

The Role of the Military in Fostering Constitutionalism: A Comparative Study of Ethiopia, Turkey, and the USA

By: Abdulnasir Bereket Adem

LL.M. SHORT THESIS
COURSE: Constitution Building in Africa
PROFESSOR: Dr. Gedion Timothewos Hessebon
Central European University
1051 Budapest, Nador utca 9.
Hungary

© Central European University April 1, 2015

Abstract

More than 20 years since the proclamation of the of the Ethiopian constitution, constitutionalism still calls for an attention, particularly in light of the excess powers vesting with the military. This paper will study the role of the military in fostering or hampering constitutionalism. Through the course of this thesis, I will underlie my research with the assumption that effective civil-military relations are necessary to build a stable constitutional order which is underlined by the tenants of constitutionalism. I will argue that the fundamental problem with constitutionalism in Ethiopia is that the Ethiopia military does not pass the two challenges selected for this thesis; which is: political neutrality and the existence of civilian supremacy over the military. As the experience of the USA and Turkey shows the early history of the military institution affects the armed forces to be partisan in nature. As concerns to civilian supremacy, the study shows that lack of diversity in the parliament, complicated party politics and diversified mission of the military leads the civilian not to effectuate control over the military. This thesis will aim to demonstrate the benefits of strictly demarcating a system where the civil-military relationship is policed by values of constitutionalism.

Acknowledgements

I begin by thanking my Teacher, Dr. Gedion Timothewos for the enlightening courses he thought me and the advises he gave me in the process of writing this thesis.

I thank my Family; It's your love that I hold on. Ali, you are special. I thank my friends; with you, I'm filled with inspiration. Also, I thank my brothers; it's the path that you are in that keeps me awake.

I thank CEU for the generous fellowship.

But most of all, I thank Allah for his guidance!

Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	i
Introduction	1
Chapter one: Theoretical Foundations	5
1.1 Constitutionalism Defined	5
1.2 What is Civil-Military Relationship?	10
1.2.1 Political neutrality of the army	13
1.2.2 Civilian Supremacy over the military	14
1.3 <i>The Nexus between Civil-Military Relationship and Constitutionalism</i>	15
1.4 <i>Building effective civil-military relationship</i>	16
Chapter Two: Political Neutrality of the Military	24
2.1. The development of the military profession from anti-military sentiments, the USA Experience	25
2.2. Military as a Guardian of the Republic, the Turkish Experience	28
2.3. The Missing Neutrality from the Start: The Ethiopian Experience	31
Chapter Three: Civilian Supremacy Over the Military	38
3.1 The Role of the Parliament	38
3.2 The Role of the Executive	42

3.3 The Effect of Diverse Missions	44
Chapter Four: Conclusion: Recommendation for the Future	47
Bibliography	52

Introduction

“The principal foundations on which the power of all governments is based (whether they be new, long-established or mixed) are good laws and good armies.”¹

The military is the most important institution in a country for the survival of a state. For the military determines the very existence of the state, law and politics tried to deal with it right from the beginning of the nation-state. The center of the problem the military poses is simply explained in the question ‘who will guard the guardians?’. We create the army to protect ourselves from outside threats. However, paradoxically, we will have to think a mechanism to keep the man with the guns not to destroy the system that created it in the first place, the constitutional order. This is the sole focus of the notion of civil-military relationship. The civil-military relationship is one aspect of national security policy that deals with on how the military operates in a constitutional civil authority and interact with other institutions, such as state institutions, civil society, the media as well as ethnic and religious groups.²

Ethiopia is a country of 100 million populations and more than 80 ethnic groups with their distinct language and tradition.³ Following the defeat of the brutal regime, the Derg, in 1991, Ethiopia passed a constitution that is in a strike difference from the previous once. The Constitution

¹Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*. Edited and translated by David Wootton, (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995), 38

² See, Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, *Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013). Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relation*, (Harvard University Press, Renewed Edition, 1985), Morris Janowitz, *The professional Soldier: A social and political Portrait*, (2nded. New York, Free press, 1972), Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations*, (Harvard University Press, England, 2003), Larry Diamond and Marc F.(eds.) Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996), Rebecca L. Schiff , *The Military and Domestic Politics A concordance theory of civil–military relations*, (Routledge, USA and Canada,2010)

³ The United Nations estimate the population of Ethiopia to be 101,216,857, “Ethiopia Population (2016) - Worldometers,” accessed March 25, 2016, <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/>.

established a federal and democratic republic with a civilian leader to the armed forces.⁴ Looking at the text of only, it can be said that the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (EPRDF) Constitution provided for a system of limited government, which is the classical definition of constitutionalism,⁵ since it enumerates the power and functions of all branches of government and reserves a chapter for bill of rights. However, the social, political and economic reality that surround the text of the law reveals that constitutionalism is yet to be materialized.

One of the negative reality is the civil-military relationship existing in the country. When the power of the officer corps is not tamed enough it poses various dangers to the political system of a nation. These dangers range from a coup d'état, the most observable kind of intervention to interference in the domestic politics of the country either by refusing to apply the civilians' decisions or by influencing the civilians to take on a policy that favors the military; from dominating and exploiting the economic resources a country to dragging the nation into unnecessary wars.⁶ For the military to play a positive role in building constitutionalism, what is required is their allegiance to the democratic system in implementing the policies set by the civilians. When there is an effective civil-military relationship, even war becomes the continuation of politics by other means.⁷

In Ethiopia, the challenge the military poses to the political system of the country is clearly seen. However, it has gone largely unnoticed and hence unevaluated among legal scholars.

⁴ See, "Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1/1995" (Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1st Year No. 1, Addis Ababa, August 21, 1995). Article 1 and Article 73 (1)

⁵ Charles Howard McIlwain, "*Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern*", Liberty Fund, INC., 2007 (First published in 1940 by Cornell University Press), P. 21

⁶ Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics A concordance theory of civil-military relations*, (Routledge, USA and Canada, 2010), P. 21

⁷ John C. Yoo, "The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers," *California Law Review* 84, no. 2 (1996): 167–305,

Therefore, this thesis aims to fill this gap. In doing so, even though in the idea of civil-military relationship poses various challenges, this thesis focuses on two main challenges the Ethiopia is facing. These are political neutrality of the military and civilian supremacy over the military. The *statement of the problem* of this thesis is how to build a military institution that is solely focused on securing the country from external threats and have no interest in involving in the internal politics of the country. I am studying this in order to give a solution to the civil-military relationship problematique, one of the fundamental problems a country faces in the process of building constitutionalism.

The *significance* of this study is immense. The challenge the Ethiopian situation presents can be useful for countries coming out of civil war, a challenge of building democratic military after an authoritarian rule. Specifically, pinpointing the Military's position in the power structure of a country helps to understand the type of government exists in that country. Answering these questions helps understand why many Constitutional violations are occurring in the country. In investigating what the role of the Military is, in highlighting where the Military stands in the political arena of the country, the writer also aims to give a clear vision on how to build constitutionalism in the country.

The comparative *methodology* this thesis adopts helps to draw lessons from experiences of other countries. The references of the comparative study are the USA and Turkey. It is crucial to note that building democratic military, crafting effective civil-military relations exhibits different challenges depending on the social, economic and political context of a country. As a result, it is difficult to accomplish democratic army in some contexts more than others.⁸

⁸Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas* (Princeton University Press, 2012), P. 3

In chapter one, the writer discusses the theoretical foundations of the notions of constitutionalism and civil-military relationship. I will give a working definition and establish the link between the idea of a civil-military relationship and constitutionalism. In the same chapter, I will treat the question of how to build an effective civil-military relationship. In chapter two I will deal with the first challenge selected for this thesis, the political neutrality of the military. I will look into the formation of the current military institution in the three jurisdictions and find out the effect on the political neutrality of the military. Chapter three of this thesis focuses on the second challenge for this thesis, civilian supremacy over the military. In this chapter, I will look into the role played by the parliament and the executive to bring about civilian supremacy. I will address the effect of the military having a broader mission beyond securing the nation from outside threats the country faces. Lastly, I will give a conclusion and a recommendation for future changes.

Chapter one:

Theoretical Foundations

In this chapter will discuss the theoretical foundations of the Concepts of constitutionalism and civil-military relationship. I will adapt working definition of the ideas of constitutionalism and civil-military relationship in the context of the thesis. In addition to that, in this chapter, I will explain the nexus between the civil-military relationship with constitutionalism. Finally, I will give a general theoretical foundation on how to apply the idea of the civil-military relationship and finally I will give a practical outline how to build an effective civil-military relationship.

1.1 Constitutionalism Defined

The focus of the concept of constitutionalism is to address the question, what does it take for an act called constitution to be a constitution in the thick sense of the term? and what must the state that has such constitution do to be considered a constitutional one?⁹ There is no single accepted definition of the concept of constitutionalism. Nevertheless, generally, there are two approaches dealing with the definition of the concept. The *first* one approaches constitutionalism from more positivist or legalist stand and views it as a system that represents the instrumentalities of governance.¹⁰

There is an agreement among constitutional theorists that a government is essential in an organized society.¹¹ However, the existence of government creates its own problem for individuals

⁹ Wojciech Sadurski (ed.), “*Constitutional Theory*”, In *The International Library of Essays in Laws & Legal Theory, second series*”, 2005, P. xi

¹⁰ J. Oloka – Onyango (ed), “*Constitutionalism in Africa: creating opportunities, Facing Challenges*”, (Kampala, Fountain Publication, 2001), p. 2

¹¹ M. J. C. Vile, “*Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers*, (Clarendon Pres, Oxford, 1967), P. 1

since there is a risk of arbitrariness and absolutism.¹² The legalist approach to constitutionalism focuses on putting limitations on the power of the government, taking auxiliary precautions in order to oblige the government to control itself.¹³ It dwells on creating a government limited by law. In the word of McIlwain, “constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on government; it is the antithesis of the arbitrary rule: its opposite is despotic government, the government of will instead of law.”¹⁴ This approach is summarized in the word of De Smith,

*The idea of constitutionalism involves the proposition that the exercise of governmental power shall be bounded by rules, rules prescribing the procedure according to which legislative and executive acts are to be performed and delimiting their permissible content – constitutionalism becomes a living reality to the extent that these rules curb the arbitrariness of discretion and are in fact observed by the wielders of political power, and to the extent that within the forbidden zones upon which authority may not trespass these significant room for the enjoyment of individual liberty.*¹⁵

The *second approach* contends that the notion of constitutionalism should be seen from the wider political, social and economic setup in which the positive laws operate.¹⁶ Constitutionalism works best when both the legal considerations and the political circumstances structure together. As a result, a theory of constitutionalism that is purely legal or purely political is a deficient one.¹⁷ The existence of written laws cannot replace the cement of society, but, they are among the additives needed to bring about the ultimate aim of constitutionalism; an enduring form of political

¹² *ibid*

¹³ Wormuth, Francis Dunham. “*The origins of modern constitutionalism*” (New York: Harper, 1949).

