Manifestations of Diplomacy:
U.S. and British Response to the Balkan Wars

By

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the diplomatic history of the United States and Great Britain through their responses to the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913. While most research into the diplomatic involvement of the Balkan Wars attempts to place it either as a prelude to World War I or as the final chapter of the long 19th century, this thesis examines the two wars as a discreet moment in diplomatic history. Great Britain and the United States were chosen for comparison due to their dissimilar trajectories of global prominence. Additionally, as each empire was highly dependent upon the other in order to maintain its diplomatic policies, this thesis explores the differences between U.S. and British diplomacy in order to show how each contributed discreetly to international reaction to the Balkan Wars. Situated before the destruction of World War I, yet removed enough from 19th century international politics so as to allow countries like the U.S. to develop novel forms of diplomacy, the Balkan Wars offer a unique glimpse into the diplomatic trends of two vastly different centuries.

In order to compare the U.S. and Great Britain this thesis analyzes the historical diplomatic traditions underscoring each nations' policy. These findings are then contrasted with contemporary news reports on the Balkan Wars in order to demonstrate the self-reinforcing tendency of historical legal precedent and public opinion. The cyclical relationship between precedent and reaction are examined for unifying themes. The commonalities between the two categories make up the diplomatic culture of each nation. These diplomatic cultures are then compared so as to explain the differing diplomatic responses of Great Britain and the United States regarding the wars in the Balkans. Drawing on methods of analysis established by Walter Russell Mead and Pamela J. Dorn Sezgin, this thesis establishes the diplomatic culture of the United States to be economically

motivated and that of Great Britain to be geographically motivated. Furthermore, it demonstrates how this difference in diplomatic culture dictated the differing responses by the two nations to the Balkan Wars.

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Introduction

At the turn of the 20th century, the global balance of power was in a state of upheaval. Empires that had stood for centuries were receding in prominence. New contenders began to challenge the established order. Though Europe remained the focal point of power in the world, signs of its eroding stability and eminence became increasingly apparent. The United States in particular rose in stature in global affairs. During this period new and old clashed in and came together to form new ways of approaching and solving international conflicts. There is no better example of this process of reimaging diplomacy than the First and Second Balkan Wars occurring the two years prior to World War I. The conflicts challenged not only diplomatic relations that had bound Europe for nearly a century, but also questioned more broadly the underpinnings of European identity.

Despite the extensive and long lasting ramifications, the Balkan Wars are a period too often overlooked when studying Europe prior to World War I. Undeniably, the Balkan Wars strained European relations and exacerbated long standing animosities. However, they also offer a unique opportunity to highlight the culmination of the empire-building strategies developed over the course of the long 19th century. Despite being a relatively minor succession of conflicts in terms of duration and geographic extent, the Balkan Wars managed to involve the diplomatic efforts of nearly every major power. Additionally, the outpouring of support from private entities, such as charitable organizations, businesses, and individuals demonstrates that the effects of the Balkan Wars emanated far beyond the confines of southeastern Europe. While World War I is often considered the turning point from a world order dominated by European empires, which defined the global politics of the 19th century, into the system of nation-states

existing in the 20th century and on to the present, I would contend that the Balkan Wars provide a better point of comparison. World War I represented an inescapable conclusion for European empires whereas the Balkan Wars provide an international diplomatic incident with no preordained promise of change and a culmination that brought effects of various diplomatic strategies into sharp relief without their complete dismantlement.

Though I utilize the Balkan Wars as a point of comparison for differing diplomatic policies, my goal is to highlight the internal developments of differing sovereign entities and show how such developments resulted in differing forms of response. Specifically, I use the Balkan Wars to compare the diplomatic models of the United States and Great Britain. My intent therefore is not to provide a definitive history of the Balkan Wars themselves, but rather to use the response offered by the U.S. and Great Britain to the Balkan Wars to highlight the differences in international outlook held by each empire. In this thesis, I argue that while Great Britain pursued a diplomatic policy based primarily on maintaining geographic stability, the United States based its diplomatic policy on maintaining economic stability, and that this difference reflects the contraction of the British Empire and the expansion of the American Empire. To arrive at this conclusion I demonstrate first how their differing responses to the Balkan Wars arose from the evolution in interpretation of preexisting official proclamations regarding the respective empires' justification for international involvement. Second, I show how these official policies manifested themselves, and were influenced by, reactions to print media produced in each respective empire.

I chose to compare the U.S. and Great Britain for two distinct reasons. First, the trajectories of growth between the American Empire and the British Empire were inverted from one another. By this I mean, Britian was in the midst of consolidation, both in terms of direct

territorial control as well as in international influence. Conversely, the U.S. emerged out of the 19th century on a wave of expansion both internally as well as abroad. Second, the British Empire was firmly connected to the imperial trends across Europe throughout the 19th century and maintained this relationship all the way through the Balkan Wars. Meanwhile, the U.S. existing in relative isolation from Europe during the 19th century developed quite differently. Thus, when the U.S. began to seriously dedicate itself to European diplomacy, just prior to the Balkan Wars, it did not carry with it decades-worth of accumulated diplomatic obligations and expectations.

Literature Review

Writing about the Balkans brings up issues of self-fashioning identity, particularly on the part of the Great Powers. The Balkan Peninsula represents a problematic area because it is both European, yet often rejected as belonging to a wholly European identity. The confusion is further intensified when one population group, in this case Great Britain for the purposes of this thesis, defines itself, at least in part, against what it perceives to be its antithesis. This problem of identity is most famously tackled by Edward Said in his book *Orientalism*.[1] In the book he sets up European identity as being based upon any and all factors deemed opposite from the Orient. For Said, the core identity of the Orient, which he contends is a wholly constructed conglomeration based on European stereotypes, includes exoticism, effeminacy, and decadence.

While Said's text does not directly apply to the population of the Balkan Peninsula, due to its disputed European identity, Said's theory was the base that Maria Todorova revised and reworked in her book *Imagining the Balkans*.[2] Her concept of balkanism is especially pertinent in understanding British treatment of the region. Essentially, balkanism is the dark, violent, hyper-masculine counterpart to Said's theory of orientalism. Another point of difference is that while Said referred to orientalism as a stereotype that lumped dissimilar groups together into an artificial whole, Todorova refers to balkanism as the stereotyped unavoidable splitting within a unified group into violent subgroups. For the purposes of this thesis, Todorova represents a better model to follow since it helps explain the reasoning behind British dismissal of the Balkan peoples.

[1] Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Random House 1978).
[2] Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009).

There are a number of good sources detailing the role of Britain during the Balkan Wars, and specifically its role in steering diplomatic relations. Generally, the focus tends to be on the legacy of charismatic leaders such as William Gladstone or Benjamin Disraeli. Another feature is the role of a colluding elite who controlled most aspects of British diplomacy. Recently however, there has been some focus on alternative avenues of British diplomacy such as the role of the press in soliciting popular support within Britain itself.

Of the former category, Miloš Ković's book *Disraeli and the Eastern Question* provides an overview of the role Disraeli played in steering British attitudes towards the Balkans.[3] Ković presents D'israeli as being the mastermind behind British policy regarding the Balkans. This type of writing is notable because it also highlights the challenging nature of British politics at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. The liberal-conservative split within British government then becomes the dominatinig feature steering British policy domestically and abroad.

T. G. Otte, in his book *The Foreign Office Mind*, and D. C. Watt, in his book *Succeeding John Bull* demonstrate a preference for focusing on the elite decision makers in the creation of foreign policy.[4] Though they utilize different terminology, the effect is similar. Namely, a close examination of elite cirlces, comprising both statesmen and influential third-party entities like newspaper owners. Otte refers to this as the "Foreign Office Mind." Watt in turn calls this group the "Elite," which sums up the nature of this style of history well. Essentially, under this interpretation of British history most important foreign policy decisions are handled by a semiformal oligarchy. This method of writing history is useful insofar as it allows for easy

[3] Miloš Ković, *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011).
[4] T.G. Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011)
D. C. Watt, *Succeeding John Bull*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984).

identification of certain key members of society. However, taken singularly these texts offer a skewed presentation of events.

The last genre brings in unofficial actors as representative of the underlying assumptions and opinions held by the public. This offers a good counterpoint to the previously referenced form of analysis in that it demonstrates that entities as large as Empires do not function solely on the actions of a select cadre of individuals. Andrew Hammond's book *Debated Lands: British and American Representations of the Balkans* is a good example of this style of writing.[5] Hammond relies extensively on travelogues and other non-governmental publications to illustrate the broad level of support necessary to create official policies on the level of empire.

Two other closely related examples deal with the presentation of the Balkans in the British press. The first is Pamela Dorn Sezgin's article "Between Cross and Crescent: British Diplomacy and Press Opinion toward the Ottoman Empire in Resolving the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913."[6] In the article she highlights the types of discord occurring domestically, such as union disputes and burgeoning feminism. Against this backdrop she analyzes the depictions of the Ottoman Empire in popular newspapers. Aleksandar Rastović's article "Srbija u Ogledalu Britanske Štampe Tokom Balkanskih Ratova" – Serbia in the Mirror of the British Press during the Balkan Wars, also analyzes the British press. However, his focus is on established experts, such as Edith Durham and R. W. Seton-Watson and how they influenced the British public.[7]

[5] Andrew Hammond, *Debated Lands: British and American Representations of the Balkans*, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press 2007)
[6] Pamela J. Dorn Sezgin, "Between Cross and Crescent: British Diplomacy and Press Opinion toward the Ottoman Empire in Resolving the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913," *War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, and their Sociopolitcal Implications*, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press 2013): 423-473
[7] Aleksander Rastović, "Srbija u Ogledalu Britanske Štampe Tokom Balkanskih Ratova" *Istorijski Časopis*, (2003): 95-105.

Though not as extensive as Dorn Sezgin's article, it offers another way of interpreting British perception of the Balkans

The biggest issue in writing a history of American diplomatic interactions during the Balkan War is the distinct lack of coverage by most historians of American diplomacy. Diplomatic histories focus on the buildup of the United States following the American Civil War. From there the attention progresses onto America's expanding role in world politics, particularly in Asia, following the Spanish-American War at the end of the 19th century. At this point, U.S. diplomatic history trails focuses on America's involvement in Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Diplomatic history of the U.S in Europe picks up at the outbreak of World War I. While some histories exist covering the American interactions with the Great Powers, coverage of American interactions in the Balkans is largely absent, save for brief acknowledgements of the Balkan Wars as a prelude to World War I.

Given this precedent, the utility of established authors of American diplomacy is their ability to raise the right sort of questions, which hold merit not because they focus on a minute point in American history but because they inform ways of thinking about nebulous trends in American history. In turn, these questions allow for the wedding of trends with temporally discreet events. In this regard, Walter Russell Mead, in his book *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and how it changed the World*, offers a compelling example.[8] He posits that the entirety of American diplomatic history is an endless debate between four reoccurring schools of thought, which he names based on presidents Hamilton, Jefferson, Jackson, and Wilson. For Mead these foreign policy debates are statically fixed around economic expansionism, strict isolationism, hawkish fear mongering, and beneficent extroversion respectively, with different

[8] Walter Russel Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and how it Changed the World*, (New York: Routledge 2002)

schools of thought gaining prominence over others due to the specific events affecting the U.S. at any given point in time. Walter McDougall takes a similar position to Mead in his book *Promised Land, Crusader State: the American Encounter with the World since 1776*.[9] His biggest deviation from Mead is focusing on cyclically invoked documents, which he breaks down into two canons – an "old testament" and a "new testament." However his general premise remains remarkably similar to Mead's.

The counter to Mead's take on American foreign policy comes from Alfred Eckes Jr. and Thomas Zeiler in their work *Globalization and the American Century*.[10] For these two scholars, the history of American diplomacy is one of a forward, evolutionary march, with each subsequent event or action undertaken or experienced by the American public moving the nation irreversibly forward. Besides arguing for globalization as an unstoppable and irreversible trend, they focus heavily on the effect non-governmental entities, such as corporations or private individuals, have in shaping America's perception of the world.

