

Russian minorities in the Post-Soviet Space: a Comparative analysis of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

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Abstract

Under the Soviet Union, Russians were spread out over the entire territory of the USSR. Russians held high positions in the Soviet Union. However, after the disintegration of the USSR, Russians who lived outside of Russia acquired the new status of being a minority. The sudden collapse of the USSR raised many concerns and fears for Russians who lived outside of Russia, since successor states prioritized nation-building processes. This study examines the treatment of Russian memories in Uzbekistan and in Kyrgyzstan by using Rogers Brubaker's framework of triadic nexus. The research covers the relations between national minority with nationalizing state and relation of national minority with external national homelands. Primarily, this thesis considers Uzbekistan's and Kyrgyzstan's treatment of Russians minorities on the basis of language and access to politics. There are examined nationalizing policies of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and Russian minorities' opinion toward such policies. In addition, it provides an analysis of Russian Federation policies on supporting its compatriots in foreign countries and Russian minorities' assessment of Russia as a state that support and pursue their interest. Based on qualitative and quantitative data, I claim that the treatments of Russians in both states are different in terms of language policies and politics. I conclude that Russian Federation does not effectively support and promote interests of its ethnocultural kin in Uzbekistan and in Kyrgyzstan, but instead pursues its geopolitical goals by using its Russian Diasporas in these states.

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List of abbreviations

CA – Central Asia

EU- European Union

FDI – Foreign Direct Investments

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

KR – Kyrgyz Republic

RU – Republic of Uzbekistan

RSFSR - The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

RF – Russian Federation

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Introduction

All five Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were members of the Soviet Union. During the period of the USSR a lot of Russian people moved to the territory of five Central Asian states in order to work in the engineering, medical and education sectors. In addition, during the Second World War many factories and industrial centres were moved to CA territory in order to protect from Nazi forces and as a result Russification tendency was increased. Russians made up nearly 20 percent of the total population in these five states.¹ With sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there appeared many minority groups together with other national minorities; twenty five million Russian people who lived in the post-Soviet states suddenly got minority status.²

Research, which was done right after the dissolution of the USSR, shows that half of the Russians, who lived in Central Asia, were born there. Others, who were not born in CA states, were living for more than twenty years in CA territory.³ Nevertheless, the unpredicted dissolution of the Soviet Union caused many questions and fears that considerably accelerated migratory movements. The migration flow in Central Asia was noticeably more than those from other ex-Post-Soviet republics. More than half of the migrants coming to Russia were from Central Asia, compared to 17 percent from the Caucasus, 20 percent from Ukraine, and 3 percent from the Baltic States. However, migratory flow of Russian from Central Asia was even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1970th Central Asia was not anymore regarded as region of priority development in USSR. With Leonid Brezhnev's policy of indigenization, necessity of Russians in CA states to progress administration and politics was not needed any longer.⁴ Nevertheless, twenty five years passed from the collapse of the USSR, but many Russian people are still living in CA republics.

This research is aimed to look at Uzbekistan's and Kyrgyzstan's treatment of Russian minorities through using Rogers Brubaker's framework of triadic nexus. Triadic nexus compromises the relation of three different nationalisms: 1) nationalising state, 2) national minority which related to nationalising state through living in its territory and through having its citizenship and 3) external homeland to which national minority belongs by ethnocultural

¹ Sebastien Peyrouse, *The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and Language* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Schol, 2008), 1–3.

² Michele E. Commercio, *Russian Minority Politics in Post-Soviet Latvia and Kyrgyzstan: The Transformative Power of Informal Networks* (United States of America: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 6.

³ Peyrouse, *The Russian Minority in Central Asia*, 8.

⁴ Ibid., 3.

affinity.⁵ As an external national homeland, here Russian Federation is applicable. In order to find out the triadic relation between Russian minority groups, nationalizing states and Russia, the study firstly look at the relation of nationalising state and minority group. I took two sectors, politics which includes participation in decision making process and socio-culture which includes language, to see what kind of conditions nationalizing states provide to minority group. I have chosen participation in decision making process because it is one of the main indicators where ethnic minorities may face discrimination. Another main feature is language; it is a location where equal treatment values should be applicable.

In order to see the relation of Russia with its ethnocultural kin in Uzbekistan and in Kyrgyzstan, I looked what kind of policies Russian Federation has to support its compatriots. Besides, there are used interviews in order to see opinion of Russian minorities towards nationalizing policies of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and to understand real actions of the Russian Federation in promotion of the interest of Russians in CA states. So, I tried to answer to the questions what kind of differences and similarities exist in politics (in decision making), in socio-culture (language) between these two post-Soviet countries concerning Russian minority group, and what is the role of Russia in endorsing the interest of Russians in CA republics.

⁵ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4.

Chapter 1

1.1. Literature review on Russian minorities in the post-Soviet states:

Ethnic minority is very delicate issue. The Soviet Union was made of many nations; all successor republics have multi-national population, but Russian minority has its exclusive differentiation from other minorities. During the Soviet times Russians had special privileges and position in whole territory of USSR.⁶ They played a huge role in all aspects of life in the Soviet Union. Due to the fact that Russians were spread out in the whole territory of USSR, from late 1990 more than 25 million Russians got a new status of minorities in successor states.⁷ Basically, identity construction, migration, protection of the rights and discriminations were studied about Russian minorities.

In the period of the USSR, Russian language was widely spread out in the Soviet Union. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed, successor states started to work on state-building processes and many states decided to concentrate on culture and language of the titular nation. William Fierman states that Russian language declined in successor states. In all three Baltic States, Russian language does not have a status of an official language of the state. South Caucasus also did not grant a status of the official language of the state to Russian language. From the Central Asian republics, in Turkmenistan and in Uzbekistan, Russian language is simply foreign language. While, in Tajikistan the Russian language is considered to be a language of inter-ethnic communication. But, in two other Central Asian states, Russian language has a status of an official language of the state.⁸

Russian language as a language of instructions is rarely used in Baltic States, Fierman points out that even during the Soviet times, students in all three countries mostly attended schools with titular language of instruction. Nowadays there is a requirement in Baltic States to have certain subjects in titular language in Russian language schools. The situation in South Caucasus is the same as in Baltic States, parents infrequently send their children to Russian schools. While in Central Asian region the image is totally different, since Russian language is widely used in all five countries. Russian language is used as a language of instructions not

⁶ Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority : Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States* (United States of America: Westview Press, 1996), 5.

⁷ Vladimir Shlapentokh, Munir Sendich, and Emil Payin, *The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics* (M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 37.

⁸ William Fierman, "Russian in Post-Soviet Central Asia: A Comparison with the States of the Baltic and South Caucasus," *Europe-Asia Studies* 64, no. 6 (August 1, 2012): 1082–1083, doi:10.1080/09668136.2012.691722.

only in schools, but also at university levels.⁹ William Fierman clearly gives explanations why in some post-Soviet states language practice together with nationalism programs were stricter, while in other it was in favour of Russian speaking population. He covers many post-Soviet states; however, he did not go deeper in all cases. His work is more as an overall picture of treatment of Russian language in the post-Soviet space. The author did not provide the reasons why in some states people send their children to Russian schools, but in other they don't. Nataliya Kosmarskaya perfectly makes an elaboration to Fierman work, she claims that in Central Asia, people speak and learn Russian language in order to raise their social advancement. To this conclusion she came through analysing interviews.¹⁰

Sebastien Peyrouse in his work "The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and Language" addresses several language issues in Central Asia. He accurately explains the treatment of the Russian language. However, his main aim was to cover migration. Basically, he tries to answer the question: what were the real causes of Russian minority leaving Central Asia right after the collapse of the Soviet Union? The author emphasizes that the motivation of leaving the CA states are different, they can be economic, social and political. Besides, the author puts language as one of the main reasons of leaving country. Since linguistic policies pushed Russians to leave CA countries.¹¹ This article is extremely useful due to the fact that all five Central Asians states were covered. On the other hand, Peyrouse main aim was to explain migration, not treatment of Russians.

States' treatment of minorities can be changed or challenged by external parties. Significant literature covers the relation of minority groups with state where they live or with other state to which they may belong by ethnicity. Rogers Brubaker proposes a theory, which includes relations between minority group, state where they reside and state to which ethnic minority belongs by ethnicity. He calls this connexion – triadic nexus.¹² David J. Smith elaborated Rogers Brubaker's triadic nexus and puzzled it by introducing another subject. He added to nationalizing state, minority nationalism, and external national homeland, fourth player, which is an international organization. From this time Rogers Brubaker's triadic nexus becomes quadrate. Smith claimed that international organizations as NATO, the OSCE and the

⁹ Ibid., 1083–1085.

¹⁰ Natalya Kosmarskaya, "Russians in Post-Soviet Central Asia: More 'cold' than the Others? Exploring (ethnic) Identity under Different Sociopolitical Settings," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 35, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 13, 15, doi:10.1080/01434632.2013.845195.

¹¹ Peyrouse, *The Russian Minority in Central Asia*, 3–6.

¹² Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 4–6.

