers have been replaced by the ‘Western’ powers that strive “to preserve, protect, and promote human life, reflecting an ethics of care and impulse to intervene for the greater good.”<sup>32</sup> Hence, one may conclude that the democratic norm exportation through the liberal peace-building practices is actually an action that resembles a contemporary type of colonialism, so-called neocolonialism.

### **1.3 Role of Humanitarian Governance in Norm Exportation**

Understanding the internationally led peace-building processes as operations that aim to transform weaker states in order to ‘develop’ them, the power domination relationship becomes evident. Namely, Barnett argues that it is even possible to observe the new world order that he labels as “international humanitarian order.”<sup>33</sup> This new world order claims to be dedicated towards the protection and preservation of human lives. Furthermore, Barnett explains that the international humanitarian order is primarily based on various set of norms, international

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<sup>30</sup> Roland, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice,’” 637.

<sup>31</sup> Roland, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice,’” 639.

<sup>32</sup> Michael N. Barnett, “International Paternalism and Humanitarian Governance,” *Global Constitutionalism* 1, no. 3 (2012): 487.

<sup>33</sup> Barnett, “International Paternalism and Humanitarian Governance,” 485.

institutions and organizations, laws and treaties, which are settled under the rhetoric of care, duty, and empathy.<sup>34</sup> All of these components create an international setting in which the ‘international community’ has commitments to its frailest members. As such, Barnett claims that the humanitarian world order actually contains almost all important features of governance that it is virtually possible to declare the presence of “humanitarian government”<sup>35</sup> at the global level. In addition, Fassin defines the humanitarian government as “the administration of human collectivities in the name of a higher moral principle that sees the preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action.”<sup>36</sup>

Perceiving the humanitarian governance as an arrangement that is dedicated towards the highest norms, pure, and impartial it is obvious that it can be easily deployed as an apparatus for international intervention. By claiming its impartiality this system of governance is easily spread to all parts of the world.<sup>37</sup> Namely, humanitarian governance claims to intervene for the altruistic reasons in order not only to save lives, but to also transform communities, governments, states, etc. in the name of advancing them and providing people with opportunities to live their lives in ways that they (re)envision them. Having created this kind of reasoning behind its actions, the humanitarian intervention is saluted by the intended communities, as it claims to be aligned with the interests of the targeted population. However, even though the humanitarian governance disguises itself by the veil of altruistic motives and deeds, Barnett argues that it contains features of control authority such as Eurocentrism and paternalism.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Barnett, “International Paternalism and Humanitarian Governance,” 485.

<sup>35</sup> Barnett, “International Paternalism and Humanitarian Governance,” 486.

<sup>36</sup> Didier Fassin, “Humanitarianism: a Nongovernmental Government,” *Nongovernmental Politics* (2007): 151.

<sup>37</sup> Richmond, “Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism,” 330.

<sup>38</sup> Michael N. Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: a History of Humanitarianism*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).



Hence, those who work on behalf of peace-building, conflict settlement, human development, and other kinds of beneficiary's advancement act in the name of doing what is believed to be in the interest of the beneficiaries. So, it is of no surprise that peace-builders who claim to be doing specific actions in the name of a certain population often act without asking for an agreement or permission of the 'recipients'.<sup>39</sup> As such the humanitarian governance works within a liberating framework that legitimizes and upholds its deeds of control.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, with the help of state-builders the norms and models of governing are being transferred from one part of the world to the other. Hence, the contemporary peace-builders can be perceived as norm transporters of suitable behavior within the internal affairs of weaker and developing states.

Interestingly, even though this well-organized apparatus of humanitarian governance has touched all the corners of the world, the practical evidence demonstrates that the above explained norm transfer to the local context has not been very successful.<sup>41</sup> Namely, according to Talentino more often than not norms embedded in international peace-building liberal prescriptions are not diffused.<sup>42</sup> The lack of this norm diffusion can also be related to the limits of norm exportation by the humanitarian governance.

Besides the lack of local ownership, the most criticized elements in the effective norm internalization are Eurocentrism and paternalism.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, these three elements can also be recognized in neocolonial practices led by the liberal core within the 'uncivilized' periphery of the

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<sup>39</sup> David Chandler, "The Security–Development Nexus and the Rise of 'Anti-Foreign Policy'," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 10, no. 4 (2007): 362-386.

<sup>40</sup> Barnett, "International Paternalism and Humanitarian Governance," 488.

<sup>41</sup> Andrea Talentino, "Transgressive Norms and the Labels of Liberal Peacebuilding," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 17, no. 1 (2012). 47

<sup>42</sup> Talentino, "Transgressive Norms," 48.

<sup>43</sup> Sarah Birgitta Kanafani von Billerbeck, "Whose Peace?: Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding," (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2012).

international community. Hence, the next section discusses the role of the listed elements in the liberal peace-building by comparing the norm exportation process to neocolonialism.

#### **1.4 International Involvement in Bosnia and Macedonia: Export of Liberal Norms as a ‘Neocolonial’ exercise**

The online Dictionary Britannica uses the term neocolonialism to describe “the control of less-developed countries by developed countries through indirect means.”<sup>44</sup> Nowadays, this kind of control can be translated into power that multi-national and international institutions create in order to preserve exploitation exercises in less developed countries. Hence, neocolonial practices of power, influence, and domination over a certain territory and/or a group of people to certain extent do resemble colonial power exercises. Some would also argue that the process of peace-building can also be perceived as a form of (neo)liberal power domination.<sup>45</sup> Lack of local ownership, Eurocentrism, paternalism, and thus a 'Western' liberal democratic approach to conflict settlement<sup>46</sup> and transformation justify the mentioned comparison of power domination. In addition, through the process of international intervention, the international community is directly involved in peace-building process in conflict torn states.

Since the international intervention in a direct form of peace agreements is an activity carried out by the external actors this kind of intervention comes from the outside with an objective to transform and 'advance' the inside by effectively applying the international liberal norms. As argued above, in most cases countries involved in international intervention aim to resolve a conflict and establish peace and order in conflict places in accordance to internationally accepted

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<sup>44</sup> “Neocolonialism,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed May 14, 2015, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/408815/neocolonialism>

<sup>45</sup> David Chandler, *International Statebuilding: the Rise of Post-Liberal Governance*, (London: Routledge, 2010).

<sup>46</sup> Conflict settlement refers to the state in which the fundamental causes of encounter are addressed and resolved.

liberal democratic norms.<sup>47</sup> By designing peace agreements without involving local ownership, imposing Eurocentric norms on conflict resolution, and directly supervising and managing the peace-building process, the involvement of the international community in conflict settlement and transformation in Bosnia and Macedonia can be considered as a neocolonial practice that claim to advance the post-conflict societies in accordance to liberal norms and ideals.<sup>48</sup>

It is important to note that the Balkans region has been perceived as the 'Orient' of Europe for the Western world. Frequent stereotypes related to the region are that its population is barbaric, illiterate, savage, uneducated, primitive, etc. In her book *Imagining the Balkans*, Maria Todorova brilliantly demonstrates the usual negative image of the Balkans in the Western eyes.<sup>49</sup> Due to a long history of conflicts, people living in the Balkans are perceived as if they are unable to create a stable, Western-like, liberal democracy. The greatest attempt to prove the contrary was the creation of Yugoslavia. After World War II and under the rule of Tito, the majority of the Balkan Peninsula (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro) became united into one, prosperous, socialistic country – Yugoslavia. During Tito's life, Yugoslavia enjoyed high and steady economic growth, stable government, unity, and freedom for all citizens.

However, the country started to fall apart in the last decade of the 1980s. Namely, after the death of Tito, and due to an economic crisis prior to the 1990s Slovenia and Croatia requested to get their independence. Soon after that in 1991 an ethnic war broke out in Bosnia. The major parties involved in the battle were: Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats (Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia). Again, the long history of unsolved ethnic tensions in ex-Yugoslavia led to a conflict that took

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<sup>47</sup> Caroline Hughes, and Vanessa Pupavac, "Framing Post-conflict Societies: International pathologisation of Cambodia and the Post-Yugoslav States," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 6 (2005): 873-889.

<sup>48</sup> Barnett, "International Paternalism and Humanitarian Governance," 485.

<sup>49</sup> Mariia Nikolaeva Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

away many lives and has once again 'proven' Balkan's 'barbarity' to the Western audience. With an extensive international involvement the war ended in December 1995 by all three divided parties signing the Dayton Peace Agreement. Once the Agreement was signed, the extensive peace and state-building of Bosnia started immediately in January 1996. Thus, the Western 'peace-creators' came to fix the ruined Bosnia and show its people how to live in a civilized and peaceful manner.<sup>50</sup>

Unlike Bosnia, Macedonia got its independence in September 1991<sup>51</sup> through a peaceful separation. It did not experience any major conflicts until 2001 when the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) demanded autonomy in the areas of the country populated with the majority of Albanian ethnic group. The conflict lasted for a few months and was stopped with the creation of the Ohrid Peace Agreement that granted equal rights as Orthodox Macedonian majority to any ethnic minority that had more than 20% of the total number of Macedonian population. It is important to note that the only ethnic minority with more than 20% of total Macedonian population is the Albanian ethnic group. Besides ensuring the power-sharing, the Ohrid Agreement also deployed NATO as a monitoring force of its implementation in Macedonia.