A third form of presenting the history of American foreign policy stands somewhat between that of Mead and that of Eckes and Zeiler. This form, which is well illustrated in *American Foreign Policy: a Documentary Survey 1776-1960*, edited by Dorothy Goebel, follows the unrelenting march forward model, favored by Eckes and Zeiler, yet focuses primarily on the governmental policy makers singled out by Mead.[11] Another example of this method, yet focused more closely on the 20th century, rather than all of American history, is *U.S. Diplomacy since 1900: Fourth Edition* by Robert Schulzinger.[12] This method feels outdated, which Goebel

[9] Walter A. MacDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: the American Encounter with the World since 1776*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1997).
[10] Alfred E. Eckes Jr. and Thomas W. Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003).
[11] Dorothy Goebel, *American Foreign Policy: a Documentary Survey 1776-1960*, (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston Inc. 1961).
[12] Robert Schulzinger, *U.S. Diplomacy since 1900: Fourth Edition*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998).

herself acknowledges in her introduction, especially given trends in historiography, published after her work, that illustrate the effects wrought by the previously overlooked silent majority.

When comparing Great Britain to the United States, some benchmarks need to be established as to how and what is actually being compared. In this regard, histories of empire offer a good starting point. The two most helpful for comparing the foreign policies of Great Britain and the U.S. are Julian Go's *Patterns of Empire: the British and American Empires 1688 to the Present* and *Colossus: the Price of America's Empire* by Niall Ferguson.[13] Go is useful because she introduces two distinct forms of comparison that work together to create a portrait of imperial self-fashioning. First, the dichotomy between formal and informal exercises of power and the blurred spectrum of coercion and sovereignty. Second, self-fashioning exceptionalism and the denial of empire. These two points are important when comparing the responses of Great Britain and the United States to the Balkan Wars since they in part help explain the shifting nature of empire occurring concurrently to the conflicts. Ferguson offers a similar point of comparison, specifically the application of soft power, yet he places a greater emphasis on self-fashioning within empire and the necessity of maintaining a "will to power."[14]

[13] Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: the British and American Empires 1688 to the Present*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011).
Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: the Price of America's Empire*, (New York: Penguin Press 2004).
[14] Ibid, 29.

Methodology

In analyzing the British and American responses to the Balkan Wars, I base this thesis on the frameworks established by Walter Russell Mead, and Pamela J. Dorn Sezgin. Specifically, Mead's contention that there are a finite number of common reoccurring tropes governing the entirety of American diplomacy forms the entry point into my analysis of British and American diplomatic policy regarding the Balkan Wars. This raises the question what are the static tropes that govern British and American diplomacy? And following this, are they the same as those delineated by Mead? Regarding the second question, the answer seemed to be intuitively false, if for no other reason than Britain did not share the same governmental history as the United States. However, to find an alternative to Mead's proposed categories a second view point is needed.

Dorn Sezgin provides a good counterpoint to Mead. His over-reliance on governmental officials, without giving enough examples on how their policies were supported by the sentiments of the public, is his largest shortcoming. Dorn Sezgin's utilization of Todorova's balkanism provides her the ability to reconstruct the public perception of the Ottoman Empire based on popular articles and satirical cartoons appearing in widely read newspapers. In so doing she is also able to highlight the level of public support for British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Based on this method of analysis, the question to be answered here is how did popular media depictions of the Balkan Wars reinforce, or detract from, the established diplomatic tradition in the United States and Great Britain?

To answer this question I examine a variety of sources, including government correspondences, statements issued by semi-official agencies like the national Red Cross societies, and a variety of types of newspapers publishing articles about the Balkan Wars. The governmental sources provide the base, as per the framework provided by Mead. However, to

test the validity of the supposed static diplomatic precedent, I compare them to contemporaneous news publications. In selecting which newspapers to use there are two criteria. First, both empires needed to have their most widely circulated publication present. In both Britain and America, these papers were heavily influenced by government policy. Therefore, to balance this I include papers with smaller circulations, the assumption being that aberration are more likely to arise from fringe news sources, providing yet another counterpart to the official static policies. By presenting both British and American policy, and their associated levels of popular support, the aim is to further highlight the effects these policies had in international diplomacy. The combination of historical precedent in governmental policy with their corresponding levels of popular support I term diplomatic culture.

This thesis is structured around two chapters. The First chapter covers the diplomatic response of Great Britain to the Balkan Wars. Due to nature of records and involvement relating to this issue, a relatively chronological narrative emerges. This is done purposefully so as to provide the reader with an overview of the progression of events that occurred during the Balkan Wars. This includes highlighting the Great Powers who had some level of involvement in the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula directly. Through this chapter emerges a general timeline concerning the history of the Balkan Wars. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the geographic concerns underpinning all aspects of British involvement. This is done by both discussing the moments when British official policy made explicit reference to the geographic stability of Europe as well as the implicit practices and attitudes adopted by all levels of British society that served as the underpinning for British conceptualization of the Balkans.

The Second chapter, concerning American involvement in the Balkans, is less concerned with presenting a linear flow of events. This is both for practical reasons, so as not to repeat

information presented in the previous chapter, but also due to the nature of the sources detailing American involvement. Whereas the British chapter follows a dedicated cause and effect timeline, the American chapter is based primarily around thematic events. These events are then connected to one another through their self-reinforcement and the ways they build off one another.

Finally, I conclude the thesis with a comparison between the two empires' responses to the Balkan Wars. Here I restate the differences that set British and American responses apart. The similarities and differences are also discussed relating to the future growth and contraction trajectories of the two empires in terms of power and international prestige. This will lead into a brief discussion over the role of the two diplomatic models following the Balkan Wars.

Chapter 1 – Britain, the Balkans, and the Concert of Europe

The onset of the Balkan Wars in October of 1912 marked the penultimate test of British diplomacy before the final conflagration of World War I. By examining the response of Great Britain to the wars in the Balkans, I highlight not only the efforts of a vast empire attempting to present a unified front in the face of extreme diplomatic crisis but also the discord arising from nearly half a century of debate by the subjects of the empire, particularly those living within the confines of the British Isles, regarding their role as arbiters of international politics. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the diplomatic culture of Great Britain, as illustrated by the empire's reaction to the Balkan Wars. This diplomatic culture, I contend, was marked by a strong desire to maintain the European status quo of the long 19th century. British response to the Balkan Wars illustrates a diplomatic culture focused on protecting geographic stability within Europe, fearful of the ramifications shifting borders between empires might elicit in the delicate balance between the European Great Powers.

The use of the term geography to describe the motivating ethos of British diplomatic culture in the early 20th century goes beyond simply the arbitrary lines drawn upon some imaginary map of Europe. Border stability for the British meant the control of populations, sanctioned access to resources, protection of British enterprise abroad, checking the possibility of conflict arising from deep seated, latent inter-imperial rivalries, and defending the empire via control over strategic, physical landscapes and strategic relations between allies. While each of these subheadings are complex issues in their own right, combined they underscore Britain's deep involvement on the European continent and show the vested interest Britain had in guiding disputes in regions of geographic contestation. Thus, with the outbreak of hostilities on October 8, 1912 between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire over national/imperial borders and claims

to sovereignty, Britain's diplomatic culture guided a response focused on the conflict's possible broad, geographic consequences in Europe.[15]

While this chapter leads to the conclusion of the existence of a broad diplomatic culture in Britain, it is important to remember the internal discord occurring simultaneously in all levels of British society.[16] Simply because there existed a diplomatic culture seeking outcomes of a geographic nature does not mean that strategies devised to obtain such outcomes were based on unanimous support. In a speech given February 14, 1912, published in *The Times* a day after its initial delivery before the British Parliament, King George V remarked, "It is lamentable that these misunderstandings and these apprehensions should exist, and it is the duty of all right-thinking people to endeavor to dispel them. In any effort to do this his Majesty's Government will, I am convinced, have the support of those who oppose them in regard to other questions."[17] The context for this passage was the King's summation of Britain's international relations with other sovereign entities. It highlights two important points. First, the not so subtle rebuke of conflicting political forces within Parliament suggests that partisan discord was undermining British efforts abroad. Second, given that parliamentarians were elected officials, and that this speech appeared verbatim in one of the most widely read newspapers in Great Britain, suggests that the hinted at ideological differences ran deep within lay citizenry as well.

On one level, the high level of partisanship within British politics at the time of the Balkan Wars stemmed from the ongoing debates between conservative and liberal factions

[15] For a detailed, albeit dated, account of the events leading up to, and during the Balkan Wars (1908-1913), please refer to the works of Neville Forbes. For a specific account of the outbreak on October 8, 1912 see - Neville Forbes, *The Balkans: a History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, and Turkey*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1915), 152.
[16] Dorn Sezgin, 423.
[17] "Great Britain and Germany," *The Times*, February 15, 1912, 10, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1912-02-15/10/1.html#start%3D1912-01-01%26end%3D1913-12-31%26terms%3Dbalkan%20war%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/2%26prev%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/15%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/17.

within British society. While somewhat outside the scope of this analysis, the basic tenants of this division can be best illustrated by the rivalry between Disraeli and Gladstone and the inheritors of their ideologies.[18] However, a more useful analysis for judging the nature of the discord within British diplomatic culture at the onset of the Balkan Wars comes from D.C. Watt, one of the most respected diplomatic historians of the 20th century. He was one of the first historians to challenge traditional assumptions of a mono-faceted diplomatic elite in British politics. Though he maintain the existence of a diplomatic elite, he qualified this support by saying, "On the British side three major qualifications have to be made to the usual assumptions of the social cohesion and unity of the British foreign-policy-making elite. The first lies in the very different career paths followed throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries by the professional soldier and the professional diplomat."[19] As will be later explained, the balance of the concerns of the military with the intricate web of treaties and diplomatic agreements binding the European empires served as one of the primary contributors to the overall British diplomatic culture focused on geographic stability.

In addition to the division in foreign policy influence between military and diplomatic elite, Watt also notes the changing access to power in British society, which allowed not only new actors to present themselves as influential in governmental process, but also provided new outlets for communication between various divisions within the British social hierarchy. He states, "It should be noted that, despite its apparent solidity, British society was far from static in 1900. Upward mobility, both by talent from the professional classes and by the acquisition of wealth from developments in newspaper ownership, distribution and industrial innovation, was

[18] For more information regarding the rivalry between William Gladstone and Isaac Disraeli, especially as it pertains to British involvement in the Balkan Peninsula in mid to late-19th century, refer to chapter four of Miloš Ković's book *Disraeli and the Eastern Question*. - 54-80.
[19] Watt, 16.

producing would-be entrants into the ruling elites from among those who were previously unacceptable...”[20] In analyzing the response by Great Britain to the Balkan Wars these changing power dynamics are important insofar as they justify the use of less traditional source material. In this case, knowing of the existence of informal or quasi-formal, lateral networks of political influence justifies elevating the role of the British press in the Balkan Wars from simply a reflection of events and opinions within British society regarding the conflicts to that of an active participant in the diplomatic process, going beyond reflection to serving as an active arbiter and mouth-piece for the official response of the British empire.