¹⁴ Charles Howard McIlwain, “*Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern*”, Liberty Fund, INC., 2007 (First published in 1940 by Cornell University Press), P. 21

¹⁵ John Hatachard, et al, *Comparative constitutionalism and good governance in the commonwealth: An Eastern and southern African perspective*, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), P. 1

¹⁶ J. Oloka – Onyango (ed), “*Constitutionalism in Africa: creating opportunities, Facing Challenges*”, (Kampala, Fountain Publication, 2001), p. 2

¹⁷ Christoph Mollers, “*The Three Branches: A comparative model of \separation of Powers*”, (Oxford University Press, 2013), P. 10

order.¹⁸ For Sajo this enduring political order cannot be achieved only with written laws, it is achieved through journeys; “constitutionalism is a storehouse of experiences”.¹⁹

This journey requires building strong institutions and developing the culture of democracy. As the considerations that one takes into account in order for the effective applications of the positive laws stipulated in the legal system of a country, the thickness of the notion of constitutionalism increases.²⁰ Carlos Nino enumerates these considerations that have an impact on the thickness of the concept. In effect, these considerations form elements of the concept constitutionalism. These are 1) Rule of law, 2) Supremacy of the constitution, 3) Formal constitutional limitations on subsidiary laws (like to be general, public, non-retroactive, stable, precise and impartiality of application), 4) Separation of powers, 5) Respect for fundamental rights, 6) Judicial review, 7) Democracy, and finally somehow related element 8) Popular democracy model.²¹

In the same way, Michel Rosenfeld sees that constitutionalism requires imposition of limits on the power of government, adherence, to the rule of law, and protection of fundamental rights.²² These social, political and economic considerations vary from context to context. For instance, in countries where there is an attempt of transition from authoritarian rule to a democratic government, the notion of constitutionalism demands more challenges to face. Scholars treat these challenges under the notion of ‘transitional constitutionalism’.²³ This notion of constitutionalism

¹⁸ Andras Sajo, “*Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism*”, (Central European University Press, Budapest, 1999), P. 10

¹⁹ Andras Sajo, *ibid*, P. 12

²⁰ Carlos Nino, “*The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy*”, 1996, P. 4

²¹ *ibid*, PP. 4-5

²² Michel Rosenfeld (ed.), *Constitutionalism. Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical perspective*, (Duke University Press, 1994), P. 3

²³ Wojciech Sadurski (ed.), “*Constitutional Theory*”, In *The International Library of Essays in Laws & Legal Theory, second series*, 2005, P. xviii, Lidija r. Casta Fleiner and Tanasije Marinkovic (eds) “*Key Developments in Constitutionalism and Constitutional law*”, (eleven international publishing, the Hague, 2014), P. 7-10

is developed recently, at the end of the twentieth century, in the wake of fall of Berlin wall and the emergence of democratic transitions in the Eastern Europe, Africa and beyond.²⁴ Transitional constitutionalism discusses issues like the role of the constitution in public life, the process of constitution making, and how to deal with the past and the future orientation of transition.²⁵

For the purpose of this thesis, although the notion of constitutionalism subsumes various concepts as elements, as I have shown above, the author minimizes the scope to Democracy and Separation of Powers. Walter F. Murphy points out that the intersection between democracy and constitutionalism lies in the notion of dignity. Democracy treats human beings in a dignified manner that it allows people to enjoy a degree of autonomy by being able to share the governance of their community. Likewise, constitutionalism enshrines human dignity in demanding the right to political participation and in the quest for the substantive limit on the power of the government so that it mirrors the popular will.²⁶

There is an intersection between constitutionalism and democracy in the definition of the concepts. Constitutionalism simply refers to limits imposed on the decisions of the majority, whether it is a procedural or substantive limitation, usually come in the form of limiting the power of the legislature.²⁷ Hence, constitutionalism is a notion that desires to limit the power of a government even if the government is the result of democratic elections.

On the other hand, in the eye of M. J. C. Vile, the doctrine of separation of powers is the most significant theory that attempted to provide a solution to the dilemma that constitutionalism

²⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)

²⁵ Wojciech Sadurski (ed.), *Constitutional Theory*, In *The International Library of Essays in Laws & Legal Theory, second series*, 2005, P. xviii

²⁶ Walter F. Murphy, *Constitution, Constitutionalism, and Democracy*, in Douglas Greenberg (eds.), *Constitutionalism and Democracy Transition in the contemporary world*, 1993, P. 3

²⁷ Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds.) *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, 1993, P. 2

identifies.²⁸ The separation of powers in the pure sense of the term is the establishment and maintenance of political liberty that the government is divided into three branches of departments, the legislature, the executive, or judiciary and giving the three branches a corresponding identifiable function of government, executive, legislative or the judiciary. Each branch should be confined to the exercise of its own function and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other branches.²⁹ Similarly, Montesquieu believed that “when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can be then no liberty”.³⁰

In conclusion, the concept of constitutionalism can be approached from two sides. One is approaching it from positivist or legalist point of view. In this case, constitutionalism means only rendering legal limitations on the power of the government. Whereas, the second approach contends that constitutionalism should be defined from wider perspective including the political, social and economic contexts within which the legal rules function. If constitutionalism is like an orchestra the law is like one of the focal instrument that without it there is no music but it also needs the support of the other instruments. The higher in number these considerations are the thicker the it makes the concept of constitutionalism. These considerations include Democracy, Separation of powers, Human Rights, Judicial Review, Written Constitution. From the various elements that constitutionalism holds, this thesis will focus on democracy and separation of powers. Recently another type of constitutionalism is on the rise. A constitutionalism that discusses the challenges of countries that are in a transition to a democratic rule. This constitutionalism is called transitional constitutionalism. Among the areas discussed in this field of constitutionalism is the idea of a civil-military relationship. Civil-military relationship touches different aspects of the

²⁸ Vile, “*Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers*”, 1967, P. 1

²⁹ M. J. C. Vile, “*Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers*, (Clarendon Pres, Oxford, 1967) P. 13

³⁰ De Montesquieu, “*The spirit of laws*”. (Cosimo, Inc., 2011). P. 215

concept of constitutionalism. But to begin with what is the notion of the civil-military relationship. The next part of this chapter deals with it.

1.2 What is Civil-Military Relationship?

The armed forces are the most important institution of a country for the survival of a state.³¹ For centuries countries relied on the military for various existential determining tasks such as protection, conquest and other less phenomenal reasons like conveying their strength and commitment to defend and advance their interest.³² In all these centuries, the question who will guard the guardians was and still is at the center of the public and academic debate. This question makes the focal point of the civil-military relationship.

The civil-military relationship is one aspect of national security policy; a policy that is concerned with enhancing the safety of a country's political, economic and social institutions against threats arising from other independent states.³³ Broadly speaking, the civil-military relations treat the issue how the armed forces operate in a constitutional civil authority and interact with other institutions, such as state institutions, civil society, the media, as well as ethnic and religious groups.³⁴ Hence, the concept of civil-military relationship requires the deconstruction of the ideological and institutional structures of a given country's basic state makeup and the reassertion of civil control and democratic culture over the organs of the government, economy and civil society.³⁵

³¹ Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), P. 14

³² Ibid, P. 14

³³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relation*, (Harvard University Press, Renewed Edition, 1985), p. 1

³⁴ Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, *Guarding the Guardians Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa*, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, England and USA, 2010)

³⁵ Ibid, P. 26

Peter Feaver refers to the sole question of the civil-military relationship (who will guard the guardians?) as the *civil-military relationship problematique*.³⁶ According to Peter Feaver, the main challenge of the civil-military relationship theory is how to build a military that is strong enough to do anything the civilians ask with a military subordinate enough to do only what the civilians authorize.³⁷ Basically, the need to have a strong military institution comes from two main reasons. The first is to have a military that can win a war. The army should be strong enough to guard the nation against real or perceived outside threats. It should be strong enough to prevail in war but, at the same time, conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy the society it is intended to protect.³⁸ The second reason is an institutional justification. The military should be granted the power to coerce others and impose its will because this is how wars are won.³⁹ The center of the theory of civil-military relationship, therefore, is making sure that the military will abide the rules of the civilians and at the same time will the military be allowed to enjoy autonomy for the purpose of effective execution of its missions. Eventually, addressing this problematique entails finding a solution for these two paradoxical concerns.

However, what happens when there is no balance between the power of the military and the civilians on the other hand? There are dangers the armed forces pose towards constitutional democracy. The classic danger coming from the armed forces is direct seizure of political power which usually involves a coup d'état.⁴⁰ However, the problem of lack of effective civil-military

³⁶ Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations*, (Harvard University Press, England, 2003), P. 4

³⁷ Ibid, P. 2

³⁸ Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), P. 14-15

³⁹ Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, (Harvard University Press), 2003, P. 5

⁴⁰ Although a detailed discussion on what coup d'état mean is out of the scope of this study, Rebecca L. Schiff defines the coup as "the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government". She gives different ways the military could end up staging a coup d'état. She calls this anatomy of coup and it includes Praetorianism, in which a politicized elite and wealthy society becomes dominant

relationship is not only a concern of the military going out of control of the civilian in a full scale; it is also a scenario where the military poses a negative influence in the whole setup of the civil-military relationship without becoming the sole political power holder in the country.

In addition to the coup d'état, the most dramatic and traditional intervention of the armed forces in the constitutional setup, there are other forms of military intervention in domestic politics including; a concern from the civilian leaders whether the military will obey their direction or will be involved in securing its own interest.⁴¹ The military might put a negative impact on the politics of a country by influencing the legislations and policies that protect the military establishment. It might also refuse to follow policies drawn by the civilian rule. The military might also exploit the country's resources as an excuse for strengthening its own capacity against the threat of enemy states. It might also drag a nation into a war in opposition to what the society needs. In general, nations which fail to build up a balanced pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run uncalculated risks.⁴²

Different contextual situations determine the successful application of the civil-military theory and building effective relationship. Building democratic armies is more difficult to accomplish in some contexts than others. These contextual circumstances usually stem from a country's messy history. The political and socioeconomic settings in which democratic armies must

and stages a coup. The other is middle-class praetorianism involves a more broadly based army operating within a centralized state. Coups could also be classified as bloodless and violent. Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A concordance theory of civil-military relations*, (Routledge, USA and Canada), 2009, P. 21

⁴¹ Peter D. Feaver, Civil-Military Relations, Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 2, 1999, P. 214

⁴² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relation*, (Harvard University Press, Renewed Edition, 1985),

be built are different and thus pose dissimilar challenges to those crafting democratic armies and civil-military relations.⁴³

In this thesis, the author focuses on two principal challenges that face countries under transition to effective civil-military relationship face. These are, 1) Political neutrality of the army, and 2) Civilian Supremacy over the military.

1.2.1 Political neutrality of the army

The commitment to political neutrality is one of the overriding principles in the theory of civil-military relationship. In countries where a military played a huge role in old regimes and in the transition to new regimes, numerous obstacles must be overcome to achieve effective civil-military relationship.⁴⁴ One challenge is a politically sterile and a military that favors the wishes of a segment of political power. Most importantly, if a military side only with one party and protects the interest of that party, it makes the practice of democracy unachievable.

