REVISITING THREAT-BASED AND RISK-BASED SECURITY LOGICS TO ANALYZE CONTEMPORARY CLIMATE SECURITY DISCOURSE IN THE U.S.

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Abstract

During President Barack Obama administration climate change is increasingly being pondered as a matter of national security in the U.S. On the one hand, many scholars within Security Studies articulate this move as securitization that leads to militarization of the environmental sector. On the other hand, recent studies argue that climate securitization might bring various cooperation strategies forward. In making apparent the main assumptions therein, the thesis elucidates that these debates accept supremacy of securitization framework to study climate security discourse. However, diversity in actions called to tackle climate change is due to 'threat-based' and 'risk-based' security logics which could be observed in contemporary climate security debate. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is as follows: (i) to situate characteristics of these security logics, and (ii) set the boundaries of a complementary approach to securitization by critical reading of the literature. Ultimately, this thesis discursively investigates through which logics and with what effects that current climate security discourse operates in the U.S. This analysis is essential as it can assist better understanding implications attached to actions driven by moving climate change into national security agenda, and generating appropriate responses to climate change. The findings of this study illustrate that, contrary to prevailing arguments of climate securitization, climate change debate in the U.S. functions through risk-security logic. Therefore, climate change is not securitized, and that politico-military establishments cooperate to adopt, mitigate or prevent climate-induced catastrophes. Nonetheless, non-securitization of the climate security debate is not impeccable: climate security discourse points at possibility of new implications arising due to uneven distribution of precautionary strategies.

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INTRODUCTION

"We never have 100 percent certainty. If you wait until you have 100 percent certainty on climate change, something bad is going to happen in battlefield."

General Gordon Sullivan, Retired United States Army General

The 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy report warns of accelerating impacts of climate change on wellbeing of human kind and survival of state.¹ Likewise, the U.S. Military Advisory Board's recent report goes into significant detail to distinguish security risks associated with climate change and refers this phenomenon as a major conflict catalyst.² What these developments indicate is climate change has already made its way up to top-notch national security agenda in the U.S.

However, the scholarship on environment and security highlights a rigorous discussion on the value of making climate change as a part of national security scheme. On the one hand, researchers, such as Hugh Dyer, Michael Thomson, Norman Myers, and Richard Ullman, contest the strategic research's focus on maintaining a restrictive definition of security, and signpost environment as the "ultimate security" matter.³ On the other hand, referring

² CNA Military Advisory Board, "National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change," (Alexandria, VA: CNA, May 2014), i. <u>https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/MAB_5-8-14.pdf</u>.

¹ The White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States," (Washington, USA: White House, February 2015), 7. <u>http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf.</u>

³ Dyer, "Theoretical Aspects of Environmental Security," in *Responding to Environmental Conflicts: Implications for Theory and Practice*, ed. Ellieen Petzold Bradley (The Netherlands: Dordrecht, 2001).;Thompson, "Security and Solidarity: An Anti-Reductionist Analysis of Environmental Policy," in *Living with Nature: Environmental Politics as Cultural Discourse*, ed. Hajer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).; Myers, "Environmental Dimensions to Security Issues," *The Environmentalist* 6, no. 4 (1986).; Ulman, "Redefining Security," *International Security* 8, no. 1 (1983).

"environmental determinism" that might be hidden in environmental scarcity⁴ and climate conflicts⁵ hypothesizes; scholars, such as Daniel Duedney, Gwynne Dyer and Norman Myers, suggest that climate change research should be confined to sustainability studies.⁶ The major reason behind such antagonistic view on inclusion of this non-traditional sector into security debate is that the strategic language embedded in climate conflicts and the internal logic of military establishment might invoke paramilitary responses to environmental and climatic problems. In that sense, climate security discourse is being criticized for it may bequeath an unprecedented role to military in environmental problem solving.

When approaching this problem, nevertheless, caution is necessary as it would be inaccurate to assume that speaking of climate change as a security issue inevitably translates itself into militarization of the contemporary climate discourse. On the contrary, there are number of cases where climatic and environmental problems exist, but the tensions between states are prevented. In other words, although linking climate change to national security scheme may reproduce defensive security programs, it also has a great potential for establishing a congruous relationship between politics and military in order to adopt, mitigate or prevent climate-induced catastrophes.

Moreover, the analysis of existing security perspectives to environment and climate change, namely ecological security, human security, environmental violence and national security approaches, reveals that different actions are prompted in response to environmental problems.

⁴ Thomas Homer Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity and Violence* (New Jersey, USA: Princton University Press, 1994-1999).

⁵ Gwynne Dyer, *Climate Wars: How Peak Oil and Climate War Will Change Canada* (Kindle Edition2011).

⁶ Daniel Duedney, ed. *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics* (Albany, USA: Suny Press, 1999).; Duedney, "Environmental Security: A Critique," in *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics*, ed. Matthew (Albany, U.S.: Suny Press, 1999).; Myers, "Environmental Dimensions to Security Issues."; *Environmental Security: What Is New and Different?* (University of Peace2002).

This diversity in responding climate change indicates, firstly, there might be distinctive logics of security thinking that are leading climate security discourse. Hence, secondly, the nature of actions to tackle with climate change depends on how climatic problems are framed. Taken these disputes over value of making climate a national security problem in consideration, thus, this thesis aims to provide an analytical framework that could address the following questions: (i) How can we analyze the construction of contemporary climate change discourse as a national security issue? (ii) Is climate change securitized to call emergency measures (threat-based security logic) or is it constructed within normal politics to bring about adaptation, planning and management strategies forward (risk-based security logic)? (iii) What might be possible implications attached to strategies called to tackle with climate change when the discourse operates through threat and/or risk-based security logics?

One of the leading approaches to examine climate security discourse as a socially constructed process is called "securitization."⁷ The term securitization, originally introduced to literature by Copenhagen Scholars (CS), refers to a state of urgency in which issues are constructed as "existential threats and moved outside of normal politics." In this way, "emergency measures are called in their response."⁸ Here, the emergency measures are often signposted as military involvement, attuning the term with a sense of negativity. The terms securitization and militarization, thenceforward, are used as if they are interchangeable. However, as noted, threats posed by climate change are not always countered through negative means in a highly de-politicized space. In other words, securitization framework cannot assist to explain efforts to encounter climate change induced perils that are occurring within the realm of normal politics.

⁷ Buzan, Security: New Framework (London: Lynne Reinner, 1998).

⁸ Ibid., 24-29.

To overcome the above-mentioned explanatory problem of securitization framework, Maria Julia Trombetta recently contextualized the notion of securitization and argued that the meaning of emergency measures were transformed to comprise politicized solutions for threats posed by environmental problems.⁹ But, does that mean politicization of the discourse in the context of climate change is exempted from challenges? The securitization as a positive concept renders the value of de-securitization whereby leaves the new precautionary measures unquestioned. In that sense, this thesis highlights a problem in theorization of the contemporary climate security discourse, a problem with an insufficient explanation of the discourse.

In sum, it will be hypothesized in this thesis that, firstly, climate security discourse does not necessarily call for paramilitary responses, as it would be foreseen by original rhetoric of the securitization. Secondly, climate securitization as a positive conception falls short to explain new implications that might be attached to non-emergency measures. Olaf Corry's recent study highlights that non-emergency measures could be explained through a framework named "riskification."¹⁰ Corry's framework offers an alternative method of thinking climatic dangers as risks that ultimately affects how they are being tackled, but there is still ambiguity surrounding new implications that might arise when climate security discourse is based on risklogic. This limitation of the riskification framework hence is addressed by adding a new criterion namely 'balanced distribution of precautionary actions' to the thesis' theoretical structure.

Furthermore, in order to achieve the major objective of this thesis, which is to provide a framework inclusive enough to explain climate security discourse and implications of nonemergency means, a differentiated approach is advocated here. Accordingly, characteristics of

⁹ Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21, no. 4 (2008).

¹⁰ Corry, "Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 40, no. 2 (2012).

two distinctive logics of security are established: (i) 'threat-based' security that is grounded on exceptional politics and (ii) 'risk-based' security that favors preemptive sustainable practices to tackle with climate change. The threat-based security logic entwined into securitization assists evaluating whether climate change debate is being moved outside of normal politics to activate paramilitary responses or not, whereas the risk-security logic helps examining whether precautionary strategies were distributed evenly in the climate security discourse or not. Consequently, this study's main contribution to the literature is its theoretical framework that combines existing research on environmental and climate security to comprehensively investigate whether, how and with what implications climate change discourse is constructed as a national security matter in the U.S.

In addition, the focus of this study, diverse security logics observed in speech acts to form a climate security discourse, is a new area of research. Accordingly, the scholarly works on this subject have not been as widespread as other areas of research on non-traditional security sectors such as migration. Hence, the analysis of different security logics incorporated in speech acts and reports presented by politico-military elites in the U.S. provides a valuable empirical content and snapshot of how the utmost predisposition of contemporary climate security discourse currently emerges. The reason for the focus on military and state actors is that they traditionally possess a right to speak about climate change in the language of security.

Furthermore, both the emphasis on climate security discourse in the U.S and the choice of timeframe are deliberate decisions. First and foremost, the U.S. is the primary case in which climate change has been progressively labeled as a national security issue during Obama administration. It is the world's second largest carbon dioxide emitter, which makes it a key actor in climate change debate. ¹¹ Relevant to this point, the U.S. openly states its ambition to guide global climate security policies. Moreover, since 1980s the North American continent has seen an unprecedented "increase in all types of climatic events– tropical cyclone, thunderstorm, winter storm, tornado, drought and flood" (see Figure 1 in Appendix 1).¹² This upward trend in frequency of climatic catastrophes is also expected to continue in the following decades, which indicates that climate security discourse will also intensify in upcoming years in the U.S.

The above-mentioned factors suggest that how the U.S. tackles with climate change would likely to have worldwide impacts. Therefore, it is imperative to examine how the U.S. has been constructing climate change as a national security matter and/or evaluate what measures that have been prompted in response to climate change thus far. Most importantly, the climate security debate in the U.S. provides a case where theoretical assumptions of this thesis could be thoroughly examined since a number of speeches and reports have been released in succession during Obama administration in which climate change has defined both as 'threat' and 'risk' to the U.S. national security.

Undoubtedly, many states are concerned with climate security and are threatened by climatic calamities. Nevertheless, only recently, following footsteps of the U.S., they begun to contemplate incorporating climate change in their national security strategies.¹³ As a result, there are not many official and unofficial documents available to assists the analysis of security

¹¹ Jos G.J Oliver, "Trends in Global Co2 Emissions 2015 Report," *European Comission and PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency* (2015): 11.

¹² MunichRE, "Severe Weather in North America: Perils, Risks, Insurance," (Germany: Munich Re, 2012).

¹³ A recent report by Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) illustrates how the U.S. sets an example for states to move climate change into their national agenda in recent years. See for example, Narula, "India's National Security Strategy: The Importance of Integrating Climate Change," *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies* (2015). Available online at: <u>http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/indias-national-security-strategy-the-importance-of-integrating-climate-change-4935.html</u>. [Accessed on 29 May 2016].

logics in different climate security discourse around the world. In many occasions, accessibility to military documents also prevents further examination of the climate security discourse. For example, although China could have been a good case to study as it is already confronting by climate related perils; information about its military's approach to climate change is immensely restricted. Due to limitations in time, space, relevance and availability of resources, hence, the scope of this project is confined to climate security discourse in the U.S.