Paul Kennedy remarked on the form and function of the press in British diplomacy, writing, “Perhaps the real significance of the press lay not so much in its impact upon official policy but in its ability to worsen the political atmosphere…the tone of many papers towards foreign states was xenophobic and arrogant, qualities which could easily be transmitted to a susceptible readership. In the age of imperialism and the various pre-1914 international crises and ‘scares,’ this tone became stiffer.”[21] While this is true to a certain extent, as I will explain, connections between British diplomatic officials and the press ran deeper than suggested here by Kennedy. However, Kennedy also remarked previously that, “The views of the British press upon foreign affairs tended to reflect – and in many cases helped to create – those put forward by the political parties.”[22] This comes closer to view put forward by Watt a few years later and which is the rationale for this chapter examining the British diplomatic relations through the lens of the contemporary press.[23]

[20] Ibid, 29.
[21] Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy 1865-1980* (Hammersmith: Fontana 1981), 57.
[22] Ibid, 53.
[23] Another telling example of the role of the press in British diplomacy reads, “In the mid-1880’s most British correspondents overseas were gentlemen, i.e., of independent means, and there were, in many cases, very close personal and social connections between correspondents, their managers, and the owners of newspapers and the

In 1912, the primary international concern of Great Britain was the escalating military rivalry with Germany. While there were concerns about the stability of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, as well as territorial disputes with Russia, the sheer volume of diplomatic correspondences and news coverage over relations with Germany indicates widespread concern, bordering on fear, of the growing power of Germany. In January 1912, *The Times* reported, "While Italy is engaged in war and the Powers of the Triple Entente are absorbed by the problems in Asia and Africa, Austria has her hands free, and needs only the assent of Germany to an aggressive movement in the Balkan Peninsula."[24] This passage illustrates both the awareness in Britain of the growing turmoil in the Balkans, suggesting that the coming war later that year was not much of a surprise, as well as the role Germany played in European relations at the time. Despite having a more direct role in shaping the politics of the Balkans, Austro-Hungary, in the eyes of the British, acted primarily as a puppet to German interests.

That Britain's primary concern in European politics revolved around its relation to Germany is further reinforced by the research of T.G. Otte. He suggests that, "Indeed, it seemed politic to restore the more cordial tone that had predominated in Anglo-Austrian relations… Friendlier relations with Vienna would thus act as 'a very convenient check' on Germany."[25] Furthermore, one of the leading Balkan scholars of the era, R.W. Seton-Watson, remarked in 1911 that, "It has long been an axiom of European diplomacy that if Austria-Hungary did not exist, it would be necessary to create it; and the maintenance of its territorial integrity has justly

personnel of the Foreign Office and diplomatic service." John Fisher and Antony Best, "Introduction," *On the Fringes of Diplomacy: Influences on British Foreign Policy, 1800-1945*, (Farnham: Ashgate 2011): 1-16, 2.

[24] "Balkan Danger: Servian Apprehensions," *The Times*, January 29, 1912, 6, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1912-01-29/6/1.html#start%3D1912-01-01%26end%3D1913-12-31%26terms%3Dbalkan%20war%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/2%26prev%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/11%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/13.

[25] Otte, 337.

been regarded as a pressing European interest."[26] Here is a blatant example of the obsession with geography that drove British diplomacy just prior to the outbreak of the Balkan War. For, had Austro-Hungary grown in strength, Britain could have lost any illusion over diplomacy geared towards containment, and had Austro-Hungary diminished, or ceased to exist entirely, Britain would have lost its most important buffer against German dominance in Europe.

Despite being united in opposition to the breakdown of the status quo in Europe, opinion within Britain was deeply divided regarding the proper strategy. This becomes apparent when comparing how various newspapers reported on the outbreak of war in October, 1912. *The Times*, one of the more neutral newspapers at that time, reported, "Now that the Powers whose interests are most likely to be affected have come together we may hope that they will remain together, and that the Concert of Europe, although it has been unable to accomplish the purpose for which it was recalled into being, will at least succeed in preserving its own existence."[27] This passage suggests a sense of incredulity as to the effectiveness of diplomacy, yet does not place the blame for this distrust explicitly upon British diplomatists. Instead, blame seems to be leveled

[26] R.W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy*, (London: Constable & Co. Ltd. 1911), 337.

[27] "War Begun in the Balkans," *The Times*, October 9, 1912, 7, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1912-10-09/7/2.html#start%3D1912-01-01%26end%3D1913-12-31%26terms%3Dbalkan%20war%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/18%26prev%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/170%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/172.
A brief description of the nature of British press, "The political press of mid-century Britain was overwhelmingly Liberal. This was due, in part, to the Liberal ascendancy in London and the Home Counties, which provided the readership for such best-selling and pro-Liberal papers as the *Daily Telegraph*, *Daily News*, *Daily Chronicle*, and *Pall Mall Gazette*; but even more important was the Liberal domination of the provincial press, in the North, the Midlands, the South-west, and elsewhere. Most of the Sunday newspapers (with their even bigger sales) were Liberal, as was the great majority of the weeklies, monthlies, and quarterlies – the *Westminster*, the *Edinburgh*, the *Fortnightly*, the *Spectator* and the *Economist*. Against this, the Tories could field only the *Standard* (for the London area), the aristocratic *Morning Post*, reviews like *Blackwood's*, the *Quarterly Review*, and the *Saturday Review*, and a smaller number of provincial papers. Finally, there were various organs which proclaimed themselves 'independent,' the most famous of which was *The Times* – although for a long time it had tended to follow Palmerston." - Kennedy, 52-53.

at the Concert of Europe more broadly, the semi-formal arrangement of diplomatic ties in Europe dating back to the Napoleonic Wars.

In comparison to the more neutral position one finds the positions taken by more liberal and conservative elements within British society. The *Aberdeen Journal*, one of the oldest continuously published newspapers in the world, tended to represent a more conservative opinion.[28] In their report on the situation, they were slightly more explicit in their blame for the failings of diplomacy saying, "It shows how slowly move the wheels of diplomacy that Sir Edward Grey had no official knowledge of the war declaration when asked for news in the Commons this afternoon."[29] While on its own this passage is fairly benign, however in the following column on the same day the *Aberdeen Journal* also reported that, "Official information from Montenegro of her declaration of war was received yesterday morning at the London office of the Consul-General for Montenegro…The nature of the communication caused no surprise among the officials."[30] The pair of articles seem to imply that the *Aberdeen Journal*, and by extension its likely readership, was distrustful of the British diplomatic competency when even within one city communication could be so delayed.

The *Yorkshire Telegraph and Star*, reported from a more liberal perspective.[31] They write, "Today's news confirms the view that Europe will not allow itself to be dragged into this quarrel, but will us its united force to draw rigid limits round the area of conflict."[32] The most apparent aspect from this excerpt is the overwhelming support for the cohesion in European

[28] British Library, "More about the newspaper titles in the 19th Century British Library Newspapers database," 1, http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/pdfs/headnotesconsolidatedlist.pdf.
[29] "The Balkan Surprise," *Aberdeen Journal*, October 9, 1912, 5, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000576/19121009/040/0005.
[30] "At the Embassies," *Aberdeen Journal*, October 9, 1912, 5, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000576/19121009/040/0005.
[31] British Library, 73.
[32] "Kings in Arms," *Yorkshire Telegraph and Star*, October 9, 1912, 4, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000276/19121009/079/0004.

diplomacy. Whereas the conservative view distrusted diplomatic efforts even within Great Britain itself, and the more independent viewpoint tended to see the diplomatic breakdown between the Powers more broadly, liberal opinion strayed towards optimism regarding the viability of diplomatic solutions.

The differences in political opinion, however, did not stop the British Foreign Service from presenting a unified agenda, at least officially. In part, this can be credited to the efforts of Edward Grey. Riding the wave of liberal ascendency within British politics beginning in 1905, by the outbreak of the Balkan Wars he had "grown in stature after half a dozen years in office …noted Valentine Chirol, the foreign affairs editor of *The Times* and himself a former diplomat."[33] The policy towards the Balkan Wars pursued by Grey included maintaining friendly relations with Russia, while simultaneously working to check their desire to advance in territorial possessions and influence over southeastern Europe.[34] Likewise, though relations with Austro-Hungary were strained due to their association with Germany, British foreign policy sought both to maintain relatively cordial communications and limit Austro-Hungary's advances into the Balkans. Andrew Hammond sums up British foreign policy by writing, "Despite the various shifts in policy, and despite the political differences that existed, the British goal in south-east Europe was to achieve a stable, relatively peaceful arrangement that would ensure both British interests in the East and Great Power harmony in Europe."[35]

After Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece joined Montenegro against the Ottoman Empire on October 17-18, 1912, previous concerns over the relations between the Powers grew into fear of

[33] Otte, 322.
[34] Turkey especially was viewed as a vital link to trade in British controlled India. Illustrating this, Hammond writes, "…there was a gathering conviction that the integrity of the Sultan's dominion, and therefore of Britain's control of India, was under threat from Russian expansionism." - Hammond, 29.
[35] Ibid, 55.

full scale war in Europe.[36] Newspaper reports from late October and early November demonstrate that the British were primarily concerned with how the Balkan states might bring Russia and Austro-Hungary into conflict rather than with the actual political situation existing between the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire. For much of 1912, cautious articles appeared warning about the instability in Europe. For example, in early October *The Times* reported, "With the success of these representations is bound up the hope of averting a war which might well have incalculable consequences not only for the Balkans, but for the whole of Europe."[37] By the end of the month, however, reports became more detailed regarding the danger of the war in the Balkans spreading across Europe. For example, *The Nottingham Evening Post* reported, "should Austria make a movement to assert her claim against the Balkan States…Russia would come to the support of the Southern Slavs…Germany's throwing of her full military weight upon the side of her ally must be taken as following inevitably…British support of France and Russia is taken as a thing assured."[38]

As the war progressed through November, tensions eased between the Powers as all sought to contain conflict. The relief felt in Britain reveals itself in the optimistic turn in reporting on the war. A month after the panicked report from *The Nottingham Evening Post*, faith in the diplomatic process seemed largely restored. On November 28, *The Yorkshire Post* reported, "Apparently the risk of a European war is still diminishing, and if reliance is to be placed on statements made public through Reuter's Agency last evening, the prospect of its

[36] Richard Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War*, (London: Routledge 2000), 15.
[37] "The Balkan Danger," *The Times*, October 2, 1912, 9, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1912-10-02/9/2.html#start%3D1912-01-01%26end%3D1913-12-31%26terms%3Dbalkan%20war%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/11%26prev%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/106%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1912-01-01%7E1913-12-31/o:date/108
[38] "European War? Nightmare of the Balkans," *The Nottingham Evening Post*, October 29, 1912, 5, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000321/19121029/033/0005.

outbreak may almost be dismissed."[39] This same article attributed success to the efforts of Grey in his dealings with the other Powers, especially Germany.[40] Kennedy explains that it was Britain's involvement in, yet formal detachment from, the political machinations between the Powers that afforded Grey room to maneuver in the diplomatic arena. He writes, "While generally associating with France and Russia, it was not bound by any legal treaty automatically to give military assistance to one or the other of the alliance *blocs*. It could make attempts to improve relations with Berlin, and co-operate as joint 'ringmasters' during the Balkan Wars."[41] However, the official diplomatic efforts of Britain only offer a partial explanation.

Though arising in part from the generally derisive attitude in Europe towards the Balkans, and its corollary of self-congratulatory elitism, some credit for the success of diplomacy between the Powers was attributed to the benevolent humility inherent in the civilized peoples of Europe. *The Yorkshire Evening Post* reported late in November that, ""Christian civilization was asking whether kingship might not win for itself new luster, and proclaim the fact that monarchy was the bulwark of European peace. Britain and Germany, Italy and France, were at peace, and owed peace to their people."[42] This general elitism also helps explain, beyond simply the official political concerns between empires, why as a whole Britain downplayed the impact of the war on the Balkan population itself.[43] For, despite reporting extensively on the daily battles and

[39] "European War Risks Lessened," *The Yorkshire Post*, November 28, 1912, 7, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000687/19121128/111/0007.
[40] Ibid, 7.
[41] Kennedy, 136.
[42] "European Crisis Abating," *The Yorkshire Post*, November 30, 1912, 9, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000687/19121130/114/0009.
[43] Hammond offers a succinct summation British attitudes towards the Balkans existing from the late 19th century onwards writing, "As an inevitable corollary of this, Britain's major concern in the region was less with the domestic politics of the Balkan peoples…that with their effect on the European balance of power." – *Debated Lands*, 29.

atrocities of the war, most often such reporting was done so as to highlight the barbarity of the involved populations.