Council of Europe can play a role to shape the formation of the post-communist identity in Central and Eastern Europe.¹³ However, this fourth player do not fit to some post-Soviet republics, for instance to Uzbekistan. Since the struggles to promote human rights and democracy are limited in Uzbekistan.¹⁴

Stephen J. Del Rosso JR. in his dissertation “Bringing the globe back in: an analysis of the effects of globalisation on national self-determination through application of Rogers Brubaker’s “Triadic Nexus” of nationalism to the case of Estonia” integrates new idea - globalisation. He argues if globalisation is integrated to each type of nationalism, then outcome will be totally different.¹⁵ Globalisation in the case of Estonia is related to Europeanization, because of Estonia’s integration to the European Union.¹⁶ However, regardless Estonian integration to EU, author claims that the situation with Estonian democracy is weak and the position of Estonia which is described by Estonian scholars as neutral with respect to ethnical minorities is biased.¹⁷ Rosso very clearly describes how nationalising state of Estonia flourished state for its core nation. As an example he brings language treatment. Estonia rejected bilingualism starting from adopting of the language law in 1995, which recognizes only Estonian as an official language of the state and other languages as a foreign language. The author argues that Russians consisted third of the total population, nevertheless, with this law Russian language became equal to Tatar and Swedish languages, however these ethnical groups were small minorities in comparison with Russians. In addition, Russo highlights that Russians had some limitations to access politics in Estonia.¹⁸

In contrast, the situation with Russians in Kazakhstan is to some extent different. Alina Jasina argues that regardless of some state policies on nationalism, Kazakhstan could manage to avoid a sense of discrimination among its Russian minorities. In her thesis “Finding Bonds that Unite: Russia’s Compatriot Policy and Identity of Young Russian Speakers in Kazakhstan” the author uses Rogers Brubaker’s triadic nexus. She states that Russian Federation is present

¹³ David J. Smith, “Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A Quadratic Nexus?,” *Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 2, no. 1 (September 1, 2002): 11, doi:10.1080/14718800208405119.

¹⁴ “Freedom of Association Under Threat: The New Authoritarians’ Offensive Against Civil Society - Uzbekistan,” Freedom House, accessed May 30, 2016, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-association-under-threat-new-authoritarians-offensive-against-civil-society-2>.

¹⁵ Stephen J. Del Rosso JR, “Bringing the Globe Back in: An Analysis of the Effects of Globalisation on National Self-Determination through Application of Rogers Brubaker’s ‘Triadic Nexus’ of Nationalism to the Case of Estonia” (University of Pennsylvania, 2004), 1–5, <http://repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/AAI3125807/>.

¹⁶ Ibid., 6–7.

¹⁷ Ibid., 152.

¹⁸ Ibid., 184 – 185.

in Kazakhstan and present economically and culturally. Russian Federation makes efforts to link Russian minorities in Kazakhstan with Russia. Nevertheless, Russians minority are more attached to Kazakhstan rather to Russia, since Russians have a right for cultural self-determination. Even Russians perceive elites in Kazakhstan as those who try to support multi-ethnic atmosphere in the state through providing equal rights and forbidding radical expression concerning nationalism. Concerning the self-determination and sense of belonging author claims that for Russians, these are not fixed yet.¹⁹

Michele E. Commercio argues that the role of informal networks also play significant role in the endorsing the interest of minorities.²⁰ In her book which is called *Russian Minority Politics in Post-Soviet Latvia and Kyrgyzstan: The Transformative Power of Informal Networks*, the author covers how Soviet Socialist legacy and post-Soviet nationalization affects the situation with Russian minorities in Latvia and Kyrgyzstan. Russians through the networks, which were inherited from the USSR, try to push their interest. However, these networks are informal organizations, since they work on the basis of not written rules. The existence of informal networks in some post-Soviet states is a result of reaction to the nationalizing policies of government.²¹ This book perfectly works in terms of getting some overall information and particularly regarding Kyrgyzstan and Latvia. However, the author makes more accents to the idea of how Russians in Kyrgyzstan and in Latvia promote their economic interest, while political interest and culture was mentioned rare.

Taken together these all sources, they all complement each other and we can see overall picture of Russian minorities in the post-Soviet states and their link with Russia. We can see that the main reasons for dissatisfaction of Russian are linguistic, political and economic discrimination. As we saw above, these motives were indicated as reason for migration. But unfortunately, to measure economy in CA states is really hard, since there is no reliable data of Russian ethnic participation in economy or in labour market. That is why I have decided to cover only language and politics. As well after making some review, I understood that more research should be done about Russians in CA states, since much of the works covered other post-Soviet states. From the Central Asian countries, only Kazakhstan was often studied.

¹⁹ Alina Jasina, "Finding Bonds That Unite: Russia's Compatriot Policy and the Identity of Young Russian Speakers in Kazakhstan" (Central European University, 2015), 51–53.

²⁰ Commercio, *Russian Minority Politics in Post-Soviet Latvia and Kyrgyzstan*, 5.

²¹ Ibid., 9–11.

Using all arguments I have decided to write about Russian in CA states, as case studies I have chosen Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Firstly, I have decided to exclude Kazakhstan since the numbers of Russians highly differ in comparison with other CA state because second large part of the population reflected to be Russians in Kazakhstan. According to national statistical committee of Kazakhstan, there were in 2009 almost 3 794 000 Russians.²² Secondly, Turkmenistan was not chosen because of limited access to data. Thirdly, I have decided to exclude Tajikistan since numbers of Russian are very little there. In Tajikistan in 2010 there were 35 000 Russians.²³ While, the numbers of the Russian people in Uzbekistan and in Kyrgyzstan do not differ very much. According to National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic there were more than 364 500 Russian in Kyrgyzstan in 2015.²⁴ While in Uzbekistan, there is no official statistics of population by ethnicity, last official data for ethnic composition was provided in 1989,²⁵ however, unofficial and non-academic sources indicate that there are 900 000 Russians currently live in Uzbekistan.²⁶ On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have different form of government. The form of government in Kyrgyzstan is semi-parliamentarian and in Uzbekistan is presidential. Besides, economically Uzbekistan is stronger and independent whereas Kyrgyzstan intensely needs for foreign direct investments.

Research Question

There are two research questions in this study. The first question: How Russian minorities in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are treated? The second question is: Whether the Russian Federation support and promote its ethnocultural kin in both Central Asian republics?

Hypothesis

There are several hypotheses proposed in this research. Firstly, using Roger's Brubaker theory, I assume that Russia plays an important role in the life of Russian people in both states.

²² "Population census 2009 [Perepis naseleniya 2009]," accessed June 1, 2016, http://stat.gov.kz/faces/wcnav_externalId/p_perepis?_afLoop=36628698037204320#%40%3F_afLoop%3D36628698037204320%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D15llrt1042_30.

²³ Dmitriy Popov, "The majority of Russians in Tajikistan - in a disastrous financial situation [Bolshenstvo russkikh v Tadjikistane - v bedstvennom materialnom položenii]," *Russian institute for strategic studies*, December 15, 2014, <http://riss.ru/analitics/7042/>.

²⁴ "Population," *National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic*, accessed June 1, 2016, <http://www.stat.kg/en/statistics/naselenie/>.

²⁵ Ekaterina Sherbakova, "After the 1989, Only the Population Census of Uzbekistan Was Not Rewritten, the 2010 Round of Censuses Were Held in 11 out of the 15 Former Soviet Republics [Posle Perepisi 1989 Goda Tolko Naselenie Uzbekistana Ne Bylo Perepisano Ni Razu, Perepisi Raunda 2010 Goda Proshli v 11 iz 15 Byvshih Soiuznyh Respublik SSSR]," *Demoskop Weekly*, January 26, 2014, <http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2014/0581/barom01.php>.

²⁶ Vitaliy Slovetkii, "Who Will Save the Uzbek Russians? [Kto Spaset Uzbekskikh Russkikh?]," *Svobodnaya Pressa*, April 2, 2013, <http://svpressa.ru/society/article/66300/>.

Rogers Brubaker's triadic nexus framework suggests that external homelands play a role of protector in the life of ethnic group. In the case of Russian minorities, the Russian Federation is an external homeland. Consequently, Russian Federation through informal politics supports its Russian people regardless the fact that they live in foreign state and have different citizenship. My second hypothesis is that both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan fits to Brubaker's nationalizing states, however, Russian minorities have more privileges in the Kyrgyz Republic in comparison with Uzbekistan because of the RF's relations with both Central Asian states. Russia can pressure more on Kyrgyzstan rather than on Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan economically is stronger and therefore does not need any aid. Whereas Kyrgyzstan needs foreign assistance and direct investments, and Russia is considered as one of the main potential FDIs providers in Kyrgyzstan.²⁷

1.2. Methodology

In this research a comparative analysis is used. Comparative method is needed in order to reveal similarities that prove or disapprove the hypotheses. The comparative analysis of Uzbekistani and Kyrgyzstani Russian minorities is based on two levels: politics and socio-culture. In this work there are combined two types of methods: qualitative and quantitative because there are statistics and interviews used in order to measure hypotheses. Mostly, statistical data from 1990 to the present time is relevant in this research since before 1990 both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were part of the Soviet Union.²⁸

Interviews were needed in order to find out situations of Russians in both states and their position and attitude to Russia. There is limited information on Russian minority in Uzbekistan, because of oppressed status of human rights NGOs²⁹ and strong media control in Uzbekistan. In order to find some accurate information on Uzbekistan, interviews with some Russian minorities in Uzbekistan are conducted. Besides, I have interviewed Russians from both states to see their attitude towards nationalizing policies. Interviews were semi-structured and with mostly grand tour questions and prompt questions. One of the main purposes of using interviews was to gain material and to understand some information from different perspective.

All interviews for Kyrgyzstan were taken in Bishkek, while interviews for Uzbekistan part were conducted through internet, but there were two exceptions, two persons from

²⁷ Commercio, *Russian Minority Politics in Post-Soviet Latvia and Kyrgyzstan*, 53.