However, Political neutrality does not mean that the professional military corps is not allowed to participate in any manner in the politics of the country, rather it is to mean that the military is not allowed to be part in a partisan politics. The man in the uniform is allowed to vote but not to involve in a political campaign or to endorse political parties or candidates.⁴⁵ However,

⁴³ Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), P. 3

⁴⁴ Felipe Aguero, Towards Civilian Supremacy in South America, in Larry Diamond et al (eds.), "Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives", (The John Hopkins University Press, 1997) , P 179

⁴⁵ Hounnikpo, *Guarding the Guardians Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa*, 2010,.P. 144, Zoltan Barany, Reforming Defense: Lessons for Arab Republics, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2013, P. 47-48

minimizing the political intervention of the military is only one goal of the civil-military relationship.⁴⁶

1.2.2 Civilian Supremacy over the military

Civilian supremacy means the role of the military is restricted to the implementation of the national defense policy which is formulated by the civilians.⁴⁷ Civilian control of the military is a doctrine that places ultimate responsibility for country's strategic decision making in the hands of the civilian political leadership rather than the military officer. Civilian control as a concept implies the right of civilian leaders to initiate policy and define strategic goals, determine the deployment of the armed forces, decide the budget, and resource levels, and undertake monitoring (audit), evaluation, and review of defense policy, structures, and performance.⁴⁸ A civilian supremacy over the military is characterized by the capacity of the civilians to 1) Conduct general policy without interference from the military; 2) define the goals and organization of defense and formulate and conduct defense policy; 3) determine the best personnel to charge with these tasks of functions, and 4) monitor and review the implementation of policy.⁴⁹

In a system where there is effective constitutionalism running the civilian control the military because there is a well-founded understanding that it is only democratically elected leaders that have the mandate and the moral and political competence to make decisions for the nation,

⁴⁶Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner (eds.), *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, (John Hopkins Press, London, 1996), P. xxviii

⁴⁷Eboe Hutchful, Bringing the Military and Security Agencies under Democratic Control: A Challenge to African Constitutionalism, in Okon Akiba (ed.), *"Constitutionalism and Society in Africa"*, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), P. 123

⁴⁸ Hutchful, *ibid*, P. 123

⁴⁹ Felipe Aguero, Towards Civilian Supremacy in South America, in Larry Diamond et al (eds.), *"Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives"*, The John Hopkins University Press, 1997, P. 177

even when they lack the technical competence. Hence, civilian control is no guarantee of good defense policy.⁵⁰

To conclude, the notion of civil-military relationship deals with the issue how the armed forces operate in a country where there is constitutionalism and how does it interact with other institutions, such as state institutions, civil society, the media, as well as ethnic and religious groups. In this thesis, the author focuses on two challenges of the transition to an effective civil-military relationship. These are civilian supremacy over the military and the political neutrality of the military.

1.3 The Nexus between Civil-Military Relationship and Constitutionalism

The military plays a definitive role in building constitutionalism for one country. A country needs to figure out how to contain the power of the military in order to survive as a democratic nation. The commitment of the military elites to democratic rule and obedience to democratically elected government is one of the main attributes a country should have for a democracy to work and to have a consolidated democracy.⁵¹

According to Huntington, it takes a genuine democratization effort to effectuate civilian control over the military.⁵² Equivalently, constitutionalism cannot be consolidated unless the

⁵⁰ Eboe Hutchful, Bringing the Military and Security Agencies under Democratic Control: A Challenge to African Constitutionalism, in Okon Akiba (ed.), *“Constitutionalism and Society in Africa”*, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), P. 124

⁵¹ Zoltan Barany, *“The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas”*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), P. 3

⁵² Samuel Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6, no. 4 (October 1995), pp. 9–17

military becomes firmly subordinate to the civilian control.⁵³ Constitutionalism is fully attained when the aims of civil-military relationship are fulfilled, and for that to happen a genuine initiation to build constitutionalism is necessary. Thus, it can be said that constitutionalism works only when it serves to coordinate a population on some matters such as national defense (and the military institution), that are more important than the issue on which they might differ, and work to the mutual advantage of both parties involved in the national defense and the civilian institutions.⁵⁴

Constitutionalism is a gradual process that requires building institutions that are fit to limit the power of the government. If there is a deficit in the civil-military relationship of the country there is an inevitably structural weakness that hinders the effective cycle of constitutionalism. As long as country's institutional foundations and political culture remain the same, a true commitment to constitutionalism remains doubtful. The intervention of the military in the political field of a country puts a danger to the sole principle of limiting the power of the government that constitutionalism stands for. Therefore, limiting the power of the military and holding it under the civilian oversight reflects the principle that constitutionalism is all about.

1.4 Building effective civil-military relationship

Dennis Blair enumerates seven characteristics of armed forces in a constitutional democracy. 1) Constitutional or legal foundation, 2) Primarily tasked for external defense mission, with domestic mission conducted under strict legal control, 3) Supervised by a competent ministry of defence, 4) Political neutrality, aligned with no political power, 5) Representative of the ethnic, regional, religious, and tribal makeup of the country, and expected to contribute to society after

⁵³ Larry Diamond et al (eds.), *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives*, (The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), P. xxviii

⁵⁴ Russell Hardin, *Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy*, (Oxford University Press, 1999), P. 1

military service, 6) Respected by the citizenry and promoted on merit, 7) Respected by the citizenry and promoted on merit.⁵⁵

However, what are the necessary steps to achieve these characteristics? In this part, I will review theoretical stances dealing with this question and give practical outline on how to achieve effective civil-military relationship. One of the main authors who deliberated on the issue of the civil-military relationship is Samuel Huntington. Even though it was written 50 years, Samuel Huntington's seminal work '*The soldier and the state*' is still a classical work that scholars rely on. In this book, Huntington makes a distinction between subjective and objective civilian control over the military. Subjective civilian control is a form of civilian control available when there is no professional officer corps. Where there is no professional military institution and military officer the civilian control is operated in a non-democratic way to maximize the power of the civilian. One is by a government institution as was the case in the old empires, where the crown controls the armed forces from above. The other method is using a powerful social class like aristocracy or bourgeois groups could control the military to advance their interest.⁵⁶ In Huntington's theory of subjective control the military could play civilians off against each other, and effectively undermining the very principle of civilian control.⁵⁷

On the other hand, objective civilian control became the characteristics of civil-military relationship with the rise of the military profession in western countries in the 19th century. The military officer developed a mindset which consists of values, attitudes, and perspectives, plus

⁵⁵Dennis Blair, *Military Engagement; Influencing armed forces worldwide to support democratic transitions Volume I overview and action plan*, (Brooking Institution Press, Washington, D.C, 2013), P.17

⁵⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, "*The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*", (Harvard University Press, Renewed Edition, 1985), PP. 80-83

⁵⁷ Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, "*Guarding the Guardians Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa*", (Ashgate Publishing Limited, England and USA, 2010), P. 49

professional ethics that qualifies him to be considered as a professional man, similar to a lawyer or a doctor. The military function is performed by public bureaucratized professional experts in the management of violence and responsibility for the military security of the state. The defining features of military professionalism are the professional qualifications obtained only in extensive training and experience, the responsibility of the officer corps and the corporate identity that distinguishes the professional military corps from other professions.⁵⁸

Objective civilian control is the direct opposite of subjective civilian control. “Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, by making them the tool of the state.”⁵⁹ In subjective civilian control, the independence of the military is not recognized and it involves in constitutional order in a more comprehensive way. Whereas in objective civilian control the military apparatus is an autonomous institution and, as a result, civilian control is undermined when the military is involved in the constitutional order. This leads to the question who holds the power to determine the arrangement of civilian control?

Two decisive shaping forces are identified in Huntington’s objective civilian control scheme. These are the functional imperative and societal imperatives. The functional imperative refers to the level of threat a society’s security is faced with, i.e. either high or low external threat. The second determining factor, the societal imperative is about the compatibility of the professional military ethic with the political ideologies prevailing in society.⁶⁰ This comprises two main features; one is the ideological makeup of society, whether society as a whole is liberal or

⁵⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, “*The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*”, (Harvard University Press, Renewed Edition, 1985), PP. 59-79

⁵⁹ Huntington, *ibid*, P. 83

⁶⁰ Huntington, *ibid*, P. 86

conservative, and the second is institutions dominant in the country.⁶¹ The interaction of the two imperatives is the key determinant factor to get an effective civil-military relationship. Huntington asserts that the functional imperative, the level of external threat a country is facing, is the determinant factor on what kind of civil-military relationship exists. The more the threat the more powerful the military will be and the lesser the threat the weaker it will be.

To get a balance between the two imperatives and answer the paradoxical question in which a country is faced by the civil-military relationship problematique, Huntington brings the concept of professionalism. To bring objective control soldiers had to be different from their fellow citizens. Rebecca L. Schiff calls this theory a separation theory of civil-military relationship.⁶² The military must remain isolated from both society and politics and retain and guard its professional autonomy. The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism.⁶³ The professionalization of the military man leads to minimization and maximization of the power of the officer corps at the same time. The two potentially conflicting aims of the civil-military relationship problematique will be achieved. In the word of Huntington,

*Objective civilian control achieves this reduction [minimization of military power by professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral. This produces the lowest possible level of military political power with respect to all civilian groups. At the same time, it preserves the essential element of power which is necessary for the existence of a military profession. A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.]*⁶⁴

Huntington's civil-military relationship theory can be summed up as:

⁶¹ Huntington, *ibid*, P 2

⁶² Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics A concordance theory of civil–military relations*, (Routledge, USA and Canada, 2010)

⁶³ Samuel P. Huntington, “*The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*”, (Harvard University Press, Renewed Edition, 1985), P. 83

⁶⁴ Huntington, *ibid*, P. 84

- a. The pattern of civilian control over the military is determined by functional imperative (external threat), and societal imperatives (which includes the political ideological setup of the country and domestic legal institutions.)
- b. A professional military will become less and less professional the more its autonomy is violated.⁶⁵
- c. Having professional military guarantees the military's will to remain subordinate to civilian authority.