In general, British newspapers tended to report more favorably about the actions of the Balkan League, the alliance between Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. However, all sides were implicated in acts of barbarism. *The Times* reported that, "The *modus vivendi* acceptable before the war can no longer be discussed in view of the atrocities committed by the Turks, who have destroyed every motive for pity and forfeited even the respect due to courage."[44] In a separate article in the same publication, they also reported that, "The Bulgarians were already in the town, the Moslem population was deserting it, soldiers were already looting and slaying. Such is the inflammability of the Levantine mind."[45] By framing both sides of the war as incapable of civilized behavior, Britain could justify to itself, both through the broader cultural discourse as well as through official opinion, its failure to treat any of the Balkan belligerents as equals to itself.

Further evidence as to the effect such reporting had on the British populace lies in the responses received by newspapers via letters to the editor. For example, it a letter to *The Times,* Syed Ameer Ali, a prominent Muslim scholar and politician from India, wrote, "What the effect of all this will be I leave to others who know the East to impress on the minds of their fellow-countrymen whose prejudices and sympathies have been inflamed and excited by one of the most

[44] "Balkan Suspicions of the Powers," *The Times*, November 6, 1912, 8, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1912-11-06/8/2.html#start%3D1912-10-01%26end%3D1912-12-31%26terms%3Dbalkan%20atrocities%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/balkan+atrocities/w:1912-10-01%7E1912-12-31/1%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+atrocities/w:1912-10-01%7E1912-12-31/2.

[45] "Scenes of Panic at Rodosto," *The Times*, November 6, 1912, 8, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1912-11-06/8/2.html#start%3D1912-10-01%26end%3D1912-12-31%26terms%3Dbalkan%20atrocities%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/balkan+atrocities/w:1912-10-01%7E1912-12-31/1%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+atrocities/w:1912-10-01%7E1912-12-31/2.

unconscionable Press campaigns known."[46] His letter to *The Times* indicates that xenophobic reporting was having an immediate effect on Britain's population, and that this effect was being felt across the entirety of the British Empire. Hammond echoes this conclusion, writing, "Although nationalism had swept through the region, finally dismantling the Ottoman Empire, the emergent states quickly assumed in the western imagination the mantle of their former rulers and – though free of Russian regulation – were themselves constructed as the West's binary opposite."[47]

Not only did the newspapers have a profound role in shaping British perceptions of the Balkans, but often they were better informed, and could transmit information more quickly, than the official channels of British diplomacy in the region. In a letter sent to Gerard Lowther, the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, by the British counsel in Salonica, and later forwarded on to Grey in London, one sees the broad reach of the British press. The consul wrote, "As regards the specific cases mentioned in the newspaper extracts left with your Excellency by the Grand Rabbi, I do not happen to be able to confirm any of them in particular. I saw the statements in the 'Independent' when they appeared, and had no reason to doubt their accuracy…"[48] The subject of the letter was the pillaging of the Jewish population in Salonica by the occupying Greek troops. The tangled flow of information implied here shows that British

[46] Ameer Ali, "Moslems and the War: to the Editor of the Times," *The Times*, October 24, 1912, 5, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1912-10-24/5/7.html#start%3D1912-10-01%26end%3D1912-12-31%26terms%3Dbalkan%20slaughter%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/balkan+slaughter/w:1912-10-01%7E1912-12-31/1%26prev%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+slaughter/w:1912-10-01%7E1912-12-31/1%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+slaughter/w:1912-10-01%7E1912-12-31/3.
For more information on Syed Ameer Ali see - Muhammad Mojlum Khan, *The Muslim Heritage of Bengal: The Lives, Thoughts and Achievements of Great Muslim Scholars, Writers and Reformers of Bangladesh and West Bengal*, (Markfield: Kube Publishing Ltd. 2013), 179-189.
[47] Andrew Hammond, *British Literature and the Balkans: Themes and Contexts*, (Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V. 2010), 27.
[48] Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther, November 27, 1912, *The Balkan Wars: British Consular Reports from Macedonia in the Final Years of the Ottoman Empire*, (London: Tauris 2014): 40, 40.

diplomats in the Balkans were receiving complaints over actions within their stationed cities due to information being printed in newspapers in Britain, which the diplomats themselves were previously unaware of.

It must be noted that the British press, though acting as an efficient conduit of information, was not always in direct contact with the information about which they reported. Florian Keisinger explains that war correspondents, "because of strict censorship…were mostly restrict to the capitals of the various countries they were supposed to write about."[49] As Keisinger further elaborates, this meant that often the reporters had little or no idea about the events they claimed to be reporting on.[50] However, in terms of British diplomatic responses arising from newspaper articles, as well as the steering of British public sentiment, it matters little whether or not the reports were entirely accurate. First, because the impact of such reports were not the factuality of their contents, but their ability to influence the British populace. In this regard they succeeded. Second, as I will further explain, there existed in Britain rooted stereotypes of the Balkans that originated prior to the Balkan Wars. Thus, while newspaper reports reinforced these stereotypes, the preconceived notions of the region were not entirely created out of serialized misinformation, or at best information of dubious origins, printed in the popular press.

The uncivilized stereotype put forth by the British press has a longer history than simply the reports of atrocities arising from the Balkan Wars. Travelogues were popular throughout the early 20th century. The Balkans in particular became associated with adventure and intrigue.[51]

[49] Florian Keisinger, "Uncivilized wars in civilized Europe? The perception of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913 in English, German, and Irish Newspapers," *The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015): 343-358, 346.
[50] Ibid, 347-349.
[51] "Again, conditions at a border are used to introduce the deficiency and danger which a traveler will go on to find in the hinterland. The passage also reminds one that international frontiers, so often places where state control is

Edith Durham, one of the more prominent British travelers in the Balkans, wrote in an account reprinted in the *Whitby Gazette*, "The raucous voices, barbaric music, and gaudy, shabby trappings, dim through the smoke, made a dramatic scene, which culminated when the priests lifted the bier and carried it from the church; there was a wild scramble of men and boys, who all strove to shove a shoulder under it, if only for a second, as it was borne all round [sic] the building."[52] Accounts such as this highlight a general consensus in Britain that even the non-Muslims in the Balkans were not wholly Christian in the civilized sense. This general discourse of Balkan otherness has been well documented, the most famous conceptualization being Maria Todorova's term *balkanism*. For her, the term meant the inevitable splintering of a group, perceived to be culturally and racially unified, because of the inability to overcome minor differences due to inherent backwardness and uncivility.[53]

In the First Balkan War, the official position of the British Empire was neutrality. Concerns over the geographic stability of Europe dictated this position, however it was strongly reinforced by xenophobic portrayals of the Balkan peoples being unequal to the other nations of Europe due to inherent uncivility. Because of the mutual commitment to confining the conflict to the Balkans, the First Balkan War actually served to strengthen relations between the Powers. *The Times* reported, "Herr von Kinderlen-Waechter, the Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, declared that throughout the recent crisis the relations of Germany and Great Britain had been marked by a mutual confidence…and had done good service in promoting an understanding

intensified, can also suggest the loosening of that control and the perceived onset of criminality and disorder." - Ibid 26.

[52] Edith Durham, "Good Friday in a Balkan Church," *Whitby Gazette*, May 5, 1905, 6, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0001103/19050505/188/0006.

[53] Todorova, 17-19.

among the Powers."[54] The generally positive reception of British diplomatic efforts further strengthened their commitment to maintaining geographic stability.

Along with the optimism towards the diplomatic process came hope that two of the major points of contention in the region between Britain and the other Powers could be resolved via diplomatic mediation. Therefore, as the First Balkan War reached its conclusion in early December, 1912, Britain asserted itself in the formulation of the armistice agreement between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan League. By mid-December Britain was actively mediating in an attempt to check the territorial ambitions of Austro-Hungary, Russia, and Italy.[55] Interestingly, an article printed in *The Yorkshire Evening Post* hints at early intentions of British mediation. Printed almost a month before formal British involvement in the conciliatory process, the article reads, "Reuter's Vienna correspondent says that a message has been received from Sofia stating according to information derived from an authoritative source, the terms offered Turkey by the Balkan States are neither in form nor substance uncompromising, and they even leave the door open for eventual modification."[56] The last phrase suggesting eventual modification, especially taken in light of later British involvement, indicates an assumption on the part of Britain in its role as a continental arbiter. This point is further supported by the generally negative reporting of the region eluding to the Balkan peoples' inability to conduct themselves with civility.

[54] "German Policy in the Balkans," *The Times*, December 3, 1912, 6, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1912-12-03/6/1.html#start%3D1912-10-01%26end%3D1912-12-31%26terms%3Dbalkan%20war%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/balkan+war/w:1912-10-01%7E1912-12-31/2%26prev%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1912-10-01%7E1912-12-31/10%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1912-10-01%7E1912-12-31/12.
[55] Hall, 72.
[56] "The Balkan War: Outlook Regarded as Hopeful," *The Yorkshire Evening Post*, November 21, 1912, 5, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000273/19121121/068/0005.

In an effort to bring the conflict to a close, delegates from the major European powers met in London during the winter of 1912-1913. The St. James Conference, as it is referred to, illustrated three key points. First, this marked the last full meeting of the Concert of Europe, the loose diplomatic organization of European powers set in place following the Napoleonic Wars to maintain the balance of powers in Europe.[57] Second, following the trend in shifting diplomatic relations, general acquiescence was granted to the Balkan League regarding their new territorial claims, formally ending British claims of impartiality in the conflict[58] Finally, the failure of Britain and the other Powers to arbitrate disputed claims to the Macedonian territory between Serbia and Bulgaria, resulted in high amounts of regional instability.[59] Besides setting the stage for the Second Balkan War, the failure to resolve the territorial disputes in southeastern Europe demonstrate that the concerns of the Powers lay primarily in stabilizing the borders around the Balkans rather than those within.[60]

When the St. James Conference, also known as the London Peace Conference, opened in December 16, 1912, sentiment in Britain had clearly shifted against the Ottoman Empire. Reporting on the conference's opening, *The Hull Daily Mail* printed, "Glancing at the respective Missions one is more impressed with the standing and reputation of the Balkan Allies' representatives that those of the Turks."[61] The article goes on to predict that the Ottoman representatives would attempt to undermine the peace talks through various devious and

[57] Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein, and Richard Langhorne, *Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy*, (New York: Continuum 2002), 144-145.
[58] Ibid, 145.
[59] Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, (New York: Harper Perennial 2012), 274-275.
[60] "…the peninsula has been conceived as an unruly borderland where the structured identity of the imperial center dissolves and alien, antithetic peripheries begin. From the days of the Ottoman expansion into Europe, the result has been an ongoing political involvement on the part of the Great Powers, who have considered western control of these peripheries essential for the preservation of peace on the continent." – *British Literature and the Balkans*, 93-94.
[61] "Today's Conference at St. James's," *The Hull Daily Mail*, December 16, 1912, 4, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000324/19121216/030/0004.

underhanded tricks of diplomacy. This shows that while Britain did not yet consider the Balkan League members its equal, British support, both popular and official, had shifted away from neutrality and now depicted the Turks as the clear antagonists of the war.

Even with Britain taking a more explicit side in negotiations, following two months of claimed neutrality in the matter, British diplomatic strategy focused primarily on maintaining the geographic status quo in Europe. This might not seem obvious given that British delegates now officially supported the massive shifts in states' territories in the Balkans. However, as was explained previously, British stereotypes of the region lumped the entirety into a general, uncivilized, south-Slavic mass. Therefore, the Balkans themselves become a singular territorial entity, irrespective of the shifting borders within the region. This becomes apparent further in the article previously referred to. *The Hull Daily Mail* reports, "Austria, too, should not complicate the game by rattling her aristocratic sabre. She is not exactly a progressive force, and her best talent is keeping the peace. Europe must see that there is a just, firm, and permanent settlement to avoid another war in ten years' time."[62] This demonstrates the consensus in Britain that responsibility for ensuring stability belonged to the Great Powers, rather than the Balkan states themselves.