²⁸ Chinn and Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority*, 223.

²⁹ "Freedom of Association Under Threat: The New Authoritarians' Offensive Against Civil Society - Uzbekistan."

Uzbekistan participated in interview in Bishkek. All interviews taped and transcribed in Russian language. The participants were chosen through snowball technique. The age of participants vary from 23 to 50 years and total participants were twenty four Russians, twelve from Kyrgyzstan and twelve from Uzbekistan. Participants for Uzbekistan part are mostly from Uzbekistan, there were two exceptions, who currently live outside of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Interviewees for Uzbekistan part were from different spheres, four of participants were journalists, one accountant, one human rights activist, one from academia, one from research institute, three work in entertainment portal and one is anonymous. While participants for Kyrgyzstan part were all from Kyrgyzstan. Three participants were MA students, one works in Software Company, and one from academia, one from private sector, four journalists, one from Customs service and one teacher. In this research participants are identified by real names and by state.

In addition to interviews, an analysis of legal documents is included. The research design of this paper is deductive, since, hypotheses were created by using various theories of nationalism. Basically, Rogers Brubaker's framework is used as theories. He combines three different theories of nationalisms in his triadic nexus framework. Furthermore, the literature is based on the primary and secondary sources. In order to understand the situation of Russian minorities in two CA states, statistics, interviews, laws and governmental policies regarding minority groups are applied as a primary source. An articles and books are used as secondary source.

First part of the study describes Rogers Brubaker's framework. While, second part of work analyses nationalism policies of both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and Russian minorities' opinion about such policies. For the socio-culture part I consider language as one of main part of culture and tool of communication. I looked at primary sources to find out the status of the Russian languages in both states. In addition I decided to search how broadly Russian language is used in schools. The answer to this question I found in secondary sources. In order to find out participation of Russian minorities in politics, basically in decision making process, I decided to look at how many members of the Parliament are ethnic Russians and how many Russians work in the governments of both states. During the interview in order to see whether Russians are discriminated, I asked participants such questions as what kind of policies Kyrgyz/Uzbek government has towards Russian language. Does the Russian minority have a real possibility to influence on government policies, does Russian ethnic group participate in political decision-making?

Further, I analyse Russia's actions in protecting its ethnocultural kin in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. To see the role of Russian Federation both primary and secondary literature were used since I used RF policies. Besides, here as well interviews were used in order to understand what Russians in both states think about Russian Federation, whether Russian Federation supports its ethnocultural kin in foreign states. To understand it I asked such questions as how do you assess Russian Federation's role in the preservation and development of Russian language in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan? What do you know about the Russian Federation's program of support of compatriots abroad?

Chapter 2. Theoretical consideration

Before deliberating the theories about ethnicity, it is needed to discuss the concept of "ethnicity". Ethnicity or Ethnic group is a socially defined category of people who identify each other based on common historical, social and cultural experience. In case of historical experience, an ethnic group has to have common ancestors and traditions, social experience compromise shared values and in cultural experience, ethnic group has to have common customs and language.³⁰

Due to significant question of ethnic minorities all over the world there have been developed a number of theories on this topic. It has at all times been understood the actions of ethnic inequality as indicators of discrimination, the point to which members of disadvantaged groups are classified to a lower position uniquely on the basis of their ethnic status.³¹ However, there sometimes can be third party which can take a role of protector of the ethnic minority. More than decades ago Rogers Brubaker introduced triadic nexus framework.

Rogers Brubaker in his book *Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe* raised the question of the specific nationalisms which were produced by political space. These types of nationalisms, which are purely political invention, are interactive and have a particular relational interconnection between each other. The relational nexus compromises national minorities, the newly nationalizing states where those national minorities reside, and the external homelands to which those national minorities belong not by legitimate citizenship but by ethnocultural link. Therefore, Rogers Brubaker's triadic nexus framework combines three different nationalisms. All three nationalisms are interconnected, but they are different and competing between each other. These reasons can affect unstableness.

The first is the "nationalizing" nationalism of newly independent state. Nationalizing nationalism covers core nation or nationality, which is defined by ethnocultural term. Under the core nation, author means owner of the state. Nationalizing nationalism regarded the state principally for the core nation and as a state of the core nation. On the other hand, the core nation, despite of having its own state, is considered economically, culturally or

³⁰ Philip Q. Yang, *Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches* (SUNY Press, 2000), 39–40.

³¹ Charles Hirschman, "Theories and Models of Ethnic Inequality," 4, accessed May 22, 2016, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.608.9840>.

demographically weak.³² The nation state considered as incomplete or lacking because the state is seen as unrealized nation-state. These weaknesses are usually used to substantiate using the state power to support the particular interests of the central nation. According to Brubaker's nationalizing state, leaders in the state endorse the language, economic growth, cultural hegemony and political priority of the major ethnocultural nation and consequently discriminate other minority groups.³³ In the scope of the functionalism, an ethnic inequality plays a vital role in the state and discrimination is absolutely contributes to the society. But, sociologists argue that discrimination contribute positively only to dominant group.³⁴ Then again, the actions of the state are not always nationalizing but they simply perceived by other two nationalisms of the triadic nexus as a threat. Besides, the impression of belonging the state to one particular ethnocultural nation and the idea of state for the core nation and of the core nation can be inherited from the past as in the case of Yugoslavia.³⁵ The new countries, which were part of USSR in the past, can easily hypothesized as nationalizing states, even though differences among all states.³⁶

The second nationalism which is external national homelands can challenge the nationalizing nationalism, from the moment when the nationalizing state brings such policies which favour their core nation and derogate minority group. Usually in such cases, external national homelands take protector's role. External national homelands observe the life conditions of their ethno-national people, who live in other countries. In addition, external national homelands can promote activities of their ethnocultural folks in a foreign country and support and protect their rights and interests. Above mentioned actions basically can come into force if ethnocultural kin in a foreign country seen to be threatened by the nationalizing policies and practices of the state where they live. Consequently, external homeland nationalism stands as an opposition to the nationalizing nationalism. To the idea that the status of ethnic minorities is entirely interior affairs, external national homelands claim that they have a responsibility to protect ethnocultural kin everywhere notwithstanding any borders.³⁷

³² Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 4–5.

³³ Ibid., 9.

³⁴ "Theories of Race and Ethnicity - Introduction to Sociology," accessed May 22, 2016, http://cnx.org/contents/r-QzKsl_@7.16:2_7V2Gl_@3/Theories-of-Race-and-Ethnicity.

³⁵ Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 63–65.

³⁶ Ibid., 9.

³⁷ Ibid., 5.

In order to be an external homeland, national minority not necessarily lived in the territory of the state, or their ancestors moved from the territory of this state.³⁸ State can become an external homeland in case if elites recognize citizens of other state as co-nationals and belong in some sense to them, consequently responsible for these co-nationals not only inside of the country but also outside, regardless that those co-nationals might have other citizenship.³⁹ External homelands politics of supporting its ethnocultural kin in another country can be different starting from immigration and providing citizenship to them. Other more harsh actions are efforts to impact other state nationalizing strategies or profess of the territory of other states.⁴⁰ However, even simple actions of defending its ethnocultural kin in another state by external homelands are problematic actions. Since commitment by “A” state to defend and support the rights and interest of citizens of “B” state can be perceived by government of “B” state as a threat to their security and sovereignty.⁴¹ This can challenge relations between states as well. Nevertheless, this relation between national minority and external homelands is not everywhere and relation between three nationalisms is not always conflictual. There are some cases, where the relation between all three nationalisms are not in conflict manner, for instance Germans national minority in nationalising state Poland and external homeland Germany are perfectly interacting.⁴²

Further, third nationalism stays between two nationalisms, which were discussed above, and it is called the national minorities. It belongs to nationalizing nationalism through living in its territory and to external national homelands by having ethnocultural similarity. This type of nationalism, as well as nationalising state and external national homeland, shows political position through claiming their own nationalism.⁴³ A national minority not a just group defined by ethnic demography. According to Brubaker a national minority has three elements. First is the public statement of ethnocultural nation about dissimilarity with the numerically or politically prevailing ethnocultural nation. Second is the request from the state to recognize this ethnocultural nationality distinct. Third is the affirmation of particular collective cultural or political rights, which is based on this ethnocultural nationality. Claims for collective cultural and political rights can be different starting from education in minority language to full independence. Besides, some national minorities can support cooperative membership with

³⁸ Ibid., 58.

³⁹ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 58.

⁴¹ Ibid., 53.

⁴² Ibid., 58.