A more similar civil-military relationship theory comes from Morris Janowitz in his work *The Professional Soldier*. Nevertheless, there is not much difference between Janowitz's theory and Huntington's as both base the center of their argument on the concept of military professionalism. However, for Janowitz, the military ought to move closer to society, embrace civilian values as much as feasible, and become open to professional reform and new organizational techniques.⁶⁶

*From Morris Janowitz . . . comes the idea that the military and society are closely linked, and that the military can never be completely separate from society. It will reflect society in some important ways, and intellectual and other currents present in the society will find their way into the military sooner or later. . . . At the same time, the military must also remain somewhat aloof from society as noted by Huntington. The military has a responsibility to defend the state, not to mirror it. Even in a democratic society, the military cannot be completely democratic, and some of the privileges open to civilians are not applicable to it.*⁶⁷

⁶⁵Peter Feaver, The Civil-Military Problematic: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of Civilian control, *Journal of Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 23, No.2, 1996, P. 161

⁶⁶ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional: Soldier A social and Political portrait*, (Free Press. 1971), Zoltan Barany, "The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas", Princeton, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), P. 22

⁶⁷ Williams, J.A. () "The international image of the military professional," *African Security Review*, 4:, 1995, PP. 24-7 as cited in Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics A concordance theory of civil-military relations*, (Routledge, USA and Canada, 2010), P. 20

In contrast with Huntington's theory, which put honor, duty and loyalty as the defining characteristics of the professional soldier, Janowitz instead believed that the essence of civilian control of the armed forces consisted of improved assessments of military performance.⁶⁸ As Zoltan Barany explains Janowitz believes that in a democratic society, it is highly inappropriate for the honor to be the sole, or even the dominant value of the professional military cadre.⁶⁹ As a substitute, Janowitz identifies three main mechanisms the civilian administration should use as major devices of control over the military as an institution. These are the budgetary control, control through civil-military appointees to the military establishment and though the obligation of the authorities in the military establishment to advise the government on foreign policy issues.⁷⁰

Douglas Bland explained the theory of civilian control from a different perspective. He tried to bridge the gap between the civilians and the military with his unified theory of civil-military relationship. "Civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. Specifically, civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military leaders are responsible and accountable for others."⁷¹ Therefore, there is a shared responsibility among the two dichotomies. These shared responsibilities are conditioned by naturally evolved principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge.⁷²

⁶⁸ Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), P.22

⁶⁹ Janowitz, *The Professional: Soldier A social and Political portrait*, (Free Press. 1971), Zoltan Barany, P. 225

⁷⁰ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional: Soldier A social and Political portrait*, (Free Press. 1971), Zoltan Barany, PP. 363-365

⁷¹ Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26, no. 1 1999, P. 3

⁷² Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations", 1999, PP. 3-4

A different approach other than the separation thesis to the civil-military relationship theory is introduced by Schiff in her concordance theory of civil-military relationship. According to the concordance theory, there should not be an assumption that the military and the civilian should be separated.

Concordance theory does not presume that civilian institutions must control the military since partnership and dialogue among the major sectors of society is more relevant to this theoretical approach. Rather, the underlying premise of concordance theory is that domestic military intervention can be avoided if there is agreement among the military, the political leadership, and the citizens regarding four indicators:

- *social composition of the officer corps*
- *political decision-making process*
- *recruitment method*
- *Military style.*⁷³

According to Schiff society has three partners: the military, political elites, and the citizenry, and only an agreement among these three partners make a military intervention in domestic politics, in its various ways, less likely. “Because all such relationships reflect specific institutional and cultural conditions shared by the three partners, no single type is seen as necessarily leading to domestic military intervention.”⁷⁴ The military, the political and the citizenry aim for a cooperative relationship that might involve separations but does not require it.⁷⁵

In this part of the chapter, I have shown different theories to give an answer to the civil-military relationship problematique, and to build a civil-military relationship characterized by the supremacy of the civilians over the military and political neutrality of the military. Samuel

⁷³ Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics A concordance theory of civil–military relations*, (Routledge, USA and Canada, 2010), P. 12

⁷⁴ Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics*, 2010, P. 32

⁷⁵ Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics*, 2010, P. 12-17

Huntington's theory assumes that separation between the civilians and the military is a necessary condition. Huntington argues that a professional military is less likely to interfere with the business of the civilians since it is duty bound and has the honor to be under the military professional ethics. Similarly, Janowitz agrees to most of the assertions of Huntington except for the conclusion that it is a duty, honor, and loyalty that serve as reinforcement for the professional military corps. He points out three mechanisms that the civilians have to use to ensure the non-interference of the professional military. These are budgetary control, control through civil-military appointees to the military establishment and through the obligation of the authorities in the military establishment to advise to the government on foreign policy issues. Other scholars like Douglas Bland and Rebecca Schiff introduced a different approach to resolving the civil-military relationship problematique in their unified and concordance theory respectively. These solutions begin by not assuming the separation between the military and civilians. The most important aspect of their theory is identifying entities affected by the problematique and involving them in a discussion on how to effectively tackle this problematique. As I have mentioned above, in this thesis I will focus on two challenges on the road to the achievement of effective civil-military relationship. The next chapter focuses on the challenge of political neutrality over the military.

Chapter Two:

Political Neutrality of the Military

In this chapter, I will address the issue of political neutrality. The primary tool to achieve political neutrality of the armed forces is to make the military institution a professional entity. In a comparative perspective, I will look to the experience of USA, Turkey, and finally I look to Ethiopia. Professionalism in the military is characterized by three main features that are built by way of a process. These are; professional expertise, professional responsibility, and professional corporateness. The existence of these three characteristics of the professional military is examined through the evolution of key guidelines of the military institution like; the requirements for entry into officer corps, the means of advancement within the officer corps, and the nature of the military staff system.⁷⁶

These characteristics of the military institution are raised in this chapter to explore the extent of professionalism in the three countries. Mostly, this chapter looks into the formation of the modern professional military institution in general terms. It stresses that the background history of the military institution has a vital importance to establish a neutral military institution.

The author refers to the foundation of the existing military institution in the three jurisdictions and implication on to the present political neutrality of the military institution. The part dealing with the USA looks to the experience of the military institution after the American Civil War. In the context of Turkey, this history stretches to the end of the First World War and the establishment of the new republic by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk. In the Ethiopian case, this thesis

⁷⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard University Press, 1957)., P. 20

looks to the role of the military in the establishment of the current republic in 1991 and the challenges in attaining political neutrality.

2.1. The development of the military profession from anti-military sentiments, the USA Experience

Although there have been certain periods of political involvement, in general, a neutral military has been characteristic of the US military since the founding of the republic.⁷⁷ The American military profession was developed in isolation from the society in the nineteenth century.⁷⁸ Huntington gives are two basic points that led to the isolation of the military from the society, and thus, gave the rise to the American military mind. The first one is that liberalism dominated American thinking from the revolution through the first half of the twentieth century and second, the lack of external threat in the most part of the nineteenth century.⁷⁹

At the end of the American civil war, the defeat of the southern marked the beginning of a new era that merged the interest of the capitalist and the interest of the population. The ideas and philosophy of business liberalism and individualism became accepted by all significant groups in America. War was considered as a thing of the past and the business pacifists wanted to eliminate all forms of military institutions and preparations. Huntington, therefore, concludes that as society evolved from the militant to industrial phase, the military profession lost its function, its attractiveness, and its popularity.⁸⁰

Huntington explains that liberalism has a hostile view of the military profession and the functions of the military institution since it originated in the assertion of the right of the individual

⁷⁷ Sam Sarkesian and Robert Connor, *The US Military Profession Into the 21st Century: War, Peace and Politics* (Routledge, 2006), P. 26

⁷⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 189 - 190

⁷⁹ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. P. 143

⁸⁰ Ibid. pp. 144 - 148

against the state. The legitimate function of the military profession is not recognized by liberals as they see the military profession as an obstacle to the achievement of their own aims. Liberal thought focused upon the relations among individual to the state and the relations among individual within society. Instead of questioning the existence of the state, liberalism presupposes the state's self-sufficiency and external security.⁸¹

It is from this hostile situation that the American military built its professional characteristic that led to the development of the neutrality mind. For instance, on June 2nd, 1784 the continental congress, the governing body of the USA during the American Revolution, passed a resolution disbanding the continental army. The congress held this decision reasoning that "standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican Governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism".⁸² At the time when the bill of right was to be added to the constitution, although no action was taken on it, Charles Pinckey from South Carolina proposed that

No troops shall be kept in time of peace, but by consent of the legislature.

The military shall always be subordinate to the civil power, and no grant of money shall be made by the legislature.

The military shall always be subordinate to the civil power, and no grants of money shall be the legislature for supporting military land forces for more than one year at a time.

*No soldier shall be quartered in any house in time of peace without consent of the owner.*⁸³

Secondly, the lack of external threats in the most years of the nineteenth century led to the belief that a large standing army is a danger to liberty, democracy, and economic prosperity. Therefore, one can say that in the United States objective civilian control existed, but as a product of geographical isolation and the international balance of power. The lack of external threat paved

⁸¹ Ibid, P. 148 - 151

⁸² Ibid. P. 143 - 144

⁸³ Arthur A. Ekirch Jr, *The Civilian and the Military: A History of the American Antimilitarist Tradition* (Independent Institute, 2010). P. 26

the way for the virtual elimination of standing army forces and the exclusion of the military from political power.⁸⁴

*The American military profession, its institutions, and its ideals, is fundamentally a product of these years. No other period has had such a decisive influence in shaping the course of American military professionalism and the nature of the American military mind. The withdrawal of the military from the civilian society at the end of the nineteenth century produced the high standards of professional excellence essential in the struggle of the twentieth century.*⁸⁵

This progress in the professionalization of the military was reflected in various areas of the military institution, including the professional military education system. The American military education began to be held in a separate institution, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, tasked solely for the training of officers and in effect recruitment to the military institution required basic liberal military education, beginning from 1802.⁸⁶ The other area which exhibits that the military made a huge progress in the professionalization of the military institution's internal structure, specifically, internal promotion system.

The American military system began to use promotion system chiefly based on the performance of the individual related to the task that is important to the goals of the institution.⁸⁷ Before the professionalization of the military, in the primitive skill structure and a relatively static organization, internal advancement inside the military was based on tradition, custom, and most important of all, on social position. Janowitz calls this *ascription*.⁸⁸ The transformation of the

⁸⁴ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 189 - 190

⁸⁵ Ibid. P. 229

⁸⁶ Cynthia A. Watson, *Military Education: A Reference Handbook* (Praeger, 2007). P. 1, Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. pp. 253 - 254

⁸⁷ Allan Mazur, Julie Mazur, and Caroline Keating, "Military Rank Attainment of a West Point Class: Effects of Cadets' Physical Features," *American Journal of Sociology* 90, no. 1 (1984): P. 125

⁸⁸ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1971). P. 60

military establishment modified the traditional ascriptive basis of military advancement towards reliance on the criteria of individual achievement.⁸⁹

In conclusion, The isolation, rejection, and reduction of the armed services after the civil war led the American military to experience one the lowest points in its history. Yet, by withdrawing into its own hard shell, the officer corps was able and permitted to develop a distinctively military character. In other words, the isolation from the civilian scene and minimization of the military power led to creation and recognition of autonomous military profession and independent military sphere.⁹⁰ Hence, in the USA, the dominance of the liberalism ideology resulted in the isolation of the military from the civilian life which led to the inculcation of the virtue of professionalism in the military institution and ultimately steered to the creation of politically sterile and neutral army. And this distilled virtue still helps the country to have a democratic army and a better civil-military relationship.