Edith Durham, as previously mentioned, was important throughout the early 20th century, including during the Balkan Wars, in documenting and influencing British opinion on the Balkans. Despite being written almost a decade before the St. James Conference, her travelogue of the Balkans illustrates the diplomatic sentiment of the Powers involved in the conference. For example one passage reads, "'Ah, Fräulein,' said the elder, '…it is your nation that keeps the Turk in Europe…They did not consider us as peoples. They marked out the Balkan Peninsula

[62] Ibid, 4.

into *spheres of influence* awaiting the pleasure of the great Powers, and we are in the Austrian sphere. England has never troubled about us. Russia is our only friend.'"[63] While written from the viewpoint of an elderly Serbian gentleman, this passage is accurate in its depiction of British attitudes towards the Balkans.

Reporting on the conference tended to focus on the positions held by the Great Powers, instead of the member states of the Balkan League. Despite negotiating for an end to hostilities between Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece against the Ottoman Empire, copious reports focus on the hawkish behavior of the Powers bordering the Balkans. For example, *The Dundee Courier* printed an article primarily covering Russian and Austrian military buildup on their Balkan borders. Of the actual involved nations in the concluding war, only the Ottoman Empire received significant coverage in the article. Like the article previously illustrated from *The Hull Daily Mail*, this article reiterates the responsibility of the Powers in reaching a diplomatic agreement. Concerning Russia, the article states, "Russia also would not like to break the peace of Europe over a comparatively trifling matter like the settlement of a Servian port on the Adriatic…The quick and harmonious conclusion of the Balkan Conference will be the best assurance Europe can have that the danger of a six-Power war will have passed away."[64] This passage further highlights the general disregard held by Britain towards the Balkan League's claims, considering them to be "trifling." Instead, the clear focus is on the ramifications of the First Balkan War on the geographic stability in Europe, to be maintained by the Powers.

Britain's relationship with Germany had been steadily improving throughout the First Balkan War, and the peace conference confirmed Germany's growing stature in Britain.

[63] M. Edith Durham, *Through the Lands of the Serbs*, (London: Edward Arnold 1904), 202.
[64] "A Hitch in the Balkan Negotiations," *The Dundee Courier*, December 18, 1912, 4, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000164/19121218/055/0004?noTouch=true.

Newspaper reports also demonstrate that this improving relationship came about in part due to increasing conflicts with Russia. Because of shared concerns over Russian expansion, Germany and Great Britain presented a unified front in negotiations at the conference. The *Derby Daily Telegraph* reports, "Germany's emphatic endorsement of Britain's policy paved the way for united action…It is agreed that Russia is now at one with Britain and France in working for peace, but had it not been for the weight of Germany's influence, asserted at a critical moment, a terrible explosion might have occurred."[65] Again, this further highlights the focus of reports regarding the conference on the diplomatic maneuverings of the Great Powers rather than the Balkan States.

The two most notable outcomes of the St. James Conference, besides marking the end of the First Balkan War, was the exclusion of Bulgaria from the Dardanelles Strait and the creation of an independent Albanian nation-state. These two points are important because they delineated the extent to which the surrounding Powers could infiltrate the Balkans. While superficially about controlling the expansionist ambitions of Serbia and Bulgaria, in actuality the primary motivation for these outcomes was fear over Russian expansion and the territorial rivalry between the Austro-Italian alliance and Russia.[66] Britain especially desired Albania to be an independent state, because as *The Times* explains, "If the country is allowed to become an Austro-Italian administrative preserve it will end by being a bone of contention between the two countries. The Albanians themselves will feel no confidence in foreign efforts unless they be

[65] "The Powers Acting for Peace," *Derby Daily Telegraph*, December 21, 1912, 4, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000327/19121221/023/0004.
[66] For a firsthand account of the diplomatic maneuverings by the Great Powers regarding Albania, the southeastern Bulgarian border, and the Austrian – Russian rivalry in the Balkans refer to the memoir of Jacob Schurman, the American ambassador to Greece during the Balkan Wars. – Jacob Schurman, *The Balkan Wars: 1912-1913*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton 1914), xii-xiii, 68-72, 98, and 119-122.

made by and under the supervision of all the Powers."[67] By making Albania independent, it was felt that other Powers, such as Britain or Germany, could help mediate any ensuing concerns, yet still maintain Albania as a buffer zone between the Austro-Hungarian and Italian sphere of influence against the Russian sphere.

The St. James Conference lasted until the end of May, 1913. Largely this was due to resistance by both the Balkan League as well as the Ottoman Empire to treaty terms, drawn up exclusively by the six Great Powers (Great Britain, Russia, Austro-Hungary, Italy, France, and Germany), which neither side found favorable. However, Britain and the other Powers felt justified in their patriarchal treatment of the Balkans because, "As both peace and settlement are indispensable to the continued diplomatic tranquility of Europe, it has become both the right and the duty of Europe to guide them towards both with a firm but gentle hand…We are satisfied that, possibly after a brief period of irritation, all the Balkan States without exception will be grateful to her for undertaking the task."[68] Yet with steady international pressure, the First Balkan War belligerents acquiesced and signed the Treaty of London, officially ending the First Balkan War May 30, 1913.[69]

The St. James Conference marked an official example of diplomatic relations between the Powers precipitated by the Balkan Wars. However, Britain involved itself in less obvious forms of diplomacy because of the conflicts as well. Foreign medical aid, in the form of the

[67] "Albania as a State: the Austro-Hungarian Proposals," *The Times*, May 9, 1913, 5, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1913-05-09/5/2.html#start%3D1912-10-01%26end%3D1913-05-30%26terms%3Dalbania%20conference%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/albania+conference/w:1912-10-01%7E1913-05-30/1%26prev%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/albania+conference/w:1912-10-01%7E1913-05-30/2%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/albania+conference/w:1912-10-01%7E1913-05-30/4.
[68] "Sir Edward Grey's Ultimatum," *The Times*, May 28, 1913, 9, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1913-05-28/9/2.html#start%3D1912-10-01%26end%3D1913-05-30%26terms%3Dalbania%20conference%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/albania+conference/w:1912-10-01%7E1913-05-30/o:-date/1%26prev%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/albania+conference/w:1912-10-01%7E1913-05-30/o:-date/3%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/albania+conference/w:1912-10-01%7E1913-05-30/o:-date/5.
[69] Hall, 101-102.

British Red Cross mission, superficially seems beneficent in the face of the hardships induced by the conflicts. While this might be true to a limited extent, correspondences sent by the British Foreign Service indicate an ulterior motive. In a letter to Ambassador Lowther, Charles Greig, the British vice-consul in Monastir (Bitola) conveyed, "It transpired from his conversation that, he had very readily committed himself to promoting the Austrian relief work in a way admirably calculated to favor Austrian propaganda, and very detrimental to British prestige…a supply of provisions equal to that promised to the Austrian consulate should be sent to me directly."[70] This example shows how one of the few aspects of British policy towards the Balkans that softened its xenophobic outlook was in fact orchestrated primarily as a diplomatic point of contention.[71]

In the same letter, Greig also revealed how this particular facet of British diplomacy relied on the explicit support of the British citizenry itself. He explains to Lowther that, "All honest charitable efforts, British or foreign, being equally deserving of support, it will be a matter for regret if Austrian relief work, which is an instrument of propaganda, and of propaganda bitterly hostile to British interests, should be promoted to our detriment by funds which are the fruits of British administration in Egypt."[72] Thus, requests for aid printed in contemporary newspapers should not be read as wholly beneficent, but rather as part of a larger British diplomatic apparatus seeking to control the situation in the Balkans. This also is the clearest example where the stereotypes of the British towards the people of the Balkans played a direct role in British diplomatic involvement.

The positive facet of British elitism was the sense of requirement in helping the less fortunate or less civilized so as to demonstrate their own superiority. This point becomes

[70] C.A. Greig to Sir Gerard Lowther, February 4, 1913, *The Balkan Wars: British Consular Reports from Macedonia in the Final Years of the Ottoman Empire*, (London: Tauris 2014): 78, 269.
[71] For a list of the amount of sent aid refer again to Greig – Ibid, 76-82.
[72] Ibid, 79.

apparent in the language used in appeals for aid funding appearing in British newspapers. In a copied letter by a certain J.H. Kaye, sent on behalf of Lady Lowther, wife of the British ambassador in Istanbul, appearing in the *Yorkshire Post*, he requested, "It is only my conviction of the generosity and pity that lies in English hearts which gives me courage to appeal in England…The British community in Constantinople have nobly responded to my appeal, and formed a War Relief Committee for the distribution of charcoal, bread and clothing to the most destitute."[73] The descriptive language used reveals the self-aggrandizement that Kaye hoped to appeal to. British citizenry here being described here as noble and generous compared to the pitiful and destitute peoples of the Balkans. The simultaneous dismissal of Balkan men as uncivilized and violent and the women and children as helpless or pitiful forms the base upon which Britain constructed their patronizing approach to the Balkans.

In an advertisement appearing in *The Times*, the British Red Cross also tapped into British self-aggrandizement. The most notable passage from the advertisement reads, "This organization, which is under the patronage of H.M. the King, presided over by H.M. Queen Alexandra, and directed by eminent surgeons and others, is based upon a sympathy so broad it knows no creed or policy…And its work of mercy is so practical, so real, that it calls for instant support from all of us."[74] In soliciting donations, the British Red Cross suggests that even ordinary citizens could share in the moral righteousness of the most eminent members of British society, including the royal family itself. This represents yet another example of the lens through

[73] J.H. Kaye, "The Distress in Constantinople," *The Yorkshire Post*, November 16, 1912, 9, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000687/19121116/147/0009.
[74] British Red Cross Society, "The Plight of the Wounded," *The Times*, November 6, 1912, 4, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1912-11-06/4/1.html#start%3D1912-10-01%26end%3D1913-05-30%26terms%3Dbalkan%20nurse%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/balkan+nurse/w:1912-10-01%7E1913-05-30/1%26prev%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+nurse/w:1912-10-01%7E1913-05-30/5%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+nurse/w:1912-10-01%7E1913-05-30/7.

which ordinary people in Great Britain lent implicit support to an overall discourse of diminishing the stature of the Balkan peoples to a subordinate social status.

The overlooking of the Balkan states, instead concentrating on the Great Powers, continued when war broke out a second time in June. Less than a month after the signing of the Treaty of London the Second Balkan War began June 29, 1913.[75] Despite Bulgaria initiating the conflict, papers accused Austro-Hungary of collusion in a ploy to further strengthen its power in the region. A week after the Second Balkan War began, *The Dundee Courier* stated, "That Austria-Hungary should be suspected of secretly fomenting trouble in the Balkans is not surprising. Unfortunately, too, the suspicion cannot be said to be groundless…Her policy is to…prevent any one of the individual States from becoming so strong as to acquire a dominant position in the Peninsula."[76] That such an accusation was made indicates that British focus resided primarily on the Great Powers and overlooked the possibility of the Balkan states of having any agency in their own actions.

The Times was more reticent in their accusations. They wrote, "The belief that after their first rush of mutual anger the combatant may quickly sheathe their swords is especially manifest in Vienna and St. Petersburg, according to the telegrams of or Correspondents. Such is not the belief of our Correspondent in the Balkan Peninsula, whose unrivalled experience lends the utmost weight to his warning."[77] This statement suggests one of two things. First, that Russia and Austro-Hungary had some form of insider knowledge to which the British press was not privy.

[75] Hall, 110.
[76] "Austria and the Balkan Problem," *The Dundee Courier*, July 4, 1913, 4, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000164/19130704/056/0004.
[77] "The New War in the Balkans," *The Times*, July 8, 1913, 9, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1913-07-08/9/2.html#start%3D1913-06-29%26end%3D1913-07-31%26terms%3Dbalkan%20war%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/balkan+war/w:1913-06-29%7E1913-07-31/1%26prev%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1913-06-29%7E1913-07-31/3%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/balkan+war/w:1913-06-29%7E1913-07-31/5.