⁴³ Ibid., 5–6.

other (other ethnic groups, core nation) in the participation in institutions whereas others can prefer separate actions.⁴⁴

Nationalist minority and external national homeland stay in opposite side to nationalising state. National minority together with external homeland can monitor the situation in the nationalizing state concerning national policies. Both are sensitive on the state national policies. In case, there is any sign of the projects of nationalization by nationalizing state, minorities can perceive it as oppressive acts. As a result of such projects, on the one hand, national minority can seek a help from external homelands. On the other hand, sometimes they can ask for autonomy or secession from the nationalising state. In this case, external national homeland can, on the basis of defender of the interests of national minority, be responsible for financial or moral assistance to initiatives of national minority. However, national minority and external national homeland not always play together as allies. Since, national minority can look for the protection from international organizations or show loyalty to the state where they reside.⁴⁵

In the twentieth century, reconfiguration of political space with national issue in Central and Eastern Europe were two times. First time it happened after decline of Ottoman Empire and collapse of Habsburg and Romanov empires. Second time it happened after dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, collapse of Yugoslavia and USSR. There appeared more than twenty new states in the territory of Eurasia. Due to the massive nationalisation of states, many people started to live outside of their own national territory. Many people become part of one state by citizenship and belong to another by ethnocultural affinity. For example, the Armenians in Azerbaijan were citizens of Armenia, but ethnoculturally belonged to Armenia.⁴⁶

Rogers Brubaker applied his triadic nexus framework to different states, for instance to post-Soviet countries. The Soviet government established ownership sense to the states. However, it was limited in the political sense of ownership, since ethnocultural nations got only their ethnocultural entitlement and political territories but did not have a right to rule them. After collapse of the USSR, power to rule was followed up. Next with the independence, former Soviet Union states were confident about their judicial independence, but their sociological state-ness had to be created. Some post-Soviet states inherited sense of ownership and encouraged the language, values and political domination of only state-bearing nation. Such

⁴⁴ Ibid., 60–61.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 61.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 55.

policies were tough in the Baltic state, while in Belarus it was weak.⁴⁷ The USSR government has transferred to successor states profoundly designed and strong beliefs of national belonging. In addition to the sense of ownership of the territory and political institution, they regard whole population as their own.⁴⁸

During the Soviet Union, Russian nationality was weakly institutionalized in comparison with other nationalities. “Russianness” filled the whole Union and there was no need to be institutionalized nationality. Since all the way through Soviet Union they had such privileges as public status, language and cultural strength in the entire territory of the Union and tended to consider the whole territory of the USSR as their own. That is why after the collapse of the USSR, Russians, who lived outside of Russian Federation, were sensitive about their nationality because of growing ethnic self-awareness of titular nationalities. Russians, who lived in one concentrated settlement in the post-Soviet states, where they were local majority of the territory, are expected to strive for territorial autonomy. Mostly Russians from northern and eastern Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine can potentially demand autonomy and directly challenge the governments. Demands concerning the territory are considered as threat and illegal by leaders of post-Soviet states.⁴⁹ In addition, Russian minorities see themselves as part of external homeland, which is Russian Federation, through nationality. This is a result of perception of nationality and citizenship. Russian minorities separate nationality from citizenship.⁵⁰ Author also pointed out that Russia plays a great role in the formation of the identity of Russians from the post-Soviet countries.⁵¹ Brubaker claims that minority group’s leaders can tend to represent the minority as belonging to a different nation from the members of the nominally state-bearing nation together with whom they live in one territory.⁵²

At the same time, Russian government considers whole territory of the Russian Federation as an external homeland for Russian people in other states. During the Soviet Union, whole territory of the USSR and its institutions were of and for the Russians. So, whole territory of the Union and all institutions considered to be theirs. Whereas, Russians did not consider the territory of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and its institutions as their own, since some Russians while being honoured outside of Russia, were unprivileged inside

⁴⁷ Ibid., 43–47.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 54.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 48–50.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 54.

⁵¹ Ibid., 5–6.

⁵² Ibid., 48.

the state. Since a lot of Russia's territory were given to the non-Russian nationalities as a national homeland. There appeared sixteen autonomous republics and fifteen autonomous national formations in 1989 inside of RSFSR. More than half of the territory of RSFSR became of and for particular non-Russian nationalities. Nevertheless, after collapse of USSR, Russian government perceives all Russians, who lives outside of Russia and have other citizenship, as belonging to Russian Federation. Russian homeland nationalism can reassure Russian people from other states to have more intransigent stances than they perhaps could have been inclined to do without assistance from Russian Federation.⁵³ To sum up, nationalising state perceives its Russian minority as part of their own state, Russian Federation expects that all Russian Diasporas belong to Russia and Russian minority think that they have connection with Russia as well with nationalising state. All these expectations can make potential conflict.⁵⁴

⁵³ Ibid., 51–53.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 54.

Chapter 3: Comparative analysis of case studies

3.1. Policies towards Russian language

This chapter describes Rogers Brubaker's nationalizing state, which means state of the core nation and for the core nation. This nationalising nationalism is applicable to all CA republics and can perfectly describe the new states, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. According to Rogers Brubaker's nationalizing nationalism "the successor units already existed as internal quasi-nation-states, with fixed territories, names, legislatures, administrative staff, cultural and political elites."⁵⁵

The first time that Russians came to Central Asia was in the ninetieth century. Russians then represented Russian empire and colonized CA states. The relation between Central Asia and Russians, which was established in the tsarist period, extended during USSR.⁵⁶ Then again, during USSR time Russians moved to CA states in accordance with the Moscow Plan, which was called "Sovietisation". However, in CA states people perceived this plan as Russification since the Russian language became dominant in politics, in administration and in education in the entire territory of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in late 1980th under Gorbachev rule and with his policy of glasnost, changes happened regarding language policies and Soviet Union member states passed a language law. The linguistic law meant that the native language had to be the state language. However, despite this law Russians kept holding privileged positions in society and almost never learnt language of the core nation. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russians were in the strange position, since they had a totally different language, culture and even religion than all CA states.⁵⁷

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence, both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan tried to build their nations and strengthen national identity through culture. Even though the elites have to take into account the importance of both core nation and other ethnic groups in the process of making the nationalism policy, the state elites in the CA republics has been influenced by the core nation. There were attempts at some nationalising measure order to promote culture of the core nation, such as re-introducing the national holidays, ideology

⁵⁵ Ibid., 41.

⁵⁶ Chinn and Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority*, 211, 213.

⁵⁷ "Assessment for Russians in Uzbekistan," *Minorities at Risk*, accessed May 23, 2016, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=70401>.

and a review of laws concerning the state languages and so on. In the adoption of the state flags, elites also carefully chose symbols, which belonged only to the core nation.⁵⁸

When Uzbekistan became independent in 1991, Uzbek government tried to establish Uzbek national identity. This particular Uzbek national identity was based on Uzbek nationalism and on Uzbek history, culture and language. Even festivals, national holidays and cultural events changed and became different from post-Soviet styles of celebration. In addition, as a result of the nationalism project of Uzbekistan, the Soviet Union's past was negatively portrayed, rewritten or even ignored.⁵⁹ In re-creating the traditions, the Uzbek government paid careful attention to the historical existence of the Uzbek nation. Islam Karimov, the president of Uzbekistan, chose Amir Temur, who was the ruler in medieval times, as a political icon. The connection of ruler Temur with the Uzbek nation was introduced in order to prove false perception that Uzbek nation was built during the USSR. However, there is a dispute that Amir Temur was not Uzbek but rather he was from the Chinggisid Mongols.⁶⁰ This can be also regarded as attempt to rewrite the history.

Another nationalizing strategy was the language policy. The language law which was adopted in 1989 changed the linguistic policy in Uzbekistan. According to the law "On the State Language" Uzbek language is the one and only official language of the state and obligatory for all public sectors, while the Russian language became the language of the inter-ethnic communication. However, in December 1995 there was a revision of the language law and Russian became a foreign language instead.⁶¹ The Constitution of Uzbekistan did not offer any specific protection of the Russian language.⁶² The Russian language became equal to the languages of other nations living in Uzbekistan.⁶³ In 1997, all public sectors had to be changed to Uzbek language.⁶⁴ So, the Russian language was eliminated from the public sectors in Uzbekistan, but it was still used in private sector, for instance in business, advertising and media.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, public sectors were fully switched to Uzbek language only in 2005.⁶⁶

⁵⁸ Graham Smith et al., *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 139–145.

⁵⁹ Moya Flynn, "Renegotiating Stability, Security and Identity in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Experience of Russian Communities in Uzbekistan," *Nationalities Papers* 35, no. 2 (May 1, 2007): 271–272, doi:10.1080/00905990701254359.

⁶⁰ Smith et al., *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, 146.

⁶¹ Flynn, "Renegotiating Stability, Security and Identity in the Post-Soviet Borderlands," 273.

⁶² Smith et al., *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, 150.

⁶³ Ibid., 200.

⁶⁴ Peyrouse, *The Russian Minority in Central Asia*, 16.

⁶⁵ Flynn, "Renegotiating Stability, Security and Identity in the Post-Soviet Borderlands," 273.

⁶⁶ Smith et al., *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, 202.

In addition, the government of Uzbekistan changed the alphabet script. The decision to replace the Cyrillic alphabet with Latin script was taken in 1993 and an initial timeline to implement this decision was seven years and Latin alphabet had to be fully used by 2000. However, in 1995, the parliament of Uzbekistan adopted a resolution which postponed the deadline for transition to the alphabet till 2005.⁶⁷ By 2005 Uzbekistan had completely removed Cyrillic alphabet and started to use the Latin alphabet.⁶⁸ Therefore, the Russian language has no status, but it was instead considered a foreign language. Nevertheless, Flynn's research shows that Russians do not perceive Uzbek governmental policy concerning language as ethnic discrimination.⁶⁹ Such opinions also were expressed during the interviews:

I personally didn't see any oppression or obstacles for learning the Russian language by the authorities. Some Russian schools and Russian groups in kindergartens were closed. However, this is due to the outflow of Russian-speaking population, and but not the actions of the authorities (Dmitriy from Uzbekistan, currently living in Europe).