Lastly, as ultimately I aim to interpret speech acts, this study cannot be freed from an ethical concern attached qualitative discourse analysis, namely subjectivity of a researcher.¹⁴ I aim to minimize limitations that might be related to my subjectivity by succinctly presenting set of rules that would be used as a template to analyze data as well as by emphasizing my expectations on the study subject.

The thesis is presented in three chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview for the emergence of environmental and climate security discourses. The diverse environmental security perspectives and constructivist take on security will be discussed in this chapter to highlight that the climate security discourse might not operate through existential threat-based securitization framework. In chapter 2, the notion of climate securitization will be critically evaluated. Next, an alternative to securitization, risk-security approach will be introduced and discussed. The chapter 3 will display the analytical framework and methodology for analyzing climate security discourse in the U.S. Moreover, in this chapter, what constitutes threat-based security frame and risk-based security frame will be settled and the case specific research objectives and questions will be restated. The final chapter 4 begins with a brief historical summary of the climate change debate in the U.S. Subsequently, assumptions made within the critical review of literature and/or speech acts performed in politico-military echelons will be

¹⁴ Alan Brymann, *Social Research Methods* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

analyzed. The thesis will conclude with an overview of the research objectives and findings, and recommendations on ways to develop research on contemporary climate security discourse.

Chapter 1

Theorization of Environmental and Climate Security

1.1 Environmental and Climate security Debates: Rising Dilemmas?

Security, in its rudimentary form, refers to a state of being safeguarded from harm. It aims to reduce "risk of something bad happening to an entity that is valued."¹⁵ Thus, it is not startling that the concept of security has also been stretched to include environmental problems causing insecurity. However, environmental security discourse is now transforming into "climate security discussions as the focus shifts to global warming and the effects it may have in coming decades." ¹⁶ Notedly, the doom-laden expressions of climate-induced problems, such as "millions of climate refugees, resource scarcities and environmental conflicts," have facilitated political discussions in recent years.¹⁷ As a result of these developments, climate security terminology is now pervasive in national security strategies of states and leading environmental organizations across the globe. These attempts to make climate change a security issue in order to call attention of policy makers, nevertheless, have been challenged by many scholars.

Specifically, military agencies' interest in climate security debate has fostered a conception of "climate securitization."¹⁸ Hence, climate change is expected to be a new *casus belli* for

¹⁵ Jon Barnett, "Environemental Security," in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Collins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 183.

¹⁶ Simon Dalby, "Climate Change and Environmental Security," in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Williams (New York: Routledge, 2013), 313.

¹⁷ Ibid., 312.

¹⁸Scott Shirley, "The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close Have We Come and Would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficienty of Global Climate Change Policy," *Review of European Community and International Environmental Law* 21, no. 3 (2012).

military intervention.¹⁹ This debate was grounded on CS securitization theory, which indicates that imposing military focus on 'non-traditional sectors' could result in de-politicization and accelerate emergency measures.²⁰ In that sense, securitization has been related to militarization. In contrast, recent studies on climate securitization discussion pointed out that the meaning of security could alter when applied to climate change discourse so that climate securitization does not necessarily bring about emergency measures and/or de-politicization of the debate.²¹ Does that mean climate security debate is now relieved from negative effects typically associated with securitization such as militarization of the environmental sector?

The post-structuralist accounts on climate securitization demonstrate that politicization of the climate security discourse might not prevent negative outcomes of securitization.²² In particular, reimbursing risks management strategies from security's confrontational tint might not always be the case. The analysis of the practices of security, for instance, indicates that defining an issue as risk is a method of "legitimizing preemptive measures"²³ and "technologies of power"²⁴ that are frequently utilized by practitioners of security institutions in everyday life.

¹⁹ Mary Ann Manahan, "In Deep Water: Confronting the Climate and Water Crises," in *The Secure and the Disposed: How the Military and Cooperations Are Shaping a Climate Changed World*, ed. Hayes (2015), 195.

²⁰ Buzan et al., *Security: New Framework*

²¹ Trombetta, "Rethinking the Securitization of the Environment: Old Beliefs, New Insights," in *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Disssolve*, ed. Balzaq (London: Routledge, 2011).; Floyd, *Security and Environment: Securitization Theory and Us Environmental Policy* (Camridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

²² See, for example, Elbe, "Risking Lives: Aids, Security and Three Concepts of Risk.," *Secuirty Dialogue* 39, no. 2-3 (2008); Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political, Agency, Audiance and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005).; Ciuta, "Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitization Theory," *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (2009).

²³ Claudia Aradau, "Governing Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un) Knowing the Future.," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007): 100.; Stefan Elbe, "Risking Lives: Aids, Security and Three Concepts of Risk.," 180.; Micheal J. Williams, "(in)Security Studies, Reflexive Modernization and the Risk Society," *Cooperation and Conflict* 43, no. 1 (2008): 73. For an in depth overview on this point also see, Yee Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management: Strategy and Conflict in an Age of Globalised Risks* (London: Routledge, 2006).

²⁴ Claudia Aradau, "Security, Technologies of Risk, and the Political," *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 2 (2008): 150.

Nonetheless, in general, academic research still points at supremacy of securitization framework in apprehending contemporary climate security debate.

As the discussion over climate change unfolds, it is important to take a thoughtful optimistic stand to avoid alarmist interpretations of the discourse. In that sense, the securitization framework will be contested throughout this review of the environmental and climate security debates, which is built upon the following research questions: How can we interpret contemporary representation of climate change as a national security threat? Specifically, how can we conceptualize whether climate change is being securitized or not? Is non-securitization eliminates concerns over militarization of climate security discourse? The evaluation of the theories of environmental security in which climate security is founded illustrates that understanding climate change as a national security matter does not unavoidably infer that climate change is being securitized to bring paramilitary emergency measures forward and/or those political and military establishments cannot work together to halt climatic problems. The diverse interpretations of environmental and/or climate security discourses should be taken into account when analyzing contemporary development of the climate security discourse. Especially, this is a problem, considering that they ultimately suggest different solutions to climatic problems.

In sum, tracing how existing theoretical approaches deal with climate change bring into the open that security is a socially constructed process that functions based on two distinctive security logics, namely existential threat-based security and risk-based security, and that depending on which logic that the climate security discourse was established, the implications attached to climate security discourse can diverge. The next section therefore provides a historical overview of the emergence of environmental and climate security discourse in international security agenda. Then, it examines solutions and challenges proposed by

divergent perspectives on environmental and climate security to guide the theoretical discussion on social construction of threats through securitization and dualisms in climate security logics.

1.2 Emergence of an Environmental and Climate Security Discourse

The origins of environmental security could be found within contentious politics of 1960s through which the nodes between environment and survival of human race were disclosed.²⁵ Furthermore, with the expansion of international non-governmental organizations in the following decades, such as Green Peace, World Wildlife Fund, World Watch Institute, and the Stockholm Environment Institute, environment became a foremost subject matter in many international agreements, reports and summits, and that the links between environment and security became ostensible (see a list of major agreement, reports and summits in Appendix 1).²⁶ These developments ultimately led to a rigorous criticism of the security discourse and emergence of a new intellectual trend namely Environmental Security Studies.

Climate change is one of these major problems that have been elevated into security agenda within the environmental security framework. Environmental problems, global warming and Ozone depletion in particular, moved climate change onto the international agenda. In 1992, for the first time, climate change was explicitly noted as an environmental security problem in Article 3 of UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.²⁷ The utterance of climate change as a security problem in international arena somewhat remained dormant in the following years. However, a new millennium came along with a recommenced interest in climate security

²⁵ Rachel Carlson, *Silent Spring* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1962). ; Erin L. Goldon, "History of Modern Environmental Movements in America", in *Environment*, (2012): 1. Available online at: http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mumbai/498320/fernandesma/June_2012_001.pdf. [Accessed on April 7, 2016].

²⁶ Jon Barnett, "Environemental Security."

²⁷ The United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, (UN, 1992), 4. Available online at: <u>http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf</u>. [Accessed on April 7, 2016].

discourse. Many international organizations indicated climate change as a new threat.²⁸ The 2007 report of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) highlighted catastrophic risks associated with anthropogenic climate change.²⁹ The report has shown that "the earth's atmosphere is now changing and setting global warming into motion" due to mankind's activities, such as cutting forests and pursuing economic and industrial development that is heavily depended on use of fossil fuels, which ultimately "renders both people and states insecure."³⁰ The IPCC's report has made it apparent that we are creating an artificial world that could not last long, but the deleterious implications of climate change have been approached as a prime security threat with the release of a UN Secretary General's report in 2009.³¹ Correspondingly, a series of discussions over the necessity of 'securitizing' climate change discourse has been generated in the last decade. In its fifth assessment report released in 2014, IPCC has also explicitly addressed implications of climate change on human and national security and called for immediate action.³²

1.2.1 Forms of Environmental and/or Climate Security Thinking

Albeit there is not a unified conceptualization of environmental security, as the referent objects to be safeguarded and the sources of risk to that referent objects vary, the major

²⁸ For a general overview of the ecological impacts of climate change see, Christopher B. Field, et al., *Ecological Impacts of Climate Change*, National Academy of Science, (Engineering, Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, 2009). Available online at: <u>http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/pd/climate/teachingclimate/ecological_impacts_of_climate_change.pdf</u>.

²⁹ Lenny Bernstein, et al., *Climate Change: Fourth Assessment Report*, (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Switzerland: Geneva, 2007). Available online: <u>http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf</u>. [Accessed on 9 May 2016].

³⁰ Dalby, "Climate Change and Environmental Security," 313.

³¹ UN Secretary General Report 2009 to the UN General Assembly, "Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications

^{,&}quot; (2009). Available online at: http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/secretary-general-reports-to-unga-onclimate-change-and-its-possible-security-implications/. [Accessed on 25 May 2016]

³² Christopher B. Field, et al., *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Fifth Assessment Report,* (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), New York: USA, 2014). Available online at: <u>http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf</u>. [Accessed on 9 May 2016].

approaches to environmental security could be delineated through following groupings: "ecological security, human security, common security, environmental violence, and national security."33 To begin with, the ecological approach to environmental security concerns with "systemic interdependence, complexity, uncertainty and sustainability."³⁴ Ecological approach indicates that we are living in an era of the Antropocene, "a new geologic epoch", in which present environmental problems are effects of long-term human activities on planetary system since the industrial revolution.³⁵ Ecological security focuses on "maintaining the integrity of natural systems on which humanity is dependent."³⁶ As one of the major objectives of climate security is to manage changes in atmosphere by reducing temperatures, climate change is a part of ecological perspective. While examining how civilizations are performing as a "geophysical power on a global scale", followers of ecological perspective to security, such as Karen Litfin, suggest that neither securitization nor politicization of the environment provide long-lasting solutions to climatic problems.³⁷ This approach hence points out a need to change the framing of environmental security problems as solely a national security matter. From an ecological standpoint, environmental security is essentially about the well-being of the social ecological system as a whole. Therefore, increasing "human consciousness on functioning of the planetary system" is the most appropriate method to deal with climate change.³⁸

On the other side of this environmental security debate stands the *human security* perspective, in which it is disputed that the effects of environmental change on international

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 ³³ For through overview of these non-exhausted categorizations of the major interpretations of environmental security see, Jon Barnett, "Environemental Security," 189.
³⁴ Ibid., 188.

²⁵ IDIO., 188.

 ³⁵ Kolbert, "Enter the Antropocene: Age of Man," *National Geographic* (2011). Available online at: http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/03/age-of-man/kolbert-text. [Accessed on 24 May 2016].
³⁶ Dalby, "Climate Change and Environmental Security," 315.