Alternatively, it could suggest gross incompetence on part of the diplomatic services in the respective Powers. In either case, it illustrates reporting focused on the involvement of these two Powers in Balkan affairs. This at minimum confirms that the British held Russia and Austro-Hungary with some level of suspicion regarding their interest in the Balkans.

The accusations regarding international origins of the Second Balkan War were extensive enough to warrant a response by Austro-Hungary. *The Yorkshire Post* wrote, "The semi-official 'Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung' declares, speaking of the attitude of Austria-Hungary, that in the present conflict the Balkan States will be left in entire independence…'All reports of European intervention are false. Possibly the Triple Alliance or individual members of it may have exerted pressure in the Balkans but there has been nothing like European intervention.'"[78] Besides further highlighting the focus on the Great Powers, this article also suggests that independent action by the Balkan states was taken to be an aberration from the accepted norm of international interaction in Europe.

Along with the treatment of the Balkan Wars as being representative of rival Great Powers' constant meddling in the balance of European influence, British officials as well voiced a similar sentiment. Otte stated, "The incipient Austro-Russian antagonism was one consideration that informed the deliberations of the 'Foreign Office mind.' Another was the wider fall-out of the collapse of the Ottoman power, now seemingly on the cards."[79] Though he refers here to the build up to the First Balkan War, this view held true during the Second Balkan War as well.

[78] "The Irregular Combatants," *The Yorkshire Post*, July 3, 1913, 7, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000687/19130703/110/0007.
[79] Otte, 372.

Evidence for the official distrust of Austro-Hungary and Russia presents itself again in the letters of British diplomats stationed in the Balkans. In a letter sent to Lowther by Greig, he writes, "It is now suspected that the gathering of tribesmen in Mat mentioned in my last dispatch is due to Austro-Bulgarian initiative supported by the Valona Cabinet and directed against the Serbs. But it is not anticipated that there will be any serious local Bulgaro-Albanian movement."[80] The instigation that Austria was influencing Albanian policy he then tied to the hawkish behavior in neighboring Serbia, writing, "I have of late frequently heard statements in official quarters to the effect that they would welcome any act of Albanian aggression which would afford the pretext for a renewed, and perhaps permanent, occupation of Albanian territory 'to which the Powers could have no reasonable objection.'"[81] Here not only does Greig suggest that Austro-Hungary was steering the course of events in the Second Balkan War, but that they were actively destabilizing the region further by antagonizing Serbia.

In some ways the Second Balkan War settled the border disagreements between Britain and the other Great Powers, at least until the outbreak of World War I. Albania remained an established sovereign entity, and the combined forces of Greece, Serbia, Romania, Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire managed to restrict Bulgaria's attempts at expansion.[82] Thus, the British concerns over the Dardanelles and the sovereignty of Albania were lifted. However, unlike the First Balkan War, little interest was paid by Britain, or any of the other Powers, in mediating disputes. Instead the Second Balkan War was viewed as sign that the Balkans were a diplomatic

[80] C.A. Greig to Sir Gerard Lowther, July 5, 1913, *The Balkan Wars: British Consular Reports from Macedonia in the Final Years of the Ottoman Empire*, (London: Tauris 2014): 123-126, 124.
[81] Ibid, 125.
[82] Three separate treaties dictated the terms of Bulgaria's surrender. The Treaty of Bucharest July 30, the Treaty of Constantinople September 30, and the Treaty of Athens November 14 confined Bulgaria from the North and West, the Southeast, and the Southwest respectively. See Hall, 123-129.

lost cause. The self-destruction of the Balkan League suggesting to the British that the Balkan disputes were beyond the scope of civil diplomacy.

Press coverage echoed the sense of futility in finding a viable form of diplomatic intercession in the Balkans. *The Yorkshire Post* wrote that while Britain originally "was disposed to promise her without restriction its moral and material aid in order to permit her to organize her possessions in Asia…British Government informs the Turkish Government that it is obliged to withdraw from it this assistance, and to leave it exposed to the disastrous consequences of the policy in which it has recklessly engaged."[83] This shows two important points. First, the resignation of Britain that the Ottoman Empire was unable to abide by British notions of proper diplomatic and military behavior supported the initial British stereotype of the region as uncivilized and backwards. Second, that as soon as the Ottomans had regained stable control over the strategic Dardanelles Strait Britain no longer had sufficient motivation to involve itself in regional affairs. This further highlights Britain's foreign policy being motivated primarily by the machinations of Great Power politics.

In the aftermath of the two Balkan Wars, Britain participated, along with France, Germany, Russia, and the United States in a commission to determine the causes and ramifications of the conflicts. The sense of diplomatic futility due to the perceived barbarism of the belligerents, as previously explained, is echoed in the findings of the commission. Their report, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explored numerous factors. However, perhaps the most poignant statement reads, "Our whole report is an answer to the question put in this chapter. That answer may be summed up in a simple statement that there is no clause in international law applicable to land war and to the treatment of the wounded,

[83] "Powers' Perplexities in the East: the Adrianople Problem," *The Yorkshire Post*, July 29, 1913, 7, http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000687/19130729/104/0007.

which was not violated, to a greater or less extent, by all the belligerents."[84] This concise statement reflects the broader tone of the report expressing dismay that the Balkan states failed to follow the paternalistic guidance of the Great Powers.

In the appendices of the report are included articles originally published by *The London Daily Telegraph*. In one article, a Russian officer accused the Bulgarians of excess. He wrote, "I shall confine myself to facts not hitherto published. The diplomatic corps and the inhabitants, whether Turkish, Greek, or Israelite, are unanimous in the indignation with which they describe the excesses of the Bulgarian occupation."[85] This article is followed by a second containing the Bulgarian rebuttal to the accusations. In it a Bulgarian officer writes, "It is true that a certain number of Turkish and Jewish houses were pillaged, but not by our soldiers. The local Greek population alone are to be blamed for these crimes…These facts may be verified by examining the papers in the office of the public prosecutor or those on my own shelves."[86] In both, there is an assurance of the "facts" of the situation. The combined effect suggests general misconduct on all sides. While most likely true, this type of reporting lent considerable credence to British stereotypes of Balkan degeneracy.

The consensus then concerning British diplomatic efforts during the Balkan Wars is that official policy was determined primarily with attention towards the politics between the various Great Powers, rather than the Balkan States themselves. This position was reinforced by perceptions by the British public, as conveyed via the popular press, of the simultaneous supremacy of British society and its people, and the degeneracy and lack of civility of the

[84] Josef Redlich, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, M. Justin Godart, Walther Schücking, Francis W. Hirst, H. N. Brailsford, Paul Milioukov, Samuel T. Dutton, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan War*, (Washington D.C.: Byron S. Adams Press 1914), 208.
[85] Ibid, 326.
[86] Ibid, 331-332.

various Balkan peoples. This latter point of support fueled the idea that the Balkan states were somehow unable to enter into civil diplomatic negotiations, and were thus written off as equals in the negotiation of treaties and settlements. Therefore, overall one finds that British diplomatic culture during the Balkan Wars based itself on geographical concerns. The primary goal of British diplomacy, as practiced by both officials and the unofficial implicit assent of Britain's populace, was to maintain geographic stability in Europe, specifically between the Great Powers.

The geographic nature of British diplomatic culture manifested itself in a number of different ways. First, and most importantly, negotiations participated in by Britain concerning the Balkan Wars were almost exclusively with other Great Powers. This demonstrated a focus on maintaining the European status quo in the balance of power on the continent. Second, the generally derisive attitude adopted by the press in reporting on the Balkan populations participating in the wars highlights a general disregard for the region itself. This suggests that Britain viewed the Balkan Peninsula primarily as a point of contention between the Great Powers rather than wars for independence or status improvement by the Balkan nations. Third, the instances where Britain directly availed itself in the wars, such as the aid work carried out by the British Red Cross, carried with them ulterior motives for undermining the prestige of other Great Powers. Also with regard to aid, the appeals for funding published in the press highlighted the general self-righteousness with which the British public held themselves when compared to the Balkan peoples. This further supported the general dismissal of the legitimacy of the conflicts themselves. The culmination then was a diplomatic culture in Britain focused primarily on maintaining geographic stability in Europe between the Great Powers.

Chapter 2 – United States and the new Capitalist Empire

At the outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans in October 1912, the United States was in the midst of profound changes to its foreign relations apparatus. This restructuring had a decidedly bipolar nature, which was reflective of the changing role of United States in global affairs. Between the bookends of the Spanish-American War, occurring at the cusp of the 20th century and the advent of American involvement in World War I in 1917 the United States developed a form of foreign relations that both set the tone for future imperial strategies throughout the 20th century as well as maintained a firm grasp on the isolationist mentality of the 19th century. Accordingly, the strategy the United States pursued regarding both the First and Second Balkan War illustrated conflicting interests between private and governmental entities, conflicting interests between personal and official opinions on the part of representatives of the State Department, and cautious steps towards taking up the mantle of a global power.

Though economic coercion is a strategy employed by nearly every empire to ever exist, the extent to which American diplomatic efforts depended upon it, particularly in the Balkans and other areas under Ottoman control, set American diplomatic strategy apart from the diplomatic strategies employed by the European powers. President William Howard Taft, who assumed the presidency in 1909, was largely responsible for expanding the scope of economic coercion as a diplomatic strategy. Eventually given the designation "dollar diplomacy," the reliance upon private capital and industry forming the basis for international involvement, without necessarily being tied to explicitly agreed upon treaties or even diplomatic presence, became solidified as the *modus operandi* under the Taft administration.[87] However, despite not

[87] "Criticized by a hostile reporter as 'dollar diplomacy,' Taft foreign policy found its way in a world of revolution and big-power brinkmanship. Joined by Secretary of State Philander Knox, one of America's top corporate lawyers, Taft set out to help corporations prosper as a way of ensuring international peace." - Eckes and Zeiler, 29.

operating through official diplomatic channels, the U.S. Department of State justified their approach via previous military engagements, treaties, and doctrines dating from the early 19th century.

Constructing the response of the United States to the Balkan Wars is less straightforward compared with response of Great Britain. Because the United States was only just beginning to venture into the politics of Europe, there were far less official diplomatic negotiations involving the U.S. concerning the conflicts in the Balkans. Understandably then, the method required to construct U.S. sentiment and response to the Balkan Wars requires a higher reliance on unofficial sources, such as newspapers, corporations, and other private entities. Occasions for official source material occur far less frequently compared to Great Britain. Unlike in the case of Great Britain, where official responses can be directly compared to concurrent unofficial responses, the U.S. generally lacks clearly articulated official policies and responses to events occurring during the conflicts. In order, therefore, to contextualize the information originating from unofficial sources one must look into the history of U.S. diplomacy leading into the 20th century.

As previously stated, the general policy maintained by the Taft administration prior to, and during, the Balkan Wars was known as dollar diplomacy. This policy traces its origins to the Monroe Doctrine. This official statement by the U.S. government to the powers of Europe essentially cordoned off diplomatic developments in North and South America from the involvement of Europe for nearly a century. In so doing, the U.S. developed a strongly isolationist attitude in relation to Europe, which remained pervasive in one form or another through both Balkan Wars and into the opening years of World War I. The Monroe Doctrine, contained initially in an 1821 speech by then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and later in the seventh State of the Union address of president James Monroe in 1823, explicitly denied the

right of Europe to involve itself in the affairs of the Americas while simultaneously exempted the United States from involving itself in European affairs.[88]

The most important legacy of the Monroe Doctrine was in establishing a precedent of acknowledging all European sovereign entities as intrinsically legitimate, or at the very least free from official judgement or mediation. The passage from Monroe's state of the union address articulating this point reads,

> "Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none."[89]

While interpreted in various ways in the intervening decades between its origin in the early 19th century and the Balkan Wars of the early 20th century, it remained consistently and explicitly referred to as the justification for official American actions abroad.[90]

An incident in Svalbard, the archipelago in the arctic frontier of Europe, set the tone for Taft's subsequent treatment of European diplomatic disputes. Though nothing about what transpired there had a direct impact on the later Balkan Wars, the response by the Taft administration, early in his presidency, established the type of diplomatic relationship the U.S. would maintain with Europe throughout the duration of Taft's

[88] John Quincy Adams, "Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on Foreign Policy," (July 4, 1821), accessed May 2, 2015, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3484.
"We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." - James Monroe "Seventh Annual Message to Congress," (December 2, 1823), accessed May 2, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29465.