2.2. Military as a Guardian of the Republic, the Turkish Experience

One of the most difficult challenges the Turkish road to constitutionalism faced and still facing is the task of controlling the Turkish armed forces and the powerful role of the military in politics.⁹¹ The influence of the military come in a diversified form; predominantly from military interventions in a coup d'état and in a "non-democratically generated tutelary powers that hold reserved domains of authority and policy making."⁹² The Turkish military staged three military coups from 1960 to 1980. In this part, I demonstrate that the establishment of the military as an institution has a deficiency that led it to involve in the political scene of the country.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Felipe Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). P. 17

⁹¹ Ali Resul Usul, *Democracy in Turkey: The impact of EU political conditionality*, (Routledge, USA and Canada, 2011), P. 144-145

⁹² Ibid, P. 145

The collapse of the Ottoman empire at the end of the First World War in 1918 ushered a new era in the history of Turkey.⁹³ In the Ottoman Empire there was an almost complete identification of the military within the state.⁹⁴ In 1923 the leaders of the nationalist movement composed of military officers, led by Mustafa Kamal Atatürk, proclaimed the new Turkish republic.⁹⁵ Kamal Atatürk abolished the sultanate that existed before and the state's official links with Islam to create the a secular republic. It is widely recognized that the army played a pivotal role in the founding process of the current Turkish Republic.⁹⁶

The role of the military did not end in the starting years of the republic only, rather it continued to influence the country's political system in the later stages too. A common observation in the literature on Turkish civil–military relations show that the military has not only been a security institution but also a key political actor.⁹⁷ In the first years after the establishment of the republic, the military played prominent role in implementing the reforms the new republic introduced all around the country. For this effect, military officers handled administrative posts (one-third of its most important posts were held by the military officers), assumed dual roles as both field commanders and governors, served as delegates in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (military officials made 20 percent of this assembly) and assumed position in as a cabinet member in the ruling People's party.⁹⁸ After the settlement of the government, however, till 1960, the military played a more symbolic role as a guardian of the republic.⁹⁹

⁹³ William M. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (Psychology Press, 1994), P. 59

⁹⁴ Mehmet Ali Birand, *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1991).

⁹⁵ Steven A. Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (JHU Press, 2007).P. 94

⁹⁶ Yaprak Gürsoy, "The Changing Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: Democratization through Coup Plots?," *Democratization* 19, no. 4 (August 1, 2012): P. 54

⁹⁷ Zeki Sarigil, "The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent?," *Armed Forces & Society*, (April 9, 2012), P. 1

⁹⁸ Steven A. Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (JHU Press, 2007). P. 95

⁹⁹ Zeki Sarigil, "The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent?," *Armed Forces & Society*, (April 9, 2012),, P. 3

The Turkish military regards to itself as the guardian of the republic, had an effect of legitimizing the exceptional position the military seeks in the political setup of the country. Interestingly, this had an effect on how the Turkish people see the military. The justification given for the repeated intervention reflected on the Turkish people and led them to see the army as a savior and never criticize its actions.¹⁰⁰

Since the first coup in 1960 the Turkish civil-military relationship was changed to a more overt/assertive role to dictate the political system. The military started to play the role of watchdog within the political system.¹⁰¹ From 1960 to 2002, when the military interrupted the democratic system four times (1960–61, 1971, 1980–83, and 1997) “it was always the military that had attempted to re-structure political life when it deemed it necessary. Following the military interventions new constitutions were adopted or the existing ones were amended; changes were also made in such important legislation as political parties act.”¹⁰²

Another tools used by the military to reach to this level of influence through the society is military training (education). Recently, politicians are promising to revise the curriculum of military schools.¹⁰³ However, to make it worse, this superior stand the military institution built influences politicians at the highest level too.

*The informal power of the Turkish military establishment extends to a range of policy and issue areas beyond national defense and security. In Turkey, the origin of these institutions lies in the prominence of the military establishment in the founding of the republic and is a consequence of the military’s formal role as the guardian of the political order.*¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ Birand, *Shirts of Steel*, P. iii

¹⁰¹ Zeki Sarigil, “The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent?,” *Armed Forces & Society*, (April 9, 2012), P. 8

¹⁰² Metin Heper, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?,” *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): P. 247

¹⁰³ “The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey - Turkish Studies - Volume 6, Issue 2,” accessed March 23, 2016, P. 217

¹⁰⁴ Steven A. Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (JHU Press, 2007), P. 103

Fundamentally, the political influence of the military Turkey “is due less to legal regulations than to historical, sociological and political factors.”¹⁰⁵ The role of the military in the founding time of the republic and the portrayal of the armed forces as the guardian of the political order led to a lack of neutrality in the Turkish constitutional democracy. The nature of the military in the time of the foundation of the republic defined the role of the military in the years to come. It took more than 80 years and the influence of regional organizations like the European Union for the military to begin to take the role of an agent to the politicians and by reference to the people, or just a mere tool in the application of the political decisions.¹⁰⁶

2.3. The Missing Neutrality from the Start: The Ethiopian Experience

In 1991, the Derg regime which ruled Ethiopia for 17 years was overthrown in a civil war. Tigrean People Liberation Front (TPLF) and Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) were at the podium leading the rebel movement.¹⁰⁷ The TPLF was founded in February 1975 as a small guerrilla movement in the northern region of Ethiopia.¹⁰⁸ Originally, the movement’s core desire was to secure self-determination for the Tigrean people. However, through time encouraged by the victory, it gained the aim of the rebel group grew to liberate Ethiopia from the repressive rule the military Junta Derg.¹⁰⁹ In the late years of the war, the organizational feature of the TPLF was also changing to Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) with a nominal

¹⁰⁵ Ergun Özbudun, “Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004,” *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 2 (June 1, 2007), P. 195

¹⁰⁶ Ali Resul Usul, *Democracy in Turkey: The Impact of EU Political Conditionality*, (Routledge, 2010), 144–151.

¹⁰⁷ Many rebel movements took part in this war against the Derg regime. Eritrean People Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Front, Afar Liberation Front are some of them. Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell, “Armed Conflict at the End of the Cold War, 1989-92,” *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 3 (1993), P. 340, Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1855 - 1991*, Second Edition (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2002), 256–259.

¹⁰⁸ Aregawi Berhe, “The Origin of the Tigrean Liberation Front,” *African Affairs* Vol. 103, no. No. 413 (October 2004), P. 569

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. P. 569

participation of two other junior parties Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) and the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO).¹¹⁰

On May 28, 1991, EPRDF and EPLF took control of the capital city, Addis Ababa. Like other African countries, one of the major decisions are taken by the winners of the war, EPRDF, was to dismiss the national army and to form a new one composed of the rebel fighters. Ethiopia demobilized close to 400 000 soldiers of the former Government from 1991 to early 1992.¹¹¹ EPRDF also disarmed fighters of the liberation fronts that negotiated the transitional government with it. It was also decided that the transitional government will be served by TPLF fighters.¹¹²

Gebru Asrat (who was the President of Tigray regional state from 1991 – 2001) mentions two justifications given at that time for the decision of EPRDF.¹¹³ The first one is the constitutional principle provided in article 87(1) and reaffirmed in article 4(2) of the defense forces proclamation, the defense forces should reflect the equitable representation of the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia. The second justification given is focusing on the economic reconstruction of the country and minimizing the by shifting the money that was supposed to be spent on building a strong military. Gebru continues to explain that these justifications are not wrong in themselves, but the application was in a way that jeopardized the national interest of the country.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Aregawi Berhe, *A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front* (Los Angeles, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2009). P. 329. It is important to note that the current setup the EPRDF includes the Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement (SEPDM) which was formed after the rebel forces took control the capital and formed a transitional government.

¹¹¹ Paul Collier, *Demobilisation and Insecurity In Ethiopia and Uganda: A study in the Economics of the Transformation from War to Peace*, in Jakkie Cilliers (ed) "Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa," October 1995, <https://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Books/Dismissed.html>. accessed March 1, 2016

¹¹² Tsegaye Ararssa, "Elections in Ethiopia: Beyond Winning (and Losing) | Addis Standard," <http://addisstandard.com/elections-in-ethiopia-beyond-winning-and-losing-2/>. accessed March 2, 2016,

¹¹³ "Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1/1995" (Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1st Year No. 1), Addis Ababa, August 21, 1995, Article 87 (1), see also "A Proclamation on the Defence Forces of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 27/1996" (Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2nd Year No. 15, Addis Ababa, February 15, 1996)., Article 4(2)

¹¹⁴ Gebru Asrat, *Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia (ሉዓላዊነትና ዴሞክራሲ)*, 4th ed., 2014. P. 175

First and foremost, the demobilization left its mark on the personnel and technical expertise of the military institution. In 1998, when war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the deficiency of military professionals was visible.¹¹⁵ To rectify this deficiency the Ethiopian government had to recall dismembered officers in the Derg regime. Additionally, this move also jeopardized the neutrality of the professional soldier. It should be stressed that political neutrality in Ethiopia was challenged from the outset of the military institution since it is only natural to side for colleagues of freedom fight and to look one another and since it takes extra professional manner to take a neutral stance. As Tsegaye Ararssa puts it,

*The fact that TPLF's army became the State's national army and substantially remained to be so to date indicates not only the partisan nature of the army but also the fundamentally militarized nature of EPRDF's politics that keeps politicized guerilla fighters for a national army. Obviously, the needed separation of politics from (military) force in a democracy is absent in Ethiopia.*¹¹⁶

Another major fact that affects the political neutrality of the armed forces is political indoctrination that exists in the military institution. Gebru notes that political indoctrination inside the armed forces began subsequent to TPLF/EPRDF split that occurred in 2001.¹¹⁷ The fundamental cause for the split was the Ethio – Eritrean war sparked in 1998. Three months before the Eritrea's invasion of Ethiopia a group led by Siye Abraha¹¹⁸ warned that Eritrea is planning to launch an attack on Ethiopia. Nevertheless, The late prime minister Meles Zenawi took a soft position on Eritrea and its capabilities and dismissed the idea as preposterous.¹¹⁹ The split and the tension within TPLF was concluded with the win of the faction led by Prime Minister Meles and it

¹¹⁵ Ibid. P. 175

¹¹⁶ Ararssa, "Elections in Ethiopia: Beyond Winning (and Losing) | Addis Standard."

¹¹⁷ Gebru Asrat, *Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia*, 2014, P. 316

¹¹⁸ Siye Abraha, Was the chairman of the board of directors and TPLF Politburo member since 1979, formerly minister of defense in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, since 1991–1995, he also served as the chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray from 1995 to 2000.