The policy of the authorities in the relation to the Russian language, I would describe as neutral. I do not keep track of the laws that have been taken in this regard, but as the man in the street, I can say that I do not feel a special attitude to the Russian language. The number of Russian language schools is reduced, quotas of admission to universities for students from Russian language schools are also small, but this proposal reflects real demand. (Nikolai from Tashkent, Uzbekistan).

Besides, many participants expressed the opinion that the Russian language is getting better position in Uzbekistan nowadays in comparison with past. Before, there was a tendency from time to time to press the Russian language. Such opinions were expressed during the interviews:

95 percent of streets and towns with Russian names were renamed. In the 1990s, it was even unofficially forbidden to give Russian names to restaurants and shops - "Natasha", for example, or "Moscow". Nowadays, it occasionally started to come across such Russian names (An anonymous from Tashkent, Uzbekistan).

Recent times there were a positive trend concerning Russian language. If the previous twenty years, Russian ousted everywhere, now you can find the official letterhead of

⁶⁷ Ibid., 202–203.

⁶⁸ Peyrouse, *The Russian Minority in Central Asia*, 16.

⁶⁹ Flynn, "Renegotiating Stability, Security and Identity in the Post-Soviet Borderlands," 273–274.

the various agencies and even the signage is in Uzbek, and Russian. This also applies to advertising in cities, which can be a quite good example of Russian language's presence in the country (Russbek from Tashkent, Uzbekistan).

Uzbekistan was most anti-Russian among Central Asian republics by attempting to eliminate the Russian language from the public use.⁷⁰ However, in the last meeting of the president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov with the president of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, held in Moscow in April 26, 2016, Islam Karimov pointed out that he totally does not agree with the statement that Russian language started to be forgotten in the post-Soviet space, because it is still present and important in Uzbekistan. He also pointed out "today in Uzbekistan, there 840 Russian schools and 450 thousand students are enrolled in Russian schools."⁷¹ On the one hand from 2012, the number of Russian schools declined, since in 2012 there were 848 Russian schools. On the other hand, the number of students enrolled in Russian schools increased, in 2012 there were 372 256 students in Russian language schools.⁷²

As already have been pointed out above, the use of Russian language is increasing in the state. However, this is not because Uzbek government supports the development of the Russian language, but instead a result of migration processes to Russia. So, there is increasing demand for the Russian language in Uzbekistan because people learn Russian language in order to move to Russian Federation.

Many people in Uzbekistan learn Russian language because they need to know it in order to go to Russia to work, there are not many Russian schools, but parents try to send children to those Russian schools. (Daniil from Tashkent, currently living in Europe).

In contrast, in Kyrgyzstan the situation with Russian language use is different in comparison with Uzbekistan. In 1989 Kyrgyzstan adopted Law on the State Language and declared that the language of the Kyrgyz SSR is Kyrgyz language.⁷³ In 1990 Kyrgyz government recognized Russian language as a language of inter-ethnic communication.⁷⁴ The

⁷⁰ Smith et al., *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, 147.

⁷¹ "Putin and Karimov: 'Straight Talk' about agricultural products, Russian language and overflow of instability [Putin i Karimov: 'Otkrovennyi razgovor' o selhoz produktah, russkom yazyke i peretikanii nestabilnosti]," accessed May 24, 2016, <http://www.fergananews.com/articles/8952>.

⁷² "The Ministry of Public Education of the Republic of Uzbekistan/Information-Educational Portal," accessed May 25, 2016, <http://eduportal.uz/rus/info/information/docs/20122013/>.

⁷³ Commercio, *Russian Minority Politics in Post-Soviet Latvia and Kyrgyzstan*, 67.

⁷⁴ Peyrouse, *The Russian Minority in Central Asia*, 16.

majority of people in Kyrgyzstan used Russian language as a language of the inter-ethnic communication.⁷⁵ In 1992, there was a modification of language the law in Kyrgyzstan and according to this modification; administrative correspondence could be in Russian language. The first constitution of 1993 of the Kyrgyz Republic accepted only Kyrgyz language as the language of the state. Nonetheless, Russian language was secured by legal actions and could be liberally used in the whole territory of Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, there was massive migration of Russian after the independence. The elites in Kyrgyzstan understood that the protection of the Russian language can diminish migration.⁷⁶

In 1994, the first president of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akaev signed a decree that guaranteed Russian language to be an official language; however it could be an official language only in predominantly Russian speaking areas of the state.⁷⁷ From 1996, many times Akaev tried to push an amendment to the constitution, which would guarantee status of an official language of the state to the Russian language. The proposal was approved by the Constitutional Court, but was rejected by the Parliament of the state.⁷⁸ Then, a new law of 2000 gave the Russian language a designation of an official language of the state. The Constitution of 2003 supported bilingualism in the state and Russian language was qualified as an official language. Russian together with Kyrgyz language became obligatory in the education system. However, the new law on the language obliged all workers in private sector to know the Kyrgyz language. This law had a provision which stated that in 2005 all official documents had to be in Kyrgyz language. Due to the fact that many civil servants could not fluently speak Kyrgyz language, many documents continued to be written in Russian and then translated to Kyrgyz.⁷⁹

After the Tulip revolution 2005, the debate on Russian language took place between south and north Kyrgyzstan. People from southern part of the state, who are more Kyrgyz speaking, wished to remove status the official status of the Russian language, while northern part of Kyrgyzstan were for preserving the Russian language since they were more Russified. Nevertheless, the Constitution of 2006 preserved the status of the Russian.⁸⁰ The Constitution

⁷⁵ Sebastien Peyrouse, "The Russians in Central Asia: a declining minority face multiple challenges [Les Russes d'Asie centrale : une minorité en déclin face à de multiples défis]," 2008, 159, http://www.persee.fr/doc/receo_0338-0599_2008_num_39_1_1885.

⁷⁶ Peyrouse, *The Russian Minority in Central Asia*, 17.

⁷⁷ Smith et al., *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, 201.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 151.

⁷⁹ Peyrouse, *The Russian Minority in Central Asia*, 17.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

of 2010 still preserves Russian language as an official language of the state.⁸¹ However, there were the ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek people in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in 2010. These clashes fostered ethnic nationalism inside of state and raised uncertainty between different ethnicities in Kyrgyzstan. Some politicians started to use nationalistic speeches. As a first instrument politicians used promotion of Kyrgyz language.⁸² A few years later after the ethnic clashes, in 2012, the Parliament of Kyrgyz Republic, adopted a law, which provided local governments to practice exclusively the Kyrgyz language in workplace and administration where a greater part of employees are Kyrgyz.⁸³ In 2013 the President of the state Almazbek Atambaev signed an amendment to the Law on National Language. According to Baimatov the law: “enacted permissions to local governments to issue legal statutes exclusively in Kyrgyz provided that the majority of the local population in their constituencies was made up by a titular nationality”.⁸⁴

Kyrgyz, as well as Uzbek government, provides education in both Kyrgyz and Russian language. In 2010 in Kyrgyzstan, there were 1 384 schools in Kyrgyz language and 166 were in Russian. Besides, there are mixed Russian-Kyrgyz language schools, by 2010 they were 318.⁸⁵ While in 2014, there were 1 424 Kyrgyz language schools, and 203 Russian language schools.⁸⁶ Many parents despite the ethnicity try to give their children to the schools where Russian is the language of instructions. That happens due to several reasons, first is that in order to get good quality education. Russian language schools have more resources, since there are more books in Russian rather than in Kyrgyz. Children from Russian language schools show better results than children from Kyrgyz language schools. Second reason is that being

⁸¹ *Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic [Konstitucia Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki]*, 2010, http://www.gov.kg/?page_id=263&lang=ru.

⁸² Bakyt Baimatov, “The Ethnic Russians – Scattered in Geo-Cultural and Semantic Spaces of Kyrgyzstan – Minorities, Diasporas or Depleting Historical Resource? Back to the History of the Issue,” 2014, 238.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Kyrgyz Republic 2010 [Obzor nacionalnoi politiki v oblasti obrozovaniya: Kyrgyzskaya Respublika 2010]*, 2010, 231, https://books.google.hu/books?id=I4IJNLXJgTIC&pg=PA231&lpg=PA231&dq=%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9+%D1%88%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%8B+%D0%BA%D1%8B%D1%80%D0%B3%D1%8B%D0%B7%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0&source=bl&ots=Kg9EAJoXCr&sig=_EUiUT-yre0FAV0XF2f_B4i3HQ8&hl=ru&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwic15a8hffMAhUFChoKHLsD8gQ6AEIUzAJ#v=onepage&q=%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9%20%D1%88%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%8B%20%D0%BA%D1%8B%D1%80%D0%B3%D1%8B%D0%B7%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0&f=false.

⁸⁶ Baimatov, “The Ethnic Russians – Scattered in Geo-Cultural and Semantic Spaces of Kyrgyzstan – Minorities, Diasporas or Depleting Historical Resource? Back to the History of the Issue,” 242.

fluent in Russian language opens better perspectives for children in future in terms of employment abroad.⁸⁷

Although government of the Kyrgyz Republic granted a status of official language to the Russian language, the necessity of knowledge of the Kyrgyz language has considerably increased last years. For instance in order to work in public sectors it is needed to know the Kyrgyz language and many interviewers pointed out that there is an increasing tendency for employers to require knowledge of Kyrgyz language during the process of hiring. Majority of respondents highlighted the requirement for Kyrgyz language.