As the European Union did not want unstable neighborhood it took the primary role in ensuring the implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia. In order to prevent another conflict on its doorstep, the EU together with other international actors decided to design, implement, assist, and finance the rebuilding of Bosnia, and monitoring of the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia. The agreements are rightfully considered as successful as they ensured the conflict settlement between divided sides and as such can be perceived as positive examples. Both Agreements are based on liberal norms

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<sup>50</sup> Bedrudin Brljavac, "Europeanisation Process of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Responsibility of the European Union?," *Balkanologie. Revue d'études pluridisciplinaires* 13, no. 1-2 (2011).

<sup>51</sup> "The Conflicts," The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), accessed May 17, 2015, <http://www.icty.org/sid/322>

of respecting the rights of each side which set the required pre-conditions for the creation of democratic societies in Bosnia<sup>52</sup> and Macedonia<sup>53</sup>. Therefore, there is no question that the involvement of the international community in the conflict prevention and settlement was required in the two instances. By forcing three sides to sign the Agreement the bloodshed in Bosnia was stopped. Similarly, by stepping in and encouraging negotiations with Albanians and Orthodox Macedonians the EU did prevent the continuation of the conflict and ensured that rights of each group are protected.

However, the manner in which the Agreements were designed and implemented can be perceived as a neocolonial project that aimed to export and institutionalize liberal norms in these two countries. With the lack of local ownership, and local voices present in the design process the international community acted the way it perceived as best for the ‘recipients’. As the literature offers almost no debate over the kind of state the international community should attempt to create in in ‘fragile’ or weak states allows international interventionists to use the approach they consider the best and appropriate for the specific setting.<sup>54</sup> This often results in the lack of local ownership required for sustainability of the peace process, presence of Eurocentrism in terms of knowledge used to approach the situation and ‘fixing’ it, and paternalism in terms of dealing with the conflict and ‘setting things right’ within a given context.

Therefore, the presence of these factors further disables the conflict transformation<sup>55</sup> to take place and ensure that the conflict does not reoccur. In addition, the fact that literature does not

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<sup>52</sup> Peter Gowan, “The New Liberal Cosmopolitanism,” *New Left Review* (2000): 79-93.

<sup>53</sup> Jenny Engstrom, “Multi-Ethnicity or Bi-Nationalism-The Framework Agreement and the Future of the Macedonian State,” *JEMIE* (2002): 1.

<sup>54</sup> Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, “Introduction: Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding,” in *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (London: Routledge, 2009): 1-20.

<sup>55</sup> Conflict transformation focuses on the practice of overcoming the dispute in order to ensure that the conflict does not arise in the future.

engage with the path a state should take forward after the conflict settlement creates a logical understanding that it should follow a Western, democratic prescription in order to achieve future progress and development.<sup>56</sup> Interpreting this analogy, conflict settlement and its expected transformation in reality is about the transfer of Western norms, and institutions to weak contexts.<sup>57</sup>

Finally, this thesis aims to investigate the limits of liberal norm exportation through the liberal international intervention in peace-building projects in Bosnia and Macedonia, respectively. The thesis will offer an overall critic of the idea of the general approach to liberal peace-building by ‘fixing’ and civilizing weak states in accordance to Eurocentric, Western norms. In addition, thesis will explore the reasons behind the lack of liberal norm internalization by not solely blaming the ‘recipient’ – the ordinary citizen. Hence, in order to find out the effects norm exportation on the micro level in these two countries, the research will get engaged with the local perceptions on the international peace-settlement projects through the creation and implementation of the Dayton and Ohrid Peace Agreements.

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<sup>56</sup> Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 337-365.

<sup>57</sup> Meera Sabaratnam, “Avatars of Eurocentrism in the Critique of the Liberal Peace,” *Security Dialogue* 44, no. 3 (2013): 259-278.

## Chapter 2: Ways in which Everyday People Live the Peace Process in Bosnia and Macedonia

This Chapter presents the findings on the understandings of the conflict settlement process and the importance of the Dayton/Ohrid Agreement in the lives of everyday people in Bosnia and Macedonia. The first section provides a short overview of the methodology used in the research process. The second section focuses on the results of the interviews in Bosnia, with three subsections that present answers of the Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks respectively. The second section is divided in two subsections that present the answers of Orthodox Macedonian and Albanian populations in Macedonia.

### 2.1 Research Methodology

Since the interviewees were approached randomly on the streets in different parts of Bosnia and Macedonia interviews had to be planned and short. Luckily, the majority of the interviewees were willing to offer more details than asked. Additionally, the average time of each interview was about twenty minutes, and contained the following main eight questions:

1. *What are your views on the involvement of the international community in the creation of the Dayton/Ohrid Peace Agreement?*
2. *What does the Dayton/Ohrid Peace Agreement represent for you?*
3. *Does the Dayton/Ohrid Peace Agreement have any type of impact on you as an individual or on your everyday life and your relationships with the others, (family, friends or other communities)?*
4. *In your opinion what has been the most important impact of the Dayton/Ohrid Agreement for you as an ordinary citizen thus far?*
5. *Do you agree or disagree with the following principles of the Dayton/Ohrid Peace Agreement?*

In order to find out how familiar citizens are with the content of the Dayton Agreement interviewees in Bosnia were asked to read *Article II* of the Agreement on *Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms*. Likewise, interviewees in Macedonia were asked to read the *Basic Principles* of the Ohrid Agreement that are written in the very introduction of the Agreement itself.

6. *Were you aware that the Dayton/Ohrid Agreement contains this Article/ these principles prior to this interview?*

7. *According to you, does the international community still have a role in the implementation of Dayton/Ohrid Peace Agreement? (if the answer is positive, then what do you think that role is?)*

8. *In your opinion was the Dayton/Ohrid Peace Agreement the best available solution for ending the conflict in Bosnia/Macedonia at the time? If not, what would have been a better solution instead?*

The socio-economic background of the interviewees differed, as well as their age. However, it was important that the interviewee is at least eighteen years old, and as such is fully allowed to participate in the democratic processes in his/her country. In addition, interviews were conducted with a fairly equal gender representation of each ethnic group (male vs female ration was usually 7:8 or 8:7 in all towns/municipalities). Additionally, due to a language similarity between Macedonian and Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian, there was no language barrier while conducting the interviews. Moreover, the majority of Albanians speak Macedonian or Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian so there were no language barriers with this ethnic group either.

In order to ensure the equal representation of all the above mentioned ethnic groups in Bosnia and Macedonia the interviews took place in several towns in the two countries. The following towns were visited in Bosnia: Banja Luka, Prnjavor, Doboj, Zavidovici, Kakanj, Sarajevo, Mostar, Capljina, and Tomislavgrad. In Macedonia, the interviews took place in: Skopje,



Ohrid, Struga, and Kumanovo. In addition, the focus of the interviews was to gather views of various age groups for the purpose of evaluating a possible difference in opinions due to age and remembrance of the events preceding the agreements. Besides being asked about their age, all interviewees were also asked about their ethnic belonging. Even though this question is considered as personal, it was asked in order to check that there is no unequal observation of any of the research relevant groups.

Furthermore, it is important to note that this research focused only on Orthodox Macedonian and Albanian ethnic groups in Macedonia, and on the three 'constitutive peoples' in Bosnia. Hence, those who belong to other minorities in Macedonia, or are not considered as a member of one of the three 'constitutive peoples' in Bosnia were not included in this research. Even though the opinions of the 'others' would provide an additional dimension to the research findings, due to a very limited amount of time for the execution of the research in the field it would have been challenging to involve representatives of these groups as well. Therefore, the research focused solely on the main ethnic groups that were considered to be involved in the conflict in 2001 in Macedonia – Albanians and Orthodox Macedonians. Likewise, in Bosnia the research involved only the representatives of the three major ethnic groups, and those defined as 'constitutive peoples' in Bosnia – Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.

## **2.2 How do Everyday People Live the Peace Process in Bosnia?**

Three subsections below demonstrate the findings of the research conducted in Bosnia. The results reveal that the majority of everyday Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks in fact express many shared opinions on their perception of certain aspects in their lives after the Dayton Agreement was adopted. Therefore, there is no significant difference in understanding the impact, the role, the creation, and the implementation of the Agreement among the representatives of the interviewed

ethnic groups.