³⁷ Karen Litfin, "Gai Theory, Global Ecovillages, and Embedding Ir in the Earth System," ed. Mayer (Theory Talk, 2014). Available online: <u>http://www.theory-talks.org/search/label/Environment</u>. [Accesses on 20 May 2016].

systems and nation states are rather vague. Hereby, human security research focuses on how environmental catastrophes and changing climate patterns impend security of individuals.³⁹ The scholarships adopting human security perspective aim to show nexuses between environmental and societal causes of the human insecurity. For instance, a case study conducted by Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) examines the 2007 flooding in Bangladesh and highlights that the effects of floods in Bangladesh are not limited to nation state, and that the Bangladeshi woman are especially vulnerable to verbal and physical violence by their male relatives during floods.⁴⁰ The results of this study demonstrate that as the floods have been causing men to loose their job, abusing women for not being able to manage limited food supplies has become a common practice in Bangladesh.⁴¹ Here, societal factors, specifically poverty triggered by environmental disruptions, appear as the source of women's insecurity. From the human security perspective, thus, climate security discourse should advocate enhancing the capacity of affected populations' adaptation to environmental degradation as a solution to alleviate future insecurities.

Despite the increasing attention given to human security and ecological security perspectives in recent years, they still remain on the peripheries of environmental and climate security theorization. Most of the scholarship takes national security theories to guide their evaluation of the climatic problems. For example, *common security* perspective emphasizes how new environmental security risks and climate change occurs at the global level.⁴² In particular, this approach underlines complexity and interdependence arising due to cumulative

³⁹ Pauline Kerr, "Human Security," in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Collins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 92-100.; Human Security Centre Centre, "Human Security Report," (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

⁴⁰ "Gender Human Security and Climate Change in Bangladesh," *Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO* (2007). Available online at: <u>http://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/bangladesh-case-study.pdf</u>. [Accessed on 20 May 2016].

⁴¹ Ibid., 6.

⁴² Barnett, "Environemental Security."

actions of nation states and dispersed effects of environmental change.⁴³ For that reason, Richard Falk, Harold and Margaret Sprout suggest that responding to these new environmental risks requires cooperation among countries, militaries and other institutions.⁴⁴ But, unlike human and ecological security approaches to environment, the proponents of common security explicitly indicate the key referent object of security as nation state and emphasize the prominence of political and military establishment's efforts to prevent climate-induced conflicts.⁴⁵

Moreover, environmental security research has included empirical studies evaluating what sort of environmental change is likely to ignite violent conflict and/or how war affect the environment. These studies employ *environmental violence* approach and consider nation state as the decisive referent object to be secured.⁴⁶ However, they do so with a transformed understanding of security. Richard Ullman, for example, argued that security understood as paramilitary capacities of nation states disregards "risks that might be more dangerous than military threats. It, therefore, "causes pervasive militarization of international relations."⁴⁷ Ullman advocated the idea that "environmental distress is a major factor behind aggressive militaristic behavior of nations states, specifically of the Third World governments."⁴⁸ Likewise, Norman Myers, in his article titled "Environmental Dimensions to Security Issues", examined the influence of a broad range of environmental problems such as food and water shortages, deforestation and climate change on conflict and affirmed that environment is likely to induce violent conflicts.⁴⁹

⁴³ Ibid., 189.

⁴⁴ Richard Falk, *This Engendered Planet* (New York: Random House, 1971). ; Harold Sprout, *Toward*

a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971).

⁴⁵ Dalby, "Climate Change and Environmental Security," 315.

⁴⁶ Barnett, "Environemental Security."

⁴⁷ Ulman, "Redefining Security," 129.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 142.

⁴⁹ Myers, "Environmental Dimensions to Security Issues."

Finally, traditionally, national security is concerned with protection of national territories from hostile military attacks.⁵⁰ However, the early arguments on environment and security contest the meaning of security by including various risks posed by environmental change in definition of *national security*. ⁵¹In an attempt to redefine national security, for instance, Lester Brown argued that "threats to national security arise less from the relationship of nation to nation and from the relationship of man to nature [which cannot be addresses by] sophisticated weapons systems."⁵² One of the most significant features of national security perspective to climate change is that it points out how environmental problems, such as droughts and rise in sea level, could undermine national sovereignty of states by pushing them into physical extinction and/or disabling nation states to sustain their populations. In that sense, for example, climate change has been pondered as a national security problem for atoll countries.

Environment and climate security has also been approached as a national security problem based on a view that the degradation of natural resources could deteriorate military basis of nation states.⁵³ For many newly affluent countries, availability and resilience of natural resources are at the core of their economic development. China would be a good example to illustrate how environmental changes might undermine capacity of the military establishments. In line with the rapid rise in its economy, China's military has undergone well-rounded modernization processes. Its defense budget, for instance, has exceeded \$144 billion as of 2015. ⁵⁴ However, for years, China has followed a path that comprised ecologically

⁵⁰ Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 5 (1997): 13.

⁵¹ Barnett, "Environemental Security."

⁵² Brown, "Redefining National Security " *World Watch Institute* (1977): 1-35. Available online at: <u>http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED147229.pdf</u>. [Accessed on 19 May 2016].

⁵³ Barnett, "Environemental Security," 192.

⁵⁴ Due to a lack of transparency of Chinese Government, it is difficult to estimate the exact amount of the military defense expenditures of China. The numbers indicated in this thesis hence are taken from a recent U.S. Department of Defense report to congress. See, U.S. Department of Defense, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016," in *Annual Report to Congress* (U.S. Department of Defense, 2016), 77. Available online at:

unsustainable practices to sustain its development, which put the country's natural resources under pressure. If China's natural resources continue to be degrading with such speed, however, this is likely to weaken its military's long-term capacity whereby national security. ⁵⁵ On the whole, notwithstanding environmental challenges has been represented as a threat to nation state, national security perspective to environment also highlights that the complexity of environmental and climate security problems requires joint management and coordinated common action in their handling. 56

To sum up, careful examination of the existing security approaches to environment and climate change above discloses that albeit the idea of including security implications of environmental problems on the political agenda has been mostly welcomed by academia, there are different interpretations and/or debates surrounding the concept of environmental security, which causes dualistic explanations of what is environmental security really and how it should be addressed. In the following section, these approaches will be evaluated and/or problematized to accentuate why climate security could be better conceptualized as a socially constructed process.

1.2.2 Evaluation of the Divergent Interpretations in Climate Security Discourse

As noted above, those scholars, such as Brown, Myers and Ullman, who favor studying environmental sector as a national security matter provide an inclusive definition of security as "social, economic, political and ecological challenges to well-being of human life"⁵⁷ and

http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report .<u>pdf</u> . [Accessed on 21 May 2016]. ⁵⁵ Barnett, "Environemental Security," 193.

⁵⁶ Richard Falk, *This Engendered Planet*, 185-96. ; Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a Politics of* the Planet Earth, 406.

⁵⁷ Norman Myers, *Environmental Security: What Is New and Different?*, 5.

underline that among a range of security challenges environmental degradation is the ultimate threat since "conservation of the earth's biosphere is essential for survival of human civilizations".⁵⁸ Furthermore, the inclusion of environment into the security debate also has received positive response due to its capacity to rebuild pillars of strategic study that are typically aligned with territory, sovereignty and identity. On this topic, Hugh Dyer, for example, emphasizes that climate security builds upon notions of "ecology, universality and governance."⁵⁹ Likewise, Michael Thompson promotes an anti-reductionist perspective to security by underlining that "social solidarity of humans contributes to plurality of knowledges [which] has to be addressed [in order to promote] effective policies of security, especially environmental security."⁶⁰

Despite the plurality of knowledges on the meaning of security and alternative definitions adapted by national security approaches, a familiar strategic language still could be observed in environmental security studies. In particular, national security and environmental violence perspectives operate within the well-known langue of security by labeling climate change as a factor causing war. ⁶¹ The idea that climate change induces environmental degradation and stimulates scarcity of resources whereby causes mass migration, interstate wars and violent conflict is thoroughly examined by Thomas Homer Dixon and Robert Kaplan.⁶² However, climate change has been considered as a security matter based on unambiguous understanding

 ⁵⁸ Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent, *Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crises in the Global Arena,* (Climate Institute. Washington DC: USA, 1995). Available online at: <u>http://www.climate.org/PDF/Environmental%20Exodus.pdf</u>, Chp. 1. [Accessed on 9 May 2016].
⁵⁹ Hugh Dyer, "Theoretical Aspects of Environmental Security," 67-81.

⁶⁰ Micheal Thompson, "Security and Solidarity: An Anti-Reductionist Analysis of Environmental Policy," 139. Available online at: <u>http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019829509X.001.0001/acprof-9780198295099-</u> <u>chapter-8</u>, Chp. 8. [Accessed on 3 May 2016].

⁶¹ Gwynne Dyer, *Climate Wars: How Peak Oil and Climate War Will Change Canada*, (2011). [Kindle Edition]

⁶² Thomas F. Homer Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity and Violence.*; Also see, Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet," *The Atlantic Monthly* 273, no. 2 (1994).

of national security as a "sequence of events that threatens quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or significantly narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state."⁶³

When climate security discourse equated to conflicts, it often impels defensive military response outside the normal politics. One of the major problems associated with this interpretation of national security approach to environmental change, therefore, is its monolithic use of the conflict-dominated language that undermines environmental security discourse's initial motivation to move away from traditional tenets of security. The criticism points out that environment should be dealt outside of the security field precisely because of militant practices that security traditionally recalls. Daniel Duedney and Simon Dalby argue that environmental security discourse may justify drastic and potentially unaccountable actions whereby cause "counterproductive outcomes." ⁶⁴ Others also warn of environmental nationalism due to the militarization of the environmental sector. ⁶⁵ Therefore, skepticism points at a zero-sum game prompted by including environment in the national security agenda that prevents cooperation.

Environmental security researchers have been pondering on a range of issues and referent objects to assist the development of the new security concept, as mentioned-above. Hitherto, climate-conflicts hypotheses explicated by Dyer, Homer Dixon, and Kaplan demonstrate that the expansion of the security field might not be freed from the logic of friend-enemy distinction. Rather, it might disseminate a rationalist reasoning into non-traditional sectors because

⁶³ Richard Ulman, "Redefining Security," 133. Available online at: <u>http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2538489.pdf?acceptTC=true</u>. [Accessed on 1 May 2016].

⁶⁴ Daniel Duedney, *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics.*; Simon Dalby, "Ecopolitical Discourse: Environmental Security and Political Geography," *Progress in Human Geography* 16, no. 4 (1992): 503-22.

⁶⁵ Jyrki Käkönen, ed. *Green Security or Militarized Environment* (Aldershot, U.K.: Darmouth, 1994).; Duedney, "Environmental Security: A Critique," 187-219.

stretching of the discourse is often based on two major assumptions. Firstly, while signposting environmental security as an ultimate security issue, proponents imply that environmental threats objectively challenge the notion of state survival. Secondly, the opponents' concern over legitimization of the use of military measures undertakes environmental conflict as a challenge to stability and sovereignty of nation state. Nevertheless, when climate security discourse engages with "Malthusian methodology, it puts forwards a "neo-environmental determinism," and hence it omits the diversity of threats" that influence consequences of anthropogenic climate change. ⁶⁶

Indeed, climate change might lead to all sorts of conflicts, but recent empirical studies reveal that not all environmental conflicts result in war. ⁶⁷ On the contrary, when states confronted with environmental problems, more often than not, they choose to cooperate. The neo-environmental deterministic approach to climate security debate overlooks that forecasting what conditions might cause climate wars also depend on politico-military elite's representation of the issue.⁶⁸ When this alternative argument is taken into consideration, the need for international cooperation, adaptation and planning in response to extreme climatic events becomes obvious.⁶⁹ In other words, only if security is understood as a discursive process through which threats are socially constructed, climate security debate liberates itself from realism's prescribed responses hence a door to apprehend diverse reactions to contemporary climate problems opens up.