Recently, government has emphasized on the strengthening the Kyrgyz language stance in the country, in order to preserve the culture and language. Therefore, all government official agencies, public enterprises and some private firms have been utilizing their activities and preparation of official documents only in Kyrgyz language. Many public job offerings were advertised in Kyrgyz, and required Kyrgyz language as only working language in the government (Anna from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

In addition, participants argue that Kyrgyz government not only requires the knowledge of the state in hiring processes but also require all document to be in Kyrgyz language:

After the Russians people mass departure from the country, the role of the Russian language is reducing every year. Many documents are required to be only in the Kyrgyz language (Anonymous from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

Russians in Kyrgyzstan think that Kyrgyz government policies put in disadvantage situations all Russian speaking population:

On the one hand the officials supported the development and spreading of Russian language on the territory of the republic. On the other hand, it puts certain limits. There is an active promotion of the state language. The Kyrgyz government recommends to use Kyrgyz language in meetings, in various institutions, and to conduct workflow. But, at the same time there is infringement of the rights of Russian-speaking population. Virtually today in every institution, all signs and announcements are in the Kyrgyz language, and it is very inconvenient for those who do not speak Kyrgyz, namely the Russian-speaking population. The authorities do not prohibit the Russian language on

⁸⁷ *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Kyrgyz Republic 2010 [Obzor nacionalnoi politiki v oblasti obrozovaniya: Kyrgyzskaya Respublika 2010], 231.*

the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, but not strongly support it (Olga from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

Even if Russian language is an official language, it does not secure total comfort to Russian speaking population. Use of state language in the public sector is recent in comparison to Uzbekistan, but this tendency is making some difficulties in getting jobs. Many Russians do not speak Kyrgyz language, for instance after twelve years of independence, in 2003, only 1.6 percent of Russians could confidently speak Kyrgyz language and 22 percent had problems with speaking, while 75 percent could not communicate in Kyrgyz language at all.⁸⁸ The greatest language assimilation of Russians in Central Asia happened in Uzbekistan.⁸⁹ In 1989, when Uzbekistan was still part of USSR, already five percent of Russians spoke Uzbek language. That is a result of a strict language policy which obligates teaching Uzbek language in schools. Nowadays the percentage of Russians speaking Uzbek is even higher particularly among young generation.⁹⁰ Respondent from Uzbekistan also suggests that many Russians speak Uzbek language:

If you are Russian and you do not know basic level of Uzbek language, then today you do not have a chance to get the state job. But it is, in principle, I consider normal and I do not consider this a violation of any rights since the language of the state is considered to be only Uzbek. There is no problem; the majority of Russians in Uzbekistan especially young people know the Uzbek language. They just need to know it (Daniil from Uzbekistan, currently living in Europe).

So, according to article 4 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan, only Uzbek language is the language of the state,⁹¹ while the Russian language does not have any status and it considered to be a foreign language. This arose from measures taken to de-russify the state and participants of the interview from Uzbekistan claim that Russian language even was oppressed. However, currently the Russian language again is taking new positions and many Uzbek people started to learn, since they need it in order to find jobs in Russia. But all governmental organizations are in Uzbek language and in order to work for the government there is a strong requirement of Uzbek language knowledge. Therefore, there is no chance to work for state organizations, if

⁸⁸ Peyrouse, "The Russians in Central Asia: a declining minority face multiple challenges [Les Russes d'Asie centrale : une minorité en déclin face à de multiples défis]," 159.

⁸⁹ Smith et al., *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, 150.

⁹⁰ Peyrouse, "The Russians in Central Asia: a declining minority face multiple challenges [Les Russes d'Asie centrale : une minorité en déclin face à de multiples défis]," 159.

⁹¹ *Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan*, 1992, <http://constitution.uz/en>.

person does not know the Uzbek language. Uzbek government is not thinking to change or mitigate the requirement of Uzbek language knowledge for hiring processes in governmental organizations. Uzbekistan can be easily categorized as Brubaker's nationalizing state, since it only promotes the Uzbek language.

Nevertheless, Russians do not feel any discrimination on the basis of language, they accept the rule that the sole language of the state is Uzbek and already many Russians speak Uzbek language. While, in Kyrgyzstan, article 10 para. 2 of the constitution of the state provides to Russian a status of the official language of the state,⁹² but harsh policies to support state language puts in disadvantaged position all Russian speaking people. Since, very little percent of Russians speak the state language. On this basis, most of the participants of the interview from Kyrgyzstan point out that they feel discrimination on the basis of language. Brubaker argues that sometimes practices, symbols, events can be perceived as nationalizing by the representatives of the national minority.⁹³ In case of Kyrgyzstan, Russian minorities can perceive state rules on developing the Kyrgyz language as a threat and discrimination, but in reality Kyrgyz government is still preserving the Russian language as an official language and Kyrgyz language should be used in the area where majority of the population are Kyrgyz people. The amendment of 2013 to the National Language Law means that local government should use Kyrgyz language if majority of the population of that region are Kyrgyz people.⁹⁴

3.2. Participation in decision making processes

As for the participation in decision making process both states give different opportunities to Russian minorities. In 1989 only 0.5 percent of the Russians was in party and held governmental position similar to both in Uzbekistan and in Kyrgyzstan.⁹⁵ After the disintegration of the Soviet Union this tendency was kept in both republics. In the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan, which was elected in 1995, the majority of the seats were taken by titular nation. There were 105 seats, 81 percent of members of the parliament were Kyrgyz people, so 85 seats taken by titular nation. There is no exact data of Russians in the parliament in Kyrgyzstan

⁹² *Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic [Konstitucia Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki]*.

⁹³ Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 63.

⁹⁴ Baimatov, "The Ethnic Russians – Scattered in Geo-Cultural and Semantic Spaces of Kyrgyzstan – Minorities, Diasporas or Depleting Historical Resource? Back to the History of the Issue," 238.

⁹⁵ Commercio, *Russian Minority Politics in Post-Soviet Latvia and Kyrgyzstan*, 44.

in 1995, but eight seats were taken by Uzbeks and only six were taken by Slavic nations, where Russians also were counted.⁹⁶

In the election of 2005 there were seventy five seats in the Zhogorku Kenesh, the parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic, and only four seats were taken by Russians. While at that time in Uzbekistan, there were five Russian deputies out of two hundred fifty people. Nonetheless, these five Russian deputies were not considered as representatives of Russian minority group in Uzbekistan, they simply were members of presidential party.⁹⁷

After 2007 parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan, seven Russians were in the parliament out of ninety.⁹⁸ Further during 2010 till 2015, there were seven Russian out of 120 members of the Zhogorku Kenesh.⁹⁹ In the parliament which is functioning from 2015, the participation of Russians in the parliament decreased; there are only four Russians out of 120 members.¹⁰⁰ As for the parliament in Uzbekistan, minority issues have not played an important role in the elections. The last poll of the population was held in Uzbekistan in 1989. In the absence of more recent statistics, data on the number of each group of national minorities vary.¹⁰¹ Currently, there are four Russians out of 150 members in the Legislative Chamber of Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan¹⁰² and no Russian nationality member in the Senate (upper house) of Oliy Majlis Senate.¹⁰³ Uzbekistan did not openly discriminate ethnic groups but policies do not provide to Russians such equal rights to participate in politics as have Uzbeks, since there was prohibition from Uzbek government to open Russian political parties.¹⁰⁴ Majority of the

⁹⁶ Smith et al., *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, 152.

⁹⁷ Peyrouse, "The Russians in Central Asia: a declining minority face multiple challenges [Les Russes d'Asie centrale : une minorité en déclin face à de multiples défis]," 155–156.

⁹⁸ Yulia Kuznestsova, "List of Members of Parliament of the 4th convocation [Spisok deputatov parlamenta 4-go sozyva]," *Stan.TV: Informational Video Portal [Informacionnyi video portal]*, December 20, 2007, <http://www.stan.tv/news/4286?REID=123128371293>. Non-official, non-academic information.

⁹⁹ "Deputies [Deputaty]," *Zhogorku Kenesh Kyrgyzskoi Respublik*, accessed May 28, 2016, <http://www.kenesh.kg/RU/Folders/235-Deputaty.aspx>.

¹⁰⁰ "Deputies of the 6th convocation of the Zhogorku Kenesh [Deputaty Zhogorku Kenesha 6-go sozyva]," *Zhogorku Kenesh Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki*, accessed May 29, 2016, http://www.kenesh.kg/RU/Folders/31642-Deputaty_ZHogorku_Kenesha_VI_sozyva.aspx.

¹⁰¹ "Republic of Uzbekistan. Parliamentary Elections, 27 December 2009" (Warsaw: OSCE, April 7, 2010), 16, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan/eoms/parliamentary_2009.

¹⁰² "Deputies [Deputaty]," *The Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of Republic of Uzbekistan [Zakonodatelnaya palata Oliy Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan]*, accessed May 29, 2016, <http://parliament.gov.uz/ru/structure/deputy/>.

¹⁰³ "Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the appointment of the members of the Senate of Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan [Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan o naaznachenii chlenov Senata Oliy Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistana]," *Senate of Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan [Senat Oliy Majlisa Respubliki Uzbekistana]*, accessed May 29, 2016, <http://senat.uz/ru/news/2015/20-01-1.html>.

¹⁰⁴ "Assessment for Russians in Uzbekistan."

respondents of the interview from Uzbekistan also state that Russians do not participate in decision making process. Such opinion indeed was clearly highlighted during the interviews. Majority of respondent from Uzbekistan claim that Russians do not usually participated in politics and can influence on governmental decision making.