Furthermore, the younger individuals (ages eighteen to twenty two) who were asked to be interviewed stated that they have no perceptions and knowledge on the Agreement, and as such were unable to provide answers related to this research. This finding suggests that the younger generations are not as exposed to and interested in the political scene in Bosnia, as the older generation (twenty five and more).

### **2.2.1 Perceptions of Everyday Croats on the Dayton Agreement and its Impact on Life in Bosnia**

The interviews with the Croatian ethnic group in Bosnia were conducted in towns of Mostar, Capljina, and Tomislavgrad. These places were directly affected during the war, and with the exception of Mostar are predominantly populated with the Croatian ethnic group. The ruling political party in these towns is the right-wing, nationalist party. Out of all three of them, Mostar was the most severely affected with the war events. Nowadays, it is a divided town between Croats and Bosniaks.

When asked about their perceptions on the involvement of the international community in the creation of the Dayton Agreement, the majority (twelve out of fifteen) of the everyday Croats in Bosnia interviewed in this research responded that the international involvement was much needed. Namely, they provided answers such as: *the representatives of the international community enabled the war to end; the international community created peace and since we are people who are unable to agree, their mediation forced us to stop the conflict.*<sup>58</sup> One interviewee added that she values the forces of the international community, but that they could have gotten involved at a much earlier stage of conflict. In addition, another person claimed that the Dayton Agreement was a great temporary solution, however, in her opinion the Agreement itself is

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<sup>58</sup> Research relevant parts of the interviews were translated by Nikolina Talijan and are presented in the italic letters throughout this thesis.

preventing the future progress of Bosnia as a unified country.

The majority of the interviewees (thirteen out of fifteen) stated that the Agreement for them represents the end of the ethnic conflict in Bosnia. In addition to that explanation, three of them added that the Agreement represents *the dysfunctional governing system of Bosnia, a document that disables the conflict resolution and progress of the country; just a conflict settlement solution, and as such is not efficient to be used for economical and other progress of Bosnia towards the EU integrations; it currently represents a document that legally allows the politicians to manipulate the members of their ethnic group and promote hatred towards other groups.*

Moreover, all fifteen interviewed everyday Croats claimed that the Agreement itself does not have any direct impact on them and their everyday lives nor on relationships with other citizens of Bosnia. However, fourteen of them provided examples on why the indirect influences of the Agreement present daily issues for them. The major complaints were on *the large, confusing, and inefficient public administration in Bosnia; unjust status of those who do not belong to the three 'constitutive' peoples of Bosnia; and the fact that the ethnic belonging defines an individual more than his/her capabilities in public administration job.*

According to the majority interviewees (twelve out of fifteen), the most significant impact of the Dayton Agreement is the conflict settlement. Interviewees perceive the settlement as an opportunity for them to continue with their lives in peace and freedom of ethnic expression. In addition, one person had no response, and one interviewee emphasized that besides the conflict settlement, the Agreement created an unstable country that does not respect basic human rights, and provides no protection for its citizens.

After having read Article II of the Dayton Agreement, all of the interviewees stated that they do agree with what the Article states. One person added that in his opinion the principles of

Article II are in practice not supported by the institutions in Bosnia. In addition, ten interviewees stated that they were unaware of this Article before, while five declared that they were well aware of the content of the Agreement. Therefore, one third of the interviewees did form their opinion on having read the Agreement, the rest explained that their understandings of the Agreement primarily comes from the local media.

All but two of the fifteen interviewees perceive the role of the international community in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement as still needed and mandatory. They believe that the involvement of the international community *is needed in order to protect the interests of the local citizens and monitor work of the local politicians*. One person claimed that the Agreement is not only a peace agreement since it became the Constitution. She believes that as such it would be natural that citizens of Bosnia ensure its implementation, but due to an inefficient and dysfunctional system the rights of citizens are *safer with the presence of the international community*.

Finally, nine interviewees claim that the Dayton Agreement was the best solution for the ending the war in Bosnia in 1995. Five people agree that it was the best solution, but added that it was successful only in terms of conflict settlement, but not as a long-term solution to governance of Bosnia. Interestingly, only one person claimed that a better solution would have been a creation of the third, Croatian, entity so that each ethnic group would have its own territorial unit within Bosnia. In addition, one interviewee stated that *since the voices of ordinary citizens were not present during the Agreement negotiation process and the locals were only represented by the ethnic leaders (who were also war leaders) the solution was the best one at the time*.

### 2.2.2 Perceptions of Everyday Serbs on the Dayton Agreement and its Impact on Life in Bosnia

The interviews with the Serbian ethnic group in Bosnia were conducted in towns of Banja Luka, Prnjavor, and Doboj. The ruling political party in these towns is the right-wing, nationalist party. Out of all three of them, Doboj was the most severely affected with the war events. Nowadays, it is a divided town between Serbs and Bosniaks.

According to the majority of the everyday Serbs in Bosnia interviewed in this research (thirteen out of fifteen), their perception of the international community's involvement in the creation of the Dayton Agreement is characterized as beneficial and necessary in order to end the ethnic conflict in Bosnia. Even though thirteen of them claimed that the involvement was necessary, their explanations often offered additional comments describing the involvement of *the international community as too late and self-centered; a foreign strive to 'civilize' people living in Bosnia; a Eurocentric approach to conflict resolution that does not work in practice*. Moreover, two persons stated that they have no opinion on the question. In addition, an explanation that was provided only by four interviewees who belong to the Serbian ethnic group was that the international community was the one that caused the war, and as such it was expected of them to end it.

When asked to explain what the Agreement represents for them, the general understanding (ten out of fifteen) among the everyday interviewed Serbs is that the Agreement ended the war, and settled the conflict in Bosnia. Three interviewees characterized the process of the Agreement creation and negotiation as quick and not well-planned. It is viewed as a good short-term solution, but since it became the Constitution of Bosnia, three persons claimed that it only allows the dysfunctional and enormous administration to continue to operate.

Moreover, the interviewees explained that the Agreement has no direct impact on them and

their lives in general. However, they claim (thirteen out of fifteen) that indirectly it is reflected in the work of the politicians in Bosnia who use the excuse of '*blaming the politicians of the other two groups*' for their own inefficiency. Analyzing the responses it is possible to conclude that interviewees are aware of the issue that the politicians use the Agreement to manipulate citizens with the large bureaucratic system for achieving their personal and political interests. In addition to that, three persons claimed that the agreement allows them to enjoy their basic human rights in the absence of war.

As the most significant impact of the Dayton Agreement eleven interviewees stated that it was the conflict settlement, and provision of basic human rights. One person stated that he is uncertain, while three persons claimed that besides peace, the most significant impact was the creation of two entities which allow greater territorial freedoms for different ethnic groups.

All fifteen interviewees agree with the principles of the Article II written in the Dayton Agreement. Namely, four of them further expressed their concern about the implementation of this very Article. Two interviewees stated that the fact that people of Bosnia could not have adopted the EU Convention on the basic human rights is devastating. Therefore, the major observation of the interviewed Serbs is the question of the implementation of these principles in Bosnia.

Surprisingly, even five interviewees stated that they have been aware that the Dayton Agreement contains the Article II, four of them have heard about some parts of the Article, and six stated that they were not aware of the content in the Dayton Agreement. These six also explained that their knowledge on the Agreement comes primarily from the local media, and discussion with friends and family.

The opinions were divided on the question whether the international community still has a role in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Three persons were uncertain, and six stated

that yes the international community is required to be involved *and ensure the fair implementation of the Agreement; through foundations and programs to force the government to implement the EU Convention on the basic human rights in order to ensure equal treatment of all people living in Bosnia; to empower greater economic prosperity in Bosnia.* In addition, six interviewees claimed that *the international community has no more role in the implementation of the Agreement, and that its impact on the Agreement declined in the past ten years.*

Twelve interviews answered that in their opinion there was no better solution at the time for ending the ethnic conflict in Bosnia. Three persons stated that they do not have enough information on the process and stated they were uncertain. Additionally, one person explained that in his opinion *the country should have been divided equally in territory between three ethnic groups in order to guarantee a peaceful future. Now there is one country without a dialogue between the citizens and as such there is no common vision for the future of the country.*

### **2.2.3 Perceptions of Everyday Bosniaks on the Dayton Agreement and its Impact on Life in Bosnia**

The interviews with the Bosniak ethnic group in Bosnia were conducted in towns of Sarajevo, Zavidovici, and Kakanj. The ruling political party in these towns is the right-wing, nationalist party. Out of all three of them, Sarajevo was the most severely affected with the war events. Nowadays, besides Brcko District, it is the most ethnically diverse town in Bosnia.