⁶⁶ Mike Hulme, "Reducing the Future to Climate: A Story of Climate Determinism and Reductionism," *Osiris* 26, no. 1 (2011): 245-66. ; Dalby, "Climate Change: New Dimensions of Environmental Security," *The RUSI Journal* 158, no. 3 (2013): 34.

⁶⁷ The possibility of cooperation in situations where there is scarcity of resources is especially highlighted in studies of water-conflicts. See for instance, Undula Alam, "Questioning the Water Wars Rationale: Case Study of the Indus Waters Treaty," *Geographical Journal* 168, no. 4 (2002): 341.

⁶⁸ Colin Kahl, *States, Scarcity and Civil Strife in the Developing World* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006).

⁶⁹ Dalby, "Climate Change and Environmental Security," 321.

The evaluation of the competing approaches to environment demonstrates a specific pattern of conflict security thinking that has been dominating the discourse. As noted above, however, environmental and climatic threats rarely cause war. This indicates that security is not only about existence of objective threats. Rather, the climate security discourse exhibits that threats are socially constructed. Therefore, the next section, firstly, will illustrate how threats posed by climate change are constructed as a security issue through specific use of performative speech acts.⁷⁰ Secondly, the presumed omnipotence of climate securitization debate will be critically discussed to emphasize that security debate.

1.3 Existential Threat-Based Security and "Securitization Framework"

In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, CS scholars, namely Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, define security as "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issues either as a special kind of politics or as above politics."⁷¹ They justify this move by arguing, "if we place the survival of collective unites and principles as the defining core of security studies, we have the basis for applying security analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the essential quality of the concept."⁷² Consequently, in security, "the task is not to assess some objective threats that 'really' endanger some object to be defended or secured" but, instead, "it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat."⁷³ In that

⁷⁰ Buzan et al., Security: New Framework

⁷¹ Ibid., 23.

⁷² Ibid., 27.

⁷³ Ibid., 26.

sense, neither security nor threats are absolute terms, but they are often inter-subjectively molded through a process called "securitization."⁷⁴ The analysis of securitization process indicates that once climatic problems are regarded as a security issue, a set of emergency measures is activated to confront it. Here, although security is still about survival, it is recognized that what constitutes a threat to survival of diverse referent objects is constructed by respected securitizing actors such as military and political elites.⁷⁵

Furthermore, the CS provides a precise procedure to determine whether an issue is securitized or not. Firstly, there must be an authoritative actor performing speech act in order to pose referent objects belonging the different sectors as an existential threat.⁷⁶ Once an issue represented as an existential threat, emergency measures should be implemented in a decidedly securitized space.⁷⁷ In essence, what the process of securitization proposes is that actions and speech acts could all be considered as "efforts to exceed threshold of exceptionality," as Angela Oels calls it.⁷⁸ The specific language of securitization thus insinuates that urgency attached to exceptional threats can mobilize attention on climate change, and "inter-subjective establishment of an existential threat have substantial political effects...to break free [from normal politics], procedures or rules [that security speech acts' mobilizing power should be approached carefully.⁸⁰ Here the assumption is that the departure from normal politics necessarily activates defensive and reactionary measures. Accordingly, in order to prevent

⁷⁴ Ibid., 25-55.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 27.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 33.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Angela Oels, "From Securitization of Climate Change to Climatization of the Security Field," in *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challanges for Soceital Stability, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace,*, ed. al. (London, UK: Springer, 2012), 185-205.

⁷⁹ Buzan, et al. *Security: New Framework* 25.

⁸⁰ ibid., 29.

negative effects of securitization, Ole Weaver recommends "de-securitization, which is a process of moving securitized issues back to the normal political debate."⁸¹

In recent years, scholars, such as Thierry Balzaq, Felix Ciuta, and Maria Julia Trombetta, have begun to criticize the logic of exceptionality and emergency measures that predominates classical securitization framework.⁸² They touched upon on a need to re-contextualize security claims in different sectors. In particular, Trombetta has "relaxed the boundaries of securitization" and contended that climate securitization allocates "new roles for security actors and different means to provide security."83 She noted that what security means in the context of climate change is more in line with "risk management [that utilizes] precautionary logic and the concept of resilience."⁸⁴ This, ultimately, enables examination of the non- emergency and/or non-military responses to climate change.⁸⁵ One of the problems that arise from relaxation of the securitization framework, however, is that if the new climate security discourse operates through normal politics as the meaning attached to threats varies, the CS's de-securitization as a method of decreasing implications of securitization losses its analytical validity.⁸⁶ What would happen if climate security discourse unfolds into normal political debate and calls for cooperation and management? Would de-securitization be able to alleviate implications that might arise from handling of climate adaptation mechanisms, for example? Although constructivist approaches, including Trombetta's research, to CS's securitization

⁸¹ Weaver, "Securitization and Desecuritization.," in *On Security*, ed. Lipschutz (New York: Colombia University Press, 1995), 46-86.

⁸² For prominent examples of resarch on how to recognize whether an issue is a security issue or not, see Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political, Agency, Audiance and Context," 171-201.; Ciuta, "Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitization Theory," 301-26.; Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse.". Also see, "Linking Climate-Induced Migration and Security within the Eu: Insights from the Securitization Debate," *Critical Studies on Security* 2, no. 2 (2014).

⁸³ "Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse," 585-602.

⁸⁴ "Rethinking the Securitization of the Environment: Old Beliefs, New Insights," 135-42.

⁸⁵ "Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse," 591.

⁸⁶ "Rethinking the Securitization of the Environment: Old Beliefs, New Insights."

criticize the notion of de-securitization in climate change discourse, they do not elaborate on how they overcome the above-mentioned challenge and/or offer an alternative approach to measure implications associated with non-emergency actions.

1.4 Concluding Remarks

The theory of securitization offers a framework for comprehending why the inclusion of climate change into national security strategies cannot be restrained as climate-conflicts, and how authoritative actors are constructing the climate change as a security matter. In essence, thus, securitization framework suggests a particular method to interpret current climate security discourse, and set the conjectural boundaries for understanding whether an issue is being securitized or not. Nonetheless, as the critical security scholarship mentions, different representations of security could exist, and that not all instances of security fit into original securitization framework. In other words, climate security understood as a speech act can follow a path that is distinct than that of rational logic of emergency measures attached to securitization process. The dilemma of de-securitization of climate security debate explicitly signposts an analytical tension that augments an immediate question: do all security speech acts pose an existential threat that recalls emergency measures and is likely to impose the militarization of the debate?

It will be discussed in the next chapter that the acknowledgment of the climate change discourse as a new breed of securitization offers a rather moderate assistance into the explaining effects and/or the implications that might arise from 'positive' conceptualization of securitization. The assorted forms of security speech acts are likely to create different outcomes and implications that need to be understood in isolation from CS's securitization framework. This is attainable by challenging the supremacy of securitization framework through recognition of the dualisms in security logics that could be observed in the climate security

discourse namely existential threat-based security and risk-based security. These dualistic logics of security thinking are linked to the main argument of this thesis in a way that they help distinguishing under what circumstances the current climate change debate refers to a process of non-securitization. Thus in the next chapter, it will be argued that when climatic threats activate a risk-logic, different outcomes and effects are stimulated that could be analyzed through a set of rules that are different than CS's securitization framework.

Chapter 2

An Alternative Approach to Climate Securitization

2.1 Risk-Based Security and "Riskification Framework"

The following questions will guide the discussion in this chapter: How can we measure whether climate security speech acts are based on a logic of risk, or not? Is non-securitization of the climate debate unproblematic whereby it refers to a state of impeccable cooperation between military institutions and politics to tackle with climate change? The purpose of this chapter is to establish and/or set the frontiers of an alternative approach to complement securitization framework in order to investigate how climate change has been a part of national security strategies of the states. Thus, instead of diluting the securitization framework, the

features of the climate security debate that are different than those classified by CS's need to be recognized and treated through an alternative set of rules.

In this regard, Olaf Corry contends that the risk-security literature offers an alternative set of rules to distinguish new features in climate security discourse and introduce a theoretical framework called "riskification".⁸⁷ According to Corry, every aspect of securitization framework changes when an issue is presented as a risk.⁸⁸ In order to understand how and why climate security discourse might bring about non-emergency measures forward, it is important to analyze the foundations and characteristics of the risk logic. The foundation of the risk logic is first introduced to the International Relations discipline by sociologist Ulrich Beck who has offered a deep-seated critique of late modern society.⁸⁹ He has discerned the era that we live in as a "second modernity" and/or "risk society" in which environment is constantly threatened by "new risks [that are] given lesser status than traditionally accepted existential threats" such as wars.⁹⁰ According to Beck, new environmental risks "...have short and long term effects."⁹¹ The new environmental risks "induce systematic and often irreversible harm that generally remains invisible." 92 However, "they can be changed, magnified, prevented, managed, dramatized or minimized within the limits of our knowledge." ⁹³ In other words, new risks cannot be considered as disasters as they operate within a time frame that is "future-future" whereby they are unknown.94

⁸⁷ Olaf Corry, "Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change."

⁸⁸ Ibid., 237.

⁸⁹ Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992).

 ⁹⁰ Ulrich "From Industrial Society to Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and Ecological Enlightment," *Theory, Culture and Society* 9(1992): 97.; Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, 22. Also see, *Ecological Politics in the Age of Risk* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
⁹¹ Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, 22-23.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 2.

It is this uncertainty that also makes the prospect of controlling risks almost impossible. This is not to say that the long-standing paradigmatic logic of threat to security losses its applicability, as there are still states, territories, militaries, and cases where friends and enemy distinction could be observed. However, risks associated with climate change oftentimes are "delocalized" and "incalculable." ⁹⁵ In addition, their consequences are not limited to space, and our knowledge on new risks is incomplete.⁹⁶ These factors, consequently, diminish our capability to control new and decidedly uncertain danger of climate change, and the "logic of [climate] security shifts form defense to management and cooperation."⁹⁷

Further, the contemporary risk-security studies highlight a possibility of a transformation in traditional military institutions. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, referring back to "reflexiverisks" and "risk-society" concepts, examines how governments and defense institutions such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have come to grasp dangers through a rational uncertainty lens and "continuously constructed new means in order to manage risks".⁹⁸ His argument hence indicates that today security institutions can play two roles: providing territorial protection and managing global risks. But, how can we differentiate between these two roles? Anne Hammerstad and Ingrid Boas examine the U.K.'s national security strategy in a ten-year period between 1991 and 2011, and explain how certain characteristics of risks affect the roles played by security institutions.⁹⁹ They argue that from the time when an issue is presented as a risk or threat, one could observe specific passages of action. Building upon the

⁹⁵ "Living in the World Risk Society," (London:: Hobhouse Memorial Public Lecture at London School of Economics, 2006).

⁹⁶ Ibid. Available online at: <u>http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/sociology/pdf/Beck-Livinginthe</u> WorldRiskSociety-Feb2006.pdf. [Accessed on May10].