De facto- Russians do not have influence on government policy or in decision making. And this is first of all because of not knowing the state language. This is a serious barrier for admission to the government (Russbek from Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

Equally, they claim that not only Russians do not have de-facto right to influence on decision making processes, but also other nationalities were deprived from such opportunity. Definitely, discrimination on participation in decision making processes does not based on ethnicity. Anonymous journalist from Tashkent states that:

Russians do not participate in decision making. But such opportunities even Uzbeks do not have - all determined by one man - Islam Karimov (Anonymous from Tashkent, Uzbekistan).

The ability to influence the policy of the state, in my opinion, is not determined by nationality. Here, perhaps, is the value of involvement in the legislative and executive power structures, or belonging to the ruling elites or being close to the people actually making decisions. What percentage of these Russian circles - I do not know, but I can assume that it is very small (Nikolai from Tashkent, Uzbekistan).

Currently in Uzbekistan there is no Russian in the government.¹⁰⁵ Remarkably, that many respondents argue that Russians do not participate in politics. Based on this we could emphasize that in politics Russians are discriminated and could categorize Uzbekistan to Brubaker's nationalizing state if we take only politics. However, not only Russian does not have an access to politics but also other ethnicities including Uzbek. As a result it is hard to put Uzbekistan in nationalizing nationalism, since Brubaker's nationalizing nationalism states that nationalizing state support political priority of the core nation,¹⁰⁶ but in reality Uzbek people together with other ethnic groups do not have such rights.

¹⁰⁵ "Personal Structure of the Cabinet of Ministers," *The Government Portal of the Republic of Uzbekistan*, accessed May 31, 2016, https://www.gov.uz/en/pages/personal_structure.

¹⁰⁶ Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 5.

Whereas, in Kyrgyzstan there have been many Russians who held Minister Positions after the independence. For instance, Russians held two times a position of the Prime Minister, Nikolai Tanaev was a Prime Minister ¹⁰⁷ before the Tulip Revolution in 2005. Another Russian Prime Minister, Igor Chudinov was appointed in 2007.¹⁰⁸ There was Vice Prime Minister Alexander Kostiuk in 2010.¹⁰⁹ In 2014 Olga Lavrova was Minister of Finance.¹¹⁰ Currently there is one Russian vice Prime Minister, who is Pankratov Oleg.¹¹¹

However, respondents from Kyrgyzstan divided into two; some support the idea that Russians have opportunity to participate in decision making processes, for instance:

The Zhogorku Kenesh has Russian-speaking members who participate in decision-making, so the actual impact on governmental decision-making exists (Igor from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

The sense is that Russian politicians represent the minority in the government. I mean those who have legal decision-making power (Anna from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

I think yes. Especially in light of the accession of Kyrgyzstan to the Eurasian Economic Space. And the authorities of the Kyrgyz Republic will have to take into account the interests of the Russian-speaking population, and this in turn should be reflected in the politics (Dariya from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

Other claims that Russians are not able to participate in politics:

It is hard to conclude that Russians have de jure and de facto political power in Kyrgyz politics (Oleg from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

Russians definitely cannot participate in decision making process. The factor is a sharp decline in Russian representatives in the country and formed the country's institute of "vote for ours." At the same time, the authorities are trying to comply with the inter-regional balance, and also try to keep the Russians away from "decision-making table" (Arkadiy from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

¹⁰⁷ Nazgul Baktybekova, "Next Revolution: Kyrgyzstan?," *The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, December 1, 2005, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/9590-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2005-1-12-art-9590.html>.

¹⁰⁸ Erica Marat, "Criminalization of the Kyrgyz State before and after the Tulip Revolution," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, no. Volume 6, No. 2 (2008): 18.

¹⁰⁹ "In Kyrgyzstan Alexander Kostiuk Was Appointed as Vice Prime Minister [V Kyrgyzstane Vice Premier Ministrom Naznachen Aleksander Kostiuk]," *24.kg*, accessed May 31, 2016, <http://arch.24.kg/personnel/78758-v-kyrgyzstane-vice-premier-ministrom-naznachen.html>.

¹¹⁰ "Olga Lavrova Was Appointed as Minister of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic [Olga Lavrova Naznachena Ministrom Finansov Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki]," *The Official Website of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic [Oficialnyi Sait President Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki]*, April 4, 2014, http://www.president.kg/ru/news/ukazy/3692_olga_lavrova_naznachena_ministrom_finansov_kyrgyzskoy_respubliki/.

¹¹¹ "Government [Pravitelstvo]," accessed May 26, 2016, http://www.gov.kg/?page_id=49&lang=ru.

Nonetheless, currently Russian minority participation in politics and in decision making process is better in Kyrgyzstan rather than in Uzbekistan. For the reason that in the parliament of KR there four Russians out of 120, while in Uzbekistan four out of 250. Such difference might be because of quotas for ethnic minorities which provided by government of the Republics. There is a quota for political parties to have ethnic minorities in their list in order to run for elections in Kyrgyzstan. When determining the list of candidates a political party is obliged to take into account the representation of ethnic minorities. Article sixty of the Constitutional Law of the KR of 2011 "On elections of President of the Kyrgyz Republic and the deputies of the Zhogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic" states that political parties should have not less than fifteen percent of members from ethnic minorities in their lists.¹¹² While in Uzbekistan there is no such quota for ethnic minorities which requires political parties to have ethnic minorities. Kyrgyzstan do not perfectly fit to the nationalizing state of the triadic nexus, since it provides some measure which promotes participation of ethnic minorities in decision making processes and there have been many Russians who held high positions in governments. Besides, majority of respondent support the idea that Russians in Kyrgyzstan have opportunity to participate in politics.

We have seen comparison of both states in the question of treatment of Russian minorities using Brubaker's nationalising nationalism. Both states pursue firstly interest of the titular nation by adopting the policies which favour core nation's language. Besides, in government and in parliament of both states mostly titular nation participate. However, treatment of Russian minorities in Kyrgyzstan is softer. Kyrgyz government provides access to Russian language and accepted Russian language as an official language of the state. Besides, there is quota law for minorities which provides participation in decision making process. In addition, two Russians were Prime Minister of the state in the history of Kyrgyzstan starting from the independence. However, Russians who live in Kyrgyzstan claim that they feel disadvantages on the basis of language, since Kyrgyz government adopted such policies which require using the Kyrgyz language in some organization, but these policies apply only to governmental agencies, while private sector, international organization can use any preferred

¹¹² *The Constitutional Law of the KR of July 2, 2011 № 68 "On Elections of President of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic" [Konstitucionnyi Zakon KR Ot 2 Iulya 2011 Goda № 68 "O Vyborah Prezidenta Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki I Deputatov Zhogorku Kenesha Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki," 2011, <http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/203244?cl=ru-ru>.*

language. Besides, Russians from Kyrgyzstan during the interviews emphasized that in comparison with other minorities, Russians in Kyrgyzstan do not feel any advantages.

In contrast to Russians in Uzbekistan with Russians in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbek Russians have fewer advantages on the state level. Russian language is not considered to be official language of the state and nationalising policies were harsh from the beginning of the independence. Besides, government do not promote participation of ethnic minorities in politics at all. However, mostly, Russians in Uzbekistan do not feel any discrimination on the basis of language or political participation. During the interviews, they justify it by saying that other minorities' situation is even worse in Uzbekistan and Russians are more privileged and respected.

Chapter 4. Russia as an external homeland

Chapter four observe Rogers Brubaker's external national homeland. According to Brubaker, external homeland support and protect interest of its ethnocultural kin in a foreign country. So, in this chapter I pay attention to the role of the Russian Federation in supporting the Russian minorities in Central Asia. Article 1 para. 3 of the Federal Law on State Policy of the Russian Federation in respect of compatriots abroad states that compatriots can be considered persons and their descendants living outside the territory of the Russian Federation and relevant, as a rule, to the peoples historically living on the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as to make a free choice in favour of the spiritual, cultural and legal ties with the Russian Federation of person, whose relatives direct ascending line previously resided on the territory of the Russian Federation, including persons who were citizens of the USSR living in countries that were part of the Soviet Union, acquired the citizenship of these states or become stateless persons.¹¹³

There are many programs and agencies in the world which directly have ties to Russian Federation. They were opened to support Russian compatriot in foreign countries. For instance "Russian World" Foundation, the main goals of the foundation is to endorse the Russian language. Their aim is to support the activities of Russian Diasporas abroad to preserve their cultural identity and the Russian language as a means of international communication, to encourage the creation of inter-ethnic environment of respect and harmony.¹¹⁴ Another "Foundation for support and protection of the rights of compatriots living abroad" is non-profit organization. The goal of the Foundation is to offer Russian compatriots full legal and other necessary support in incident of violation of their rights, freedoms and legitimate interests in accordance with the accepted values and standards of international law on human rights.¹¹⁵ Another centre is Russian Centre of Science and Culture, which main goal is also promotion

¹¹³ *Federal Law on State Policy of the Russian Federation in respect of compatriots abroad [Federalnyi zakon o Gosudarstvennoi politike Rossiiskoi Federacii v otnoshenii sootechestvennikov za rubejom]*, vol. № 99-FL, 1999, <http://archive.mid.ru//bdomp/ns-dgpch.nsf/1a268548523257ccc325726f00357db3/8440d36903c217a4c3257776003a73f5!OpenDocument>.

¹¹⁴ "Russki Mir Foundation [Fond Russkii Mir]," accessed May 29, 2016, <http://www.russkiymir.ru/fund/>.