According to the opinions of everyday Bosniaks interviewed in this research, it is possible to conclude that all of them evaluate the involvement of the international community as required in order to end the ethnic conflict in Bosnia in 1995. Three persons further added that *the peace agreement would not have been reached if there was no involvement of the international community.* Interestingly, four interviewees focused their answers on the manner in which the international community intervened in ending the conflict. Namely their answers were: *the*

*international community had the major role in creating the Dayton Agreement, and it was created in accordance to their (referring to international community) previous experiences in 'fixing' the post-conflict societies; the international community 'orchestrated' the Peace Agreement in Bosnia, and I believe that the international community was the key factor in creation, mediation, adoption, and implementation of the Dayton Agreement; it was imposed by the international community, and in my opinion divided sides will never be satisfied (with the Agreement) as there are many holes in it.*

Moreover, when asked what the Dayton Agreement represents for them, thirteen interviewees focused their answers on explaining that they perceive the Agreement as needed to achieve conflict settlement. Two persons responded that for them the Agreement represents a complex and confusing Constitutional structure. In addition, nine of them added that in their opinions the Agreement was designed to serve only as a short-term solution *and since the Agreement was modeled on the American federal governance system it created a complicated governance system that is not needed, and makes no sense for a small country like Bosnia.*

When asked about the impact the Agreement has on their everyday lives, all of them expressed opinions that the Dayton Agreement makes no direct impact on their lives. However, five of them explained that the Agreement legally allowed the division of the country and its people, which affects citizens in socio-political and economic manners. In addition, one interviewee added that *the Agreement created the basis for political and ethnic leaders to further spread their ideas of nationalism and ethnic hatred. Citizens live in constant fear of the 'others' (stories of secession of the Republic of Srpska, terrorist in forms of jihadists and Russian rebels) which causes additional stress and insecurity in lives of ordinary people.*



Eight interviewees emphasized that the most significant aspect of the Agreement was the conflict settlement. Moreover, one person stated that for her it represents an incentive to leave the country *as the politicians have no incentive to work on the unification and centralization of Bosnia, which makes life in Bosnia administratively difficult*. Another interviewee stressed out that the *Agreement further divided a country that has already been divided*, and as such he does not see it as beneficial to peace anymore.

All of the fifteen interviewees stated that they agree with the principles of the Article II written in the Dayton Agreement. Two of them added that the Convention on human rights is not fully implemented in Bosnia, even though the Constitution, the Dayton Agreement contains it. Ten of them stated that they were not aware of the Article II and that they have never read the Agreement itself. In addition, their major source of information regarding the Agreement were the local media and politicians. In addition, five who stated that they were aware of the Article II, and that they have read the agreement have either studies political and related sciences, or work in positions that require them to have a knowledge on the Agreement/Constitution.

Only four interviewees explained that according to them, the international community has no more role in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia. The other eleven interviewees replied that the role of the international community in Bosnia is in a form of monitoring and directing the Dayton Agreement. One person stated that *due to the complex system created with the Dayton Agreement, and lack of local ownership, it is hard for the citizens to take responsibility and ownership of something they did not create*. Therefore, in her opinion *the role of the international community declined, but their presence is guaranteed by the Constitution, and until the three sides create a new Constitution the international community has a responsibility to be involved in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement*.

Finally, ten interviewees agreed that the Dayton Agreement was the best available solution for ending the ethnic conflict in Bosnia in 1995. One person was uncertain, three emphasized that it was a good temporary (two year) solution, but not a permanent one, while one interviewee stated that in his opinion *a division on economic regions instead of ethnic ones would create a more prosperous and efficient Bosnia.*

## **2.3 How do Everyday People Live the Peace Process in Macedonia?**

Similarly to the case of Bosnia, it is possible to notice patterns in the perceptions of the majority of the interviewees in Macedonia. Namely, according to the conducted interviewees, the majority of everyday Orthodox Macedonians and Albanians express shared opinions on their perception of certain aspects in their lives after the Ohrid Agreement was adopted.

Additionally, it is important to mention that the younger members who were approached to be interviewed (ages eighteen to twenty two) had no understanding of the Agreement, and thus were unable to provide any feedback on whether it impacts their lives or not.

### **2.3.1 Perceptions of Everyday Orthodox Macedonians on the Ohrid Agreement and its Impact on Life in Macedonia**

The interviews with the everyday Orthodox Macedonians were conducted in Macedonian towns of Skopje, Ohrid, and Tetovo. The ruling political party in these towns is the right-wing, nationalist party. Out of all three of them, Tetovo was the most severely affected with the conflict.

When asked about his/her perceptions on the involvement of the international community in the creation of the Ohrid Peace Agreement, everyday Orthodox Macedonians offer various answers. The general consensus (nine out of fifteen) among the interviewees is that there was a clear need for the international involvement in the conflict settlement. However, besides having a

clear interest in conflict settlement in Macedonia, the majority of the interviewees (eleven of out of fifteen) believe that the international community had a self interest in preventing a conflict at the doorstep of the European Union. In addition, one person answered that he believes that the international community should have gotten involved at a much earlier stage in the conflict.

Moreover, the answers in regards to the second interview question on what does the Ohrid Agreement represent to him/her, the majority of everyday Orthodox Macedonians (ten out of fifteen) provided negative answers towards the Albanian ethnic group such as: *conflict settlement which gave Albanians what they wanted; the moment when the country was 'sold'; disappearance of the Macedonian one nation state*. Therefore, there is a trend that the majority of the interviewees perceive the Ohrid Agreement as a legal document that provides more benefits to the other ethnic group, the Albanians. It is important to note that a small number of people stated that the Agreement was beneficial as it prevented the conflict, and one person also stated that the Ohrid Agreement *represents the cornerstone of the modern Macedonian democratic and multi-ethnic history of the modern Macedonia*. There was only one answer stating that the Agreement does not represent anything to him.

Interestingly, all interviewees stated that the Agreement does not have any direct type of impact on their everyday lives as ordinary Orthodox Macedonians. However, two people offered an interesting opinion and claimed that it bothers them that the Agreement allows many unqualified Albanians to get employed due to the employment quotas<sup>59</sup> that were imposed by the Agreement. The quotas require a higher number of Albanians to find employment in the public sector, and due to a common stigma about the public administration sector in the Balkans, the interviewed everyday Orthodox Macedonians are bothered by the 'fact' that these Albanians are

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<sup>59</sup> The role of quotas is briefly explained in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

being paid only in order to fulfil the quota. Therefore, the general conclusion is that the major indirect impact of the Agreement on the lives of everyday Orthodox Macedonians is that quotas are more important than the work quality. It is of no surprise that they are focused on this particular issue due to the high unemployment rate and low economic growth in the country.

Furthermore, after being presented with the Basic Principles of the Ohrid Agreement, all of the interviewees stated that they were not aware of them before. In addition, all of them explained that they have not read the Agreement and that their opinion on it was primarily shaped by the local media, and through discussions with their fellow citizens. All of them agreed that in theory the principles were correctly stated, and a few of them added that these principles are required to be implemented in order to ensure a peaceful and democratic Macedonia.

The opinions on the question on whether the international community still has a role in the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, only one person replied negatively stating that *their job is done, and now it is up to the people of Macedonia to ensure the successful implementation of the Agreement*. However, the opinion of the majority was that the international community still plays a significant role in the implementation of the Agreement. According to them, the only the pressure and the EU succession conditions of the international community can ensure that the Ohrid Agreement will continue to be implemented. Some perceive the representatives of the international community, the EU in this case, as the main guarantors of peace and stability in Macedonia. In addition one person stated that *it is in the interest of Macedonia to ensure the successful implementation of the Ohrid Agreement as it is the pre-condition for Macedonian membership in the EU*.

Finally, the opinions were divided about the last question. Namely, when asked whether the Ohrid Peace Agreement was the best solution for ending the conflict in 2001 the majority of

everyday Orthodox Macedonians stated that it was the best solution for ending the conflict at the time. Namely, twelve of them added that its main function was to settle the conflict. In addition, some added that in their opinion the conflict was settled with the Agreement, but that the Agreement itself did not resolve the conflict. In addition, one person replied that he was uncertain whether the Agreement was the best available solution, while one person stated that in his opinion there were better solutions, but that the politicians were unwilling to consider them.

### **2.3.2 Perceptions of Everyday Albanians on the Ohrid Agreement and its Impact on Life in Macedonia**

The interviews with the everyday Albanians in Macedonia were conducted in towns of Skopje, Struga, and Tetovo. The ruling political party in these towns is the right-wing, nationalist party. Out of all three of them, Tetovo was the most severely affected during the conflict.

According to the majority of interviewed everyday Albanians (twelve out of fifteen) the international community played a key role in achieving the Ohrid Agreement. They evaluate the involvement of the international community as much needed in order to ensure a successful mediation between Albanians and Orthodox Macedonians. However, three interviewees stressed that according to them the international community has primarily gotten involved due to its own self-interest to prevent a conflict that is close to the European Union, and not solely out of true altruistic humanitarian reasons – to help the people of Macedonia.