⁹⁷ "Living in and Coping with World Risk Society " (Switzerland: St. Gallen Symposium, 2012). Available online at: <u>http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/jan/06/ulrich-beck</u>. [Accessed on May10].

⁹⁸ Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "Reflexive Security: Nato and International Risk Society," *Milennium Journal of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2001): 285-86.

⁹⁹ Anne Hammerstad, "National Security Risks? Uncertainty, Austerity and Other Logics of Risk in the Uk Government's National Security Strategy," *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 4 (2015): 475-91.

principle of uncertainty, Hammerstad and Boas indicate that threats are "direct and imminent", whereas risks are "indirect, distant and unintended".¹⁰⁰ Therefore, risks are more "prone to elaboration of the long-term risk management strategies rather than to the implementation of [extraordinary] security measures."¹⁰¹

Regardless of which strand of the risk-security scholarship that aforementioned researchers belongs to, they all point to a transformation of security and/or a contemporary securitization trend which defines risks as new threats that have been operating within normal politics. However, it is argued here that there is a far-reaching departure of risk-based security from existential threat-based securitization. First of all, as noted by Corry, risk-security can operate "below the level of exceptionality." 102 This notion contradicts with the CS's seminal securitization framework, in which existentiality of threats has given a central role to detect whether extraordinary emergency measures have to be adopted in climate change discourse or not.¹⁰³ Risks do not have to be existential, although they could also be uttered as such. Thus, the major confusion arises when risks are referred as an existential threat.

Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that a discerning feature of risks, existential or not, is that they have widespread effects and multiple sources that are known for their perpetual uncertainty. For this reason, risks-security scholars pay attention to "indirect causes of the conditions of a possibility of harm."¹⁰⁴ In other words, the causality of risks points to a subsidiary, cooperative and dynamic process of enhancing "resilience of the referent objects that are under risk."¹⁰⁵ This process of identifying conditions of harm includes an open

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 481.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Corry, "Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change," 244.

¹⁰³ In this outset, for example, CS scholars notes that for a "successful securitization there needs to be existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules." Buzan, Security: New Framework 25.

¹⁰⁴ Corry, "Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change," 246-47. ¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 248.

discussion on appropriate actions to be taken to prevent harm; hence, risks are "subject to political governance."¹⁰⁶ With risks, the strategic defensive targeting outside of normal politics cannot aim to exterminate the danger. Rather, relevant speech acts primarily suggest "long-term politics of precautionary measures such as adaptation, planning or managing of uncertainty and/or vulnerabilities" caused by risks.¹⁰⁷

To sum up, unlike securitization that moves issues outside of the normal politics and call for defensive emergency measures, Corry argues that risk-security operates through a specific risk-politics that "legitimizes long term precautionary principle."¹⁰⁸ Whereas normal politics calls for "cost-benefit analysis and trading-off certain issues over others."¹⁰⁹ In that sense, as part of a normal politics, climate change is considered as something "worth governing" along with other issues such as "health and education".¹¹⁰ The discussion below hence will unfold around three goals: (i) to illustrate the implications of limiting theorization of climate security discourse to securitization, (ii) to set new rules for identifying effects and/or implications that might be attached to climate security discourse operating through risk logic, and (iii) to emphasize the value of analyzing non-securitized cases through risk-based security framework.

2.1.1 The Problem of Securitizing Risk-Based Climate Change Discourse

What happens when risk-based climate security discourse is conceptualized as securitization? In such cases de-securitization is promoted as suggested by CS scholars. Nonetheless, Corry accentuates that "de-securitization is a problematic approach in cases

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 248.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ "What Is a Global Polity?," *Review of International Studies* 36(2010): 157-80.

where risk-security logic is apparent." ¹¹¹ For one, the logic of de-securitization can target precautionary principle of risk-security that is essential for contriving long-term programs that facilitates resilience of referent objects such as common energy policy. Furthermore, instead of politicization, de-securitization logic might also "normalize the climate security discourse" by suggesting that it as an issue that requires a balanced bargaining along with other security risks such as poverty, health, and economic problems.¹¹²

However, conceptualizing climate change solely as a matter of political bargaining is a deal beyond retrieval considering the uncertainty attached to consequences of climate change on the planet. Robyn Eckersley and Matt McDonald explicate that the contestation of climate change and national economic growth in the same security discourse was the major factor behind postponement of "global cooperation on mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions during Kyoto Protocol."¹¹³ This example touches on a prime problem that where there is a buoyant competition between two valued referent objects, political bargaining and/or cost-benefit analysis can result in a normalizing deadlock. De-securitization of the risk-based discourse, therefore, might result in disempowering policies that typically prioritize prevention and management of the possible causes of harm induced by climate change.

2.1.2 Implications of Risk-Based Climate Security Discourse: A Revised Framework of Risk-Based Security

As noted above, Corry suggests an alternative theoretical framework to climate securitization namely, the "riskification framewok." ¹¹⁴ The process of riskification suggests

¹¹¹ "Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change," 255. ¹¹² Ibid., 256.

¹¹³ Eckersley, "Australia and Climate Change," in *Australian Foreign Policy: Controversies and Debates*, ed. Daniel Baldino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 230.

¹¹⁴ Corry, "Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change."
that the issues become a matter of risk-security through speech acts of authoritative securitizing actors that are distinctive than what is suggested by CS.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, according to Corry, climate change is being "riskified" when "constitutive causes of harm" is presented as a risk/threat to different referent objects via successful application of risk-security speech acts, and "long-term precautionary governance" is called in response to those climatic problems.¹¹⁶

For him, even if risk-based security logic might legitimize precautionary policies as it is emphasized by post-structural scholarship (see chapter 1),¹¹⁷ riskification is less problematic than securitization as it often "suspends exceptional and undemocratic emergency measures foreseen by CS." ¹¹⁸ Nonetheless, although Corry is concerned about negative outcomes of desecuritization and normalization of climate security debate, he does not implicitly examine how new challenges might arise from risk-security logic itself. Hence, this thesis expands Corry's alternative methodological approach to climate securitization by establishing a new set of rules to investigate specific effects and implications associated with risk-security logic.

In order to modify riskification framework, it is imperative to examine what response strategies that national political and security establishments has been calling to tackle with adverse impacts of climate change thus far. I argue that three major forms of action that could be called by politicians and military elites who perform risk-security speech act namely adaptation, management, and planning as methods to deal with climate change that requires further investigation. In particular, although adaptation and contingency planning methods typically function at the level of prognosis, they might have two distinctive purposes. First of all, they can call for an urgent response to stabilize effects of climatic problems and favor short-

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 249.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Aradau, "Governing Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un) Knowing the Future.," 89-115.

¹¹⁸ Franszikus von Lucke et al., "What's at Stake in Securitising Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach,," *Geopolitics* 19, no. 4 (2014): 14.; Corry, "Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change," 438-225.

term strategies. Secondly, they could emphasize the importance of general readiness and resilience of politico-military establishments. When the former is the goal of adaptation and planning strategies; however, this could evoke a danger of moving the risk-based climate security discourse to outside of normal politics and "privileging strategies of adaptation and planning over management." ¹¹⁹ In other words, the short-term security thinking could ultimately serve to "preservation of status-quo," rather than providing "a potent catalyst for cooperation."¹²⁰ Likewise, adaptation might aim to stabilize the climate security debate might be rendered to do only as much in terms of risk management. This is problematic as it could eventually slow down the process of implementing a "radical international climate security agenda to reduce greenhouse gas emissions."¹²¹ In case of conflict" is substituted by "development aid and peacekeeping forces" as risk security measures."¹²²

The implications attached to adaptation and contingency-planning methods invoked by risk-security logic thus could be analyzed through looking at goals attached to these methods of climate adaptation and planning. Furthermore, in order to identify whether climate security discourse have a tendency to lean towards securitization or not, the overall distribution of long-term management strategies and above noted adaptation and planning strategies need to be analyzed, which is the process that is entitled here as balanced distribution of precautionary measures. In case of a monolithic pattern and/or favoring of specific risk-security measures in

¹²⁰ Matt McDonald, "Discourses of Climate Security," *Political Geography* 33, no. 1 (2013): 45.; Scott Shirley, "The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close Have We Come and Would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficieny of Global Climate Change Policy," 221.

¹¹⁹ von Lucke, "What's at Stake in Securitising Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach,," 864.

¹²¹ von Lucke, "What's at Stake in Securitising Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach,," 875.

¹²² Ibid., 14.

the climate security discourse are observed. It could be regarded as a warning signal that the climate security debate might follow a path towards securitization and militarization. Hence, the solution to prevent implications attached to risk-security measures is to ensure that short-term precautionary measures do not dominate the climate security discourse. The presence of the diverse strategies in speech acts that are harmoniously performed by securitizing actors proves that politics and military might act synergistically to combat root causes of the risk in order to manage the global climate change.

To sum up, the securitization framework could assist whether the climate security discourse is being de-politicized or not. The CS scholars succinctly indicate the problems associated with existential-threat based security as de-politicization of the discourse. In case of risk-security, however, the responses to climate change problems do not operate outside the normal politics. Corry aims to provide a framework that is equivalent to securitization framework. The riskification framework is valuable for scrutinizing under what circumstances risk-security logic operates. However, categorizing the conditions of riskification cannot assist to analyze neither what the prospects of current climate security being securitized are, nor can it offer an alternative solution to de-securitization. Therefore, riskification framework is being modified here by adding criteria that is filtering of security speech acts via examination of the measures called by risk-securitylogic. This is a meaningful practice because although militaristic responses to risk-based security challenges are acknowledged to be uncommon by scholars, as illustrated above, this does not necessarily wipe such possibility out, and that it serves to answer one of the research questions of this thesis: is non-securitization indicate an impeccable cooperation between military institutions and politics to tackle with climate change?

2.2. Concluding Remarks

As illustrated above, there is no supremacy of the set of rules defining the climate security debate. Epistemologically then this thesis acknowledges that since realities differ, so do the rules that define the nature of security. In fact, multiple security speech acts can synchronously be at work in the debate surrounding climate change. The interactions between distinctive security logics become more apparent when their borders are clearly defined. The extrication of these two ideal types of climate security discourse, namely risk-based security and threat-based security, provides an analytical clarity that is necessary for investigating whether inclusion of climate in national security scheme inevitably cause securitization and/or militarization the discourse or not. Likewise, it also facilitates research on utility and effects of mechanisms that are applied in handling of the climate security debate. Thus, informed by above-mentioned theoretical discussion, the thesis provides a standard template defining features of existential threat-based and risk-based security logics.

Chapter 3

Context and Methodology

3.1 Context- Threat-Based and Risk-Based Security logics

As discussed in the critical evaluation of the existing theories in previous chapters, authoritative actors construct certain issues as a security issue and actions that are called to tackle with climatic problems depends on how security has been constructed through speech acts. In accordance with assumptions delineated in the critical discussion, thus, research undertaken for this thesis used two conceptual frameworks to investigate: (i) how climate change has been constructed as a national security matter in the U.S., (ii) whether it has been securitized to call paramilitary responses or it functions through risk-based security logic, and (iii) is non-securitization exempted from implications that might be attached to actions prompted in response to climate change? Two distinctive security logics that might be permeated in the climate security discourse and could assist evaluating contemporary climate security discourse in the U.S are "existential threat-based" security and "risk-based" security. These security logics exhibit unique characteristics and follow specific set of rules to frame

climate change as a security matter, and responses to climate change fluctuate depending on which logic that the climate security discourse has been established.

