CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2015
| Author | Trifan, Isabella Ana-Maria |
|---|---|
| Title | Lives Worth Starting and the Non-Identity Problem |
| Summary | In this paper I propose a person-affecting solution to the notorious non-identity problem. The non-identity problem arises in cases where a prospective parent’s options are to either conceive a child that she knows will suffer from a severe disability, but would still have a life worth living, or conceive a different, healthy child at a different time. Most people believe the morally right choice is to bring the healthy child into existence rather than the disabled one, but it seems that this conclusion cannot be supported by concern for the disabled child’s well-being, as it seems that for her the only two possibilities are a life with a disability, or no life at all. Following David Benatar, I argue that there is a distinction between a life worth starting and a life worth continuing. A bad situation that would make life not worth starting may not be bad enough to make life worth ending. If this is true, there need not be a paradox in saying that non-existence in the sense of never starting a life can be preferable to a life worth living understood as continuing. Further, I argue for the right not to be brought into existence with a life not worth starting, even though it may be worth continuing once it has started. I appeal to Ronald Dworkin’s view of life as a challenge, and his understanding of a good life as a skilful performance in the face of this challenge. The opportunities for well-being, or the limits for how good our performance can be, are set by the parameters of our life, namely our specific circumstances. Some of these parameters are normative, which means that no matter how well one responds to their circumstances (i.e. they have a life worth continuing), their life still goes badly because they should have not been facing those circumstances in the first place (their life was not worth starting). One has the right not to be caused to exist with a life not worth starting, where this means a life that is set within inadequate parameters that impermissibly limit one’s opportunities for well-being. |
| Supervisor | Moles, Andres |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2015/trifan_isabella.pdf |
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