CEU eTD Collection (2015); Vitasovic, Daria: Subjective Intentionality and Unconscious Phenomenology

CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2015
Author Vitasovic, Daria
Title Subjective Intentionality and Unconscious Phenomenology
Summary Abstract
The aim of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, I will argue for the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis from an immediate, 1st person perspective on intentionality or Subjective Intentionality. By Subjective Intentionality I entail an intrinsic source of intentionality; that is, a state, in order to be genuinely intentional, has to be intentional for me. Secondly, I intend to provide an answer to the main objection for the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis, namely that phenomenology requires consciousness, hence intentionality requires consciousness. But there are unconscious intentional states, which would imply that the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis is false. I will present empirical evidence for genuinely intentional unconscious perceptual states. I argue that these states are Subjectively Intentional and Phenomenally Intentional. If both of this is true, then unconscious states are Genuinely Intentional. And if there is unconscious perceptual phenomenology, then I see no prima facie problem in inferring from that to the unconscious phenomenology of a thought.
Keywords: intentionality, phenomenology, consciousness, unconscious, first person perspective.
Supervisor Pitt, David
Department Philosophy MA
Full texthttps://www.etd.ceu.edu/2015/vitasovic_daria.pdf

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