Below the Table 1 illustrates how these security logics are presented in performative speech acts, what actions are called in response to threat and/or risks, what effects they might produce, and ultimately what solutions they might promote to prevent implications attached to each logics of security. In brief, climate change is securitized when the discourse operates through threat-based security logic that is embedded in CS's securitization framework, which presents threats as existential, imminent and external to a valued referent object that is in need of protection.¹²³

	Threat-Based Security Logic ¹²⁵	Risk-Based Security Logic ¹²⁶
Characteristics of Speech Acts	 Existential and imminent threats. External referent object Exceptional and emergency measures Outside of normal-politics 	 "Conditions of possibility of harm caused by risk" (existential or less than existential threats) Referent objects that require governance Normal politics.
Characteristics of Responses to Climate Change and Purpose of Security Speech Acts	 Reactionary- defensive action Permanent eradication of direct sources of threat 	• Short and/or long- term (often non- defensive) pre- emptive strategies of adaptation, planning and management.

Table 1. Standard Template for Security Logics in Climate Change Debate¹²⁴

¹²³ Buzan et al., Security: New Framework 24-29.

¹²⁴ This templete nspired and informed by CS's "securitization grammar" and Olaf Corry's summary of the the "grammars of security".

¹²⁵ Buzan et al., Security: New Framework 24-29.

¹²⁶ Corry, "Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change," 249.

Implications and Solutions to Security Speech Acts	 State of exception and emergency measures (often militaristic) De-securitization. 	 Justification of pre- emptive measures Disproportional employment of risk- security measures. Balanced distribution of precautionary strategies.
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In order to preserve referent objects, such as nation state, people and the planet Earth, actors hence call for emergency measures that can take various forms of non-democratic actions and even excessive military-build up.¹²⁷ In particular, the nature of actions called in handling of existential threats is defensive as the goal is to exterminate existential threats through fighting against them. Consequently, one of the major problems arises from social construction of an issue through the "threat-based security logic" is that security speech acts are performed to justify non-political actions to ensure the existence of referent objects.¹²⁸ Therefore, an optimal solution to prevent non-politicization is to "de-securitize" the discourse and promote actions that fittingly befall in normal politics.¹²⁹

The second conceptual perspective used during this research is the risk-based security logic that is embedded in Corry's riskification theory, which sought to examine non-emergency measures taken in response to climate change.¹³⁰ The risk-based security logic use different set of rules to explain how issues are being socially constructed as a security matter. In particular, threats to referent objects could be existential or less than existential threats, but they are not targeted directly. Rather, the issues are moved to security agenda due to circumstances and/or

¹²⁷ Buzan et al., *Security: New Framework* 24-29.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 29.

¹³⁰ Corry, "Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change."

harmed caused by risks. Accordingly, the goal of making issues as a security matter is to manage and/or prevent causes of risk. In other words, threats to referent objects are conceptualized as governable within the normal politics, and long or short-term preemptive strategies, such as adaptation, planning, and risk-management, are promoted in handling of risks. The major implication arises from risk-based security is hence the validation of the pre-emptive measures in a highly politicized environment.

Nevertheless, the rules identified by Corry's theory is in need of expansion if we are to comprehend implications attached to actions prompted by risk-based security speech act. It is suggested that implications of precautionary actions stimulated by risk-logic come to the surface when the goal of employing adaptation, management, preemptive measures are analyzed for if they aim to temporarily prevent the effects of risks or they are aiming at long-term structural changes to minimize conditions of risks. However, considering that both long and short-term strategies are awaited in response to risks, such as catastrophic weather events, one of the implications of risk-security logic is inattentiveness to tackling of root causes of the problems and/or disproportionate distribution of the short-term adaptation methods. Thus, it is argued that the balanced distribution of the short and long term methods in the security discourse is the prime solution to overcome this problem.

3.2 Methodology- Qualitative Content and Discourse Analysis

In order to understand how climate security debate is constructed in the U.S., this thesis drew on aspects from both of these afore-outlined security logics, and engaged in qualitative content and discourse analyses methods. The former method is used to, firstly, categorize key texts and speeches, in which instances of both threat-based and risk-based climate security language were present, and secondly measure the frequency and/or balanced distribution of the precautionary actions. In particular, the analysis based on publicly available documents and

speeches provided by political and military institutions and/or echelons, and non-governmental organizations between the years of 2009-2016 (see Appendix 2). Table 2 demonstrates source and quantity of documents that were collected for this investigation. The single major criterion was applied as selection procedure of data that is its relevance to the topic of this study and/or presence of the references to climate change as 'risk' and 'threat' to national security in the text.

However, as Victor Turner states, "as members of society, most of us see only what we expect to see, and what we expect to see is what we are conditioned to see when we have learned the definitions and classifications of our culture."¹³¹ In other words, the use of certain vocabularies does not necessarily reflect a social reality because language is not simply a tool. It also possesses a constitutive role to form reality in a particular way, and depending on how reality is constructed certain actions are either would be empowered and/or disregarded. In that sense, we cannot take utterance of word threat at its face value, and assume that the climate security discourse is securitized. In order to understand whether the climate security discourse operates via threat-based security logic or risk-based security logic requires careful examination of the constitutive function of the language.

Following the set of rules outlined above, the next section will provide an interpretivist account of a contemporary climate security discourse and investigate: (i) through which logic the climate security discourse is based, (ii) what actions where empowered when the discourse is constructed based on risk-based security, and (iii) what goals associated to non-emergency measures precautionary measures.

Table 2. Documents and/or Politico-Military Speeches investigated during research on threat versus risk security logics in climate security discourse in the U.S.

¹³¹ Victor Turner, "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites of Passage.," in *Betwixt and Between: Patterns of Masculine and Feminine Initiation.*, ed. Louise Carus Mahdi (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1987), 6.

Source	SRR	PARSS	CTS	FMR	Total ²
U.S. Department of	26	-	13	-	39
Defense					
U.S. Department of	5	-	6	-	11
Homeland Security					
The White House	5	12	4	5	26
Strategic Institutions	5	-	-	7	12
Total	41	12	23	12	88

Notes:

1 Strategic Reports and Roadmaps=SRR, Publicly Available Remarks and Speeches=PARS, Congressional Testimonies and Statements=CTS, Formal Media Release=FMR

2 Total quantities of texts analyzed by type and source.

Chapter 4

Analyzing Contemporary Climate Security Discourse in the U.S.

4.1 Brief History of Climate Security Debate in the U.S.

Climate change debate in the U.S. evolved in line with the emerging of environmental security concept and international environmental agreements. The concept of climate security has been of a great interest to former vice president Albert Arnold Gore, who launched a campaign to inform the public about the threats posed by climate change, specifically global warming. His campaign also included a movie *Inconvenient Truth*, which bluntly shown devastating effects of climate change and popularized the issue of climate change. Although foundations of the attempts to move climate change into a national security agenda is laid during president Bill Clinton's administration, it has moved to national security scheme during president Barack Obama administration, which is the period that will be closely examined in the rest of this chapter.

4.2. Discursively Framing Climate Change

The initial quantitative comparison of the all-direct references to the term climate change as either risk and/or threat indicated that climate change has been progressively extended to a national security agenda since president Barack Obama took the office on January 2009. The results of frequency analysis of reports and speeches released by the U.S. political and military establishment and relevant strategic agencies illustrate that although military elites spoke on the issue of climate change earlier, political leaders has also increasingly began referring climate change as threat and/or risk to national security of the U.S. (see the list of documents in Appendix 2).

This analysis thus began by asking how climate change has been framed as an issue that needs to be elevated to a national security matter and whether it has been securitized or it operates through risk-based security logic. From the outset, it has considered that these questions only be comprehensively answered by discursively analyzing speech acts performed in political and defense context. The earlier debates on moving climate change from environmental and sustainability debate to the national security agenda shows that the forms climatic problems might take, albeit cannot be predicted in advance, are of great concern for homeland and national security due to their dire effects.

To begin with, the meaning of homeland security is redefined and framed in a way to emphasize hazardous impacts of climate change, and climatic disasters are named as new threats that are in need of immediate vigilance. The 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report of the U.S Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for example, highlighted deleterious effects of climate change:

[&]quot;We have learned as a nation that we must maintain a constant, capable, and vigilant posture to protect ourselves against new threats and evolving hazards...

Hurricane Katrina [is] an example of climatic threats ¹³² that are central to homeland security, requiring a wide variety of capabilities to address them."¹³³

This excerpt indicates that although climate change posed as a homeland security matter, it is not a direct threat, as the DHS does not treat climatic threats as a traditional enemy. In order to be able to call this attempt as securitization, however, hazardous events, such as Hurricane Katrina should have been targeted as an external threat that needs to be eliminated. What is also apparent in this example that the aim of the DHS is not to eliminate future disasters that might take different forms and cannot be predicted in advance.

Further investigation of the DHS's call to increase its capabilities to address climate change reveals that these capabilities also do not refer to non-political emergency measures. On the contrary, they operate within normal politics to ensure protection of people through improving critical "infrastructures, services, and emergency mechanism of the department."¹³⁴ In other words, the meaning of homeland security rearticulated in order to increase resilience for disasters that are uncertain. Thus, climate security discourse is framed here in line with risk-logic, and uncertain climatic threats are indicated by way of consequences of climate change that need to be governed and prepared for. Therefore, DHS's handling of unusual weather events cannot be named and/or explained as securitization.

The assumption that climate change has been securitized is also often based on military's increasing interest on the matter. Nonetheless, the analysis of the reports released by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) reveals that the military's use of

¹³² In the rest of this ananlysis 'key words' would be highlighted in the excerpts.

¹³³ Department of Homeland Security, "Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland," (2010), 7.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

language in order to frame climate change as a national security threat is similar to that of homeland security department's approach. In particular, the DoD refers climate change as a threat, but it is also concerned with dire impacts of the climatic events on its establishments and infrastructures. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, for example, specifically states that the climatic events put the operations of military under risk and the effects of climate change along with other threats, such as rising demand for energy resources, add the complexity of security environment and "exacerbate future conflicts."¹³⁵ Here the notion is that climate change could generate new problems and could exacerbate traditional threats. Thus, the DoD aims to prevent these conditions of conflict. In that sense, climate change is not a direct cause of conflict and/or a direct threat that calls for military's involvement in the climate-wars.

The specific attention has also given by military to address the challenge through adjusting its facilities' capability to consequences of climate change:

The DoD will need to adjust to the impacts of climate change on our facilities and military capabilities. The Department is developing policies and plans to manage the effects of climate change on its operating environment, missions, and facilities.¹³⁶

This and alike statements could also be observed in recent 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), in which the DoD refers to climate change's impacts on military's facilities:

The impacts of climate change may increase the frequency, scale, and complexity of future missions, including defense support to civil authorities, while at the same time undermining the capacity of our domestic installations to support training activities. Our actions to increase energy and water security, including investments in energy efficiency, new technologies, and renewable energy sources, will increase the resiliency of our installations and help mitigate these

¹³⁵ Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," (2010), 4.

¹³⁶ Ibid, 15.

effects.137

The 2014 QDR report thus adds to the notion that climate change is constructed through a risk-logic, as the term threat does not call for un-democratic emergency measures. The focus on mitigation also suggests that climate is not framed as a direct military threat, and the DoD favors the actions that tackle with causes and impacts of the climate change.