¹¹⁹ Paulos Milkias, "Ethiopia, the TPLF, and the Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor," *Northeast African Studies* 10, no. 2 (2003): P. 19

remodeled the structure of the TPLF. Among the results of this split was the renewal process that hit the high positions of the armed forces.¹²⁰ The expulsion of high military officials like the respected Chief of Defence Staff, Lt.-General Tsadkan Gebre Tinsae under the guise of renewal was without an “indication of a plot by the dissidents or elements in the army to remove Prime Minister Meles illegally, or any evidence of a consensus to force him out of office legally.”¹²¹ This tells that the late Prime Minister had control over the military as an institution; yet have not used it to build a democratic military. The Prime Minister used his power to make the armed forces a partisan institution and ensure his dominion.¹²²

Furthermore, the split in the TPLF was followed by a renewal campaign led by the winning faction aiming to get the support of the officer corps.¹²³ This statement was affirmed recently by the current Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, General Samora Yunus in a conference held on the celebration of the 3rd national defence day. On a paper he presented by the title “The FDRE Defence Forces From Where to Where?” he explained that after the crisis in the EPRDF the military also went through a restoration process which enabled it to withdraw ideas that forced the institution to lag behind.¹²⁴

This “indoctrination program” became a pattern in the armed forces and presently it is done in a department with the same name in order to conscientize the army to their duty to preserve the constitutional order. Nevertheless, the department “routinely provides orientation to the army in

¹²⁰ Medhane Tadesse and John Young, “TPLF: Reform or Decline?,” *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 97 (September 1, 2003): 391–392

¹²¹ Tadesse, *Ibid.* 392

¹²² Gebru Asrat, *Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia (ሉዓላዊነትና ዴሞክራሲ)*, 316–317.

¹²³ Asrat, *ibid.*, 316 - 319

¹²⁴ “General Samora Yunus, *The FDRE Armed Forces; from where to where?* የኢ.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ መከላከያ ሠራዊት ከየት ወዴት? ጄኔራል ሳሞራ ዮሴፍ, <<የአገር መከላከያ ሠራዊት ተዋጽኦ እንደ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት መቀመጫ የሚከፋፈል አይደለም>> ጄኔራል ሳሞራ ዮሴፍ,” <http://www.satenaw.com/amharic/archives/4748>, February 18, 2015

order to inculcate the principles of revolutionary democracy, developmentalism, and self-determination from EPRDF's book.”¹²⁵

The effect of the indoctrination process is usually seen in the comments military officials give. At the wake the TPLF split high level generals gave their support to the winning side publicly.¹²⁶ In a recent video, the Chief of Staff, General Samora Yunus, criticized opposition parties saying “EPRDF welcomes genuine opposition groups. However, the opposition that we have now is ready to give the country’s core national interests away.”¹²⁷

Additionally, looking closer to the institutional structure of the Ethiopian armed forces, one notes that there is a discrepancy in the regulation of the internal advancement process of officer corps. On the one hand, according to article 20 (1) of the armed forces proclamation internal advancement should be based on excellence in the performance of military duties, the observance of discipline and in qualities of leadership.¹²⁸ On the other hand, the internal regulations of the armed forces reveal that advancement in the military is not done on the basis of professional performance, rather in a manner that tries to balance between diversity in the military.¹²⁹ Hence, if professionalism is not given the primacy of evaluation, the political neutrality it is difficult to attain the political neutrality of the military.

In this chapter I have discussed the formation of the existing military institution and examined the political neutrality of it. I also dealt with the ramifications of the inception of the military as a professional institution in the current nature of the military. In the USA where the

¹²⁵ Tsegaye Ararssa, “Election and the Political Class: Beyond Winning (or Losing) Elections in Ethiopia: Part IV | Addis Standard,” accessed March 2, 2016, <http://addisstandard.com/election-and-the-political-class-beyond-winning-or-losing-elections-in-ethiopia-part-iv/>. accessed March 2, 2016.

¹²⁶ Gebru Asrat, *Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia*, P. 318

¹²⁷ “General Samora Lambasts Opposition Groups for Disregarding Values of National Interests (Video) - Awramba Times,” <http://www.awrambatimes.com/?p=13031>. accessed March 11, 2016

¹²⁸ “Defence Forces Proclamation No. 27/1996.” Article, 20 (1)

¹²⁹ Dr Tsegaye Ararssa, Interview with Bezhisamint, January February 7 2016 Part 2 - YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9U_r5-_Kdc. accessed March 10, 2016

professional military is the result of isolation since the founding leaders and the society believed that a standing army is a threat to liberal freedom, the armed forces developed a professional mind that exists still, i.e. a mind that the task of the military corps is applying what the civilians decide to the extent that even war is a politics by other means.¹³⁰

On the contrary, unlike the USA experience Turkey's military developed a mind of intervention by labeling itself as the guardian of the constitutional order. Since 1923 the coming to power of the Ataturk republic the influence of the military in the political field is unhidden fact. The Turkish military is very qualified in terms of professional expertise. But not when it comes professional responsibility and professional corporateness. Through the years the military transgressed its responsibility to get involved in the country's politics through coups and through exertion of influence on the man in the office.

In Ethiopia, it is hard to separate the ruling party and the military and the officer corps. Beginning from the transitional period at the wake of the defeat of the brutal regime Derg, the TPLF/EPRDF decided to constitute the defence force from the one-time rebel fighters. Still now the military leaders and the government leaders are the previous independence war brothers. The presumed lack of neutrality was tasted in various occurrences. One is at the party crisis that happened in 2001 which ultimately led to the split of leading party personnel. The effect of this split was felt in the military institution too because there was a measure taken by the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to dismiss the respected Chief of Defence Staff, Lt.-General Tsadkan Gebre Tinsae. It is clear the military was subordinate to the wishes of the civilian leader yet, interestingly, the fact that the commander in chief exploited this subordination to the continuation of its influence in the military through appointing new Chief of Staff and performing the ritual of indoctrination to

¹³⁰ John C. Yoo, "The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers," *California Law Review* 84, no. 2 (1996): 167–305

get the support of the officer corps made the armed forces lack the needed professional quality, political neutrality.

Chapter Three:

Civilian Supremacy Over the Military

This chapter will deal with the second challenge selected for this thesis, i. e, civilian supremacy over the military. As I have noted in chapter one civilian supremacy over the military refers to the power of the elected leader to exercise the right of initiate, define and pass the policies of the defence forces. This policy includes defining the strategic goals, to determine the deployment of the armed forces, decide the budget, and resource levels, and undertake monitoring (audit), evaluation, and review of defense policy, structures, and performance.¹³¹ In this chapter I will look into the role of the parliament and the executive in the task of oversight. In addition to that, I will investigate the effect of having a broader mission for the armed forces in the realizing civilian supremacy over the military. In this thesis the author takes the administration of budget system in the military institution as an illustration to the idea civilian supremacy over the military.

3.1 The Role of the Parliament

In countries where constitutionalism prevails parliamentarians enjoy the opportunity to advise or otherwise convey their opinions to the executive branch through their debate, vote and monitoring of the implementation of the policies they have passed.¹³² The democratically elected parliamentarians play the role of ensuring civilian supremacy in the way of controlling (when they engage in formulating defense and budget legislation, and passing related policies) and oversighting function (when they monitor the implementation of these policies and legislations).¹³³

¹³¹ Eboe Hutchful “Bringing the Military and Security Agencies under Democratic Control,” in Okon Akiba, ed. *Constitutionalism and Society in Africa* (England, USA: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004), P. 123

¹³² Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas* (Princeton University Press, 2012), P. 29

¹³³ Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, “Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons.,” in Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott Tollefson (eds.) *Who Guards the Guardians and How*, (United States: University of Texas Press, 2006), P. 34.

“A vigorous parliament is a key requirement (or indicator) of democratic civil-military relations. Parliament has a critical role of laying down the legal framework of civil-military relations.”¹³⁴ The participation of the legislature is also important in enhancing the accountability, quality, transparency and legitimacy of policies of civil military relationship.¹³⁵

Different factors determine the role of the parliament in the task of oversight over the military. First and foremost, the existence of a legal framework that enables this process effectively is important. In Ethiopia for instance, the constitution puts the most important decision in the institution of the military, declaration of war, as the task of the parliament upon on the proposal of the council of ministers. Article 55 (9) of the FDRE constitution reads as:

*On the basis of a draft law submitted to it by the Council of Ministers it shall proclaim a state of war.*¹³⁶

Similarly, the US Constitution, in its article one, section eight gives the task of determining war as the task of the congress.¹³⁷ And in line with article 87 and 92 of the Turkish constitution declaration of war is the task of the Grand National Assembly (which is the legislative body of the republic).¹³⁸ Joseph Story clarifies that “the power is far more safe in the hands of congress than of the executive; since otherwise the most summary and severe punishments might be inflicted at the mere will of the executive.”¹³⁹ Constitutionally, the involvement of the civilians in the task of the military is guaranteed in two ways. The first way is the parliament should participate in drawing

¹³⁴ Eboe Hutchful “Bringing the Military and Security Agencies under Democratic Control,” in Okon Akiba, ed. *Constitutionalism and Society in Africa* (England, USA: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004), P. 12 pp. 127–128.

¹³⁵ Giraldo, “Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons,” 35.

¹³⁶ “The Constitution of Ethiopia,” Article. 55 (9)

¹³⁷ [The US Constitution], article 1 section 8

¹³⁸ [The Turkish Constitution], Article 87 and 92

¹³⁹ Joseph Story, *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: With a Preliminary Review of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States, Before the Adoption of the Constitution* (Hilliard, Gray, 1833), P. 418

up the basic element of the defense policy. The second is in terms of allocation of resources to defense and the oversight in the implementation of the budget.¹⁴⁰

When it comes to the regulation of the institution of the Armed forces, the Ethiopian Constitution also gives a power to the parliament. Article 55 (7) of the Constitution states that the parliament has the power to determine the organization of national defense.¹⁴¹ Besides, the parliament is empowered to play the role of supervision in cases when the officer corps infringes human rights and the nation's security and to carry out necessary measures accordingly.¹⁴² The parliament is also tasked to call and to question the Prime Minister and other federal officials and to investigate the Executive's conduct and discharge of its responsibilities, which includes the task of national defense issue.¹⁴³ The power of the parliament also extends to the regulation of the budgetary control. In accordance with article 55 (11) of the constitution, the parliament has the power to ratify the federal budget presented by the council of ministry.