[89] Ibid.

[90] "As late as the 1930's, the Monroe Doctrine was not a historical curiosity but a living and active principle whose terms were frequently invoked by statesmen to justify their policies in the same way that Reagan or Madeleine Albright might have referred to 'the lessons of Munich' in defending a particular stand overseas." - Mead, 58.

presidency, including the during Balkan Wars. In the relatively minor disagreement over mining rights to coal reserves on Svalbard Taft stated his administration, "…would not become a signatory to any conventional arrangement…which would imply contributory participation by the United States in any obligation or responsibility for the enforcement of any scheme of administration which might be devised by the Conference for the islands."[91] In this statement Taft reaffirmed the America's traditional self-imposed exclusion from European politics. However, that Taft felt compelled to represent the interests of American mining operations there demonstrated his insistence that political isolationism is not synonymous with economic isolationism.

Philander Knox, who served as Taft's Secretary of State, built upon the precedent established by Taft and articulated clearly how the U.S. could simultaneously uphold isolationism and economic expansion. In an address to the New York Bar Association, he stated, "The most effective way to escape the logical consequences of the Monroe doctrine is to help them to help themselves. Assuming the correctness of Mr. Root's corollary, it is our duty, to ourselves and to them, to cooperate in preventing, where possible, specific condition where we might have to become in too great a measure accountable."[92] The focus on "help them help themselves" succinctly sums up the position of the U.S. diplomatic mission during the Taft administration.

Taft left office at the end of December 1912. The incoming president, Woodrow Wilson, though generally more inclined to involve the U.S. in more than simply supporting economic enterprise, as typified Taft's tenure, he was unable to move beyond

[91] William Howard Taft, "First Annual Message to Congress," (December 7, 1909), accessed May 2, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29550.
[92] Philander G. Knox, "Address Before the New York Bar Association," *American Foreign Policy: a Documentary Survey 1776-1960,* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston Inc. 1961):175-177, 176.

Taft's diplomatic legacy. Even so far removed as the end of World War I, he still had difficulty in rousing support for his view of foreign policy.[93] Thus, even though Wilson was president for much of the conflict in the Balkans, Taft and his legacy remained the driving force behind U.S. foreign policy.

In their study on the rise of U.S. power in global affairs, Alfred Eckes Jr. and Thomas Zeiler highlight the transitional phase the U.S. foreign policy underwent in the early years of the Taft administration. They wrote, "The United States had erratically attempted to assert its influence abroad after the Civil War, mostly by commercial means rather than territorial conquest. This was the era of informal imperialism…During the period from 1870-1913, the United States grew at about twice the rate of Britain."[94] This reliance on commercial influence carried into the Balkan Wars. It marked a unique moment in U.S. diplomatic history, ended by the outbreak of World War I, where the U.S. enjoyed robust expansion of international trade with little corresponding increase in international political obligations.

The role of the U.S. Foreign Service in promoting trade expansion, especially in Europe, is apparent in the market reports printed in contemporary newspapers. In 1910 the *New York Times* reported, "An American consular officer in Southern Europe, reports that there is a good demand in his district for machines for cleaning and pressing broom corn. Two inquiries for such machinery have been received, and manufacturers are requested to send illustrated literature and price lists."[95] This article highlights two intriguing points about American foreign relations. First, that there is an established

[93] Mead, 35-38.
[94] Eckes and Zeiler, 11.
[95] "Foreign Trade Opportunities," *The New York Times*, January 6, 1910, 12, http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1910/01/06/issue.html.

consular officer. As will be explained later, the expanding consular network was a novel feature for American foreign relations at this time. Second, the role the expanding international business of American manufactured goods had in driving the expansion of the consular network. They served as the point of communication between local consumers and American producers.

Regarding American manufactured goods, Eckes and Zeiler relate an anecdote told by a British engineer, writing, "'The inventive faculty of Americans is the most dangerous weapon of this formidable competition,' wrote Benjamin Thwaite, a British Engineer, 'Whilst our soldiers and sailors are opening up new highways of commerce, the American by his ingenuity is producing machinery that will enable him to undersell every the Briton in every market of the world.'"[96] Ultimately Mr. Thwaite was proven correct in his prediction. U.S. manufactured goods dominated international markets throughout the early 20th century.

Undoubtedly, the best example of the booming American businesses is the Singer Sewing Machine Company. In the fifty years since its founding in the 1850's, the company managed to capture the attention of the entire world, and particularly the European market. By 1903 the company was selling 1.35 million sewing machines a year. One decade later and that number jumped to 3 million sewing machines a year, with the company's 80% saturation of the global market giving it a virtual monopoly.[97] In the Ottoman Empire alone, "There is probably almost no family which did not own one Singer Sewing machine or at least know one neighbor who possessed one."[98] With this

[96] Eckes and Zeiler, 20.
[97] Singer, "History," http://www.singerco.com/company/history+
[98] Yavuz Köse, "Flooding the Ottoman Market," *Living in the Ottoman Ecumenical Community*, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV 2008): 221-245, 238.

level of foreign investment the U.S. required an adequate diplomatic corps to represent its international assets.

In his second State of the Union address, Taft expanded upon the importance of trade, and used it as justification for increasing diplomatic involvement in world affairs. First, he stated, "All these tariff negotiations, so vital to our commerce and industry, and the duty of jealously guarding the equitable and just treatment of our products, capital, and industry abroad devolve upon the Department of State."[99] By making this statement, Taft confirmed that the role of U.S. foreign policy was to secure opportunities for private trade. In order to accomplish this he recommended, and Congress approved, a major expansion to the U.S. Foreign Service, with newly established permanent consulates providing the necessary governmental oversight abroad.[100]

In the two years leading up to the First Balkan War, Taft made the promotion of American business interests in Turkey and the Balkans a priority in his foreign policy scheme. In each of his State of the Union addresses leading up to the First Balkan War, he made special mention of the growth in regional trade. In 1910 he was especially explicit saying, "The rapid development now beginning in that ancient empire and the marked progress and increased commercial importance of Bulgaria, Romania, and Servia make it particularly opportune that the possibilities of American commerce in the Near East should receive due attention."[101] And, one year later he confirmed the success of American business ventures in the region, noting the

[99] William Howard Taft, "Second Annual Message to Congress," (December 6, 1910), accessed May 2, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29551.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid.

mutual exchanges of corporate personal between American businesses and manufacturers and their counterparts in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan nations.[102]

Expanding business opportunities in the region continued after Taft's commitment to greater diplomatic involvement in the region. *The New York Times* regularly printed requests by consular officers for increasing American investment in the region. These were provided exclusively to *The New York Times* by the Department of Commerce and Labor. In just one paper alone, printed May 29, 1911, the Levantine consulate in the Ottoman Empire placed and order for $550,000 worth of thread, yarn, and cloth.[103] In the same listing, the Near-Eastern consulate, representing Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, placed an order for heavy construction machinery, though no indication is given regarding the cost.[104]

This pattern of self-supporting build up in the Balkans, between private and governmental organizations, was unique to the U.S. Walter Mead explains this by stating, "Throughout American history the distinction between state and society has been blurrier than in Europe, and fewer of the key activities of American society have been led or carried out by the state. This is as true in foreign policy as in many other aspect of national life."[105] The most notable result from this type of buildup was the creation of consulates only when deemed necessary for the protection or promotion of trade. This differs significantly from the British example discussed in the previous chapter where the role of diplomats was primarily to serve as liaisons between officials and government organizations, and to be the primary driver of expanding spheres of influence.

[102] William Howard Taft, "Third Annual Message to Congress," (December 5, 1911), accessed May 2, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29552.
[103] "Foreign Trade Opportunities," *The New York Times*, May 29, 1911, 13, http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1911/05/29/104781711.html?pageNumber=13.
[104] Ibid 13.
[105]Mead, 52-53.

Given this pattern of U.S. involvement in global affairs, and here particularly regarding the Balkans, it should come as little surprise that the U.S. declared neutrality when the First Balkan War began. In keeping with the government's policy of leading from the rear, no official statement concerning the First Balkan War was issued until nearly a month of fighting had passed. The Taft administration's main concern was maintaining viable trade networks. Therefore diplomacy and military action extended only so far as to protect privately controlled American interests in the region. In his final State of the Union address, Taft outlined the official American response to the First Balkan War. First by stating, "The United States has happily been involved neither directly nor indirectly with the causes or questions incident to any of these hostilities and has maintained in regard to them an attitude of absolute neutrality and of complete political disinterestedness."[106] He then followed this with a promise of military protection only so far as to "bear its part in such measures as it may be necessary…for the safeguarding of foreign lives and property in the Ottoman Empire in the event that a dangerous situation should develop."[107] This response left little doubt that official intervention would be unlikely, however it did not signal the absence of American involvement in the conflict.

Newspapers kept the American public informed of the progression of the conflict in the Balkans. However, the nature of reporting differed from its counterpart in Great Britain. Correspondingly, the reaction by the American public differed as well. The primary reasons for the differences in reporting styles rested on the American reliance on foreign trade as its main entry point into foreign affairs, the high amount of autonomy granted to the American public to involve themselves personally in the conflicts, and the large immigrant populations in the U.S. that originally hailed from the belligerent nations. These three points are interrelated as each both

[106] Taft, "Fourth Annual Message to Congress."
[107] Ibid.

relied on, and supported, the others. Generally, the American press tended to portray the Balkan states in a more favorable light compared to their British equivalents. Whereas the British press tended to demean the Balkan peoples as being a lesser form of humanity, and the war itself as important only so far as it pertained to Great Power politics, the American press treated the peoples of the Balkans as equals and the wars as a form of independence struggle.

When Montenegro attacked the Ottoman Empire, *The Day Book* published a running narrative of the events occurring in the Balkans. In closing their first story of the war they included a rather cheeky slight against the Great Powers' efforts to control the situation. They reported, "Two hours before delivery of note Montenegro formally declared war and when note was delivered by powers asked what they were going to do about it."[108] That *The Day Book* portrays Montenegro as audacious enough to stand up to the Conference of Europe indicates most strikingly the difference in American perception of the conflict versus Great Britain's perception. This theme of presenting the Balkan League especially as the heroic underdogs differs explicitly from the tone of British reporting on the issue.

The trend of portraying the belligerent states, particularly the Balkan League, as morally superior to the Great Powers carried over across a wide number of papers. *The Washington Times* reported, "Austria, it is understood, has entirely abandoned negotiations with the other powers looking toward intervention in the Balkan struggle and is in communication with the capitals of Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece in an effort to convince them that they will do better to hand over a share of the plunder to Franz Josef than to force him to fight for it."[109] The portrayal of "Franz Josef" as representative of the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire is

[108] "The War Situation," *The Day Book*, October 9, 1912, 7, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045487/1912-10-09/ed-1/seq-7/.
[109] "Adrianople is cut off from Supply Base," *The Washington Times*, October 28, 1912, 1, 4, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84026749/1912-10-28/ed-1/seq-4/.

especially interesting as it suggests that the newspaper, and by extension its readership, held royalty to be an autocratic, immoral form of leadership. This point is further reinforced by the article equating the Austrian monarch as being greedy and violent against the comparatively moral Balkan League.