Although official documents published by the DoD emphasize complexity and indirectness of climatic threats, those who claim militarization of the climate discourse often refers to public speeches and congressional testimonies of high-ranked defense personnel, reports published by strategic institutions and retired military officials' speeches to point out how climate change was posed as an existential threat. Following is a passage from a recent speech of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter in which he is addressing security implications of climate change and whether Anthropogenic climate change pose an existential threat to survival of human civilization and military or not:

It [climate change] is a serious concern and real risk for the Department of Defense...Climate change does have strategic implications for us... And we're seeing climate change in the Arctic, for example... We don't have the luxury of choosing among these challenges. But we do have the ability to set a course for a future that's uncertain... Patterns of climate affect human security because they cause people to move and famines to occur and things like that have security implications... We don't have a whole lot of effect on it, but it does have an effect on us. We watch all that and try to adopt our military infrastructures.¹³⁸

This is a typical example of how dualism in logics of security plays out in current climate security debate in the U.S. The excerpt shows how climate change was framed as an existential threat; although the nature of threat is more direct here in terms of its

¹³⁷ Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," (2014), 6.

¹³⁸ Ash Carter, "Secretary of Defense Speech: Securing the Oceans, the Internet, and Space: Protecting the Domains that Drive Prosperity." (California: Department of Defense, 2016. Available online at: <u>http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/684118/remarks-on-securing-the-oceans-the-internet-and-space-protecting-the-domains-th</u>. [Accessed 10 May 2016].

consequences, the discourse follows logic of risk. Firstly, Carter speak of climate change as if it is a matter of an anticipatory strategic defense, but he then indicates that there is little that could be done to directly target these climatic threats. His stress on diverse effects of climate change on humans and military facilities also implies that climate change has not been taken as a single major enemy to be targeted by traditional military means. As risk-logic would suggest, there is also an uncertainty attached to climatic threats; hence, it recommends adaptation that follows a precautionary logic. Risks posed by climate change, in that sense, are a matter of governance.

How the department frames climatic risks as governable issue becomes clearer in another speech act performed by Carter in which he highlights the importance of U.S.-Philippines partnership on climate change and explicates what he means by adopting effects of climate change. Below is a summary of the Carter's speech released by the Canter for Climate and Security:

The U.S.-Philippines partnership needs to include measures to ensure preparedness for some of the more damaging effects of climate change, including sea level rise. The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Philippines already includes work relevant to preparing for the changing climate, including the humanitarian assistance/disaster relief elements.¹³⁹

What has proposed here to respond climate change is preparedness through means such as disaster relief that are not non-democratic emergency measures. In fact, reference to bilateral agreements implies that climate change is contemplated as an opportunity for cooperation. These solutions would unquestionably encounter with securitization's existential threat based logic that would suggests emergency measures to be taken outside

¹³⁹ Christine Parthamore. "Enhancing U.S. –Philiphinnes Defense Cooperation in a Changing Climate." *The Center for Climate and Security*. (2015) Available online at: <u>https://climateandsecurity.org/2016/04/15/enhancing-u-s-philippines-defense-cooperation-in-a-changing-climate/</u>. [Accssed on 29 May 2016].

of outside of normal politics.

The examination of this particular climate security speech act from a broader international context, current hostile strategic environment in South China Sea, hints to a possibility that sea level rise in the region might be prevented before it causes tensions through increasing military readiness, resilience of local infrastructure and assistance to those people most vulnerable to effects of prospected catastrophes. In that regard, the effects of climate change are treated as an effective governance issue. The fact that political cooperation has been proposed as a solution to climate change hence also shows that the discourse is exempted from secrecy and un-political procedures foreseen by securitization.

One of the most cited examples to support the claim that climate change is securitized mentions the parallels drawn between water-food-energy nexus and climate conflicts in Centre for Naval Analysis's (CNA) reports. The latest report of CNA elucidates how national security risks were accelerated by climate change and indicates that climate change poses a risk that is as serious as transnational terrorism, and "the projected impacts of climate change are more than threat multipliers; they serve as catalysts for instability and conflict."¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, in case of terrorism the nature of threat and available options to tackle with it are more explicit than climatic threats. The metaphor that is made between climate and terrorism and prophesizing of a gloomy future-catastrophe cannot prove that climate is being securitized. The CNA's report essentially differentiates between traditional threats and risks when it states "climatic risks to the U.S. national security cannot be predicted beforehand".¹⁴¹ In other words, climatic risks are uncertain

 ¹⁴⁰ CNA Military Advisory Board, "National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change,"
 i.
 ¹⁴¹ Ibid, 1-4.

and cannot be combatted.

An alternative to military solution that the CNA advocates is "guarding against a failure of imagination."¹⁴² Its interest in identifying climatic risks implies that CNA promotes a deeper understanding of climatic challenges as a prime solution to tackle with climatic threats. In this way, it aims to ensure that the U.S.'s is prepared for worst-case scenarios. Noticeable in this discourse, despite the presence of traditional anticipatory defense logic in initial framing of climate as an existential threat, the uncertainty attached climate change necessitates precautionary logic of risk. The report also states that "the potential security ramifications of global climate change should be serving as catalysts for cooperation and change", which echoes the notion disseminated by DoD.¹⁴³ The defense sector's approach to climate change reaffirms that the climate security discourse in the U.S. military is framed within normal political environment, and the military favors pre-emptive adaptation and management, and planning measures.

In addition, it is also important to investigate how the issue is represented in political statements in order to understand whether military and politics are acting synergetically to construct climate security discourse in the U.S. In last few years president Obama has delivered a number of speeches touching upon this issue. The president has referred climate change as a national security threat and called for fight against climate change. The 2013 Climate Action Plan sheds light on what Obama's fight against climate change actually refers to.¹⁴⁴ Firstly, the climate action plan reveals that what is targeted is impacts of climatic events that are both urgent and uncertain, and this uncertainty could be reduced

¹⁴² Ibid, 2.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ White House, "The President's Climate Action Plan," (2013). Available online at: <u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf</u>. [Accssed on 30 May 2016].

through precautionary measures that increase the resilience of entities that are prone to be

harmed:

And we'll also open NASA climate imagery to the public, to make sure that cities and states assess risk under different climate scenarios, so that we don't waste money by building structures that don't withstand the next storm... We know that the costs of these events can be measured in lost lives and lost livelihoods, lost homes, lost businesses, hundreds of billions of dollars in emergency services and disaster relief. In fact, those who are already feeling the effects of climate change don't have time to deny it -- they're busy dealing with it.¹⁴⁵

The action plan also explicitly emphasizes that solution is not a military response but to

establish an international cooperation to halt root causes of the problem such as reducing

GHG emissions:

The climate action plan is a plan to protect our country from the impacts of climate change... We have intensified our climate cooperation with major emerging economies... Through our Climate Action Plan and related executive actions, we aim go further with a goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 26 to 28 percent of 2005 levels by 2025.¹⁴⁶

Albeit climate change is framed as urgent and real threat, what is recommended as a solution, averting its impacts via long-term plans (reducing GHG emission) and international cooperation, once again supports the notion that climate change operates via risk-security logic.

Furthermore, recently, climate change is placed into a list of top-notch national security threats, such as terrorism and fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which led to regeneration of the notion of climate securitization.¹⁴⁷ However, closer look at this discourse displays that the White House's prioritization of the climate

CEU eTD Collection

¹⁴⁵ White House, "Remarks by the President on Climate Change." (2013). Available online at: <u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-change</u>. [Accssed on 30 May 2016].

¹⁴⁶ White House, "U.S. National Security Strategy," (2015), 12. ¹⁴⁷ "U.S. National Security Strategy,"1.

change as national security matter does not follow threat-based security logic. The 2015 National Security report states that the purpose of moving climate change to national security scheme is to promote "concerted actions to confront the dangers posed by climate change." ¹⁴⁸ In particular, climate security has been linked to strengthening of the energy security, and promoting efforts to reduce GHG emissions in international arena. In that sense, solution to climate change threat points at necessity of cooperation among states to move towards a more sustainable future, which ultimately indicates that climatic risks is perceived as governable.

To sum up, above the examination of the primary examples of the climate change discourse in the U.S. shows that both military and politico establishments frame the discourse through risk security logic and perceives climatic problems as governable. The conceptualization of climate security discourse as climate securitization undermines these new sets of rules attached to the current climate security discourse. As the climate security debate is already constructed within normal politics moving the issue back to normal politics, de-securitization, losses its validity. However, the new strategies to tackle with climate change might also raise implications. Thus, they will be examined in the next section.

4.3. Emerging Trends in Climate Security Discourse

The reactions to climate change cannot be rendered to draconian emergency-measures as the discourse of climate security is framed based on risk-security logic. As shown above, the current climate change debate points at a new trend of governance of climate change via adaptation and risk management strategies in a non-securitized space. The

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

absence of non-emergency measures, however, does not mean that these strategies unproblematic. There are different purposes attached to the adaptation, planning, and management strategies, and that there is no monopolization of solutions. As seen in the above examples, for Pentagon, cooperation and resilience is predominantly about preventing tensions that might arise due to climate induced catastrophes, whereas in political discussion, cooperation is often associated with addressing a root of causes of climatic risks through a substantial green international energy policy. This diversity in responses to climate change indicates that the new strategies to deal with key climatic risks must also be analyzed for their goals, and that they cannot be left unchallenged.

The overview of the discourse reveals that adaptation measures promoted by the U.S. Department of Defense often aim to provide short-term crisis response and relief strategies. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hegel's remark on the department's adaptation strategies to climate change illustrates this point:

By taking a proactive...approach to adaptation, the Defense Department will keep pace with a changing climate, minimize its impacts on our missions, and continue to protect our national security. We are studying the implications of increased demand for our National Guard in the aftermath of extreme weather events."¹⁴⁹

Likewise, the U.S Marine Corps Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Joseph F. Dunford states that "the security environment changes and threats change, but what won't change is our role as the nation's crises response force of choice."¹⁵⁰ The military aims to employ adaptation measures, such as "humanitarian assistance and disaster relief overseas," to increase its ability to respond immediate consequences of extreme whether events. ¹⁵¹One of the problems

¹⁴⁹ John D. Banusiewicz, "Hagel to Address 'Threat Multiplier' of Climate Change," *The US DoD News, Defense Media Activity* (2014).

¹⁵⁰ Dunford, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," *The US Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard* (2015): 9.

¹⁵¹ DoD, "2014 Climate Change Adoptation Roadmap," *The US Department of Defense* (2014): 4-5.

attached to adaptation measures thus they do not respond to root causes of the risk as they simply aim to keep the harm caused by risk of climatic catastrophes at a reasonable level. However, responding the sources of climatic problems is an essential part of constructing a radical climate security agenda.

Additionally, the Department of Defense promotes risk-management strategies that include planning for possible implications of climate change through identifying how it might effect the U.S. military operations and facilities. In that sense risk management strategies includes activities such as improving military infrastructures' resiliency and reducing energy dependency of military through smarter energy investments. However, the dominant discourse where risk management strategies advocated is linked to in which ways that climate change might de-stabilize security environment; in particular risk-management is linked to climate conflicts. Both the U.S. Navy and the new adaptation roadmap point out that climate change might enhance disasters that "disproportionally affect island-states, which may trigger social instability."¹⁵² Specifically, the DoD highlights that "the impacts of climate change may cause instability by impairing access to food and water, damaging infrastructure, spreading disease, uprooting and displacing large numbers of people, compelling mass migration...¹⁵³ Thus, for the DoD, the goal of promoting risk-management strategies is to maintain stability through long-term planning, increasing the U.S. military's preparedness, enhancing peace-building and cooperation with fragile states. In other words, it aims to tackle with root causes of the future conflicts through strengthening governance of the climate security problems. Nevertheless, the goal of stabilization has two-sides, and on the other side of the coin, stabilization could mean exacerbating strategic short-term adaptation mechanism in response to inconsequential

¹⁵² The US Navy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," (2015).