Moreover, interpreting the interviews of everyday Albanians who participated in this research, the majority (ten out of fifteen) claims that for him/her the Agreement represents a document that guarantees the peaceful *coexistence between ethnic communities in Macedonia regardless of religion and other differences*. In addition, one interviewee stated that for him the Agreement means nothing, as he believes that there is no one in charge of its implementation. In

his opinion, the agreement exists *only formally, in theory, and he does not see it being implemented*. Similarly, another person claimed that in his opinion *the Agreement is not being implemented in accordance to what has been agreed upon between Orthodox Macedonians and Albanians*. He further added that *even though the Agreement has been adopted, all of its articles are not being implemented*.

Regarding their answers on the third question, all the interviewees stated that they feel that the Agreement has no direct impact on their everyday lives. The major impact five interviewees stated was that the Agreement allows the Albanian community to have more rights and be equally represented in the government which was not the case before. Therefore, the impact of the Agreement on the lives of the Albanian community is viewed in a more political, minority representational manner, without having an obvious direct way. Moreover, in their interviews two people also added that besides the greater representation of their ethnic group in the Macedonian government, the Agreement did enable a greater number of Albanian population to be employed in the public service sector. Consequently, the fact that they are more represented makes them feel *'safer' as they believe their voices are more represented*.

Interestingly, their responses on the fourth question regarding the most significant impact of the Agreement varied. A common answer that was provided by eight interviewees was that the most significant change is the *greater employability in the public sector for the representatives of the Albanian population*. They view this as a positive change and that they are being treated more equally after the minority representational quotas were introduced with the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement since 2001. Yet, seven people explained that they do not see any significant change since the Agreement was adopted, and that life in their communities is going the same way as before. In addition, one of the respondents who claimed that there is no significant change also

added that *he still feels as a minority in his town, even though it has a 70% of Albanian majority that lives in it*. Therefore, there is a general understanding that interviewed Albanians are satisfied with the system of quotas.

When asked about their opinions on the Basic Principles of the Ohrid Agreement, all of them stated that they agree with these principles, and these principles do exist in theory. However, six interviewees stated that in his/her opinion these stated principles are not being implemented and that Macedonia is still a long way from being considered a multi-ethnic society. In addition, only one out of fourteen persons replied that he has been aware of these principles before and that he has read the Ohrid Agreement. For the other fourteen interviewees these principles were unknown, and they explained that their knowledge on the Ohrid Agreement was coming primarily from the media, and their politicians.

Even though only five everyday Albanian interviewees explained that the Ohrid Agreement is not being fully implemented, twelve of them stated that in their opinion the international community still has a role in the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. Namely, they view the international community as the major mediator, and perceive its role as the monitoring body that will ensure the fair implementation of the Agreement in the future: *“they still monitor the Albanian-Orthodox Macedonian relations in the country and try to interfere when there is a disagreement on certain ethnic issue”*.

Yet, one person claimed that the government is sufficient to provide future implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, and that the international community has no role in it anymore. In addition, one person was unsure whether the international community still has a role in the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. According to him, the Macedonian government has the major role in its implementation, while the representatives of the international community can

assist in monitoring of the implementation.

Finally, all fifteen everyday Albanian interviewees agree that the Ohrid Agreement was the best solution for ending the ethnic violence at the time. Six of them explained that even though the conflict was successfully settled with the Agreement, they do not think that it was resolved. According to one interviewee even though the Ohrid Agreement *saved many lives, there is a lot to be done in order to ensure that the conflict does not repeat.*



## **Chapter 3: Evaluating the Success of Norm Exportation through Peace Agreements**

This Chapter analyzes the research results presented in Chapter 2. Namely, the aim of this Chapter is to evaluate the success of liberal norms and values exportation to Bosnia and Macedonia through the design and implementation of the Dayton and Ohrid Peace Agreements, respectively. In order to provide some contextual background on the Agreements, the first section will briefly present their role in ending ethnic violence. Afterwards, the second section will focus on analyzing the research findings demonstrated in the previous Chapter to evaluate the effectiveness their application from the perspective of the everyday, local people in these two countries.

### **3.1 Peace Agreements and International Involvement as a Response to Inter-State Conflicts**

As it has been already discussed in the introduction, peace agreements are perceived as the most frequent intervention of the international community in ending inter-state, ethnic conflicts. This section gives a short overview of the two important peace agreements, the Dayton and the Ohrid, that ended ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Macedonia, respectively. In addition, each subsection briefly demonstrates the involvement of the international community as well as of the everyday, local people in the agreement drafting and negotiating processes.

#### **3.1.1 Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia**

The Dayton Peace agreement ended a three years ethnic war in the Balkans. With careful mediation of the international representatives, the Agreement was finally accepted and signed by all divided sides on 14 December 1995 in Paris. Hence, the involvement of the international community was of a great significance in preventing further bloodshed at the moment in 1995. It is essential to note that even today in 2015, twenty years after the war ended, the international

community still has an important role in the implementation of the Agreement.

By signing the Dayton Agreement, the international community legally secured its direct involvement in socio-political and economic matters in Bosnia. To be exact, the Agreement itself defined that the recovery process in the country will be coordinated by the guidance of the international community. Due to that reason and in accordance with the Annex 10 of the Agreement, the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Office of High Representative (OHR) were formed in order to monitor the implementation of the Dayton Agreement until they evaluate it as completed.<sup>60</sup> Naturally, as a representative of the international community, a High Representative is a citizen of the European Union, while his principal deputies are from the United States. In such way, major Western powers ensured their continuous presence in turning Bosnia into a truly democratic Western-like democratic country. Aiming to achieve that goal, the OHR works closely with everyday Bosnian citizens, local institutions and the international community in order to ensure that the country evolves into a: “peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions.”<sup>61</sup> Once the OHR completes its goal and the country is fully able to take responsibility for its affairs, its work will be considered as complete. Until today, twenty years after, this task has yet not been completed.

It is important to note that the Dayton Agreement, initiated by the US, was more focused on ending the war in Bosnia than to create foundations needed for a sustainable country.<sup>62</sup> Thus, its primary task was to stop the conflict and make each party content, and not to work on uniting the divided sides together, on ensuring that a conflict will be transformed and decades long disputes would finally be resolved. In addition, the Dayton Agreement settled “one of the most complicated

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<sup>60</sup> “About OHR,” Office of High Representative, accessed May 5, 2015, [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content\\_id=38519](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=38519)

<sup>61</sup> Office of High Representative, “About OHR.”

<sup>62</sup> Richard Holbrooke, *How To End a War* (New York City: Modern Library, 1999), 25-48.

and wasteful systems of government ever devised.”<sup>63</sup> The agreement became the country's Constitution and it created a country with a weak central, Bosnian, government, two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, one district Brčko, 10 cantons in the Federation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina and 142 local municipalities. According to the preliminary results of the last census in 2013, the total population of Bosnia is 3.8 million<sup>64</sup> with three ‘constituent peoples’: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. Those who do not identify themselves with one of the main three ethnic groups are considered as ‘others’ and as such do not enjoy the same rights as the ‘constituent peoples’ do.

The complicated and large bureaucratic system in Bosnia after the war is also well illustrated with the fact that in the Former Yugoslavia this country (Bosnia) had one central government situated in Sarajevo and 109 local municipal government structures.<sup>65</sup> Therefore, the country has previously proven that it can be centrally governed with a much smaller administrative system. Furthermore, besides having one central constitution, after signing the Dayton Agreement the country has a total of 13 constitutions: in addition to the state with its two entities, each of the 10 cantons have their individual constitution.

Although the Dayton Agreement was successful in ending the war in 1995, all the above mentioned facts prove that the Agreement created a dysfunctional and administratively weak country with an enormous administrative apparatus. In addition, designed by the representatives of the international community, signed by the relevant international and local representatives, with almost no local ownership, the Dayton Agreement was imposed upon everyday Bosnians and

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<sup>63</sup> Ian Traynor, “Revealed: US Plans for Bosnian Constitution,” *The Guardian*, November 10, 2005, accessed May 10, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/nov/10/warcrimes.iantraynor>.

<sup>64</sup> “Preliminary Results Of the 2013 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina” Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, accessed May 7, 2015, <http://www.bhas.ba/>.

<sup>65</sup> Ian Traynor, “Revealed: US Plans for Bosnian Constitution.”

Herzegovinians to be implemented and accepted. As it will be discussed in the next section, according to opinions of the everyday Bosnian citizens the omission in the Agreement creation to empower local ownership of the Agreement is one of the greatest obstacles to its complete application in the country.