In the US Constitution, article one, section eight lists the power of the Congress from which the last six paragraphs deal with the issue of national defense. This article gives the Congress the power to declare war, to raise and support the armies, to provide and maintain the Navy, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and Naval Forces, organize and arm the militias of the states, and to stipulate the criteria for converting the militias into the national armed forces.¹⁴⁴

Nonetheless, this is not the case in all the time. In Turkey, before the 2010 referendum, the Constitution used to have a provision to make immune the military leaders from. Provisional article 15 stated that "no allegation of criminal, financial or legal responsibility and shall be made nor

¹⁴⁰ Eboe Hutchful "Bringing the Military and Security Agencies under Democratic Control," in Okon Akiba, ed. *Constitutionalism and Society in Africa* (England, USA: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004), P. 12., pp. 127-128

¹⁴¹ "The Constitution of Ethiopia.", Article 55 (7)

¹⁴² Ibid., Article 55 (7)

¹⁴³ Ibid, 55 (17)

¹⁴⁴ The us constitution, Article, 1, section 8

shall an application be filed with a court for this purpose in respect of any decisions or measures whatsoever taken by The Council of National Security ...”. Following the adoption of the amendment and the repeal of this provisional article, Turkish courts began prosecuting the leaders of the Armed Forces in time of the 1980 coup in which Fifty people were executed, an estimated half a million arrested, hundreds died in jail, and many more disappeared during three years of military rule following the coup.¹⁴⁵

However, even if legal limitations on the power of the military are in place to ensure civilian supremacy, accomplishing it in practice asks for more considerations on a practical level. For instance, in Ethiopia, the Defence Force is not subjected to critical oversight mechanism from the civilians. Despite the fact that there is an allegation of widespread corruption inside, the Ethiopian military has refused to be audited on several occasions. On April 30, 2013, in its annual report to the parliament, the General Audit office deliberated that the defense institution has used incomplete documentation of receipts for three and a half Billion Ethiopian Birr. Yet, the defense forces refused to open up the accounts of the institution to the General Auditor.¹⁴⁶

The main cause for the lack critical oversight is the absence of interest and inability from the side of the parliament to effectively apply the text of the law. This inability and absence of interest of the parliament mainly stem from the lack of plurality in the Parliament. In the latest election, the ruling party EPRDF won all 100% seats in the parliament. This is a major constraint in the ability of the legislature to function as an organ tasked in the supervision of the Armed Forces as it affects the diversity of voices. The fact that the public does not get enough access to investigate

¹⁴⁵ “Turkey Puts Former Military Ruler on Trial - Al Jazeera English,” 04 Apr 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/2012440046366904.html>, accessed March 18, 2016

¹⁴⁶ Aweramba, “An Order Passed Not to Audit The Defence Forces, Which Is Struggling in a Huge Corruption, በከፍተኛ ሙስና የተዘፈቀው መከላከያ ሂሳቡ እንዳይመረመር ታዘዘ,” accessed March 12, 2016, http://justfreedomnow.blogspot.hu/2013/06/blog-post_7663.html, accessed March 12, 2016

the wrongdoings of the military via media and civil societies diminishes the public nature of parliamentary oversight.¹⁴⁷ When it comes to the supervision of Armed Forces, the Ethiopian parliament could be characterized as “laid back” institution.¹⁴⁸ A parliament that sees the malpractice of the military but cannot stop it.

Essentially, the role of the parliament in facilitating civilian supremacy derives from its power to formulate defense policies and oversight the implementation. For this two things are necessary, enabling laws and the active nature of the parliament to apply the texts of the law.

3.2 The Role of the Executive

In a democratic government, it is crucial to have a civilian control over the military be balanced between the executive and the legislative.¹⁴⁹ “The civilians who control the military and police must themselves be subjected to the democratic process.”¹⁵⁰ However, this assertion is not backed by all scholars. Samuel Huntington believes this balanced approach driven by the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances is a “real constitutional stumbling block” to the objective civilian control over the military for the reason that the military is accountable to two institutions.¹⁵¹

In the USA, as a Presidential system of government, the commander in chief of the nation is the President. Article 2 Section II declares that “The President shall be Commander in Chief of

¹⁴⁷ “World Report 2015: Ethiopia,” *Human Rights Watch*, January 9, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/ethiopia>.

¹⁴⁸ Talking about the Military as an institution in Africa generally, in relation to their differences in the nature and extent of their constitutional role and powers, as well as their inclination to exercise those powers in terms of political will and muscle, *Hutchful* classifies them into three groups, these are, ‘activist’, ‘moderate’ and ‘laid back’. Eboe Hutchful “Bringing the Military and Security Agencies under Democratic Control,” in Okon Akiba, ed. *Constitutionalism and Society in Africa* (England, USA: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004), P. 128

¹⁴⁹ Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas* (Princeton University Press, 2012). P. 29

¹⁵⁰ Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, (Yale University Press, 1991), P. 245

¹⁵¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard University Press, 1957), P. 191

the Army and Navy of the United States”¹⁵² Similarly, the Ethiopian constitution in the article makes the Prime Minister the commander in chief of the national armed forces.¹⁵³ According to article 77 sub article 3, the council of ministers is responsible for both the drawing and the implementation of the budget upon approval of the parliament/ house of representatives. In line with article 72 (2) of the constitution, the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers are responsible to the House of Peoples’ Representatives. In the exercise of State functions, members of the Council of Ministers are collectively responsible for all decisions they make as a body. Budgetary oversight is part of the power of the parliament to call ministers and question the implementation of the budget. The role of the executive also extends to the formulation of policies in a government capacity. Because it is the executive that frames the budget in the first place.¹⁵⁴

In times, the legal framework might not be enabling for the civilians. The turkey constitution establishes a National Security Council, a mixed civilian-military body weighted in favor of the officers, that advice the Council of Ministers in issues of with regard to the formulation, determination, and implementation of the national security policy of the State in which military corps are part of it.¹⁵⁵ The origin of this body goes back to the 1961 Constitution, and its status and power was strengthened by the 1971 and 1982 Constitutions which are adopted under the influence of the military.¹⁵⁶ In the 1961 Constitution civilians dominated the composition of the National Security Council. Whereas, the 1982 Constitution equalized the civilians and the military in the council. However, the power of Council was strengthened in the in adding wordings that instruct

¹⁵² The US constitution, Article 2 section II

¹⁵³ “Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1/1995” (Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1st Year No. 1, Addis Ababa, August 21, 1995), Article. 74 (1)

¹⁵⁴ Budgeting for the military sector in Africa

¹⁵⁵ The Turkish Constitution, Article. 118

¹⁵⁶ Ergun Özbudun, “Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004,” *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 2 (June 1, 2007), P. 193

the Council of Ministers to give priority to the decisions of the National Security Council.¹⁵⁷ In military invaded Iraq in the mid-1997 and prosecuted the war against the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) without informing the government.¹⁵⁸

In 2001, through a constitutional amendment that is still in force, civilians are given an advantage by adding the deputy Prime Minister into the composition of the Council. The wording of the effect of the decisions of the Council was changed from "The Council of Ministers *shall give priority consideration* to the decisions of the National Security Council..."¹⁵⁹ to less morally discharged expression; "The Council of Ministers shall *evaluate* decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society."¹⁶⁰

Beyond the legal framework, the role of the military is also determined by the party politics. This can be illustrated by the experience of the Ethiopian ruling party EPRDF. As discussed above the, in the previous chapter, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had exerted control over the military. But, after his sudden death, the ruling party is left without an influential figure causing the lack of proper control of the civilians/the ruling party over the military.

3.3 The Effect of Diverse Missions

Another contributing factor for the lack of civilian supremacy in the Ethiopian military institution is the diversified mission of the armed forces inside and outside the country. The armed

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Steven A. Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (JHU Press, 2007), P. 25.

¹⁵⁹ Ergun Özbudun, "Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004," *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 2 (June 1, 2007), P.

193

¹⁶⁰ The Turkish Constitution, Article 118

forces have missions that make the task of the parliament very difficult. At the moment, the mission of the military in Ethiopia can be summarized as

1. Guarding the border, especially contested borders, in the Eritrean side of the country
2. Undertakes military actions against rebel groups inside the country that are struggling the government.
3. Participates in international peacekeeping missions. (The Ethiopian military has been participating in peacekeeping mission in different parts of Africa including Library, Burundi, and presently it has deployed its soldiers in Sudan/South Sudan and Somalia.)
4. Involves in various economic activities.

The missions of the armed forces are extended to economic development through instrumentalization the law. The proclamation to give definition and power to the federal executive organs of the country mentions that one of the duties of the ministry of defense is to facilitate the participation of defense forces in the country's development activities in times of peace.¹⁶¹ It is very interesting to observe that the power the Ministry of National Defense extends to the level of having membership position in a foundation put up recently in the name of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ "Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 916/2015" (Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2015).

¹⁶² "Meles Foundation Establishment Proclamation No. 781/2013", Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 19th Year No. 24 Addis Ababa 25th January 2013, Article 8 (1(b))

Furthermore, the council of ministers has established an economic corporation called The Metals and Engineering Corporation (METEC) to the Ministry of National Defence.¹⁶³ Through this corporation, the defense forces directly involve in the economic activities of the country. According to its website, the aim of the corporation is to become part of the country's aspiration of realization of a middle-income country broadening the mission of the military to economic interests.¹⁶⁴ Currently, METEC is composed of 15 manufacturing companies operating in more than nine different sectors.¹⁶⁵

These diversified missions of the armed forces make the task of the parliament and the executive wide and difficult to manage. The fact that the military is involved in these missions gives the civilians a difficult task to handle the oversight of the institution effectively and establish a supreme civilian rule. The portrayal of the military institution as an institution that will champion poverty and lead the country to a middle income nation is giving the military a responsibility that is not in the nature of its profession. Whenever the military advances its economic empire and gains more bargaining power the challenge of attaining civilian supremacy is at greater risk.

¹⁶³ *Metals and Engineering Corporation Establishment Council of Ministers Regulation No. 183/2010*, Federal Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 16th year no. 30, Addis Ababa, 9th June 2010, Article 10 (2)

¹⁶⁴ "About US," <http://www.metec.gov.et/index.php/en/about-us>, accessed March 20, 2016

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

Chapter Four:

Conclusion: Recommendation for the Future

The Ethiopian Constitution provides for a system where the power of the government is limited, a system of constitutionalism. Nevertheless, in practice, the constitutional provisions are violated in various restrictive law, repression of human rights and a hegemonic control of the ruling party over the country's institutions. One of the main factors that results in the lack of constitutionalism is the defective civil-military relationship existing in the country. The Ethiopian civil-military relationship is characterized by its partisan nature, the inability of the civilians to effectuate control over the military and a military institution that involves in what should be the business of the civilians.

In this thesis, I have focused on two principal challenges to build effective civil-military relationship, political neutrality of the military and civilian supremacy over the military. As the experience of the USA demonstrates building a neutral military takes more than rules in legal system. Civil-military relationship and constitutionalism has a two-way relationship. Without effective civil-military relationship it is difficult to attain constitutionalism and, without constitutionalism it is impossible to get the desired civil-military relation.

Contrary to Samuel Huntington's assertion, in the Ethiopian context, I believe there needs to be a firm belief in liberal and democratic ideas in the society generally and in the country's elites specifically. It is this belief that the appetite to control the military, to limit its focus on securing the national interest against external threats, to make it neutral in a political matter, to make it accountable in a time of misdeeds, to make it a response to the policies the civilians pass, ascends.

In relation to the second challenge attaining civilian supremacy over the military, I have discussed three issues that determine the process. Firstly, there must be an active parliament that sets the policies for the function of the military and oversees how those policies are executed. In Ethiopia, where the parliament is controlled by one party with 100% seats, the function of oversight over the military is hardly practiced. This is illustrated in the budgetary control where the parliament heard a report of the General Audit that the military has misused over 3 Billion Ethiopian birr, yet did not do anything. Secondly, the role of the executive is also curtailed by the lack of power to influence the military. This situation can be contrasted with the Turkish military, where it is considered as the guardian of the constitutional system, and exerts its own power. After the death of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi the power of the executive to instruct the military is at risk with the continuous uncertain power balance inside the ruling party. Thirdly, the growing economic power of the Ethiopian armed forces exacerbates the challenge of the civilians to supremely control the military. The portrayal of the military institution as an institution that will champion poverty and lead the country to a middle income nation is giving the military a responsibility that is not in the nature of its profession. Whenever the military advances its economic empire and gains more bargaining power the challenge of attaining civilian supremacy is at greater risk.