Jacob Schurman, U.S. ambassador to Greece at the onset of the First Balkan War, suggests that in part the American support of the Balkan League rested on hopes that they might fashion themselves into a united states based around American constitutionalism. He wrote in his later account of the conflict that, "For months after the outbreak of the war against Turkey the development of this Alliance into a Confederation of the Balkan states, on the model of the American or the German constitution, was a theme of constant discussion in Europe and America."[110] Certainly during the First Balkan War this sentiment held true. Americans presented the Balkan League as being caught in a confrontation between outdated, decadent Powers.

Mabel Grouitch, the American wife of the prominent Serbian diplomat Slavko Grouitch, regularly made appeals to the American public. Often to raise money for the Red Cross, but also to highlight the effect of the Balkan Wars. In a piece written for her in *The New York Times* she stated, "'Thus the political powers will never interfere to save a much-persecuted people until the very worst is at hand…There must be bloodshed before there can be sympathy.'"[111] As an American she was well received with her remarks on the war. She appealed not only to immigrants but American citizens as well.

[110] Schurman, 34.
[111] "Mme. Grouitch here for a Servian Fund," *New York Times*, October 28, 1912, accessed May 2, 2015, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D06E7DB133CE633A2575BC2A9669D946396D6CF

As stated previously, the three points of having a large immigrant population, granting the public high levels of autonomy in their interactions with the Balkans, and the generally favorable portrayal of the Balkan peoples were interconnected. Regarding the immigrant population, many returned back to their home countries to fight in the war. The *Times* reported early in November 1912 that, "Besides the thousands of Greeks who are flocking home to fight against the Turks, several hundred Americans have applied to the Greek Legation for the privilege of volunteering in the same cause."[112] Though the article goes on to suggest that the Americans are only volunteering out of a sense of adventure, it still indicates the high level of support for the Balkan League in the First Balkan War.

In fact, before the war had even broke out immigrants were leaving the U.S. in preparation to fight. Early in October *The Evening Star* reported, "A telegram from Sofia states that 15,000 Macedonians are about to return from the United States as volunteer soldiers in the expected Balkan War."[113] Besides the obvious anticipatory sentiment held by the Macedonian immigrants, what is more remarkable is the sheer number of volunteers. Again, without the U.S. granting high levels of autonomy to its population, this level of movement would not be possible. Had the U.S. taken a stricter stance towards its population, and had this been recognized by the Ottoman Empire, then it is easy to imagine such action being misconstrued as an act of aggression.

Part of the reason such scenario did not happen was the high level of U.S. trade with the Ottoman Empire. In an expose printed in October 1913, *The New York Times* reported, "The

[112] "Americans Would Volunteer," *The New York Times*, November 3, 1912, 2, http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1912/11/03/issue.html.
[113] "Martial Law Probable," *The Evening Star*, October 2, 1912, 15, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045462/1912-10-02/ed-1/seq-1/#date1=1912&index=0&rows=20&words=Balkan+volunteer+war&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=District+of+Columbia&date2=1913&proxtext=volunteer+balkan+war&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1.

principal imports from America are agricultural machinery and oil. Mr. Perkins has recently revealed the not very secret secrets of the International Harvester Company, which, in various forms, does a large business in the Balkans. As you ride through the country you see solemn yoke of oxen drawing an American reaper through the growing grain."[114] Though after the events of the Balkan Wars, it is safe to assume that this article is indicative of a larger trend of American trade in the region. Supporting the diplomatic practice put in place by Taft favoring strong international economic ties.

Eckes and Zeiler support this point as well. Regarding American business expansion abroad they wrote, "Almost every prominent tycoon of the era had some interest in foreign businesses. The list included railroad builders Cornelius Vanderbilt and E.H. Harriman as well as banker J.P. Morgan. Companies like Standard Oil of New Jersey, Singer Sewing Machine, International Harvester, and New York Life had established significant positions abroad."[115] In all cases these businesses continued to grow despite the conflict in the Balkans.

In part, booming American business abroad was a result not so much due to trade with the Balkan states themselves, but rather to panicked European markets anxious over the effect of the war. The *Honolulu Star Bulletin* printed an optimistic article in the winter of 1913 claiming, "American securities at the time of the Balkan outbreak, this country should still have a liberal credit abroad, considering the large excess of exports over imports which continued through 1912. The unusual character of this movement emphasizes two points. First the exceptional strain in Europe, and, second, our ability and readiness to give financial aid to Europe."[116] In

[114] Albert Bushnell Hart, "Road Along the Danube," *The New York Times*, October 26, 1913, 13, http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1913/10/26/issue.html.
[115] Eckes and Zeiler, 22.
[116] "Clews takes Cheerful View," *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, January 22, 1913, 8, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82014682/1913-01-22/ed-1/seq-8/#date1=1912&index=2&rows=20&words=Balkan+exports&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=&date2=1913&proxtext=balkan+exports&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1.

addition to showing how American markets were doing well, this article also brings up the point of monetary aid. The relief efforts for the Balkan Wars solicited large amounts of money in aid via the American Red Cross Society amongst other charitable organizations.

In one notable fund raising event, hosted by M. F. Pupin, a professor at Columbia University and an honorary representative of Serbia in the U.S., $16,000 were raised. The *New York Times* reported, "The sum of $16,000 was raised at the meeting, $10,000 of which was donated by the Chairman and $5,000 by Milan Yovanowich, the Servian farmer from the West…'I have in this world $7,000, and of this sum I have brought to New York with $5,000.'"[117] While clearly an exceptional case, it does highlight two important points. First, the willingness to donate without the appearance of coercion as in the case of British donations. Second, that those donated empathized with those they were donating to, again unlike in the British example where pity punctuated the giving of donations. The previously mentioned *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan War*, also highlights the amount of aid leaving the U.S. To Greece alone, thousands of dollars of cash deposits were made in Greek banks from American transfers.[118]

Within a month of the beginning of hostilities, the U.S. managed to raise $40,000. In a brief quip run November 21, 1912 in the *Evening Star* reported that, "John D. Rockefeller has contributed $5,000 to the American Red Cross for use in relief work in the Balkan states. Mr. Rockefeller's contribution makes the American total $40,000"[119] This pattern of gift giving fits in with overall economic basis of American diplomatic culture for a couple reasons. First, aside from the aforementioned case of the Montanan farmer

[117] "Gives Life Savings to Servia for War: Serb Farmer from Montana Stirs Mass Meeting in Amsterdam Opera House to Tears," *The New York Times*, October 22, 1912, 1, accessed May 2, 2015, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D01E4DC133CE633A25752C2A9669D946396D6CF.
[118] *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan War*, 392-393.
[119] "Rockefeller Gives $40,000," *Evening Star*, November 21, 1912, 2, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83045462/1912-11-21/ed-1/seq-2/#date1=1836&index=5&rows=20&words=Balkan+Rockefeller&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=&date2=1922&proxtext=rockefeller+balkan&y=12&x=23&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1

donating his life savings, to be able to afford, or at the very least have the desire to donate, one must have some amount of disposable income. Second, the popularity of private donations over official government intervention in the region suggests a preference towards private enterprise being the primary driver of American exposure to the conflict.

The Carnegie Foundation report marked a tipping point in U.S. diplomatic relations. The U.S. was now at the point where it was competing directly with the European Powers. By including an American delegate on the investigatory panel, Europe marked the U.S. as equal to itself in prestige. Jonathan Schmitt explains, "The recognition by the European powers of the development of a new strain of imperialism in the United States that subordinated outright colonization and unapologetic resource extraction to clandestine economic penetration may have influenced the Great Power representatives' rhetorical treatment of the United States in the Carnegie Inquiry."[120] Either the robustness of American industry or the general efficacy of the U.S. in maintaining friendly relations abroad worked in establishing the new diplomatic model in Europe. Either way, the Balkan Wars marked the tipping point for America's position in global affairs. The global pause before the horror of World War I marked a unique moment were both the old system of diplomacy, championed by Britain, and the newer, more coercive strategy of the United States had relatively equal efficacy.

[120] Jonathan Schmitt, "Whose is the House of Greatest Disorder? Civlization and Savagery on the Early Twentieth-Century Eastern European and North American Frontiers," *War and Nationalism: the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, and their Sociopolitical Implications*, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press 2013): 496-527, 499.

Conclusion

The original questions guiding the analysis were what are the static tropes that govern British and American diplomacy and how did popular media depictions of the Balkan Wars reinforce, or detract from, these established diplomatic traditions in the United States and Great Britain? The two chapters show that there were in fact established traditions governing how each empire approached international relations. However, unlike Mead's assertion towards static, reoccuring policies, the established diplomatic traditions functioned primarily as a form of rhetorical justification rather than as unchanging doctrine. In each case, and supporting the methodology drawn from Dorn Sezgin, popular sentiment played large role in reinforcing or even altering official policy.

In Great Britain the derision expressed towards the people of the Balkans helped to uphold the general policy of maintaining geographic stability on the continent between the Great Powers. The stereotyping of the Balkans ensured that Britain continued to treat the Balkan nations as pawns in a broader diplomatic game between itself, Russia, Germany, France, Austro-Hungary, and Italy. With the commonly held view that the Balkan peoples were somehow a lesser form of humanity than other Europeans, it supports why Britain rarely if ever directly negotiated with the Balkan states themselves. The result was diplomatic culture centered on maintaining geographic stability, specifically regarding the balance of power between the Great Powers of Europe.

This diplomatic culture carried over into Britain's charitable endeavors in the Balkans. This took explicit form when Britain attempted to appear the most beneficent of all the Powers so as to not lose diplomatic credibility. The elitist attitude adopted by British citizenry when comparing themselves to the people of the Balkan Peninsula also played a role in charitable

donations since the giving of donations was presented as a way of demonstrating one's own superiority.

Unlike the British, Americans held generally favorable views of the Balkan peoples. This occurred in part due to the high numbers of Balkan immigrants in the United States. Additionally, the investment of American capital into the region fostered trade networks that further enhanced Americans' perception of the Balkans. The role of American capitalists in determining America's diplomatic culture was great. They served as the vanguard that prompted the expansion of the official diplomatic presence in the region. This diplomatic expansion had to contend, however, with established American policy to exclude itself from the affairs of Europe.

The legacy of the Monroe Doctrine actually had a synergistic effect on American foreign policy when paired with private capital investment. American trade in the region required neutrality in order to function. Likewise, the legal precedent set by the Monroe Doctrine stipulated that neutrality was the only option available to the U.S. However, even neutral involvement would have been perceived as going against traditional interpretations of the doctrine, so in this regard the populace, and popular media, played a definitive role in establishing a European foreign policy for the United States. The sum total then of American international affairs during the Balkan Wars illustrates a diplomatic culture driven by economics.

Demonstrating the cyclical cause-and-effect relationship between the policy and popular support, the level of autonomy granted U.S. citizens came from the reliance by the federal government on its citizenry to promote U.S. interests abroad. This autonomy granted citizens and residents of the U.S. the freedom to involve themselves personally in the Balkan Wars. The most obvious of this being of course the large number of immigrants who returned en masse to the Balkans to fight and lend aid to the wounded.

Despite differing in their application and nature, the diplomatic cultures of the United States and Great Britain demonstrate the interconnectedness of Dorn Sezgin and Mead's models. Together, the combination of popular perceptions with established tradition creates a cyclical effect that drives the development of foreign policy. Established patterns of diplomatic orthopraxy determine how and when its supporting population may respond to external events. Yet, even the most entrenched policies must be reworked and reinterpreted based on popular support since they become meaningless without tacit acquiescence by the individuals they are designed to govern. This cycle as a whole, represents diplomatic culture. The identity of this culture depends upon what commonly held desire links old tradition with new stimuli. Thus, during the Balkan Wars the U.S. acted with a diplomatic culture driven by economics, whereas the British, operating with different concerns and a different governing history, saw its diplomatic culture be dominated by concerns over the political geography of Europe.

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