### 3.1.2 Ohrid Peace Agreement in Macedonia

The Ohrid Peace Agreement was designed in order to stop the escalation of a violent ethnic conflict in spring 2001 in Macedonia.<sup>66</sup> Namely, the conflict arose between the security forces of the Orthodox Macedonian majority, on the one side, and the armed insurgents (National Liberation Army – NLA) of the Albanian minority population, on the other side.<sup>67</sup> It was finally brought to an end with the involvement of the EU and US on behalf of the international community. After six months of violence, the divided sides – representatives of the ethnic majority Orthodox Macedonians and the NLA representing the Albanian ethnic minority signed the Ohrid Peace Agreement in Ohrid, Macedonia, on August 13, 2001.

The conflict arose due to the accumulation of tensions caused by the status of the Albanian minority in Macedonia. Namely, during the rule of ex-Yugoslavia, Macedonia was regarded as a state of predominantly Orthodox Macedonians with Albanian and Turkish minorities. After the break-up of Yugoslavia, in the Macedonian constitution of 1989 the country was characterized as an Orthodox Macedonian nation state. The abolishment of minority representations in the new constitution naturally led the Albanian minority, 25.2%<sup>68</sup> of the total population in Macedonia, to demand greater rights. It is important to note that the refugees from the crisis on Kosovo in 1999,

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<sup>66</sup> Mirjana Maleska, “What Kind of a Political System did Macedonia Get After the Ohrid Peace Agreement?,” *New Balkan Politics* 9 (2005): 12.

<sup>67</sup> Maleska, “What Kind of a Political System did Macedonia Get After the Ohrid Peace Agreement?,” 12.

<sup>68</sup> “Macedonia – Events of 2004,” Human Rights Watch, accessed May 5, 2015, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2005/macedonia>.

contributed to the increasing number of the Albanian nationalists and members of NLA who clashed with the Macedonian security forces in 2001. In order to prevent any further violence in the region, it was the imperative of the international community to get involved in preventing the conflict escalation.

Therefore, as a solution to the conflict, the Ohrid Agreement requested that the government of Macedonia adopt necessary reforms that will, among other requests, “decentralize government, increase ethnic minority rights, and amend discriminatory passages in the constitution.”<sup>69</sup> According to Pearson, the Agreement presents the Western understanding of the conflict as a mere inter-ethnic dispute between Albanian and Orthodox Macedonian ethnic groups in Macedonia, instead of observing the general problem that is the unresolved issue of large Albanian diaspora population due Kosovo crisis in 1999.<sup>70</sup> As such, the Agreement did succeed in ending the conflict itself, but failed to end the source of the conflict.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, it is of no surprise that in his research Reka concludes that many articles of the Ohrid Agreement have not been implemented in the first decade of its application.<sup>72</sup> Reka points out that the EU was expecting from the Orthodox Macedonian political elite to absorb the values mandated in the Agreement and target the ethnic issues in Macedonia that were cause the conflict in 2001 in order to ensure that the conflict does not repeat.<sup>73</sup> Therefore the Agreement specifically emphasized that from 2001 Macedonia must present itself as a multi-ethnic country with several ethnic minorities. The emphasis that Macedonia is not a mono-ethnic country was expected to encourage the creation of a civic state

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<sup>69</sup> Brenda Pearson, “Putting Peace into Practice - Can Macedonia’s New Government Meet the Challenge?” *USIP Special Report* 96 (2002): 4, accessed May 4, 2015, <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr96.pdf>.

<sup>70</sup> Pearson, “Putting Peace into Practice”, 5-8.

<sup>71</sup> Blerim Reka, *Ten Years from the Ohrid Agreement – Is Macedonia Functioning as a multi-ethnic state?*, (Tetovo: South East European University, 2011), 12, accessed May 14, 2015, [http://www.seeu.edu.mk/files/research/projects/OFA\\_EN\\_Final.pdf](http://www.seeu.edu.mk/files/research/projects/OFA_EN_Final.pdf)

<sup>72</sup> Reka, *Ten Years from the Ohrid Agreement*, 14.

<sup>73</sup> Reka, *Ten Years from the Ohrid Agreement*, 15.

where all its citizens enjoy equal treatment.

Furthermore, the Ohrid Agreement requests of Macedonia to promote bilingualism in districts where the population of the ethnic minority is greater than 20%. It also introduced minority employment quotas in civil service sector such as military, police and other state related agencies.<sup>74</sup> According to the CIA World Factbook the total population of Macedonia in 2014 is estimated to be a bit over 2 million, while the estimates from 2002 suggest the Macedonian Orthodox majority of 64.2%, and the following minorities: Albanian (25.2%), Turkish (3.9%), Roma (2.7%), Serb (1.8%) and other 2.2%.<sup>75</sup> Therefore, one notes that the only ethnic group that was given the 20% representational rights for non-majority citizens by the Ohrid Agreement is the Albanian ethnic group which does give them a different status in relation to other minorities.<sup>76</sup>

Therefore, Macedonia adopted the Ohrid Agreement due to the hard pressures by the international community represented by the EU. According to Akcali, the EU was successful in ending the conflict by promising a better status towards the EU membership if the country creates reforms for becoming a multi-ethnic society.<sup>77</sup> According to her, the EU conditionality policies were successful mainly in settling the conflict and also providing benefits from structural reforms to all ethnic groups in Macedonia.<sup>78</sup> Yet, as it will be discussed in the next section, both everyday Orthodox Macedonians and Albanians have been unhappy with the implementation of the Agreement since 2001.

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<sup>74</sup> Svetomir Skaric, "Ohrid Agreement and Minority Communities in Macedonia," *Prospects of Multiculturalism in Western Balkan States* (2004): 94-110.

<sup>75</sup> "Macedonia," CIA The World Factbook, accessed May 13, 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mk.html>

<sup>76</sup> Reka, *Ten Years from the Ohrid Agreement*, 15.

<sup>77</sup> Emel Akcali, "The European Union's Competency in Conflict Resolution: The Cases of Bosnia, Macedonia and Cyprus'," *Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads* (2009): 180-197.

<sup>78</sup> Akcali, "The European Union's Competency in Conflict Resolution," 182.

## 3.2 Interpreting the Results on Local Views of the Peace-Living Process

This section will analyze the key issues towards successful liberal norm exportation and internalization in Bosnian and Macedonian societies identified by the everyday, local people themselves. Namely, interpreting the interviews conducted in the two countries, one concludes that the major obstacles towards the complete internalization of the norms ‘prescribed’ by Dayton and Ohrid Agreements are: lack of local ownership by everyday citizens, Eurocentric approach to conflict settlement, and paternalism of the international community. All of these issues will be further elaborated on and explained in the following three subsections.

### 3.2.1 Local Ownership in Liberal Conflict Settlement Processes in Bosnia and Macedonia

The term *local ownership* is almost a mandatory buzz-word in debates related to peace-building, state-building, development aid, and conflict settlement. Namely, the motivation behind advocating for the promotion of local ownership is to acquire better effectiveness and sustainability in peace-building actions.<sup>79</sup> With the effective use of local ownership, activities conducted by the external actors are believed to be better accepted and absorbed by the local population.<sup>80</sup> Ideally, ensuring the strong presence of local ownership will ensure the long-term sustainability of the peace operations, and as such will not depend on the constant involvement and financing of the external actors. However, it is important to note that many scholars critique the concept as being too vaguely used. Reich claims that there is not enough debate dedicated towards the creation of a concrete meaning of the concept as well as precise steps on how it is to be achieved.<sup>81</sup> Therefore, it is not surprising that the concept is often too ambiguous to be successfully applied, but yet too

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<sup>79</sup> Richmond, “Becoming liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism,” 332.

<sup>80</sup> Hannah Reich, “Local Ownership,” *Conflict Transformation Projects: Partnership, Participation or Patronage* (2006): 5.

<sup>81</sup> Reich, “Local Ownership,” 7.

vital in ensuring the internal sustainability of any kind of external operations, especially peace related ones.

Interpreting the answers coming from all five ethnic groups on the ways in which the everyday people perceive the implementation of the Dayton and Ohrid Agreements, one may find out that the issue of local ownership has been identified as the major obstacle towards the successful application of the two agreements in Bosnia and Macedonia, respectively. For the purpose of this analysis the concept local ownership is used to describe the extent to which the local population in Bosnia and Macedonia feel that they as citizens 'possess' the Peace Agreements that were adopted on their behalf.