Hereinbelow I will give a short outline on what practical steps should be taken to reach to a better civil-military relationship generally having in mind the two challenges picked for this thesis, supremacy of the civilian over the military and political neutrality of the military specifically.

Transform the military professionalism

The first measure that should be taken to achieve civilian supremacy is *transforming the military professionalism*. Transforming the military professionalism requires defining the qualifications needed for membership in the armed forces (i.e. requiring training for membership), modifying the system for promotion (especially the selection of high-level military leadership should be based on professional merits), controlling the organization of military training (this measure needs cautious application so as not to affect the autonomy of the military establishment), and finally changing the quality of life of the military corps by paying good salaries, pensions and benefits.¹⁶⁶ Having a professional military corps is the first step in tackling the challenge of political neutrality.

4.1.2 Civilian Oversight over the Military

The civilians use different mechanisms to look after the armed forces and to surrender the institution of the military to the democratic governance. One is legislative involvement in issues that concern the military. The parliament lays down the *framework of the civil-military relations, reviews and approves the defense policies, budgets and oversees the military spending, procurement, operation, and deployment*.¹⁶⁷ The legislative should be given the power to call executives responsible and military official when discussing issues related to the establishment of

¹⁶⁶Narcis Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces*, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2010, As Translated by Peter Bush, PP, 84-89, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman: (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), P.252

¹⁶⁷Eboe Hutchful "Bringing the Military and Security Agencies under Democratic Control," in Okon Akiba, ed. *Constitutionalism and Society in Africa* (England, USA: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004), P. 123

the military.¹⁶⁸ The legislative also involves in the appointment of the most senior military officers and approves the government decision to go to war.¹⁶⁹

In a democratic system the power of the defense minister is to provide and advise on military policies, however, the ultimate power rests with the parliament.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, this is not to mean that the ministry of defense must be weak to the extent that it only serves a ceremonial value to the structure.¹⁷¹ The minister of defense receives professional military advice from the military corps and implements the national decisions that affect the same institution.¹⁷²

As mentioned above, budgetary control is an effective mechanism to bring the military under the civilian control. It is also important to open up the military institution to journalists and civil societies and public opinion in a way that does not affect the national interest of the country.¹⁷³

Eliminating the role of the military in domestic missions and in the economy of the country

The mission of the military should be crafted having in mind the external threats a country faces.¹⁷⁴ The only legitimate internal mission for the military is to provide relief after natural disasters.¹⁷⁵ The military's involvement in economic sector distracts the attention from their primary mission creates conditions for corruption, and harm to the professionalism.¹⁷⁶ Huntington suggests that it is important to get the military establishment as far as possible from capital cities

¹⁶⁸ Zoltan Barany, *Reforming Defense: Lessons for Arab Republics*, 2013, P. 52

¹⁶⁹ Dennis Blair, *Military Engagement; Influencing armed forces worldwide to support democratic transitions Volume I overview and action plan*, (Brooking Institution Press, Washington, D.C, 2013), P.18

¹⁷⁰ Blair, *ibid*, P.23

¹⁷¹ Eboe Hutchful "Bringing the Military and Security Agencies under Democratic Control," in Okon Akiba, ed. *Constitutionalism and Society in Africa* (England, USA: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004), P. 130

¹⁷² Blair, *Military Engagement; Influencing armed forces worldwide to support democratic transitions*, 2013, P.23

¹⁷³ Samuel Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6, no. 4, October 1995, P. 12

¹⁷⁴ Huntington, *Ibid*, 1995), pp. 9–17

¹⁷⁵ Zoltan Barany, *Reforming Defense: Lessons for Arab Republics*, 2013, P. 50

¹⁷⁶ Barany, *Ibid*, 2013, P. 51

because their role is protecting the borders.¹⁷⁷In the same way, it is also important to restructure the armed forces, reduction in size, in a way that shows the level of external threat a country faces.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman: (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), P. 252

¹⁷⁸Samuel Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations", in Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner (eds.), *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, (John Hopkins Press, London, 1996), P. 6

Bibliography

Books

- Agüero, Felipe. *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.
- Akiba, Okon, ed. “Bringing the Military and Security Agencies under Democratic Control.” In *Constitutionalism and Society in Africa*, 121–40. England, USA: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004.
- Aregawi Berhe. “The Origin of the Tigrean Liberation Front.” *African Affairs* Vol. 103, no. No. 413 (October 2004): pp. 569–59.
- Barany, Zoltan. *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*. Princeton University Press, 2012.
- Berhe, Aregawi. *A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front*. Los Angeles, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2009.
- Birand, Mehmet Ali. *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces*. Palgrave Macmillan, 1991.
- Blair Dennis, *Military Engagement; Influencing armed forces worldwide to support democratic transitions Volume I overview and action plan*, (Brooking Institution Press, Washington, D.C, 2013
- Cook, Steven A. *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*. JHU Press, 2007.
- Dahl, Robert A. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New edition edition. Yale University Press, 1991.
- De Montesquieu, “*The spirit of laws*”. (Cosimo, Inc., 2011)
- Diamond Larry and Mark F. Plattner (eds.), *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, (John Hopkins Press, London, 1996)
- Elster Jon and Slagstad Rune (eds.) *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, 1993
- Gebru Asrat. *Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia (ሉዓላዊነትና ዴሞክራሲ)*. 4th ed., 2014.
- Gürsoy, Yaprak. “The Changing Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: Democratization through Coup Plots?” *Democratization* 19, no. 4 August 1, 2012: 735–60. doi:10.1080/13510347.2011.623352.

- Hale, William M. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. Psychology Press, 1994.
- Heper, Metin. "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?" *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 241–52. doi:10.1080/14683849.2011.572631.
- Hatachard John, et al, *Comparative constitutionalism and good governance in the commonwealth: An Eastern and southern African perspective*, Cambridge University Press, 2004,
- Houngnikpo, Dr Mathurin C. *Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Harvard University Press, 1957.
- _____ Samuel P, "*The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*", (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)
- Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. New York: Free Press, 1971.
- Jr, Arthur A. Ekirch. *The Civilian and the Military: A History of the American Antimilitarist Tradition*. Independent Institute, 2010.
- "Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons." In *Who Guards the Guardians and How*, 34–70. United States: University of Texas Press, 2006.
- McIlwain Charles Howard, "*Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern*", Liberty Fund, INC., 2007
First published in 1940 by Cornell University Press,
- Mollers Christoph, "*The Three Branches: A comparative model of \separation of Powers*", Oxford University Press, 2013,
- Murphy, Walter F. Constitution, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in Douglas Greenberg (eds.), "Constitutionalism and Democracy Transition in the contemporary world", 1993
- Nino Carlos, "*The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy*", 1996
- Onyango J. Oloka –(ed), "*Constitutionalism in Africa: creating opportunities, Facing Challenges*", Kampala, Fountain Publication, 2001
- Sajo Andras, "*Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism*", Central European University Press, Budapest, 1999
- Sarkesian, Sam, and Robert Connor. *The US Military Profession Into the 21st Century: War, Peace and Politics*. Routledge, 2006.

- Schiff, Rebecca L., *The Military and Domestic Politics: A concordance theory of civil–military relations*, Routledge, USA and Canada, 2009
- Story, Joseph. *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: With a Preliminary Review of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States, Before the Adoption of the Constitution*. Hilliard, Gray, 1833.
- Usul, Ali Resul. *Democracy in Turkey: The Impact of EU Political Conditionality*. Routledge, 2010.
- Vile, M. J. C., “*Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers*”, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967
- Sadurski Wojciech (ed.), “*Constitutional Theory*”, In *The International Library of Essays in Laws & Legal Theory, second series*”, 2005
- Watson, Cynthia A. *Military Education: A Reference Handbook*. Praeger, 2007.
- Wormuth, Francis Dunham. “*The origins of modern constitutionalism*” New York: Harper, 1949
- Zewde, Bahru. *A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1855 - 1991*. Second Edition. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2002.

Journal Articles

- Mazur, Allan, Julie Mazur, and Caroline Keating. “Military Rank Attainment of a West Point Class: Effects of Cadets’ Physical Features.” *American Journal of Sociology* 90, no. 1 (1984): 125–50.
- Milkias, Paulos. “Ethiopia, the TPLF, and the Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor.” *Northeast African Studies* 10, no. 2 (2003): 13–66.
- Özbudun, Ergun. “Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004.” *Turkish Studies* 8, no. 2 (June 1, 2007)
- Sarigil, Zeki. “The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent?” *Armed Forces & Society*, April 9, 2012
- Tadesse, Medhane, and John Young. “TPLF: Reform or Decline?” *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 97 (September 1, 2003): 389–403
- “The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey - Turkish Studies - Volume 6, Issue 2.”
- Wallensteen, Peter, and Karin Axell. “Armed Conflict at the End of the Cold War, 1989-92.” *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 3 (1993): 331–46.

Yoo, John C. “The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers.” *California Law Review* 84, no. 2 (1996)

Websites

Ararssa, Tsegaye. “Election and the Political Class: Beyond Winning (or Losing) Elections in Ethiopia: Part IV | Addis Standard.” Accessed March 2, 2016. <http://addisstandard.com/election-and-the-political-class-beyond-winning-or-losing-elections-in-ethiopia-part-iv/>.

———. “Elections in Ethiopia: Beyond Winning (and Losing) | Addis Standard.” Accessed March 2, 2016. <http://addisstandard.com/elections-in-ethiopia-beyond-winning-and-losing-2/>.

Avenue, Human Rights Watch | 350 Fifth, 34th Floor | New York, and NY 10118-3299 USA | t 1.212.290.4700. “World Report 2015: Ethiopia.” *Human Rights Watch*, January 9, 2015. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/ethiopia>.

“Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa.” Accessed March 19, 2016. <https://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Books/Dismissed.html>.

“General Samora Lambasts Opposition Groups for Disregarding Values of National Interests (Video) - Awramba Times.” Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://www.awrambatimes.com/?p=13031>.

“Turkey Puts Former Military Ruler on Trial - Al Jazeera English.” Accessed March 28, 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/2012440046366904.html>.

“የኢ.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ መከላከያ ሠራዊት ከየት ወዴት? ጄኔራል ሳሞራ የኑሲ, <<የአገር መከላከያ ሠራዊት ተዋጽኦ እንደ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት መቀመጫ የሚከፋፈል አይደለም>> ጄኔራል ሳሞራ የኑሲ,” February 18, 2015. <http://www.satenaw.com/amharic/archives/4748>.