¹¹⁵ "Foundation for Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad [Fond Podderjki I Zashity Prav Sootechestvennikov, Projivaiushih Za Rubejom]," accessed May 29, 2016, <http://pravfond.ru/?module=pages&action=view&id=6>.

of the Russian language and culture. This centre has its branches in Bishkek¹¹⁶ and in Tashkent as well.¹¹⁷

Association “Rodina”, which keeps links with compatriots abroad, is supporting the Russian culture and language. The association is actively using all accessible prospects to bring reliable information about the state programs and its implementation to the overseas compatriots.¹¹⁸ There is also a state program to assist the voluntary resettlement to the Russian Federation of compatriots living abroad aims at bringing together potential of compatriots living abroad, with the development needs of Russian regions.¹¹⁹

The fact is that the government of the Russia Federation have many programs and the main aims of these programs are to support its compatriots. However, in reality the environments are different. In Uzbekistan many participants pointed out that in truth Russia’s programs do not support them, for instance in maintaining the Russian language. Moreover, they even do not support people who come with some idea to preserve the Russian language.

The Russia does not do anything for the preservation and development of the Russian language. In 2012, the Russian cultural centre in Uzbekistan planned to open three centres for the study of the Russian language - in Tashkent, in Chinaz, city Tashoblasti. The Uzbek authorities have not given permission for the opening of two centres in the regions. We went to talk on the subject to representatives of the Russian authorities, but they did not even try to do anything (Anonymous from Tashkent, Uzbekistan).

Another participant argues that Russian Federation is simply following its interest using Russian minorities in the post-Soviet space:

Russia loves to talk about the Russian world, and how they need to maintain and preserve the influence of the Russian language. But it is more than such ideological food for Russian citizens in Russia. Russia wants to show them that Russia still remains “Great” in fact Russia does not participate in preservation the Russian language.

¹¹⁶ “Russian Centre of Science and Culture/Kyrgyzstan[Rossiskii Centr Nauki I kultury/Kirgizia],” accessed May 29, 2016, <http://kgz.rs.gov.ru/>.

¹¹⁷ “Russian Centre of Science and Culture in Tashkent [Rossiskii Centr Nauki I Kultury v Tashkente],” accessed May 29, 2016, <http://uzb.rs.gov.ru/>.

¹¹⁸ “Association ‘Rodina’ for the Relations with Compatriots Abroad [Associacia ‘Rodina’ Po Svyazyam S Sootchestvennikami Za Rubejom],” accessed May 29, 2016, <http://association-rodina.ru/assotsiatsiya/istoriya>.

¹¹⁹ “The state program of resettlement [Gosudarstvennaya programma pereseleniya],” *Russkii vek*, accessed June 1, 2016, <http://www.ruvek.ru/?module=regions&action=list>.

Russia is doing something, but it is ineffective. The only thing that happens is the TV channels..... in Russian. This has a huge influence. But it is not a Russian policy, but mostly selection of local residents. In the development and preservation of the language, Russia has no effect (Daniil from Uzbekistan, currently living in Europe)

Besides, Russia's programmes and agencies can support interest of the government of Uzbekistan rather than protect its ethnocultural kin.

Until now Russia does very little for the preservation and development of Russian culture and language. Russian language and culture in Uzbekistan maintained only by inertia. As for the Russian cultural centre, it is limited only by the spread of information about the resettlement programs to Russia and actually serves the interests of the Uzbek authorities carrying out their will. When I wrote an article about the destruction of the monument of Soviet soldiers in Angren, for which I was forced to flee from Uzbekistan, the authorities began to choke me by hands of Russian centre. This centre is in direct contact with the Russian Embassy in Uzbekistan. I want also to mention an organization as the Rossotrudnichestvo, which is the official performer of Russia in a foreign country. For 5 days prior to the demolition of the monument, in Tashkent, there was a conference on the theme "Preservation of monuments of the Soviet Republic in Uzbekistan" by Russian cultural centre and Rossotrudnichestvo. However, the monument was demolished, and then I asked Rossotrudnichestvo for comments, but they said that there wasn't any conference and refused to discuss anything. Despite the fact that I had with me printed transcript of the conference. Here is the position of Russia. (Dmitriy from Uzbekistan, currently living in Europe).

In Kyrgyzstan, opinion is totally different, to the question what is the role of Russian Federation in the preservation and development of Russian language and whether Russia supports Russian Diaspora. Many Russians from Kyrgyzstan claim that Russian Federation is playing huge role in the endorsing the interest of Russian population in Kyrgyzstan.

Currently, Russia is supporting cultural institutions such as the Centre of Russian culture, concerts of Russian artists, Russian TV channels, newspapers and magazines (Anonymous from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

In my opinion, today the reason that this language has a place to be still in Kyrgyzstan, it is because the country is close to the Russia. The friendly, mutually beneficial

relations do not give official authority to prohibit the distribution and use of the Russian language on the territory of Kyrgyzstan (Olga from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

However, there was other who thought in opposite way:

To be honest it seems that Russia is not particularly concerned about preservation and development of the Russian language. It pursues some geopolitical interests in Kyrgyzstan. But with regard to the language policy I think they don't do anything (Dariya from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

Russia behaves passively in the preservation of the Russian language. It simply confines small association, where diplomats proclaim peace and friendship (Tatyana from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan).

Participants from Kyrgyzstan supported the idea that Russian Federation has great impact in promoting the interest of Russian Diaspora in Kyrgyzstan; while in Uzbekistan almost all interviewees answered that Russian Federation do nothing for preservation and development of the Russian language. Out of twelve participants only two answered that Russia is helping to keep the Russian language in Uzbekistan. On the one hand, indirectly Russian Federation supports preservation of the Russian language in Uzbekistan and in Kyrgyzstan. Russia provides jobs for migrants from Central Asia. All migrants have to know a minimum knowledge of Russian language that is why they learn language in their homelands. In order to learn Russian language, they go to the schools where the language of instructions is Russian. Consequently there is a demand for Russian language schools and government because of demand, open new schools or preserve old Russian language schools. On the other hand, by providing workplaces for migrants, both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan lose Russian speaking population.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to reflect on Central Asian republics' treatment of Russian minorities; mainly there were covered Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Despite the fact that the Constitutions of both states provide and guarantee equal rights to all people in the state notwithstanding of race, gender, religion, language, ethnicity and age,^{120 121} nationalizing states adopted such policies and practises which give benefits commonly to its titular nation. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan can be considered as typical nationalizing states, as described Rogers Brubaker, which promote interests of the core nation. Both clearly are states of and for the core nation, since both states endorse the languages of the titular nation and in politics decision making tools are also generally under control of titular nations.

However, in Kyrgyzstan, Russians can participate in politics and the government of the Republic provides such opportunity through establishing a quota rule which obliges political parties to have ethnic minorities. Russian language is also an official language of the state. Although Russian language is considered to be the official language of Kyrgyzstan, the government of the Kyrgyz Republic approved new policies which make Kyrgyz language use obligatory in the state organizations. As a result Russian speaking population feel to be disadvantaged since majority of the Russian population in Kyrgyzstan do not speak the state language.

By contrast, in Uzbekistan, since independence, the only language of the state has been Uzbek language. Russian language was the language of inter-ethnic communication, but in 1995 Russian language was proclaimed to be a foreign language¹²² and became equal to all other foreign languages in the republic. In addition, Russians do not participate in politics in comparison with Russians in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, Russians in Uzbekistan do not think that Uzbek government discriminate against them on the basis of language, since many Russians already speak Uzbek language.

Besides, they also accept that Russians cannot influence governmental decision making and they are not concerned about this fact. Russians in Uzbekistan simply accept that no one can influence governmental decision making except those who have ties to president Karimov. Unlike their counterparts, Russians in Kyrgyzstan consider that the Kyrgyz government

¹²⁰ *Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic [Konstitucia Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki].*

¹²¹ *Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan.*

¹²² Smith et al., *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, 150.

deprives the right to work in the governmental organizations and in participation during governmental decision making processes on the basis of the language.

The external national homeland of Russians in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is considered to be the Russian Federation. However, Russia does not fully fit to Rogers Brubaker's approach to external national homeland nationalism in two cases which were considered in this study. The Russian Federation considers all ethnocultural kin in foreign countries as their compatriots and opened many programs to support Russians in foreign countries. However, most of the participants in Uzbekistan indicated that Russian Federation do not support them and do not make effective efforts to preserve the Russian language in the region. While in Kyrgyzstan, opinion was opposite, majority think that Russia plays a primary role in the preservation of the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan through its cultural programs, other thought that Russia does not bother about it. However, majority of Russians from Uzbekistan and some from Kyrgyzstan indicated that Russia simply follows its geopolitical interest rather than pursue interest of the Russian minorities in the region.

An essential conclusion of this thesis paper raises new questions that can be used for further research. Since this thesis is covered analysis of the similarities and differences of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in treatment of its Russian minorities and the role of Russian Federation in the endorsing the interests of its diaspora in two Central Asian states, the question about fourth party which was proposed by Smith was not included. So, further research can include the role of fourth party in the promotion of the interest of ethnic minorities. Another focus for further research is to compare several ethnicities inside of one state; for this study can be taken any post-Soviet country, for instance Kyrgyzstan and two ethnic minorities: Uzbeks and Russians and their external states: Uzbekistan and Russian Federation. Also, using Brubaker's triadic nexus framework a study of other Diasporas in post-Soviet republics, for instance Koreans in Central Asia can be studied.

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