Namely, it is important to note that during the Agreement negotiating process, the only local representatives present in both instances were the leaders and representatives of the divided sides. In the case of Macedonia, those were the political elite, representatives of the Orthodox Macedonians, and Albanian nationalists represented by the NLA. Similarly, in the Bosnian case, the representatives were the war and at the same time leaders of Bosniak, Serb, and Croat ethnic groups. It is obvious that the local voices representing ordinary, everyday people were not involved in this process. Hence, the Agreements focused on 'satisfying' the requirements and demands expressed by the local elites who were the major conflict initiators in the first place.<sup>82</sup> One Croatian interviewee stated *that since the voices of ordinary, everyday citizens were not present during the Agreement negotiation process and the locals were only represented by the ethnic leaders (who were also war leaders) the solution was the best one at the time*. His answer precisely demonstrates the dissatisfaction of the local, everyday citizens whose opinions and wishes were not taken into

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<sup>82</sup> Simon Chesterman, "Imposed Constitutions, Imposed Constitutionalism, and Ownership," *Conn. L. Rev.* 37 (2004): 947.



consideration during the peace negotiation processes.

Therefore, one concludes that the local majority, the everyday citizens of Bosnia and Macedonia did not come up with these liberal norms of multi-ethnic understandings of their society that are prescribed by the two Agreements. On the contrary, the liberal norms and understandings such as multi-ethnic society, good governance, democratic society, etc. were imposed upon them through the liberal norm exportation in the design of peace agreements that are being of vital importance in these two societies. As such, the local population feels no ownership and responsibility towards the implementation of the articles written in the Agreements themselves. As a matter of fact, the vast majority of the interviewed everyday citizens in Bosnia and Macedonia stated that they are not fully aware of the content of the Dayton/Ohrid Agreement. It is important to note that this does not imply that the everyday people do not see the importance of the two agreements in the conflict settlement in Bosnia and Macedonia. On the contrary, according to their answers it is possible to conclude that citizens do value and evaluate the Agreements as necessary in ending ethnic conflicts in two countries. However, it is also possible to recognize a high degree of dissatisfaction with the international approach towards solving the local issues at the times of the Agreements negotiation. Thus, the lack of local ownership and consequently liberal norm institutionalization in the Agreement implementation since 1995 can be summed up by the claim of one of the Bosniak interviewees that *the Agreement created the basis for political and ethnic leaders to further spread their ideas of nationalism and ethnic hatred*. Thus, the Agreement succeeded in primarily gaining the support of the local elites, who were also involved in the conflict, and who have accepted the Agreement in order to implement their own, personal, hidden

agendas.<sup>83</sup>

Similarly, in the case of Macedonia, the interviewed representatives of everyday people through their answers have described that the people themselves did not come to the understanding that the provision of equal rights among Orthodox Macedonians and Albanians was required. Namely, as it is demonstrated through the answers of the Orthodox Macedonians, a multi-ethnic Macedonia was not desired by their majority at the time. Naturally, their answers show that now they feel that Macedonia is moving away from being a one-nation state, which is not desired by the majority of its citizens. On the contrary, the responses of the representatives of the everyday Albanians in Macedonia demonstrate that they do not feel that they are being treated in a manner that is prescribed by the Ohrid Agreement, and as such feel that the ethnic majority is not implementing the imposed values mandated by the Agreement. Hence, the interviewees demonstrated that the lack of norm internalization related to multi-ethnic society in Macedonia, led towards the unsuccessful implementation of the Agreement.

Finally, one may conclude that in theory, the two Agreements have been perfectly planned and written. However, in reality, interviewed everyday people of Bosnia and Macedonia express their discontent with the manner in which the Agreements were negotiated and in which they are being implemented in two countries. The Agreements, created in order to settle ethnic conflicts have turned out to be a country's constitution with a huge and dysfunctional administration in Bosnian case, and a 'threat towards a loss of nation state' in Macedonia.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, one of the primary limits to exportation of liberal norms to Bosnia and Macedonia through the Dayton and Ohrid Agreements is the lack of local ownership required to internalize, absorb, sustain, and act

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<sup>83</sup> Timothy Donais, "Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes," *Peace & Change* 34, no. 1 (2009): 3-26.

<sup>84</sup> Ulf Brunnbauer, "The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Ethnic Macedonian Resentments," *JEMIE* (2002): 1.

upon these norm.

### 3.2.2 Eurocentrism in Conflict Settlement Agreements in Bosnia and Macedonia

The issue of Eurocentric approach to conflict settlement and peace-building is closely related to the issue of lack of local ownership in the negotiation and design of the Agreements. Namely, as it was argued in Chapter 1, since precise directions for conflict settlement and peace-building operations do not exist, the intervening actors usually apply the norms and approaches they believe would be the best in the given situation. One of the Bosniak interviewees claimed that *the international community had the major role in creating the Dayton Agreement, and it was created in accordance to their (referring to international community) previous experiences in 'fixing' the post-conflict societies*. This acknowledgment demonstrates that everyday people are aware of the inability to 'copy-paste' norms and solutions from one state to another. Therefore, without consulting any local representatives, besides the local elites, the external actors rely on their own understanding of the issue, and finding a solution they believe will work based on their liberal norms and practices. It is impossible not to note that the issue of Eurocentrism is also related to the issue of paternalism present in peace operations of the international community which will be discussed in the next subsection.

Eurocentrism is primarily present in the design of the two Peace Agreements, where the Western liberal democracies perceive themselves as the development models and as such have designed and created the Agreements in accordance to their liberal norms and ideas. In addition, by having a Eurocentric approach, the international actors very often end up addressing only the symptoms, but not the root causes of a conflict.<sup>85</sup> Interpreting the answers of everyday people in Bosnia and Macedonia, the everyday people believe that the each Peace Agreement was successful

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<sup>85</sup> Wendy Lambourne, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding," *Security Dialogue* 31 (2000): 357.

only in the conflict settlement, but not conflict transformation and liberal norm internalization, precisely due to the Eurocentrism in approaching the conflict. As such, the already existing ethnic tensions were not solved, but only frozen. Namely, one Serbian interviewee characterized the involvement of the international community in conflict settlement in Bosnia as a *Eurocentric approach to conflict resolution that does not work in practice*. His answer demonstrates that coming from the outside, Western liberal peace-builders have not taken into consideration the local customs, historic relationships, and practices in order to design an unique sustainable solution to the conflict among three ethnic groups in Bosnia.<sup>86</sup>

Similarly, in Macedonia, by the creation of the Ohrid Agreement, the Western peace-builders did not address the core issue, mentioned in the first section of this Chapter, of conflict between Orthodox Macedonians and Albanians.<sup>87</sup> Instead they solved the current obvious problem by providing the Albanian minority more rights, and promising the Orthodox Macedonian leadership better EU accession status.<sup>88</sup> It was naive of the EU representatives to expect that simply by mandating the normative prescription in regards to the multi-ethnicity of Macedonia by the Ohrid Agreement will create a true multi-ethnic society within the country. As the country is still away from its EU accession, the political predominantly Orthodox Macedonian elite to be fully engaged in the field of democracy and multi-ethnicity promotion among the citizens.<sup>89</sup> In addition, the Ohrid Agreement requests that Macedonia has to encourage bilingualism in districts where the population of the ethnic minority is greater than 20%. One cannot but notice that the EU preceded the conflict settlement in Macedonia with an idealistic expectation that the political elites will be willing to give up their current power(s) in order to create a truly multi-ethnic state. Namely, by

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<sup>86</sup> Paris and Sisk, "Introduction: Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding," 15.

<sup>87</sup> Reka, *Ten Years from the Ohrid Agreement*, 16.

<sup>88</sup> Akcali, "The European Union's Competency in Conflict Resolution," 188.

<sup>89</sup> Reka, *Ten Years from the Ohrid Agreement*, 17.

adapting the institutionalized liberal norms in accordance to local customs and traditions the society would potential be able to internalize them and make Macedonia a truly multi-ethnic state, which is not in the interest of the Orthodox political elites in Macedonia.

Therefore, one concludes that by being involved in the conflict settlement the Western interventionists, led by the EU and the US strove to promote liberal norms and practices in order to encourage a manner of subjectivity that is conducive to Western standards and policies.<sup>90</sup> Unfortunately, without an active and constant involvement of the everyday people, who would successfully internalize the Western liberal norms, the norm exportation through peace-building process faced its limit.

### **3.2.3 International Community's Paternalism in Conflict Settlement in Bosnia and Macedonia**

Paternalism is very easy to slip in the conflict settlement process. Being a blend of care and control,<sup>91</sup> paternalism functions in the name of humanity and as such defends its legitimacy on the ground claiming to represent the interest of the targeted communities.<sup>92</sup> An obvious issue with paternalism is that the interference with the other is justified as the benefit for the other, without presenting the obvious self-interest of the paternalist, representatives of the international community in the cases of Bosnia and Macedonia. According to Barnett, contemporary tools such as institutions, information and knowledge, and experts have replaced the violent and obvious colonial paternalism. Thus, the paternalism has not disappeared, but has changed its methods and imposed more rigorous norms, procedures, and institutional limitations upon international actors

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<sup>90</sup> Juha Käpylä and Denis Kennedy, "Cruel to Care? Investigating the Governance of Compassion in the Humanitarian Imaginary," *International Theory* 6, no. 2 (2014): 255-292.