¹⁵³ DoD, "2014 Climate Change Adoptation Roadmap," 4.

conditions of risk and increasing military presence in overseas, which ultimately could serve moving the climate change discourse to a securitized-space.

The risk-management strategies are also noticeable in political statements. They include policies that could aid increasing resiliency of public and private infrastructures, monetary, humanitarian and social insurance assistance before and aftermath of catastrophes. These strategies thus aims to enhance capabilities of the relevant federal agencies, primarily Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Federal Flood Risk Management Standard (FFRMS) as well as Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense, to address climatic challenges. In an executive order addressing risk reduction and resilience to climatic catastrophes, floods in particular, the importance of building long-lasting and resilient infrastructures, and planning ahead to prevent wasting of government resources are articulated as follows:

As part of a national policy on resilience and risk reduction consistent with my Climate Action Plan, the National Security Council staff coordinated an interagency effort to create a new flood risk reduction standard for federally funded projects. Incorporating this Standard will ensure that agencies expand management from the current base flood level to a higher vertical elevation and corresponding horizontal floodplain to address current and future flood risk and ensure that projects funded with taxpayer dollars last as long as intended.¹⁵⁴

The prevalent focus of risk management strategies, however, is on reducing CO2 emissions and investment in sustainable and clean energy resources. Thus, the risk management strategies supported by the government are concerned with preventing long-term consequences of climate change. Following Paris Agreement, president Obama's remarks on this historical deal, for instance, point out importance of cooperation and American leadership on reducing GHG, and

¹⁵⁴ The White House, "Executive Order – Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input," *The White House* (2015). Available online at: <u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/30/executive-order-establishing-federal-flood-risk-management-standard-and-</u> [Accessed on 1 May 2016].

that the U.S. must pursuit a clean power plan to prevent security impacts of climate change, including its effects on the health of future generations.¹⁵⁵ In that sense, risk management strategies prompted by politics aim to deal with the root causes of the problem, and specifically emphasize human security implications of climate change.

On the whole, this brief assessment of the new strategies indicates that although both adaptation and risk-management strategies are essential to tackle with security implications of climate change, risk management strategies often offers a long-term approach to climate security whereby they could better assist preventing aggravation of the phenomena. Therefore, as it is suggested in the methodology section, one way to investigate the path of current climate security discourse is to examine overall distribution of the precautionary adaptation and management strategies in the climate security discourse. Are these new adaptation and riskmanagement strategies evenly distributed in the climate security discourse?

An unexhausted overview of the discourse illustrates that over the last three years longterm risk-management strategies are increasingly favored in politics. The quantitative content analysis of the references to risk-management strategies within official documents also shows a consistently upward trend. Accordingly, the White House has initiated a series of sturdy actions focusing particularly on energy efficiency in the year of 2015 alone. Most prominent among them are a plan to cut methane emissions by 40-45 percent by 2025,¹⁵⁶ a new bilateral climate agreements¹⁵⁷, expansion of existing clean energy research, and an executive order targeting federal agencies to reduce their GHG emissions

¹⁵⁵ House, "Climate Change and President Obama's Action Plan," ibid. Available online at: <u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change</u>. [Accessed on 1 May 2016]. ; "Fact Sheet: Obama Administration Announces Actions to Protect Communities from the Health Impacts of Climate Change at White House Summit," *The White House* (2015).

¹⁵⁶ "Executive Order -- Planning for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade," *The White House* (2015). ¹⁵⁷ "Fact Sheet: U.S. And India Climate and Clean Energy Cooperation," *The White House* (2015). Available online at: <u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/fact-sheet-us-and-india-climate-and-clean-energy-cooperation</u>. [Accessed on 1 June 2016].

by 40 percent by 2025.¹⁵⁸ The latest executive order of president Obama, which aims to reduce GHG emissions, also calls DoD to strengthen its alternative energy programs, requesting from DoD to "fulfill the requirements for DoD goals amended in National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010."¹⁵⁹

Although references to short-term adaptation strategies and military's role as a crisis respondent are widespread within the documents released by the DoD, long-term planning and risk management strategies dominates the climate security discourse in defense sector. In particular, military's risk management approach is predominantly linked to long-term stabilization and conflict prevention strategies. However, in 2014, Secretary Hegel defined military's response strategies to climate changes during Halifax International Secretary Forum and stated:

We know that climate change is taking place; we are assessing our coastal instillations to help ensure they will be resilient to its effects. Planning for climate change and smarter energy investments not only make us a stronger military, they have many additional benefits-saving us money, reducing demand, and helping protect the environment. These initiatives all support president Obama's Climate Action Plan.¹⁶⁰

By linking risk management strategies and sustainability of energy resources, this statement imply that the defense sector is following the initiative set by politics. Accordingly, the speech acts that are performed by the defense authorities emphasize the importance of green energy investments in recent years. Nevertheless, the weight of greening the military as a risk-management strategy in the documents released by defense sectors is still minimal in comparison to above-noted forms of risk management methods.

¹⁵⁸ "Executive Order -- Planning for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade."

¹⁵⁹ The White ibid. Available online: <u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/19/executive-order-planning-federal-sustainability-next-decade</u>. [Accessed on 1 June 2016].

¹⁶⁰ DoD, "2014 Climate Change Adoptation Roadmap," 4.

From the outset; it could be observed that both strategies of management and adaptation are implemented in response to climate change in the U.S., with the risk-management strategies becoming more widespread in the last years. Thus, overall pattern illustrates a relatively balanced distribution of these strategies in political and military establishments. Therefore, it would be accurate to claim that the climate security discourse operates within the realm of normal politics and that climate change is handled as a governance matter.

CONCLUSION

There are two major conclusions to be drawn from this thesis' analysis of the contemporary climate security debate in the U.S. To start with how the climate change is constructed as a security matter, the findings of the study illustrate that the early interest of military in the climate security discourse is gradually emulated within political debates. Today, many high-pitch speech acts on the issue could be observed in the U.S. politics. However, this is not an indication of climate securitization and militarization. The DoD has a great impact on politics. But, the analysis reveals that its influence on politics is not due to its artillery power; rather, it affects the climate security discourse by its traditional strategic planning and precautionary capability on forecasting climatic risks. Likewise, in political sector, despite the increasing utterance of climate change as an urgent threat, and

even existential threat, number of non-emergency regulations promoted to tackle with the consequences of risks associated with climate change shows that climate change is undertaken as a governance matter. Hence, this indicates that speaking loudly on the issue and referring climate change as an existential threat do not automatically cause climate securitization. States that are most vulnerable to its dire impacts, for instance, do not open war against the U.S. because it did not reduce its carbon emission significantly. This proves that climate security discourse is not framed as a direct threat that needs to be confronted via violent means. Rather, it is part of a complex mesh of global problems that require international cooperation, not war. In that regard, findings of the analysis support one of the main assumptions of the thesis that current climate security debate is constructed based on a set of rules that fits into risk-based security logic, and CS's securitization framework cannot have supremacy over explaining climate security discourse.

Furthermore, the results of this study points out that CS's emergency measures namely are substituted by adaptation and risk-management strategies. Both of these strategies function in the normal politics hence they render the value of de-securitization as a method of checking the discourse. Many scholars, such as Trombetta, argue that in the context of climate change securitization transforms, and non-emergency measures are produced. This non-securitized space is then considered to be unproblematic. This may or may not be true, but it is hypothesized in this thesis that the discourse could only be thoroughly analyzed, if the possibility that new measures to tackle with risk posed by climate change might not be un-problematic is taken into consideration.

Consequently, this thesis supplemented riskification theory with a new criteria (see chapter 3) to assess implications that might be enclosed in non-emergency measures. The analysis of the climate security discourse in the U.S under the light of this modified risk-

security framework displays; in last years, primarily long-term risk-management strategies to address root causes of climate change are implemented in the U.S. politics. Riskmanagement strategies are also favored in defense sector. The examination of the overall weight of precautionary measures in the climate security discourse in the U.S. illustrates that political and military leaders are concerned with both improving the U.S.'s response to immediate challenges (adaptation strategies) and tackling with root causes of climate change (risk-management strategies).

However, this analysis suggests that military's approach to climate change needs to be cautiously observed in the upcoming decades. In particular, the distribution of riskmanagement strategies in the current debate reveals that the U.S. military predominantly implements risk-management strategies to prevent future conflicts. This could be problematic because if the military continues to mainly focus on stabilization of the risk of climatic conflict, it is likely to undermine the political demand for improving its energy efficiency, and in this way it may even move the discourse into a securitized space.

The DoD highlights its interest in greening the U.S. military, but in order to reach aforementioned energy efficiency goals, it needs to considerably minimize its military operations that are one of the major sources of the U.S.'s contribution to GHG emission globally. Nevertheless, the DoD's current drive to stabilize climatic conflicts means that it may need to launch more missions overseas in the future. The results of this study thus indicate that the following questions need to be investigated in the future research: What are the characteristics of energy efficiency programs adopted by the U.S. military? How and/or in which ways progress of military in terms of greening its military could be a key factor in defining the future of climate security discourse in the U.S. in the upcoming decades?

Appendix 1

Figure 1. Upward trends in weather related loss events per-continent between the years of 1980

and 2011



Source: (Munich Re 2012)

The figure above illustrates the trends in weather-related loss across global continents over 30 Years. The top blue line shows the trend for North America that displays a rise higher than for any of the other continents.

Figure 2. Major International Environmental Agreements, Reports and Conferences between 1960 and 2016

1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in	1987 World Commission on Environment and		
the Atmosphere in Outer Space and Under Water	Development Report		
1971 London Convention on the Prevention of	1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate		
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and	Change (Rio de Janerio Conference)		
Other Matter			
	1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Treaty		
1971 Convention for the Protection of the World			
Cultural Natural Heritage	1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations		
	Framework Convention on Climate Change		
1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment			
	2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent		
1973 Convention on International Trade in	Organic Pollutants		
Engendered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora			
	2005 UN Framework Convention on Climate		
1979 Convention on Long-Range Trans-	Change (Montreal Action Plan)		
boundary Air Pollution			
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea	2009 UN Framework Convention on Climate		
	Change (Copenhagen Climate Summit)		
1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement			
	2015 UN Framework Convention on Climate		
198/ Montreal Protocol on Substances that	Change (Paris Agreement)		
Depiete Ozone Layer	2016 Down Climate Talks		
1097 LINI Drutland Depart	2010 Donn Chimate Talks		
1987 UN Brutiand Report			

The figure above illustrates the list of international agreements, reports, conferences and summits that are assisted to development of the concept of environmental and climate security

Appendix 2

List of Documents¹⁶¹

1. THE WHITE HOUSE

Strategic Reports and Roadmaps (SRR)

2015. "Findings from Select Federal Reports: National Security Implications of a Changing Climate Change." Available online at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/National Security_Implications_of_Changing_Climate_Final_051915.pdf . [Accessed on 13 May 2016]

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¹⁶¹ The documents are listed based on their ccontemporariness. The primary databases used to obtain documents examined in this research are National Security Stategy Archieve and National Archieve Catalog. Available at: <u>http://nssarchive.us/</u> and <u>http://www.archives.gov/research/catalog/</u>.

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