<sup>91</sup> Barnett, "Humanitarian Governance," 487.

<sup>92</sup> Barnett, "Humanitarian Governance," 488.

that plan to intrude the lives of others for their own good.

Furthermore, the merging discourses of security and development especially in the past 20 years the global South has been reinterpreted as dangerous, and thus in order to secure the order within the global governance, using developmental tools to resolve antagonisms peacefully and prevent fragile states from failing.<sup>93</sup> Hence, the international community, the West, holds that in order to prevent various transnational threats (fragile markets and countries) these states cannot be left to their own methods of problem solving, and thus the international community needs to step in and react by exporting its liberal norms and practices.<sup>94</sup>

As the conflict states are believed to represent a risk for the international security globally, it is of no surprise that the Western liberal democracies strive to intervene and prevent its possible escalation. Namely, the presence of Eurocentrism enhances the rationality that perceives liberal democracy as the model of progressive and advanced in relation to other governing systems.<sup>95</sup> This kind of classification forms a global ordering that broadens the liberal democracy project to societies and states that are viewed as a 'threat' to the security of the entire international community.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, the security issue relevant to the leaders of the international community, Western liberal democracies, such as 'weak' states created by ethnic conflicts, are constructed as risks that require immediate international response.<sup>97</sup> This type of labeling creates power structures that give exclusive rights to norms of the 'liberal' core in order to protect itself from the illiberal periphery.<sup>98</sup> As such, Western democracies feel responsible towards securing the international

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<sup>93</sup> Mark Duffield, "The Liberal Way of Development and the Development—Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 1 (2010): 53-76.

<sup>94</sup> Hughes, and Pupavac, "Framing post-conflict societies," 884.

<sup>95</sup> Sabaratnam, "Avatars of Eurocentrism in the Critique of the Liberal Peace," 264.

<sup>96</sup> William Clapton, "Risk in international relations," *International Relations* 25, no. 3 (2011): 286.

<sup>97</sup> Hughes and Pupavac, "Framing post-conflict societies," 886.

<sup>98</sup> William Clapton and Shahar Hameiri, "The Domestic Politics of International Hierarchy: Risk Management and the Reconstitution of International Society," *International Politics* 49, no. 1 (2012): 59-77.

community, which enhances the presence paternalism in approaching the rest of the world.

Moreover, in their responses, interviewees recognized the presence of paternalism in the involvement of the international community in the peace-settlement process in Bosnia and Macedonia. According to Robinson<sup>99</sup>, the international intervention in weak, conflict contexts often create regimes that are dependent on the outside powers, instead of creating strong self-governing states. Hence, the settled conflict usually requires constant international presence and intervention in domestic affairs. So, as one Orthodox Macedonian interviewee notices, the international community *still monitors the Albanian-Orthodox Macedonian relations in the country and tries to interfere when there is a disagreement on certain ethnic issues*.

Furthermore, out of the total of forty-five interviewees in Bosnia and thirty in Macedonia, only ten everyday people stated that the international community has no further role in the implementation of the Dayton/Ohrid Agreement. Therefore, the vast majority of everyday people still believe that it is the role of the international community to still be actively involved and ensure the just implementation of the Agreements. This paternalistic behavior of the international community has been internalized and accepted by the everyday people who have no trust in the local governments. Hence, neither of the Agreements was successful in terms of creating a domestic internalization of the liberal Western norms and values in relation to living in modern, multi-ethnic societies.

Consequently, one may conclude that identified components of liberal norm exportation through the peace-building processes do represent serious obstacles towards the liberal norm internalization by the local people in Bosnia and Macedonia. Interpreting the answers provided by

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<sup>99</sup> Neil Robinson, *State-building and International Politics: the Emergence of a 'New' Problem and Agenda*, (London: Routledge, 2007), 1-28.

the interviewees the Eurocentric and paternalistic approach to norm exportation prevents the norm adaptation to the local traditions and customs and as such its final internalization within the society. Therefore, the liberal norm exportation process in Bosnia and Macedonia did not involve the local voices, and was imposed upon the everyday people to be accepted and implemented. This kind of Eurocentric and paternalistic behavior demonstrates the neocolonial attitude towards ‘civilizing’ the ‘uncivilized’ without his/her active involvement.

Finally, this Chapter aimed to provide an analytical interpretation of the empirical findings presented in Chapter 2. Thus, one may conclude that according to the everyday people in Bosnia and Macedonia the major reasons for the lack of norm internalization through peace-building processes are: the lack of local ownership during the agreement drafting and negotiation processes, the presence of Eurocentrism, and paternalism in the approach of the international community.

Since the majority of the existing research on norm exportation focuses on analyzing the norm entrepreneurs and their manner of norm exportation, the conclusions based on the perceptions of the everyday people who are targeted by the norm exportation provide a distinctive perception. Hence, this research contributes to the existing literature on the norm exportation during the peace-building process with a unique perspective – the perceptions of the everyday people on the reasons behind the lack of norm internalization in post-conflict societies.



## Conclusion

This thesis aimed to investigate the impact of peace agreements on the lives of everyday people in Bosnia and Macedonia. By exploring the limits of liberal norm exportation during the peace-building processes in post-conflict states, the thesis intention was to identify whether the liberal norms have been successfully internalized by the individuals in the context of Bosnia and Macedonia through the Dayton and Ohrid Agreements, respectively.

Therefore, as it has been demonstrated in this research, the application of the liberal norm exportation seems unsuccessful in instances that lack local ownership of those very ideals such are the cases of Bosnia and Macedonia. Namely, it is important to note that based on findings of this research the everyday people in Bosnia and Macedonia do not seem to be against the liberal norms and values, but since these ideas and norms were imposed upon them to be accepted and implemented, the process of internalization is ineffective. An obvious example would be the fact that the Ohrid Agreement defines Macedonia as a multi-ethnic country. However, based on the interviews with the everyday Orthodox Macedonians and Albanians, there is a significant number of people who do not feel that Macedonian society is a truly multi-ethnic society with an equal treatment for all citizens.

As it has been revealed in Chapter 3, due to the lack of local ownership demonstrated through the interviews, in the peace-settlement process, everyday people of Bosnia and Macedonia do not feel responsible for the implementation of the Peace Agreements. As such, the liberal norm exportation in the form of peace-building faces its limits, as the well-designed ‘prescriptions’ for successful conflict settlement in the two countries are not completely implemented and internalized by the targeted group – the everyday people.

Furthermore, it is possible to observe several major obstacles to the successful liberal norm internalization by the local communities in Bosnia and Macedonia. Firstly, the lack of fruitful implementation that would lead towards conflict resolution is due to the fact that the Dayton and Ohrid Agreements failed to ensure the conflict transformation between the divided sides. Interpreting the interviewees conducted in Bosnia and Macedonia, one may conclude that conflicts between ethnic groups have only been settled, but not transformed. Hence, the everyday people, the 'recipients', fail to internalize liberal democratic norms as they have not been designed in accordance to local customs, traditions, and understandings. Naturally, as the members of local society cannot relate themselves to the international prescriptions, they fail to internalize them, and as such the liberal norm exportation reaches its limits. Secondly, the Eurocentric approach and paternalism, which are closely related to each other, form the manner in which the Western representatives of the international community access the process of peace-settlement and thus peace-building. As the representatives of the international community believe that their approach to conflict settlement is well-established and superior they often stay blind to the root causes of a conflict. Hence, one may recognize a mismatch between the target of the supposedly good and beneficial liberal norms and the local conditions on the ground that prevent the norm internalization.

Therefore, this thesis aimed to investigate the relationship between the liberal norm imperative and the everyday, local rationales as the result of that very push. The research concludes that newly molded circumstances created by this interaction of liberal rationalities with the local social structures does not lead towards conflict transformation. On the contrary, as it was demonstrated in the cases of Bosnia and Macedonia, this interaction was successful in terms of settling the conflict, but not resolving it completely. Instead, the Agreements created in order to

ensure the sustainability of peace intervention seem to be causing more dissatisfaction as there is decreased international interest in these states with the conflict not being vividly present any longer.

Finally, this research offers a unique perspective to the already existing literature on the liberal norm exportation within the peace-building process. By reaching out directly to the everyday people it was possible to learn about their perceptions on the peace-building processes designed and implemented on their behalf. Research results demonstrate that everyday people, the group targeted by the peace-building process often stays unheard during the design and implementation of the peace process itself. As such, these people ‘fail’ to internalized all the ‘good’ prescriptions that are believed to benefit them as a society. Moreover, the findings suggest that the future peace agreements should be designed in a manner that somehow includes the voices of the everyday people in all stages of conflict settlement and peace-building processes.

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